"The pilots of an Air France jet that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean two years
ago apparently became distracted with faulty airspeed indicators and failed to
properly deal with other vital systems, including adjusting engine thrust,
according to people familiar with preliminary findings from the plane's
recorders."

"The final moments inside the cockpit of the twin-engine Airbus A330, these
people said, indicate the pilots seemingly were confused by alarms they received
from various automated flight-control systems as the plane passed through some
turbulence typical on the route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris. They also faced
unexpectedly heavy icing at 35,000 feet. Such icing is renowned for making
airspeed-indicators and other external sensors unreliable."



Entire article at:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304066504576341631579541512.html?m od=dist_smartbrief



Vaughn

"vaughn" > wrote:

> "The pilots of an Air France jet that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean
> two years ago apparently became distracted with faulty airspeed
> indicators and failed to properly deal with other vital systems,
> including adjusting engine thrust, according to people familiar with
> preliminary findings from the plane's recorders."

An unfortunate rush to judgement on the part of the media. The aircraft
appears to have had major systems fail, and the pilot is blamed for not
being able to deal with it. There is even some question that Air France
trains the pilots on how to handle such problems.

Maybe system failure or inadequate training is more to blame, and the
pilots were simply the victims?

James Robinson writes:

> Maybe system failure or inadequate training is more to blame, and the
> pilots were simply the victims?

At Airbus, pilots are always at fault by definition, no matter who or what was
actually at fault. Remember Habsheim.

In article >,
James Robinson > wrote:

> "vaughn" > wrote:
>
> > "The pilots of an Air France jet that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean
> > two years ago apparently became distracted with faulty airspeed
> > indicators and failed to properly deal with other vital systems,
> > including adjusting engine thrust, according to people familiar with
> > preliminary findings from the plane's recorders."
>
> An unfortunate rush to judgement on the part of the media. The aircraft
> appears to have had major systems fail, and the pilot is blamed for not
> being able to deal with it. There is even some question that Air France
> trains the pilots on how to handle such problems.
>
> Maybe system failure or inadequate training is more to blame, and the
> pilots were simply the victims?

Scuttlebutt is that a Northwest crew faced a similar problem (in an
Airbus) but reverted to basics and flew the airplane, rather than try to
figure out the automated stuff. A good friend used to fly Airbusses for
American, but he did not LIKE them! He would rather fly Boeings.

James Robinson > wrote:
> "vaughn" > wrote:
>
>> "The pilots of an Air France jet that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean
>> two years ago apparently became distracted with faulty airspeed
>> indicators and failed to properly deal with other vital systems,
>> including adjusting engine thrust, according to people familiar with
>> preliminary findings from the plane's recorders."
>
> An unfortunate rush to judgement on the part of the media. The aircraft
> appears to have had major systems fail, and the pilot is blamed for not
> being able to deal with it. There is even some question that Air France
> trains the pilots on how to handle such problems.
>
> Maybe system failure or inadequate training is more to blame, and the
> pilots were simply the victims?
>

The PBS NOVA TV series aired an episode in February that attempted to apply
accident forensics on the facts then known. This being nearly two years
after the crash, with the not unreasonable assumption that the recorders
would never be recovered, they could not be accused of leaping to
conclusions.

If the preliminary indications from the recorders are as claimed, then it
appears the NOVA experts did a remarkable job in determining the most
probable accident sequence sans recorder data.

The NOVA show can be viewed online here (I thought it well done for its
target audience):

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/space/crash-flight-447.html

Mxsmanic > wrote:

> James Robinson writes:
>
>> Maybe system failure or inadequate training is more to blame, and the
>> pilots were simply the victims?
>
> At Airbus, pilots are always at fault by definition, no matter who or
> what was actually at fault. Remember Habsheim.

Ignoring much of the controvery over the investigaion, the pilot at
Habsheim should get a major chunk of the blame. Anyone who chose to risk
an aircraft, full of passengers, at the limits of its capability, during an
unpracticed demonstration, over an airfield he was unfamiliar with, should
have his head examined.

James Robinson writes:

> Ignoring much of the controvery over the investigaion, the pilot at
> Habsheim should get a major chunk of the blame. Anyone who chose to risk
> an aircraft, full of passengers, at the limits of its capability, during an
> unpracticed demonstration, over an airfield he was unfamiliar with, should
> have his head examined.

Any combination of Airbus and Air France is hazardous, because Airbus doesn't
like to admit when its planes have defects, and Air France pilots are cowboys
who greatly overestimate their skills and don't like to do things the safe
way.

Orval Fairbairn > wrote:

> In article >,
> James Robinson > wrote:
>
>> "vaughn" > wrote:
>>
>> > "The pilots of an Air France jet that crashed into the Atlantic
>> > Ocean two years ago apparently became distracted with faulty
>> > airspeed indicators and failed to properly deal with other vital
>> > systems, including adjusting engine thrust, according to people
>> > familiar with preliminary findings from the plane's recorders."
>>
>> An unfortunate rush to judgement on the part of the media. The
>> aircraft appears to have had major systems fail, and the pilot is
>> blamed for not being able to deal with it. There is even some
>> question that Air France trains the pilots on how to handle such
>> problems.
>>
>> Maybe system failure or inadequate training is more to blame, and the
>> pilots were simply the victims?
>
> Scuttlebutt is that a Northwest crew faced a similar problem (in an
> Airbus) but reverted to basics and flew the airplane, rather than try
> to figure out the automated stuff. A good friend used to fly Airbusses
> for American, but he did not LIKE them! He would rather fly Boeings.

There have been similar incidents in other Airbuses and Boeings (777)
where the pilots managed to keep control of the aircraft. What was the
difference this time? Was it inadequate training, confusing cockpit
alarms and displays, the lack of outside visual references? Blaming it
entirely on the crew at this early stage is premature.

As for preference, it's a little like people's views about Ford or Chevy.
There really isn't that much difference between them, but there are
passionate defenders of both brands. There are many pilots who fly both
brands who prefer Airbus. The relative safety records for thousands of
aircraft of both types are quite similar, so there is no systemic reason
to complain about one over the other.

Mxsmanic > wrote:

> James Robinson writes:
>
>> Ignoring much of the controvery over the investigaion, the pilot at
>> Habsheim should get a major chunk of the blame. Anyone who chose to
>> risk an aircraft, full of passengers, at the limits of its
>> capability, during an unpracticed demonstration, over an airfield he
>> was unfamiliar with, should have his head examined.
>
> Any combination of Airbus and Air France is hazardous, because Airbus
> doesn't like to admit when its planes have defects, and Air France
> pilots are cowboys who greatly overestimate their skills and don't
> like to do things the safe way.

Airbus' overall safety record is just as good as Boeing's, so your rants
are misdirected.

Air France, on the other hand, seems to have emerging culture problems that
I thought they had shaken after their spate of accidents in the 1960s.
Their safety group has to be under a management microscope with all their
recent problems. Korean Air seems to have sorted their problems out, no
reason Air France can't.

"Orval Fairbairn" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> James Robinson > wrote:
>
>> "vaughn" > wrote:
>>
>> > "The pilots of an Air France jet that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean
>> > two years ago apparently became distracted with faulty airspeed
>> > indicators and failed to properly deal with other vital systems,
>> > including adjusting engine thrust, according to people familiar with
>> > preliminary findings from the plane's recorders."
>>
>> An unfortunate rush to judgement on the part of the media. The aircraft
>> appears to have had major systems fail, and the pilot is blamed for not
>> being able to deal with it. There is even some question that Air France
>> trains the pilots on how to handle such problems.
>>
>> Maybe system failure or inadequate training is more to blame, and the
>> pilots were simply the victims?
>
> Scuttlebutt is that a Northwest crew faced a similar problem (in an
> Airbus) but reverted to basics and flew the airplane, rather than try to
> figure out the automated stuff. A good friend used to fly Airbusses for
> American, but he did not LIKE them! He would rather fly Boeings.

Automation has some opportunity to make things better or worse. Take
auto-throttles. Most commercial jets have some sort of automatic
throttling - change a setting and the throttles adjust. In a Boeing, you
adjust the setting and the throttle levers actually move. It makes it easy
for the pilot to do a quick scan or feel for verification or in unusual ops.
In an Airbus, on the other hand, the engineers seem to think that the pilot
is a redundant component in the cockpit and doesn't need any feedback -
auto-throttle DOES NOT move the throttle levers when they're adjusted. The
Airbus thinking seems to be that the computer is always right so don't argue
with it. There's a LOT more that makes Airbus less than a treat to fly.

If it ain't Boeing, I ain't going.

"Robert Barker" > wrote:
> And to protect Airbus, they'll call it "pilot error".

Based on what I've read, that is most likely the case. As I understand it,
this isn't the first time the pitot tubes have iced up on an Airbus and the
pilot has had to fly manually. This is just the first time a pilot has
failed to resort to book procedure all the way to impact.

From what I've read, if the speed readings don't make sense, the book
procedure calls for the pilot to set a specific thrust and elevator
setting. It sounds like the junior pilot did not follow the book procedure.

> Impartial
> analysis will probably show the pilots had their hands full trying to
> turn off all the automation so they could actually fly the stupid
> thing.

As I understand it, the autopilot released control to the pilot once the
speed readings on the pitot dropped below a threshold point, so there was
no automation to turn off - it was already off.

"Robert Barker" > wrote:
>
> "Edward A. Falk" > wrote:
>>
>> Robert Barker > wrote:
>>>
>>> Airbus thinking seems to be that the computer is always right so
>>> don't argue with it. There's a LOT more that makes Airbus less than
>>> a treat to fly.
>>
>> There's a saying that on an Airbus, the autopilot outranks the
>> captain.
>
> And to protect Airbus, they'll call it "pilot error". Impartial
> analysis will probably show the pilots had their hands full trying to
> turn off all the automation so they could actually fly the stupid
> thing.

No, the system switched to alternate law all by itself when the speed
signals went screwy, and there was no need to shut off the automation. In
this mode, it is like flying any direct fly aircraft, but without stall
protection. It still maintains some protecton against overstressing the
airframe. Automation didn't initiate the climb, which is what doomed the
flight, it was the pilot input that did that, resulting in the upset.

On the surface, the pilot lost control of a perfectly flyable airplane,
which was in stable flight before he took control. However, part of the
investigation certainly has to be why the pilot flying didn't put the
nose down as a reaction to repeated stall warnings. This is something
any pilot learns when first starting to fly, and should be a natural
reaction when hearing the alarm. Was he overwhelmed by all the alarms and
missed the stall warning? Did he think he was correcting for wind shear
or some other problem?

The pilot of the Colgan Air flight approaching Buffalo did the same
thing, and some studies suggest that when surprised, the majority of
pilots will try to pull the nose up when they hear a stall warning, which
is exactly the wrong thing to do. Is it just human nature to pull back
on the controls, thinking you want to stay away from the ground, rather
than point the aircraft at the ground to recover?

Further, why did he never figure out that he was in a stall and take
appropriate action? Beyond the alarms, the lack of wind noise past the
cockpit should have been an obvious clue, yet only once did he try
putting the nose down, and only then for a short time.

That said, there have been a number of other times on both Boeing and
Airbus aircraft where the pitots froze up in similar conditions, and the
pilots were easily able to maintain control without the need for
aggressive control inputs. Why was it different this time?

James Robinson writes:

> The pilot of the Colgan Air flight approaching Buffalo did the same
> thing, and some studies suggest that when surprised, the majority of
> pilots will try to pull the nose up when they hear a stall warning, which
> is exactly the wrong thing to do. Is it just human nature to pull back
> on the controls, thinking you want to stay away from the ground, rather
> than point the aircraft at the ground to recover?

Yes, I think so. The number of pilots who do this, even with long experience
and extensive training that is supposed to prevent them from doing it, implies
that it has some sort of instinctive component. Perhaps in much the same way
that a person will reach out to catch a falling coffee pot, even though he
knows very well that the coffee pot is extremely hot and will burn his hands
badly if he just grabs it.

> Further, why did he never figure out that he was in a stall and take
> appropriate action? Beyond the alarms, the lack of wind noise past the
> cockpit should have been an obvious clue, yet only once did he try
> putting the nose down, and only then for a short time.

Perhaps all the other alarms distracted him. Apparently a lot of things were
going wrong.

> That said, there have been a number of other times on both Boeing and
> Airbus aircraft where the pitots froze up in similar conditions, and the
> pilots were easily able to maintain control without the need for
> aggressive control inputs. Why was it different this time?

Sensory overload and no prior experience in the same type of situation,
perhaps.

Jim Logajan > wrote:

> The PBS NOVA TV series aired an episode in February that attempted to
> apply accident forensics on the facts then known. This being nearly
> two years after the crash, with the not unreasonable assumption that
> the recorders would never be recovered, they could not be accused of
> leaping to conclusions.
>
> If the preliminary indications from the recorders are as claimed, then
> it appears the NOVA experts did a remarkable job in determining the
> most probable accident sequence sans recorder data.
>
> The NOVA show can be viewed online here (I thought it well done for
> its target audience):
>
> http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/space/crash-flight-447.html

A professional airline pilot writing on another blog doesn't agree with
its quality:

"Nova tried to explain the events leading up to the crash. I'll address
only the Wx radar here.

Their expert, from NCAR part of NOAA, said the Wx radar on AF447 had only
50 mile range. Strike one. It's 320 miles, if the storm is dense enough
to matter.

Nova showed a small/medium sized cell in the plane's track toward the
major line of storm. Nova said the small cell would obscure the radar
view of the major storm, causing them to stumble into it.

Poppycock/BS/Hogwash! The Wx radar on 447 returns were calibrated for
rainfall intensity. When the intensity of return is high, an algorithm
called "Path Attenuation Compensation" kicks in to assure calibrated
display. When the storm is too intense for penetration without reserve to
see the full picture of the "storm behind the storm," the Wx radar puts
up a yellow band, called PAC Alert, at the outer range ring of the
display.

I have great respect for Public Broadcasting in the US, but this program
failed miserably. I wonder if major sponsor, billionaire David H. Koch,
didn't have too much editorial input?
--------

PS: Why did they choose to interview a radar guy unfamiliar with that
specific airborne Wx radar? The least the guy could have done would be to
study the Pilot's Guide in NCAR's own C-130, which is operationally just
like the WX radar that was in AF447."

On 2011-05-29, James Robinson > wrote:
> No, the system switched to alternate law all by itself when the speed
> signals went screwy, and there was no need to shut off the automation.

Indeed.

> On the surface, the pilot lost control of a perfectly flyable airplane,
> which was in stable flight before he took control. However, part of the
> investigation certainly has to be why the pilot flying didn't put the
> nose down as a reaction to repeated stall warnings. This is something
> any pilot learns when first starting to fly, and should be a natural
> reaction when hearing the alarm. Was he overwhelmed by all the alarms and
> missed the stall warning? Did he think he was correcting for wind shear
> or some other problem?

Like any crash, there is a chain of events. There could be user interface
issues (a famous example of this was the Three Mile Island incident,
a famous aviation related incident of bad user interface being a
contributory cause of a crash was the Boeing 737 that crashed near
Kegworth in England after the crew shut down the wrong engine).
There could be training issues. I'm certainly not going to condemn
a crew even though on the obvious face of it, it may look like pilot
error. There is likely to be plenty of contributory factors.

> The pilot of the Colgan Air flight approaching Buffalo did the same
> thing, and some studies suggest that when surprised, the majority of
> pilots will try to pull the nose up when they hear a stall warning, which
> is exactly the wrong thing to do.

I think in the case of Colgan Air, the recent emphasis on icing related
tailplane stalls (recovery procedure the opposite of main wing stall)
may have been a contributory cause. Similarly, perhaps the high emphasis
on windshear recovery (which when all the automation in a modern airliner
be it Boeing or Airbus is to do a maximum performance climb, which may
not work as expected if the automation is turned off and the crew are
too busy to remember that stall protection has gone away). These
aren't the first times either, long before automation was a factor
a crew crashed a Hawker Siddeley Trident 3 (an airliner superficially
similar to a Boeing 727, 3 engines and T-tail) near London by getting it into
a deep stall. After inadvertently retracting the leading edge devices,
the crew deliberately deactivated the stick shaker and pusher while
pulling up, getting the aircraft into a deep stall from which it was
impossible to recover. Why? There had been recent incidents of false
stick shaker activations, the weather was not great, the captain had
an undiagnosed heart condition which may have started to cause him some
pain thus fogging his judgement, there were industrial relations problems
(with the captain on one side of the argument and the rest of the crew
on the other), and the first officer was timid about challenging the
captain's decision to keep pulling back on the stick because he had
recently been reprimanded for challenging a captain. So the captain
assumed it was a false activation of the stick shaker and turned off
the stick shaker and stick pusher, and stalled it.

> Is it just human nature to pull back
> on the controls, thinking you want to stay away from the ground, rather
> than point the aircraft at the ground to recover?

And how often is stall avoidance/recovery trained for in an airline
setting?

On 2011-05-26, James Robinson > wrote:
> Mxsmanic > wrote:
>> At Airbus, pilots are always at fault by definition, no matter who or
>> what was actually at fault. Remember Habsheim.
>
> Ignoring much of the controvery over the investigaion, the pilot at
> Habsheim should get a major chunk of the blame.

The aircraft also actually performed slightly better than book figures.
The aircraft was put in a situation from which it would be impossible
to get away without hitting those trees, whether it was fly by wire
or fly by steel cable.

On Jun 2, 10:46*am, Dylan Smith > wrote:

> And how often is stall avoidance/recovery trained for in an airline
> setting?

Not nearly enough.
Dudley Henriques

Have you catch the episode of aviation destroyed and cause of bee. A bee has build a small net on the rear side of wings. Just because of that simulator showing a wrong reading and pilot increased the speed though he know that something wrong is happening.

On Jun 2, 12:38*pm, Dudley Henriques >
wrote:
> On Jun 2, 10:46*am, Dylan Smith > wrote:
>
> > And how often is stall avoidance/recovery trained for in an airline
> > setting?
>
> Not nearly enough.
> Dudley Henriques

Unless the controls were jammed and the attitude indicator was busted,
it is tough to blame any other instrument failure for this. Most
likely pilot error due to complacency developed from thousands of
hours of cruising at flight levels in a highly automated airplane.

(Edward A. Falk) wrote:

> A heavy aircraft at high altitude is approaching what is known as
> the "coffin corner" in which slowing down *or* speeding up is a Very
> Bad Thing. Being up there and not knowing your airspeed would be very
> unhappy-making. But again, the proper thing to do in those
> circumstances is to lose altitude, so pulling up would still be the
> wrong response.
>
> Found a fascinating blog when searching for the term "coffin corner"
> on the intertubes:
> http://www.fromtheflightdeckbook.com/2010/01/coffin-corner.html
>
> It was written over a year ago, and speculates that Air France 447
> encountered the coffin corner.

The report from the French accident investigation agency is a bit too thin
on details to come to any firm conclusions, but it does imply that the
initial zoom climb was initiated by the PF, and not because of weather or
because of a low or high speed stall. There is no doubt that once the
climb was initiated, the aircraft became a victim of a low speed stall,
which the crew were not able to recover from.

The vexing question is why the PF initiated the climb. We will have to
wait for the final report for more enlightenment, otherwise it's just
speculation.

On 6/18/11 3:08 PM, James Robinson wrote:

/snip/ There is no doubt that once the
> climb was initiated, the aircraft became a victim of a low speed stall,
> *which the crew were not able to recover from.*
>
>/snip/

Correction: "which the crew *did not* recover from." There is
currently no indication that the aircraft was uncontrollable, rather
that the crew did not, for some reason/s, initiate the appropriate response.

Roger

In article tions>,
, Roger Ramjet says...
>
> On 6/18/11 3:08 PM, James Robinson wrote:
>
> /snip/ There is no doubt that once the
> > climb was initiated, the aircraft became a victim of a low speed stall,
> > *which the crew were not able to recover from.*
> >
> >/snip/
>
> Correction: "which the crew *did not* recover from." There is
> currently no indication that the aircraft was uncontrollable, rather
> that the crew did not, for some reason/s, initiate the appropriate response.

Indeed, true. I guess there's a few Roger Ramjet's around, but if
you're the same one I know, are you still on the 777's?, have they
sorted the fuel icing problems or still working around 'em?

--
Duncan.