Tom Fleischman > wrote:

> If you want to read something really disturbing, this is it.

Is there something specific that is disturbing, or are you referring to the
entire report? I read through it and, while it is always disturbing when
an accident results in fatalities, I honestly didn't see anything that
stuck out as *really disturbing* such as drugs, alcohol, or a blatant
mistake. What did I miss?

--
Peter













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How about why is an instructor taking a primary student, he doesn't even
have a pp-asel, up in 200- 1/2 with a 0 temp/dew point spread?


"Peter R." > wrote in message
...
> Tom Fleischman > wrote:
>
>> If you want to read something really disturbing, this is it.
>
> Is there something specific that is disturbing, or are you referring to
> the
> entire report? I read through it and, while it is always disturbing when
> an accident results in fatalities, I honestly didn't see anything that
> stuck out as *really disturbing* such as drugs, alcohol, or a blatant
> mistake. What did I miss?
>
> --
> Peter
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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> News==----
> http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+
> Newsgroups
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Steve S > wrote:

> How about why is an instructor taking a primary student, he doesn't even
> have a pp-asel, up in 200- 1/2 with a 0 temp/dew point spread?

That fact had been discussed heavily in this group already. I guess I was
expecting to read some additional information that was not already
mentioned in those long threads.

--
Peter













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Maybe I'm missing something as well.
I fail to understand why everyone is making a big deal of this accident, and
the coverage it received in the press, when I don't see anything so unusual
about either.

Certainly the accident is regrettable, and it is highly likely that the final
report will come in with PIC error as causal and low IFR weather as
contributing. We'll wait and see, but this is most likely.

Taking a pre-PPL student up in these conditions for IFR training may be a poor
use of the student's time and money, but the CFI is PIC, and if he's current,
IFR with lots of experience and lots of recent time, there's nothing so
"shocking" about it.

If we're lucky, there will be something we can all learn from this accident.
But just as likely there will be a sum of circumstances that simply got the
better of the crew's resources. Poor judgement to go there under these
conditions? Probably - but then IFR is meant to fly in poor conditions, and
still leave your options open if it gets below minimums. When the facts are
all in, will we end up with the feeling they should have diverted elsewhere?
Maybe.

I think it's useful to discuss accidents - even typical accidents - as there
is something instructive in trying to understand how they let themselves get
in too deep (if this turns out to be the case); But I fail to see what is so
shocking or unusual about this particular accident, or the press coverage of
it.

G Faris

On Wed, 4 May 2005 22:27:09 -0400, "Steve S"
> wrote:

>How about why is an instructor taking a primary student, he doesn't even
>have a pp-asel, up in 200- 1/2 with a 0 temp/dew point spread?


Where does it say that a pilot needs a pp-asel in order to take
instrument instruction?

Peter R. wrote:

> Tom Fleischman > wrote:
>
>
>>If you want to read something really disturbing, this is it.
>
>
> Is there something specific that is disturbing, or are you referring to the
> entire report? I read through it and, while it is always disturbing when
> an accident results in fatalities, I honestly didn't see anything that
> stuck out as *really disturbing* such as drugs, alcohol, or a blatant
> mistake. What did I miss?
>

My reaction also. Fatal accidents are always disturbing in general, but
nothing in particular jumped out of this summary.


Matt

Steve S wrote:

> How about why is an instructor taking a primary student, he doesn't even
> have a pp-asel, up in 200- 1/2 with a 0 temp/dew point spread?

To show him what an instrument approach looks like? If the instructor
was qualified and current, this shouldn't have been a problem.
Descending below minimums is the problem, it doesn't matter who is
flying or who is in the right seat.

Matt

> wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 4 May 2005 22:27:09 -0400, "Steve S"
> > wrote:
>
>>How about why is an instructor taking a primary student, he doesn't even
>>have a pp-asel, up in 200- 1/2 with a 0 temp/dew point spread?
>
>
> Where does it say that a pilot needs a pp-asel in order to take
> instrument instruction?
>
It's not a question of needing one, just that there is limited benefit, if
any, of instrument instruction to a student still learning basic attitude
flying, navigation etc.

On Thu, 5 May 2005 06:57:16 -0400, "Steve S"
> wrote:

> wrote in message
...
>> On Wed, 4 May 2005 22:27:09 -0400, "Steve S"
>> > wrote:
>>
>>>How about why is an instructor taking a primary student, he doesn't even
>>>have a pp-asel, up in 200- 1/2 with a 0 temp/dew point spread?
>>
>>
>> Where does it say that a pilot needs a pp-asel in order to take
>> instrument instruction?
>>
>It's not a question of needing one, just that there is limited benefit, if
>any, of instrument instruction to a student still learning basic attitude
>flying, navigation etc.
>

Maybe the student just wanted to see what it was like. Sort of like
folks who take aerobatic rides, glider rides, balloon rides. Limited
benefit? Who can judge?

"Steve S" > wrote in message
...
> How about why is an instructor taking a primary student, he doesn't even
> have a pp-asel, up in 200- 1/2 with a 0 temp/dew point spread?

It's not necessarily unreasonable to show a primary student what LIFR is
like, if the student is interested in the experience. (I have a friend who's
a lapsed student pilot who wants to come along sometime when I shoot
approaches in IMC. I'm happy to oblige, and I'm not even a CFI.) The
reported winds were benign, and the reported ceiling and visibility were
adequate for the approach. It should've been easy for a competent instrument
pilot.

But given the low-altitude alert and the apparently continued low altitude
until impact, it seems conceivable that the instructor was actually letting
the student fly the approach, and failed to take control when the plane got
dangerously low.

--Gary

In article >,
says...

>
>But given the low-altitude alert and the apparently continued low altitude
>until impact, it seems conceivable that the instructor was actually letting
>the student fly the approach, and failed to take control when the plane got
>dangerously low.
>


Come on now, that's a wild guess!
Could have been any number of things. Maybe they couldn't find the GS.
Maybe they thought they were still above it, when they were already below it.
Sounds like there was some confusion about what their actual altitude was,
which should not be going on if established on an ILS a mile out. According to
the controller's radar they lost 300ft in 14 sec - trying to duck under?
Trying toget their GS indicator to come alive? Maybe there was something wrong
with the instrument - we can't exclude that at this early stage.

The weather report indicated 200 ft - but that was 20 minutes earlier. The
Citation reported 200 also, but when I hear jets reporting minimums, I always
wonder if it's really lower, and they just don't want to say it.

For now, it remains a tragedy for the freinds and families of the victims,
otherwise an approach accident in low IFR, and we'll have to wait to know
more.

G Faris

Greg Farris wrote:
> Come on now, that's a wild guess!
> Could have been any number of things. Maybe they couldn't find the
GS.
> Maybe they thought they were still above it, when they were already
below it.
> Sounds like there was some confusion about what their actual altitude
was,
> which should not be going on if established on an ILS a mile out.
According to
> the controller's radar they lost 300ft in 14 sec - trying to duck
under?
> Trying toget their GS indicator to come alive? Maybe there was
something wrong
> with the instrument - we can't exclude that at this early stage.
>
> The weather report indicated 200 ft - but that was 20 minutes
earlier. The
> Citation reported 200 also, but when I hear jets reporting minimums,
I always
> wonder if it's really lower, and they just don't want to say it.
>
> For now, it remains a tragedy for the freinds and families of the
victims,
> otherwise an approach accident in low IFR, and we'll have to wait to
know
> more.
>
> G Faris

What do you do when you cannot get the GS on approach? Can you
descent?

i"JimBob" > wrote in message
oups.com...
>>
> What do you do when you cannot get the GS on approach? Can you
> descent?
>
If you cannot get the GS in an ILS apporach, then it turns into a localizer
approach, which has higher minimums.
You can descend down to the MDA (minimum descent altitude), which typically
can be as low as 400'AGL... but if there are obstacles around it may be a
lot higher (i.e here at FTY in atlanta its about 700'AGL.).
If you cannot make it, then you shall go to your alternate.

> What do you do when you cannot get the GS on approach? Can you
> descent?

If you are ready for it, and the approach contains LOC minima, you can
do a LOC approach, and descend as appropriate when you pass the given
fixes. OTherwise, do not descend, proceed to the MAP, and go missed.

Jose
--
Get high on gasoline: fly an airplane.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

On Thu, 5 May 2005 11:11:31 -0400, "Guillermo" >
wrote:

>i"JimBob" > wrote in message
oups.com...
>>>
>> What do you do when you cannot get the GS on approach? Can you
>> descent?
>>
>If you cannot get the GS in an ILS apporach, then it turns into a localizer
>approach, which has higher minimums.
>You can descend down to the MDA (minimum descent altitude), which typically
>can be as low as 400'AGL... but if there are obstacles around it may be a
>lot higher (i.e here at FTY in atlanta its about 700'AGL.).
>If you cannot make it, then you shall go to your alternate.
>


If you cannot make it, then you shall go wherever you are subsequently
(or already) cleared, which might be your alternate, and it might not.

"Greg Farris" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> says...
>>But given the low-altitude alert and the apparently continued low altitude
>>until impact, it seems conceivable that the instructor was actually
>>letting
>>the student fly the approach, and failed to take control when the plane
>>got
>>dangerously low.
>
> Come on now, that's a wild guess!

I clearly characterized it as a guess. I don't think it's particularly wild
though.

> Could have been any number of things. Maybe they couldn't find the GS.

Then they should have flown above the LOC minimums, or gone missed. Any
other decision would be grossly incompetent. I'm making the charitable
assumption that the CFII at least knew how to fly an approach properly
himself, but may not have developed a sound technique for letting a student
fly it safely.

> Maybe they thought they were still above it, when they were already below
> it.
> Sounds like there was some confusion about what their actual altitude was,
> which should not be going on if established on an ILS a mile out.
> According to
> the controller's radar they lost 300ft in 14 sec - trying to duck under?

Could've been just 200', if the controller's radar was rounded to the
nearest 100. Still, that's indeed on the faster side. But in any case,
trying to duck under a reported 200' ceiling from a mile out would not have
been a competent decision.

> Trying toget their GS indicator to come alive? Maybe there was something
> wrong
> with the instrument - we can't exclude that at this early stage.

Trying to get the GS indicator to come alive by diving while inside the FAF
and after having acknowledged a low-altitude altert a few hundred feet AGL?
That would be beyond mere incompetence.

It's conceivable that the GS was giving a false reading without flagging
(and without the needle just being stuck in one place, which would've been
readily noticeable), though I've never heard of that happening (if you
penetrate the GS at the prescribed altitude). But if the GS did falsely
indicate a proper altitude, the pilot should certainly have gone missed as
soon as the altitude alert was issued. If your GS says you're on target and
the controller's radar says otherwise, you don't continue the approach until
you figure out which is right.

> The weather report indicated 200 ft - but that was 20 minutes earlier. The
> Citation reported 200 also, but when I hear jets reporting minimums, I
> always
> wonder if it's really lower, and they just don't want to say it.

Could be, but they crashed a mile out. A lower ceiling wouldn't have had any
effect until they reached DA (and even then, the only effect it should have
is to trigger a missed approach).

--Gary

While I'd agree that taking a student pilot may be wasting resources if he
tries to shoot IFR approaches before getting his pilot's license, I think
taking a student pilot for an IMC flight is extremely valuable and may help
him realize how easy is to get disoriented and how worthless our sense of
balance turns once we are in the clouds.
My personal preffered way to do it is taking friends who are students pilots
to get a free ride in the back seat when I am doing practice instrument
approaches in IMC with my instructor (I am IFR rated but I want to keep
current). I think having students pilots experience IMC is great for
awareness of how tough it could be to fly IMC. Probably would not be very
useful trying to make them fly the approach.
I think it is not even useful to have instrument students fly approaches
their first few lessons.

guillermo



"Steve S" > wrote in message
...
> How about why is an instructor taking a primary student, he doesn't even
> have a pp-asel, up in 200- 1/2 with a 0 temp/dew point spread?
>
>
> "Peter R." > wrote in message
> ...
> > Tom Fleischman > wrote:
> >
> >> If you want to read something really disturbing, this is it.
> >
> > Is there something specific that is disturbing, or are you referring to
> > the
> > entire report? I read through it and, while it is always disturbing
when
> > an accident results in fatalities, I honestly didn't see anything that
> > stuck out as *really disturbing* such as drugs, alcohol, or a blatant
> > mistake. What did I miss?
> >
> > --
> > Peter
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet
> > News==----
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>
>

> It's conceivable that the GS was giving a false reading without
flagging

Is there a way you can check the GS reading?

"JimBob" > wrote in message
oups.com...
>> It's conceivable that the GS was giving a false reading without
> flagging
>
> Is there a way you can check the GS reading?

A few ways. One check, of course, is to determine that the ILS is properly
IDed and the GS is not flagged. You can also check that the GS needle
actually moves (if you're so precise a pilot that it's staying at dead
center, you can deliberately deviate slightly to confirm its
responsiveness). When you cross the FAF at GS altitude, you should check the
altimeter against the expected altitude as indicated on the profile; past
the FAF, you can check the altimeter against the expected altitude for your
distance from the FAF (as measured by markers, DME, or other fixes if
available, or just by dead reckoning). Third, if the controller's radar
shows your altitude, you can get an altitude alert (as the HPN pilots did).
These checks assume the GS needle isn't fully deflected (past the FAF); if
it is, you should be executing a missed approach whether the GS is working
or not.

--Gary

The main thing (other than the questionable decision to make the flight) is
that the
CFI's last medical was on Mar 7, 2003 which means it was expired. Neither
of the pilots was licensed to be up there.


"Peter R." > wrote in message
...
> Tom Fleischman > wrote:
>
>> If you want to read something really disturbing, this is it.
>
> Is there something specific that is disturbing, or are you referring to
> the
> entire report? I read through it and, while it is always disturbing when
> an accident results in fatalities, I honestly didn't see anything that
> stuck out as *really disturbing* such as drugs, alcohol, or a blatant
> mistake. What did I miss?
>
> --
> Peter
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet
> News==----
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> =----

I think if you can't get the GS then you go missed and start over. Trying to
re-brief a new approach chart on final is a bad plan.

"Guillermo" > wrote in message
...
> If you cannot get the GS in an ILS apporach, then it turns into a
> localizer
> approach, which has higher minimums.

On 2005-05-05, Gary Drescher > wrote:
> Third, if the controller's radar
> shows your altitude, you can get an altitude alert (as the HPN pilots did).

Except the report made it sound like they acknowledged it and kept going.
Hard to believe a CFII wouldn't know offhand from that comment that they
were in trouble (being at a familiar airport).

--
Ben Jackson
>
http://www.ben.com/

> CFI's last medical was on Mar 7, 2003 which means it was expired.
Neither
> of the pilots was licensed to be up there.

Any medical issued to a pilot under 40 (which the CFI was) is good for
3rd class privileges for 3 years, which is all that is required for
flight instruction. The CFI was instrument rated, and presuming he was
current he had a legal right to be up there.

Michael

"Ben Jackson" > wrote in message
...
> On 2005-05-05, Gary Drescher > wrote:
>> Third, if the controller's radar
>> shows your altitude, you can get an altitude alert (as the HPN pilots
>> did).
>
> Except the report made it sound like they acknowledged it and kept going.
> Hard to believe a CFII wouldn't know offhand from that comment that they
> were in trouble (being at a familiar airport).

Yes, he had to know by then that they were too low.

--Gary

According to this article, the CFI was 45 years old.

http://tinyurl.com/b8p8s

> Is there something specific that is disturbing, or are you referring
to the
> entire report? I read through it and, while it is always disturbing
when
> an accident results in fatalities, I honestly didn't see anything
that
> stuck out as *really disturbing* such as drugs, alcohol, or a blatant

> mistake. What did I miss?

I think that's pretty much the point. This is the reality of most
accidents. The pilot is qualified (at least on paper) and there are no
red flags likel buzzing, running out of fuel, drugs, alcohol, or a
blatant mistake or disregard for the regulations. There is simple
mishandling of the airplane in the takeoff/climb or approach/landing
phase of flight. That's what accounts for most accidents and
fatalities.

The last reported weather was 200 and 1/2 - not great, but certainly
legal and acceptable on an ILS. I've shot that particular ILS into
HPN, and there's nothing special or tricky about it - it's a garden
variety approach. The airplane was new, well equipped for IFR, and
very simple, slow, and stable.

So how could something like this happen?

It's important to remember that just because someone is qualified on
paper doesn't mean he is qualified in reality. There is a huge
difference between giving instrument dual in actual and instrument dual
under the hood. And while 900 hours sounds like a lot of experience
(and it can be), it's not much at all if it consists of 300 hours of
preparing for checkrides and 600 hours of sitting in the right seat of
a trainer preparing other people for checkrides.

Let me tell you a story.

Imagine a student pilot, getting close to the checkride, who already
has some hood time. The student already meets the PTS standards for
emergency instrument flight, and there's still well over an hour of
instrument time to go, since 3 hours are now required. The CFI is also
a CFII. An IFR-certified C-172 is available, and the student already
has about 6 hours of C-172 time, VFR. And the CFI/CFII is not
comfortable.

The student can't understand why, and keeps pushing. Eventually, the
CFII runs out of excuses. After months of waiting, there is benign IMC
- ceilings in the 1000 ft range, good vis underneath, high freezing
levels (well above what a 172 will cruise), no convective activity, and
the weather is only forecast to improve. So he grits his teeth, files
IFR, and off they go.

The student does a reasonable job in IMC - gets vertigo, but keeps the
plane upright and keeps on trucking. In the meantime, the transponder
fails. ATC pressures the CFI to cancel IFR (which he can't - they're
IMC) and he gets further and further behind the ball. The student is
flying the LOC BC approach and botches it badly. The needle is pegged,
and as the CFI sits there muttering to himself "We shouldn't be doing
this" the student descends below minimums with the needle pegged and
the runway not in sight.

Fortunately they don't hit anything, the student is familiar with the
area, identifies a water tower, turns towards the airport, and lands.
Had the conditions been worse, we would have read about the fatality.

So how does this sort of thing happen? More importantly, why?

The CFI/CFII in question had made ONE flight in actual IMC prior to
this. This was his second, and he was attempting to teach. According
to the FAA, he was well qualified to make this instructional flight -
but there's a big difference between a pilot who has just read the
books and gone through the motions, and one who has real experience.

A real instrument pilot would have told ATC to deal - a transponder is
not required outside Class B/C airspace below 10,000 ft, and in any
case it had failed in flight.

A real instrument pilot would have recognized that the approach was
being botched, and either talked the student through a recovery or
missed approach, or done those things himself. A real instrument pilot
would certainly not have permitted descent below minimums with the
needle pegged and the runway not in sight.

In the end, it was the student's local knowledge and level headed
action that saved the flight. The instructor became a passenger.

The CFI has gone on to bigger and better things years ago, has
thousands of hours, and from all reports has become quite a good pilot.
The student went on to complete the private (with another instructor),
and is now considered a very good pilot, quite capable on instruments -
but did not get an instrument rating for many years, until the fear of
IMC wore off.

Those two were lucky. As this accident shows, it could have been much
worse.

Michael

On 5 May 2005 11:48:24 -0700, "Michael"
> wrote:

>> CFI's last medical was on Mar 7, 2003 which means it was expired.
>Neither
>> of the pilots was licensed to be up there.
>
>Any medical issued to a pilot under 40 (which the CFI was) is good for
>3rd class privileges for 3 years, which is all that is required for
>flight instruction. The CFI was instrument rated, and presuming he was
>current he had a legal right to be up there.
>
>Michael


Actually, no medical is required for flight instruction.

The only requirement is to be pilot in command, which he obviously had
to be in this case.

In article <2005050421420215925%bodhijunkoneeightyeightjunkatm acdotcom@junkjunk>, Tom Fleischman wrote:
> If you want to read something really disturbing, this is it.
> *
> http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC05FA075&rpt=p

I had an Angel Flight mission scheduled last the week. Night before,
looking at the forecast, I was thinking the flight was doable but
a bit below my comfort level. I called my instructor to ask if he'd
come along. Didn't need him as an instructor, but as an extra pair
of eyes and hands to shed that critical workload. Conditions were
forcast for near minima, but better at the destination and scheduled
to improve.

He looked at the forecast and said he wouldn't do it without a second
engine, second alternator, second vac, ...

What he said was particularly articulate. It would be a doable
flight *if* nothing went wrong.

Wound up cancelling the trip, despite the self-induced pressure
to go. Next morning, when the actual conditions were reported, I
knew it was the right decision.


Morris

Matt Whiting wrote:
>
> To show him what an instrument approach looks like? If the instructor
> was qualified and current, this shouldn't have been a problem.
> Descending below minimums is the problem, it doesn't matter who is
> flying or who is in the right seat.
>
> Matt

He may not have been far from his minimums if he was flying the ILS. DA
for the ILS was 639 MSL, and based on the accident report, combined with
terrain elevations north of the approach end, and 75' tree height, he
may have impacted the tree at about 610 MSL. This would have been
possible if he was below glideslope, and then initiated go-around at his
DA (DH). He would have had some height loss expected before the aircraft
responded.

JPH

"J Haggerty" > wrote in message
news:sQzee.4525$Ri4.3415@okepread07...
> Matt Whiting wrote:
>>
>> To show him what an instrument approach looks like? If the instructor
>> was qualified and current, this shouldn't have been a problem. Descending
>> below minimums is the problem, it doesn't matter who is flying or who is
>> in the right seat.
>>
>> Matt
>
> He may not have been far from his minimums if he was flying the ILS. DA
> for the ILS was 639 MSL, and based on the accident report, combined with
> terrain elevations north of the approach end, and 75' tree height, he may
> have impacted the tree at about 610 MSL. This would have been possible if
> he was below glideslope, and then initiated go-around at his DA (DH). He
> would have had some height loss expected before the aircraft responded.

But he was still a mile out when he crashed. Well above the DA, he'd have to
have been fully below the glideslope, which calls for an immediate
missed-approach execution. The DA has no relevance in that situation.

--Gary

Gary Drescher wrote:

>
> But he was still a mile out when he crashed. Well above the DA, he'd have to
> have been fully below the glideslope, which calls for an immediate
> missed-approach execution. The DA has no relevance in that situation.
>
> --Gary
>
>
Yes, he would have been well below the theoretical glideslope elevation
a mile out (GS elev at that point is approx 812 MSL), but if for some
reason (GS malfunction, undetected false glideslope, equipment problem)
he thought he was on the glideslope, then he probably would not have
initiated go-around until the 639 MSL DA, which would have been too late
based on the elevation of the terrain.
If the 200 AGL ceiling was at the same MSL (839) elevation at the crash
site, then it was only about 20' AGL at the crash site elevation.
Hopefully the final report will shed more light on what happened, as all
we can do is guess.

JPH

"J Haggerty" > wrote in message
news:ezAee.4545$Ri4.99@okepread07...
>
> Yes, he would have been well below the theoretical glideslope elevation a
> mile out (GS elev at that point is approx 812 MSL), but if for some reason
> (GS malfunction, undetected false glideslope, equipment problem) he
> thought he was on the glideslope, then he probably would not have
> initiated go-around until the 639 MSL DA, which would have been too late
> based on the elevation of the terrain.

Except that he'd received and acknowledged a low-altitude alert. If his GS
needle *didn't* show he was very low, then he knew something was wrong
either with the GS or with the controller's radar. That unequivocally calls
for an immediate climb and missed approach.

--Gary

Michael > wrote:

> I think that's pretty much the point. This is the reality of most
> accidents. The pilot is qualified (at least on paper) and there are no
> red flags likel buzzing, running out of fuel, drugs, alcohol, or a
> blatant mistake or disregard for the regulations. There is simple
> mishandling of the airplane in the takeoff/climb or approach/landing
> phase of flight. That's what accounts for most accidents and
> fatalities.

Good point. I never thought of an accident record devoid of "really
disturbing" as being "really disturbing," but this logic does makes sense.

--
Peter


















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Gary Drescher > wrote:

> Except that he'd received and acknowledged a low-altitude alert. If his GS
> needle *didn't* show he was very low, then he knew something was wrong
> either with the GS or with the controller's radar.

Not at all suggesting that this was the case, but at our local flight
school that has all late model C172SPs equipped with B/K KLN-94 GPS's and
moving maps, a number of students over the last few years have been known
to forget to toggle the NAV/GPS switch from GPS to NAV when transitioning
from en route to ILS approach.

As you know, when this happens the VOR1 instrument would show the CDI alive
(but really tracking the GPS's course for the localizer). The glideslope
needle, however, would be flagged and remain perfectly centered, as if the
pilot were flying a perfect glideslope.

--
Peter


















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"Peter R." > wrote in message
...
> Gary Drescher > wrote:
>
>> Except that he'd received and acknowledged a low-altitude alert. If his
>> GS
>> needle *didn't* show he was very low, then he knew something was wrong
>> either with the GS or with the controller's radar.
>
> Not at all suggesting that this was the case, but at our local flight
> school that has all late model C172SPs equipped with B/K KLN-94 GPS's and
> moving maps, a number of students over the last few years have been known
> to forget to toggle the NAV/GPS switch from GPS to NAV when transitioning
> from en route to ILS approach.
>
> As you know, when this happens the VOR1 instrument would show the CDI
> alive
> (but really tracking the GPS's course for the localizer). The glideslope
> needle, however, would be flagged and remain perfectly centered, as if the
> pilot were flying a perfect glideslope.

Yup. Fortunately, there are at least five ways for an instrument pilot to
detect that problem before it's too late: 1) double-check the NAV/GPS
switch; 2) observe the flag on the GS; 3) the GS needle should start high
and then come to center when approaching the FAF; 4) even when established
on the GS, a needle that stays perfectly centered at all times should arouse
suspicion; 5) a low-altitude alert should certainly call attention to the
problem.

--Gary

Gary Drescher > wrote:

> Fortunately, there are at least five ways for an instrument pilot to
> detect that problem before it's too late: 1) double-check the NAV/GPS
> switch; 2) observe the flag on the GS; 3) the GS needle should start high
> and then come to center when approaching the FAF; 4) even when established
> on the GS, a needle that stays perfectly centered at all times should arouse
> suspicion; 5) a low-altitude alert should certainly call attention to the
> problem.

For the relatively inexperienced or out of practice instrument pilot, high
workload in actual IMC has a way of tricking the mind into seeing or
hearing things that aren't or in your five ways listed above, not seeing or
hearing things that are.

--
Peter


















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cfey,
The instructor was giving IFR instruction for an unrated pilot in
actual IMC. Here is a link to an old thread on Instructor Medical


http://groups-beta.google.com/group/rec.aviation.student/msg/6b825fc9a3dfb2=
e2?dmode=3Dsource&hl=3Den

"In accordance with =A7 61.23(3)(iv) the instructor must hold a valid
third class medical to act as PIC or to be the safety pilot. This is
because of required crewmember status, not due to instruction duties. "

In article >,
says...

>
>Not at all suggesting that this was the case, but at our local flight
>school that has all late model C172SPs equipped with B/K KLN-94 GPS's and
>moving maps, a number of students over the last few years have been known
>to forget to toggle the NAV/GPS switch from GPS to NAV when transitioning
>from en route to ILS approach.
>
>As you know, when this happens the VOR1 instrument would show the CDI alive
>(but really tracking the GPS's course for the localizer). The glideslope
>needle, however, would be flagged and remain perfectly centered, as if the
>pilot were flying a perfect glideslope.
>


The 172R has the same switch (button actually) and yes, it is easy to forget.
But as you correctly state, this produces a flagged, immobile GS indicator.
This would be very difficult to stare at for very long before realizing that
something was wrong.

G Faris

Tom Fleischman > wrote:

> Multiple choice: a) you acknowledge the tower call, look
> over to the other side of the cockpit to check the altimeter setting,
> look at the approach plate, calm down the student pilot in the right
> seat and say, in about 14 seconds, hit the cumulogranite;

Why are you assuming the student was flying the approach in this accident?
Do you know something that hasn't been reported?

--
Peter


















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Not according to the news reports I read. And since his 2nd class
reverts to third .. he does get 2 years. The accident was in April.
His medical would have been good till the end of March.


"Michael" > wrote in message
oups.com...
> Any medical issued to a pilot under 40 (which the CFI was)
>
> Michael
>

Tom Fleischman > wrote:

> I don't think I ever said that I assumed that.
>
> I don't think I ever made any statement about who was manipulating the
> controls on the approach. I have no idea about that.

Sorry, I thought this statement, "calm down the student pilot in the right
seat," was an implication that the student pilot was flying.

Back when I was a student pilot, one of my early instructors demonstrated a
spin to me in a C152. If there were a flying moment that would cause a
student pilot to panic, this would have been it. Instead, I remained
naively calm and jovial. My point is simply that there are probably many
student pilots who have too much trust in their instructors and do not
realize the actual risk in which they are placed.

In this accident, it *seems* logical to me that the instructor would have
been flying this particular approach. Again, I cannot imagine any student
pilot being capable of flying an approach in actual conditions, nor an
instructor allowing a pre-PPL to do so. Most likely, the NTSB will not be
able to conclude who was actually flying the approach so we will never
know.

--
Peter


















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Tom Fleischman > wrote:

> Now can you honestly say that you find nothing disturbing in any of this?

Now look who has misinterpreted what he has read. I never stated that I
found nothing disturbing about this accident. All aircraft accidents that
result in fatalities are disturbing to me, as they are to any pilot.

What I did post was this:

"I honestly didn't see anything that stuck out as *really disturbing* such
as drugs, alcohol, or a blatant mistake."

BTW, my statement was posted before the group figured out that the
instructor had an expired medical, assuming the report about his age at 45
being correct. In hindsight, the fact that his medical had expired by a
month (Class III expires in two years from March '03, right?) was somewhat
interesting for a large flight school such as AF. Did it expire because of
oversight or did it expire because the instructor had a condition that
wouldn't allow him to pass? We don't know.

Also, being unfamiliar with the approach, I would agree with you that
flying below the glideslope and not going missed as this aircraft did would
indicate a mistake, but when taking all of the aircraft accidents of this
type into account, this particular one has yet to stand out as *really
disturbing.* IMO, of course.


--
Peter


















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Tom Fleischman wrote:
> If you want to read something really disturbing, this is it.
>
> http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC05FA075&rpt=p
>

You're right. It IS disturbing that you are ready to be judge
and jury based on this report, which contains virtually nothing
new.

wrote:
> On Thu, 5 May 2005 06:57:16 -0400, "Steve S"
> > wrote:
>
>
> wrote in message
...
>>
>>>On Wed, 4 May 2005 22:27:09 -0400, "Steve S"
> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>>How about why is an instructor taking a primary student, he doesn't even
>>>>have a pp-asel, up in 200- 1/2 with a 0 temp/dew point spread?
>>>
>>>
>>>Where does it say that a pilot needs a pp-asel in order to take
>>>instrument instruction?
>>>
>>
>>It's not a question of needing one, just that there is limited benefit, if
>>any, of instrument instruction to a student still learning basic attitude
>>flying, navigation etc.
>>
>
>
> Maybe the student just wanted to see what it was like. Sort of like
> folks who take aerobatic rides, glider rides, balloon rides. Limited
> benefit? Who can judge?
>
>

I started IFR instruction with an instructor that refused to fly in
actual. I fired him and got another instructor. Nothing more goddam
useless than an IFR instructor who won't fly IFR.

> He looked at the forecast and said he wouldn't do it without a second

> engine, second alternator, second vac, ...

That's the logic that put me in a twin, where I do indeed have a second
engine, second generator, second vacuum pump, second attitude gyro -
well, you get the idea. I wouldn't absolutely say no for a one time
deal, but I wouldn't make a habit of making flights like that single
engine either. Eventually the odds will catch up with you.

> What he said was particularly articulate. It would be a doable
> flight *if* nothing went wrong.

Right. Thing is, nothing went wrong (with the airplane - everything
that could be checked after the crash checked out OK) and they died
anyway. And this, unfortunately, is the reality of most accidents. No
system failure. No gross violations of common sense. Just another
pilot who got behind the curve and mishandled the airplane in the
approach/landing or takeoff/climb phase of the flight. A twin would
have been no help.

Michael

> I cannot imagine any student
> pilot being capable of flying an approach in actual conditions, nor
an
> instructor allowing a pre-PPL to do so.

You lack imagination. I've allowed a student pilot to fly an approach
in IMC, and he actually did quite well for a while (with a lot of
coaching, obviously). This was a much more demanding approach (night
circling NDB) in a much more demanding airplane (my Twin Comanche).
Eventually he started losing it (meaning he could no longer keep up
with what had to be done even with my coaching) and I had to take it
from him and complete the approach myself.

There's nothing wrong with an instructor allowing a student to fly an
approach in actual IMC - as long as the instructor is prepared to take
the airplane before a dangeerous situation develops.

There's no question here that the approach was mishandled, and I don't
consider it important to know who was actually manipulating the
controls. In any case, the CFI was PIC, and he was responsible for the
control inputs of the student. I suspect he simply got overloaded
trying to teach in IMC (or perhaps just fly in IMC). Either way, it
hardly matters. He overestimated his abilities, and has now paid the
ultimate price. His student paid too, and his only mistake was
overestimating the capabilities of his instructor. Sad but hardly
unique.

Michael

Mea culpa. You are correct, the news stories indicate he was 45, which
would make his medical almost a month out of date, which means he was
technically not legal to make the flight..

Michael

"OtisWinslow" > wrote in message
.. .
> Not according to the news reports I read. And since his 2nd class
> reverts to third .. he does get 2 years. The accident was in April.
> His medical would have been good till the end of March.

If he'd just recently renewed it, I wonder if the records might not have
been available yet for the preliminary accident report.

--Gary

"Scott Moore" > wrote in message
...
> I started IFR instruction with an instructor that refused to fly in
> actual. I fired him and got another instructor. Nothing more goddam
> useless than an IFR instructor who won't fly IFR.


I had the same experience a few years ago when I went for an IPC. At that
point I had about 1000 hours with about 100 approaches in actual. First he
refused to fly in my plane, which is a hell of a lot better maintained and a
much better IFR platform than the FBO planes. Then he added that he was
uncomfortable flying in actual since he didn't know me. Needless to say I
found another CFII.

Michael

"Gary Drescher" > wrote in
:

> "Peter R." > wrote in message
> ...
> Yup. Fortunately, there are at least five ways for an instrument
> pilot to detect that problem before it's too late: 1) double-check the
> NAV/GPS switch; 2) observe the flag on the GS; 3) the GS needle should
> start high and then come to center when approaching the FAF; 4) even
> when established on the GS, a needle that stays perfectly centered at
> all times should arouse suspicion; 5) a low-altitude alert should
> certainly call attention to the problem.
>
> --Gary

In this case there should have been a sixth way - the instructor sitting
right seat...

> I had the same experience a few years ago when I went for an IPC. At that
> point I had about 1000 hours with about 100 approaches in actual. First he
> refused to fly in my plane, which is a hell of a lot better maintained and a
> much better IFR platform than the FBO planes. Then he added that he was
> uncomfortable flying in actual since he didn't know me. Needless to say I
> found another CFII.

jeez, I had my IFR checkride scheduled for may 7th. I have about 11 out
of 50 hours in actual with about 25 of that at night which is a good
substitute for actual when under the hood. I told my instructor that
I wanted to fly in the worst crap out there so I'm comfortable when the
**** hits the fan. I had a few flights that were very bumpy and weird
ATC routings. I'm glad I did it as I wouldn't say I'm
comfortable in hard IMC but in smooth IMC I think I'd do quite well.
I do think I'm more comfortable than most instructors as most
instructors I think have mostly private students and don't stay IFR
current and IFR proficient themselves.

So my FBO is ****ing me off because what they consider IFR capable
is not so in my book. I don't trust anyone who says a plane with
an AI that takes "10 or 15 minutes" to erect is IFR capable even in
severe clear.

well I'll get my shot in a couple of weeks in a well maintained airplane.

Gerald

Tom Fleischman > wrote
in
news:2005050612522816807%bodhijunkoneeightyeightju nkatmacdotcom@junkjunk:

> On 2005-05-06 09:48:46 -0400, "Peter R." >
> said:
>
<snip>
> Regardless of who was flying the instructor was doubtless PIC. Now I
> know that the Passeur Airport Monitor
> (http://www4.passur.com/hpn.html) does not give an officially
> recognized altitude readout, but if you set that site to begin on 4/23
> at about 16:15 local time you can track the flight. If you compare
> their altitude readout to other aircraft flying the same approach it
> seems evident that they were below the approach segment altitude even
> before they crossed the outer marker. In fact it shows them crossing
> HESTR already 100' too low (1900'). I can not fathom what this
> instructor was thinking continuing the approach so far below the
> glideslope, even after an altitude alert from the tower.
<snip>

If you go back to about 15:10 and set the window to 20 miles you can pick
him up as low as 1600' just south of Yorktown Heights over 134, which I
believe is inside the FARAN intersection, but clearly outside the Outer
Marker - ie: Minimum Safe Altitude is 2000', and he is 400' low...

It's tough to say how accurate and to-scale the Passur site is, but if you
set the scale to 5 miles and watch as he enters the area, it would imply
that he passed the Outer Marker at around 1200'...

Maybe he was tracking a harmonic?

Michael > wrote:

> You lack imagination.

Lack instructing experience and knowledge, definitely, but lack
imagination? Absolutely not.

During minor outpatient surgery many years ago I was hooked up to an IV and
awaiting the arrival of the doctor. With nothing else to occupy my mind, I
started to imagine what the IV needle must have looked like inside my vein,
the tip of the submerged needle pressing against the inside wall of the
vein and the suger-water dripping out of the point to mix with my blood,
creating a pinkish hue as the mixture was carried off downstream. The
image in my mind was so vivid I then passed out. :-)

Sorry to digress but I had to rebut ...

--
Peter


















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Tom Fleischman > wrote:

> Things
> like this just give all of us as pilots a black eye because in todays
> society the general public seems to paint everything with a very broad
> brush . That is what really disturbs me.

I am in total agreement with you.

--
Peter


















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Tom Fleischman wrote:
> Baloney, it contains a lot that is new.
>
> 1 - There was communication with the tower throughout the approach and
> the pilot was WARNED that he was too low and continued to descend
> anyway.

Do you think that a descent rate of more than 1200 fpm (300' in 14 seconds)
is normal after being warned that he was too low? Since something around
500 fpm would be more 'normal', perhaps there was something else gong on
other than he "continued to descend anyway"?


> 2 - It appears that his medical was out of date and he was not legal to
> be PIC on that flight.

Perhaps the web site does not have the latest data and the pilot just came
from the doc?


> 3 - There was nothing wrong with the major aircraft systems that could
> be evaluated on the preliminary report suggesting that a mechanical
> problem was not a likely cause.

Exactly - nothing on the *preliminary* report - that's why they don't stop
there. This does not suggest that "mechanical problem was not likely the
cause". All it says is that the preliminary report showed nothing wrong
with the major aircraft systems. Do you know that his static port wasn't
blocked, that his altimeter was set correctly and reading correctly, that he
didn't suffer a heart attack, that the student didn't committed suicide, ...


> 4 - It appears that American Flyers is incapable of even keeping track
> of the medical currency of their instructors, a fairly simple task.

See my above comment on his medical.


> That is gross negligence IMHO.

I would consider making unsubstantiated and potentially completely false
claims with minimal knowledge of the real facts gross negligence.


> I don't know where you get the idea that I have set myself up as judge
> and jury on this.

Read your post again.

Hilton

"Scott Moore" > wrote in message
...
> I started IFR instruction with an instructor that refused to fly in
> actual. I fired him and got another instructor. Nothing more goddam
> useless than an IFR instructor who won't fly IFR.

You should try the instructors at my club then. If you're out on a checkride
or some other such exercise that has no formal content requirement (e.g. the
club has a new aircraft and they want you to do a dual hour so they can show
you the knobs and dials) they'll almost certainly try to find some cloud to
go and play in, icing conditions permitting. When we got our "new" PA-28
with different radio navaids than I was used to, when we went out for my
check ride I found myself in the grey stuff doing holds and finishing with
an ILS down to a 1,200' cloudbase. Not minima, I'll admit, but it's good
that all our instructors are of the opinion that the more you fly in IMC,
the more likely you are to stay in one piece when the cloud is lower than
you thought.

D.

"Greg Farris" > wrote in message
...
>>As you know, when this happens the VOR1 instrument would show the CDI
>>alive
>>(but really tracking the GPS's course for the localizer). The glideslope
>>needle, however, would be flagged and remain perfectly centered, as if the
>>pilot were flying a perfect glideslope.
> The 172R has the same switch (button actually) and yes, it is easy to
> forget.
> But as you correctly state, this produces a flagged, immobile GS
> indicator.
> This would be very difficult to stare at for very long before realizing
> that
> something was wrong.

I've been surprised, in the half-dozen or so different aircraft I've sat in
the front seat of, how much the visibility of the flags in instruments
varies. A PA-28 I got into recently had instruments with flags that all but
obscured the dial - so you absolutely couldn't miss them. An aircraft I flew
a while back, though, had rather smaller flags, and I strongly suspect that
under stress, one's brain could have completely failed to acknowledge they
were there.

D.

"Tom Fleischman" > wrote in
message
news:2005050607023016807%bodhijunkoneeightyeightju nkatmacdotcom@junkjunk...
> Let's see, you are maybe a few hundred feet above the ground in the clouds
> when you get a low altitude alert and new altimeter setting from the
> tower. Multiple choice: a) you acknowledge the tower call, look over to
> the other side of the cockpit to check the altimeter setting, look at the
> approach plate, calm down the student pilot in the right seat and say, in
> about 14 seconds, hit the cumulogranite; or b) you add power and climb in
> a go-around, realizing something is wrong and sort it out at a safe
> altitude.

I've kinda been there in an IMC training flight (in proper IMC). The reports
and the tower said the cloudbase was 800 feet, and althought the instruments
were telling us everything was normal (i.e. glideslope, DME and altimeter
cross-matched), we still couldn't see civilisation at 500 feet. We took
option (b) - up is a very good way to go until you know what's going on.

D.

"Peter R." > wrote in message
...
> In hindsight, the fact that his medical had expired by a
> month (Class III expires in two years from March '03, right?) was somewhat
> interesting for a large flight school such as AF. Did it expire because
> of
> oversight or did it expire because the instructor had a condition that
> wouldn't allow him to pass? We don't know.

And as someone else said, if memory serves, it could well be that he'd just
renewed it and the paperwork hadn't caught up. I don't know about the US,
but in the UK the doctor issues a new medical certificate directly to the
pilot, and then sends notification to the authorities. It's believable that
there could be a few days/weeks before stuff shows up on the official
records.

D.

"Tom Fleischman" > wrote in
message
news:2005050612522816807%bodhijunkoneeightyeightju nkatmacdotcom@junkjunk...
>Now I know that the Passeur Airport Monitor
>(http://www4.passur.com/hpn.html) does not give an officially recognized
>altitude readout, but if you set that site to begin on 4/23 at about 16:15
>local time you can track the flight. If you compare their altitude readout
>to other aircraft flying the same approach it seems evident that they were
>below the approach segment altitude even before they crossed the outer
>marker. In fact it shows them crossing HESTR already 100' too low (1900').

True, but 100' is within PTS tolerance prior to the FAF. After the FAF, they
just need to stay on the GS.

> I can not fathom what this instructor was thinking continuing the
> approach so far below the glideslope, even after an altitude alert from
> the tower.

Yup, that's where it was totally botched.

--Gary

"Hilton" > wrote in message news:Li_ee.8399
> Tom Fleischman wrote:
>> 3 - There was nothing wrong with the major aircraft systems that could
>> be evaluated on the preliminary report suggesting that a mechanical
>> problem was not a likely cause.
>
> Exactly - nothing on the *preliminary* report - that's why they don't stop
> there. This does not suggest that "mechanical problem was not likely the
> cause". All it says is that the preliminary report showed nothing wrong
> with the major aircraft systems. Do you know that his static port wasn't
> blocked, that his altimeter was set correctly and reading correctly,
> that he didn't suffer a heart attack, that the student didn't committed
> suicide, ...

He had an opportunity (and responsibility) to verify his altimeter reading
when crossing the FAF. And when he acknowledged the low-altitude alert, the
altitude he reported was consistent with ATC's radar. And regardless of his
altimeter reading, he would've been well below the glideslope.

He was already inexplicably low; he acknowledged a low-altitude alert while
continuing to descend, taking the time to report his altimeter setting and
his indicated altitude, but without mentioning any mechanical or medical
problems; and >then< he had a heart attack, or his student carried out a
murder-suicide? I think Tom is justified to conclude that such a sequence is
unlikely.

--Gary

"Judah" > wrote in message
. ..
> If you go back to about 15:10 and set the window to 20 miles you can pick
> him up as low as 1600' just south of Yorktown Heights over 134, which I
> believe is inside the FARAN intersection, but clearly outside the Outer
> Marker - ie: Minimum Safe Altitude is 2000', and he is 400' low...

Just a point of terminology--2000' is the minimum altitude there, but it's
not the MSA. The MSA there is 2900', and wouldn't be relevant. (As is often
the case, the FAA has violated a cardinal rule of clear naming: when two
names are similar, the difference between them should reflect the difference
in their meanings. The MSA differs from the minimum altitude not with regard
to being safe, but with regard to applying when off-course.)

> It's tough to say how accurate and to-scale the Passur site is, but if you
> set the scale to 5 miles and watch as he enters the area, it would imply
> that he passed the Outer Marker at around 1200'...
>
> Maybe he was tracking a harmonic?

Is it possible to pick up a false GS a few hundred feet *below* the proper
altitude?

--Gary

"Gary Drescher" > wrote in
:

> "Judah" > wrote in message
> . ..

<snip>

> Just a point of terminology--2000' is the minimum altitude there, but
> it's not the MSA. The MSA there is 2900', and wouldn't be relevant.
> (As is often the case, the FAA has violated a cardinal rule of clear
> naming: when two names are similar, the difference between them should
> reflect the difference in their meanings. The MSA differs from the
> minimum altitude not with regard to being safe, but with regard to
> applying when off-course.)


A valid point. The MSA for the northeastern region within 25 NM is
2900', though the published minimum allowable (and presumably safe)
altitude while flying the ILS inside Faran is 2000'. Is there a name for
that published altitude?


<snip>

>> Maybe he was tracking a harmonic?
>
> Is it possible to pick up a false GS a few hundred feet *below* the
> proper altitude?

According to the document published at

http://afsafety.af.mil/magazine/htdocs/octmag98/dontneed.htm

if a heavy was holding inside the ILS Hold Short Line it could generate
interference that could cause the glideslope to fail high or low...

Not really a harmonic, I guess, but apparently a possibility.

"Hilton" > wrote in
ink.net:

<snip>
>> 3 - There was nothing wrong with the major aircraft systems that
>> could be evaluated on the preliminary report suggesting that a
>> mechanical problem was not a likely cause.
>
> Exactly - nothing on the *preliminary* report - that's why they don't
> stop there. This does not suggest that "mechanical problem was not
> likely the cause". All it says is that the preliminary report showed
> nothing wrong with the major aircraft systems. Do you know that his
> static port wasn't blocked, that his altimeter was set correctly and
> reading correctly, that he didn't suffer a heart attack, that the
> student didn't committed suicide, ...

<snip>

The whole situation is unfortunate, and it is impossible for anyone to
accurately state what happened.

However, on an ILS approach, I don't believe a failed PitotStatic System
would prevent the glideslope from reading fully deflected at 1 mile and
300' low. If I'm not mistaken, at 5 miles, the reading is about 50' per
dot, and at 1 mile the reading is about 8' per dot.

Furthermore, the fact that he is reported to have read back his altitude
in response to the warning and it was within 100' of what they told him
during a descent strongly implies that he did not have a blocked static
port...

Additionally, the fact that he was as much as 400' low outside the FAF
implies that he was not properly managing the airplane for a significant
amount of time.

While it is not clear what exactly went wrong, there seems to be
evidence that the instructor may not have been very conservative or
attentive. Whether or not that was the cause of the accident or even
contributed to it is impossible to say.

Gary Drescher wrote:
> Hilton wrote:
> > Tom Fleischman wrote:
> >> 3 - There was nothing wrong with the major aircraft systems that could
> >> be evaluated on the preliminary report suggesting that a mechanical
> >> problem was not a likely cause.
> >
> > Exactly - nothing on the *preliminary* report - that's why they don't
stop
> > there. This does not suggest that "mechanical problem was not likely
the
> > cause". All it says is that the preliminary report showed nothing wrong
> > with the major aircraft systems. Do you know that his static port
wasn't
> > blocked, that his altimeter was set correctly and reading correctly,
> > that he didn't suffer a heart attack, that the student didn't committed
> > suicide, ...
>
> He had an opportunity (and responsibility) to verify his altimeter reading
> when crossing the FAF. And when he acknowledged the low-altitude alert,
the
> altitude he reported was consistent with ATC's radar. And regardless of
his
> altimeter reading, he would've been well below the glideslope.
>
> He was already inexplicably low; he acknowledged a low-altitude alert
while
> continuing to descend, taking the time to report his altimeter setting and
> his indicated altitude, but without mentioning any mechanical or medical
> problems; and >then< he had a heart attack, or his student carried out a
> murder-suicide? I think Tom is justified to conclude that such a sequence
is
> unlikely.

I absolutely agree that it *appears* that the CFI messed up. Most accident
sequences are pretty 'obvious', this one included. But just when you think
the cause is obvious, it turns out to be something else. I've just seen too
many accident reports like this to state absolutely what happened only a few
days after the accident with minimal investigation. Perhaps some guy taxied
into the ILS critical area by mistake? Heck, I don't know. While the
'obvious' conclusion is that the CFI screwed up, let's not trash the guy's
name too early in the investigation.

Hilton

"Judah" > wrote in message
. ..
> "Gary Drescher" > wrote in
> :
>> Just a point of terminology--2000' is the minimum altitude there, but
>> it's not the MSA. The MSA there is 2900', and wouldn't be relevant.
>> (As is often the case, the FAA has violated a cardinal rule of clear
>> naming: when two names are similar, the difference between them should
>> reflect the difference in their meanings. The MSA differs from the
>> minimum altitude not with regard to being safe, but with regard to
>> applying when off-course.)
>
> A valid point. The MSA for the northeastern region within 25 NM is
> 2900', though the published minimum allowable (and presumably safe)
> altitude while flying the ILS inside Faran is 2000'. Is there a name for
> that published altitude?

The NACO approach-plates legend just calls it the "minimum altitude".

--Gary

"Hilton" > wrote in message
ink.net...
> I absolutely agree that it *appears* that the CFI messed up. Most
> accident
> sequences are pretty 'obvious', this one included. But just when you
> think
> the cause is obvious, it turns out to be something else. I've just seen
> too
> many accident reports like this to state absolutely what happened only a
> few
> days after the accident with minimal investigation.

Agreed. But Tom merely stated conservatively that mechanical failure was not
a "likely cause", based on the available evidence. If anything, I think
that's an understatement.

> Perhaps some guy taxied into the ILS critical area by mistake? Heck, I
> don't know.

Even if that happened, and went unnoticed at the time, and remains unknown
to the NTSB so far, the CFI should have gone missed upon reaching the DA
(according to topographic maps, the terrain at the crash site was at most a
few feet higher than the TDZE). And even if his altimeter or static system
*also* failed--which it didn't, given the agreement of ATC's radar with the
altitude the CFI reported moments before crashing--he should have gone
missed when he received the low-altitude alert. Even with latitude to
speculate freely, no one here has proposed a plausible scenario consistent
with the available facts that doesn't include a major blunder by the CFI
during the approach.

> While the 'obvious' conclusion is that the CFI screwed up, let's not trash
> the guy's
> name too early in the investigation.

As opposed to suggesting that his student committed a murder-suicide? :) In
any case, to propose that the CFI made a critical mistake while flying is
not to accuse him of negligence or other moral culpability; I don't think it
"trashes" him.

Aside from the apparent in-flight mistake, Tom also impugns the CFI's
judgment in undertaking the flight at all, given the reported and forecast
weather conditions. I disagree with Tom's assessment there, but that's a
different question--the actual cause of the crash, whatever it turns out to
be, isn't relevant to whether the decision to fly was warranted by the
information available to the CFI at that time; there's no need to await a
final report before debating *that* question.

--Gary

> wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 6 May 2005 17:03:31 -0600, "Michael 182"

> Well, different strokes for different folks, but there is no way I am
> doing an IPC in IMC with someone I've never flown with in an aircraft
> I've never been in.
>


Really, why not? I can see saying you want to check out the plane (which is
maintained by the same FBO the CFI works from - he can simply talk to the
head mechanic) and see my log book. The plane has dual controls. Unless I'm
suicidal what is the concern?

Michael

I guess you might call it "instructional personal minimums".

I won't launch into IMC in an aircraft I've never been in in any
event, even to do an x/c. I fly in lots of different aircraft, and
every one needs familiarization to some extent, since no two panels
are alike, and they all have their own idiosyncracies, which I don't
like discovering for the first time while IMC. Yesterday I flew in
one that wouldn't register below 13" MP once power went below that
number. I just don't like discovering that sort of thing the first
time I try to set power for an ILS descent in actual conditions and
discover it from curious and unusual aircraft performance.

As a practical matter, one needs to do partial panel approaches and
partial panel unusual attitudes during an IPC. I'm not about to
discover that the guy is not real good in recovering from steep
spirals or imminent stalls while IMC with instruments covered. It's
also sometimes difficult getting a block of atltitude from ATC to do
them in, even if I wanted to.

One other matter is the question of being PIC. I once asked an
examiner if he would be willing to conduct a practical test in IMC.
"Not on my ticket", he told me.

Mine either.




On Sat, 7 May 2005 21:44:06 -0600, "Michael 182"
> wrote:

>
> wrote in message
...
>> On Fri, 6 May 2005 17:03:31 -0600, "Michael 182"
>
>> Well, different strokes for different folks, but there is no way I am
>> doing an IPC in IMC with someone I've never flown with in an aircraft
>> I've never been in.
>>
>
>
>Really, why not? I can see saying you want to check out the plane (which is
>maintained by the same FBO the CFI works from - he can simply talk to the
>head mechanic) and see my log book. The plane has dual controls. Unless I'm
>suicidal what is the concern?
>
>Michael
>

If your "instructional personal minimums" don't include training In
IMC down to legal minimums, in an airworthy aircraft, you are cheating
your students and charging too much, at any price. My students get
what they pay for. "Not on my ticket" is not an option for a
competent instructor.

Bill Zaleski www.instrumentratings.com


On Sun, 08 May 2005 12:26:58 GMT, wrote:

>I guess you might call it "instructional personal minimums".
>
>I won't launch into IMC in an aircraft I've never been in in any
>event, even to do an x/c. I fly in lots of different aircraft, and
>every one needs familiarization to some extent, since no two panels
>are alike, and they all have their own idiosyncracies, which I don't
>like discovering for the first time while IMC. Yesterday I flew in
>one that wouldn't register below 13" MP once power went below that
>number. I just don't like discovering that sort of thing the first
>time I try to set power for an ILS descent in actual conditions and
>discover it from curious and unusual aircraft performance.
>
>As a practical matter, one needs to do partial panel approaches and
>partial panel unusual attitudes during an IPC. I'm not about to
>discover that the guy is not real good in recovering from steep
>spirals or imminent stalls while IMC with instruments covered. It's
>also sometimes difficult getting a block of atltitude from ATC to do
>them in, even if I wanted to.
>
>One other matter is the question of being PIC. I once asked an
>examiner if he would be willing to conduct a practical test in IMC.
>"Not on my ticket", he told me.
>
>Mine either.
>
>
>
>
>On Sat, 7 May 2005 21:44:06 -0600, "Michael 182"
> wrote:
>
>>
> wrote in message
...
>>> On Fri, 6 May 2005 17:03:31 -0600, "Michael 182"
>>
>>> Well, different strokes for different folks, but there is no way I am
>>> doing an IPC in IMC with someone I've never flown with in an aircraft
>>> I've never been in.
>>>
>>
>>
>>Really, why not? I can see saying you want to check out the plane (which is
>>maintained by the same FBO the CFI works from - he can simply talk to the
>>head mechanic) and see my log book. The plane has dual controls. Unless I'm
>>suicidal what is the concern?
>>
>>Michael
>>

I teach the instrument PTS in instrument conditions. It doesn't take
balls, just knowledge, skill, and confidence. I guess that it does
take balls, however, to put your real name and email address on the
NG. Where are yours? My balls have 12,000 hours of flight time. IF
you insist on flying in VMC with every instrument rated pilot and
aircraft that are new to you prior to getting wet, your comfort level
must be fairly low. Your attitude is the reason I am booked 4 months
ahead with students. The HPN incident was NOT a case of going to
minimums. It was the mistake of going below minimums. Yes, my
students get value for their training dollar, not a scarey carnival
ride. My post doesn't have any abusive language in it. Why does
yours?


On Sun, 08 May 2005 17:12:13 GMT, wrote:

>On Sun, 08 May 2005 15:44:11 GMT, Bill Zaleski
> wrote:
>
>>If your "instructional personal minimums" don't include training In
>>IMC down to legal minimums, in an airworthy aircraft, you are cheating
>>your students and charging too much, at any price. My students get
>>what they pay for. "Not on my ticket" is not an option for a
>>competent instructor.
>>
>>Bill Zaleski www.instrumentratings.com
>
>
>You ought to try reading the post before running off at the mouth.
>
>I said I would not do an IPC in IMC with a pilot I have never flown
>with in an aircraft I have never been in.
>
>That is far from "training in IMC down to legal minimums", which I do
>regularly, although it's really none of your business.
>
>And we only have your say-so that your students get what they pay for.
>Our recent thread about a CFII who was taking a student pilot to
>minimums at HPN where they were both killed was an example of a
>student who got "more than he paid for". Just because you have balls
>doesn't mean you are giving someone his money's worth of training.
>
>If you want to do unusual attitudes partial panel in IMC in a strange
>aircraft on your ticket, that's your business. Just because I think
>you are an idiot if you do, doesn't necessarily make you one.

I said "if you don't go to mins". You say that you do, so what's your
problem? You must be a troll, without a name...a touchy one at
that...


On Sun, 08 May 2005 18:59:01 GMT, wrote:

>On Sun, 08 May 2005 18:13:41 GMT, Bill Zaleski
> wrote:
>
>>My post doesn't have any abusive language in it. Why does
>>yours?
>
>
>It was probably motivated by this gratuitous assertion of yours:
>
>
>>you are cheating
>>your students and charging too much,

Sometimes I think we pilots get a little too defensive about crash talk.
Its one thing to be circumspect and relentlessly factual with the
general non-flying public, but it seems a bit short sighted to try and
kill all hangar talk among pilots.

Now it's arguable whether forums are 'communities' or 'public'. And we
all know that each aviation sub-community has it's own version of hangar
talk, acceptable subject matter, and definitions of who is 'in' and who
isn't.

We don't have the facts and probably never will beyond a reasonable
doubt - NTSB report or not. The things we seem to know are disturbing.
They are disturbing as documented in the prelim. We can defend almost
every aspect of the flight in isolation but what happened to the idea
that accidents are the result of a sequence of events. There are a whole
lot of things to learn from and think about the incomplete set of things
we read here. If some want to kill any speculation in writing, so be
it. But if we can't learn something from the little we think we know
and from reasonable speculation, we are missing an opportunity.

(this isn't aimed at Scott or anyone in particular, just a rant)

Scott Moore wrote:
> Tom Fleischman wrote:
>
>>If you want to read something really disturbing, this is it.
>>
>>http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC05FA075&rpt=p
>>
>
>
> You're right. It IS disturbing that you are ready to be judge
> and jury based on this report, which contains virtually nothing
> new.
>

That's an unfortunate setup. On my GNC 300XL setup the VOR/GPS switch
is overriden by tuning in an ILS freq. I can't display the GPS CDI when
an ILS freq is tuned.

I think it was an option during the installation but 'recommended'

Peter R. wrote:
> Gary Drescher > wrote:
> Not at all suggesting that this was the case, but at our local flight
> school that has all late model C172SPs equipped with B/K KLN-94 GPS's and
> moving maps, a number of students over the last few years have been known
> to forget to toggle the NAV/GPS switch from GPS to NAV when transitioning
> from en route to ILS approach.
>
> As you know, when this happens the VOR1 instrument would show the CDI alive
> (but really tracking the GPS's course for the localizer). The glideslope
> needle, however, would be flagged and remain perfectly centered, as if the
> pilot were flying a perfect glideslope.
>

Tom Fleischman wrote:

> Baloney, it contains a lot that is new.
>
> 1 - There was communication with the tower throughout the approach and
> the pilot was WARNED that he was too low and continued to descend
> anyway.

So ? If the instructor was in the cockpit drinking beer with the student
and jerking off with a magazine, that hardly bears on the *ridiculous*
conclusion made here that somehow this flight *never should have been
made* because it involved because it involved a student and a pilot
flying IFR. The status of the passenger was irrelivant, he/she could
have been sightseeing for all I care. If the instructor was current,
then he/she could fly IFR.

>
> 2 - It appears that his medical was out of date and he was not legal to
> be PIC on that flight.
>
> 3 - There was nothing wrong with the major aircraft systems that could
> be evaluated on the preliminary report suggesting that a mechanical
> problem was not a likely cause.
>
> 4 - It appears that American Flyers is incapable of even keeping track
> of the medical currency of their instructors, a fairly simple task.
> That is gross negligence IMHO.
>
> I don't know where you get the idea that I have set myself up as judge
> and jury on this. Obviously you have not been reading my other posts on
> the subject. But the more information that comes out on this crash the
> more disturbing it becomes.
>
> Now, what's YOUR agenda here? Eh?
>

So maybe the pilot screwed up. Maybe American fryers did. Whats the bearing
on IFR safety here ?

"I'm sorry, I'm from the FAA, you can't go IFR with that student"

"but hes not a student, hes just a passenger"

"well, thats ok then...."

BTW from the report, all you have is the airplane was low, and the instructor
knew it. You don't know why he was low, or what he was doing about it
(if anything). That's an example of your being "judge and jury" here.

"Maule Driver" > wrote in message
om...
> Sometimes I think we pilots get a little too defensive about crash talk.
> Its one thing to be circumspect and relentlessly factual with the
> general non-flying public, but it seems a bit short sighted to try and
> kill all hangar talk among pilots.
>
> Now it's arguable whether forums are 'communities' or 'public'. And we
> all know that each aviation sub-community has it's own version of hangar
> talk, acceptable subject matter, and definitions of who is 'in' and who
> isn't.
>
> We don't have the facts and probably never will beyond a reasonable
> doubt - NTSB report or not. The things we seem to know are disturbing.
> They are disturbing as documented in the prelim. We can defend almost
> every aspect of the flight in isolation but what happened to the idea
> that accidents are the result of a sequence of events. There are a whole
> lot of things to learn from and think about the incomplete set of things
> we read here. If some want to kill any speculation in writing, so be
> it. But if we can't learn something from the little we think we know
> and from reasonable speculation, we are missing an opportunity.
>
> (this isn't aimed at Scott or anyone in particular, just a rant)
>
No rant at all--your post is a good perspective on usenet in general and
this issue in particular...

Scott Moore > writes:

> [...] BTW from the report, all you have is the airplane was low,
> and the instructor knew it. You don't know why he was low, or what
> he was doing about it (if anything). That's an example of your being
> "judge and jury" here.

Tell me, just how much information would you require the feds to put
on paper before allowing yourself to form and state an educated
opinion about the wisdom of this flight?

- FChE

Frank Ch. Eigler wrote:
> Scott Moore > writes:
>
>
>>[...] BTW from the report, all you have is the airplane was low,
>>and the instructor knew it. You don't know why he was low, or what
>>he was doing about it (if anything). That's an example of your being
>>"judge and jury" here.
>
>
> Tell me, just how much information would you require the feds to put
> on paper before allowing yourself to form and state an educated
> opinion about the wisdom of this flight?
>
> - FChE

Me ? Actually, never. Fortunately, nobody asks my opinion. Our yours,
either, for that matter. Before calling any dead pilot an idiot,
I recommend everyone take a good look in the mirror.

Sound like a needle using junkie you do.

Peter R. wrote:
> During minor outpatient surgery many years ago I was hooked up to an IV and
> awaiting the arrival of the doctor. With nothing else to occupy my mind, I
> started to imagine what the IV needle must have looked like inside my vein,
> the tip of the submerged needle pressing against the inside wall of the
> vein and the suger-water dripping out of the point to mix with my blood,
> creating a pinkish hue as the mixture was carried off downstream. The
> image in my mind was so vivid I then passed out. :-)

.....I had to digress

> Sound like a needle using junkie you do.

Sound like Yoda *you* do. ;)

--
Peter

Scott Moore wrote:

> Frank Ch. Eigler wrote:
> > Tell me, just how much information would you require the feds to put
> > on paper before allowing yourself to form and state an educated
> > opinion about the wisdom of this flight?

> Me? Actually, never. Fortunately, nobody asks my opinion. Our
> yours, either, for that matter.

Does this mean that you intend henceforth to withhold your other
opinions until someone asks you for them?

> Before calling any dead pilot an idiot, I recommend everyone take a
> good look in the mirror.

(Say, was that an opinion?) These are not mutually exclusive. One
does not have to be perfect to recognize imperfection. That would be
an impossible requirement.


- FChE

> One
> does not have to be perfect to recognize imperfection. That would be
> an impossible requirement.

No, but before condemning imperfection, a look in the mirror is always
appropriate.

Jose
--
Money: what you need when you run out of brains.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

Jose > writes:

> > One does not have to be perfect to recognize imperfection. That
> > would be an impossible requirement.
>
> No, but before condemning imperfection, a look in the mirror is always
> appropriate.

Yes, but then what? This is what I don't understand about the "don't
judge" crowd. Why do you imagine that people don't consider their own
errors before making judgments? Do you think that the only
appropriate response to realizing "Oops, I have screwed up too",
is "I better not say anything about another's big screwup"?


- FChE

> Yes, but then what? This is what I don't understand about the "don't
> judge" crowd. Why do you imagine that people don't consider their own
> errors before making judgments? Do you think that the only
> appropriate response to realizing "Oops, I have screwed up too",
> is "I better not say anything about another's big screwup"?

There's a difference between "at first sight it looks like the pilot
screwed up", "the pilot royally screwed up - he shouldn't have even been
there", and "the pilot is a flaming idiot for screwing up so totally,
and with a passenger too - sheesh - nobody with half an ounce of brains
would ever do something like that".

All this before it comes out that the pilot had a heart attack, and the
passenger did his best to bring the airplane down quickly and safely.

Jose
--
Money: what you need when you run out of brains.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.