To Whom It May Concern:

The FAA has told us that the lone controller at Lexington tower turned
his back on Comair 191 and was busy with "administrative duties,
traffic count" after he cleared Comair191 for takeoff while it was on
the wrong runway. Initially, he admitted seeing Comair on the wrong
runway and later changed his testimony..

The FAA released the tapes the other day and I downloaded it from
their site at....

http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/accident_incident/comair_tapes/

If you download the ATC Communications audio (MP3) tape there and play
it, you can hear Diane English, an FAA employee, say she made the tape
from 0944 Coordinated Universal Time - 1026 Coordinated Universal Time
on August 27, 2006. The accident occurred at 1006 Coordinated
Universal Time.

If you want to understand what happened, download the tape and play it
while you read the following information....

At 06:52 into the tape, Comair 191 calls clearance delivery for his
clearance to Atlanta.

Christopher Damron, operating initials CD, the lone controller, was
working four positions. (1) Flight data/clearance delivery(FD/CD)
where he had to contact center and transmit clearances to aircraft on
one frequency, (2) Ground Control (GC) where he had to issue taxi
clearance and watch taxiing aircraft on ramp and taxiways on another
frequency, Local Control (LC) where he had to watch aircraft on the
runway and in the traffic pattern in the control zone out to five mile
radius on a third frequency, and Radar Departure Control (DC) where he
had to give heading to fly for arrivals and departures below 10,000
ft. on a fourth frequency. This is not too much to handle if things
fall in a staggered sequence, but when you get busy, someone has to
wait. You can't talk on four frequencies at once or talk to ten
aircraft at once. In the business, it's called going "Down the tubes".
During the day, all these positions are manned and in addition the
local control position can be split between two controllers. There is
a supervisor and cab coordinator (CC) also who monitor all positions
to insure safe operations. I have a photo I took a LGB where you can
see ten controllers in the tower cab.

As you listen to the tape, you will see that CD doesn't have a lot of
time to catch his breath in the minutes before Comair is cleared for
takeoff. After that, he has nothing to do. He let his guard down.
These times show it to some degrees but his transmissions are
sometimes lengthy and there is little time between each transmission.

At 06:58, CD issues Comair his clearance to ATL and..
At. 07:12 Comair reads back the clearance and admits he missed his
arrival route into ATL. CD had to spell it out for him.

At 13:30 CD makes a blanket broadcast that the ATIS has changed to
Bravo and the new altimeter setting is 30.00.

At 13:54, the controller, operating initials Charley Delta, calls
ARTCC. He doesn't key his microphone while dialing (old rotary pulse
phone) but has to key in to talk to center at 13:58. That is when you
hear CD breathing and the music in the background from the radio. He
unkeys his mike at 14:05 and the music can no longer be heard. We hear
it again at 14:09 when he keys in. ARTCC hasn't come up on the line so
the music can only be in the tower cab. At 14:08, ARTCC comes on the
line and CD requests a release on Skywest 6819. Center releases him
and CD gives his initials and hangs up at 14:12. The music stops at
that time.

At 16:04 into the tape, Comair 191 advises he is about to push back.
At 16:09, ATC responds Roger, advise ready for taxi.
At 16:11, Comair says Roger.

At 16:32 into the tape, Eagleflight 882 calls for taxi and at 16:43 he
taxis him to RWY22.
At 17:26, Skywest 6819 calls for takeoff clearance at RWY22
At 17:30, ATC says Thanks, turn right heading 270, Runway 22, cleared
for takeoff. Since there was only one active runway, it is not
required that ATC specify the runway when issuing takeoff clearance.
At 17:35, Skywest 6819 acknowledges cleared for takeoff.

At 18:33, Eagle 882 calls ready for departure
At 18:36, ATC replies, Eagle 882, roger, hold short.
At 18:40, Eagle 882 acknowledges, Hold short of the runway.

At 18:57, Comair 191 advises he is ready for taxi instructions and
states that he has Alpha. At 13:30 the ATIS changed to Bravo and he
was not aware that the ATIS had changed .This means he has listened to
the Airport Terminal Information Service (ATIS) on a separate
frequency which gives him the active runway, winds, altimeter setting,
and other NOTAMS (Notice To Airman) about taxiway closures, instrument
approach outages, lights out of service, etc. You can also hear it on
the phone, as well. In the government pages of the white pages, it's
under Transportation, Department of, FAA, ATIS. To his credit, CD
caught this and re-issued and winds and altimeter to Comair.

At 19:02, Comair 191 acknowledges that he is to taxi to rwy 22.
At 19:09, CD clears Eagle 882 for takeoff
At 19:11 CD calls radar contact on Skywest 6819 and gives him further
instrutions.

At 20:27, CD calls radar contact on Eagle 882 and gives clearance to
10,000FT.

At 20:48 CD goes on the land line and dials center (ARTCC).
At 20:55 CD again keys his mike and we hear the music. While waiting
for center, Skywest 6819 can be heard on the speaker in the background
saying he is passing 10,000ft.and requesting a turn to 300 degrees to
avoid weather. CD approves his request and immediately center comes on
the line and CD request a release on Comair. He had to be watching
Comair approaching the approach end of the short runway because he
call for the release in advance of him arriving at runway 22.


At 21:09 CD keys his mike and again we hear the music and hear him
tapping the flight progress strip for Comair191 on the console. He
asked center for a release on Comair and center issues the release, CD
gives his initials and hangs up the line.

He immediately calls another sector and requests the 300 heading for
Skywest 6819 to "get around some weather", but he had already approved
the turn for Skywest.

At 21:19, CD tells Skywest 6819 to contact center.
At 21:23 Skywest acknowledges the frequency change.

At 21:25 CD gives Eagle 882 a new heading
At 21:30 Eagle882 acknowledges the turn.

At 22:07 Comair 121 transmits that he is ready to go.

At 22:10 CD says Comair 191, Lexington Tower, fly runway heading,
cleared for takeoff.

If Comair 191 is at the approach end of the wrong runway, he is
nowhere near runway 22. In an interview CD acknowledges that he saw
Comair 191 on the wrong runway and NOT on the taxiway to runway 22,
but 30 minutes later changed his testimony.

At 22:14 Comair acknowledged fly runway heading, cleared for takeoff.

CD immediately focuses back on Eagle 882 and ...

At 22:17 CD asked Eagle 882 if the heading he gave him worked for him
or did he want a further turn to the northwest of the weather that's
ahead of him.

At 22:23 Eagle 882 says "That looks fantastic, thank you very much"

CD missed the response and...

At 22:25 CD transmits "Say again, please" to Eagle 882, while Comair
is rolling on the wrong runway. He is NOT doing traffic count as the
FAA is telling us.

At 22:26, Eagle882 repeats "This heading looks great,

At 22:30, CD is probably looking at the radar scope as he is talking
to Eagle 882 and giving him a frequency change to center.

This is 16 seconds after he cleared Comair for takeoff and he hasn't
seen him rolling on the wrong runway. He was supposed to scan his
runway when he cleared him for takeoff and should have noticed him on
the wrong runway. He claimed he did see him on the wrong runway but
said nothing to him and didn't cancel his takeoff clearance.

It's odd that a station agent for American Eagle saw Comair on the
wrong runway, but the controller claims he saw nothing,.....
eventually.

Here's the articles...

http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/16486163.htm

and..

http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/news/local/16486135.htm?
source=rss&channel=kentucky_local

In this second article, it states....

Damron told investigators that he did not know the plane had taken off
from the wrong runway until a union official, who had reviewed radar
data, told him. If Comair would have taken off on the right runway, he
would have contacted tower on departure and CD would have issued radar
contact. CD should have been at the radar scope waiting for Comairs
call instead of doing the traffic count.

According to the other tape I downloaded at the FAA site at...

http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/accident_incident/comair_tapes/

this one labeled..

ATC Phone Call to Fire and Rescue audio (MP3)*

CD pulled the crash phone and reported the aircraft crash, (an Alert
III ) at 06:29 into the tape.

Again, the crash phone recording was narrated by Diane English. The
tape runs from 1002 CUT-1013CUT on August 27, 2006

That means that CD pulls the hook at 1008:30 CUT. That is about 2 1/2
minutes after the crash. Traffic count doesn't take 2 1/2 minutes to
perform. The accident occurred at about 1006 CUT. CD had to be doing
something else for that other two minutes. What could he have been
doing for all that time? Maybe he took the clipboard over to the radio
to change stations. He wouldn't have gone to the bathroom when he was
expecting a call from Comair.

He tells the crash crew that the aircraft is off the approach end of
runway 8. That is the departure end of runway 26. 80 plus 180 degrees
is 260, BUT then he tells the crash crew the aircraft took off of
runway 22. I can't understand how he thought Comair took off runway 22
and ended up off the departure end of runway 26. If he took off of 22,
he would have had to go off the right side of runway 22 before he got
halfway down the runway.

If there would have been a second controller working the radar scope,
CD could have been watching his runway a lot closer, but that is no
excuse when the runway is the primary responsibility. CD wasn't
focusing on his primary responsibility, the runway, but let his
attention focus in the wrong direction dealing with radar traffic in
the air. Traffic count had nothing to do with this accident.

CD had three departures in a short period of time with a lot of
coordination with ARTCC. He is listening to music in the background.
If he did the traffic count when he was finished talking with
Eagle882, Comair was at the departure end of runway 26 or colliding
into the trees off the departure end. Comair crashed before he started
the traffic count. He should have seen it happening. CD should have
been watching his runway. Aircraft in the air pose little threat to
safety compared to ones on the runway.

CD never did tell us why he wasn't looking at the radar scope and
telling Comair that he had radar contact on him. He should have been
wondering why no radar target showed up at the departure end on runway
22. The traffic count scenario is just smoke and mirrors.

Today, I read an article about the FAA refusing to have weather band
radios in the control towers siting it would be a distration. Here's
the article....

http://blogs.usatoday.com/weather/2007/01/radars_yes_radi.html

According to a spokeswoman from the FAA, the decision to pull the
radios seeks to limit distractions for controllers and ensure safe
operation of the airspace.

We had a radio with a cd player in the tower cab at MYF and we used to
bring our own cd's to work and listen to them while working traffic.
Once at LGB tower, we had a portable TV in the tower cab watching a
football game and I forgot to take it home when the tower closed. The
next morning, the chief saw it and demanded to know who's it was. I
confessed and he chewed my butt until I promised him it would never
happen again.


Traffic count should be done on the hour and is a secondary function.
The crash occurred at about 6 minutes after the hour. Six minutes
prior to the accident, CD was busy with Eagle882 ready for departure.
Traffic count is not important. CD had three departures and all he had
to do was write down 0-2-0-0-0 on a clipboard to complete the traffic
count, Takes all of two seconds. Comair was on the wrong runway for
close to 25 seconds.

Here is some inside information for the layman, you don't have to turn
your back on the runway to do traffic count. You read the numbers off
the counter in front of you and put them on a clipboard, again, in
front of you. He should have been watching his radar scope when Comair
was no longer on the runway, again in front of him. There is NO reason
to turn your back.

The pilot and first officer were given toxicology tests after the
crash but I have never heard of a controller being tested for drugs or
alcohol following and accident or incident. We hear of the TSA people
reporting pilots when they smell alcohol on their breath and they have
been pulled off of airliners and registered massive amounts of alcohol
in their systems.

Since the 70's, control towers that used to be above the terminals
were moved across the airport and the public never came in contact
with us if we didn't want them around. At Christmas, pilots used to
drop off gifts for us, it's an old tradition. We got candy and
cookies, but the main item offered to us was booze, and lots of it.
Why would you want to give your controller a bottle of scotch, I never
understood it. When I tell people about all the drugs being used on
the job, the number one response I get is "Well, it's a really
stressful job, isn't it?" I guess they feel if you are in a stressful
job, you ought to be able to shoot up a little heroin now and then.

The FAA knows that the public knows nothing about the functions of a
control tower and it is easy to "hoodwink" the masses. Now you know
the truth.

I came across a letter to AvWeb from a controller claiming things are
worse now than when I blew the whistle. AvWeb has been able to confirm
her identity. Her letter is at ....

http://www.avweb.com/eletter/archives/avflash/286-printable.html

I have been at this for close to 20 years now. Who is looking out for
the safety of the flying public? The FAA ALWAYS says safety is their
number one concern. If that was true, they wouldn't have hired one on
my co-workers after he had been busted twice in the US Navy for
trafficing in drugs. And another who would come to work drunk once a
week. They would not have hired me when they knew I had vision
problems. But they fired me when I had seen it all too many times and
told my chief we were getting tipped off about random drug testing and
over half of us were using on the job. He was the one who tipped us
off the day before the drug team arrived so we could switch shifts
with a non-using controller, if we could find one. And the guy who the
chief told was the guy who was dealing all the drugs.

I have played tapes of telephone calls with my co-workers where they
admit knowledge of druguse on the job to my Congressman, Duncan
Hunter, and to the press in San Diego. Nothing is done. I have sent
the tapes to the Aviation Subcommittee of Congress and to the White
House. Nothing is done.

Who is going to stop this from happening again and again. We have been
ignored, attacked, and accused of having our own agenda by the press,
government officials, and family members of such tragedies as TW800,
Swissair111, Egyptair990, and ValuJet 592. Now one of the Comair191
family members has asked me to remove him from my mailing list.

We are the head wiring experts from Boeing and the Dept. of Defense,
airline pilots, two FAA lead airline inspectors, an FAA security
expert who reported problems at Boston Logan and resigned after the
FAA cooked his reports (before 9/11), an airline mechanic, and the
inventor of the smoke hood for airline cockpits. Everyone talks about
wanting to make sure nothing like this happens again, but when we give
them what they need to do something about it, it's "shoot the
messenger".

The press could report these crimes, but they refuse to let the people
know the truth in our land of the free. I have told reporters that if
they get this story past their editor, the next big story they will be
working on is the bear problem at the dump. How can our President say
people are jealous of our freedom?

Now YOU know the truth about what happened to Comair191. The NTSB
final report will say that the controller had his back turned away
from the runway and nothing more. If you don't believe me, look at how
the NTSB covered up the crash of VJ592 and screwed over the families
there. You can read all about it on my website at....

http://users.sdccu.net/chickenlittle

The Congress won't let me testify because they can't have everyone
knowing the real story about aviation safety and the way they are
watching over the system. We will just have to hear about more
innocent people dying by the hundreds over and over again. I will be
wasting my time for decades to come.

Regards,


James Bergquist
Air Safety Activist
Former USAF and FAA air traffic controller
Former San Diego Country NATCA representative

Very interesting reading... and while there may be plenty of blame to
pass around, when push comes to shove, the aircraft was cleared to
depart from the proper runway, but the Pilot In Command effectively
failed to ensure that they were in fact lined up on that runway. It was
his responsibility. Regardless of any and all other contributing
factors, the FAA and the air traffic controllers weren't flying the
plane, the Pilot (and his crew) was.

Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
tragedy to advance an agenda?

Dave S writes:

> Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
> tragedy to advance an agenda?

It is pretty obviously the latter. None of the data provided in the
article supports the assertions and implications made by the article
when examined closely.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

Dave S > wrote in news:T%_uh.16106$yx6.10555
@newsread2.news.pas.earthlink.net:

> Very interesting reading... and while there may be plenty of blame to
> pass around, when push comes to shove, the aircraft was cleared to
> depart from the proper runway, but the Pilot In Command effectively
> failed to ensure that they were in fact lined up on that runway. It was
> his responsibility. Regardless of any and all other contributing
> factors, the FAA and the air traffic controllers weren't flying the
> plane, the Pilot (and his crew) was.
>
> Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
> tragedy to advance an agenda?

While we pilots shouldn't depend on "safety nets", in my opinion, ATC is
our safety net for when we make mistakes.

The ATC folks that do catch our mistakes get very little media attention.
You can bet if that ATC controller had caught the mistake, it wouldn't
have made the comic page. Had that LEX mistake been caught at Ohare, it
may have made the third page.

Unfortunately, it does take a tragedy to get things changed.

In the LEX case, in my opinion, IF the controller was truly overworked,
that is where our safety net failed.

Allen

A Lieberma wrote:
> Dave S > wrote in news:T%_uh.16106$yx6.10555
> @newsread2.news.pas.earthlink.net:
>
>
>>Very interesting reading... and while there may be plenty of blame to
>>pass around, when push comes to shove, the aircraft was cleared to
>>depart from the proper runway, but the Pilot In Command effectively
>>failed to ensure that they were in fact lined up on that runway. It was
>>his responsibility. Regardless of any and all other contributing
>>factors, the FAA and the air traffic controllers weren't flying the
>>plane, the Pilot (and his crew) was.
>>
>>Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
>>tragedy to advance an agenda?
>
>
> While we pilots shouldn't depend on "safety nets", in my opinion, ATC is
> our safety net for when we make mistakes.
>
> The ATC folks that do catch our mistakes get very little media attention.
> You can bet if that ATC controller had caught the mistake, it wouldn't
> have made the comic page. Had that LEX mistake been caught at Ohare, it
> may have made the third page.
>
> Unfortunately, it does take a tragedy to get things changed.
>
> In the LEX case, in my opinion, IF the controller was truly overworked,
> that is where our safety net failed.
>
> Allen

Before folks here reject or support the message of the original poster
you should listen to the ATC tape recording while following along on the
official transcript, then draw your own conclusions as to the sole
controller's workload during the few minutes that count.

And, consider the language in the 7110.65P (in effect on the date of the
accident). Does it mean what it says, or is it simply ATO CYA "puff."
If it means what it says, doesn't that become an impossible task for a
IFR tower/TRACON staffed with only one controller, and who is acting as
local controller, ground controller, radar controller, and data
controller?

I don't have the answer; perhaps someone here does.

Pertinant references from 7110.65P

2-1-2. DUTY PRIORITY

a. Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts
as required in this order. Good judgment shall be used in prioritizing
all other provisions of this order based on the requirements of the
situation at hand.

3-1-4. COORDINATION BETWEEN LOCAL AND GROUND CONTROLLERS

Local and ground controllers shall exchange information as necessary for
the safe and efficient use of airport runways and movement areas. This
may be accomplished via verbal means, flight progress strips, other
written information, or automation displays. As a minimum, provide
aircraft identification and applicable runway/intersection/taxiway
information as follows:

a. Ground control shall notify local control when a departing aircraft
has been taxied to a runway other than one previously designated as active.

3-1-10. OBSERVED ABNORMALITIES

When requested by a pilot or when you deem it necessary, inform an
aircraft of any observed abnormal aircraft condition.

3-1-12. VISUALLY SCANNING RUNWAYS

a. Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent
possible.

b. Ground control shall assist local control in visually scanning
runways, especially when runways are in close proximity to other
movement areas.

And, finally, do safety alerts apply only to radar operations? If so,
why is it in Chapter 2 and not Chapter 4 or 5 of the 7110.65?

2-1-6. SAFETY ALERT

Issue a safety alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is in
a position/altitude which, in your judgment, places it in unsafe
proximity to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. Once the pilot
informs you action is being taken to resolve the situation, you may
discontinue the issuance of further alerts. Do not assume that because
someone else has responsibility for the aircraft that the unsafe
situation has been observed and the safety alert issued; inform the
appropriate controller.

NOTE-
1. The issuance of a safety alert is a first priority (see para 2-1-2,
Duty Priority) once the controller observes and recognizes a situation
of unsafe aircraft proximity to terrain, obstacles, or other aircraft.
Conditions, such as workload, traffic volume, the quality/limitations of
the radar system, and the available lead time to react are factors in
determining whether it is reasonable for the controller to observe and
recognize such situations. While a controller cannot see immediately the
development of every situation where a safety alert must be issued, the
controller must remain vigilant for such situations and issue a safety
alert when the situation is recognized.

2. Recognition of situations of unsafe proximity may result from
MSAW/E-MSAW/LAAS, automatic altitude readouts, Conflict/Mode C Intruder
Alert, observations on a PAR scope, or pilot reports.

3. Once the alert is issued, it is solely the pilot’s prerogative to
determine what course of action, if any, will be taken.

a. Terrain/Obstruction Alert. Immediately issue/ initiate an alert to an
aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is at an altitude which, in your
judgment, places it in unsafe proximity to terrain/obstructions. Issue
the alert as follows:

PHRASEOLOGY-
LOW ALTITUDE ALERT (call sign),
CHECK YOUR ALTITUDE IMMEDIATELY.
THE (as appropriate) MEA/MVA/MOCA/MIA IN YOUR
AREA IS (altitude),
or if an aircraft is past the final approach fix
(nonprecision approach),
or the outer marker,
or the fix used in lieu of the outer marker (precision approach),
and, if known, issue
THE (as appropriate) MDA/DH IS (altitude).

Sam Spade writes:

> Before folks here reject or support the message of the original poster
> you should listen to the ATC tape recording while following along on the
> official transcript, then draw your own conclusions as to the sole
> controller's workload during the few minutes that count.

Even if he was hopelessly overworked, the final responsibility rests
with the flight crew. And it doesn't appear that he did anything
wrong, anyway, however overworked he might have been.

Why are so many pilots so quick to cry that it's not their fault when
they are actually held accountable for their mistakes?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Mxsmanic ]
> Posted At: Sunday, January 28, 2007 10:51 AM
> Posted To: rec.aviation.ifr
> Conversation: The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he
> cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff
> Subject: Re: The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he
> cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff
>
....
>
> Why are so many pilots so quick to cry that it's not their fault when
> they are actually held accountable for their mistakes?
>
> --
> Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

Because they couldn't find the reset button?

(I just had to take the shot...)

"A Lieberma" > wrote in message
. 18...
> Dave S > wrote in news:T%_uh.16106$yx6.10555
> @newsread2.news.pas.earthlink.net:
>
>>
>> Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
>> tragedy to advance an agenda?
>
> While we pilots shouldn't depend on "safety nets", in my opinion, ATC is
> our safety net for when we make mistakes.

ATC's job is separation. If they catch something, that's dandy. As such, if
a passenger catches something, that's dandy, too.

"chickenlittle92071" > wrote in message
ups.com...
>
> To Whom It May Concern:

And Bush flew those missles into the WTC, right?

"Jim Carter" > wrote in message
news:001f01c74304$7e55a260$4b01a8c0@omnibook6100.. .
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Mxsmanic ]
>> Posted At: Sunday, January 28, 2007 10:51 AM
>> Posted To: rec.aviation.ifr
>> Conversation: The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he
>> cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff
>> Subject: Re: The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he
>> cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff
>>
> ...
>>
>> Why are so many pilots so quick to cry that it's not their fault when
>> they are actually held accountable for their mistakes?
>>
>> --
>> Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.
>
> Because they couldn't find the reset button?
>
> (I just had to take the shot...)
>
Cheap shot! :~)

Mxsmanic wrote:
> Sam Spade writes:
>
>
>>Before folks here reject or support the message of the original poster
>>you should listen to the ATC tape recording while following along on the
>>official transcript, then draw your own conclusions as to the sole
>>controller's workload during the few minutes that count.
>
>
> Even if he was hopelessly overworked, the final responsibility rests
> with the flight crew. And it doesn't appear that he did anything
> wrong, anyway, however overworked he might have been.
>
> Why are so many pilots so quick to cry that it's not their fault when
> they are actually held accountable for their mistakes?
>

You're missing my point.

Matt Barrow wrote:

> "A Lieberma" > wrote in message
> . 18...
>
>>Dave S > wrote in news:T%_uh.16106$yx6.10555
:
>>
>>
>>>Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
>>>tragedy to advance an agenda?
>>
>>While we pilots shouldn't depend on "safety nets", in my opinion, ATC is
>>our safety net for when we make mistakes.
>
>
> ATC's job is separation. If they catch something, that's dandy. As such, if
> a passenger catches something, that's dandy, too.
>
>
ATC provides separation when working IFR aircraft. The local
controllers' duties are different. They provide sequencing and safe use
of runways and takiways. "Separation" in the context of IFR separation
is not part of the local job when the Class D area is VFR.

The ATC handbook references I provided earlier certainly are pertinent
to some extent.

Matt Barrow wrote:

> "chickenlittle92071" > wrote in message
> ups.com...
>
>>To Whom It May Concern:
>
>
> And Bush flew those missles into the WTC, right?
>
>
Is that why he looks the way he does?

Sam Spade writes:

> You're missing my point.

Perhaps; what is your point? Since the pilots ultimately screwed up,
what else is there to say? No matter what the problems of the
controller may have been, it wasn't his actions that caused the
problem, and it wasn't his responsibility.

--
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Sam Spade writes:

> ATC provides separation when working IFR aircraft. The local
> controllers' duties are different. They provide sequencing and safe use
> of runways and takiways. "Separation" in the context of IFR separation
> is not part of the local job when the Class D area is VFR.

The controller did all of that here. Where's the problem?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

"Matt Barrow" > wrote in
:

> ATC's job is separation. If they catch something, that's dandy. As
> such, if a passenger catches something, that's dandy, too.

Safety / Security is in layers :-)

Note, I said ATC was a safety net, not their job for ensuring our safety
EXCEPT in IMC where we depend on ATC to maintain seperation.

Under VMC, it's our job to ensuring seperation, but ATC would be our safety
net should we miss something. Just like passengers spotting another plane,
always nice to have that handy, though IMC that's not possible (plane
spotting that is).

Allen

Mxsmanic wrote:
> Sam Spade writes:
>
>
>>You're missing my point.
>
>
> Perhaps; what is your point? Since the pilots ultimately screwed up,
> what else is there to say? No matter what the problems of the
> controller may have been, it wasn't his actions that caused the
> problem, and it wasn't his responsibility.
>

There is a theory both in law and accident investigation called
comparative negligence. Have you read the 7110.65 excerpts I posted
earlier today?

Matt Barrow wrote:

> ATC's job is separation. If they catch something, that's dandy. As such, if
> a passenger catches something, that's dandy, too.
>
>
Towers do darn little separation as well.

"A Lieberma" > wrote in message
. 18...
> "Matt Barrow" > wrote in
> :
>
>> ATC's job is separation. If they catch something, that's dandy. As
>> such, if a passenger catches something, that's dandy, too.
>
> Safety / Security is in layers :-)
>
> Note, I said ATC was a safety net, not their job for ensuring our safety
> EXCEPT in IMC where we depend on ATC to maintain seperation.
>
> Under VMC, it's our job to ensuring seperation, but ATC would be our
> safety
> net should we miss something. Just like passengers spotting another
> plane,
> always nice to have that handy, though IMC that's not possible (plane
> spotting that is).
>
A safety net exists to catch mistakes.

Under your scenario, you're relying on ATC as a backup. I'd say that's a bad
idea to have that notion in that back of ones head. This, though, in no way
takes away from asking for specific assistance as a situation warrants.

"Ron Natalie" > wrote in message
...
> Matt Barrow wrote:
>
>> ATC's job is separation. If they catch something, that's dandy. As such,
>> if a passenger catches something, that's dandy, too.
> Towers do darn little separation as well.

Okay, separation and sequencing.

But they are NOT a safety net, which as I point out in another post, exists
to catch mistakes. ATC is NOT our co-pilot.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> ATC provides separation when working IFR aircraft. The local controllers'
> duties are different. They provide sequencing and safe use of runways and
> takiways. "Separation" in the context of IFR separation is not part of
> the local job when the Class D area is VFR.
>

ATC provides runway separation to IFR and VFR aircraft.

Steven P. McNicoll writes:

> ATC provides runway separation to IFR and VFR aircraft.

What other aircraft were on the closed runway?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

"Matt Barrow" > wrote in
:

> A safety net exists to catch mistakes.
>
> Under your scenario, you're relying on ATC as a backup. I'd say that's
> a bad idea to have that notion in that back of ones head. This,
> though, in no way takes away from asking for specific assistance as a
> situation warrants.

Actually, I disagree as your definition of safety net must be different
then mine.

I am hoping ATC saves my skin should I bungle something up, no different
than a trapeze artist using the safety net to save their bacon. A safety
net is there as a "last resort".

I'd have a better chance of NOT doing something stupid with ATC as a safety
net (like flying into P40), then flying willy nilly without the extra
"insurance / safety net / professional eyes" of ATC.

I do not rely on ATC as a backup to make decisions.

Allen

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
> "Sam Spade" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>ATC provides separation when working IFR aircraft. The local controllers'
>>duties are different. They provide sequencing and safe use of runways and
>>takiways. "Separation" in the context of IFR separation is not part of
>>the local job when the Class D area is VFR.
>>
>
>
> ATC provides runway separation to IFR and VFR aircraft.
>
>
I think I state that by saying "safe use of runways."

Dave S > wrote:

>Very interesting reading... and while there may be plenty of blame to
>pass around, when push comes to shove, the aircraft was cleared to
>depart from the proper runway, but the Pilot In Command effectively
>failed to ensure that they were in fact lined up on that runway. It was
>his responsibility. Regardless of any and all other contributing
>factors, the FAA and the air traffic controllers weren't flying the
>plane, the Pilot (and his crew) was.
>
>Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
>tragedy to advance an agenda?

It was obvious very soon after the crash (several days) that the
pilots (two) screwed up. Try as you want to blame others there were
two people responsible for taking off the ONLY viable runway for their
aircraft and they blew it.

Ron Lee

Ron Lee wrote:

>
> It was obvious very soon after the crash (several days) that the
> pilots (two) screwed up. Try as you want to blame others there were
> two people responsible for taking off the ONLY viable runway for their
> aircraft and they blew it.
>
> Ron Lee
>

Knowing the heading bugs were set on 227 helps me. I didn't know that
until the last couple of days.

chickenlittle92071 wrote:

> To Whom It May Concern:
>
> The FAA has told us that the lone controller at Lexington tower turned
> his back on Comair 191 and was busy with "administrative duties,
> traffic count" after he cleared Comair191 for takeoff while it was on
> the wrong runway. Initially, he admitted seeing Comair on the wrong
> runway and later changed his testimony..

Rather than take your word for it, please refer us to his recanted and
present testimony.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> I think I state that by saying "safe use of runways."
>

You stated that ATC provides separation when working IFR aircraft and that
the local controllers duties are different. Your statement was incorrect,
the local controller does provide separation.

Sam Spade wrote:

>>
> ATC provides separation when working IFR aircraft. The local
> controllers' duties are different.

No they are not.



They provide sequencing and safe use
> of runways and takiways. "Separation" in the context of IFR separation
> is not part of the local job when the Class D area is VFR.


It most certainly is and the weather is irrelevant.

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
> "Sam Spade" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>I think I state that by saying "safe use of runways."
>>
>
>
> You stated that ATC provides separation when working IFR aircraft and that
> the local controllers duties are different. Your statement was incorrect,
> the local controller does provide separation.
>
>
You would rather argue than quote me accurately. I said,

"Separation" in the context of IFR separation
is not part of the local job when the Class D area is VFR.

What part of "in the context of IFR separation" do you not understand?

Newps wrote:

>
>
> Sam Spade wrote:
>
>>>
>> ATC provides separation when working IFR aircraft. The local
>> controllers' duties are different.
>
>
> No they are not.

There aren't any VFR towers these days? There aren't any aircraft not
on VFR flight plans these days?
>
>
>
> They provide sequencing and safe use
>
>> of runways and takiways. "Separation" in the context of IFR
>> separation is not part of the local job when the Class D area is VFR.
>
>
>
> It most certainly is and the weather is irrelevant.
>
>
Visual separation of IFR aircraft is no longer used?

Sam Spade wrote:
> Newps wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Sam Spade wrote:
>>
>>>>
>>> ATC provides separation when working IFR aircraft. The local
>>> controllers' duties are different.
>>
>>
>> No they are not.
>
> There aren't any VFR towers these days?




You said the local controllers duties are different, saying they do not
provide separation. The local controller ensures initial IFR separation
between IFR arrivals and departures.





>>
>"Separation" in the context of IFR
>>> separation is not part of the local job when the Class D area is VFR.
>>
>>
>>
>> It most certainly is and the weather is irrelevant.
>>
>>
> Visual separation of IFR aircraft is no longer used?


You said separation is not part of the local job. IFR separation is
always part of the job. The weather is irrelevant. If visual
separation is used you have to have approved separation both before and
after the application of visual.

Newps wrote:
>
>
> Sam Spade wrote:
>
>> Newps wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Sam Spade wrote:
>>>
>>>>>
>>>> ATC provides separation when working IFR aircraft. The local
>>>> controllers' duties are different.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No they are not.
>>
>>
>> There aren't any VFR towers these days?
>
>
>
>
>
> You said the local controllers duties are different, saying they do not
> provide separation. The local controller ensures initial IFR separation
> between IFR arrivals and departures.
>
>

>
>
>
>>>
>> "Separation" in the context of IFR
>>
>>>> separation is not part of the local job when the Class D area is VFR.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It most certainly is and the weather is irrelevant.
>>>
>>>
>> Visual separation of IFR aircraft is no longer used?
>
>
>
> You said separation is not part of the local job. IFR separation is
> always part of the job. The weather is irrelevant. If visual
> separation is used you have to have approved separation both before and
> after the application of visual.
>
>
When I am cleared for a visual I am told to maintain my own separation.
I guess you are referring to the tower applying visual separation
without telling me?

I still fail to understand where a VFR tower does other than release
aircraft and accept them as the IFR controlling facility tells them.

I understand that local controller at an IFR tower does some limited
separation duties, again in accordance with the IFR controlling agency,
whether it be a TRACON downstairs or a center.

Those duties are quite limited compared to runway and ground movement
activities.

Sam Spade wrote:

> When I am cleared for a visual I am told to maintain my own separation.


If you see the airplane in front of you, yes, you are told to follow it.
Or if the aircraft is landing on a different runway you would be told
to maintain visual.


> I guess you are referring to the tower applying visual separation
> without telling me?

They can, between you and a departure.



>
> I still fail to understand where a VFR tower does other than release
> aircraft and accept them as the IFR controlling facility tells them.


They are responsible for the initial separation, either as specified by
the radar facility or in a letter of agreement.

Newps wrote:


>>
>> I still fail to understand where a VFR tower does other than release
>> aircraft and accept them as the IFR controlling facility tells them.
>
>
>
> They are responsible for the initial separation, either as specified by
> the radar facility or in a letter of agreement.
>

I don't want to whip this puppy to death, but if ACME TRACON tells PDQ
VFR tower to "release N1234C at 24 minutes past the hour, void after 27
past the hour" what possible separation duties is the tower performing
other than to comply with the release time, which assures the separation
the TRACON is providing will, in fact, happen.

Sam Spade wrote:

>
> I don't want to whip this puppy to death, but if ACME TRACON tells PDQ
> VFR tower to "release N1234C at 24 minutes past the hour, void after 27
> past the hour"


They don't give a release like that to a tower. That's FSS stuff only.
The tower will be given the release with any restrictions such as
altitude and/or heading.



what possible separation duties is the tower performing
> other than to comply with the release time, which assures the separation
> the TRACON is providing will, in fact, happen.


The release will be given and the tower has to separate the departure(s)
from any arrivals already talking to the tower. The tower has to ensure
initial separation from successive departures, especially diverging
runways where the departures then have to turn back toward each other to
get to their radar assigned headings.

Newps > wrote in
:

> They don't give a release like that to a tower. That's FSS stuff
> only.

FSS gives releases?????

I was always told FSS passes on FSS clearances and you get a ATC clearance
through FSS.

Allen

A Lieberma wrote:
> Newps > wrote in
> :
>
>> They don't give a release like that to a tower. That's FSS stuff
>> only.
>
> FSS gives releases?????


It's the type of release given to a FSS.

Sam Spade writes:

> I don't want to whip this puppy to death ...

All I see is dry puppy-shaped bones.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

Newps wrote:

>
>
> Sam Spade wrote:
>
>>
>> I don't want to whip this puppy to death, but if ACME TRACON tells PDQ
>> VFR tower to "release N1234C at 24 minutes past the hour, void after
>> 27 past the hour"
>
>
>
> They don't give a release like that to a tower. That's FSS stuff only.
> The tower will be given the release with any restrictions such as
> altitude and/or heading.
>
>
>
> what possible separation duties is the tower performing
>
>> other than to comply with the release time, which assures the
>> separation the TRACON is providing will, in fact, happen.
>
>
>
> The release will be given and the tower has to separate the departure(s)
> from any arrivals already talking to the tower. The tower has to ensure
> initial separation from successive departures, especially diverging
> runways where the departures then have to turn back toward each other to
> get to their radar assigned headings.

That sounds like an IFR tower.

Mxsmanic wrote:

> Sam Spade writes:
>
>
>>I don't want to whip this puppy to death ...
>
>
> All I see is dry puppy-shaped bones.
>

Yeah, but you don't have a clue about the issue being discussed.

Sam Spade wrote:
> Newps wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Sam Spade wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I don't want to whip this puppy to death, but if ACME TRACON tells
>>> PDQ VFR tower to "release N1234C at 24 minutes past the hour, void
>>> after 27 past the hour"
>>
>>
>>
>> They don't give a release like that to a tower. That's FSS stuff
>> only. The tower will be given the release with any restrictions such
>> as altitude and/or heading.
>>
>>
>>
>> what possible separation duties is the tower performing
>>
>>> other than to comply with the release time, which assures the
>>> separation the TRACON is providing will, in fact, happen.
>>
>>
>>
>> The release will be given and the tower has to separate the
>> departure(s) from any arrivals already talking to the tower. The
>> tower has to ensure initial separation from successive departures,
>> especially diverging runways where the departures then have to turn
>> back toward each other to get to their radar assigned headings.
>
> That sounds like an IFR tower.




An IFR tower doesn't call for release.

So what's your point?
The controller did not take off ont he wrong runway. The PIC and SIC
did. End of story.

chickenlittle92071 wrote:
> To Whom It May Concern:
>
> The FAA has told us that the lone controller at Lexington tower turned
> his back on Comair 191 and was busy with "administrative duties,
> traffic count" after he cleared Comair191 for takeoff while it was on
> the wrong runway. Initially, he admitted seeing Comair on the wrong
> runway and later changed his testimony..
>
> The FAA released the tapes the other day and I downloaded it from
> their site at....
>
> http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/accident_incident/comair_tapes/
>
> If you download the ATC Communications audio (MP3) tape there and play
> it, you can hear Diane English, an FAA employee, say she made the tape
> from 0944 Coordinated Universal Time - 1026 Coordinated Universal Time
> on August 27, 2006. The accident occurred at 1006 Coordinated
> Universal Time.
>
> If you want to understand what happened, download the tape and play it
> while you read the following information....
>
> At 06:52 into the tape, Comair 191 calls clearance delivery for his
> clearance to Atlanta.
>
> Christopher Damron, operating initials CD, the lone controller, was
> working four positions. (1) Flight data/clearance delivery(FD/CD)
> where he had to contact center and transmit clearances to aircraft on
> one frequency, (2) Ground Control (GC) where he had to issue taxi
> clearance and watch taxiing aircraft on ramp and taxiways on another
> frequency, Local Control (LC) where he had to watch aircraft on the
> runway and in the traffic pattern in the control zone out to five mile
> radius on a third frequency, and Radar Departure Control (DC) where he
> had to give heading to fly for arrivals and departures below 10,000
> ft. on a fourth frequency. This is not too much to handle if things
> fall in a staggered sequence, but when you get busy, someone has to
> wait. You can't talk on four frequencies at once or talk to ten
> aircraft at once. In the business, it's called going "Down the tubes".
> During the day, all these positions are manned and in addition the
> local control position can be split between two controllers. There is
> a supervisor and cab coordinator (CC) also who monitor all positions
> to insure safe operations. I have a photo I took a LGB where you can
> see ten controllers in the tower cab.
>
> As you listen to the tape, you will see that CD doesn't have a lot of
> time to catch his breath in the minutes before Comair is cleared for
> takeoff. After that, he has nothing to do. He let his guard down.
> These times show it to some degrees but his transmissions are
> sometimes lengthy and there is little time between each transmission.
>
> At 06:58, CD issues Comair his clearance to ATL and..
> At. 07:12 Comair reads back the clearance and admits he missed his
> arrival route into ATL. CD had to spell it out for him.
>
> At 13:30 CD makes a blanket broadcast that the ATIS has changed to
> Bravo and the new altimeter setting is 30.00.
>
> At 13:54, the controller, operating initials Charley Delta, calls
> ARTCC. He doesn't key his microphone while dialing (old rotary pulse
> phone) but has to key in to talk to center at 13:58. That is when you
> hear CD breathing and the music in the background from the radio. He
> unkeys his mike at 14:05 and the music can no longer be heard. We hear
> it again at 14:09 when he keys in. ARTCC hasn't come up on the line so
> the music can only be in the tower cab. At 14:08, ARTCC comes on the
> line and CD requests a release on Skywest 6819. Center releases him
> and CD gives his initials and hangs up at 14:12. The music stops at
> that time.
>
> At 16:04 into the tape, Comair 191 advises he is about to push back.
> At 16:09, ATC responds Roger, advise ready for taxi.
> At 16:11, Comair says Roger.
>
> At 16:32 into the tape, Eagleflight 882 calls for taxi and at 16:43 he
> taxis him to RWY22.
> At 17:26, Skywest 6819 calls for takeoff clearance at RWY22
> At 17:30, ATC says Thanks, turn right heading 270, Runway 22, cleared
> for takeoff. Since there was only one active runway, it is not
> required that ATC specify the runway when issuing takeoff clearance.
> At 17:35, Skywest 6819 acknowledges cleared for takeoff.
>
> At 18:33, Eagle 882 calls ready for departure
> At 18:36, ATC replies, Eagle 882, roger, hold short.
> At 18:40, Eagle 882 acknowledges, Hold short of the runway.
>
> At 18:57, Comair 191 advises he is ready for taxi instructions and
> states that he has Alpha. At 13:30 the ATIS changed to Bravo and he
> was not aware that the ATIS had changed .This means he has listened to
> the Airport Terminal Information Service (ATIS) on a separate
> frequency which gives him the active runway, winds, altimeter setting,
> and other NOTAMS (Notice To Airman) about taxiway closures, instrument
> approach outages, lights out of service, etc. You can also hear it on
> the phone, as well. In the government pages of the white pages, it's
> under Transportation, Department of, FAA, ATIS. To his credit, CD
> caught this and re-issued and winds and altimeter to Comair.
>
> At 19:02, Comair 191 acknowledges that he is to taxi to rwy 22.
> At 19:09, CD clears Eagle 882 for takeoff
> At 19:11 CD calls radar contact on Skywest 6819 and gives him further
> instrutions.
>
> At 20:27, CD calls radar contact on Eagle 882 and gives clearance to
> 10,000FT.
>
> At 20:48 CD goes on the land line and dials center (ARTCC).
> At 20:55 CD again keys his mike and we hear the music. While waiting
> for center, Skywest 6819 can be heard on the speaker in the background
> saying he is passing 10,000ft.and requesting a turn to 300 degrees to
> avoid weather. CD approves his request and immediately center comes on
> the line and CD request a release on Comair. He had to be watching
> Comair approaching the approach end of the short runway because he
> call for the release in advance of him arriving at runway 22.
>
>
> At 21:09 CD keys his mike and again we hear the music and hear him
> tapping the flight progress strip for Comair191 on the console. He
> asked center for a release on Comair and center issues the release, CD
> gives his initials and hangs up the line.
>
> He immediately calls another sector and requests the 300 heading for
> Skywest 6819 to "get around some weather", but he had already approved
> the turn for Skywest.
>
> At 21:19, CD tells Skywest 6819 to contact center.
> At 21:23 Skywest acknowledges the frequency change.
>
> At 21:25 CD gives Eagle 882 a new heading
> At 21:30 Eagle882 acknowledges the turn.
>
> At 22:07 Comair 121 transmits that he is ready to go.
>
> At 22:10 CD says Comair 191, Lexington Tower, fly runway heading,
> cleared for takeoff.
>
> If Comair 191 is at the approach end of the wrong runway, he is
> nowhere near runway 22. In an interview CD acknowledges that he saw
> Comair 191 on the wrong runway and NOT on the taxiway to runway 22,
> but 30 minutes later changed his testimony.
>
> At 22:14 Comair acknowledged fly runway heading, cleared for takeoff.
>
> CD immediately focuses back on Eagle 882 and ...
>
> At 22:17 CD asked Eagle 882 if the heading he gave him worked for him
> or did he want a further turn to the northwest of the weather that's
> ahead of him.
>
> At 22:23 Eagle 882 says "That looks fantastic, thank you very much"
>
> CD missed the response and...
>
> At 22:25 CD transmits "Say again, please" to Eagle 882, while Comair
> is rolling on the wrong runway. He is NOT doing traffic count as the
> FAA is telling us.
>
> At 22:26, Eagle882 repeats "This heading looks great,
>
> At 22:30, CD is probably looking at the radar scope as he is talking
> to Eagle 882 and giving him a frequency change to center.
>
> This is 16 seconds after he cleared Comair for takeoff and he hasn't
> seen him rolling on the wrong runway. He was supposed to scan his
> runway when he cleared him for takeoff and should have noticed him on
> the wrong runway. He claimed he did see him on the wrong runway but
> said nothing to him and didn't cancel his takeoff clearance.
>
> It's odd that a station agent for American Eagle saw Comair on the
> wrong runway, but the controller claims he saw nothing,.....
> eventually.
>
> Here's the articles...
>
> http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/16486163.htm
>
> and..
>
> http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/news/local/16486135.htm?
> source=rss&channel=kentucky_local
>
> In this second article, it states....
>
> Damron told investigators that he did not know the plane had taken off
> from the wrong runway until a union official, who had reviewed radar
> data, told him. If Comair would have taken off on the right runway, he
> would have contacted tower on departure and CD would have issued radar
> contact. CD should have been at the radar scope waiting for Comairs
> call instead of doing the traffic count.
>
> According to the other tape I downloaded at the FAA site at...
>
> http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/accident_incident/comair_tapes/
>
> this one labeled..
>
> ATC Phone Call to Fire and Rescue audio (MP3)*
>
> CD pulled the crash phone and reported the aircraft crash, (an Alert
> III ) at 06:29 into the tape.
>
> Again, the crash phone recording was narrated by Diane English. The
> tape runs from 1002 CUT-1013CUT on August 27, 2006
>
> That means that CD pulls the hook at 1008:30 CUT. That is about 2 1/2
> minutes after the crash. Traffic count doesn't take 2 1/2 minutes to
> perform. The accident occurred at about 1006 CUT. CD had to be doing
> something else for that other two minutes. What could he have been
> doing for all that time? Maybe he took the clipboard over to the radio
> to change stations. He wouldn't have gone to the bathroom when he was
> expecting a call from Comair.
>
> He tells the crash crew that the aircraft is off the approach end of
> runway 8. That is the departure end of runway 26. 80 plus 180 degrees
> is 260, BUT then he tells the crash crew the aircraft took off of
> runway 22. I can't understand how he thought Comair took off runway 22
> and ended up off the departure end of runway 26. If he took off of 22,
> he would have had to go off the right side of runway 22 before he got
> halfway down the runway.
>
> If there would have been a second controller working the radar scope,
> CD could have been watching his runway a lot closer, but that is no
> excuse when the runway is the primary responsibility. CD wasn't
> focusing on his primary responsibility, the runway, but let his
> attention focus in the wrong direction dealing with radar traffic in
> the air. Traffic count had nothing to do with this accident.
>
> CD had three departures in a short period of time with a lot of
> coordination with ARTCC. He is listening to music in the background.
> If he did the traffic count when he was finished talking with
> Eagle882, Comair was at the departure end of runway 26 or colliding
> into the trees off the departure end. Comair crashed before he started
> the traffic count. He should have seen it happening. CD should have
> been watching his runway. Aircraft in the air pose little threat to
> safety compared to ones on the runway.
>
> CD never did tell us why he wasn't looking at the radar scope and
> telling Comair that he had radar contact on him. He should have been
> wondering why no radar target showed up at the departure end on runway
> 22. The traffic count scenario is just smoke and mirrors.
>
> Today, I read an article about the FAA refusing to have weather band
> radios in the control towers siting it would be a distration. Here's
> the article....
>
> http://blogs.usatoday.com/weather/2007/01/radars_yes_radi.html
>
> According to a spokeswoman from the FAA, the decision to pull the
> radios seeks to limit distractions for controllers and ensure safe
> operation of the airspace.
>
> We had a radio with a cd player in the tower cab at MYF and we used to
> bring our own cd's to work and listen to them while working traffic.
> Once at LGB tower, we had a portable TV in the tower cab watching a
> football game and I forgot to take it home when the tower closed. The
> next morning, the chief saw it and demanded to know who's it was. I
> confessed and he chewed my butt until I promised him it would never
> happen again.
>
>
> Traffic count should be done on the hour and is a secondary function.
> The crash occurred at about 6 minutes after the hour. Six minutes
> prior to the accident, CD was busy with Eagle882 ready for departure.
> Traffic count is not important. CD had three departures and all he had
> to do was write down 0-2-0-0-0 on a clipboard to complete the traffic
> count, Takes all of two seconds. Comair was on the wrong runway for
> close to 25 seconds.
>
> Here is some inside information for the layman, you don't have to turn
> your back on the runway to do traffic count. You read the numbers off
> the counter in front of you and put them on a clipboard, again, in
> front of you. He should have been watching his radar scope when Comair
> was no longer on the runway, again in front of him. There is NO reason
> to turn your back.
>
> The pilot and first officer were given toxicology tests after the
> crash but I have never heard of a controller being tested for drugs or
> alcohol following and accident or incident. We hear of the TSA people
> reporting pilots when they smell alcohol on their breath and they have
> been pulled off of airliners and registered massive amounts of alcohol
> in their systems.
>
> Since the 70's, control towers that used to be above the terminals
> were moved across the airport and the public never came in contact
> with us if we didn't want them around. At Christmas, pilots used to
> drop off gifts for us, it's an old tradition. We got candy and
> cookies, but the main item offered to us was booze, and lots of it.
> Why would you want to give your controller a bottle of scotch, I never
> understood it. When I tell people about all the drugs being used on
> the job, the number one response I get is "Well, it's a really
> stressful job, isn't it?" I guess they feel if you are in a stressful
> job, you ought to be able to shoot up a little heroin now and then.
>
> The FAA knows that the public knows nothing about the functions of a
> control tower and it is easy to "hoodwink" the masses. Now you know
> the truth.
>
> I came across a letter to AvWeb from a controller claiming things are
> worse now than when I blew the whistle. AvWeb has been able to confirm
> her identity. Her letter is at ....
>
> http://www.avweb.com/eletter/archives/avflash/286-printable.html
>
> I have been at this for close to 20 years now. Who is looking out for
> the safety of the flying public? The FAA ALWAYS says safety is their
> number one concern. If that was true, they wouldn't have hired one on
> my co-workers after he had been busted twice in the US Navy for
> trafficing in drugs. And another who would come to work drunk once a
> week. They would not have hired me when they knew I had vision
> problems. But they fired me when I had seen it all too many times and
> told my chief we were getting tipped off about random drug testing and
> over half of us were using on the job. He was the one who tipped us
> off the day before the drug team arrived so we could switch shifts
> with a non-using controller, if we could find one. And the guy who the
> chief told was the guy who was dealing all the drugs.
>
> I have played tapes of telephone calls with my co-workers where they
> admit knowledge of druguse on the job to my Congressman, Duncan
> Hunter, and to the press in San Diego. Nothing is done. I have sent
> the tapes to the Aviation Subcommittee of Congress and to the White
> House. Nothing is done.
>
> Who is going to stop this from happening again and again. We have been
> ignored, attacked, and accused of having our own agenda by the press,
> government officials, and family members of such tragedies as TW800,
> Swissair111, Egyptair990, and ValuJet 592. Now one of the Comair191
> family members has asked me to remove him from my mailing list.
>
> We are the head wiring experts from Boeing and the Dept. of Defense,
> airline pilots, two FAA lead airline inspectors, an FAA security
> expert who reported problems at Boston Logan and resigned after the
> FAA cooked his reports (before 9/11), an airline mechanic, and the
> inventor of the smoke hood for airline cockpits. Everyone talks about
> wanting to make sure nothing like this happens again, but when we give
> them what they need to do something about it, it's "shoot the
> messenger".
>
> The press could report these crimes, but they refuse to let the people
> know the truth in our land of the free. I have told reporters that if
> they get this story past their editor, the next big story they will be
> working on is the bear problem at the dump. How can our President say
> people are jealous of our freedom?
>
> Now YOU know the truth about what happened to Comair191. The NTSB
> final report will say that the controller had his back turned away
> from the runway and nothing more. If you don't believe me, look at how
> the NTSB covered up the crash of VJ592 and screwed over the families
> there. You can read all about it on my website at....
>
> http://users.sdccu.net/chickenlittle
>
> The Congress won't let me testify because they can't have everyone
> knowing the real story about aviation safety and the way they are
> watching over the system. We will just have to hear about more
> innocent people dying by the hundreds over and over again. I will be
> wasting my time for decades to come.
>
> Regards,
>
>
> James Bergquist
> Air Safety Activist
> Former USAF and FAA air traffic controller
> Former San Diego Country NATCA representative
>

Newps wrote:

>
>
> An IFR tower doesn't call for release.

I have been reviewing the transcript and actual tape of the Lexingon
tower during the period pertinent to the crash of Comair 5191. The
tower controller called the center for a release for each IFR departure
on the tape.

Then they give the radar back to the center for the night. No radar
facility has to call center for a release under normal circumstances.
Some things that may pop up that require a call are weather or accident
related ground stops and ground delay programs. A loss of automation
can also necessitate a call for release program.




Sam Spade wrote:
> Newps wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> An IFR tower doesn't call for release.
>
> I have been reviewing the transcript and actual tape of the Lexingon
> tower during the period pertinent to the crash of Comair 5191. The
> tower controller called the center for a release for each IFR departure
> on the tape.

Newps wrote:


>
>
> An IFR tower doesn't call for release.

This is from the NTSB ATC Chairman's report about Comair 5191 and
confirmed by the transcript and ATC tape:

"At 0447 (UTC), all LEX tower and radar positions were combined and
being worked from the local control position in the tower cab. In
addition to those functons, the tower controller was responsible for
obtaining releases from the Indianapolis (ZID) Air Route Traffic Control
Center (ARTCC) Traffic Management Unit (TMU), and recording the ATIS
broadcast and all other operational and administrative duties required
of a tower/radar facility."

Newps wrote:
> Then they give the radar back to the center for the night. No radar
> facility has to call center for a release under normal circumstances.
> Some things that may pop up that require a call are weather or accident
> related ground stops and ground delay programs. A loss of automation
> can also necessitate a call for release program.
>
I guess that was the case. The local controller was using the ASR and
did approve a heading change for weather for one aircraft but he let the
Center know about that.

It sounds confusing. A G/A pilot could show up VFR 25 miles out and
call LEX Approach for an ILS. Would the local controller ship him off
to Indy Center or would he call Indy for permission to vector the guy
onto the ILS?

Sam Spade wrote:
> Newps wrote:
>
>
>>
>>
>> An IFR tower doesn't call for release.
>
> This is from the NTSB ATC Chairman's report about Comair 5191 and
> confirmed by the transcript and ATC tape:
>
> "At 0447 (UTC), all LEX tower and radar positions were combined and
> being worked from the local control position in the tower cab. In
> addition to those functons, the tower controller was responsible for
> obtaining releases from the Indianapolis (ZID) Air Route Traffic Control
> Center (ARTCC) Traffic Management Unit (TMU), and recording the ATIS
> broadcast and all other operational and administrative duties required
> of a tower/radar facility."

It would be nice to see what their LOA with the center shows. Having to
call TMU is a tip off that something was going on. TMU are not
controllers, they don't work any airplanes, they have no airspace. TMU
are the guys you call when a ground stop/delay program is going on. If
you want a regular old release you call the radar controller who owns
the airspace.

Sam Spade wrote:
> Newps wrote:
>> Then they give the radar back to the center for the night. No radar
>> facility has to call center for a release under normal circumstances.
>> Some things that may pop up that require a call are weather or
>> accident related ground stops and ground delay programs. A loss of
>> automation can also necessitate a call for release program.
>>
> I guess that was the case. The local controller was using the ASR and
> did approve a heading change for weather for one aircraft but he let the
> Center know about that.

Yep, that's required as the LOA with the center normally says the
aircraft will be on course or a vector to intercept their on course
heading within the approach controls airspace.



>
> It sounds confusing. A G/A pilot could show up VFR 25 miles out and
> call LEX Approach for an ILS. Would the local controller ship him off
> to Indy Center or would he call Indy for permission to vector the guy
> onto the ILS?



A radar controller doesn't have to call anybody else to vector aircraft
within his own airspace.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> You would rather argue than quote me accurately. I said,
>
> "Separation" in the context of IFR separation
> is not part of the local job when the Class D area is VFR.
>
> What part of "in the context of IFR separation" do you not understand?
>

I didn't quote you at all. What I said about what you wrote is completely
accurate, however. You wrote:

"ATC provides separation when working IFR aircraft. The local controllers'
duties are different. They provide sequencing and safe use of runways and
takiways. 'Separation' in the context of IFR separation is not part of the
local job when the Class D area is VFR."

I don't know where you picked up your limited knowledge of ATC, but it is
completely wrong. Where did you get the idea that IFR separation
requirements in Class D airspace changed with the weather? What made you
think IFR separation was not part of the local controller's job? And what
is a takiway?

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
> "Sam Spade" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>You would rather argue than quote me accurately. I said,
>>
>> "Separation" in the context of IFR separation
>> is not part of the local job when the Class D area is VFR.
>>
>>What part of "in the context of IFR separation" do you not understand?
>>
>
>
> I didn't quote you at all. What I said about what you wrote is completely
> accurate, however. You wrote:
>
> "ATC provides separation when working IFR aircraft. The local controllers'
> duties are different. They provide sequencing and safe use of runways and
> takiways. 'Separation' in the context of IFR separation is not part of the
> local job when the Class D area is VFR."
>
> I don't know where you picked up your limited knowledge of ATC, but it is
> completely wrong. Where did you get the idea that IFR separation
> requirements in Class D airspace changed with the weather? What made you
> think IFR separation was not part of the local controller's job? And what
> is a takiway?
>
>
My point was that IFR separation is a limited part of the duties of
local control at an IFR tower and almost none (to none) of the duty of a
local controller at a VFR tower.

My knowledge of how ATC operates is limited, as I am not a controller.
I am a professional pilot and work with TERPs criteria. Those two areas
are your areas of limited knowledge.

Cooperation works better than contention, but I know you prefer the
latter, especially when you would even comment on "takiway." That is
petty, at best.

"chickenlittle92071" > wrote in message
ups.com...
>
> Christopher Damron, operating initials CD, the lone controller, was
> working four positions. (1) Flight data/clearance delivery(FD/CD)
> where he had to contact center and transmit clearances to aircraft on
> one frequency, (2) Ground Control (GC) where he had to issue taxi
> clearance and watch taxiing aircraft on ramp and taxiways on another
> frequency, Local Control (LC) where he had to watch aircraft on the
> runway and in the traffic pattern in the control zone out to five mile
> radius on a third frequency, and Radar Departure Control (DC) where he
> had to give heading to fly for arrivals and departures below 10,000
> ft. on a fourth frequency. This is not too much to handle if things
> fall in a staggered sequence, but when you get busy, someone has to
> wait. You can't talk on four frequencies at once or talk to ten
> aircraft at once. In the business, it's called going "Down the tubes".
> During the day, all these positions are manned and in addition the
> local control position can be split between two controllers. There is
> a supervisor and cab coordinator (CC) also who monitor all positions
> to insure safe operations. I have a photo I took a LGB where you can
> see ten controllers in the tower cab.
>

Actually, it's quite easy to talk on four or more frequencies at once.


>
> As you listen to the tape, you will see that CD doesn't have a lot of
> time to catch his breath in the minutes before Comair is cleared for
> takeoff. After that, he has nothing to do. He let his guard down.
> These times show it to some degrees but his transmissions are
> sometimes lengthy and there is little time between each transmission.
>

It doesn't appear he needed to catch his breath. Traffic was very light.


>
> At 13:54, the controller, operating initials Charley Delta, calls
> ARTCC. He doesn't key his microphone while dialing (old rotary pulse
> phone) but has to key in to talk to center at 13:58. That is when you
> hear CD breathing and the music in the background from the radio. He
> unkeys his mike at 14:05 and the music can no longer be heard. We hear
> it again at 14:09 when he keys in. ARTCC hasn't come up on the line so
> the music can only be in the tower cab. At 14:08, ARTCC comes on the
> line and CD requests a release on Skywest 6819. Center releases him
> and CD gives his initials and hangs up at 14:12. The music stops at
> that time.
>

If the music was in the tower cab it'd be heard on every recorded line. It
isn't heard when he's making a transmission, it's only heard when he's
dialed ZID TMU.


>
> At 20:48 CD goes on the land line and dials center (ARTCC).
> At 20:55 CD again keys his mike and we hear the music. While waiting
> for center, Skywest 6819 can be heard on the speaker in the background
> saying he is passing 10,000ft.and requesting a turn to 300 degrees to
> avoid weather.
>

No, SKW6819 says "we need right of course for weather about a three hundred
heading". He says nothing about passing any altitude at that time, he'd
only been cleared to 10,000.


>
> CD approves his request and immediately center comes on
> the line and CD request a release on Comair. He had to be watching
> Comair approaching the approach end of the short runway because he
> call for the release in advance of him arriving at runway 22.
>

How do you draw that conclusion? He had an aircraft taxiing that needed a
flow release, why would he wait until the aircraft reached the runway to get
it?


>
> He immediately calls another sector and requests the 300 heading for
> Skywest 6819 to "get around some weather", but he had already approved
> the turn for Skywest.
>

Yes, and after issuing it he had to coordinate it.


>
> If Comair 191 is at the approach end of the wrong runway, he is
> nowhere near runway 22.
>

Nowhere near? The distance between them looks to be less than 700 feet.


>
> This is 16 seconds after he cleared Comair for takeoff and he hasn't
> seen him rolling on the wrong runway. He was supposed to scan his
> runway when he cleared him for takeoff and should have noticed him on
> the wrong runway. He claimed he did see him on the wrong runway but
> said nothing to him and didn't cancel his takeoff clearance.
>

You think Comair was on the wrong runway when he called ready for takeoff?

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> Before folks here reject or support the message of the original poster you
> should listen to the ATC tape recording while following along on the
> official transcript, then draw your own conclusions as to the sole
> controller's workload during the few minutes that count.
>

I did that. I concluded his workload was quite light.


>
> And, consider the language in the 7110.65P (in effect on the date of the
> accident). Does it mean what it says, or is it simply ATO CYA "puff." If
> it means what it says, doesn't that become an impossible task for a IFR
> tower/TRACON staffed with only one controller, and who is acting as local
> controller, ground controller, radar controller, and data controller?
>
> I don't have the answer; perhaps someone here does.
>
> Pertinant references from 7110.65P
>
> 2-1-2. DUTY PRIORITY
>
> a. Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts as
> required in this order. Good judgment shall be used in prioritizing all
> other provisions of this order based on the requirements of the situation
> at hand.
>
> 3-1-4. COORDINATION BETWEEN LOCAL AND GROUND CONTROLLERS
>
> Local and ground controllers shall exchange information as necessary for
> the safe and efficient use of airport runways and movement areas. This may
> be accomplished via verbal means, flight progress strips, other written
> information, or automation displays. As a minimum, provide aircraft
> identification and applicable runway/intersection/taxiway information as
> follows:
>
> a. Ground control shall notify local control when a departing aircraft has
> been taxied to a runway other than one previously designated as active.
>
> 3-1-10. OBSERVED ABNORMALITIES
>
> When requested by a pilot or when you deem it necessary, inform an
> aircraft of any observed abnormal aircraft condition.
>
> 3-1-12. VISUALLY SCANNING RUNWAYS
>
> a. Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent
> possible.
>
> b. Ground control shall assist local control in visually scanning runways,
> especially when runways are in close proximity to other movement areas.
>
> And, finally, do safety alerts apply only to radar operations? If so, why
> is it in Chapter 2 and not Chapter 4 or 5 of the 7110.65?
>
> 2-1-6. SAFETY ALERT
>
> Issue a safety alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is in a
> position/altitude which, in your judgment, places it in unsafe proximity
> to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. Once the pilot informs you
> action is being taken to resolve the situation, you may discontinue the
> issuance of further alerts. Do not assume that because someone else has
> responsibility for the aircraft that the unsafe situation has been
> observed and the safety alert issued; inform the appropriate controller.
>
> NOTE-
> 1. The issuance of a safety alert is a first priority (see para 2-1-2,
> Duty Priority) once the controller observes and recognizes a situation of
> unsafe aircraft proximity to terrain, obstacles, or other aircraft.
> Conditions, such as workload, traffic volume, the quality/limitations of
> the radar system, and the available lead time to react are factors in
> determining whether it is reasonable for the controller to observe and
> recognize such situations. While a controller cannot see immediately the
> development of every situation where a safety alert must be issued, the
> controller must remain vigilant for such situations and issue a safety
> alert when the situation is recognized.
>
> 2. Recognition of situations of unsafe proximity may result from
> MSAW/E-MSAW/LAAS, automatic altitude readouts, Conflict/Mode C Intruder
> Alert, observations on a PAR scope, or pilot reports.
>
> 3. Once the alert is issued, it is solely the pilot's prerogative to
> determine what course of action, if any, will be taken.
>
> a. Terrain/Obstruction Alert. Immediately issue/ initiate an alert to an
> aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is at an altitude which, in your
> judgment, places it in unsafe proximity to terrain/obstructions. Issue the
> alert as follows:
>
> PHRASEOLOGY-
> LOW ALTITUDE ALERT (call sign),
> CHECK YOUR ALTITUDE IMMEDIATELY.
> THE (as appropriate) MEA/MVA/MOCA/MIA IN YOUR
> AREA IS (altitude),
> or if an aircraft is past the final approach fix
> (nonprecision approach),
> or the outer marker,
> or the fix used in lieu of the outer marker (precision approach),
> and, if known, issue
> THE (as appropriate) MDA/DH IS (altitude).
>

How is 3-1-4 pertinent in this case? Nothing in the transcript suggests the
controller failed to comply with anything you pasted above.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> There aren't any VFR towers these days? There aren't any aircraft not on
> VFR flight plans these days?
>

There are. Were you trying to make a point?


>
> Visual separation of IFR aircraft is no longer used?
>

It is. Were you trying to make a point?

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> When I am cleared for a visual I am told to maintain my own separation. I
> guess you are referring to the tower applying visual separation without
> telling me?
>
> I still fail to understand where a VFR tower does other than release
> aircraft and accept them as the IFR controlling facility tells them.
>
> I understand that local controller at an IFR tower does some limited
> separation duties, again in accordance with the IFR controlling agency,
> whether it be a TRACON downstairs or a center.
>
> Those duties are quite limited compared to runway and ground movement
> activities.
>

You're a pilot? You hold an instrument rating? Where did you get your
misconceptions about ATC? Many nonpilots have better knowledge of ATC than
you do.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> I don't want to whip this puppy to death, but if ACME TRACON tells PDQ VFR
> tower to "release N1234C at 24 minutes past the hour, void after 27 past
> the hour" what possible separation duties is the tower performing other
> than to comply with the release time, which assures the separation the
> TRACON is providing will, in fact, happen.
>

It may be providing runway separation between N1234C and VFR traffic.

You're still missing the point, you said local controllers did not provide
IFR separation. That just ain't so.

"Newps" > wrote in message
...
>
> They don't give a release like that to a tower. That's FSS stuff only.
> The tower will be given the release with any restrictions such as altitude
> and/or heading.
>

It's entirely possible for a VFR tower to receive a release like that. But
LEX is not a VFR tower so it's irrelevant to this discussion.

"A Lieberma" > wrote in message
8...
>
> FSS gives releases?????
>
> I was always told FSS passes on FSS clearances and you get a ATC clearance
> through FSS.
>

What's an FSS clearance?

FSSs relay ATC clearances to aircraft and they may very well include a
release window.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> That sounds like an IFR tower.
>

What's an IFR tower? What's a VFR tower? What type of tower is LEX?

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> Yeah, but you don't have a clue about the issue being discussed.
>

Careful. You've got a pot-kettle issue here.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> I have been reviewing the transcript and actual tape of the Lexingon tower
> during the period pertinent to the crash of Comair 5191. The tower
> controller called the center for a release for each IFR departure on the
> tape.
>

Wrong. The tower controller did not call the LEX sector at ZID for an IFR
release of any of the five aircraft on the tape. He called ZID TMU for flow
releases on SKW6819 to ORD and COM191 to ATL. TMU is Traffic Management
Unit, aka flow control.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> I guess that was the case. The local controller was using the ASR and did
> approve a heading change for weather for one aircraft but he let the
> Center know about that.
>
> It sounds confusing. A G/A pilot could show up VFR 25 miles out and call
> LEX Approach for an ILS. Would the local controller ship him off to Indy
> Center or would he call Indy for permission to vector the guy onto the
> ILS?
>

He would do neither, ZID had not assumed the LEX approach airspace.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> This is from the NTSB ATC Chairman's report about Comair 5191 and
> confirmed by the transcript and ATC tape:
>
> "At 0447 (UTC), all LEX tower and radar positions were combined and being
> worked from the local control position in the tower cab. In addition to
> those functons, the tower controller was responsible for obtaining
> releases from the Indianapolis (ZID) Air Route Traffic Control Center
> (ARTCC) Traffic Management Unit (TMU), and recording the ATIS broadcast
> and all other operational and administrative duties required of a
> tower/radar facility."
>

An IFR tower does not call for an IFR release, it may have to call for a
flow release if the aircraft is going to an applicable destination such as
ORD or ATL.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in
hlink.net:

>
> "A Lieberma" > wrote in message
> 8...
>>
>> FSS gives releases?????
>>
>> I was always told FSS passes on FSS clearances and you get a ATC
>> clearance through FSS.
>>
>
> What's an FSS clearance?
>
> FSSs relay ATC clearances to aircraft and they may very well include a
> release window.

Then it's an ATC clearance. FSS do not give clearances or releases.

In fact it's required that FSS says ATC clears you, and gives you the CRAFT
which may or may not include a void time.

Allen

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> My knowledge of how ATC operates is limited, as I am not a controller. I
> am a professional pilot and work with TERPs criteria.
>

Based on the knowledge of flying and TERPS you've displayed in these forums
I find that very hard to believe.


>
> Those two areas are your areas of limited knowledge.
>

Ya think? What do you base that on?

"A Lieberma" > wrote in message
. 18...
> "Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in
> hlink.net:
>
>>
>> "A Lieberma" > wrote in message
>> 8...
>>>
>>> FSS gives releases?????
>>>
>>> I was always told FSS passes on FSS clearances and you get a ATC
>>> clearance through FSS.
>>>
>>
>> What's an FSS clearance?
>>
>> FSSs relay ATC clearances to aircraft and they may very well include a
>> release window.
>
> Then it's an ATC clearance. FSS do not give clearances or releases.
>
> In fact it's required that FSS says ATC clears you, and gives you the
> CRAFT
> which may or may not include a void time.
>

FSSs gives clearances and releases to aircraft that they've obtained from
ATC.

Obtain clearance from ATC + give clearance to aircraft = relayed clearance.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in
nk.net:

>
> "A Lieberma" > wrote in message
> . 18...
>> "Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in
>> hlink.net:
>>
>>>
>>> "A Lieberma" > wrote in message
>>> 8...
>>>>
>>>> FSS gives releases?????
>>>>
>>>> I was always told FSS passes on FSS clearances and you get a ATC
>>>> clearance through FSS.
>>>>
>>>
>>> What's an FSS clearance?
>>>
>>> FSSs relay ATC clearances to aircraft and they may very well include
>>> a release window.
>>
>> Then it's an ATC clearance. FSS do not give clearances or releases.
>>
>> In fact it's required that FSS says ATC clears you, and gives you the
>> CRAFT
>> which may or may not include a void time.
>>
>
> FSSs gives clearances and releases to aircraft that they've obtained
> from ATC.
>
> Obtain clearance from ATC + give clearance to aircraft = relayed
> clearance.

Call it whatever you want Steve.

FSS does not ISSUE clearances. They don't give CRAFT assignments. Yes,
they may relay clearances, but they don't issue them.

Please see http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATC/Chp4/atc0402.html 4-2-2 b where
it clearly states ATC clears.

Allen

"A Lieberma" > wrote in message
8...
>
> Call it whatever you want Steve.
>
> FSS does not ISSUE clearances. They don't give CRAFT assignments. Yes,
> they may relay clearances, but they don't issue them.
>

Nobody said otherwise.


>
> Please see http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATC/Chp4/atc0402.html 4-2-2 b where
> it clearly states ATC clears.
>

No need, I'm completely familiar with FSS's role.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> I have been reviewing the transcript and actual tape of the Lexingon tower
> during the period pertinent to the crash of Comair 5191. The tower
> controller called the center for a release for each IFR departure on the
> tape.
>

You performed a rather poor review. The tower controller did not call the
center for any IFR releases.

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

>
> How is 3-1-4 pertinent in this case? Nothing in the transcript suggests the
> controller failed to comply with anything you pasted above.
>
>
a. Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent
possible.

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

> "Sam Spade" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>My knowledge of how ATC operates is limited, as I am not a controller. I
>>am a professional pilot and work with TERPs criteria.
>>
>
>
> Based on the knowledge of flying and TERPS you've displayed in these forums
> I find that very hard to believe.
>
>
>
>>Those two areas are your areas of limited knowledge.
>>
>
>
> Ya think? What do you base that on?
>
>
Your many past comments on those subject areas.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
> Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
>
>>
>> How is 3-1-4 pertinent in this case? Nothing in the transcript suggests
>> the controller failed to comply with anything you pasted above.
>>
>
> a. Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent
> possible.
>

I can't seem to find that sentence anywhere in paragraph 3-1-4. Do you
think you could direct me to it?

Paragraph 3-1-4 is COORDINATION BETWEEN LOCAL AND GROUND CONTROLLERS. The
lone controller was performing both of those functions at the time of the
accident, please explain how para 3-1-4 is pertinent in this case.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> Your many past comments on those subject areas.
>

How many of my past comments on those subject areas do you think you can
demonstrate to be incorrect?

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
> "Sam Spade" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
>>
>>
>>>How is 3-1-4 pertinent in this case? Nothing in the transcript suggests
>>>the controller failed to comply with anything you pasted above.
>>>
>>
>>a. Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent
>> possible.
>>
>
>
> I can't seem to find that sentence anywhere in paragraph 3-1-4. Do you
> think you could direct me to it?
>
> Paragraph 3-1-4 is COORDINATION BETWEEN LOCAL AND GROUND CONTROLLERS. The
> lone controller was performing both of those functions at the time of the
> accident, please explain how para 3-1-4 is pertinent in this case.
>
>
Try 3-1-12. My secretary made a topo. I suspect you knew where it was,
though.

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

> "Sam Spade" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>Your many past comments on those subject areas.
>>
>
>
> How many of my past comments on those subject areas do you think you can
> demonstrate to be incorrect?
>
>
>
>
I just threw them all out yesterday.

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

> "Sam Spade" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>I guess that was the case. The local controller was using the ASR and did
>>approve a heading change for weather for one aircraft but he let the
>>Center know about that.
>>
>>It sounds confusing. A G/A pilot could show up VFR 25 miles out and call
>>LEX Approach for an ILS. Would the local controller ship him off to Indy
>>Center or would he call Indy for permission to vector the guy onto the
>>ILS?
>>
>
>
> He would do neither, ZID had not assumed the LEX approach airspace.
>
>
As Newps already told me.

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

> "Sam Spade" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>I have been reviewing the transcript and actual tape of the Lexingon tower
>>during the period pertinent to the crash of Comair 5191. The tower
>>controller called the center for a release for each IFR departure on the
>>tape.
>>
>
>
> You performed a rather poor review. The tower controller did not call the
> center for any IFR releases.
>
>
It would, of course, be a poor review to you. The point from an
accident review standpoint is that he had those activities.

If it were an ATC procedures review, as I have participated in during
some NTSB investigations, there is always a facility controller
participating who actually helps us understand those nuances.

They were some kind of handoff contact and, in the context of his
workload, that is all that is pertinent.

This guy did not do anything wrong except *perhaps* look away from the
last flight he had to work too soon. There will be a lot of discussion
and arguments about that in the coming months. Had a second controller
been there as the Administrator required, that second set of eyes might
have made a difference.

Regardless, the flight crew is virtually entirely to blame to the point
of gross negligence.

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

> "Sam Spade" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>That sounds like an IFR tower.
>>
>
>
> What's an IFR tower? What's a VFR tower? What type of tower is LEX?
>
>
If you don't know, I am not going to help you.

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

> "Sam Spade" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>When I am cleared for a visual I am told to maintain my own separation. I
>>guess you are referring to the tower applying visual separation without
>>telling me?
>>
>>I still fail to understand where a VFR tower does other than release
>>aircraft and accept them as the IFR controlling facility tells them.
>>
>>I understand that local controller at an IFR tower does some limited
>>separation duties, again in accordance with the IFR controlling agency,
>>whether it be a TRACON downstairs or a center.
>>
>>Those duties are quite limited compared to runway and ground movement
>>activities.
>>
>
>
> You're a pilot? You hold an instrument rating? Where did you get your
> misconceptions about ATC? Many nonpilots have better knowledge of ATC than
> you do.
>
>
Now you are just being your usual ass self.

Sam Spade wrote:

> It would, of course, be a poor review to you. The point from an
> accident review standpoint is that he had those activities.

No, it's not. I never listened to the tape, I just don't care. But,
did the controller call prior to takeoff for a release from the center
or not? This is completely different than a manual handoff.



>
> They were some kind of handoff contact and, in the context of his
> workload, that is all that is pertinent.

Handoff is completely different than getting a release. He may have had
to make a manual handoff because the automation was down. This happens
every night. The center basically does a control-alt-delete and
restarts their computers each night. For us Salt Lake does it after the
last of our cargo planes leaves at 1:30-2:00 am.


>
> This guy did not do anything wrong except *perhaps* look away from the
> last flight he had to work too soon. There will be a lot of discussion
> and arguments about that in the coming months. Had a second controller
> been there as the Administrator required, that second set of eyes might
> have made a difference.

No doubt about it, it probably would have.



>
> Regardless, the flight crew is virtually entirely to blame to the point
> of gross negligence.

Yep.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> Try 3-1-12. My secretary made a topo. I suspect you knew where it was,
> though.
>

Of course I did. Are you going to answer my question?

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> If you don't know, I am not going to help you.
>

I'm trying to help you. Don't you want to learn?

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> Now you are just being your usual ass self.
>

No, I'm quite sincere. I think you're fibbin' about being a pilot.

Maybe you guys should ratchet down the personal diatribe and save it for the
real idiots.

"Newps" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> No, it's not. I never listened to the tape, I just don't care. But, did
> the controller call prior to takeoff for a release from the center or not?
> This is completely different than a manual handoff.
>

The tape covers 42 minutes. There are transmissions from five different
aircraft on the tape, but the last two aircraft make all their transmissions
after Comair crashes. The controller doesn't call for an IFR release for
any aircraft, he calls ZID TMU for flow releases on two aircraft, SKW6819 to
ORD and COM191 ATL.


>
> Handoff is completely different than getting a release. He may have had
> to make a manual handoff because the automation was down. This happens
> every night. The center basically does a control-alt-delete and restarts
> their computers each night. For us Salt Lake does it after the last of
> our cargo planes leaves at 1:30-2:00 am.
>

There was no manual handoff, the LEX tower controller called the ZID LEX
sector controller just once to coordinate a heading.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> It would, of course, be a poor review to you.
>

I have nothing to do with it. Your review is poor because it shows things
that did not happen. The LEX controller never called ZID for a release of
any IFR departure during the period covered by the tape.


>
> The point from an accident review standpoint is that he had those
> activities.
>

Wrong. He did not have those activities, the ZID/LEX Letter of Agreement
states, "Aircraft may be cleared without coordination if Tower has a
computer flight plan."


>
> They were some kind of handoff contact and, in the context of his
> workload, that is all that is pertinent.
>

There was no handoff contact. The LEX ATCT controller called the ZID LEX
sector controller just once, to coordinate a heading. His workload was
light throughout the period covered by the tape.