Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.

However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
"Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
doing by 1944.

History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?


SMH

"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
> Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
> intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
> were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
>
> However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
> they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
> escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
> "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
> follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
> doing by 1944.
>
> History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
> to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
> for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
> German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
> with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
> destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.
>
> Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
> in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
> reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
> over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
> "never losing a bomber"?
>
>
> SMH
>

Seems like the answer to that might depend on whether you were
flying in the bomber, or armchair quarterbacking in the 21st century...

HB

>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
>in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>"never losing a bomber"?

I know more revelevent people will chime in here, but that accolade is not at
all hollow. Their tactics meant that they followed the tactical definition of
Escort Fighter far more accurately than some of the other groups, who were
somewhat famous among bomber crews for failing to show up to cover their
assignments. Bomber guys talk with literal dread when they mention missions
where the escorts never arrived - the 303rd (?) BG was shredded after one such
event and it happened to other heavy bomber groups as well. How could
'provided excellent coverage and defense against all enemy comers' be
considered a hollow accolade?

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

Donate your memories - write a note on the back and send your old photos to a
reputable museum, don't take them with you when you're gone.

Stephen Harding wrote:
> Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
> intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
> were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
>
> However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
> they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
> escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
> "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
> follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
> doing by 1944.

Try this page for one;
http://nasaui.ited.uidaho.edu/nasaspark/safety/history/tusk.html

This question had been answered not so long ago that I'd thought there'd at
least be an FAQ somewhere ?

Richard.

>Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
>From: Stephen Harding
>Date: 2/11/04 4:01 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id:

>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>"never losing a bomber"?
>

Doesn't sound hollow to me. I guess you had to have been there.((:->))


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>Subject: Re: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
>From: "Henry Bibb"
>Date: 2/11/04 4:06 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
>> Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
>> intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
>> were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
>>
>> However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
>> they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
>> escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
>> "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
>> follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
>> doing by 1944.
>>
>> History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
>> to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
>> for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
>> German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
>> with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
>> destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.
>>
>> Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
>> in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
>> reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>> over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>> "never losing a bomber"?
>>
>>
>> SMH
>>
>
>Seems like the answer to that might depend on whether you were
>flying in the bomber, or armchair quarterbacking in the 21st century...
>
>HB
>

Mine eyes are dim I cannot see,
I do not have my E6-B with me,
In the valley of the Ruhr.

(old WW II ditty)



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>Subject: Re: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
>From: (Krztalizer)
>Date: 2/11/04 4:10 PM Pacific Standard Time

>Bomber guys talk with literal dread when they mention missions
>where the escorts never arrived -

Yeah. Tell me about it.

>How could
>'provided excellent coverage and defense against all enemy comers' be
>considered a hollow accolade?

Only to those who weren't there. (sigh)


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"Stephen Harding" > wrote
> Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
> intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
> were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
>
> However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
> they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
> escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
> "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
> follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
> doing by 1944.
>
> History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
> to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
> for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
> German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
> with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
> destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.
>
> Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
> in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
> reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
> over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
> "never losing a bomber"?

What was the mission they were given? Bomber escort, ground attack, or air
superiority?

Leaving the bombers exposed leaves them vulnerable to other enemy fighters.

They flew their missions they were tasked with, did the job (exceptionally
well) and most came home.

Pete
Son and nephew of Tuskegee Airmen

Stephen Harding wrote:
> Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
> intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
> were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
>
> However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
> they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
> escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
> "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
> follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
> doing by 1944.
>
> History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
> to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
> for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
> German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
> with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
> destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.
>
> Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
> in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
> reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
> over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
> "never losing a bomber"?

12th AF was in Italy.....13th AF in the Pacific, I believe.

George Z.

On Thu, 12 Feb 2004 00:06:51 GMT, "Henry Bibb" >
wrote:

>
>"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
>> Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
>> intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
>> were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
>>
>> However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
>> they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
>> escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
>> "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
>> follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
>> doing by 1944.
>>
>> History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
>> to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
>> for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
>> German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
>> with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
>> destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.
>>
>> Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
>> in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
>> reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>> over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>> "never losing a bomber"?
>>
>>
>> SMH
>>
>
>Seems like the answer to that might depend on whether you were
>flying in the bomber, or armchair quarterbacking in the 21st century...
>
>HB
i saw the same show, and they clareified that they never lost a
bomber to enemy fighters, but flak was another thing

>Subject: Re: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
>From: Lyle
>Date: 2/11/04 7:17 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>On Thu, 12 Feb 2004 00:06:51 GMT, "Henry Bibb" >
>wrote:
>
>>
>>"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
>>> Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
>>> intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
>>> were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
>>>
>>> However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
>>> they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
>>> escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
>>> "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
>>> follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
>>> doing by 1944.
>>>
>>> History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
>>> to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
>>> for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
>>> German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
>>> with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
>>> destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.
>>>
>>> Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
>>> in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
>>> reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>>> over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>>> "never losing a bomber"?
>>>
>>>
>>> SMH
>>>
>>
>>Seems like the answer to that might depend on whether you were
>>flying in the bomber, or armchair quarterbacking in the 21st century...
>>
>>HB
>i saw the same show, and they clareified that they never lost a
>bomber to enemy fighters, but flak was another thing


Flak is always another thing



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
> Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
> intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
> were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
>
> However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
> they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
> escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
> "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
> follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
> doing by 1944.
>
> History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
> to be doing!

History wasnt flying a bomber


> The bombers served as much as "incentive"
> for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
> German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
> with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
> destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.
>

I rather supect different orders applied depending on the
importance of the mission and the roleof the unit concerned.

> Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
> in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
> reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
> over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
> "never losing a bomber"?
>

The command at the time seems to have been happy
with them else they doubtless have issued other orders.

Keith

In article >,
says...
> Stephen Harding wrote:
> > Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
> > intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
> > were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
> >
> > However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
> > they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
> > escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
> > "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
> > follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
> > doing by 1944.
>
> Try this page for one;
> http://nasaui.ited.uidaho.edu/nasaspark/safety/history/tusk.html

Interesting web site and explains why they did use them. But it does not
answer the question put forward by Stephen Harding. Were these tactics
correct?


>
> This question had been answered not so long ago that I'd thought there'd at
> least be an FAQ somewhere ?

Please.

>
> Richard.
>
>
>


--
A department of the government runs itself. In that it is run for its
employees benefit first.


Observations of Bernard - No 43

Hardly. You would be blaming a unit for decisions made at a higher level.
The Tuskeegee Airmen were following orders. If it was the wrong tactic then
15th AF was to blame.

Jimmy Doolittle, who changed the tactics in the 8th, pointed out in his
autobiography that he was willing to accept more bomber losses in the short
term for greater gains and lower losses in the long term. (Patton had the
same philosophy on the ground.) He was proven correct but it was a hard sell
to the bomber crews.

The ultimate goal was to destroy the enemy. One way was to ensure the
bombers made it through, using fighters to protect them. Another way was to
turn those escorting fighters into offensive weapons. The learning curve was
pretty steep at the time. Using single-seat single-engine fighters as an
offensive weapon in a strategic arena was still new. What works in one
theater at one time may not work in another.

Curt

"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
> Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
> intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
> were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
>
> However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
> they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
> escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
> "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
> follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
> doing by 1944.
>
> History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
> to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
> for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
> German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
> with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
> destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.
>
> Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
> in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
> reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
> over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
> "never losing a bomber"?
>
>
> SMH
>

Henry Bibb wrote:

>>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
>>in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
>>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>>"never losing a bomber"?
>
> Seems like the answer to that might depend on whether you were
> flying in the bomber, or armchair quarterbacking in the 21st century...

<sigh>
Here we go again.


SMH

Krztalizer wrote:

>>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
>>in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
>>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>>"never losing a bomber"?
>
> I know more revelevent people will chime in here, but that accolade is not at
> all hollow. Their tactics meant that they followed the tactical definition of
> Escort Fighter far more accurately than some of the other groups, who were
> somewhat famous among bomber crews for failing to show up to cover their
> assignments. Bomber guys talk with literal dread when they mention missions
> where the escorts never arrived - the 303rd (?) BG was shredded after one such
> event and it happened to other heavy bomber groups as well. How could
> 'provided excellent coverage and defense against all enemy comers' be
> considered a hollow accolade?

If you've come to the show to win the war, it's a "hollow accolade"
in pointing to being adept at using the wrong tactics.

It's one thing if you don't know better, like trying to dogfight
Zeros in early 1942, but by 1944, weren't "the right" tactics in
bomber "escort" known?

Have I jumped the gun on what was known in the context of the times?


SMH

ArtKramr wrote:

>>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>>"never losing a bomber"?
>
> Doesn't sound hollow to me. I guess you had to have been there.((:->))

If I had been there, I'd probably have been baking your bread!


SMH

George Z. Bush wrote:

>>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
>>in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
>>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>>"never losing a bomber"?
>
> 12th AF was in Italy.....13th AF in the Pacific, I believe.

Knew that didn't quite sound right.

Thanks George. BTW, was that "your" AF?


SMH

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
>
>>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
>>in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
>>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>>"never losing a bomber"?
>
> The command at the time seems to have been happy
> with them else they doubtless have issued other orders.

No doubt true.

I will presume that other fighter groups in the 12th were
doing precisely the same thing (sticking with the bombers).

In this case, and assuming going after the fighters to destroy
them rather than sticking, *was the correct thing to do*, then
someone higher up was responsible for escort implementation
"error", at a time the 8th AF "knew better" (say early 1944).

Guess this all boils down to "what did leadership know and
when did they know it?".

Some things never change.


SMH

Pete wrote:

> What was the mission they were given? Bomber escort, ground attack, or air
> superiority?
>
> Leaving the bombers exposed leaves them vulnerable to other enemy fighters.
>
> They flew their missions they were tasked with, did the job (exceptionally
> well) and most came home.

Actually, I'd say they did more than their mission. They moved
American race relations ahead, towards the eventual goal of a
color blind nation.

But that wasn't the question. The question is was their mission
the wrong one, or improperly implemented by command?

Was B Davis the one who would dictate that fighters under his
command would implement bomber escort by sticking with the bombers
or was it an AF wide implementation order, done at a higher level
than Group or Wing?


SMH

>Subject: Re: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
>From: Stephen Harding
>Date: 2/12/04 5:39 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>ArtKramr wrote:
>
>>>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>>>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>>>"never losing a bomber"?
>>
>> Doesn't sound hollow to me. I guess you had to have been there.((:->))
>
>If I had been there, I'd probably have been baking your bread!
>
>
>SMH
>


Nice crisp crust please.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
> Krztalizer wrote:
>
> >>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
> >>in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
> >>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
> >>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
> >>"never losing a bomber"?
> >
> > I know more revelevent people will chime in here, but that accolade is
not at
> > all hollow. Their tactics meant that they followed the tactical
definition of
> > Escort Fighter far more accurately than some of the other groups, who
were
> > somewhat famous among bomber crews for failing to show up to cover their
> > assignments. Bomber guys talk with literal dread when they mention
missions
> > where the escorts never arrived - the 303rd (?) BG was shredded after
one such
> > event and it happened to other heavy bomber groups as well. How could
> > 'provided excellent coverage and defense against all enemy comers' be
> > considered a hollow accolade?
>
> If you've come to the show to win the war, it's a "hollow accolade"
> in pointing to being adept at using the wrong tactics.
>
> It's one thing if you don't know better, like trying to dogfight
> Zeros in early 1942, but by 1944, weren't "the right" tactics in
> bomber "escort" known?
>
> Have I jumped the gun on what was known in the context of the times?

Yes. Known as Monday morning quarterbacking.

Brooks

>
>
> SMH
>

"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
> George Z. Bush wrote:
>
> >>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
> >>in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
> >>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
> >>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
> >>"never losing a bomber"?
> >
> > 12th AF was in Italy.....13th AF in the Pacific, I believe.
>
> Knew that didn't quite sound right.
>
> Thanks George. BTW, was that "your" AF?

12th, and before you have to ask, I was in Troop Carrier flying goonies, which
is why I stayed out of the discussion about the Tuskegee Airmen.

George Z.

"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
> > "Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
> >
> >>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
> >>in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
> >>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
> >>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
> >>"never losing a bomber"?
> >
> > The command at the time seems to have been happy
> > with them else they doubtless have issued other orders.
>
> No doubt true.
>
> I will presume that other fighter groups in the 12th were
> doing precisely the same thing (sticking with the bombers).
>
> In this case, and assuming going after the fighters to destroy
> them rather than sticking, *was the correct thing to do*, then
> someone higher up was responsible for escort implementation
> "error", at a time the 8th AF "knew better" (say early 1944).
>

Thats assuming it was an error. Depending on the relative
numbers of German versus Allied aircraft in the Italian theatre
and a host of other factors it may well have been that the correct
strategy was to stay with the bombers.

> Guess this all boils down to "what did leadership know and
> when did they know it?".

Just so

Keith

>Subject: Re: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
>From: "Keith Willshaw"
>Date: 2/12/04 6:38 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
>> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>>
>> > "Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
>> >
>> >>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
>> >>in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
>> >>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>> >>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>> >>"never losing a bomber"?
>> >
>> > The command at the time seems to have been happy
>> > with them else they doubtless have issued other orders.
>>
>> No doubt true.
>>
>> I will presume that other fighter groups in the 12th were
>> doing precisely the same thing (sticking with the bombers).
>>
>> In this case, and assuming going after the fighters to destroy
>> them rather than sticking, *was the correct thing to do*, then
>> someone higher up was responsible for escort implementation
>> "error", at a time the 8th AF "knew better" (say early 1944).
>>
>
>Thats assuming it was an error. Depending on the relative
>numbers of German versus Allied aircraft in the Italian theatre
>and a host of other factors it may well have been that the correct
>strategy was to stay with the bombers.
>
>> Guess this all boils down to "what did leadership know and
>> when did they know it?".
>
>Just so
>
>Keith
>
>

As far as I know no other squadron in the ETO in WW II could make that claim.
And it is a claim that I personally find meritorious. Can anyone find anyone
who flew bombers in WW II that finds the claim "Hollow"?




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
>
> Was B Davis the one who would dictate that fighters under his
> command would implement bomber escort by sticking with the bombers
> or was it an AF wide implementation order, done at a higher level
> than Group or Wing?

Within general terms, I'd venture to say that it was from higher HQ. If
every unit CO were able to define his own taskings, some would be left out.
You can't have everyone doing the glamour missions.

8th AF, you do this
12th AF, you do that

Tactics evolve with experience, but the general instructions flow downward.

Pete

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> "Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
>>
>>Have I jumped the gun on what was known in the context of the times?
>
> Yes. Known as Monday morning quarterbacking.

I'll wait for some more opinions before I accept that.

It's not yet clear to me that the tactic of "sticking with
the bombers" was not known as the *wrong* tactic by early 1944.

I'm not even certain that "following the LW down and destroying
them" was considered the *right* tactic by the 8th AF at that
time either.

I *do* know that by 1944, the 8th had learned the tactic of
bombers "fighting their way to the target and back" without
escort was considered inappropriate.

Doesn't mean the crews that implemented that tactic during 1942/43
were somehow inferior by any measure, to those implementing the
more appropriate tactic (paradigm) later.


SMH

Stephen Harding wrote:

>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
>in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>"never losing a bomber"?

None other than ace Robert S. Johnson spoke about how they
made sure they were not drawn away from escort position in order to
chase easy kills. In many instances the 56th FG would dispatch a
single squadron or pair of flights in order to engage targets of
opportunity (Luftwaffe fighters) while the rest of the group continued
escorting the bombers along their route.

The key is really not to get drawn away from the bombers you
are charged with escorting, since catching up is sometimes not
possible, and other times may be too late.

ONLY after significant numbers of long range fighters were
available were tactics changed to a roaming cover (Zemke fan, or
Roving High Cover are two of the names used for this technique). All
the first-hand accounts I have read stated that the suggestion was put
forth by squadrons & groups, but was made policy by the major AF
command. I don't know if their particular AF implemented it, or merely
the 8th AF.

I'd say that the Tuskeegee Airmen sacrificed their personal
scores (only one pilot made ace, IIRC) in order to protect the
bombers. Ultimately, it was the strategic bomber that made the
difference instead of the fighter escort mission.

I'd say it was the right move, although not a choice that was
correct by a huge and obvious margin. Credit to them for their
devotion.



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>Subject: Re: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
>From: Stephen Harding
>Date: 2/12/04 9:46 AM Pacific Standard Time

> *do* know that by 1944, the 8th had learned the tactic of
>bombers "fighting their way to the target and back" without
>escort was considered inappropriate.

Inappropriate? Now there is an interesting word choice. (sigh)


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>Subject: Re: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
>From: (John S. Shinal)
>Date: 2/12/04 9:49 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>Stephen Harding wrote:
>
>>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
>>in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
>>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>>"never losing a bomber"?
>
> None other than ace Robert S. Johnson spoke about how they
>made sure they were not drawn away from escort position in order to
>chase easy kills. In many instances the 56th FG would dispatch a
>single squadron or pair of flights in order to engage targets of
>opportunity (Luftwaffe fighters) while the rest of the group continued
>escorting the bombers along their route.
>
> The key is really not to get drawn away from the bombers you
>are charged with escorting, since catching up is sometimes not
>possible, and other times may be too late.
>
> ONLY after significant numbers of long range fighters were
>available were tactics changed to a roaming cover (Zemke fan, or
>Roving High Cover are two of the names used for this technique). All
>the first-hand accounts I have read stated that the suggestion was put
>forth by squadrons & groups, but was made policy by the major AF
>command. I don't know if their particular AF implemented it, or merely
>the 8th AF.
>
> I'd say that the Tuskeegee Airmen sacrificed their personal
>scores (only one pilot made ace, IIRC) in order to protect the
>bombers. Ultimately, it was the strategic bomber that made the
>difference instead of the fighter escort mission.
>
> I'd say it was the right move, although not a choice that was
>correct by a huge and obvious margin. Credit to them for their
>devotion.
>

Ah a voice of reason at last. Thank you.
As Churchill said," The fighters are our salvation, but the bombers alone
provide the means of victory".


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Stephen Harding > wrote in message >...
> Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
> intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
> were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
>
> However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
> they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
> escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
> "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
> follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
> doing by 1944.
>
> History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
> to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
> for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
> German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
> with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
> destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.
>
> Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
> in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
> reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
> over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
> "never losing a bomber"?

Is it a hollow accolade? No. Was their's the best tactics to use?
I'm sure the bomber crews thought so. IMO, it wasn't. The fighter
group that hunts down the enemy, shoots down 300-600 enemy aircraft,
and goes looking for more planes on the ground to shoot up does more
to win the war and protect bombers overall, than the group that sticks
with the bombers and shoots down 111 of the enemy. The Tuskegee
Airman would not have been successful with their tactics if the other
groups weren't out there seriously weakening the Luftwaffe.

~Michael

ArtKramr wrote:

> As far as I know no other squadron in the ETO in WW II could make that claim.
> And it is a claim that I personally find meritorious. Can anyone find anyone
> who flew bombers in WW II that finds the claim "Hollow"?

OK I guess I've used the wrong terminology, "hollow claim".

But...

Let's say some general felt lining everyone up, elbow to elbow,
and marching the unit in nice lines straight across the field at
the entrenched enemy (actually, that's exactly what was being
done through a good part of WWI, and that's pretty close to what
the heavy day bombers of WWII were doing) was a valid tactic.

Would having a unit claim to have the straightest marching
lines in the Army be something to be put down in the unit history?
During the Civil War, there *were* units well known for their smart
changes in formation and straight line advances (something useful
in maintaining frontal cohesion and hitting power against enemy over
broken ground). Of course totally inappropriate by WWI.

I know using such inappropriate tactics during WWII isn't the same
as sticking close to a bomber formation you have been tasked to
protect. But *if* such a method of bomber escort was "inappropriate",
then the usefulness of the unit in winning the war was reduced.

The bravery of the people involved isn't in question, nor lowered
because of the possible lack of validity of methods used.

Probably better to switch the focus of my question, as it seems
people are getting personally offended by some implications of my
wording.

Rephrased...

Was "going after the LW and destroying it" a known "better" tactic
in winning WWII in the air, than the previously implemented "stick
with the bombers" paradigm (for the 8th AF)?

If so, was this "correct tactic" recognized by leadership by 1944?

Why would this "correct tactic" not be universally applied to all
theaters of the ETO by 1944? (I'm assuming the distances to/from
targets aren't especially longer than from England, nor the supply
of escorts significantly different for Italian versus English
based AFs).


SMH

"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
> ArtKramr wrote:
>

>
> Why would this "correct tactic" not be universally applied to all
> theaters of the ETO by 1944? (I'm assuming the distances to/from
> targets aren't especially longer than from England, nor the supply
> of escorts significantly different for Italian versus English
> based AFs).
>

I'm not convinced they are good assumptions and I'd be
grateful if anyone has a few facts that we can examine
before making that judgement

What were the relative strengths of the bomber and fighter forces ?

How strong was the Luftwaffe in each region ?

What were the typical targets ?

How strong were the defenses in comparison ?

Keith

>
>I know using such inappropriate tactics during WWII isn't the same
>as sticking close to a bomber formation you have been tasked to
>protect. But *if* such a method of bomber escort was "inappropriate",
>then the usefulness of the unit in winning the war was reduced.

Everyone plays a role, and the Tuskeegee Airmen played theirs to a very high
standard. Tactics were not static - there was no "right tactic" for the period
of "1944-1945" - any set-piece attempts at tactics were bound to get you in a
world of trouble in a modern war, so what was tried and used to great advantage
in some places would not have been as advantageous in others. There isn't a
point in refighting the strategic planning conferences of units long gone to
dust - the central contention of your original question was, basically, did the
Tuskeegee Airmen have a reason to crow about their 'no bomber lost due to enemy
fighters' accolade. I think the answers from the mob made it clear.

>
>The bravery of the people involved isn't in question, nor lowered
>because of the possible lack of validity of methods used.
>

Same can be said of many other aircraft types and military units - USN Torpedo
Bomber crews, sacrificed in droves while proving they could follow current
attack doctrine comes straight to mind.

>Was "going after the LW and destroying it" a known "better" tactic
>in winning WWII in the air, than the previously implemented "stick
>with the bombers" paradigm (for the 8th AF)?

These are elements of the same strategy, such as a boxer using a one-two punch.
If every time the fighters broke away to pursue the Luftwaffe, then (as
happened), the LW mustered a large force of rocket-armed heavy fighters to make
a nearly unmolested attack on the bomber stream with predictably bad results
for our side. Now, those fighters of ours that were chasing single seat
fighters all the way to Linz were following that "better tactic", but it wasn't
'better' that day.

>If so, was this "correct tactic" recognized by leadership by 1944?
>

Good tactics are arrows in a quiver, not a Holy Unbroken Rule that applies to
all situations, days, and units.


>
>Why would this "correct tactic" not be universally applied to all
>theaters of the ETO by 1944?

Because universal tactics are Maginotesque.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

Donate your memories - write a note on the back and send your old photos to a
reputable museum, don't take them with you when you're gone.

> Thanks George. BTW, was that "your" AF?
>
>12th, and before you have to ask, I was in Troop Carrier flying goonies,
>which
>is why I stayed out of the discussion about the Tuskegee Airmen.
>
>George Z.
>

My grandfather was in the 17th TCS as a gooney pilot.




Ron
Pilot/Wildland Firefighter

Ron wrote:
>> Thanks George. BTW, was that "your" AF?
>>
>> 12th, and before you have to ask, I was in Troop Carrier flying goonies,
>> which
>> is why I stayed out of the discussion about the Tuskegee Airmen.
>>
>> George Z.
>>
>
> My grandfather was in the 17th TCS as a gooney pilot.

Your granddad was in the 64th TCGp....I was in the 4th TCSq, 62nd TCGp. Your
granddad's outfit was mostly involved in servicing the Yugoslav part of the
theater, whereas we mostly worked the NW part of Italy (up around Genoa and
Milan, etc.). The third TCGp (the 60th) was based around Naples and did mostly
intra-theater stuff. Small world!

George Z.
>
>
>
>
> Ron
> Pilot/Wildland Firefighter

my understanding is that a wing or squad or whatever you guys call it, stays
with the bombers, and other groups are assigned the straffing, and chasing
off, and aerial combat with the huns, i have read many books by different
guys who were there, and this is what i'm led to believe happens.
If a group was there to stay with the bombers then thats what they were
ordered to do, there was top cover, low cover, sweeping missions, and the
like, each group assigned to do a particular part in that mission.
"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
> Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
> intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
> were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
>
> However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
> they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
> escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
> "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
> follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
> doing by 1944.
>
> History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
> to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
> for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
> German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
> with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
> destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.
>
> Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
> in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
> reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
> over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
> "never losing a bomber"?
>
>
> SMH
>

John S. Shinal wrote:

> Stephen Harding wrote:
>
>>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
>>in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
>>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>>"never losing a bomber"?
>
> None other than ace Robert S. Johnson spoke about how they
> made sure they were not drawn away from escort position in order to
> chase easy kills. In many instances the 56th FG would dispatch a
> single squadron or pair of flights in order to engage targets of
> opportunity (Luftwaffe fighters) while the rest of the group continued
> escorting the bombers along their route.

This would have been before the loosening of regulations on escort
correct? At this time, the numbers of escorts available were still
small and the opposition fairly high (and skilled) in number. This
would also have been a shorter escort run, since Johnson was a P-47
pilot.

> The key is really not to get drawn away from the bombers you
> are charged with escorting, since catching up is sometimes not
> possible, and other times may be too late.
>
> ONLY after significant numbers of long range fighters were
> available were tactics changed to a roaming cover (Zemke fan, or
> Roving High Cover are two of the names used for this technique). All
> the first-hand accounts I have read stated that the suggestion was put
> forth by squadrons & groups, but was made policy by the major AF
> command. I don't know if their particular AF implemented it, or merely
> the 8th AF.

It has sometimes been said that the PTO was more a "fighter pilot's
war", meaning that groups were more free to improvise. Tactics
were discussed in more informal manner and less a "top down" command
type of approach.

Certainly in the Pacific, fighter groups were less tightly attached
to the bombers they were escorting, allowing for fighters roaming
ahead of the bomber formations in order to break up on coming enemy.

I understand at one point, the 8th AF dictated escorts be no farther
than about 100 feet of an escorted bomber! Don't know if that is
actually true, but I believe during 1943 and very, very early 1944,
the fighters were not allowed much leeway in how they did their escort.

> I'd say that the Tuskeegee Airmen sacrificed their personal
> scores (only one pilot made ace, IIRC) in order to protect the
> bombers. Ultimately, it was the strategic bomber that made the
> difference instead of the fighter escort mission.
>
> I'd say it was the right move, although not a choice that was
> correct by a huge and obvious margin. Credit to them for their
> devotion.

Absolutely true, especially when one throws in what those fellows
had to endure just getting to the fight.


SMH

Michael wrote:

> Stephen Harding > wrote in message >...
>
>>Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
>>intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
>>were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
>>
>>However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
>>they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
>>escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
>>"Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
>>follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
>>doing by 1944.
>>
>>History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
>>to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
>>for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
>>German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
>>with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
>>destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.
>>
>>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
>>in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
>>reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
>>over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
>>"never losing a bomber"?
>
>
> Is it a hollow accolade? No. Was their's the best tactics to use?
> I'm sure the bomber crews thought so. IMO, it wasn't. The fighter
> group that hunts down the enemy, shoots down 300-600 enemy aircraft,
> and goes looking for more planes on the ground to shoot up does more
> to win the war and protect bombers overall, than the group that sticks
> with the bombers and shoots down 111 of the enemy. The Tuskegee
> Airman would not have been successful with their tactics if the other
> groups weren't out there seriously weakening the Luftwaffe.

I agree with you overall, but do not know that the other groups were
using any different tactics than the black fighter squadrons. It would
seem likely all the groups in the AF were told to do escort the same
way.


SMH

>
>Your granddad was in the 64th TCGp....I was in the 4th TCSq, 62nd TCGp. Your
>granddad's outfit was mostly involved in servicing the Yugoslav part of the
>theater, whereas we mostly worked the NW part of Italy (up around Genoa and
>Milan, etc.). The third TCGp (the 60th) was based around Naples and did
>mostly
>intra-theater stuff. Small world!
>
>George Z.

He told me stories of being in Italy when Mussolini was killed and they drove
thru the city and saw the body hanging.

Another time they were flying some weapons to some partisans, and there was not
enough straight distance to land and take off because it was in a mountain
valley, even in the C-47, so the takeoff and landing was all done in a turn.


Ron
Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)

I think you'll find that all the groups did this, wether they were assigned
to escort, high cover, withdrawal support; an element would break away to
attack targets of opporchancity, some would even go straffing if there was
no show by the luftwaffe.
This as i have said before is a result of reading many books by many of the
guys who were there, i am in no way an expert.
"John S. Shinal" > wrote in message
...
> Stephen Harding wrote:
>
> >Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
> >in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
> >reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
> >over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
> >"never losing a bomber"?
>
> None other than ace Robert S. Johnson spoke about how they
> made sure they were not drawn away from escort position in order to
> chase easy kills. In many instances the 56th FG would dispatch a
> single squadron or pair of flights in order to engage targets of
> opportunity (Luftwaffe fighters) while the rest of the group continued
> escorting the bombers along their route.
>
> The key is really not to get drawn away from the bombers you
> are charged with escorting, since catching up is sometimes not
> possible, and other times may be too late.
>
> ONLY after significant numbers of long range fighters were
> available were tactics changed to a roaming cover (Zemke fan, or
> Roving High Cover are two of the names used for this technique). All
> the first-hand accounts I have read stated that the suggestion was put
> forth by squadrons & groups, but was made policy by the major AF
> command. I don't know if their particular AF implemented it, or merely
> the 8th AF.
>
> I'd say that the Tuskeegee Airmen sacrificed their personal
> scores (only one pilot made ace, IIRC) in order to protect the
> bombers. Ultimately, it was the strategic bomber that made the
> difference instead of the fighter escort mission.
>
> I'd say it was the right move, although not a choice that was
> correct by a huge and obvious margin. Credit to them for their
> devotion.
>
>
>
> ----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet
News==----
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Newsgroups
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i think we have to stay in context here; the bombers were assigned targets,
primary, secondary, or targets of opportunity, i.e. the nearest strategic
target to their intended mission. They were assigned the destruction of a
particular target such as the oilfields, aircraft production, industrial
targets, these cannot be destroyed by straffing; bombs are much more
effective.
The were some times hitting airfields, but you'll find that the medium
bombers would do most of the bombing of airfields as part of support of a
larger mission, to soften up the defences, and the fighters would straffe
them, straffing was effective if a target of opportunity was in their area,
they would even follow the enemy down, and attack the landing patterns at
the airfields, they could destroy many planes this way, because of their
speed and the abilty to get low and their aglity, bombers were not really
designed to do this, thats why the medium bombers would attack them, other
targets of opportunity for them being ghost fields, (not officially
designated as an airfield, but an ordinary field suitable to be used to
avoid their detection, and used as a forward operating fighter field). They
would stumble on these and they had the chance to do something about it.
Each force had a perticular part to play in a mission, wether it be the
fighters on bomber escort, withdrawal support, top cover, etc, the medium
bombers hitting smaller targets in support, softening defences, airfields
etc, and the heavies attacking ussually a few targets at one time with
various groups, including a diversionary raid, to fool the enemy as to the
intended target.
Each group, combat wing, etc contributing to the overall picture until the
ultimate defeat of the enemy.
The bombers did major work on hitting hitlers oil supplies, ultimately
grounding his airforce for lack of fuel.
....Each had a part to play!!
"Michael" > wrote in message
om...
> Stephen Harding > wrote in message
>...
> > Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
> > intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
> > were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
> >
> > However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
> > they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
> > escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
> > "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
> > follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
> > doing by 1944.
> >
> > History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
> > to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
> > for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
> > German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
> > with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
> > destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.
> >
> > Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
> > in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
> > reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
> > over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
> > "never losing a bomber"?
>
> Is it a hollow accolade? No. Was their's the best tactics to use?
> I'm sure the bomber crews thought so. IMO, it wasn't. The fighter
> group that hunts down the enemy, shoots down 300-600 enemy aircraft,
> and goes looking for more planes on the ground to shoot up does more
> to win the war and protect bombers overall, than the group that sticks
> with the bombers and shoots down 111 of the enemy. The Tuskegee
> Airman would not have been successful with their tactics if the other
> groups weren't out there seriously weakening the Luftwaffe.
>
> ~Michael

Stephen Harding wrote:
>This would have been before the loosening of regulations on escort
>correct? At this time, the numbers of escorts available were still
>small and the opposition fairly high (and skilled) in number. This
>would also have been a shorter escort run, since Johnson was a P-47
>pilot.

Correct. It was not too long after the 56th FG became fully
operational. Johnson, Gabreski, Schilling and Zemke all had relatively
low scores at this point (compared to their later tallies).



>It has sometimes been said that the PTO was more a "fighter pilot's
>war", meaning that groups were more free to improvise. Tactics
>were discussed in more informal manner and less a "top down" command
>type of approach.

Absolutely. John Blackburn in VF-17 developed the Roving High
Cover tactic in the Solomons at a squadron meeting, and got approval
from their next higher command relatively quickly. It was pretty much
done on a handshake, and as long as it was successful, the brass were
willing to let them improvise with minor limitations (only the most
experienced pilots, no lower than a particular altitude, etc.).

>I understand at one point, the 8th AF dictated escorts be no farther
>than about 100 feet of an escorted bomber! Don't know if that is
>actually true, but I believe during 1943 and very, very early 1944,
>the fighters were not allowed much leeway in how they did their escort.

I've seen this described by members of the 95th BG and in
short stories about John Godfrey and Gabreski.




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> (Ron) wrote:

[snip]

>Ron
>Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Ya' landed the job eh? Congrats!

>
>>Ron
>>Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)
>^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
>Ya' landed the job eh? Congrats!

Yes, got the phone call a little bit ago. Turns out this plane was Adm Nimitz
personal transport during WW2, so I will actually be flying a plane with some
real military history to it.

I will be based in Silver City tanker base for apr-jul, then Oregon at a tanker
base there for jul-oct






Ron
Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)

> (Ron) wrote:
>>Mike Marron wrote:

>>Ya' landed the job eh? Congrats!

>Yes, got the phone call a little bit ago. Turns out this plane was Adm Nimitz
>personal transport during WW2, so I will actually be flying a plane with some
>real military history to it.

>I will be based in Silver City tanker base for apr-jul, then Oregon at a tanker
>base there for jul-oct

Cool. Maybe you can also moonlight with that 135 charter outfit in
Silver City during the off-season.

>Subject: Re: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
>From: "Emmanuel Gustin"
>Date: 2/12/04 3:54 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
>
>> History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
>> to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
>> for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
>> German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
>> with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
>> destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.
>
>I think there are two separate issues involved, related but
>not identical.
>
>One is the use of correct escort tactics. Many airforces,
>including the USAAF, started the war with faulty escort
>tactics. They put the fighters very close to the bombers,
>which was good for the morale of the bomber crews, but
>gave the enemy the opportunity to set up his attacks unhindered
>and put the escort fighters in a disadvantageous position.
>Later it was recognized that the escort fighters needed more
>freedom and a better position, so that they could control the
>airspace around the bomber formation more effectively. This
>also allowed them to disrupt enemy interceptor formations
>before they could align for their attacks. This was probably
>the best way to cope with Luftwaffe tactics such as head-on
>attacks or attacks from the rear in close formation, which
>needed careful preparation. Establishing a presence over
>enemy airfields was an unorthodox 'escort' method, but it
>worked by attacking enemy fighters when they were most
>vulnerable.
>
>The other choice is one of air force strategy. Initially the 8th
>AF relied on its bombers to destroy the Luftwaffe, by halting
>aircraft production. But attacks on aircraft factories achieved
>much less than hoped for and the bombers were suffering heavy
>losses. So Doolittle decided to rely on his fighters, not his
>bombers, to destroy the Luftwaffe and win air supremacy.
>This worked much better, in part because the fighters were
>quite effective at destroying enemy aircraft, but also because
>the real weakness of the Luftwaffe was not aircraft but pilots
>--- there were enough aircraft, even at the very end of the war,
>despite all the bombing; but the shortage of trained pilots was
>chronic.
>
>But neither consideration implies that the Tuskegee Airmen
>were 'wrong'. Even at the end of the war there was still a need
>to provide a strong escort for the bomber formation; not all
>fighters could roam freely over enemy territory. Especially
>when the Me 262 appeared, numbers were really important --
>the German interceptors had to run the gauntlet of escort fighters
>diving on to them, on their way in and out.


See "Fighter Cover RAF Style" on my website.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>From: Stephen Harding
>
>
>Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where intermission had
discussions with a couple fellows who were members of the real thing. Quite
interesting.
>
>However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that they never lost a
bomber to enemy fighters that they escorted. One reason, according to one of
the actual "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than follow the
German fighters to the ground as the 8th was doing by 1944.
>
>History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing to be doing! The
bombers served as much as "incentive" for the LW to come up to fight, as they
were in destroying German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.<

You are using the incorrect "history" in your assessment. The tactics of the
Tuskeegee Airmen derived from their mission. And WHAT was their mission?

Their mission was no less then the beginning of the racial integration of the
US Armed Forces......no small feat considering the state of US race relations
in the 1940's (a mere 75 years after the end of the Civil War) and the amount
of inherent inertia in a bureaucracy the size of the US Department of Defense.

The group was formed at the behest of social progressive Eleanor Roosevelt,
IIRC. They were not tasked with winning THE WAR against the Germans.....they
were tasked with winning A BATTLE with the (then) current (sad) state of racial
affairs back in the US.

As I am sure any of them will tell you, everything about the Tuskeegee Airmen
must be viewed through the prism of the racial context of the
times......including their strict adherence to following military ORDERS
governing their tactics while escorting the bomber fleets and engaging any
attackers.

They didn't follow enemy fighters to the ground because they had strict orders
directing them to stay with the bomber groups.....and the white guys in the
bombers loved them for staying in position (although the black TA's couldn't
even have a drink in the white base officer's club.....ask Art K.).

Getting the white guys in the bombers to respect the black Tuskeegee Airmen,
and having the TA develop a reputation for being very predictable and
dependable in battle (i.e., this respect was not misplaced) was a major goal of
the whole operation and a crucial first step in integrating the Armed Forces.

>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen in particular,
following the wrong tactic? Is the reputation of this fine group of fighter
pilots somewhat over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?
>SMH

Wrong questions. The Tuskeegee Airmen performed their assigned tasks in a
fashion consistent with high military discipline and efficiency and can be
proud of their service.
Dave

On Thu, 12 Feb 2004 12:46:20 -0500, Stephen Harding
> wrote:

>It's not yet clear to me that the tactic of "sticking with
>the bombers" was not known as the *wrong* tactic by early 1944.

As I recall the Battle of Britain, the German fighters were difficult
to cope with because they did *not* stick with the bombers -- at least
in the sense that they flew nearby. Instead they flew at a much higher
altitude. That's what caused the Brits to adopt the strategy of
sending the Hurricanes after the bombers and the Spitfires after the
fighters.

Nichts?

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

ArtKramr wrote:

> See "Fighter Cover RAF Style" on my website.

I think I've read all your stuff, but reread this article.

I wonder if the difference in escort "technique" reflected
the different escort experience of the two air forces?

The USAAF was flying deep escort and needed to have a looser
attachment to the bombers in order to maintain a tactical
edge as Emmanuel has described. This was "known" to the 8th
AF fighter command by early 1944 (and 9th AF as well).

The RAF didn't do deep penetration escort (the Spit didn't
have the range) and would be more inclined to stick close
to its escort charges. The fact that individuals would peel
off to go after AAA is probably a reflection of the confidence
of having air superiority and adequate numbers by mid/late '44.

I don't think the peel off would have been done in '43.

You're always a great read, even more than once!


SMH

Dav1936531 wrote:

> You are using the incorrect "history" in your assessment. The tactics of the
> Tuskeegee Airmen derived from their mission. And WHAT was their mission?
>
> Their mission was no less then the beginning of the racial integration of the
> US Armed Forces......no small feat considering the state of US race relations
> in the 1940's (a mere 75 years after the end of the Civil War) and the amount
> of inherent inertia in a bureaucracy the size of the US Department of Defense.
>
> The group was formed at the behest of social progressive Eleanor Roosevelt,
> IIRC. They were not tasked with winning THE WAR against the Germans.....they
> were tasked with winning A BATTLE with the (then) current (sad) state of racial
> affairs back in the US.

I think you're mixing two different contexts.

A political context, as defined and promoted by E. Roosevelt, and those
sympathetic to the cause, and a military context of winning WWII.

There is a transition of contexts somewhere in the upper military
command, where political goals translate into military ones, and
while Davis would be very well aware of the political pressures the
group would be under (as would the airmen themselves), he was primarily
concerned with implementation of the military objectives handed to him.

At the group level, military goals and objectives would have ruled.
At least, that's the way I would envision it being, not having been
there myself. Race politics certainly adds complications, as it does
to this day.

> As I am sure any of them will tell you, everything about the Tuskeegee Airmen
> must be viewed through the prism of the racial context of the
> times......including their strict adherence to following military ORDERS
> governing their tactics while escorting the bomber fleets and engaging any
> attackers.
>
> They didn't follow enemy fighters to the ground because they had strict orders
> directing them to stay with the bomber groups.....and the white guys in the
> bombers loved them for staying in position (although the black TA's couldn't
> even have a drink in the white base officer's club.....ask Art K.).

They had strict orders from Davis, or he had strict orders from someone
higher?

If we want to play conspiracy games, we can claim the strict orders
came from some racist white commander *above* Davis who *knew* that
sticking close to bombers during escort, and not leaving the bombers
to follow enemy to shoot them down would result in lowered personal
(and Group) scores. As has been mentioned, there was only one TA ace.
The Machiavelian "higher up" would therefor have succeeded in making
the group look bad in that statistic, promoting his racist attitudes.

All this would seem a bit much to me, but the movie did show racist
white political leaders questioning the performance of the TA in
North Africa, only to find they didn't shoot down e/a because they
never, or rarely encountered them. They had been left in place while
all the other Groups had moved to Italy. An attempt to sabotage a
record?

So the simple question for me is, was the TA Group using tactics that
the other 12th AF Groups had abandoned by mid/late 1944 because of
lessons learned by the 8th/9th AF in deep penetration bomber escort?

If so, who is responsible? Or, is anyone really responsible? Is
this whole question a dead horse as has been suggested by another,
that the TA were simply using one of many tactics that were valid
at the time? No conspiracy to make someone look bad; no "incompetence"
by someone using outmoded, obsolete tactics.

> Getting the white guys in the bombers to respect the black Tuskeegee Airmen,
> and having the TA develop a reputation for being very predictable and
> dependable in battle (i.e., this respect was not misplaced) was a major goal of
> the whole operation and a crucial first step in integrating the Armed Forces.

>>Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen in particular,
>
> following the wrong tactic? Is the reputation of this fine group of fighter
> pilots somewhat over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
> "never losing a bomber"?

> Wrong questions. The Tuskeegee Airmen performed their assigned tasks in a
> fashion consistent with high military discipline and efficiency and can be
> proud of their service.

I have not claimed that TA individuals should be ashamed of their service.
Simply a question of whether tactics used were the best for ending the
war as quickly as possible, and wondering if the TA "should" have known
what those better tactics were by that time (assuming of course that
there actually were "better tactics", which is in question).

It is always difficult to speak words of criticism towards entities
that have gained somewhat legend status. It reminds me a little of
the AVG critiques on this NG that questioned shootdown scores or
whether the AVG ever actually shot down a "Zero".

It's difficult to critique/discuss and not come across as insulting,
especially when individuals "who were there" are involved, versus
individuals who were not.


SMH

>Subject: Re: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
>From: Stephen Harding
>Date: 2/13/04 3:59 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>ArtKramr wrote:
>
>> See "Fighter Cover RAF Style" on my website.
>
>I think I've read all your stuff, but reread this article.
>
>I wonder if the difference in escort "technique" reflected
>the different escort experience of the two air forces?
>
>The USAAF was flying deep escort and needed to have a looser
>attachment to the bombers in order to maintain a tactical
>edge as Emmanuel has described. This was "known" to the 8th
>AF fighter command by early 1944 (and 9th AF as well).
>
>The RAF didn't do deep penetration escort (the Spit didn't
>have the range) and would be more inclined to stick close
>to its escort charges. The fact that individuals would peel
>off to go after AAA is probably a reflection of the confidence
>of having air superiority and adequate numbers by mid/late '44.
>
>I don't think the peel off would have been done in '43.
>
>You're always a great read, even more than once!
>
>
>SMH
>

Thanks. Glad you enjoyed it.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>Subject: Re: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
>From: Cub Driver
>Date: 2/13/04 3:30 AM Pacific

>That's what caused the Brits to adopt the strategy of
>sending the Hurricanes after the bombers and the Spitfires after the
>fighters.

Hurricanes were all in the MTO.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Ron wrote:
>> Your granddad was in the 64th TCGp....I was in the 4th TCSq, 62nd TCGp. Your
>> granddad's outfit was mostly involved in servicing the Yugoslav part of the
>> theater, whereas we mostly worked the NW part of Italy (up around Genoa and
>> Milan, etc.). The third TCGp (the 60th) was based around Naples and did
>> mostly
>> intra-theater stuff. Small world!
>>
>> George Z.
>
> He told me stories of being in Italy when Mussolini was killed and they drove
> thru the city and saw the body hanging.
>
> Another time they were flying some weapons to some partisans, and there was
> not enough straight distance to land and take off because it was in a mountain
> valley, even in the C-47, so the takeoff and landing was all done in a turn.
>
>
> Ron
> Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)

Ron wrote:
>> Your granddad was in the 64th TCGp....I was in the 4th TCSq, 62nd TCGp. Your
>> granddad's outfit was mostly involved in servicing the Yugoslav part of the
>> theater, whereas we mostly worked the NW part of Italy (up around Genoa and
>> Milan, etc.). The third TCGp (the 60th) was based around Naples and did
>> mostly
>> intra-theater stuff. Small world!
>>
>> George Z.
>
> He told me stories of being in Italy when Mussolini was killed and they drove
> thru the city and saw the body hanging.

Some place in an old photo album, I have a 2-1/4 X 3-1/4 B&W snapshot of him and
his mistress, Clara Petacci, hanging by the heels like two sides of beef in a
gas station near Milano.
>
> Another time they were flying some weapons to some partisans, and there was
> not enough straight distance to land and take off because it was in a mountain
> valley, even in the C-47, so the takeoff and landing was all done in a turn.
>
I always thought that the hairier stuff was flying to a DZ on radar following a
stream through a valley, which also bent and turned, with an solid overcast
above you and the mountain peaks on each side of you lost in the clouds. Well,
I guess it couldn't have been too bad, since I'm here to tell you about it.
(^-^)))

George Z.
>
> Ron
> Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)

Art wrote:
>Hurricanes were all in the MTO.

NOT during the Battle off Britian, Art.

oxmoron1
CRS/CSS/MFE

Stephen Harding > wrote in message >...
> Michael wrote:

> > Is it a hollow accolade? No. Was their's the best tactics to use?
> > I'm sure the bomber crews thought so. IMO, it wasn't. The fighter
> > group that hunts down the enemy, shoots down 300-600 enemy aircraft,
> > and goes looking for more planes on the ground to shoot up does more
> > to win the war and protect bombers overall, than the group that sticks
> > with the bombers and shoots down 111 of the enemy. The Tuskegee
> > Airman would not have been successful with their tactics if the other
> > groups weren't out there seriously weakening the Luftwaffe.
>
> I agree with you overall, but do not know that the other groups were
> using any different tactics than the black fighter squadrons.

Number of kills alone tells me they had to be. Let's compare them to
the 31st FG, another 15th AF P-51 unit; From June '44 to the end of
the war (the time I beleive the Tuskegee Airmen were in P-51s and in
the thick of air to air combat) the 31st FG claimed 226 EA shot down
(their total for the war was 570). The Tuskegee Airman's victories
claims for the entire war were 111. That tells me they were doing
things very differently when they were outscored by more than double
during the same time period (6-1-44 to 5-1-45).

> It would seem likely all the groups in the AF were told to do escort the same
> way.

While using overall similiar tactics, each group applied them their
own way and tried to improve upon things in their own way.

~Michael

>Subject: Re: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
>From: (OXMORON1)
>Date: 2/13/04 6:39 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>Art wrote:
>>Hurricanes were all in the MTO.
>
>NOT during the Battle off Britian, Art.
>
>oxmoron1
>CRS/CSS/MFE


I was responding to a broad general statement involving how escort fighters
operated. The statement should have pointed out that Hurricanes were shipped
off to the MTO shortly . after the B of B. To talk about Hurricanes without
pointing this out distorts the picture of fighter cover in the ETO. But maybe
the poster was unaware of these facts.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >Subject: Re: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
> >From: Cub Driver
> >Date: 2/13/04 3:30 AM Pacific
>
> >That's what caused the Brits to adopt the strategy of
> >sending the Hurricanes after the bombers and the Spitfires after the
> >fighters.
>
> Hurricanes were all in the MTO.
>

Not in 1940 they werent , they were in the skies over England
and there were 2 of them for every Spitfire available.

Keith

Cub Driver > wrote in message >...
> On Thu, 12 Feb 2004 12:46:20 -0500, Stephen Harding
> > wrote:
>
> >It's not yet clear to me that the tactic of "sticking with
> >the bombers" was not known as the *wrong* tactic by early 1944.
>
> As I recall the Battle of Britain, the German fighters were difficult
> to cope with because they did *not* stick with the bombers --

As I understand it, they were most successful when they were permitted
a "frie jagd", where a gruppe would sweep out ahead of the bombers
they were escorting. The powers that be incorrectly thought close
support was the way to go and reined the fighters in, taking the
initiative and advantage away from them and helping the RAF.

~Michael

(Michael) wrote in message >...
> Cub Driver > wrote in message >...
> > On Thu, 12 Feb 2004 12:46:20 -0500, Stephen Harding
> > > wrote:
> >
> > >It's not yet clear to me that the tactic of "sticking with
> > >the bombers" was not known as the *wrong* tactic by early 1944.
> >
> > As I recall the Battle of Britain, the German fighters were difficult
> > to cope with because they did *not* stick with the bombers --
>
> As I understand it, they were most successful when they were permitted
> a "frie jagd", where a gruppe would sweep out ahead of the bombers
> they were escorting. The powers that be incorrectly thought close
> support was the way to go and reined the fighters in, taking the
> initiative and advantage away from them and helping the RAF.
>

This may have much to do with the characteristics of the 109s vs
the Hurricans and Spitfires. The 109 was faster, and from the
E-4 (I think) onward had cannons. But the British planes
had a much tighter turning radius, that is they were better dog
fighters. The sucessful German tactic was to come in fast, rely
on deflection firing, and bug out. Hanging out with the bombers
would lead them into a turning contest where they would be at
a disadvantage.

--

FF

>Subject: Re: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
>From: (Fred the Red Shirt)
>Date: 2/13/04 11:11 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
(Michael) wrote in message
>...
>> Cub Driver > wrote in message
>...
>> > On Thu, 12 Feb 2004 12:46:20 -0500, Stephen Harding
>> > > wrote:
>> >
>> > >It's not yet clear to me that the tactic of "sticking with
>> > >the bombers" was not known as the *wrong* tactic by early 1944.
>> >
>> > As I recall the Battle of Britain, the German fighters were difficult
>> > to cope with because they did *not* stick with the bombers --
>>
>> As I understand it, they were most successful when they were permitted
>> a "frie jagd", where a gruppe would sweep out ahead of the bombers
>> they were escorting. The powers that be incorrectly thought close
>> support was the way to go and reined the fighters in, taking the
>> initiative and advantage away from them and helping the RAF.
>>
>
>This may have much to do with the characteristics of the 109s vs
>the Hurricans and Spitfires. The 109 was faster, and from the
>E-4 (I think) onward had cannons. But the British planes
>had a much tighter turning radius, that is they were better dog
>fighters. The sucessful German tactic was to come in fast, rely
>on deflection firing, and bug out. Hanging out with the bombers
>would lead them into a turning contest where they would be at
>a disadvantage.
>
>--
>
>FF


In my expeirence, whe n we goit Spitfire fighter cover they would sock in
around us like a clam shell. But at the first bust of flak one would pull out
and dive down and go after that flak gun. Made me feel good all over. The
others would hang in tight all around us. We were never uncovered as long as
the Spits were around. There will always be an England.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

In message >, Cub Driver
> writes
>As I recall the Battle of Britain, the German fighters were difficult
>to cope with because they did *not* stick with the bombers -- at least
>in the sense that they flew nearby. Instead they flew at a much higher
>altitude. That's what caused the Brits to adopt the strategy of
>sending the Hurricanes after the bombers and the Spitfires after the
>fighters.

Correct, until bomber losses led to complaints about the fighters
"failing to escort": so instead of operating to maximise attrition
against the RAF, the Luftwaffe fighters were ordered into close escort
of the bombers.

Doubtless reassuring, to see 109s flying S-curves alongside you: but
they've got a lot less speed and height to use when the RAF comes in to
play.




--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

Stephen Harding wrote:
> Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
> intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
> were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.
>
> However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
> they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
> escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
> "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
> follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
> doing by 1944.
>
> History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
> to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
> for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
> German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
> with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
> destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.

History is a wonderful thing and everything might seem the right thing to do
at that time. Sadly, hindsight is no use to the past.

Still, it keeps this group busy!

Richard.