Army ends 20-year helicopter program
Canceled Comanche program will cost Army at least $10 billion
Monday, February 23, 2004 Posted: 1:50 PM EST (1850 GMT)

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The Army has decided to cancel its Comanche helicopter
program, a multibillion-dollar project to build a new-generation chopper for
armed reconnaissance missions, officials said Monday.

The contractors for Comanche are Boeing Co. and Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.

With about $8 billion already invested in the program, and the production line
not yet started, the cancellation is one of the largest in the history of the
Army. It follows the Pentagon's decision in 2002 to cancel the Crusader
artillery program -- against the wishes of Army leaders.

Pentagon officials said a public announcement was planned for Monday afternoon.

Congressional lawmakers and company executives associated with the program were
scrambling Monday to figure out the Pentagon's plans.

Sikorsky spokesman Matthew Broder would only say that "we are on track and fully
funded until we hear otherwise."

The Sikorsky plant in Bridgeport, Connecticut, where the Comanche is being
built, opened last year and employs about 400 workers.

The Comanche has been a target of critics who say it was an expensive mistake.

"The Comanche program has been plagued with wildly unrealistic technological
expectations and the bugaboo of pay more and get less. Cancellation of this
program would free up funds for weapons that work and meet our country's true
national security needs," said Eric Miller of the Project on Government
Oversight, a private watchdog group.

Loren Thompson, who follows aviation and other defense issues for the Lexington
Institute think tank said he believes the Army under new chief of staff Gen.
Peter Schoomaker favors ending the Comanche program, even though the service had
been counting on it to provide a new reconnaissance capability.

"The Bush administration has now killed the two biggest Army weapons programs it
inherited from the Clinton administration," Thompson said, referring to the
Crusader and Comanche.

Earlier this year the White House budget office asked the Pentagon to provide
independent reviews of the Comanche and another expensive aviation program, the
Air Force's F/A-22 Raptor fighter.

Although killing the Comanche project would save tens of billion in future
costs, the cancellation decision is expected to require the Army to pay at least
$2 billion in contract termination fees.

The Comanche program was started in 1983 and had survived many reviews. Under a
restructuring worked out in 2002, a decision on going ahead with initial
low-rate production was to be made in 2007, with the first Comanches delivered
to the Army in 2009 and full-rate production to begin in 2010.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Copyright 2004 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not
be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.

Garrison Hilliard > wrote:
>Army ends 20-year helicopter program
>Canceled Comanche program will cost Army at least $10 billion
>Monday, February 23, 2004 Posted: 1:50 PM EST (1850 GMT)

Commanche go bye-bye.

Garrison Hilliard > wrote:
>Army ends 20-year helicopter program
>Canceled Comanche program will cost Army at least $10 billion
>Monday, February 23, 2004 Posted: 1:50 PM EST (1850 GMT)

Commanche go bye-bye.

I love it when someone tries to be informative about a topic, but
informs us most about themselves. Let's look at what Garrison's done here:

1. Illegally posted a copyrighted story.
2. Included the copyright notice, in the illegal redistribution.
3. Posted an ever-so-clever one line commentary
3. Reposted ever-so-clever one line commentary

Well thank you Garrison. It's been nice getting to know you. I just
wish there was some way I could read more of your wonderful work, as you
clearly have so much to share.

"Garrison Hilliard" > wrote in message
...

(Snip)

> The Comanche program was started in 1983 and had survived many reviews. Under
a
> restructuring worked out in 2002, a decision on going ahead with initial
> low-rate production was to be made in 2007, with the first Comanches delivered
> to the Army in 2009 and full-rate production to begin in 2010.

Since this Reagan era DOD project survived the Reagan DOD evaluations, and those
of Daddy Bush, and those of Bill Clinton, we now have arrived at the present
situation, with our present DOD deciding that the project was unworthy of
completion and not worth spending any more money on. Why do I have that uneasy
feeling that brain surgery is about to be done by our neighborhood podiatrist?
Why do I feel that they'd rather spend the money on some other project, like
Star Wars, that they'd like rather than this one that the Army has said all
along that it needs?

George Z.
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
>
> Copyright 2004 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may
not
> be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
>
>
>

On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 16:34:45 -0500, "George Z. Bush"
> wrote:

>Since this Reagan era DOD project survived the Reagan DOD evaluations, and those
>of Daddy Bush, and those of Bill Clinton, we now have arrived at the present
>situation, with our present DOD deciding that the project was unworthy of
>completion and not worth spending any more money on. Why do I have that uneasy
>feeling that brain surgery is about to be done by our neighborhood podiatrist?
>Why do I feel that they'd rather spend the money on some other project, like
>Star Wars, that they'd like rather than this one that the Army has said all
>along that it needs?

While I'm no supporter of Star Wars (since it does damn all against a
nuke arriving Fed-ex, a rather larger risk), I would point out one
thing. .....

It's the Army cancelling the Comanche, at least according to the
reports I've seen.

My guess is the money saved will go towards more armed UAVs and
(hopefully) more armed scouts of the OH-58D variety for the Guard.

Of course it *could* be used to go towards making the budget a little
more balanced, but that seems unlikely.

Peter Kemp

George Z. Bush wrote:
> "Garrison Hilliard" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> (Snip)
>
>> The Comanche program was started in 1983 and had survived many
>> reviews. Under a restructuring worked out in 2002, a decision on
>> going ahead with initial low-rate production was to be made in 2007,
>> with the first Comanches delivered to the Army in 2009 and full-rate
>> production to begin in 2010.
>
> Since this Reagan era DOD project survived the Reagan DOD
> evaluations, and those of Daddy Bush, and those of Bill Clinton, we
> now have arrived at the present situation, with our present DOD
> deciding that the project was unworthy of completion and not worth
> spending any more money on. Why do I have that uneasy feeling that
> brain surgery is about to be done by our neighborhood podiatrist? Why
> do I feel that they'd rather spend the money on some other project,
> like Star Wars, that they'd like rather than this one that the Army
> has said all along that it needs?

The Army aviaiton community has said so all along. But Army aviation's
credibility is not what it once was. It's a little hard to claim, with a
stright face anyway, that the Army's next-generation scout helo needs
extensive and expensive radar-frequency stealth when Apache units in
Afghanistan and Iraq are getting rocked by optically-aimed guns and IR
MANPADS. Granted they may not have done as badly as press reports suggest,
but these wars showed that the idea odf the deep penetration striek by
helicopters independant of ground forces was probably not a viable option.
And that was what Commanche was designed around. That level of stelath was
only needed to penetrate an enemy's sophisitcated battlefield air defenses
and strike deep into their rear area, where the radar SAMs would live.

It's also hard to understand why a scout needs an armament that's only
slightly lighter than the attack helo it's supposedly scouting for, or why
you need a scout at all when the attack helos have potent surveillance
radars like Longbow.

Commanche may have been the right answer for fighting in the 1990s against a
Soviet force with integrated air deffenses even with its mobile armored
units (but I won't bet on it). But the mid 1990s, it was obviously the
wrong answer. Likely some sort of replacement was needed, but Commanche was
way too much helo for the job.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

"George Z. Bush" > wrote in
:

>
> "Garrison Hilliard" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> (Snip)
>
>> The Comanche program was started in 1983 and had survived many
>> reviews. Under
> a
>> restructuring worked out in 2002, a decision on going ahead with
>> initial low-rate production was to be made in 2007, with the first
>> Comanches delivered to the Army in 2009 and full-rate production to
>> begin in 2010.
>
> Since this Reagan era DOD project survived the Reagan DOD evaluations,
> and those of Daddy Bush, and those of Bill Clinton, we now have
> arrived at the present situation, with our present DOD deciding that
> the project was unworthy of completion and not worth spending any more
> money on. Why do I have that uneasy feeling that brain surgery is
> about to be done by our neighborhood podiatrist? Why do I feel that
> they'd rather spend the money on some other project, like Star Wars,
> that they'd like rather than this one that the Army has said all along
> that it needs?
>
> George Z.



Maybe RPVs or armed UAVs weren't seen as being practical back then?
Also the recent anti-helo tactics (RPGs')developed by the Moslems and the
highly-effective MANPADS SAMs means the low-level threat makes manned helos
too risky.

--
Jim Yanik
jyanik-at-kua.net

I'd be very surprised if a lot of the technology created for this program
doesn't suddenly appear in law enforcement and other types of government flight
applications.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

Donate your memories - write a note on the back and send your old photos to a
reputable museum, don't take them with you when you're gone.

"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
ink.net...
> George Z. Bush wrote:
> > "Garrison Hilliard" > wrote in message
> > ...
> >
> > (Snip)
> >
> >> The Comanche program was started in 1983 and had survived many
> >> reviews. Under a restructuring worked out in 2002, a decision on
> >> going ahead with initial low-rate production was to be made in 2007,
> >> with the first Comanches delivered to the Army in 2009 and full-rate
> >> production to begin in 2010.
> >
> > Since this Reagan era DOD project survived the Reagan DOD
> > evaluations, and those of Daddy Bush, and those of Bill Clinton, we
> > now have arrived at the present situation, with our present DOD
> > deciding that the project was unworthy of completion and not worth
> > spending any more money on. Why do I have that uneasy feeling that
> > brain surgery is about to be done by our neighborhood podiatrist? Why
> > do I feel that they'd rather spend the money on some other project,
> > like Star Wars, that they'd like rather than this one that the Army
> > has said all along that it needs?
>
> The Army aviaiton community has said so all along. But Army aviation's
> credibility is not what it once was. It's a little hard to claim, with a
> stright face anyway, that the Army's next-generation scout helo needs
> extensive and expensive radar-frequency stealth when Apache units in
> Afghanistan and Iraq are getting rocked by optically-aimed guns and IR
> MANPADS. Granted they may not have done as badly as press reports
suggest,
> but these wars showed that the idea odf the deep penetration striek by
> helicopters independant of ground forces was probably not a viable option.

That is one hell of a leap based upon the results encountered during a
single mission where the SEAD support was intentionally withheld. A lot of
green suiters (outside the aviation community) thought that the emphasis on
the deep attack mission was bit overdone, but to condemn the entire concept
as "not viable" based upon one mission? That's a bit much.

> And that was what Commanche was designed around. That level of stelath
was
> only needed to penetrate an enemy's sophisitcated battlefield air defenses
> and strike deep into their rear area, where the radar SAMs would live.

Well, to be honest, that is not quite completely true. The Soviet (and hence
it still remains a viable model since so many potential foes still use it)
FAAD system did indeed include radar guided systems, both missile and gun
type (even the ubiquitous ZSU-23/4 used a radar gun laying system). You
could expect to encounter those kinds of systems up pretty close to the
FLOT.

>
> It's also hard to understand why a scout needs an armament that's only
> slightly lighter than the attack helo it's supposedly scouting for,

You think the cavalry scout helos are there only to operate in support of
the attack helos? Nope. Cavalry units can be tasked to independently screen
and guard at the division level; add the other required assets (i.e.,
additional tanks and arty support on the ground side and attack helos on the
air side) and you can also do a covering force fight (though that would
normally be in the corps level cavalry regimet's domain). Scout helos also
support indirect fires, and with the RAH-66 it was expected to perform
general deep intel collection. Personally I see the latter as stretching
things a bit too far, but as to including weapons on scout helos--witness
the AH-58D; that weapons capability id there for a reason.

or why
> you need a scout at all when the attack helos have potent surveillance
> radars like Longbow.

So the attack helos can concentrate on their mission (killing bad guys),
while the cavalry scouts perform their mission (screen, guard, reconnoiter,
etc.).

>
> Commanche may have been the right answer for fighting in the 1990s against
a
> Soviet force with integrated air deffenses even with its mobile armored
> units (but I won't bet on it). But the mid 1990s, it was obviously the
> wrong answer. Likely some sort of replacement was needed, but Commanche
was
> way too much helo for the job.

I think Commanche could have been of value against the old Soviet threat in
a European battle environment. But I agree with your last two sentences, and
it is a shame that the previous leadership (at both DoD and senior Army
levels) got sucked into supporting the beast for as long as they did.

Brooks

>
> --
> Tom Schoene

Kevin Brooks wrote:
> "Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
> ink.net...
Granted
>> they may not have done as badly as press reports suggest, but these
>> wars showed that the idea odf the deep penetration striek by
>> helicopters independant of ground forces was probably not a viable
>> option.
>
> That is one hell of a leap based upon the results encountered during a
> single mission where the SEAD support was intentionally withheld. A
> lot of green suiters (outside the aviation community) thought that
> the emphasis on the deep attack mission was bit overdone, but to
> condemn the entire concept as "not viable" based upon one mission?
> That's a bit much.

As I've said in another post, it's not just one mission. Afghanistan
(especially Op ANACONDA) certainly cast some doubt on current attack helo
doctrine.

But I did sort of misdirect my comments here. I really should have said
that these ops suggested that Comanche wasn't going to offer enough
improvement in Army aviation's capability to perform these missions. As a
fairly large helo (smaller than Apache, but not that much smaller), Comanche
wasn't going to be dramatically less vulnerable to the sort of threats that
were actually being encountered. But it was going to be a lot more
expensive. Its main improvement for the performance of these missions seems
to have been in sensors, which surely can be retrofitted to Apache for less
money.

>>
>> It's also hard to understand why a scout needs an armament that's
>> only slightly lighter than the attack helo it's supposedly scouting
>> for,
>
> You think the cavalry scout helos are there only to operate in
> support of the attack helos? Nope. Cavalry units can be tasked to
> independently screen and guard at the division level;

Granted. But why do they need a unique helo for this? Can't a cavalry
aviation formation have attack helos the same way a cavalry ground formation
has tanks?

> or why
>> you need a scout at all when the attack helos have potent
>> surveillance radars like Longbow.
>
> So the attack helos can concentrate on their mission (killing bad
> guys), while the cavalry scouts perform their mission (screen, guard,
> reconnoiter, etc.).

In which case, the scouts don't need heavy armament. If you were going to
have a heavily armed scout, it seems like the Apache could have done that
job, too with the main differences being in crew training and doctrine
rather than the airframe. Given the shortcomings of the Kiowa Warrior, I
get the impression that Apache units have been pretty much self-scouting in
many cases anyway.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
ink.net...
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > "Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
> > ink.net...
> Granted
> >> they may not have done as badly as press reports suggest, but these
> >> wars showed that the idea odf the deep penetration striek by
> >> helicopters independant of ground forces was probably not a viable
> >> option.
> >
> > That is one hell of a leap based upon the results encountered during a
> > single mission where the SEAD support was intentionally withheld. A
> > lot of green suiters (outside the aviation community) thought that
> > the emphasis on the deep attack mission was bit overdone, but to
> > condemn the entire concept as "not viable" based upon one mission?
> > That's a bit much.
>
> As I've said in another post, it's not just one mission. Afghanistan
> (especially Op ANACONDA) certainly cast some doubt on current attack helo
> doctrine.

How did Anaconda do that? There they used the attack helos as CAS platforms
in a rather demanding environment (helos don't like really high altitude
operations that much). They performed their mission and took ground fire;
one helo was lost after it had to set down during the transit back home
(another Apache took an RPG round and stayed in the fight). So what
universal conclusion can you reach based upon Anaconda results? Or for that
matter based upon any other attack helo usage in Afghanistan?

>
> But I did sort of misdirect my comments here. I really should have said
> that these ops suggested that Comanche wasn't going to offer enough
> improvement in Army aviation's capability to perform these missions. As a
> fairly large helo (smaller than Apache, but not that much smaller),
Comanche
> wasn't going to be dramatically less vulnerable to the sort of threats
that
> were actually being encountered. But it was going to be a lot more
> expensive. Its main improvement for the performance of these missions
seems
> to have been in sensors, which surely can be retrofitted to Apache for
less
> money.

I'd agree with the conclusion that Commanche did not offer enough gain to be
worth its increasingly ridiculous cost. As to retrofitting sensors on
Apache, another poster has already addressed the concerns that will have to
be overcome if that route is followed. That would be sort of a reverse move
for the Army, though-- IIRC they just finished pulling the AH-64's from the
Cav units a few years ago in favor of the AH-58D.

>
> >>
> >> It's also hard to understand why a scout needs an armament that's
> >> only slightly lighter than the attack helo it's supposedly scouting
> >> for,
> >
> > You think the cavalry scout helos are there only to operate in
> > support of the attack helos? Nope. Cavalry units can be tasked to
> > independently screen and guard at the division level;
>
> Granted. But why do they need a unique helo for this? Can't a cavalry
> aviation formation have attack helos the same way a cavalry ground
formation
> has tanks?

The AH-58D became the standard Cav scout/light attack aircraft for the DIV
Cav squadrons years ago, and the Apaches reside in the attack battalions at
both DIV and Corps level, except for the airborne and light divisions, which
have AH-58D's in their *attack* units (the 101st AASLT DIV retained the
Apache). You are somewhat mixing your unit definitions a bit, too--cavalry
units, be they corps or division level, are combined arms teams that already
include *both* ground and air components (at DIV level the mix is three
ground troops and two air troops, while at the corps level the regiment is
made up of three ground squadrons and an air squadron). Yes, you can
*augment* the cavalry unit's firepower by attaching some number of Apaches
to it (if, for example, you wanted your DIV Cav unit to conduct a cover
mission, which is normally beyond its capabilities). The current "unique
helo", the AH-58D, is quite capable of performing the normal range of
cavalry duties, and can perfrm adequately in the light attack role--why
would you want to pull Apaches away from their normal attack duties and try
and turn them into cavalry platforms?

>
> > or why
> >> you need a scout at all when the attack helos have potent
> >> surveillance radars like Longbow.
> >
> > So the attack helos can concentrate on their mission (killing bad
> > guys), while the cavalry scouts perform their mission (screen, guard,
> > reconnoiter, etc.).
>
> In which case, the scouts don't need heavy armament.

Uhmmm...look up what is involved with both screen and guard missions. Both
involve the potential of direct combat (guard moreso than screening). Then
there is that pesky fact that we have *only* AH-58D's assigned to the light
and airborne divisions...

If you were going to
> have a heavily armed scout, it seems like the Apache could have done that
> job, too with the main differences being in crew training and doctrine
> rather than the airframe.

Again, you are going to be pulling them away from their primary role of
being killing platforms. The 58D is a little smaller (a good thing for the
sneak and peek role) and is easier to get into theater via airlift. It
apparently performs quite well in the scout role, so why remove attack
assets from the force structure to replace them?

Given the shortcomings of the Kiowa Warrior, I
> get the impression that Apache units have been pretty much self-scouting
in
> many cases anyway.

Not sure what "shortcomings" you would be referring to in the case of the D
model. And you have sort of made a point that goes against your earlier
claim that the scouts are there "only" to support the attack helos. In
actuality they support the entire force; they *can* and often *do* support
the Apaches, but not always, and not exclusively.

Brooks

>
> --
> Tom Schoene

"Hobo" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> "George Z. Bush" > wrote:
>
> > Why do I feel that they'd rather spend the money on some other project,
like
> > Star Wars, that they'd like rather than this one that the Army has said
all
> > along that it needs?
>
> I think unmanned vehicles can serve the reconaissance function much
> better than an ultra-expensive helo. The whole concept of a stealthy
> helo which can fly unnoticed and collect information has problems. Helos
> are noisy and produce a lot of heat and it is hard to make them radar
> stealthy. The fact that the whole thing got so expensive pushed it over
> the edge.

Now the Army has plenty of money to do that.