What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?

Some candidates

Yamamoto shootdown
Hiroshima
Paul Doumer bridge LGB
Dambusters
Tirpitz
Norwegian heavy water
Midway
Doolittle raid

"Leadfoot" > wrote in message
news:KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06...
> What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?
>
> Some candidates
>
> Yamamoto shootdown
> Hiroshima
> Paul Doumer bridge LGB
> Dambusters
> Tirpitz
> Norwegian heavy water
> Midway
> Doolittle raid
>
>

Not taking on the Soviet Union. Winners.

While there will be those who fixate completely on large raids by large
bombers, how about ...

Taranto. Eliminated the Italian navy's influence in the Mediterranean
theatre.

Pearl Harbor. Flawed in many ways (didn't eliminate ship repair facilities
or oil storage, nor did it catch the carriers in port AND didn't anticipate
US population's reaction), but certainly accomplished Yamamoto's goal to
allow him to "run wild" in the Pacific for 6-12 months (well, 5 months and 4
weeks actually). In terms of tactical execution (strike force performing as
the script required), absolutely brilliant.

Incendiary attacks on Japan. Switch from high altitude bombing to fire
raids quickly decimated Japan's small manufacturing base and its ability to
supply armaments factories with the subassemblies for its weapons of war.

Israeli raid on Osirak nuclear facility.

Linebacker 2. Brought North Vietnam back to the table to negotiate the
alleged end of the Vietnam war.

The difficulty in reviewing "great" strategic air missions is that what
seemed like a good idea at the time turns out to be not so good, or too
expensive or results in an unintended consequence (Pearl Harbor). While the
need for the nuclear attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki seemed overwhelming
to the national command authority at the time, with the clear perspective of
hindsight they contributed little to the defeat of Japan and certainly
opened up Pandora's box for the postwar world. Similarly, the urgency to
strike the Norwegian heavy water facilities seemed an imperative, but
there's little doubt that Germany's nuclear program was not (and could not
be) supported adequately to produce a weapon in time for use.

A lot of ink is thrown at the 8th Air Force's campaign against Germany.
Certainly valor was in overwhelming supply as the crews hurled themselves at
a well-integrated defense in broad daylight with little escort (to start).
OTOH, the strategy looks remarkably similar to that British Expeditionary
force in the battle of the Somme, 1916: "Here we come, try and stop us."
Fortunately, by late 1944, they couldn't. But it was an expensive effort.

> Yamamoto shootdown

Brilliant tactical execution. Strategic consequences? After all, Yamamoto
brought the Japanese the flawed Midway campaign (and overlooked some
important strategic targets at Pearl Harbor). Would his leadership have had
an impact on Philippine Sea or Leyte campaigns?

> Hiroshima

See above

> Paul Doumer bridge LGB

That and the Thahn Hoa raids introduced precision weapons to the tactical
air power game, but did either raid accomplish significant alterations in
the strategic picture?

> Dambusters

One of my favorites.

> Tirpitz

Freed RN for other duty. But considering Tirpitz never did anything in her
service life, kind of a non-event.

> Norwegian heavy water

See above

> Midway

In terms of fleet placement and combat orders, I'd have to agree. Tactical
execution defined "luck" for the dive bombers (Luck = when preparation meets
opportunity). When gamed by the Naval War College, the US loses Midway just
about every time.

> Doolittle raid

Amen! Any time you can influence the enemy to change his game plan in your
favor, it's a good thing.

Leadfoot wrote:

>What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?
>
>Some candidates
>
>Yamamoto shootdown
>Hiroshima
>Paul Doumer bridge LGB
>Dambusters
>Tirpitz
>Norwegian heavy water
>Midway
>Doolittle raid

How about the Korean War Dam busting campaign? Only real strategic air mission
of the war, but it worked better than most believed.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On Fri, 20 Aug 2004 21:23:23 -0700, "Leadfoot" >
wrote:

>What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?
>
>Some candidates
>
>Yamamoto shootdown

A tactical mission with strategic implications.

>Hiroshima

Most assuredly strategic and resoundingly decisive. Changed the view
of airpower and war forever.

>Paul Doumer bridge LGB

The Doumer LGB mission in May of '72 was only one of a long series of
Doumer Bridge missions dating back to Jan. '67. Immortalized in a
great Keith Ferris painting!

Clearly, in terms of "strategic" mission the North Vietnam war doesn't
offer many good examples. One could suggest that the 29-30 June '66
Hanoi oil raids were strategic, with significant destruction of POL
supplies and crippling of POL infrastructure.

Arguably the introduction of technological advances rather than
specific missions could be the strategic milestones. Anti-radiation
missiles, Wild Weasels, airborne command/control systems, ECM
self-protection, non-cooperative target ID, and precision guided
munition introductions to name a few.

Biggest strategic campaign, of course, would be Linebacker II.

>Doolittle raid

Tactical mission, but politically strategic.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

"Leadfoot" > wrote in message
news:KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06...
> What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?
>
> Some candidates
>
> Yamamoto shootdown
> Hiroshima
> Paul Doumer bridge LGB
> Dambusters
> Tirpitz
> Norwegian heavy water
> Midway
> Doolittle raid

You would surely have to include the 11th September attacks on New York and
Washington. For an outlay of well under $1M, and some volunteers suicide
attackers with box cutters, whoever executed it massively damaged the US
economy, and so spooked the US that they started not one but two unwinnable
wars (in Afghanistan and Iraq) in response. Surely that has to place it up
there with Hiroshima?

John

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> >Doolittle raid
>
> Tactical mission, but politically strategic.

Was there not a change in the deployment of Japan's air forces as a
result? If so, would it not fall into the strategic realm?
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)

On Sat, 21 Aug 2004 17:14:50 GMT, Andrew Chaplin
> wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> >Doolittle raid
>>
>> Tactical mission, but politically strategic.
>
>Was there not a change in the deployment of Japan's air forces as a
>result? If so, would it not fall into the strategic realm?

BTSOM. We're quickly descending into the realm of semantics here. The
distinction that is usually applied to tactical-v-strategic is one of
goals rather than outcomes.

The goal of the Doolittle raid was certainly not to bring Japanese
industrial might to its knees nor to destroy critical military assets
but rather to demonstrate to both the American people and the enemy
that the war could be brought to the enemy's homeland.

The targets were minimal and the impact even less except for the
demonstration of resolve.

IMHO.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

"hobo" > wrote in message
...
> In article <KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06>,
> "Leadfoot" > wrote:
>
>> Some candidates
>>
>> Yamamoto shootdown
>> Hiroshima
>> Paul Doumer bridge LGB
>> Dambusters
>> Tirpitz
>> Norwegian heavy water
>> Midway
>> Doolittle raid
>
> Why isn't the Israeli attack on the Egyptian AF to start the Six Day war
> listed?

Cuz I didn't think of it in the twenty minutes I took from taking the idea
in my head to flowing the electrons onto the internet.

It's definitely a good candidate I didn't think of along with 9-11 or
Taranto.


After their AF was destroyed on the ground the Egyptians ordered
> their troops on the border to retreat, which was most likely a mistake,
> and they were slaughtered by the Israelis as they withdrew. Eliminating
> Egypt so quickly allowed the Israelis to fight a 3 front war one front
> at a time.

"Emmanuel Gustin" > wrote in message
om...
> "Leadfoot" > wrote in message
> news:<KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06>...
>
>> What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?
>
> Depends on what you criterion for "greatest" is. The attacks on the
> Paul Doumer bridge, the Tirpitz, and the Japanese carriers at Midway
> can't really be described as strategic; I would also rule out the
> assasination of Yamamoto from that category.

The lgb attack on Paul Doumer knocked it out for a considerable time. This
was a vital artery for munitions from China.

Tirpitz tied down a considerable number of capitol ships

Without aircraft carriers the Japanese decided not to take Midway

A great deal of thought went into Yamamoto. One, was it legal to target a
particual individual in war? Two, did Japan have anyone better? Three, was
he worth risking the breaking of JN-25 cypher being revealed?

Let me ask the question another way. How many of you can name his
replacement off the top of your head?

Scroll down for the answer


























Admiral Mineichi Koga, who took over as Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial
Navy after Yamamoto's assassination said it very simply:


There was only one Yamamoto, and no one can replace him.




>
> If impact on the course of the war (regardless of risk, losses, or
> size of the operation) makes an operation "great", then Hiroshima and
> Nagasaki must take first place. Followed, perhaps, by the Doolittle
> raid, which had an impact on Japanese strategy entirely out of
> proportion with the damage done or the size of the force involved. But
> these were of course very much exceptional missions, hard to compare
> with anything else.
>
> If the criterion for a "great" operation is large, bloody battle with
> lots of opportunity to demonstrate personal valour, then it is hard to
> overlook the attacks on Regensburg, Schweinfurt and Ploesti. These
> cannot be called really successful,

I thought of them and decided not to list them for that very reason


and their impact on the course of
> the war was not what had been hoped, but they were certainly events in
> which a lot of courage was displayed and a lot of people died, and
> deserve to be remembered. On a smaller scale, 617's attack on the dams
> also belongs in this category, if you consider the survival rate on
> this operation.
>
> On the whole the problem with "great strategic missions" is that as a
> rule, single missions had little value. Factories, power plants,
> railway installations, etc. would be repaired after an attack, and
> often surprisingly quickly. To keep them disabled repeat attacks were
> always necessary. But then you are talking about a strategic campaign,
> not a mission. The campaign against the German transport network was
> probably the most significant and successful of all, followed by the
> campaign against the German oil industry.

Operation "Point Blank" the destruction of the Luftwaffe was pretty good
too. I considered listing it. maybe if we see "greatest strategic air
campaigns"

>
> Emmanuel Gustin

"John Carrier" > wrote in message
...
> While there will be those who fixate completely on large raids by large
> bombers, how about ...
>
> Taranto. Eliminated the Italian navy's influence in the Mediterranean
> theatre.
>
> Pearl Harbor. Flawed in many ways (didn't eliminate ship repair
> facilities
> or oil storage, nor did it catch the carriers in port AND didn't
> anticipate
> US population's reaction), but certainly accomplished Yamamoto's goal to
> allow him to "run wild" in the Pacific for 6-12 months (well, 5 months and
> 4
> weeks actually). In terms of tactical execution (strike force performing
> as
> the script required), absolutely brilliant.
>
> Incendiary attacks on Japan. Switch from high altitude bombing to fire
> raids quickly decimated Japan's small manufacturing base and its ability
> to
> supply armaments factories with the subassemblies for its weapons of war.
>
> Israeli raid on Osirak nuclear facility.
>
> Linebacker 2. Brought North Vietnam back to the table to negotiate the
> alleged end of the Vietnam war.
>
> The difficulty in reviewing "great" strategic air missions is that what
> seemed like a good idea at the time turns out to be not so good, or too
> expensive or results in an unintended consequence (Pearl Harbor). While
> the
> need for the nuclear attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki seemed
> overwhelming
> to the national command authority at the time, with the clear perspective
> of
> hindsight they contributed little to the defeat of Japan and certainly
> opened up Pandora's box for the postwar world.

Actually I believe that if we hadn't used Atomic weapons at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki then they would have been used at some point in past history most
likely with far greater death and destruction. Hiroshima and Nagasaki
taught the world how horrible atomic weapons are.


Similarly, the urgency to
> strike the Norwegian heavy water facilities seemed an imperative, but
> there's little doubt that Germany's nuclear program was not (and could not
> be) supported adequately to produce a weapon in time for use.

Not something known at the time of the attack

>
> A lot of ink is thrown at the 8th Air Force's campaign against Germany.
> Certainly valor was in overwhelming supply as the crews hurled themselves
> at
> a well-integrated defense in broad daylight with little escort (to start).
> OTOH, the strategy looks remarkably similar to that British Expeditionary
> force in the battle of the Somme, 1916: "Here we come, try and stop us."
> Fortunately, by late 1944, they couldn't. But it was an expensive effort.
>
>> Yamamoto shootdown
>
> Brilliant tactical execution. Strategic consequences? After all,
> Yamamoto
> brought the Japanese the flawed Midway campaign (and overlooked some
> important strategic targets at Pearl Harbor). Would his leadership have
> had
> an impact on Philippine Sea or Leyte campaigns?

See answer to Emmanuel Gustin post

>
>> Hiroshima
>
> See above
>
>> Paul Doumer bridge LGB
>
> That and the Thahn Hoa raids introduced precision weapons to the tactical
> air power game, but did either raid accomplish significant alterations in
> the strategic picture?

How long were the bridges out of action compared to previous missions?

>
>> Dambusters
>
> One of my favorites.
>
>> Tirpitz
>
> Freed RN for other duty. But considering Tirpitz never did anything in
> her
> service life, kind of a non-event.
>
>> Norwegian heavy water
>
> See above
>
>> Midway
>
> In terms of fleet placement and combat orders, I'd have to agree.
> Tactical
> execution defined "luck" for the dive bombers (Luck = when preparation
> meets
> opportunity). When gamed by the Naval War College, the US loses Midway
> just
> about every time.

I thought you said "Yamamoto brought the flawed Midway campaign?" ;-)

>
>> Doolittle raid
>
> Amen! Any time you can influence the enemy to change his game plan in
> your
> favor, it's a good thing.
>
>

"BUFDRVR" > wrote in message
...
> Leadfoot wrote:
>
>>What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?
>>
>>Some candidates
>>
>>Yamamoto shootdown
>>Hiroshima
>>Paul Doumer bridge LGB
>>Dambusters
>>Tirpitz
>>Norwegian heavy water
>>Midway
>>Doolittle raid
>
> How about the Korean War Dam busting campaign? Only real strategic air
> mission
> of the war, but it worked better than most believed.

They don't call Korea "the forgotton war" for nothing do they? Thanks!!!

Is there a good link on this?

>
>
> BUFDRVR
>
> "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it
> harelips
> everyone on Bear Creek"

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 20 Aug 2004 21:23:23 -0700, "Leadfoot" >
> wrote:
>
>>What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?
>>
>>Some candidates
>>
>>Yamamoto shootdown
>
> A tactical mission with strategic implications.
>
>>Hiroshima
>
> Most assuredly strategic and resoundingly decisive. Changed the view
> of airpower and war forever.

I have a theory that Hiroshima and Nagasaki actually prevented future
nuclear attacks by being examples of how horrible nuclear weapons are and
therefore saved many lives during the cold war.


>
>>Paul Doumer bridge LGB
>
> The Doumer LGB mission in May of '72 was only one of a long series of
> Doumer Bridge missions dating back to Jan. '67. Immortalized in a
> great Keith Ferris painting!
>
> Clearly, in terms of "strategic" mission the North Vietnam war doesn't
> offer many good examples. One could suggest that the 29-30 June '66
> Hanoi oil raids were strategic, with significant destruction of POL
> supplies and crippling of POL infrastructure.
>
> Arguably the introduction of technological advances rather than
> specific missions could be the strategic milestones. Anti-radiation
> missiles, Wild Weasels, airborne command/control systems, ECM
> self-protection, non-cooperative target ID, and precision guided
> munition introductions to name a few.
>
> Biggest strategic campaign, of course, would be Linebacker II.
>
>>Doolittle raid
>
> Tactical mission, but politically strategic.
>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> "Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
> Both from Smithsonian Books
> ***www.thunderchief.org

>But then you are talking about a strategic campaign,
>not a mission. The campaign against the German transport network was
>probably the most significant and successful of all, followed by the
>campaign against the German oil industry.
>
>Emmanuel Gustin
>

Or as Harris liked to call them, panaceas.

"John Mullen" > wrote in message
...
> "Leadfoot" > wrote in message
> news:KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06...
>> What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?
>>
>> Some candidates
>>
>> Yamamoto shootdown
>> Hiroshima
>> Paul Doumer bridge LGB
>> Dambusters
>> Tirpitz
>> Norwegian heavy water
>> Midway
>> Doolittle raid
>
> You would surely have to include the 11th September attacks on New York
> and
> Washington. For an outlay of well under $1M, and some volunteers suicide
> attackers with box cutters, whoever executed it massively damaged the US
> economy, and so spooked the US that they started not one but two
> unwinnable
> wars (in Afghanistan and Iraq) in response. Surely that has to place it up
> there with Hiroshima?

I think the Doolittle raid is a much closer parallel to 9-11 than Hiroshima


>
> John
>
>

Some snipping ...

> Actually I believe that if we hadn't used Atomic weapons at Hiroshima and
> Nagasaki then they would have been used at some point in past history most
> likely with far greater death and destruction. Hiroshima and Nagasaki
> taught the world how horrible atomic weapons are.

A good point worthy of debate. It can be speculated that had the two
weapons not been employed, a more grisly later scenario might have
developed. Or, perhaps the cold war might have never progressed beyond a
mild detente. At any rate, the brink was seriously approached in October
1962. (There were several folks in high places that would happily have gone
to defcon 1.)

Post WWII we launched ouselves into a nuclear-centric defense policy at the
expense of conventional forces. There were high human costs associated with
that decision.

I wonder how many destroyed cities Stalin would have considered
unacceptable? I know the answer for the United States: ZERO. So did we
really need 2500 bombers to create a sufficient deterrent? Perhaps if we
needed to assure ourselves the rubble would bounce ... many times over.

Perhaps the world DID learn how horrible nuclear weapons are. OTOH, the US
and Soviet Union deployed several 10's of thousands of the things. And a
number of folks who hardly need them for their national security have
deployed them or are working hard to develope/acquire them.

> Similarly, the urgency to
> > strike the Norwegian heavy water facilities seemed an imperative, but
> > there's little doubt that Germany's nuclear program was not (and could
not
> > be) supported adequately to produce a weapon in time for use.
>
> Not something known at the time of the attack

"Seemed an imperative" is the operative phrase. Yes it was not known at the
time. The tricky part of the original question is the definition of
greatness. The war did not turn on this. Had Germany thrown all its
resources at a nuclear weapons program, it might have been more significant
(albeit heavy water was hardly a key ingredient to the Manhattan project).

> >> Paul Doumer bridge LGB
> >
> > That and the Thahn Hoa raids introduced precision weapons to the
tactical
> > air power game, but did either raid accomplish significant alterations
in
> > the strategic picture?
>
> How long were the bridges out of action compared to previous missions?
>

Much longer for sure, but how important were they to the overall war
strategy? Perhaps the best answer is, "What strategy?" The military
leadership was never allowed to implement a meaningful winning strategy.

> >> Midway
> >
> > In terms of fleet placement and combat orders, I'd have to agree.
> > Tactical
> > execution defined "luck" for the dive bombers (Luck = when preparation
> > meets
> > opportunity). When gamed by the Naval War College, the US loses Midway
> > just
> > about every time.
>
> I thought you said "Yamamoto brought the flawed Midway campaign?" ;-)

By subdividing his force into four separate entities, three of which were
beyond his tactical control (because of radio silence requirements), he
created a scenario which made it barely possible for a US success. Given
that scenario, it still gamed in favor of the Japanese, but there was this
seam in his plan which could be exploited ...

A little less subtlety (AKA concentration of combat forces) plus elimination
of the meaningless Alutian feint, and he would have truly been unstoppable.
Oh yes, and don't give your (perhaps indecisive) CarGru commander
conflicting orders: Attack Midway and OBTW draw out and kill the US fleet.

The point is that while Yamamoto was regarded as the resident genius within
the Japanese Navy, he made key mistakes in at least two campaigns. At Pearl
Harbor, he was so fixated upon the US Fleet, he overlooked the value of the
SRF and oil storage facilities. (Yet he readily admitted any success would
be short lived as "the sleeping giant" awoke. Prioritizing Pearl's logistic
capability vice its combat capability would have had more permanent impact
vis a vis Japan's interests in securing its defensive perimeter around the
Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.)

R / John

Leadfoot wrote:

>Is there a good link on this?

Here's a brief one on the Air War in Korea:

http://www.afa.org/magazine/july2003/0703korea.asp

Another quick blurb about it here:

http://www.afa.org/magazine/june2000/0600korea.asp

There's a whole chapter dedicated to the Dam campaign in "The United States Air
Force in Korea" by Robert F. Futrell


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 20 Aug 2004 21:23:23 -0700, "Leadfoot" >
> wrote:

>
> Biggest strategic campaign, of course, would be Linebacker II.
>

I'd suggest the oil campaign against Germany in WW2
was rather more significant.

Keith

>Subject: Re: Greatest Strategic Air Missions?
>From: "Keith Willshaw"
>Date: 8/21/2004 2:01 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>> On Fri, 20 Aug 2004 21:23:23 -0700, "Leadfoot" >
>> wrote:
>
>>
>> Biggest strategic campaign, of course, would be Linebacker II.
>>
>
>I'd suggest the oil campaign against Germany in WW2
>was rather more significant.
>
>Keith
>
Absolutely. But it was a two pronged effort combining strategic and tactical
missions. The heavies hit targets like Ploesti we hit rhe oil storage farms and
traffic moving out of refineries like truck convoys and oil storage around
airfields and wherever we could find them. But many operations combind both
stragoic and tactical in combination. To think of them as totally separate is
to be thinking WW I.




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>ubject: Re: Greatest Strategic Air Missions?
>From: "Keith Willshaw"
>Date: 8/21/2004 2:01 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>> On Fri, 20 Aug 2004 21:23:23 -0700, "Leadfoot" >
>> wrote:
>
>>
>> Biggest strategic campaign, of course, would be Linebacker II.
>>
>
>I'd suggest the oil campaign against Germany in WW2
>was rather more significant.
>
>Keith


And let's never forget the massive and all encompassing transportation campaign
all across Europe.. Besides, the success of any campaign is better validated in
wars we won rather than wars we lost.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Keith Willshaw wrote:

>I'd suggest the oil campaign against Germany in WW2
>was rather more significant.
>

Had POL been a top priority beginning in 1942 I think the POL campaign would be
an obvious choice, but the fact that POL was not a high priority until 1944
kind of blurs its importance. According to Speer, had we systematically
attacked Germany's electricity (production and distribution) beginning in 1942,
the war in Europe would have ended 6-8 months sooner.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On Sat, 21 Aug 2004 22:01:35 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
> wrote:

>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>> On Fri, 20 Aug 2004 21:23:23 -0700, "Leadfoot" >
>> wrote:
>
>>
>> Biggest strategic campaign, of course, would be Linebacker II.
>>
>
>I'd suggest the oil campaign against Germany in WW2
>was rather more significant.
>
>Keith
>
Context, ol' buddy. Context! You've snipped the location of that
single line away--it was following the listing of the Doumer Bridge
LGB attack as a great strategic event, and my comments were strictly
related to the SEA unpleasantness of we colonials.

When we're talking strategic campaigns, WW II has got some huge ones.
Vietnam, on the other hand, simply ground on until every one got tired
and went home.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

On Sat, 21 Aug 2004 10:53:21 -0700, "Leadfoot" >
wrote:

>
>"hobo" > wrote in message
...
>> In article <KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06>,
>> "Leadfoot" > wrote:
>>
>>> Some candidates
>>>
>>> Yamamoto shootdown
>>> Hiroshima
>>> Paul Doumer bridge LGB
>>> Dambusters
>>> Tirpitz
>>> Norwegian heavy water
>>> Midway
>>> Doolittle raid
>>
>> Why isn't the Israeli attack on the Egyptian AF to start the Six Day war
>> listed?
>
>Cuz I didn't think of it in the twenty minutes I took from taking the idea
>in my head to flowing the electrons onto the internet.
>
>It's definitely a good candidate I didn't think of along with 9-11 or
>Taranto.
>
>
>After their AF was destroyed on the ground the Egyptians ordered
>> their troops on the border to retreat, which was most likely a mistake,
>> and they were slaughtered by the Israelis as they withdrew. Eliminating
>> Egypt so quickly allowed the Israelis to fight a 3 front war one front
>> at a time.
>

And, if we're going into pre-emptions, how about Pearl Harbor?


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

In article >, Andrew Chaplin
> wrote:

> Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
> > >Doolittle raid
> >
> > Tactical mission, but politically strategic.
>
> Was there not a change in the deployment of Japan's air forces as a
> result? If so, would it not fall into the strategic realm?

Part of the problem in placing this particular raid is that it was
planned mostly for domestic morale reasons, not the immense strategic
effect it actually had. We get into the fundamental definition of
"strategic".

In general, I use "strategic" to describe an air operation that will
have a significant effect on the entire war, without major interaction
with other operations. The Doolittle raid, in particular, brings up the
question "do the planners need to be aware they are trying for a major
[strategic] effect?"

This didn't appear to be a consideration in planning this raid -- the
effect was unforeseen. Perhaps we can also consider what might be
called "negative strategic" decisions, such as Goering deciding to stop
what we'd now call a SEAD campaign, and switch to city bombing.

In article >, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:

> On Sat, 21 Aug 2004 17:14:50 GMT, Andrew Chaplin
> > wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >
> >> >Doolittle raid
> >>
> >> Tactical mission, but politically strategic.
> >
> >Was there not a change in the deployment of Japan's air forces as a
> >result? If so, would it not fall into the strategic realm?
>
> BTSOM. We're quickly descending into the realm of semantics here. The
> distinction that is usually applied to tactical-v-strategic is one of
> goals rather than outcomes.
>
> The goal of the Doolittle raid was certainly not to bring Japanese
> industrial might to its knees nor to destroy critical military assets
> but rather to demonstrate to both the American people and the enemy
> that the war could be brought to the enemy's homeland.
>
> The targets were minimal and the impact even less except for the
> demonstration of resolve.
>

Agreed that was the planners' intent. The Japanese reaction is what we
didn't predict. It caused considerable loss of face especially to the
Army, but also to the Navy in not guarding the homeland.

There is considerable postwar data that the fundamentally unwise
decision, in terms of strategic overreach, to attack Midway was a direct
consequence of the Doolittle raid. Capturing Midway would have extended
the outer security perimeter and thus have prevented further raids, or
so the staff thought.

Again, the "turning points" are different from different perspectives.
From the US position, the Japanese defeat at Midway turned the tide. For
any appreciable faction within the Japanese Naval staff, it was the
capture of Saipan that triggered the formation of a peace faction.
Japan put more value on Saipan as a key part of the inner perimeter than
the US had realized.

In article <CsMVc.122499$sh.74185@fed1read06>, "Leadfoot"
> wrote:

And without giving away your spoiler, Yamamoto's replacement didn't last
long before being lost in a storm.

>ubject: Re: Greatest Strategic Air Missions?
>From: Howard Berkowitz
>Date: 8/21/2004 4:06 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>In article >, Andrew Chaplin
> wrote:
>
>> Ed Rasimus wrote:
>>
>> > >Doolittle raid
>> >
>> > Tactical mission, but politically strategic.
>>
>> Was there not a change in the deployment of Japan's air forces as a
>> result? If so, would it not fall into the strategic realm?
>
>Part of the problem in placing this particular raid is that it was
>planned mostly for domestic morale reasons, not the immense strategic
>effect it actually had. We get into the fundamental definition of
>"strategic".
>
>In general, I use "strategic" to describe an air operation that will
>have a significant effect on the entire war, without major interaction
>with other operations. The Doolittle raid, in particular, brings up the
>question "do the planners need to be aware they are trying for a major
>[strategic] effect?"
>
>This didn't appear to be a consideration in planning this raid -- the
>effect was unforeseen. Perhaps we can also consider what might be
>called "negative strategic" decisions, such as Goering deciding to stop
>what we'd now call a SEAD campaign, and switch to city bombing.
>


I think that hte greatest strategic missions was the Battle of Britain. It
changed the course of the wsr. It stopped the German invasion of England which
allowed us to fortify England which led to the Normandy imvasions which led to
final victory in western europe. I can think of no other air battles which come
even close in importance, power and success. A single battle which led to
final victory.




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"Howard Berkowitz" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, Andrew Chaplin
> > wrote:
>
> > Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >
> > > >Doolittle raid
> > >
> > > Tactical mission, but politically strategic.
> >
> > Was there not a change in the deployment of Japan's air forces as a
> > result? If so, would it not fall into the strategic realm?
>
> Part of the problem in placing this particular raid is that it was
> planned mostly for domestic morale reasons, not the immense strategic
> effect it actually had. We get into the fundamental definition of
> "strategic".
>
> In general, I use "strategic" to describe an air operation that will
> have a significant effect on the entire war, without major interaction
> with other operations.

I think you were sort of on the right course, but you left the tracks with
that last clause. "Without major interaction with other operations"? I'd
posit that if your goal does NOT "interact" with "other operations", as in
being complimentary of, then it is not only not a strategic operation, it is
probably one that was a wasted effort in the first place.

A better solution IMO would be to look at things from the overarching
strategic framework perspective. At the top you have strategy--the setting
of goals, and resourcing elemnts such that they can acheive those goals,
that lead to obtaining national goals, or the endstate desired. In a broad
sense, for example, our strategic goals for the combined bomber offensive
against Germany was to significantly reduce the effectiveness of German
industrial production, degrade their capability of transporting military
resources to their desired destinations, and defeat the morale of the German
populace and reduce their support for continuing the war. Next comes the
operational level, where successive campaigns are planned and resourced to
acheive these goals over a period of time; IMO, the "transportation plan"
and the "oil plan" were not really *strategies*--they were instead
operational level efforts aimed at helping acheive strategic objectives.
Then you would have the individual raids, which are essentially the tactical
level execution of the operational plans (i.e., they equate to "battles" in
the ground combat arena).

Note that we refer to what occured in Europe during WWII as the "European
Theater of Operations", not the "European Theater of Strategy".

The Doolittle raid, in particular, brings up the
> question "do the planners need to be aware they are trying for a major
> [strategic] effect?"

Yes, they do, and in this case they apparently did--the effect being more
the domestic morale boost that you pointed to above before you veered a bit
offcourse. That they *also* acheived some degree of strategic effect
(causing the Japanese to rethink and redeploy their available air assets)
may have been an unforseen benefit, but it had some strategic ramifications
nonetheless. And those strategic ramifications would have been measured in
how much they "interacted" (or more accurately impacted) other operations.
IMO, the Doolittle Raid was one of those rare exceptions to what I outlined
above; it was a single raid (or "battle") planned to acheive a strategic
goal (morale boost), that also had the added benefit of at least marginally
impacting what was then still a japanese "center of gravity", which was
their (at the time) still effective air operations throughout their theaters
of operations.

>
> This didn't appear to be a consideration in planning this raid -- the
> effect was unforeseen.

But it occured anyhow. The thread posits missions that had a strategic
impact, not necesarily those that acheived said impact that was preplanned
as an objective.

Perhaps we can also consider what might be
> called "negative strategic" decisions, such as Goering deciding to stop
> what we'd now call a SEAD campaign, and switch to city bombing.

I'd put that decision more into the "negative operational decision"
category; he changed the operational objective from defeating the RAF (an
operational objective if there ever was one) to the more daunting task of
defeating British morale with raids often targeted at nothing of direct
military value. And he had a rather paltry capability of acheiving that goal
(morale defeat) with the force he had available; say what you will about the
RAF targeting of large urban areas, but at least they had the muscle to make
an honest effort of it.

Brooks

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 21 Aug 2004 22:01:35 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>>> On Fri, 20 Aug 2004 21:23:23 -0700, "Leadfoot" >
>>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Biggest strategic campaign, of course, would be Linebacker II.
>>>
>>
>>I'd suggest the oil campaign against Germany in WW2
>>was rather more significant.
>>
>>Keith
>>
> Context, ol' buddy. Context! You've snipped the location of that
> single line away--it was following the listing of the Doumer Bridge
> LGB attack as a great strategic event, and my comments were strictly
> related to the SEA unpleasantness of we colonials.

Actually my intent in using the word "strategic" was to avoid the listing of
missions such as "most aircraft shot down" or "most tanks busted" type
missions which while important to any war effort wasn't what I was looking
for. "Mission" could be numerous sorties on different days such as
"dambusters" but wouldn't include something like "Point Blank". I could
have been clearer but since this is Usenet it probably wouldn't make a
diffence anyway as people tend to post whatever they want.




>
> When we're talking strategic campaigns, WW II has got some huge ones.
> Vietnam, on the other hand, simply ground on until every one got tired
> and went home.
>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> "Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
> Both from Smithsonian Books
> ***www.thunderchief.org

>Subject: Re: Greatest Strategic Air Missions?
>From: "Leadfoot"
>Date: 8/21/2004 5:51 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id:

>Actually my intent in using the word "strategic" was to avoid the listing of
>missions such as "most aircraft shot down" or "most tanks busted" type
>missions which while important to any war effort wasn't what I was looking

How about missions that changed the world? Battle of Britain comes to mind.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
| >Subject: Re: Greatest Strategic Air Missions?
| >From: "Leadfoot"
| >Date: 8/21/2004 5:51 PM Pacific Standard Time
| >Message-id:
|
| >Actually my intent in using the word "strategic" was to avoid the listing
of
| >missions such as "most aircraft shot down" or "most tanks busted" type
| >missions which while important to any war effort wasn't what I was
looking
|
| How about missions that changed the world? Battle of Britain comes to
mind.
|
|
| Arthur Kramer




If (in this case) we draw a difference between 'mission' and 'campaign' ,
which is what the BoB really was, the significant mission on both sides,
would have been the decision to bomb each others' capital city.





Cheers


Dave Kearton

"Leadfoot" > wrote in message
news:TUMVc.122627$sh.67356@fed1read06...
>
> "John Mullen" > wrote in message
> ...
> > "Leadfoot" > wrote in message
> > news:KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06...
> >> What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?
> >>
> >> Some candidates
> >>
> >> Yamamoto shootdown
> >> Hiroshima
> >> Paul Doumer bridge LGB
> >> Dambusters
> >> Tirpitz
> >> Norwegian heavy water
> >> Midway
> >> Doolittle raid
> >
> > You would surely have to include the 11th September attacks on New York
> > and
> > Washington. For an outlay of well under $1M, and some volunteers suicide
> > attackers with box cutters, whoever executed it massively damaged the US
> > economy, and so spooked the US that they started not one but two
> > unwinnable
> > wars (in Afghanistan and Iraq) in response. Surely that has to place it
up
> > there with Hiroshima?
>
> I think the Doolittle raid is a much closer parallel to 9-11 than
Hiroshima

Fair point.

Churchill's raid on Berlin in 1940 as well?

John

Ed Rasimus wrote:

>Vietnam, on the other hand, simply ground on until every one got tired
>and went home.
>

The great Strategic campaigns in Vietnam were the ones that never happened.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

"Dave Kearton" > wrote in
message ...
> "ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> ...
> | >Subject: Re: Greatest Strategic Air Missions?
> | >From: "Leadfoot"
> | >Date: 8/21/2004 5:51 PM Pacific Standard Time
> | >Message-id:
> |
> | >Actually my intent in using the word "strategic" was to avoid the
> listing
> of
> | >missions such as "most aircraft shot down" or "most tanks busted" type
> | >missions which while important to any war effort wasn't what I was
> looking
> |
> | How about missions that changed the world? Battle of Britain comes to
> mind.

Thats a campaign, not a mission

> |
> |
> | Arthur Kramer
>
>
>
>
> If (in this case) we draw a difference between 'mission' and 'campaign' ,
> which is what the BoB really was, the significant mission on both sides,
> would have been the decision to bomb each others' capital city.

Or going after radar sites

>
>
>
>
>
> Cheers
>
>
> Dave Kearton
>
>

"John Mullen" > wrote in message
...
> "Leadfoot" > wrote in message
> news:TUMVc.122627$sh.67356@fed1read06...
>>
>> "John Mullen" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> > "Leadfoot" > wrote in message
>> > news:KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06...
>> >> What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?
>> >>
>> >> Some candidates
>> >>
>> >> Yamamoto shootdown
>> >> Hiroshima
>> >> Paul Doumer bridge LGB
>> >> Dambusters
>> >> Tirpitz
>> >> Norwegian heavy water
>> >> Midway
>> >> Doolittle raid
>> >
>> > You would surely have to include the 11th September attacks on New York
>> > and
>> > Washington. For an outlay of well under $1M, and some volunteers
>> > suicide
>> > attackers with box cutters, whoever executed it massively damaged the
>> > US
>> > economy, and so spooked the US that they started not one but two
>> > unwinnable
>> > wars (in Afghanistan and Iraq) in response. Surely that has to place it
> up
>> > there with Hiroshima?
>>
>> I think the Doolittle raid is a much closer parallel to 9-11 than
> Hiroshima
>
> Fair point.
>
> Churchill's raid on Berlin in 1940 as well?


Proved they could do it. Probably not much damage to the German war effort
except for the MAJOR damage to Hermann Meyers (goering) reputation.

>
> John
>
>

"Leadfoot" > wrote in message
news:BlXVc.124472$sh.98869@fed1read06...

> Proved they could do it. Probably not much damage to the German war
effort
> except for the MAJOR damage to Hermann Meyers (goering) reputation.
>

I suspect John was referring to the raid in late August 1940
where bombs were droped on Berlin. This is often
said to have been a response to German bombers
dropping bombs on south London (Croydon)

In fact the reality is more mundane. Both aircraft
were simply off target when thet dropped their
bombs. The RAF aircraft were attemting to attack
a military airfield and the Siemens factory

Keith

>Subject: Re: Greatest Strategic Air Missions?
>From: "Leadfoot"
>Date: 8/21/2004 11:46 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: <iiXVc.124448$sh.75819@fed1read06>
>
>
>"Dave Kearton" > wrote in
>message ...
>> "ArtKramr" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> | >Subject: Re: Greatest Strategic Air Missions?
>> | >From: "Leadfoot"
>> | >Date: 8/21/2004 5:51 PM Pacific Standard Time
>> | >Message-id:
>> |
>> | >Actually my intent in using the word "strategic" was to avoid the
>> listing
>> of
>> | >missions such as "most aircraft shot down" or "most tanks busted" type
>> | >missions which while important to any war effort wasn't what I was
>> looking
>> |
>> | How about missions that changed the world? Battle of Britain comes to
>> mind.
>
>Thats a campaign, not a mission
>
>> |


Same for Linebacker II.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >Subject: Re: Greatest Strategic Air Missions?
>>From: "Leadfoot"
>>Date: 8/21/2004 11:46 PM Pacific Standard Time
>>Message-id: <iiXVc.124448$sh.75819@fed1read06>
>>
>>
>>"Dave Kearton" > wrote in
>>message ...
>>> "ArtKramr" > wrote in message
>>> ...
>>> | >Subject: Re: Greatest Strategic Air Missions?
>>> | >From: "Leadfoot"
>>> | >Date: 8/21/2004 5:51 PM Pacific Standard Time
>>> | >Message-id:
>>> |
>>> | >Actually my intent in using the word "strategic" was to avoid the
>>> listing
>>> of
>>> | >missions such as "most aircraft shot down" or "most tanks busted"
>>> type
>>> | >missions which while important to any war effort wasn't what I was
>>> looking
>>> |
>>> | How about missions that changed the world? Battle of Britain comes to
>>> mind.
>>
>>Thats a campaign, not a mission
>>
>>> |
>
>
> Same for Linebacker II.

Some one else posted linebacker II not me. I did consider it and decided it
was a campaign not a mission when I started the thread

>
>
> Arthur Kramer
> 344th BG 494th BS
> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
> Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
> http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
>

On Sun, 22 Aug 2004 13:34:00 -0700, "Leadfoot" >
wrote:


>>>Thats a campaign, not a mission
>>
>> Same for Linebacker II.
>
>Some one else posted linebacker II not me. I did consider it and decided it
>was a campaign not a mission when I started the thread
>

I'd think that maybe 11 days might be closer to a battle, but if you
want it to be called campaign, then let's just go with December
18/19th night. One hundred fifty BUFF sorties scheduled and most of
them flown into an area the size of Rhode Island. Accompanied by a
bunch of F-111's against the airfields and followed up with the full
force of all the USAF/USN airplanes in theater the next day, hitting
virtually every worthwhile (and many sub-worthwhile) targets in RP VI
within 24 hours.

Looked pretty impressive from my seat.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

Ed Rasimus > wrote:

>On Sun, 22 Aug 2004 13:34:00 -0700, "Leadfoot" >
>wrote:
>
>>>>Thats a campaign, not a mission
>>>
>>> Same for Linebacker II.
>>
>>Some one else posted linebacker II not me. I did consider it and decided it
>>was a campaign not a mission when I started the thread
>>
>I'd think that maybe 11 days might be closer to a battle, but if you
>want it to be called campaign, then let's just go with December
>18/19th night. One hundred fifty BUFF sorties scheduled and most of
>them flown into an area the size of Rhode Island. Accompanied by a
>bunch of F-111's against the airfields and followed up with the full
>force of all the USAF/USN airplanes in theater the next day, hitting
>virtually every worthwhile (and many sub-worthwhile) targets in RP VI
>within 24 hours.
>
>Looked pretty impressive from my seat.

No doubt, Ed.

I'd call the whole Linebacker II campaign a strategic success. As I
remember, the North Vietnamese had walked away from the Paris negotiations,
and had to be 'persuaded' to come back. Seems like taking the gloves off
worked.

I don't know how long we could have sustained that level of losses,
specially the BUFFs, but I'm reasonably sure the NV thought we'd go as long
as we had to. If only we'd done it earlier...

| George Ruch
| "Is there life in Clovis after Clovis Man?"

Leadfoot > wrote:
> What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?

> Some candidates

> Yamamoto shootdown
> Hiroshima
> Paul Doumer bridge LGB
> Dambusters
> Tirpitz
> Norwegian heavy water
> Midway
> Doolittle raid

Although many missions have been added the First World War is
completely missing. Here are my two suggestions:

- First RFC raid on Friedrichhafen Zeppelin hangars, late 1914
- Would you go on a bombing raid with Avro 504?

- First German Riesenbomber raids on London
- Raid which seriously depleted RFC Western
Front fighter strengths. Besides, those Gothas look
damn impressive.

terveisin,
jukka raustia

--
"Päinvastoin, olisi nähtävä, että Suomen turvallisuus _kaikissa tilanteissa_
nojautuu olennaisesti siihen, että tarpeen vaatiessa Suomi voi tukeutua
Neuvostoliiton apuun koskemattomuutensa säilyttämiseksi."
-s. 57, Kaksiteräinen miekka - 70-luvun puolustuspolitiikkaa"
Jaakko Blomberg, Pentti Joenniemi, Helsinki 1971.

"John Mullen" > wrote in message
...
> "Leadfoot" > wrote in message
> news:KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06...
> > What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?
> >
> > Some candidates
> >
> > Yamamoto shootdown
> > Hiroshima
> > Paul Doumer bridge LGB
> > Dambusters
> > Tirpitz
> > Norwegian heavy water
> > Midway
> > Doolittle raid
>
> You would surely have to include the 11th September attacks on New York
and
> Washington. For an outlay of well under $1M, and some volunteers suicide
> attackers with box cutters, whoever executed it massively damaged the US
> economy, and so spooked the US that they started not one but two
unwinnable
> wars (in Afghanistan and Iraq) in response. Surely that has to place it up
> there with Hiroshima?
>
> John
>
Also destroying Dresden, historical art city is impressive. Even today there
is marks of bombings.

"hobo" > wrote in message
...
> In article <KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06>,
> "Leadfoot" > wrote:
>
> > Some candidates
> >
> > Yamamoto shootdown
> > Hiroshima
> > Paul Doumer bridge LGB
> > Dambusters
> > Tirpitz
> > Norwegian heavy water
> > Midway
> > Doolittle raid
>
> Why isn't the Israeli attack on the Egyptian AF to start the Six Day war
> listed? After their AF was destroyed on the ground the Egyptians ordered
> their troops on the border to retreat, which was most likely a mistake,
> and they were slaughtered by the Israelis as they withdrew. Eliminating
> Egypt so quickly allowed the Israelis to fight a 3 front war one front
> at a time.

It's for sure one of greatest, expecially if to keep in mind that air
superiority was main factor in their victory.

On Mon, 23 Aug 2004 01:28:09 -0600, George Ruch
> wrote:

>Ed Rasimus > wrote:
>>>
>>I'd think that maybe 11 days might be closer to a battle, but if you
>>want it to be called campaign, then let's just go with December
>>18/19th night. One hundred fifty BUFF sorties scheduled and most of
>>them flown into an area the size of Rhode Island. Accompanied by a
>>bunch of F-111's against the airfields and followed up with the full
>>force of all the USAF/USN airplanes in theater the next day, hitting
>>virtually every worthwhile (and many sub-worthwhile) targets in RP VI
>>within 24 hours.
>>
>>Looked pretty impressive from my seat.
>
>No doubt, Ed.
>
>I'd call the whole Linebacker II campaign a strategic success. As I
>remember, the North Vietnamese had walked away from the Paris negotiations,
>and had to be 'persuaded' to come back. Seems like taking the gloves off
>worked.
>
>I don't know how long we could have sustained that level of losses,
>specially the BUFFs, but I'm reasonably sure the NV thought we'd go as long
>as we had to. If only we'd done it earlier...

The loss level dropped abruptly after day six and although several
more BUFFs were lost in the remaining five days, the near total
destruction of the NVN air defense system means that the campaign
could have been sustained until the level of the 1964 LeMay
prescription--"back to the stone age." On day six, I was part of a
Hunter/Killer flight supporting a day strike to Hanoi. We orbited
Bullseye (Hanoi geographic center) for more than 25 minutes at six
thousand feet over a solid undercast--a prescription for almost
certain disaster a week earlier.

The question about how it might have turned out had we done it earlier
is certainly one for extended debate, but that was then and this is
now. The huge difference was that during the period in question, there
was a significant doubt about what would inadvertently trigger
intervention by the Soviets or the PRC and start the slippery slide to
nuclear exchange.

Bottom line for consideration, however, is that the restraint
exercised by the Nixon administration in terminating the campaign
after eleven days when an agreement was reached seems to put into
question the assertions of atrocities, war crimes, carpet-bombing, etc
instituted from the highest levels of command.




Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

Does the Isreali strike on Iraq's nuclear plant qualify?

Rick Clark

George Ruch > wrote in message >...
>
> ...
>
> I'd call the whole Linebacker II campaign a strategic success. As I
> remember, the North Vietnamese had walked away from the Paris negotiations,
> and had to be 'persuaded' to come back. Seems like taking the gloves off
> worked.
>

What was the issue in Paris that the NV refused to accept before
Linebacker II, and to which they agreed afterward?

--

FF

"Leadfoot" > wrote in message news:<KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06>...
> What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?
>
> Some candidates
>
> Yamamoto shootdown
> Hiroshima
> Paul Doumer bridge LGB
> Dambusters
> Tirpitz
> Norwegian heavy water
> Midway
> Doolittle raid

Interview with Heisenberg and others in the German nuclear program,
as well as conversations among the German scientists surrepeticiously
recorded while in British detention indicate that the German nuclear
program was geared toward nuclear power and not an atomic bomb.

If the Germans had dedicated more resources to nuclear weapons then
I'd argue that the Norwegian heavy water raid might have reversed
the outcome of the war.

But after reading through this thread I'd have to agree that the
greatest strategic air mission FAILURE was the attack on
Pearl Harbor, despite being an overwhelming tactical victory.
Strategicaly, it assured the ultimate defeat of Japan.

Hiroshima, because it along with Nagasaki ended the War without
an invasion of the Japanese mainland would be the greatest
strategic air victory.

--

FF

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

>What was the issue in Paris that the NV refused to accept before
>Linebacker II, and to which they agreed afterward?

None. The only changes to the document signed in January 1973 and the one
agreed upon in October 1972 was some wording.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

In article >,
(BUFDRVR) writes:
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
>>I'd suggest the oil campaign against Germany in WW2
>>was rather more significant.
>>
>
> Had POL been a top priority beginning in 1942 I think the POL campaign would be
> an obvious choice, but the fact that POL was not a high priority until 1944
> kind of blurs its importance. According to Speer, had we systematically
> attacked Germany's electricity (production and distribution) beginning in 1942,
> the war in Europe would have ended 6-8 months sooner.

There's some evidence that POL was seen as a weak point in the early
days of WW 2. IIRC, there was a British attempt to get bombers over
Ploesti and the Dessarabians oil facilities in what was then the
Soviet Union. (Let's not overlook the fact that the Soviets didnt
throuw in with the Allies until June 1941, and had been perfectly
happy helping Hitler carve up Europe before that)

The raids got as far as forward-basing bombers in, I believe, Greece,
but the plan was cancelled at the last minute.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

"Glenfiddich" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 23 Aug 2004 17:36:52 +0300, "Vello" > wrote:
> >"hobo" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> In article <KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06>,
> >> "Leadfoot" > wrote:
> >>
> >> > Some candidates
> >> >
> >> > Yamamoto shootdown
> >> > Hiroshima
> >> > Paul Doumer bridge LGB
> >> > Dambusters
> >> > Tirpitz
> >> > Norwegian heavy water
> >> > Midway
> >> > Doolittle raid
> >>
> >> Why isn't the Israeli attack on the Egyptian AF to start the Six Day
war
> >> listed? After their AF was destroyed on the ground the Egyptians
ordered
> >> their troops on the border to retreat, which was most likely a mistake,
> >> and they were slaughtered by the Israelis as they withdrew. Eliminating
> >> Egypt so quickly allowed the Israelis to fight a 3 front war one front
> >> at a time.
> >
> >It's for sure one of greatest, expecially if to keep in mind that air
> >superiority was main factor in their victory.
>
> Israel had that after they caught many of the Egyptian planes
> on the ground, but you seem to be saying Israel had air superiority
> BEFORE they attacked.
> Can you confirm that to be the case?

I did not read it that way at all. It appears he was saying that the air
strikes were indeed key *if* you keep in mind that their *subsequent*
unchallenged (or darned close to it) air superiority was key to their
overall success.

Brooks

Pete Stickney wrote:

>There's some evidence that POL was seen as a weak point in the early
>days of WW 2.

Absolutely it was. Even after the U.S. jumped in POL was considered a good
payoff target...the problem was (IIRC) that the entire POL system (from
production to distribution) was so dispersed that only the production node was
seen as vulnerable to air strike and the effects of hitting production much too
delayed. After Ploesti, no serious strikes on POL facilities took place again
until the Spring before D-Day.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

Ed Rasimus > wrote:

>On Mon, 23 Aug 2004 01:28:09 -0600, George Ruch
> wrote:
>
>>Ed Rasimus > wrote:
>>>>
>>>I'd think that maybe 11 days might be closer to a battle, but if you
>>>want it to be called campaign, [...]
>>>
>>>Looked pretty impressive from my seat.
>>
>>No doubt, Ed.
>>
>>I'd call the whole Linebacker II campaign a strategic success. As I
>>remember, the North Vietnamese had walked away from the Paris negotiations,
>>and had to be 'persuaded' to come back. Seems like taking the gloves off
>>worked.
>>
>>I don't know how long we could have sustained that level of losses,
>>specially the BUFFs, but I'm reasonably sure the NV thought we'd go as long
>>as we had to. If only we'd done it earlier...
>
>The loss level dropped abruptly after day six and although several
>more BUFFs were lost in the remaining five days, the near total
>destruction of the NVN air defense system means that the campaign
>could have been sustained until the level of the 1964 LeMay
>prescription--"back to the stone age."

I was at Takhli at the time - 474AMS pod shop (ALQ-87s). We didn't get
much detail at the time - some of the strike photos, but not much of the
big picture. We lost 6 airplanes - three of them during Linebacker.

>On day six, I was part of a
>Hunter/Killer flight supporting a day strike to Hanoi. We orbited
>Bullseye (Hanoi geographic center) for more than 25 minutes at six
>thousand feet over a solid undercast--a prescription for almost
>certain disaster a week earlier.

Glad you got back in one piece. That could definitely have ruined your
day.

>The question about how it might have turned out had we done it earlier
>is certainly one for extended debate, but that was then and this is
>now. The huge difference was that during the period in question, there
>was a significant doubt about what would inadvertently trigger
>intervention by the Soviets or the PRC and start the slippery slide to
>nuclear exchange.

Even without that possibility, a heavy bombing campaign would have been a
very sharp dual edged sword. Military necessity vs. major portions of Hanoi
and Haiphong leveled by 'indiscriminate' bombing. The foreign press and
some of our own would have torn the Johnson and Nixon administrations
apart.

>Bottom line for consideration, however, is that the restraint
>exercised by the Nixon administration in terminating the campaign
>after eleven days when an agreement was reached seems to put into
>question the assertions of atrocities, war crimes, carpet-bombing, etc
>instituted from the highest levels of command.

Good point.

| George Ruch
| "Is there life in Clovis after Clovis Man?"

"Glenfiddich" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 23 Aug 2004 17:36:52 +0300, "Vello" > wrote:
> >"hobo" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> In article <KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06>,
> >> "Leadfoot" > wrote:
> >>
> >> > Some candidates
> >> >
> >> > Yamamoto shootdown
> >> > Hiroshima
> >> > Paul Doumer bridge LGB
> >> > Dambusters
> >> > Tirpitz
> >> > Norwegian heavy water
> >> > Midway
> >> > Doolittle raid
> >>
> >> Why isn't the Israeli attack on the Egyptian AF to start the Six Day
war
> >> listed? After their AF was destroyed on the ground the Egyptians
ordered
> >> their troops on the border to retreat, which was most likely a mistake,
> >> and they were slaughtered by the Israelis as they withdrew. Eliminating
> >> Egypt so quickly allowed the Israelis to fight a 3 front war one front
> >> at a time.
> >
> >It's for sure one of greatest, expecially if to keep in mind that air
> >superiority was main factor in their victory.
>
> Israel had that after they caught many of the Egyptian planes
> on the ground, but you seem to be saying Israel had air superiority
> BEFORE they attacked.
> Can you confirm that to be the case?


No, no, sorry, what I want to point out is the fact that before surprise
attack Egypt outnumbered Israel by planes by far. Without taking air
superiority with that brilliant operation all the war would probably turn
for disaster for Israel as Egypt was much stronger by tanks and manpower,
too. This way I think this single operation was a key for all war.

"Fred the Red Shirt" > wrote in message
m...
> "Leadfoot" > wrote in message
news:<KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06>...
> > What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?
> >
> > Some candidates
> >
> > Yamamoto shootdown
> > Hiroshima
> > Paul Doumer bridge LGB
> > Dambusters
> > Tirpitz
> > Norwegian heavy water
> > Midway
> > Doolittle raid
>
> Interview with Heisenberg and others in the German nuclear program,
> as well as conversations among the German scientists surrepeticiously
> recorded while in British detention indicate that the German nuclear
> program was geared toward nuclear power and not an atomic bomb.
>
> If the Germans had dedicated more resources to nuclear weapons then
> I'd argue that the Norwegian heavy water raid might have reversed
> the outcome of the war.
>
> But after reading through this thread I'd have to agree that the
> greatest strategic air mission FAILURE was the attack on
> Pearl Harbor, despite being an overwhelming tactical victory.
> Strategicaly, it assured the ultimate defeat of Japan.
>
> Hiroshima, because it along with Nagasaki ended the War without
> an invasion of the Japanese mainland would be the greatest
> strategic air victory.
>
> --
>
> FF

Strong candidate would be air bridge to West Berlin. It unites western world
again - and let us understand, that despite war was over, there still was a
totalitarian state wanting to rule the Europe and Universe.

(BUFDRVR) wrote in message >...
> Fred the Red Shirt wrote:
>
> >What was the issue in Paris that the NV refused to accept before
> >Linebacker II, and to which they agreed afterward?
>
> None. The only changes to the document signed in January 1973 and the one
> agreed upon in October 1972 was some wording.
>

So in 1973 did NV abandon an issue they had been holding out for?
If not, why'd they walk out?

I had thought that the last dividing issue was the presence of NVA
troops in South Vietnam, e.g. the "Parrot's Beak". South Vietnam
refused to sign the treaty unless the the NVA troops withdrew and
NV refused to withdraw them. Ulitmately, South Vietnam relented
and the treaty was signed.

Have I got that wrong?

--

FF

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

>So in 1973 did NV abandon an issue they had been holding out for?

Nope.

>If not, why'd they walk out?

There walk out was two fold. First off, the agreement and draft were finalized
in mid-October '72 and arrangements made to sign the document "after
consultations". The NVN were immediately ready, however Kissenger needed to
travel to Saigon to meet with with Nguyen Van Thieu and get his "ok" on the
agreement. The agreement contained several aspects that Theiu thought
unacceptable including no provision to remove NVA forces in SVN. Thieu even
wanted the agreement to include the removal of VC forces from SVN. While Nixon,
Kissenger and Thieu debated and looked at recrafting the agreement, bombing
south of the 20th parallel (on top of NVA forces) continued. Hanoi accused the
U.S. of purposely using the agreement to stall while Saigon regrouped their
ground forces. Meanwhile....back in the U.S. several democratic Senators just
prior to the Thanksgiving break called for a vote on suspending funding for the
war in SE Asia. The idea began to publically be debated and suddenly Hanoi
figured they could get the whole enchillada by *not* signing the agreement and
simply waiting for the U.S. Congress to end the war. So...they announced the
U.S. was stalling, rejected the proposed changes presented by Kissenger and
left. Why did they return? Because the calls in Congress for suspending funding
died down, Nixon bombed them during the Christmas break and no congressmen
publically made a "peep" and because they figured the deal they made in October
was the best they were going to get. Le Duc Tho informed Kissenger on 27
December he was returning to Paris and was ready to sign the original
agreement. Kissenger leaned on Theiu, there was some wording that was changed,
but basically the Peace Accord signed in January 1973 was the one drafted in
October 1972.

>I had thought that the last dividing issue was the presence of NVA
>troops in South Vietnam, e.g. the "Parrot's Beak". South Vietnam
>refused to sign the treaty unless the the NVA troops withdrew and
>NV refused to withdraw them. Ulitmately, South Vietnam relented
>and the treaty was signed.

For the most part, yes.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

(BUFDRVR) wrote in message >...
> Fred the Red Shirt wrote:
>
> >So in 1973 did NV abandon an issue they had been holding out for?
>
> Nope.
>
> >If not, why'd they walk out?
>
> There walk out was two fold. First off, the agreement and draft were finalized
> in mid-October '72 and arrangements made to sign the document "after
> consultations". The NVN were immediately ready, however Kissenger needed to
> travel to Saigon to meet with with Nguyen Van Thieu and get his "ok" on the
> agreement. The agreement contained several aspects that Theiu thought
> unacceptable including no provision to remove NVA forces in SVN. Thieu even
> wanted the agreement to include the removal of VC forces from SVN. While Nixon,
> Kissenger and Thieu debated and looked at recrafting the agreement, bombing
> south of the 20th parallel (on top of NVA forces) continued. Hanoi accused the
> U.S. of purposely using the agreement to stall while Saigon regrouped their
> ground forces. Meanwhile....back in the U.S. several democratic Senators just
> prior to the Thanksgiving break called for a vote on suspending funding for the
> war in SE Asia. The idea began to publically be debated and suddenly Hanoi
> figured they could get the whole enchillada by *not* signing the agreement and
> simply waiting for the U.S. Congress to end the war. So...they announced the
> U.S. was stalling, rejected the proposed changes presented by Kissenger and
> left. Why did they return? Because the calls in Congress for suspending funding
> died down, Nixon bombed them during the Christmas break and no congressmen
> publically made a "peep" and because they figured the deal they made in October
> was the best they were going to get. Le Duc Tho informed Kissenger on 27
> December he was returning to Paris and was ready to sign the original
> agreement. Kissenger leaned on Theiu, there was some wording that was changed,
> but basically the Peace Accord signed in January 1973 was the one drafted in
> October 1972.

It would seem that there is no reason to believe the NVN would not
have returned as soon as the SVN agreed to the October, 1972 terms.
IOW, bringing the NVN back to the table by itself accomplished nothing.

Does this not imply that Linebacker II accomplished nothing worthwhile?

>
> >I had thought that the last dividing issue was the presence of NVA
> >troops in South Vietnam, e.g. the "Parrot's Beak". South Vietnam
> >refused to sign the treaty unless the the NVA troops withdrew and
> >NV refused to withdraw them. Ulitmately, South Vietnam relented
> >and the treaty was signed.
>
> For the most part, yes.
>

--

FF

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

>It would seem that there is no reason to believe the NVN would not
>have returned as soon as the SVN agreed to the October, 1972 terms.

Had Theiu agreed initially, the Peace Accord would have been signed in
November.

>Does this not imply that Linebacker II accomplished nothing worthwhile?

No, the bombing campaign, along with silence from the U.S. congress convinced
the NVN that they were not going to get the whole "enchilada". By there
reasoning, if congress accepted a bombing campaign in previously restricted
areas of Hanoi, certainly they were not ready to vote to suspend funding for
the war.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 2 Sep 2004 10:59:49 -0700, (Fred the Red
Shirt) wrote:


>Does this not imply that Linebacker II accomplished nothing worthwhile?
>

I've got several hundred POW friends that might like to discuss that
with you.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
> On 2 Sep 2004 10:59:49 -0700, (Fred the Red
> Shirt) wrote:
>
>
> >Does this not imply that Linebacker II accomplished nothing worthwhile?
> >
>
> I've got several hundred POW friends that might like to discuss that
> with you.
>

Your friends might have been home for Christmas 1972 had the SVN
agreed to the accords in October 1972. The SVN continued to
hold out foir awhile even AFTER the NVN returned to the table.
The seminal event that brought them home was the agreement to
the accords by the SVN.

Had the SVN relented befor Linbacker II AND the NVN reneged then
the efficacy of Linbacker II would be pretty well established.
As it is, we can only speculate.

--

FF

On 3 Sep 2004 09:13:45 -0700, (Fred the Red
Shirt) wrote:

>Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
>> On 2 Sep 2004 10:59:49 -0700, (Fred the Red
>> Shirt) wrote:
>>
>>
>> >Does this not imply that Linebacker II accomplished nothing worthwhile?
>> >
>>
>> I've got several hundred POW friends that might like to discuss that
>> with you.
>>
>
>Your friends might have been home for Christmas 1972 had the SVN
>agreed to the accords in October 1972. The SVN continued to
>hold out foir awhile even AFTER the NVN returned to the table.
>The seminal event that brought them home was the agreement to
>the accords by the SVN.

That's a pretty selective interpretation of history. The fact is that
bombing north of 20 degrees was halted in late October when there was
agreement to sign. In late November, the agreement had not been signed
by the North and they walked out of Paris. Establishing a "rooster
crows--sun rises" syllogism based on SVN actions is a stretch. Nothing
happens in a vacuum.
>
>Had the SVN relented befor Linbacker II AND the NVN reneged then
>the efficacy of Linbacker II would be pretty well established.
>As it is, we can only speculate.

You can speculate, I was a participant, and the POWs were on-scene
observers. I can find a direct causative relationship between getting
the crap kicked out of them for eleven days and crying "uncle", then
signing and in very short order releasing the guys.

Various historians have viewed Linebacker II and reached different
conclusions. Eschmann seemed to see the campaign as very effective.
Clodfelter drew more subtle conclusions and leaned toward the classic
"bombing alone doesn't win wars" answer. Michel, doing the most recent
work and being the first with major participation with the NVN in his
research, ascribed losses to bureaucratic infighting, ascribed victory
to both sides by their own interpretation, and agreed with most that
there was a direct linkage between the bombing campaign and the
conclusion of the war.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

> Your friends might have been home for Christmas 1972 had the SVN
> agreed to the accords in October 1972. The SVN continued to
> hold out foir awhile even AFTER the NVN returned to the table.
> The seminal event that brought them home was the agreement to
> the accords by the SVN.
>
> Had the SVN relented befor Linbacker II AND the NVN reneged then
> the efficacy of Linbacker II would be pretty well established.
> As it is, we can only speculate.

....or, propagandize and spin.

If I had been making those decisions for SVN I would have agreed to the
accords only with extreme reluctance. Do you think they did not know
what would happen when the US pulled out its forces? Everyone understood
it was only a matter of time without direct US support on the ground
until SVN was overrun.

Survival is the name of the game, and as has too often been the case,
the piece of mind of the US Left is more important than the commitments
to support the survival of some of our allies -- even when those
commitments were the product of Democratic administrations.

The US has much to be proud of and much to be ashamed of with regard to
VN, but not necessarily what those of your political persuasion might claim.


Jack

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> In late November, the agreement had not been signed
>by the North and they walked out of Paris.

Ed, that is a misleading description of events. When the NVN walked out in
November, they had nothing to sign. Kissenger had recently submitted changes to
the October agreement, but even if NVN found them acceptable it would have been
weeks before a final signing. Bottom line; NVN walked out because we were
changing an already agreed upon accord AND (more importantly) the anti-war
movement in congress was threatening to give them much more than the Paris
Peace Accord.

>You can speculate, I was a participant, and the POWs were on-scene
>observers.

You and I have been over this before Ed, but I don't believe participation in
history makes someone an expert in anything other then your own part in that
event. In this discusion, aircrew perspective doesn't provide much.

>I can find a direct causative relationship between getting
>the crap kicked out of them for eleven days and crying "uncle", then
>signing and in very short order releasing the guys.

Without a doubt, however LBII would have lasted until the dollars ran out if
congress had returned and voted to suspend funding for the war. The bombing
and, as equally important, the silence from congress convinced NVN to return to
Paris and sign *the original October agreeement*.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 04 Sep 2004 00:42:19 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> In late November, the agreement had not been signed
>>by the North and they walked out of Paris.
>
>Ed, that is a misleading description of events. When the NVN walked out in
>November, they had nothing to sign. Kissenger had recently submitted changes to
>the October agreement, but even if NVN found them acceptable it would have been
>weeks before a final signing. Bottom line; NVN walked out because we were
>changing an already agreed upon accord AND (more importantly) the anti-war
>movement in congress was threatening to give them much more than the Paris
>Peace Accord.

You fail to add one important link to the events: There was an
election on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. And,
you also fail to acknowledge my qualification that causative
relationships in issues like this are not simple.
>
>>You can speculate, I was a participant, and the POWs were on-scene
>>observers.
>
>You and I have been over this before Ed, but I don't believe participation in
>history makes someone an expert in anything other then your own part in that
>event. In this discusion, aircrew perspective doesn't provide much.

I'm not going to descend to the level of others who discount anyone
who wasn't there. That's why I added reference to Eschmann, Clodfelter
and Michel as well. When we take on-scene observers (the POWs who were
interacting with the NVN military on a daily basis and had seen
considerable shifts in attitudes, goals, and political positions in
the camp leadership in response to events), participants (lots of them
who had been through multiple tours), senior military leaders who were
in-the-loop on classified and back-channel traffic, and the historians
you should be able to get a much better interpretation of events than
simple archivist reviewer historians (and many with a political ax to
grind.)
>
>>I can find a direct causative relationship between getting
>>the crap kicked out of them for eleven days and crying "uncle", then
>>signing and in very short order releasing the guys.
>
>Without a doubt, however LBII would have lasted until the dollars ran out if
>congress had returned and voted to suspend funding for the war. The bombing
>and, as equally important, the silence from congress convinced NVN to return to
>Paris and sign *the original October agreeement*.

And, the "silence from Congress" can very clearly be linked to the '68
election and the need to wrap things up without political campaign
positions interfering.

To suggest that LBII would have gone on until the budget tightened is
to be unaware of the initial alerting order for the campaign which
said "three days" of maximum effort. That doesn't sound like an
open-ended campaign to me.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
> On 3 Sep 2004 09:13:45 -0700, (Fred the Red
> Shirt) wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
> >> On 2 Sep 2004 10:59:49 -0700, (Fred the Red
> >> Shirt) wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> >Does this not imply that Linebacker II accomplished nothing worthwhile?
> >> >
> >>
> >> I've got several hundred POW friends that might like to discuss that
> >> with you.
> >>
> >
> >Your friends might have been home for Christmas 1972 had the SVN
> >agreed to the accords in October 1972. The SVN continued to
> >hold out foir awhile even AFTER the NVN returned to the table.
> >The seminal event that brought them home was the agreement to
> >the accords by the SVN.
>
> That's a pretty selective interpretation of history. The fact is that
> bombing north of 20 degrees was halted in late October when there was
> agreement to sign. In late November, the agreement had not been signed
> by the North and they walked out of Paris.

Which stil makes it seem rather obvious that it was the SVN resistance
to the Accords that prevented them from being signed in October 1972.
Offhand, I can't say as I blame them.

> >
> >Had the SVN relented befor Linbacker II AND the NVN reneged then
> >the efficacy of Linbacker II would be pretty well established.
> >As it is, we can only speculate.
>
> You can speculate, I was a participant, and the POWs were on-scene
> observers. I can find a direct causative relationship between getting
> the crap kicked out of them for eleven days and crying "uncle", then
> signing and in very short order releasing the guys.

Respectfully, you were not a participant in the negotiations in
Paris. However you have convinced me that that Linbacker II brought
the NVN back to the table. Clearly that was necessary for the Accord
to be signed and that the SVN held out longer (we weren't bombing them)
doesn't change that.

On Fri, 03 Sep 2004 10:45:24 -0600, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:


>Various historians have viewed Linebacker II and reached different
>conclusions. Eschmann seemed to see the campaign as very effective.

From the military point of view, yes, bombing was effective.

>Clodfelter drew more subtle conclusions and leaned toward the classic
>"bombing alone doesn't win wars" answer. Michel, doing the most recent
>work and being the first with major participation with the NVN in his
>research, ascribed losses to bureaucratic infighting, ascribed victory
>to both sides by their own interpretation, and agreed with most that
>there was a direct linkage between the bombing campaign and the
>conclusion of the war.

I don't get that. Is the current opinion that North Vietnamese
conquest of South Vietnam was some other, different war from the one
that was "concluded" by Treaty in Paris?

It seems to me that Linebacker II had virtually no strategic effect as
far as South Vietnamese were concerned, they were wiped out from the
map.


Drax

OK guys, I've been following this and i have to admit that I'm not on all the
missions you have listed in this thread but it seems to me that there is one
that is very aparent by it's absense. Since we're talking about strategic
missions, how about the mission of the Strategic Air Command?
For nearly 50 years their mission was to insure that we maintained a viable
nuclear deterence, maintain 2/3 of the US's nuke strike capability and train
for and conduct strategic bombing missions, both conventional and nuke.
While they were never called upon to conduct the nuke missions, they were
called upon at several times to conduct conventional missions. And since there
was never a nuke exchange while SAC was in operation, I'd venture a guess at
saying they were very succesful at the deterence side of their mission.

just my 2 cents

Jim
SAC Cop
78-88

" PEACE WAS OUR PROFESSION AND WE WON "