A terrible tragedy happened yesterday here at my home airport and I can't
get it off my mind as to "why" it happened.

3 people lost their life yesterday. The pilot was a very dear and wonderful
person, 72 years young and a pilot of 24 years. "Jean" Bible was never IFR
rated and only flew 30 minutes or so each flight in clear skies and
daylight. She was a very careful pilot and always used good judgement.

Yesterday she was to give a "first flight" to an 11 year old girl for a
Christmas gift given by her Aunt.

Visibility at the airport was less than 1 mile...you could not see the
opposite end of the runway and yet...for some reason know only to God. She
departed the runway and was airborne for about 1 minute before slamming into
the ground about 100 yards off the runway center line killing all three
people. From the hangar the "thug" was heard but you could not see the
airplane lying upside down about 1/4 mile away.

How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come back
another time? Perhaps thinking she could maintain visual contact with the
ground and just to some touch and go's? Some way, some how, she "psyched"
herself into doing something that ended in a horrible tragedy.

This in a way is written for "Jean" the pilot and the two passengers that
died needlessly so that perhaps all of us can learn something. Pilots must
never give in to the pressures that be. We have our lives and the lives of
others in our hands. We will always make safety our top priority, know
ourselves, our limits.

I don't have the answers but I needed to write this...

Here's the link if interested..http://www.nbc4i.com/news/4035611/detail.html

Terry PP-ASEL

N6401F

Terry ) wrote:

> I don't have the answers but I needed to write this...

Terry, this is really unfortunate and my condolences go out to the
families involved.

I do have a question, though: I realize that media reports are usually
wrong, but twice in that linked article there was mention of the weather
turning bad *at* or just after takeoff.

Now, I realize that this seems unlikely, but I have read of accounts
here in this newsgroup of cases where fog developed very, very quickly
around an aircraft. I suppose there would have been tell-tale clues
ahead of time, such as a close temperature/dewpoint spread that the
pilot should have seen.

Do you know first or second-hand that the weather was actually bad prior
to takeoff?


--
Peter

This is always tough. The 99's lost a couple good pilots not too long
ago off the coast of Monterey. The pilot was VERY experienced but not
instrument rated. Why she took off into the fog, no one will ever know.

Hi Terry

An experienced pilot with a first time 11 year old flyer? That is a
real tragedy. My condolences to all involved.
At face value, a VFR pilot taking off in less than 1 mile viz? I have to
ask why. But did it really happen that way? I see already responses that
suggest maybe that wasn't the case.

I hope that this doesn't turn into another trial by usenet. A lot of
people are hurting right now - we should wait for the NTSB reports.

Meanwhile, my thoughts are with all those that knew the victims. It's
always sad to lose someone, but at this time of year it seems even worse.

Just remember her as a good pilot who was doing a favour for a kid - and
it went tragically wrong.

Bet wishes

Tony
--

Tony Roberts
PP-ASEL
VFR OTT
Night
Cessna 172H C-GICE

My condolences to the families involved. That's terrible news.

That's a shame Terry. I can see you are pretty disturbed by it and
that's understandable. When these things happen there's seldom a quick
answer, and nothing can really make things right for those like yourself
who know the people involved. I know this perhaps better than anyone, as
in my end of the aviation business, tragedy has been a lifetime
companion.
Let me give you some sage advice if you'll allow me to do so.
Don't try and figure this out now. It seldom helps, and in almost every
case what actually happened turns out to something other than it appears
in the direct aftermath.
Something obviously went terribly wrong. Wait for the investigation
before assuming anything or trying to figure it out.
Be a friend to those you know who have been affected by this by being
there to support them. You might suggest that others at the field do the
same.
I completely understand how you feel about this. Trust me, I've been
there many times. It hurts!
Dudley

"Terry" > wrote in message
link.net...
>A terrible tragedy happened yesterday here at my home airport and I
>can't get it off my mind as to "why" it happened.
>
> 3 people lost their life yesterday. The pilot was a very dear and
> wonderful person, 72 years young and a pilot of 24 years. "Jean" Bible
> was never IFR rated and only flew 30 minutes or so each flight in
> clear skies and daylight. She was a very careful pilot and always used
> good judgement.
>
> Yesterday she was to give a "first flight" to an 11 year old girl for
> a Christmas gift given by her Aunt.
>
> Visibility at the airport was less than 1 mile...you could not see the
> opposite end of the runway and yet...for some reason know only to God.
> She departed the runway and was airborne for about 1 minute before
> slamming into the ground about 100 yards off the runway center line
> killing all three people. From the hangar the "thug" was heard but you
> could not see the airplane lying upside down about 1/4 mile away.
>
> How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not
> wanting to deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having
> to say come back another time? Perhaps thinking she could maintain
> visual contact with the ground and just to some touch and go's? Some
> way, some how, she "psyched" herself into doing something that ended
> in a horrible tragedy.
>
> This in a way is written for "Jean" the pilot and the two passengers
> that died needlessly so that perhaps all of us can learn something.
> Pilots must never give in to the pressures that be. We have our lives
> and the lives of others in our hands. We will always make safety our
> top priority, know ourselves, our limits.
>
> I don't have the answers but I needed to write this...
>
> Here's the link if
> interested..http://www.nbc4i.com/news/4035611/detail.html
>
> Terry PP-ASEL
>
> N6401F
>
>

Terry wrote:
> I don't have the answers but I needed to write this...

It's ok not to have the answers Terry. Thanks for sharing what
happened. I very much agree with Dudley's advice not to try and figure
it out right now. It's not going to make sense anyway as these things
seldom do. I hope you can be there to support friends, family, and the
community of folks at the airport. Our prayers are with you and
everyone touched by this tragedy.

--
Jack Allison
PP-ASEL, IA Student, airplane partnership student

"When once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the Earth
with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there
you will always long to return"
- Leonardo Da Vinci

(Remove the obvious from address to reply via e-mail)

As others have already done; my deepest condolences to the families of the
lost loved ones. As for you; time will sort it all out for you. Dudley and
some of the other posters put it best and I can't even attempt to match the
sage advice Dudley and the others have given you already. You and your
lost friends will be in my thoughts, tonight and on into the new year.

Take care!

--
--
=-----
Good Flights!

Cecil
PP-ASEL-IA
Student - CP-ASEL

Check out my personal flying adventures from my first flight to the
checkride AND the continuing adventures beyond!
Complete with pictures and text at: www.bayareapilot.com

"I fly because it releases my mind from the tyranny of petty things."
- Antoine de Saint-Exupery -

"We who fly, do so for the love of flying. We are alive in the air with
this miracle that lies in our hands and beneath our feet"
- Cecil Day Lewis -

"Terry" wrote:
>A terrible tragedy happened yesterday here at my home airport and I
>can't get it off my mind as to "why" it happened.
>
> 3 people lost their life yesterday. The pilot was a very dear and
> wonderful person, 72 years young and a pilot of 24 years.

This is awful. Your pain is obvious and you have my sympathies.

Most of us who have been around aviation even a little while have a
personal connection to one or more of these stories. It illustrates the
paradox about personal flying: it's very safe until one mistake makes it
very dangerous. "How could Joe DO something like that? He was such a
careful, conscientious pilot!" We comfort ourselves that we would NEVER
do such a thing. We're in control of our fates--heck, we're safer
flying than we are driving to the airport! But we keep hearing about
these other folks who apparently don't have as much sense as we do
killing themselves and their passengers.

I don't know the answer to preventing these terrible events, but I urge
all pilots to resist the idea that they are immune to such things, that
flying is somehow safer than driving because they have more control.
This produces a false sense of security that actually contributes to the
number of these tragedies we see each year, I believe.
--
Dan
C172RG at BFM

Terry, chalk this one up to how quickly the conditions can change given
the weather in Central Ohio this past week.
Cold, snow covered ground with warm moist air flowing over it.
Remember that senario from you PPL test questions?
(I was reminded of this while walking the dog last night. As the light
breeze blew across a pile of snow, you could see the moisture condensing
around it (fog forming) with backlighing from the nearby gas station.)

It was a perfect setup. The temperature/dew points were close to the
condensation point. It is amazing how quickly the two can converge. You
can fly for hours and have a thousand and three, and in less than 60
seconds go to zero-zero.

Jean probably did what we all have been doing this week, look out the
window and see how far we can see, determining from the distance of
known object in the vicinity of the airport that conditions were good
enough.

It isn't until you get off the runway that you can really understand how
much worse than you thought they were. (Been there, done that, lived to
tell about it.) Until you make that mistake, you cannot really
understand how quickly things can happen. It is truely one of those "OH,
****!" moments.

Depending upon one's expeience, the outcomes will be different. Rember
the rule, "FLY THE AIRPLANE!"

In Central Ohio, you don't have to go very far to find another place to
land should conditions at your current location deteriorate.

I had met Jean at various aviation functions in the area and will miss
her, too.

In article . net>, "Terry"
> writes:

>How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
>deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come back
>another time? Perhaps thinking she could maintain visual contact with the
>ground and just to some touch and go's? Some way, some how, she "psyched"
>herself into doing something that ended in a horrible tragedy.
>
>This in a way is written for "Jean" the pilot and the two passengers that
>died needlessly so that perhaps all of us can learn something. Pilots must
>never give in to the pressures that be. We have our lives and the lives of
>others in our hands. We will always make safety our top priority, know
>ourselves, our limits.
>
>I don't have the answers but I needed to write this...

Thanks for the info on the crash. I read about it in the paper but didn't know
the details. Very sad but a lesson for us all !!

I still remember a couple of years ago when I said no to a "first flight" with
thunder storms in the distance. The storms didn't hit but I keep remembering
that my decision before the fact was correct. SWometimes it is not easy but it
is correct.

Chuck

This reminds me of a flight I did a few years ago on Thanksgiving.
I took my father on a flight in a Cessna 150 from Falcon Field,AZ to
Payson in the morning to "keep out of the way" of mom. A few high clouds
when we took off, nothing too interesting. There is a range of mountains
between here and there called 4 Peaks. After getting some breakfast and
looking around the ramp at Payson I looked at 4 Peaks in the distance
and the clouds had decended below the peaks. I told my dad we'd have to
wait until the clouds lifted. He told me how mad mom would be if we
didn't make it back on time for Thanksgiving, I mentioned how unhappy
she'd be if we never made it back. I also mentioned that if worse came
to worse we could get a rental car to get back. (It was a 45 minute
flight but would take 2+ hours by car to get back.)

Long story short, we waited 3 or 4 hours until the clouds were about
1500ft above the peaks and made it back for a later than normal
Thanksgiving dinner.

We just need to remember that we are in charge of safety here and not to
allow others to influence our decisions. After hearing many storys like
"Jeans" it only reinforces my decision that day.

Fly safe.
--
Bart D. Hull

Tempe, Arizona

Check http://www.inficad.com/~bdhull/engine.html
for my Subaru Engine Conversion
Check http://www.inficad.com/~bdhull/fuselage.html
for Tango II I'm building.

Remove -nospam to reply via email.
PaulaJay1 wrote:
> In article . net>, "Terry"
> > writes:
>
>
>>How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
>>deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come back
>>another time? Perhaps thinking she could maintain visual contact with the
>>ground and just to some touch and go's? Some way, some how, she "psyched"
>>herself into doing something that ended in a horrible tragedy.
>>
>>This in a way is written for "Jean" the pilot and the two passengers that
>>died needlessly so that perhaps all of us can learn something. Pilots must
>>never give in to the pressures that be. We have our lives and the lives of
>>others in our hands. We will always make safety our top priority, know
>>ourselves, our limits.
>>
>>I don't have the answers but I needed to write this...
>
>
> Thanks for the info on the crash. I read about it in the paper but didn't know
> the details. Very sad but a lesson for us all !!
>
> I still remember a couple of years ago when I said no to a "first flight" with
> thunder storms in the distance. The storms didn't hit but I keep remembering
> that my decision before the fact was correct. SWometimes it is not easy but it
> is correct.
>
> Chuck

Why do so many crashed aircraft have (nearly) all the seats filled. It
seems to me to be out of proportion to what I otherwise see flying. Do
others see this to?, or is it my selective imagination?

We should withold any judgement until the accident has been
investigated. The stock 172N engine has some history of not responding
well to unusually cold starts and could have shelled out on her.
Tragic....

While I am sad for everyone involved, the little girl's death
is especially tragic.

And I really hope that her parents don't sue Cessna.

-Mark

Terry,

My sympathies to you, and everyone affected by this incident.

Just for reference, I am a 10k+ hr CFI, CFII, MEI, ASC, and have
studied for many years the human factors answers to the questions you
are asking.

I have had several experiences similar to yours over 17 years of
flying. I know how it hurts to see this happen--as you properly
say--needlessly.

In cases like this, we will never truly know the whole answer, as we do
not get the priviledge of interviewing the decisionmaker. However, we
can deduce the most likely scenario based on many similar experiences.

Here we have a non-IFR rated pilot departing into instrument
conditions. As often happens, they literally do not make it off the
airport property. If the aircraft was in flight for one minute, as you
say, then it is likely that the maximum alititude reached was less than
500 feet. This is almost certainly a spatial disorientation accident;
I will offer a prediction that the eventual NTSB report will determine
that, and state that no faults were found with the aircraft or engine.

Year after year we lose several hundred people to this or similar
scenarios; 40% of the light aircraft fatal accidents in the NTSB
database include "continuation of flight into weather for which the
pilot was not qualitied" as the proximate or a contributing cause.

I and other Accident Prevention Counselors across the country have been
fairly shouting this from the rooftops for years, yet we see the same
accident over and over again. Presumably everyone with a license has
been told that flying in such conditions without an instrument rating
is foolhardy. Hence your question: why does this happen?

I think you are close to the answer. Every time I hear about one of
these, I silently ask myself "Where was the time pressure coming from?"

Why does someone consider something they know is a bad idea, and then
decide to do it anyway? Why not just cancel the flight, head for a
restaraunt, and have lunch. You can wait for the weather to get
better, or schedule for another day.

But, no, she decided to do it now--when the evidence is all around that
we should *not* do it now. Visibility less than 1/4 mile? They do not
even allow us to complete an *instrument* approach in that kind of
weather. (Cat I ILS minima are 1/2 mile visibility or greater.)

Here is a person who, in your words, 'always used good judgment.'
Unfortunately, that is obviously not true. She did not use good
judgment on this day. I suspect that this was not the first time,
either, but you may never get to know that.

The bad news is that most people tend to make decisions on emotional,
rather than rational, criteria. That is most certainly true of this
pilot on this day. She allowed her emotional desires to drive her
decisionmaking instead of compying with a rational decision process.
Very likely she did not want to disappoint the passengers. Or maybe it
was to comply with some time constraint established by the parents. It
really doesn't matter which form the time pressure came in; what is
important is the PIC's failure to resist it.

Very often I get asked the question 'What does it take to become a
pilot?' People think it is great motor coordination, or math skills,
or good eyesight, or some such. I tell them, no, all you need is
average skills in those areas. What it takes to be a good pilot is
ultimately the *will to say no.*

You have to pre-define what your personal safety margins are; and then
you have to say no to yourself, and/or whomever else, no matter what
the emotional cost, when continuing will take you into that grey area
beyond those personal margins.

You have to say no when everyone will be mad at you. You have to be
able to say no when its going to cost you money you didn't plan on.
You have to say no when everyone else is doing it. You have to be able
to say no when they are all going to call you a 'wimp.'

I was interviewed for a fifteen minute segment on a TV show after John
Kennedy's accident. We went up in a Saratoga and demonstrated spatial
disorientation to the reporter. As we taxied back in, I told her that
the real thing that killed JFK Jr was not weather or lack of instrument
skills or spatial disorientation; all those things contributed. But
the real cause of these kinds of accidents is an inability to say 'no'
to yourselft--when you know youve done it before and it worked, you
know no one will see you and it will be easy to get away with doing
what you 'want.' But it is over the line, and you know where the line
is. You have to say no, anyway. If you can't do that, you need to
take up basketweaving or chess, but get out of aviation.

You have no right to put your passengers in this kind of a situation.
When they get in the airplane, they have no way of knowing the level of
risk you are taking. They are literally trusting you with thier lives.
You job as PIC is to honor that trust by maintaining wide safety
margins, by not even remotely approaching the 'edge.' It is not fair
to shave off the safety margin just so you can show off, or save a
buck, or have a thrill or whatever. Once you let your emotional needs
become more important than maintaining wide safety margins, you have
violated a sacred trust.

Your passengers deserve better, and so did the little girl in this
accident.

John Kennedy Jr died because he failed to say 'no' to himself when the
margins closed in. Same thing happened in this situation.

The FARs are 'written in blood;' for every paragraph in there, somebody
died to prove to us we needed that rule. I wish that no one will ever
again have to give their life to teach us something; but they do it
anyway.

I just wish that if someone insists on making the ultimate sacrifice to
teach us something, would they please try at least to pick something we
don't already know?

Sincerely,

Gene Hudson
CFI-IA, MEI, ASC

nrp wrote:
>
> Why do so many crashed aircraft have (nearly) all the seats filled.

Because most of us buy the smallest aircraft that can reasonably do the job for
us?

George Patterson
The desire for safety stands against every great and noble enterprise.

G.R. Patterson III wrote:

>
> nrp wrote:
>
>>Why do so many crashed aircraft have (nearly) all the seats filled.
>
>
> Because most of us buy the smallest aircraft that can reasonably do the job for
> us?

Probably a contributing factor, but most airplanes I see arriving for
fuel, etc., typically have only the pilot and maybe one other person on
board. Yet, it does seem that there are disproportionately few
accidents involving only the pilot. Ron, here's another research
article for you to do for Kitplanes or whoever will publish it.

It may just be my imagination, but I tend to agree with the OP that at
least my perception is that more accidents involve a number of
passengers as compared to the number of flights that include a full
load. It does make one wonder of the extra pressure to complete the
flight that carrying passengers entails is playing a role. I don't know
if any of the safety stats have the data required to determine this, but
it is an interesting question.

Matt

> You have no right to put your passengers in this kind of a situation.
> When they get in the airplane, they have no way of knowing the level of
> risk you are taking. They are literally trusting you with thier lives.
> You job as PIC is to honor that trust by maintaining wide safety
> margins, by not even remotely approaching the 'edge.'

That one paragraph could save so many lives, if only pilots adhered to
it. There is not one single excuse that gives any pilot the right to
play the odds with another persons life.

Tony

--

Tony Roberts
PP-ASEL
VFR OTT
Night
Cessna 172H C-GICE

Gene (and others too)

Not being an instructor but a 42 year Pvt Instrument (no longer current
by a long ways) -

In biennials, in your opinions, what fraction of the experienced (say
over 10 years experience) pvt-onlys are instrument competent (not
necessarily legal) when confronted by a sudden loss of visibility?

It has really bugged me that Kennedy, who I understand was nearly
complete with his instrument rating, couldn't even make the transition
in a slowly deteriorating situation. I know another case some years
ago of a fellow that was working on an instrument that also lost a
Mooney and three other guys in a similar situation with ground fog and
a night departure, and 5 hours of fuel on board.

For that matter - what fraction of experienced instrument people could
make that same rapid transistion to the gages?

I would have thought that 25 years of experience would have at least
keyed this grandma into expecting something difficult. That's why I
would want to withhold judgement.

There is a journalistic attitude that attempts to simply blame pilots
(the tsk! tsk! type comments suggesting I wouldn't do that) rather than
search for the process where they get schnookered (sp?) into a stupid
situation.
I too hope Cessna doesn't get sued. I appreciate your thoughts. THX

On Sat, 01 Jan 2005 05:02:43 GMT, Terry wrote:

> 3 people lost their life yesterday. The pilot was a very dear and wonderful
> person, 72 years young and a pilot of 24 years. "Jean" Bible was never IFR
> rated and only flew 30 minutes or so each flight in clear skies and
> daylight. She was a very careful pilot and always used good judgement.

Hi Terry,

Sorry to hear such sad news.

> How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
> deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come back
> another time? Perhaps thinking she could maintain visual contact with the
> ground and just to some touch and go's? Some way, some how, she "psyched"
> herself into doing something that ended in a horrible tragedy.

Looking at the pictures provided at the link you gave in your post, I wish
we had answers. Snow cover and fog surely wasn't conducive of any type of
VFR work. I had met Jean when I lived in Morrow County. Very, very nice
down to earth lady.

I only hope we as pilots learn from prior people's mistakes and take them
to heart when we are tasked with a go / no go decision.

It's fresh in our minds now, but time tends to heal itself and we "forget"
our own vulnerabilities it seems as time rolls on.

Allen

> How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
> deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come
> back another time?

Awful, awful news.

As a newly minted private pilot, I had a similar opportunity to give a young
lad and his father their first airplane ride. As we pulled the rental plane
out of the hangar, the wind began to pick up substantially, and the sky
became covered with a low, scuddy layer.

Looking at the excited kid and his dad, the pressure to fly was tremendous.
The airport's single-runway was 90 degrees offset from the wind direction,
and the scud was clearly moving in off of Lake Michigan. If we were even
going to get to fly the pattern, it was now or never...

....and I chose never. As we pushed the plane back into the hangar, their
disappointment was palpable. Sadly, I never did get that kid in the air.

But I made the right choice. A man has got to know his limitations.

My condolences to the families.
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

"nrp" > wrote in message
oups.com...
>
> It has really bugged me that Kennedy, who I understand was nearly
> complete with his instrument rating, couldn't even make the transition
> in a slowly deteriorating situation. I know another case some years
> ago of a fellow that was working on an instrument that also lost a
> Mooney and three other guys in a similar situation with ground fog and
> a night departure, and 5 hours of fuel on board.
>

If you read the accident reports you'll see plenty of instrument pilots lose
it in the soup too.

Good question...

A 1954 study (Stonecipher, et al) found that of 20 private pilots, of
varying levels of experience, exactly 0 'survived' a simulated
encounter with IFR conditions. 19 did graveyard spirals, and 1 was
going to do a whip stall when the data-taker/safety pilot said "I've
got it."

My experience on BFR's may not be representative, as I am considered a
'tough; insturctor and that reputation precedes me to the point that
most of the people who call me are pretty good pilots to begin with and
probably perform better than the average. Given that, my experience is
such that I think that in excess of 70% of private pilots would 'buy
it' if they wandered into instrument conditions. The real numbers may
be higher.

One of the problems we have (but is not well discussed) is that in
training the stress level (even on a BFR) is a tiny fraction of what
the pilot will experience if he runs into these conditions solo.
Stress degrades performance in every area, so I think that what we see
on the BFR is something of a best case scenario. I try to make the
hood work a little more demanding than the average CFI, to simulate
some of the stress that may occur in the real situation, but I think I
am still an order of magnitutde or two below what a
non-instrument-rated private pilot experiences in a real (solo) IMC
encounter. A clue can be had by listening to the video presentation
"17 Ways to Fall Out of the Sky"; there is an audio tape in that video
of a real life VFR-into-IMC encounter involving a VFR C310 pilot trying
to get down through an overcast. Noteably, when he first gets into
trouble his voice goes up at least two octaves. (He did not make it.)

Unlike some CFIs, I aggressively seek out actual instrument condtions
in which to take up not only my instrument students but also my private
students. I figure if they have proven to themselves that they can
indeed hold it right side up in turbulence in IMC, then their stress
will be (a little) lower if it ever happens for real. I like to train
them well beyond the PTS in this area, but not all students are willing
to do that (those that aren't have to go somewhere else--I sleep really
well at night and want to keep it that way.)

I have unique methods for teaching flight by reference to instruments,
and I have at least one known 'save' of a student pilot who got into
IMC on his first solo, and flew there for 20 min successfully before
breaking out and landing--using the methods he heard me present in a
Wings Seminar. (Please don't try this at home...!)

I think most pilots are grossly unaware of how insidious spatial
disorientation can be for the non-IMC-experienced pilot. Most people
seem to think that the accident pilot is unaware of his improper flight
attitude, and would correct to level if he or she knew; I think this is
a dangerous idea. I have personally observed a student pilot in IMC as
she rolled into a left spiral while literally screaming at me for help
because 'it's rolling to the left and I can't stop it.' Her conscious
mind could read the instruments and correctly deduce our real attitude,
but it had lost the battle for control of her hands to her unconscious,
which was following the (erroneous) inner ear indications into the left
spiral. To her it felt as if the controls were jammed, and she could
not get it to roll to the right. (I had her let go and then I rolled
out with two fingers.)

I think a major portion of the spatial disorientation accidents are of
this ilk; i.e. fully aware of the nature of the problem but unable to
move their hands to recover. JFK, for example; needle slap indicated
he had applied maximum takeoff power before he hit the water... I
suspect he knew fully well what was going on but could not stop it.

This is the difference between an instrument rated pilot and an
instrument competent pilot; the competent instrument pilot has enough
IMC experience that he has been able to condition his unconscious to
let go and let the conscious mind take control of the hands.

I think most VFR-rate pilots are nowhere near this level of IMC
experience, and when the stress maxes out, they are toast. All the
more reason to avoid situations that get anywhere close to the edge.
Gene

On 1-Jan-2005, wrote:

> I think you are close to the answer. Every time I hear about one of
> these, I silently ask myself "Where was the time pressure coming from?"

To me, this is one of the more perplexing questions arising from this tragic
story. As I understand it, the young girl was having a Christmas gift
fulfilled by the ill-fated flight. Why would you "treat" someone to a
flight with 1/4 mi visibility? For most non-pilots, flight in IMC in a
light airplane is boring at best and uncomfortable at worst. The primary
splendor of fight at low elevations is in the sightseeing. For this reason,
a "joyride" should always be conducted in good VFR even if the pilot and
airplane are fully capable of safe operation in less favorable weather. It
seems to me that "Jean" thus had a perfectly good reason to postpone or
cancel this flight without feeling any pressure.


> Your passengers deserve better, and so did the little girl in this
> accident.

Absolutely correct!! What we as pilots need to remember is that most
passengers do not have any basis on which to form their own judgments as to
the safety of a flight, and are thus forced to rely fully on us for that
call. This is an AWESOME responsibility -- by far the most significant
"right and privilege" granted with a pilot's license.

--
-Elliott Drucker

Re: JFK Jr.

As I understand it, JFK Jr. was reported to be "50%" through his
instrument rating. By that point one should in theory have no
difficulty managing the conditions he encountered. But, the record
shows that when the windows went grey he did not have or could not
apply the required skills.

A grocery store clerk asked me, shortly after that accident, "Doesn't
it worry you, training people to go off and then maybe crash like
that?"

I had a simple answer: "If he'd been my student he wouldn't be dead
now and we wouldn't be having this converstation."

It really hurts me to see this kind of stuff happen; it is needless.
contrary to one of the other posters here, I am of the opinion that
light aircraft flying can be much safer than driving a car (ok I live
in LA and driving here is a lot more crazy, but still...) if you
properly manage the risk. In my car, I am at the mercy of every
testosterone-poisoned teenager who decides to weave through traffic at
120 mph. I cannot control his studpidity. In the airplane, I HAVE
CONTROL OF HOW MUCH RISK I TAKE.

When I go up to see my mom in San Jose, I feel MUCH safer when I fly
than when I drive up I-5. I know what the risk factors are in the
airplane, and how to mitigate them. I cannot control these idiots in
their 'hot' cars!

I wish I could just grab on to some people (pilots) and just shake them
until they hear me. YOU CAN MAKE THIS AS SAFE AS YOU WANT! STOP BEING
STUPID!

OK, sorry, off my soapbox...

Gene

Yes!!!!!!!

*You*... are a *pilot!*

Gene

The pressure is tremendous--it's human nature. Just think about when you
offer to take someone up that you see on a regular basis for the first
time--you talk about it. A lot. When that day comes where the schedules fall
into place, there's usually a lot of leading up to that day.

Saying "no" is hard. It get's harder when you have a couple of attempted
flights in recent memory that were cancelled due to iffy weather and the
weather turned out to be better than forecast. But as a "good" pilot, you
need to say no. It's your responsibility.

For this reason, I find myself not going out of my way anymore to offer
"new" flyers flights. If it works out due to last-minute
circumstances--great. The absence of a long-term plan for the trip makes
cancelling for any reason easy.

If you fly long enough, the weather will eventually throw you a curve. It's
unfortunate Jean wasn't ready when it threw her one and terrible that she
had a young passenger on board. I consider myself lucky that my curve ball
(and a deep respect for weather) came when I was had not one but two CFIIs
on board. A fog rolled in from the south shore of Long Island, NY and
covered the island within minutes. We had to divert and shoot an ILS to
minimums at another airport and wait it out a couple of hours.

God bless their souls and families.

Marco Leon

"Jay Honeck" > wrote in message:
[snip]
> Looking at the excited kid and his dad, the pressure to fly was
> tremendous. The airport's single-runway was 90 degrees offset from the
> wind direction, and the scud was clearly moving in off of Lake Michigan.
> If we were even going to get to fly the pattern, it was now or never...
>
> ...and I chose never. As we pushed the plane back into the hangar, their
> disappointment was palpable. Sadly, I never did get that kid in the air.
>
> But I made the right choice. A man has got to know his limitations.
>
> My condolences to the families.
> --
> Jay Honeck
> Iowa City, IA
> Pathfinder N56993
> www.AlexisParkInn.com
> "Your Aviation Destination"
>



Posted Via Usenet.com Premium Usenet Newsgroup Services
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Good question...

A 1954 study (Stonecipher, et al) found that of 20 private pilots, of
varying levels of experience, exactly 0 'survived' a simulated
encounter with IFR conditions. 19 did graveyard spirals, and 1 was
going to do a whip stall when the data-taker/safety pilot said "I've
got it."

My experience on BFR's may not be representative, as I am considered a
'tough; insturctor and that reputation precedes me to the point that
most of the people who call me are pretty good pilots to begin with and
probably perform better than the average. Given that, my experience is
such that I think that in excess of 70% of private pilots would 'buy
it' if they wandered into instrument conditions. The real numbers may
be higher.

One of the problems we have (but is not well discussed) is that in
training the stress level (even on a BFR) is a tiny fraction of what
the pilot will experience if he runs into these conditions solo.
Stress degrades performance in every area, so I think that what we see
on the BFR is something of a best case scenario. I try to make the
hood work a little more demanding than the average CFI, to simulate
some of the stress that may occur in the real situation, but I think I
am still an order of magnitutde or two below what a
non-instrument-rated private pilot experiences in a real (solo) IMC
encounter. A clue can be had by listening to the video presentation
"17 Ways to Fall Out of the Sky"; there is an audio tape in that video
of a real life VFR-into-IMC encounter involving a VFR C310 pilot trying
to get down through an overcast. Noteably, when he first gets into
trouble his voice goes up at least two octaves. (He did not make it.)

Unlike some CFIs, I aggressively seek out actual instrument condtions
in which to take up not only my instrument students but also my private
students. I figure if they have proven to themselves that they can
indeed hold it right side up in turbulence in IMC, then their stress
will be (a little) lower if it ever happens for real. I like to train
them well beyond the PTS in this area, but not all students are willing
to do that (those that aren't have to go somewhere else--I sleep really
well at night and want to keep it that way.)

I have unique methods for teaching flight by reference to instruments,
and I have at least one known 'save' of a student pilot who got into
IMC on his first solo, and flew there for 20 min successfully before
breaking out and landing--using the methods he heard me present in a
Wings Seminar. (Please don't try this at home...!)

I think most pilots are grossly unaware of how insidious spatial
disorientation can be for the non-IMC-experienced pilot. Most people
seem to think that the accident pilot is unaware of his improper flight
attitude, and would correct to level if he or she knew; I think this is
a dangerous idea. I have personally observed a student pilot in IMC as
she rolled into a left spiral while literally screaming at me for help
because 'it's rolling to the left and I can't stop it.' Her conscious
mind could read the instruments and correctly deduce our real attitude,
but it had lost the battle for control of her hands to her unconscious,
which was following the (erroneous) inner ear indications into the left
spiral. To her it felt as if the controls were jammed, and she could
not get it to roll to the right. (I had her let go and then I rolled
out with two fingers.)

I think a major portion of the spatial disorientation accidents are of
this ilk; i.e. fully aware of the nature of the problem but unable to
move their hands to recover. JFK, for example; needle slap indicated
he had applied maximum takeoff power before he hit the water... I
suspect he knew fully well what was going on but could not stop it.

This is the difference between an instrument rated pilot and an
instrument competent pilot; the competent instrument pilot has enough
IMC experience that he has been able to condition his unconscious to
let go and let the conscious mind take control of the hands.

I think most VFR-rate pilots are nowhere near this level of IMC
experience, and when the stress maxes out, they are toast. All the
more reason to avoid situations that get anywhere close to the edge.
Gene

Marco,

I offer you an alternative method of dealing with that pressure.
Instead of not offering, properly set the expectations up front. That
is, explain to them that you want them to have a really good
experience, and in order for that to happen you have to have good,
clear, smooth conditions. Set up and 'out,' ie and alternative planned
activity if the weather turns out to be not just right. You can also
set a rain date; "if the weather does not cooperate on that weekend,
how bout a 'rain date' on the 25th?"

This communicates to your prospective passenger that you are reallly
concerned for their feelings (almost all of them are at least a little
scared). They are usually delighted that you are going to say no if it
is not perfect.

By having the expectation set that a cancellation/reschedule is likely,
and the reschedule date already agreed upon, the dissappointment about
not flying on the appointed day is greatly mitigated.

All of this makes it easeir for you to say no when that is the right
thing to do.

Gene

("Marco Leon" <mleon(at)optonline.net>) wrote:

> The pressure is tremendous--it's human nature. Just think about when you
> offer to take someone up that you see on a regular basis for the first
> time--you talk about it. A lot. When that day comes where the schedules fall
> into place, there's usually a lot of leading up to that day.

I have taken up several "first flight" people and in every conversation
we have, from day one right up to the drive to the airport, I discuss
the possibility that we might no be able to make the flight due to
weather or an unexpected maintenance issue.

--
Peter

On Sun, 2 Jan 2005 07:52:51 -0500, Peter R. wrote:

> I have taken up several "first flight" people and in every conversation
> we have, from day one right up to the drive to the airport, I discuss
> the possibility that we might no be able to make the flight due to
> weather or an unexpected maintenance issue.

I have been honored with the same, to taking first time people who have
never left terra firma, much less a single engine.

I have not been "weathered out" as I always do it on a spur of a moment
rather then plan a week ahead. Even on the spur of the moment, I take the
first time passenger in the FBO and through the weather briefing motions,
so they can see what preparation is needed before each and every flight.
This also helps me verify my go decision.

I always have the first time passenger go through preflight, and tell them
in plain English....

"The plane goes through a "three point" inspection (outside inspection,
inside inspection and an engine check) and if anything fails, we don't fly.
I'd much rather dissapoint you while we are on the ground, then find out
something is wrong in the air."

Allen

tony roberts wrote:

>>You have no right to put your passengers in this kind of a situation.
>>When they get in the airplane, they have no way of knowing the level of
>>risk you are taking. They are literally trusting you with thier lives.
>>You job as PIC is to honor that trust by maintaining wide safety
>>margins, by not even remotely approaching the 'edge.'
>
>
> That one paragraph could save so many lives, if only pilots adhered to
> it. There is not one single excuse that gives any pilot the right to
> play the odds with another persons life.

True, but this is making a big assumption that the pilot knew she was
doing this. None of us were there to see the weather at the time of
takeoff or know what else was going on. I don't know many pilots who
would intentionally put their passengers at risk, but sometimes it
happens. Never having had a crash, I don't know what a typical lead-in
scenario is and many pilots who crash don't live to tell us what they
were seeing and thinking.


Matt

nrp wrote:

> Gene (and others too)
>
> Not being an instructor but a 42 year Pvt Instrument (no longer current
> by a long ways) -
>
> In biennials, in your opinions, what fraction of the experienced (say
> over 10 years experience) pvt-onlys are instrument competent (not
> necessarily legal) when confronted by a sudden loss of visibility?
>
> It has really bugged me that Kennedy, who I understand was nearly
> complete with his instrument rating, couldn't even make the transition
> in a slowly deteriorating situation. I know another case some years
> ago of a fellow that was working on an instrument that also lost a
> Mooney and three other guys in a similar situation with ground fog and
> a night departure, and 5 hours of fuel on board.
>
> For that matter - what fraction of experienced instrument people could
> make that same rapid transistion to the gages?

You raise two interesting questions. I'm not a CFI or DE either, just
an instrument rated private pilot (who has passed the commercial written
recently though! :-) ) with 26 years of flying history.

I personally don't think many non-instrument pilots can handle
unexpected IMC. In fact, even many instrument rated pilots aren't
current and proficient enough to handle it. Also, I think there is a
pyschological "switch" that must be made even for instrument pilots when
encountering marginal conditions. You have to make a decision to
abandon your attempt to remain visual and go onto instruments full time.
I think the really dangerous part is trying to switch back and forth
and keeping hoping that you'll return to visual. I think this can trap
even proficient instrument pilots.


Matt

Jay Honeck wrote:

>>How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
>>deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come
>>back another time?
>
>
> Awful, awful news.
>
> As a newly minted private pilot, I had a similar opportunity to give a young
> lad and his father their first airplane ride. As we pulled the rental plane
> out of the hangar, the wind began to pick up substantially, and the sky
> became covered with a low, scuddy layer.
>
> Looking at the excited kid and his dad, the pressure to fly was tremendous.
> The airport's single-runway was 90 degrees offset from the wind direction,
> and the scud was clearly moving in off of Lake Michigan. If we were even
> going to get to fly the pattern, it was now or never...
>
> ...and I chose never. As we pushed the plane back into the hangar, their
> disappointment was palpable. Sadly, I never did get that kid in the air.

Yes, but not nearly as sad as being the cause of the kid's funeral. As
you said, you made the right choice.


Matt

wrote:

> Good question...
>
> A 1954 study (Stonecipher, et al) found that of 20 private pilots, of
> varying levels of experience, exactly 0 'survived' a simulated
> encounter with IFR conditions. 19 did graveyard spirals, and 1 was
> going to do a whip stall when the data-taker/safety pilot said "I've
> got it."
>
> My experience on BFR's may not be representative, as I am considered a
> 'tough; insturctor and that reputation precedes me to the point that
> most of the people who call me are pretty good pilots to begin with and
> probably perform better than the average. Given that, my experience is
> such that I think that in excess of 70% of private pilots would 'buy
> it' if they wandered into instrument conditions. The real numbers may
> be higher.
>
> One of the problems we have (but is not well discussed) is that in
> training the stress level (even on a BFR) is a tiny fraction of what
> the pilot will experience if he runs into these conditions solo.
> Stress degrades performance in every area, so I think that what we see
> on the BFR is something of a best case scenario. I try to make the
> hood work a little more demanding than the average CFI, to simulate
> some of the stress that may occur in the real situation, but I think I
> am still an order of magnitutde or two below what a
> non-instrument-rated private pilot experiences in a real (solo) IMC
> encounter. A clue can be had by listening to the video presentation
> "17 Ways to Fall Out of the Sky"; there is an audio tape in that video
> of a real life VFR-into-IMC encounter involving a VFR C310 pilot trying
> to get down through an overcast. Noteably, when he first gets into
> trouble his voice goes up at least two octaves. (He did not make it.)
>
> Unlike some CFIs, I aggressively seek out actual instrument condtions
> in which to take up not only my instrument students but also my private
> students. I figure if they have proven to themselves that they can
> indeed hold it right side up in turbulence in IMC, then their stress
> will be (a little) lower if it ever happens for real. I like to train
> them well beyond the PTS in this area, but not all students are willing
> to do that (those that aren't have to go somewhere else--I sleep really
> well at night and want to keep it that way.)

You sound like my kind of instructor. My instrument instructor was a
real pain also, but I appreciate every minute of it now. Almost every
training flight beyond the intial time of learning the basics of flight
by instruments was partial panel from takeoff to touchdown. I told my
DE that the check ride was the first time in months that I'd seen the AI
and DG!


> I have unique methods for teaching flight by reference to instruments,
> and I have at least one known 'save' of a student pilot who got into
> IMC on his first solo, and flew there for 20 min successfully before
> breaking out and landing--using the methods he heard me present in a
> Wings Seminar. (Please don't try this at home...!)

My primary instructor taught us to descend through an overcast in an
emergency by rolling full nose up trim in the C150, pulling the throttle
to idle and then use rudder to maintain wings level. This worked
amazingly well in that airplane. I never had to use the technique
fortunately.


> I think most pilots are grossly unaware of how insidious spatial
> disorientation can be for the non-IMC-experienced pilot. Most people
> seem to think that the accident pilot is unaware of his improper flight
> attitude, and would correct to level if he or she knew; I think this is
> a dangerous idea. I have personally observed a student pilot in IMC as
> she rolled into a left spiral while literally screaming at me for help
> because 'it's rolling to the left and I can't stop it.' Her conscious
> mind could read the instruments and correctly deduce our real attitude,
> but it had lost the battle for control of her hands to her unconscious,
> which was following the (erroneous) inner ear indications into the left
> spiral. To her it felt as if the controls were jammed, and she could
> not get it to roll to the right. (I had her let go and then I rolled
> out with two fingers.)
>
> I think a major portion of the spatial disorientation accidents are of
> this ilk; i.e. fully aware of the nature of the problem but unable to
> move their hands to recover. JFK, for example; needle slap indicated
> he had applied maximum takeoff power before he hit the water... I
> suspect he knew fully well what was going on but could not stop it.
>
> This is the difference between an instrument rated pilot and an
> instrument competent pilot; the competent instrument pilot has enough
> IMC experience that he has been able to condition his unconscious to
> let go and let the conscious mind take control of the hands.

Absolutely. I just returned to flying after a four year layoff. I'm
competent to fly instruments, but I don't have the same level of
proficiency I had when I was flying often several years ago. Although,
I was up yesterday with a safety pilot to get in my 6 approaches and it
is starting to feel like the good old days now where I actually get
bored on the approaches waiting for the next waypoint/fix. To me,
having excess time during an approach is one sign that you finally have
it together again.

I got through my ICC pretty well back in the spring and even took one
long flight in IMC with my instructor that went well, however, I always
felt a little uneasy and it seemed I was always running at 95% mental
capacity on the approaches. I don't like that feeling and won't carry
pax in weather when I feel that way. Yesterday I felt like I was
running at 70% CPU during the approaches (and it was a bumpy and windy
day in the northeast) and had some capacity left for the unexpected.


Matt

"Terry" > writes:

> "Jean" Bible was never IFR
> rated and only flew 30 minutes or so each flight in clear skies and
> daylight.

Nobody has commented on this. It strikes me that with 24 years of
flying experience she was only flying 30 minute flights in clear
skies. Had she always done that, or only recently?

Yesterday there was a gap between storms in North California, so I
made a 30 minute local flight under broken clouds. There were a line
of rain showers to the west of the airport. Some spots had heavy rain
that I could not see through, others lighter rain. I flew through one
of the lighter areas, and back, just to remind myself what it was
like. The point is that one must challenge oneself on occasion, not
to routinely do risky behavior but to be a little prepared should
something bad happen. Hopefully one gets that on BFRs or Wings
excursions, but you can safely do it yourself too.

writes:

> I offer you an alternative method of dealing with that pressure.
> Instead of not offering, properly set the expectations up front.

Amen brother!

Accidents are set up days, or even years in advance, by the attitudes
we develop in ourselves and others. Whenever I offer someone a ride,
or go on a cross-country for myself, I try to set up everybody's
expectations:

- wife: I might be a few days late for weather, I'll call every night
and let you know.

- job: Ditto. I might need more vacation time than planned, I'll
call if I get delayed.

- pax: We might get delayed. If you can't wait with me, I'll do
everything I can to put you on a bus or whatever you want to get back
home.

- sightseeing trips: I'll call you before you leave the house if it
doesn't look good. We may get to the airport and then it may not look
good, your safety and comfort are more important than this particular
flight, so we may have to reschedule at the last minute.

By acting as pilot in *command* well in advance, people are more
comfortable at the moment of flight.

Terry,
I am very sorry to hear about your friend. It is truly unfortunate that
this accident occurred and my thoughts and prayers go out to the family.
It is amazing that flying into IMC can disorient you (and almost
incapacitate you) within seconds. Thanks for sharing.

Jon Kraus
PP-ASEL-IA
Student Mooney Owner

Terry wrote:

> A terrible tragedy happened yesterday here at my home airport and I can't
> get it off my mind as to "why" it happened.
>
> 3 people lost their life yesterday. The pilot was a very dear and wonderful
> person, 72 years young and a pilot of 24 years. "Jean" Bible was never IFR
> rated and only flew 30 minutes or so each flight in clear skies and
> daylight. She was a very careful pilot and always used good judgement.
>
> Yesterday she was to give a "first flight" to an 11 year old girl for a
> Christmas gift given by her Aunt.
>
> Visibility at the airport was less than 1 mile...you could not see the
> opposite end of the runway and yet...for some reason know only to God. She
> departed the runway and was airborne for about 1 minute before slamming into
> the ground about 100 yards off the runway center line killing all three
> people. From the hangar the "thug" was heard but you could not see the
> airplane lying upside down about 1/4 mile away.
>
> How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
> deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come back
> another time? Perhaps thinking she could maintain visual contact with the
> ground and just to some touch and go's? Some way, some how, she "psyched"
> herself into doing something that ended in a horrible tragedy.
>
> This in a way is written for "Jean" the pilot and the two passengers that
> died needlessly so that perhaps all of us can learn something. Pilots must
> never give in to the pressures that be. We have our lives and the lives of
> others in our hands. We will always make safety our top priority, know
> ourselves, our limits.
>
> I don't have the answers but I needed to write this...
>
> Here's the link if interested..http://www.nbc4i.com/news/4035611/detail.html
>
> Terry PP-ASEL
>
> N6401F
>
>

> True, but this is making a big assumption that the pilot knew she was
> doing this.

I wasn't assuming anything. I was reponding to a previous post that
stated:

> >> They are literally trusting you with thier lives.
> >>You job as PIC is to honor that trust by maintaining wide safety
> >>margins,

We were not discussing this accident, we were discussing safety margins.

Tony

--

Tony Roberts
PP-ASEL
VFR OTT
Night
Cessna 172H C-GICE

In article >,
Matt Whiting > wrote:

> tony roberts wrote:
>
> >>You have no right to put your passengers in this kind of a situation.
> >>When they get in the airplane, they have no way of knowing the level of
> >>risk you are taking. They are literally trusting you with thier lives.
> >>You job as PIC is to honor that trust by maintaining wide safety
> >>margins, by not even remotely approaching the 'edge.'
> >
> >
> > That one paragraph could save so many lives, if only pilots adhered to
> > it. There is not one single excuse that gives any pilot the right to
> > play the odds with another persons life.
>
> True, but this is making a big assumption that the pilot knew she was
> doing this. None of us were there to see the weather at the time of
> takeoff or know what else was going on. I don't know many pilots who
> would intentionally put their passengers at risk, but sometimes it
> happens. Never having had a crash, I don't know what a typical lead-in
> scenario is and many pilots who crash don't live to tell us what they
> were seeing and thinking.
>
>
> Matt

Gene, you cited a 1954 Stonecipher report in an earlier post. Is this the
current Boeing chairman?

I admire your attitude regarding flying, and your remarks about this tragic
case. I'm a PP-ASEL with about 220 hrs and want to get my instrument
rating. What do you think of the accelerated programs? I'm thinking in
particular about PIC.

This thread ought to be required reading by every pvt pilot.

"Mark" > wrote in message
...
> While I am sad for everyone involved, the little girl's death
> is especially tragic.
>
> And I really hope that her parents don't sue Cessna.
>
> -Mark

Mark, all due respect to the grieving parents, that would be impossible
since the statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act
has run for a 1977 Cessna 172. Even if you could get around the statute of
repose, it would be foolhardy to attempt to attach an aircraft manufacturer
for liability in a case in which all the evidence points to pilot error by
attempting to fly in IMC.

GARA precludes the general aviation product liability which has plagued
manufacturers such as Piper, Beech and Cessna with litigation involving old
aircraft. The Statute of Repose immunizes a general aviation manufacturer
for an accident occurring more than eighteen (18) years after the delivery
of the aircraft to the customer or dealer. GARA applies to aircraft
certified by the FAA, which have a capacity of nineteen passengers or less
when originally certificated and only applies to aircraft not engaged in
scheduled, passenger-carrying operations.

"Peter R." > wrote in message
...
>
> Now, I realize that this seems unlikely, but I have read of accounts
> here in this newsgroup of cases where fog developed very, very quickly
> around an aircraft. I suppose there would have been tell-tale clues
> ahead of time, such as a close temperature/dewpoint spread that the
> pilot should have seen.

I know nothing about this particular accident, but I did once have a very
memorable incident where an obscuring layer of fog developed under me in the
space of five minutes. Yes, we were aware of the close temp/dewpoint spread,
and delayed the flight for an hour until the local graybeards deemed it safe.

Oh yes; this particular flight was one of my early student solos...in a
glider! All ended well, but the lesson about the quick-forming nature of fog
was well-learned.

Vaughn

Hi Bob...

I made the remark about Jean flying for 30 minutes or so
each time she flew was to make the point that she was "72 years
young"" and ONLY flew for pleasure. No business trips etc. She
could fly anytime their was good weather as she was retired.

My original post about this terrible event was for all us
pilots to maybe stop and think and try to understand how these
things happen. Hopefully to learn....

Fly Safe!

Terry

"Bob Fry" > wrote in message
...
> "Terry" > writes:
>
>> "Jean" Bible was never IFR
>> rated and only flew 30 minutes or so each flight in clear
>> skies and
>> daylight.
>
> Nobody has commented on this. It strikes me that with 24 years
> of
> flying experience she was only flying 30 minute flights in
> clear
> skies. Had she always done that, or only recently?
>

Tony,

With respect, I fear you miss my point.

I disagree that it is a big assumption that the accident pilot knew she
was launching into marginal VFR and/or IFR conditions.

My point is, that, as PIC, a pilot is responsible for determining those
conditions, or the liklihood of their developing, prior to flight. I
maintain that if she didn't know, she was remiss, and if she did know,
even more so. In either case, she failed to maintain wide safety
margins.

Assuming the conditions were as reported by the poster, the visibility
was less than one mile, and perhaps less than a quarter mile. No VFR
operation should be attempted in these conditions unless someone has a
gun to your head.

Further, the aircraft was airborne for about 1 min., and came to rest
100 yds off the runway centerline. The wreck could be heard--but not
seen--from a hangar 1/4 sm away.

You are going to have a hard time convincing me that this pilot could
reasonably be surprised by weather encountered in the first 60 seconds
after liftoff. Weather such as this should be completely obvious to
anyone who walked out to the aircraft without being blinfolded.

The sacred trust given to us by our passengers requires that we operate
at a higher level of responsibility. This means taking the
responsibility to find out what the weather is, and is likely to be,
and making a good, pessimistic assessment of what it is likely to
become. It means making highly conservative decisions about what
conditions we will fly in, as compared to our skills. In other words,
it means never even *remotely* approaching the 'edge.'

With deep respect to family and friends, I maintain that this incident
would never have occured if appropriately wide safety margins had been
maintained.

There is nothing I can do for those we have already lost. But please,
please learn the lesson offered in this tragedy: if you are not IFR
rated and current, stay out of marginal VFR conditions. Don't even get
close--especially if you are carrying the responsibility of passengers.
Sincerely,

Gene

Joe,

I suspect the two Stoneciphers are not the same person, but they might
be related.

I have worked with several people that went thru PIC, and I was not
displeased with the results. You must be aware, however, that any 7-14
day instrument rating will have limitations. By that I mean that after
you get home, you should consider yourself an instrument-rated novice.
This is not a bad thing, I just think you want to build your experience
and confidence gradually after getting the rating.

There is another short course I can recommend, and that is Maury's West
Coast Adventures. A couple of clients of mine have gone through the
program, and they were very happy. This program takes a group of three
students in a T182RG on a cross-country IFR adventure that is kind of a
tour of the western US. In the process you get a lot of experience in
a variety of weather, terrain and ATC environments.

Maury's course requires that you have your attitude instrument flight
skills and your written test report before you report for the course.
I believe the PIC course requires only the written test done prior.

Those are the only two short courses I can recommend. There are a lot
of others, but I have not seen another that I had any confidence in.

I have done a fair amount of business taking some of the people that
come out of some of the other short courses and bringing their
(deficient) skills up to the point that they could actually use their
rating without scaring themselves to death...

In all cases, I find the weakest area in most instrument courses, and
the short ones in particular, is the basic attitude instrument flying
skills. They act like the foundation of a great pyramid; use weak
stones in the foundation and as you add weight onto the upper courses,
the foundation crumbles and it all falls down.

Regards,

Gene

Hi Gene

I take your point 100%
I'm not disagreeing with a single thing that you said and can only
assume that you are attributing someone elses quote, from one of my
responses, to me.

Tony

--

Tony Roberts
PP-ASEL
VFR OTT
Night
Cessna 172H C-GICE


In article om>,
wrote:

> Tony,
>
> With respect, I fear you miss my point.
>
> I disagree that it is a big assumption that the accident pilot knew she
> was launching into marginal VFR and/or IFR conditions.
>
> My point is, that, as PIC, a pilot is responsible for determining those
> conditions, or the liklihood of their developing, prior to flight. I
> maintain that if she didn't know, she was remiss, and if she did know,
> even more so. In either case, she failed to maintain wide safety
> margins.
>
> Assuming the conditions were as reported by the poster, the visibility
> was less than one mile, and perhaps less than a quarter mile. No VFR
> operation should be attempted in these conditions unless someone has a
> gun to your head.
>
> Further, the aircraft was airborne for about 1 min., and came to rest
> 100 yds off the runway centerline. The wreck could be heard--but not
> seen--from a hangar 1/4 sm away.
>
> You are going to have a hard time convincing me that this pilot could
> reasonably be surprised by weather encountered in the first 60 seconds
> after liftoff. Weather such as this should be completely obvious to
> anyone who walked out to the aircraft without being blinfolded.
>
> The sacred trust given to us by our passengers requires that we operate
> at a higher level of responsibility. This means taking the
> responsibility to find out what the weather is, and is likely to be,
> and making a good, pessimistic assessment of what it is likely to
> become. It means making highly conservative decisions about what
> conditions we will fly in, as compared to our skills. In other words,
> it means never even *remotely* approaching the 'edge.'
>
> With deep respect to family and friends, I maintain that this incident
> would never have occured if appropriately wide safety margins had been
> maintained.
>
> There is nothing I can do for those we have already lost. But please,
> please learn the lesson offered in this tragedy: if you are not IFR
> rated and current, stay out of marginal VFR conditions. Don't even get
> close--especially if you are carrying the responsibility of passengers.
> Sincerely,
>
> Gene

Thanks for the thoughtful response. Using google, I found the citation for
the article to which you referred on the FAA web site:

Bryan, L.A., Stonecipher, J.W., and Aron, K. (1954). 180-degree turn
experiment. University of Illinois Bulletin, Aeronautics Bulletin Number 11.

The current Boeing chairman is Harry C. Stonecipher, not the same person but
possibly related as you said.

It's a cliche, but I really regarded the private certificate as a license to
learn. I got it at 70 hours, and have had no passengers until recently (a
little over 200 hours). I've spent the intervening time practicing all the
various PTS maneuvers (solo stalls were a little intimidating at first!),
becoming more comfortable with talking to ATC, studying navigation,
building the 50 hrs of cross country time for the instrument rating,
attending FAA safety seminars, etc. My field is only 10 minutes away, so I
can usually schedule a plane at the last minute. Nonetheless, I've
cancelled due to marginal weather conditions on a number of occasions, and
have not regretted even the instances when the weather actually improved.
All this is a long winded way of agreeing with you that I think the IR is
also merely a license to learn. I wouldn't be eager to attempt an approach
at minimums the day after getting IR, accelerated or not. I'll check out
Maury's West Coast Adventures--thanks for the tip.

You and Gene are absolutely right. I thought about it after I posted and
realized managing expectations is really the way to go.

I've learned to manage expectations with my wife when I go up. I always pad
my estimated return time by one or two hours and call her if I get stuck at
another airport. Learned the hard way of course...

Marco Leon

"Bob Fry" > wrote in message
...
> writes:
>
>> I offer you an alternative method of dealing with that pressure.
>> Instead of not offering, properly set the expectations up front.
>
> Amen brother!
>
> Accidents are set up days, or even years in advance, by the attitudes
> we develop in ourselves and others. Whenever I offer someone a ride,
> or go on a cross-country for myself, I try to set up everybody's
> expectations:
>
> - wife: I might be a few days late for weather, I'll call every night
> and let you know.
>
> - job: Ditto. I might need more vacation time than planned, I'll
> call if I get delayed.
>
> - pax: We might get delayed. If you can't wait with me, I'll do
> everything I can to put you on a bus or whatever you want to get back
> home.
>
> - sightseeing trips: I'll call you before you leave the house if it
> doesn't look good. We may get to the airport and then it may not look
> good, your safety and comfort are more important than this particular
> flight, so we may have to reschedule at the last minute.
>
> By acting as pilot in *command* well in advance, people are more
> comfortable at the moment of flight.



Posted Via Usenet.com Premium Usenet Newsgroup Services
----------------------------------------------------------
** SPEED ** RETENTION ** COMPLETION ** ANONYMITY **
----------------------------------------------------------
http://www.usenet.com

Ah, Tony, you are correct.

He quoted you in that post, but that line I attributed to you was
actually his. I am carrying on multiple conversations here at the same
time and I got that one crossed up.

I get a little intense over this issue, because I have been doing this
for 17 plus years and have watched *so many* repetitions of this same
accident. So when it happens, I tend to want to 'pound it in' to some
heads here and there, but only so as to try to reach one or two who
might learn something important from it.

I tell my Private Pilot students that if I *ever* catch them flying in
marginal conditions before they are instrument rated that they really
better die in the crash, because I *will* make it to the crash site
before the paramedics, and what will happen next will make 'em wish the
fire had got 'em long before I got there!

(Not true of course, but it helps get the message across.)

I actually had an ex student who managed to run out of gas once and
land (successfully) in a farmers field (no damage, flew it out). Funny
thing was, he hid from me for *months.* He was much more afraid of
*me* finding out than if the FAA did!

(That was years ago, and we are fast friends today--and he hasn't done
that again, at least, not that he has let me find out about.)
Kindest regards,

Gene

Wow! Good research. I've got a hard copy of it around here somewhere,
but after three moves, only God knows *where* around here.

You will find that the conditions used in the study were actually a
little extreme; the test aircraft was a high-perf retract, (Bonanza, i
think), and the did not give them an AI. The theory was to develop a
survival procedure that would work in any airplane, including those not
equipped with an AI.

I suspect that if the experiment were repeated using a 172 with an AI
you would get better results--but not that much better, maybe a 30%
survival rate rather than 0%. However, those results would, I think,
be unrealistically optimistic; the uncontrolled variable is the stress
factor. A private pilot in a study, under the hood, in VMC, with an
instructor next to him knows that if he really screws it up the worst
that is going to happen is he 'fails' the test. His life is not really
at risk, and he knows it.

Put that same private pilot in a 172, solo, or with non-pilot
passengers, in IMC, with a little turbulence and I think the stress
level will be *enormous.* If you could do a study where the pilot was
convinced that it was real IMC, with real rocks below, no instructor,
and no help available, then you might see some results that have
validity.

Listen to the guy's voice on the 17 ways tape and tell me what you
think.

Gene

I know I am getting in on this thread a little late.

I had read that when they took off, visibility was 4 miles, then
deteriorated to 1/2 mile due to fog. So they did not take off into IMC,
rather, so-so weather changed very quickly.

Yes, every pilot should read about incidents like this one. How would you
have reacted? What could have been done differently to prevent the
situation? Things to take to heart and consider.

Hi Gene

> I get a little intense over this issue, because I have been doing this
> for 17 plus years and have watched *so many* repetitions of this same
> accident.

It is so sad that we as pilots don't learn from the mistakes of those
that went before. We have to keep making them again and again :(


> I actually had an ex student who managed to run out of gas once and
> land (successfully) in a farmers field (no damage, flew it out). Funny
> thing was, he hid from me for *months.* He was much more afraid of
> *me* finding out than if the FAA did!

That's a great story - and he should have been scared.
We had one at our flying school, signed out for solo, went to the side
gate and let 2 friends in, and off they went. Over a large lake he ran
out of gas. Could have made the shore but elected to land on the lake.
His passengers got out and he drowned.
A friend of mine bought the wreck as is where is.
Made his own barge to raise it, got it to shore and the right tank was
full of gas - fuel was on left!

Keep preaching the message - because people just don't get it - what
does it take?

Best regards

Tony





--

Tony Roberts
PP-ASEL
VFR OTT
Night
Cessna 172H C-GICE

snipped

> The FARs are 'written in blood;' for every paragraph in there, somebody
> died to prove to us we needed that rule. I wish that no one will ever
> again have to give their life to teach us something; but they do it
> anyway.
>
> I just wish that if someone insists on making the ultimate sacrifice to
> teach us something, would they please try at least to pick something we
> don't already know?
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Gene Hudson
> CFI-IA, MEI, ASC
>

Thanks for the considered & helpful words in this thread by you, Dudley and
others.

I note that most of the responders are suggesting flight into
IMC/disorientation as the probable cause of the loss of control. Based on
the metars showing deteriorating trends of vis & dp spread I would tend to
agree this is a probable scenario but
I would like to relate an experience which may or may not have any relevance
to this crash (I cannot bring myself to call it an accident)

I drove from Banff to Springbank(Calgary) on a winter morning under a
blindingly clear Alberta sky and was surprised to see the airport lying in a
thin veil of ground fog. Approaching from the west and looking down to the
airport I could see that the fog was very thin and no more than 100 ft
thick. Driving up to the school it was obvious that it was below VFR but
looked like it would clear later after the sun got a little higher and
warmed things up. The ATIS noted expected equal temp/dp. Horizontal vis
was minimal and very grey but looking up the sky was clear blue.

It was one of those sucker traps where it was easy to think that with my
instrument training (but not rating) I would be able to easily take off and
climb s&l through the thin fog to the clear sky above and that the fog would
have long burned off by the time of return for landing. My training and
instinct for self preservation stopped me from giving this any serious
consideration but I did perform a short experiment.

I started an aircraft engine and allowed it to idle @ 8-900 rpm for the same
time as it would have taken to reach the run-up bay, I then performed a
standard run-up @ 1800 rpm then shutdown. I felt that this duplicated the
conditions that would exist if attempting to fly.

After shutdown I examined the prop and found that the inner half of the prop
was covered with very thick ice and with ridges as much as 3/8 in. thick,
the outer prop showed thinner icing. I consider it probable that any
attempt to take off would have resulted in a failure to climb out of ground
effect and a likely a blind landing in the soup off the end of the runway.
Since the ice would have melted by the time any investigators arrived it
would probably be attributed to the engine failing to develop sufficient
power, perhaps due to carb icing which would also likely have occurred but
also melted.

We took a Polaroid of the prop which severed as a cautionary notice on the
bulletin board for that season.

After some ground study and hangar flying the fog burned off and I had a
cavok day, proving again the old adage about bad weather, "IT WILL PASS"
The associated thought is that if you crash due to bad weather, your
funeral will be held on a sunny day.

Blue skies and best wishes to all
diver driver
CPL & student of flight

"Terry" > writes:

> Hi Bob...
>
> I made the remark about Jean flying for 30 minutes or so
> each time she flew was to make the point that she was "72 years
> young"" and ONLY flew for pleasure.

....

Point taken. And like many others, please accept my sincere sorrow
and condolences for all involved. No matter our speculation about the
causes or how to prevent accidents, this one occured, at great loss to
those involved, and at some loss to all of us.

Bob

"Terry" > wrote in message news:T9qBd.10480

>From the hangar the "thug" was heard but you could not see the
> airplane lying upside down about 1/4 mile away.
>
> How does something like this happen?

Terry, thank you for posting this for all of us. Hopefully each pilot here
will take it to heart and apply it as a learning experience. Having said
that, even if you're an eyewitness it's probably best to wait for the NTSB
report to find out what happened.

I had a similar experience with Jeff Ethell. We'd just finished filming the
P-38 segment of his series and getting ready to do the next segment when he
went out for a veterans reunion in a P-38 and crashed away from the field.
His father, who flew 38s in combat, was at the field reported that Jeff came
over with an engine out and was flying too slow for that condition.

Turns out he had a problem with a worn fuel selector detent (he -points out
the very problem- in the video) which caused starvation of one engine, and
ended up in a flat spin trying to bring it home. People speculated as to
the cause right up until the NTSB determination, and I don't recall anybody
correctly identifying the problem until then.

Why somebody would take off into obvious IMC is even more confusing. Please
keep us posted.

-chris gattman
pp-asel-ia

"tony roberts" > wrote in message news:nospam-

> Keep preaching the message - because people just don't get it - what
> does it take?

Just keep preaching the message. Maybe everybody won't get it, but there's
quite a few readers here thinking about it today.

-c

gatt ) wrote:

> "tony roberts" > wrote in message news:nospam-
>
> > Keep preaching the message - because people just don't get it - what
> > does it take?
>
> Just keep preaching the message. Maybe everybody won't get it, but there's
> quite a few readers here thinking about it today.

I just can't stop thinking not only about the loss experienced by that
young girl's family, but also about the larger scale damage to general
aviation's reputation. Both of those make me very angry because, once
again, signs indicate that this was totally preventable.



--
Peter

> wrote in message
oups.com...
> Re: JFK Jr.
>
> I had a simple answer: "If he'd been my student he wouldn't be dead
> now and we wouldn't be having this converstation."
>

Gene,

With all due respect to your no-doubt considerable instructing prowess, some
people are just too stupid to save themselves. I agree that the conditions
were such that he should have been able to hand-fly it out, let alone click
the autopilot on the minute things got touchy, but IMHO the real problem
happened when he took off. If you know how to train a Kennedy to not take
idiotic risks you should become a therapist and open an office in LA.

-cwk.

----- Original Message -----
From: "gatt" >
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.owning,rec.aviation.student
Sent: Monday, January 03, 2005 12:40
Subject: Re: 3 lives lost


>
> Why somebody would take off into obvious IMC is even more confusing.
Please
> keep us posted.
>
> -chris gattman
> pp-asel-ia
>
>

Please see previous post.

http://www.bucyrusonline.com/articles/news/articles/000003/000362.htm

"Joe Johnson" > wrote in message
...
I'll check out
> Maury's West Coast Adventures--thanks for the tip.
>

Actually, it's Morey...Field Morey. His site is here:
http://www.ifrwest.com/

Colin,

You are very 'on' with both points. There are quite a few (not a
majority, but enough to drive up the statistics) for whom no amount of
education will eradicate their emotionally-driven ignorance. And I
fully agree with you that the real problem was that he took off in the
first place. The conditions were iffy enough that his own flight
instructor called him and said words to the effect "It looks pretty
bad, let me go with you." And he is reported to have replied, "No,
this is something Ive got to do by myself." That statement is all
about proving that he is 'good enough,' which is, I believe, where he
drove off into the psychological 'ditch.'

I have been told that there were two CFI's holding down a couch in the
lobby just a couple of hundred feet away when he was loading up. When
his sister in law was 2hr late, and forced his planned daylight flight
into a night departure, that was the point where he shoulda walked into
that lobby and said "Which one of you guys wants to make $300?" (He
was reportely collecting $5mil a year off of his trust. $300 would
have been pocket change.)

I have also read that he and his instructor had been having problems
with the autopilot; it apparently was prone to occaisionally doing a
roll-axis hard-over failure for no apparent reason. Given that, and
his low time in type (30hr), and thus a probable lack of familiarity
with that autopilot, it may be that he was reluctant to turn it on.
Maybe he *did* turn it on, and it did its hard-over thing and made a
marginal situation worse.

I have, as of late, made it my business to study the human factors
issues associated with these kinds of accidents, because I agree with
you that it was the decision to go under these conditions that was the
real problem. My research has led me into the psychology of
narcissism, and I believe that is a major factor in this seemingly
mysterious penchant some pilots have to go ahead and launch when
prudence would dictate another less risky course of action.

If you trace the history of the Kennedys and the behavior of the men
(date rape, skiing into trees, trophy wives, affairs with actresses,
need to prove, and angrily blaming others when something doesnt go
right), and then bounce that off the DSMV-IV diagnostic criteria for
narcissistic personality disorder, you wil find it is a near perfect
match.

Unfortunately for our industry, a large percentage of the people who
have the money to fly are highly driven, type A, take-no-prisoners
types--and these traits are often symptoms of the narcissistic
personality.

The downside includes a need to constantly prove oneself 'good enough,'
trophy seeking, and the appearance of competence being valued much more
than the actual competence itself.

I wrote an article about this that was published in Plane and Pilot ,
called "The Wrong Stuff." It is available to view on my website at
www.genehudson.com if you care to read more about this stuff.

Become a therapist and open an office in LA? You are not the first
person to have said that... others have offered that I already have
done both... I don't want to advertise it too much, though, for fear
that then *all* my time would be spend wrestling with these types! (It
is, in fact, *very* hard work--getting some of these types to 'see
through their own bs.')

And, as you point out, it only works some of the time. Probably much
less than half the time.

A couple of years ago I lost one... ex-fighter pilot, took his
commercial training from me... I thought I had really made some
progress when after many hours of pushing and pulling, I finally got
him to agree to actually use a checklist. A year later he was leading
a flight of two, 'hot-dogging' at low level in mountainous terrain; he
turned up the wrong canyon, and found he could not outclimb the
terrain, and could not turn around. Both aircraft impacted the ridge
600 feet below the pass.

The unfortunate reality of this is that he and the other pilot took
four other (trusting) souls with them into the fireball. Six lives
snuffed out--and for what? To prove that you can fly up the canyon at
low level? Big deal.

He proved it all right. So did JFK Jr. ('I can do it by myself!')

I think this is in large part the answer to the painful question raised
by the accident that started this thread; why would someone who 'knows
better' take off in conditions such that the impact could be heard, but
not seen, from a hangar a 1/4 mi away?

I bristle at the notion that the weather just 'closed in'
unexpectedly.' The aircraft was airborne for about 60 seconds. I
argue that the conditions did not change that fast. She knew fully
well she was launching into a low vis condition (IMHO).

Why would Jessica Debroff's CFI allow them to depart, over-gross, in
the summer, at a high alt airport, in a non-turboed airplane, when hail
was falling on the roof of their car as they drove to the airport, with
a huge cell sitting directly on the airport, and the 414 that departed
before them called back with a windshear report, stating that he (with
620 turbocharged hp) 'almost didnt make it?'

What are we trying to prove? Can't we re-define 'good pilot' to mean
one that has the guts to tell everyone else to 'put a sock in it, I
a-ain't a-goin'?'
I gotta get a new soapbox, I am wearging this one out.

Regards,

Gene

) wrote:

> What are we trying to prove? Can't we re-define 'good pilot' to mean
> one that has the guts to tell everyone else to 'put a sock in it, I
> a-ain't a-goin'?'
> I gotta get a new soapbox, I am wearging this one out.

I hope you stick around. During your short time here you have quickly
become one of my favorite posters.

--
Peter
700 hr instrument-rated private pilot

> wrote in message
oups.com...

> What are we trying to prove? Can't we re-define 'good pilot' to mean
> one that has the guts to tell everyone else to 'put a sock in it, I
> a-ain't a-goin'?'

Maybe my take on this is a little more cynical. I tend to think that the
people like this fighter pilot are simply unrecoverable. *Maybe* if they get
into a real close call, or a good friend of theirs buys the farm doing
something stupid, the shock will wake them up. But, if they were amenable to
reason and logic, they probably would have found it on their own long before
you got there. Like motorcycling, skydiving, rock climbing, etc., flying
attracts a certain percentage of daredevils who will take the dare too far.
Perhaps the best we can hope to do with them is limit the damage they cause.
JFK was certainly part of this group, something his mother seems to have
recognized far better than he did.

However, I find cases like this one to be much more interesting, in that you
have pilots who have displayed good decisionmaking for perhaps decades, and
one day take off, VFR, into 1/4mi viz. These cases seem to me far more
interesting in that these are presumably people who can actually be helped,
because they are willing to listen. I look at these very closely because if
my research has taught me anything, it is that I am not too good to make
this kind of mistake. In this case though, I really wonder whether this lady
didn't have something physiologically bsuted in her brain. I'm
instrument-rated and current and I wouldn't take off into those conditions,
even 1mi viz. is tighter than I prefer given my skills and equipment.
Continuing VFR into IMC on a cross-country I can understand. This one simply
defies rational analysis.

-cwk.

wrote:
>
> What are we trying to prove? Can't we re-define 'good pilot' to mean
> one that has the guts to tell everyone else to 'put a sock in it, I
> a-ain't a-goin'?'

I think most of us have that definition. It's just that good pilots don't get
the publicity.

George Patterson
The desire for safety stands against every great and noble enterprise.

Hi, Gene,

My research has led me into the psychology of
narcissism, and I believe that is a major factor in this seemingly
mysterious penchant some pilots have to go ahead and launch when
prudence would dictate another less risky course of action.


Sam:

These may be of interest to you;

http://malignantselflove.tripod.com/journal66.html
http://malignantselflove.tripod.com/journal70.html

Take care.

Sam

"Colin W Kingsbury" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> > wrote in message
> oups.com...
>
> ...in that you have pilots who have displayed good decisionmaking for
perhaps decades, and
> one day take off, VFR, into 1/4mi viz.


Did you read the story? She did not take off in IMC, vis was 4sm at takeoff.

Sam,

I will look at those. Thank you.

Gene

Colin,

I agree that the fighter pilot was probably unrecoverable. The tough
part from my position is how to separate those from the recoverable
ones *before* they make their airplane into an aluminium plate on the
side of a rock. Since I have not yet figured out how to tell, I tend
to give it my best to try to get to whatever common sense might still
be operating while there still is time to try. A lot of that effor is
wasted.

In the interest of effort that probably will not be wasted (you seem to
be listening) , I want to point out that the idea that there was
'something psychologically busted in her brain' misses the most
important point. Most likely there was not; the fact is, we all are
susceptible to the same kind of error. That's the point; that she
*wasn't* different from the rest of us, that the only thing that
separates us from 'them' is a will to choose--and it is a choice--not
to succumb to the same temptations.

There was nothing 'wrong' with her. She was just like us. We could do
the same thing tomorrow, except that--if we choose--we can realize that
and learn from her mistakes and decide to take actions to make sure
that when we are being taken down that path by our emotions, that we
then *choose* to do not what we want to do, nor what everyone else is
doing, nor what will make us popular, but rather that which we know is
better from a purely rational point of view. It sounds easy when we
are not in the midst of it, and in fact it is not.

Gene

Nobody,

Come on. It was *reported* to be 4sm vis. In fact, the aircraft was
airborne for 60 seconds. The reported ceiling was 500 overcast. The
crash was heard, but not seen, from a hangar a qtr mile away.

She took off into conditions that were entirely visibile to a casual
observer. That the weather report says the conditions are 4 sm does
not absolve the PIC from looking out the window.

She did not maintain conservative safety margins; and her emergency IFR
skills we inadequate.

Please get this. It was not an 'act of God.' This was entirely
preventable.

Gene

> I wrote an article about this that was published in Plane and Pilot ,
> called "The Wrong Stuff." It is available to view on my website at
> www.genehudson.com if you care to read more about this stuff.

Couldn't find the article there. I found where it was listed with other
articles, and many of those other articles are clickable links which take
you into their content, but "The Wrong Stuff" is not clickable.


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Geoffrey,

If you give me an email address I can send it to you, I still have the
original draft on my computer.

Gene

"Terry" > wrote in message
link.net...

Terry,

Very sorry to read of this accident.

Despite the recent influx of gee-whiz electronics and the advances made in
mechanical / structural areas, flying is still a very human endeavour...and
humans are falible.

I hope you find peace

Sincerest Regards,

Jay Beckman
PP-ASEL
Chandler, AZ

Gene, how about posting it here?

wrote:
> Geoffrey,
> If you give me an email address I can send it to you, I still have the
> original draft on my computer.

There is no way visibility goes from adequate VFR to low IMC in less than
sixty seconds. I'm calling bull**** on this.

"nobody" > wrote in message
...
>
> Did you read the story? She did not take off in IMC, vis was 4sm at
takeoff.
>

> wrote in message
oups.com...
>
> In the interest of effort that probably will not be wasted (you seem to
> be listening) , I want to point out that the idea that there was
> 'something psychologically busted in her brain' misses the most
> important point. Most likely there was not; the fact is, we all are
> susceptible to the same kind of error. That's the point; that she
> *wasn't* different from the rest of us, that the only thing that
> separates us from 'them' is a will to choose--and it is a choice--not
> to succumb to the same temptations.
>

Like I said, I understand VFR into IMC, and I can see it happening in the
context of a rational thought process. This specific case I have a much
harder time with. I'm just trying to reconstruct the thought process in my
head that could lead someone to take off in these conditions.

-cwk.

Colin W Kingsbury wrote:

> There is no way visibility goes from adequate VFR to low IMC in less
than
> sixty seconds. I'm calling bull**** on this.

It's not usual, but I've had it happen once or twice. Only once did I
get caught in it, and then only for about 5 seconds, but it can happen,
even in daytime. You fly out of BED in MA, IIRC, right? I fly out of
FIT in MA usually, but once at BED I took off, was flying a pattern in
VFR conditions with 6 mile visibility, 1500 ft. ceilings, and just
managed to get down and land before a rainshower came through at about
30 kts and vis. went to .5 miles with a 200 ft ceiling.

The 5 second time was with 1200 ft. ceiling and 4-6 mile vis., and then
I just flew into a cloud, which I THOUGHT I could see through and was
just light rain. Boom - white. I knew that the weather was clear to
the left, made a shallow 90 deg. turn, and popped out 5 seconds later.
Went back to FIT and landed.....

I agree with you that even with 4 mi. vis. and the ceilings reported at
the airport, you've got to wonder what the pilot was thinking, but
weather CAN close in very quickly, especially if you're moving at 100
mph.....

--
Marc J. Zeitlin
http://marc.zeitlin.home.comcast.net/
http://www.cozybuilders.org/
Copyright (c) 2004

Colin W Kingsbury wrote:

> There is no way visibility goes from adequate VFR to low IMC in less than
> sixty seconds. I'm calling bull**** on this.

Well, you've obviously never lived near a coast of had warm moist air
move over snow. I've had my house go from sunshine to completely fogged
in within this amount of time, and I live on top of a hill nowhere's
near water. Snow can cause fog very quickly under the right conditions.

I personally think the pilot should have seen this coming, however, it
is amazing how fast conditions can change. Even so, usually the
conditions that might cause these changes can be known in advance, which
I'm assuming is your fundamental point - and with that I agree.


Matt

John,

I don't mind posting the article here, as long as the powers that be
are ok with it--but its about 1500 words, a little larger than the
typical post.
If thats ok with the local etiquette, its ok with me.

Gene

Colin,

>I'm just trying to reconstruct the thought process in my
>head that could lead someone to take off in these conditions.

Good, that's what I am trying to get people to do.

The reasons are many, but they all fall into the same category: trying
to please somebody. Often its financial pressure (I need the revenue
today); time pressure (we gotta get to work by 8am); social pressures
(they'll think I'm a wimp); need to prove one's self (I'll show them, I
can fly in conditions the rest of these weaklings are afraid of), etc.

Ron Brown is dead because his USAF pilot succumbed to the time
pressure.
JFK Jr is dead because he felt he needed to prove he could do it by
himself.

At the end of Oct we just lost another bizjet in San Diego because they
were in too much of a hurry to take the time to make a phone call and
prefile; instead they did a night VFR takeoff under a 2100 ft overcast,
in a valley surrounded by mountains. The idea was to file in the air
by radio. Their airplane made a big boom and a great flash of light as
it dashed itslef into a zillion pieces against the side of Otay
mountain, 8 nm east of the departure airport. The wreckage was about
3000 feet away from the site where another jet pilot did *exactly* the
same thing, from the same airport, hitting the same mountain, ten years
earlier. In that case it was carrying half of Reba MacEntyre's band.

I'm sure they saved at least 10 to 15 minutes each.

Recommended reading: AC60-22, available online at the faa's website.
Redefining Airmanship, by Tony Kern. Aviation Psychology, ed by
Roscoe. Human Factors in Aviation, ed by Nagel.

"If you think you are late now, just imagine how late you will be when
you are dead."

Gene

On Sat, 08 Jan 2005 17:32:53 GMT, Colin W Kingsbury wrote:

> There is no way visibility goes from adequate VFR to low IMC in less than
> sixty seconds. I'm calling bull**** on this.

Colin,

Having lived in the area for 4 years before I moved to MS, it does happen.

I have seen the fog rolling in no time flat due to warm frontal passages.

Please keep in mind the the ground had a 12 to 18 inch snow pack, and with
warm air advecting into the area, you get some incredible fog formations in
the North Central Ohio area with this combination of weather.

The closest reporting airport is MFD (Mansfield), and the second closest
airport is MNN (Marion). I have seen it raining at both airports and
snowing at 4I9. The distance from each airport is rather small for such
diverse weather conditions.

I personally thought that 4 mile viz and snow cover is not condusive of any
sight seeing anyway, thus I would have question the decision to launch FOR
SIGHT SEEING PURPOSES. There would have been no visible horizon with that
kind of visibility and snow cover once you left pattern altitude.

But, since I wasn't there, Monday night quarterbacking is only speculative.

Allen

My condolences to family and friends of the three who lost their lives.

Many years ago I was about to run into comparable trouble at Rotterdam
Airport: 8 km visibility and temp well above dewpoint at take-off.
Nevertheless, when flying to the East (away from the shore) at 1000 ft I
met severe haze, had scarcely any horizon, fortunately no fogging up!
Within 10 minutes I was back at the airport. So far my experience with
poor visibility coming up in a whiff.

I cannot overestimate how important it is to do at least one IF lesson
at the earlierst useful point in training.

Different subject:
A cross-probing on "wrong stuff" and "gene hudson" in Google yielded the
following:

http://www.misc-transport.com/trucking/The_old_Top_Ten_revisited_220951.html

It may be of some use.

Best regards: Johan E. Mebius (former private pilot)


Geoffrey Barnes wrote:

>>I wrote an article about this that was published in Plane and Pilot ,
>>called "The Wrong Stuff." It is available to view on my website at
>>www.genehudson.com if you care to read more about this stuff.
>>
>>
>
>Couldn't find the article there. I found where it was listed with other
>articles, and many of those other articles are clickable links which take
>you into their content, but "The Wrong Stuff" is not clickable.
>
>
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