I previously posted this as a reply on the original thread, but that thread
is getting so old I thought a bunch of interested folks might miss it, so I
thought I'd repost it as a new thread. I've taken the time to correct and
clarify some of the things I wrote in the original version.

Jay and perhaps some others seem to think that we should have launched every
available alert aircraft during the 9-11 attacks. I don't want to argue for
or against their points, but for consideration I do want to point out how
things were in West Germany during the time I was there from 1983-86. I've
already posted how few fighters NATO had on alert during the time, but what
some of you guys might not know is that the Warsaw Pact frequently sent
fighters across the border into West German airspace to test our reactions
two or three times a month or even more often at times. During each
incursion, only two NATO ZULU alert fighters were launched, sometimes from
Ramstein, sometimes from Bitburg, sometimes from one of the other bases with
ZULU Alert commitments. Fighters have only an hour or two's endurance
without air refueling, and it would be stupid to launch all of your jets at
once.
Imagine how vulnerable to attack we'd have been had all of our alert jets
been airborne at the same time, then they all had to land and had been off
alert status while they were refueled. I never heard if the Warsaw Pact made
incursions at more than one point at a time, I'm supposing if they had then
NATO would have launched sufficient ZULU jets to make intercepts at each
point, but certainly not all of the ZULU jets at once. It could be that
NORAD only launched a minimum of alert aircraft on 9-11 for the same reason.
If you look at a map that shows where Ramstein, Bitburg, Soesterburg, and
RAF Wildenrath (not Bruggen, Bruggen was the Jaguar base, Wildenrath had
the Phantoms. I was mistaken in my previous post.) were in relation to the
West-East German border, you'll see that our bases were on the far side of
West Germany away from the border. It took some minutes for our jets to get
airborne and cross West German territory to make the intercept. As our jets
got close, the Pact fighters would turn around and head back for their side.

Here's a story about one such intercept. I should mention that we launched
our alert jets at least once a day, usually for what we called TANGOs,
which were training sorties, not actual intercepts. As the Phantoms rolled
out onto the runway, they were told it was a TANGO, so when they took off
on Runway 09, they immediately made a left turn and came out of burner so
as not to overfly the city of Kaiserslautern and **** off the locals.
Actual intercepts were called ALPHA launches, and us groundcrew could
always know when it was an ALPHA because the jets stayed in burner and flew
right over Kaiserslautern heading east, still in burner for as far as we
could see them. Not all ALPHAs were for border incursions. Many were to
intercept civilian aircraft that were lost and heading for the East German
border, and for ADIZ violations. So, on this particular day, I had to be
at ZULU to meet our F-4Es as they landed because while they were coming
back to Ramstein after an ALPHA launch, one Phantom pilot had called in to
report a problem with their IFF interrogator. I needed to fix the jet as
quickly as possible after it had landed so they could put it back up on
alert status. As the crew were getting out of their jets they were
excitedly talking back and forth about what they'd seen. From what they
said, they'd been in IMC, and as they approached the Munich area, they had
a radar target which accelerated away from them, heading back over the
border at Mach 2.8 and accelerating. While they never got a visual ID, they
were certain it was a MiG-25.

One more story: I mentioned the pair of Luftwaffe ZULU F-4Fs that diverted
into Ramstein one day in late 1985. I should explain that the Luftwaffe
ZULU Phantoms were restricted by post-WW2 status of forces agreements to
TANGO launches. They were not allowed to do ALPHAs, unless an actual war
with the Warsaw Pact had started. So this one day, our ZULU jets launched
on a TANGO. It was a typical rainy German day, but not too bad as I could
clearly see the jets come out of burner and make their left turns. Later Job
Control announced over our maintenance radio net that the jets wouldn't be
coming back, they'd diverted for the weather and we needed to upload a
couple more F-4Es and get them over to ZULU ASAP. It was about that time
that the Luftwaffe Phantoms landed and were parked in our Restricted Area.
They were gone when I came back to work the next morning. I'd always
wondered what was going on, why our jets had to weather divert when it
wasn't that bad out, and the Luftwaffe jets had landed okay. I don't know
when our airplanes finally returned.

Fast forward to about 7 or 8 years ago. I was at the Manitowoc, Wisconsin
airshow, and there were a couple of A-10s from the Battle Creek ANG unit on
display. The pilots were standing by the jets talking to people, and one of
them, a Lieutenant Colonel, looked very familiar to me. Turned out he had
been a Phantom Phlyer in the 526 TFS at Ramstein while I was there, and we
started talking about the good old days. For whatever reason, I mentioned
that day when our jets diverted and the Luftwaffe jets landed instead, and
he told me the rest of the story. Someone high up at NATO had decided to do
something about all of the incursions by Warsaw Pact aircraft, so they came
up with a plan. They launched out our ZULU F-4Es on a TANGO, and at the same
time TANGOed the Luftwaffe ZULU F-4Fs from JG 74 at Neuberg, which is a bit
north of Munich and much closer to the East-West German border. All four
Phantoms joined up and swapped callsigns, and landed at each other's
airfields. The 526 TFS jets were immediately refueled and put on alert
status at Neuberg in the Luftwaffe ZULU barn. Sure enough, a few days later
a Pact MiG-23 flew across the border into West German airspace. But instead
of Ramstein or Bitburg launching their alert aircraft from all the way
across Germany, the pair of 526 TFS F-4Es came up from Neuberg, between the
MiG and the border. The LtCol told me the plan was to shoot down the MiG on
our side of the border, but only if they could be sure that the wreckage
would fall away from any towns. The F-4Es were under Ground Controlled
Intercept control, but there was some glitch and they were not given
permission to fire. So one parked himself at the MiG's six-o'clock while the
other pulled up alongside the MiG and they escorted the MiG back to the
border. He told me there were no further Warsaw Pact incursions after that.

One other thing I'd like to point out for Jim, who seems to have a problem
with the ANG holding the alert commitment in CONUS. He seemed to think this
was a bad idea because, he thinks, the ANG doesn't have enough full-timers
to generate a large number of aircraft if there were an attack. Chew on this
info... During my time at Ramstein from 1983 to 86, during the Cold War,
Reagan's saber rattling, the attack on Libya, NATO's equipping with Pershing
2s and GLCMS and all the tension that caused with the Soviets, we worked
three shifts Monday through Friday. The F-15 units were cut down to two
shifts, days and evenings since they didn't have as much maintenance
required on their aircraft. USAFE cut us down to two shifts in late 1985
too, I was on second shift and worked a number of 16 hour shifts trying to
get the next day's jets all fixed, since there was no midnight shift to take
over. When we got the jets done, we went home and from that moment there was
no one on duty in our unit for those hours until the day shift showed up at
6 AM.

During the weekends and holidays, we had a skeleton crew of one maintenance
specialist from each specialty, plus four crew chiefs if memory serves. We
worked 12 hour shifts during weekend duty, from 5 AM to 5 PM. From 5 PM to 5
AM we had no maintenance people on duty in our Aircraft Maintenance Unit.
Our main duty on Weekend Duty was to launch out and recover the few F-4Es we
had going on cross-countries. We also finished up whatever work there was on
the next Monday's jets that were on the flying schedule. I don't know how
many pilots had weekend duty as Operations worked out of a different
building, but I'm guessing very few if any were there after 5PM. Without us
being there, it wouldn't have mattered even if there were pilots on duty. As
a reminder, an F-4E can't launch out without ground crew, since Phantoms use
external start carts (AM32A-60) to start the engines. Not that it would've
mattered anyway, since none of the jets were armed with anything but the
nose gun. Had there been a "bolt out of the blue" attack, ZULU would have
been on their own until sufficient maintenance and weapons people could be
called in to start loading out the jets and we had aircrews on hand to fly
them. No ****.

I'm quite sure the Soviets were well aware of that too. We communicated
with each other and Job Control with Motorola hand-held radios which
weren't encrypted. Any Soviet spy could've been stationed off base,
monitoring our radio traffic and known everything that was going on. USAFE
was well-aware of the spy potential, we were given an "OPSEC" training
course as part of our unit in-processing that discussed the fact the
Soviets were most likely listening in on our communications and that we
should be careful not to discuss anything classified.
Zulu at Ramstein was manned 24-7 by two pilots, two WSOs, and four crew
chiefs. The aircrew members and ZULU qualified crew chiefs rotated the
duty, which is exactly how the ANG does it. When the 86 TFW at Ramstein
began converting to F-16Cs and Ds, six ANG F-4D Phantoms, their ground
crews and aircrews were brought over to Ramstein to take over the ZULU
commitment. There were two jets from Minnesota, two from North Dakota, and
two from California. At any given time, they had two up on alert status and
the other four flew local training sorties.
Anyway, the point I was going to make is the ANG has full-timers manning
their alert aircraft, plus full-timers conducting day-to-day operations.
During nights and holidays they have probably as many people on duty as we
did at Ramstein. If there would be indications of hostilities, they'd do
exactly what we'd have done at Ramstein: recall all off-duty personnel,
and get ready to fight the war. The ANG has always done extremely well,
and often won, in USAF competitions such as Gunsmoke (gunnery and bombing)
and William Tell (air to air), and ANG and Reservist trash haulers have
freqently won or placed very highly in Airlift Rodeo competitions. Having
been both Air Guard and Active Duty USAF, I personally have no problems
with the idea that the ANG and AFRES have taken over a good portion of air
defense, transport and tanker missions from the USAF. I don't belive Jim's
criticism is warranted.
Scott Wilson

wrote:
> I previously posted this as a reply on the original thread, but that thread
> is getting so old I thought a bunch of interested folks might miss it, so I
> thought I'd repost it as a new thread. I've taken the time to correct and
> clarify some of the things I wrote in the original version.
>
> Jay and perhaps some others seem to think that we should have launched every
> available alert aircraft during the 9-11 attacks. I don't want to argue for
> or against their points, but for consideration I do want to point out how
> things were in West Germany during the time I was there from 1983-86. I've
> already posted how few fighters NATO had on alert during the time, but what
> some of you guys might not know is that the Warsaw Pact frequently sent
> fighters across the border into West German airspace to test our reactions
> two or three times a month or even more often at times. During each
> incursion, only two NATO ZULU alert fighters were launched, sometimes from
> Ramstein, sometimes from Bitburg, sometimes from one of the other bases with
> ZULU Alert commitments. Fighters have only an hour or two's endurance
> without air refueling, and it would be stupid to launch all of your jets at
> once.

Your post covered a lot of ground, but your point above is very
important and not understood by Jay and others lacking knowledge of
military tactics and capability. It is very important to not be tricked
into showing what your true capabilities are and letting your enemies
think you have much less capability than you have is a very smart
tactic. The one exception was during the cold war when the MAD strategy
required showing a fair bit of your capability to your enemy.

Launching more aircraft than required for the threat at hand serves no
purpose other than to convey a lot of information about your capability.
I still believe based on what I know from both public and private
sources, the the main lag on 9/11 was a complete lack of any expectation
about an attack of this sort and the fact that the military really
wasn't prepared for it from a decision-making perspective more so than a
fundamental capability basis.

One can argue as to whether they should have been expecting a threat of
this nature and whether intel should have been shared better between the
many government (military and non-military) intelligence agencies, but
that has nothing to do with the number of fighters we have and whether
we need new or old technology fighters.

Matt

On 1-Jan-2008, Matt Whiting > wrote:

> Your post covered a lot of ground, but your point above is very
> important and not understood by Jay and others lacking knowledge of
> military tactics and capability. It is very important to not be tricked
> into showing what your true capabilities are and letting your enemies
> think you have much less capability than you have is a very smart
> tactic. The one exception was during the cold war when the MAD strategy
> required showing a fair bit of your capability to your enemy.
>
> Launching more aircraft than required for the threat at hand serves no
> purpose other than to convey a lot of information about your capability.
> I still believe based on what I know from both public and private
> sources, the the main lag on 9/11 was a complete lack of any expectation
> about an attack of this sort and the fact that the military really
> wasn't prepared for it from a decision-making perspective more so than a
> fundamental capability basis.

I agree with you Matt, except for one point. I am completely sure that the
Soviets knew exactly how many jets were up on alert status at each of the
NATO bases, and could probably even give you the tail numbers of the jets on
alert on any given day. Our OPSEC (Operations Security) left a lot to be
desired. Any time a ZULU jet had a problem, Job Control radioed the fact
along with the tail number of the afflicted jet to us in our AMU so we could
dispatch someone over to fix it. And when the jet was repaired, the fact was
radioed to Job Control as well. When a scheduled tradeout of tail numbers
was to be done, that info was also talked about openly on our radio net. The
only thing I can figure is that USAFE and NATO were quite convinced the
Warsaw Pact would never actually attack us, contrary to the public posturing
put forth about the "imminent Soviet Threat." I wonder if the whole
propaganda effort was just in order to keep their funding up, and continues
to this day supported by the paranoids in our government. I do know I came
away from that experience and several other experiences during my 10 years
Active Duty thinking that what we refer to as "Hawks" in our government
really don't know what they are talking about. To me they are just paranoid
beyond all reason. Remember the "Domino Theory" and how it was so important
to stop the Communists in Vietnam to prevent the global spread of Communism?
Well, the Communists won in Vietnam, and the dominos didn't fall. And all
the bluster about Saddam and Iraq from the Bush Administration leading up to
the invasion was simply ridiculous, and it's a shame that so many of our
people were paranoid enough to have bought into it. I believe it's our duty
to be skeptical of our government's claims of threats, they've proven
themselves not trustworthy in my view.
Scott Wilson

wrote:
> On 1-Jan-2008, Matt Whiting > wrote:
>
>> Your post covered a lot of ground, but your point above is very
>> important and not understood by Jay and others lacking knowledge of
>> military tactics and capability. It is very important to not be tricked
>> into showing what your true capabilities are and letting your enemies
>> think you have much less capability than you have is a very smart
>> tactic. The one exception was during the cold war when the MAD strategy
>> required showing a fair bit of your capability to your enemy.
>>
>> Launching more aircraft than required for the threat at hand serves no
>> purpose other than to convey a lot of information about your capability.
>> I still believe based on what I know from both public and private
>> sources, the the main lag on 9/11 was a complete lack of any expectation
>> about an attack of this sort and the fact that the military really
>> wasn't prepared for it from a decision-making perspective more so than a
>> fundamental capability basis.
>
> I agree with you Matt, except for one point. I am completely sure that the
> Soviets knew exactly how many jets were up on alert status at each of the
> NATO bases, and could probably even give you the tail numbers of the jets on
> alert on any given day. Our OPSEC (Operations Security) left a lot to be
> desired. Any time a ZULU jet had a problem, Job Control radioed the fact
> along with the tail number of the afflicted jet to us in our AMU so we could
> dispatch someone over to fix it. And when the jet was repaired, the fact was
> radioed to Job Control as well. When a scheduled tradeout of tail numbers
> was to be done, that info was also talked about openly on our radio net. The
> only thing I can figure is that USAFE and NATO were quite convinced the
> Warsaw Pact would never actually attack us, contrary to the public posturing
> put forth about the "imminent Soviet Threat." I wonder if the whole
> propaganda effort was just in order to keep their funding up, and continues
> to this day supported by the paranoids in our government. I do know I came
> away from that experience and several other experiences during my 10 years
> Active Duty thinking that what we refer to as "Hawks" in our government
> really don't know what they are talking about. To me they are just paranoid
> beyond all reason. Remember the "Domino Theory" and how it was so important
> to stop the Communists in Vietnam to prevent the global spread of Communism?
> Well, the Communists won in Vietnam, and the dominos didn't fall. And all
> the bluster about Saddam and Iraq from the Bush Administration leading up to
> the invasion was simply ridiculous, and it's a shame that so many of our
> people were paranoid enough to have bought into it. I believe it's our duty
> to be skeptical of our government's claims of threats, they've proven
> themselves not trustworthy in my view.
> Scott Wilson

Yes, certainly poor operational practice and meddling politics can muck
up the best of systems.

Matt

> I previously posted this as a reply on the original thread, but that thread
> is getting so old I thought a bunch of interested folks might miss it, so I
> thought I'd repost it as a new thread. I've taken the time to correct and
> clarify some of the things I wrote in the original version.
>
> Jay and perhaps some others seem to think that we should have launched every
> available alert aircraft during the 9-11 attacks.

<Big snip of fascinating post>

Thanks, Scott, for the great post. Very interesting -- and scary --
stuff.

Two quick points, and a question:

1. I didn't say we should have launched everything we had on 9/11. I
said we DID launch everything we had in the D.C.-to-New York area,
according to published reports. That's the scary part, cuz it
amounted to a tiny handfull of fighters to defend our most important
assets.

2. I'm not sure that highlighting the incompetence of our Cold War-era
Air Force is a good way to prove that handing over our home defense to
the Air Guard has been a good idea. The fact that at the height of the
Cold War our air and support crews predictably took weekends and
holidays off -- and broadcast this status over walkie-talkies -- does
NOT inspire confidence. It just doesn't get much dumber than that,
tactically.

3. Did word of the Soviet incursions into German air space ever leak
out at the time? I don't remember reading anything about this, back
then -- and you'd think it would have been big news.

Thanks,
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

Jay Honeck > wrote:
> > I previously posted this as a reply on the original thread, but that thread
> > is getting so old I thought a bunch of interested folks might miss it, so I
> > thought I'd repost it as a new thread. I've taken the time to correct and
> > clarify some of the things I wrote in the original version.
> >
> > Jay and perhaps some others seem to think that we should have launched every
> > available alert aircraft during the 9-11 attacks.

> <Big snip of fascinating post>

> Thanks, Scott, for the great post. Very interesting -- and scary --
> stuff.

> Two quick points, and a question:

> 1. I didn't say we should have launched everything we had on 9/11. I
> said we DID launch everything we had in the D.C.-to-New York area,
> according to published reports. That's the scary part, cuz it
> amounted to a tiny handfull of fighters to defend our most important
> assets.

Published reports of anything are generally inaccurate.

> 2. I'm not sure that highlighting the incompetence of our Cold War-era
> Air Force is a good way to prove that handing over our home defense to
> the Air Guard has been a good idea. The fact that at the height of the
> Cold War our air and support crews predictably took weekends and
> holidays off -- and broadcast this status over walkie-talkies -- does
> NOT inspire confidence. It just doesn't get much dumber than that,
> tactically.

The military usually takes holidays off unless someone is shooting
at them, and even then sometimes.

Everybodies military; if they don't the other side will get really
suspicious.

> 3. Did word of the Soviet incursions into German air space ever leak
> out at the time? I don't remember reading anything about this, back
> then -- and you'd think it would have been big news.

Sigh, there were Soviet incursions into just about every part of
European airspace, Asian airspace, and American airspace.

They would turn around as soon as someone came out to greet them.

It was all a game and both sides played.

There were occasional pictures of Bear crews waving to the US fighters
published in the military oriented aviation mags; it was no secret.

--
Jim Pennino

Remove .spam.sux to reply.

Jay Honeck > wrote in
:

>> I previously posted this as a reply on the original thread, but that
>> thread is getting so old I thought a bunch of interested folks might
>> miss it, so I thought I'd repost it as a new thread. I've taken the
>> time to correct and clarify some of the things I wrote in the
>> original version.
>>
>> Jay and perhaps some others seem to think that we should have
>> launched every available alert aircraft during the 9-11 attacks.
>
> <Big snip of fascinating post>
>
> Thanks, Scott, for the great post. Very interesting -- and scary --
> stuff.




Aren't we mr reasonable all the sudden?

Bertie

On 1-Jan-2008, wrote:

> The military usually takes holidays off unless someone is shooting
> at them, and even then sometimes.
>
> Everybodies military; if they don't the other side will get really
> suspicious.


> > 2. I'm not sure that highlighting the incompetence of our Cold War-era
> > Air Force is a good way to prove that handing over our home defense to
> > the Air Guard has been a good idea. The fact that at the height of the
> > Cold War our air and support crews predictably took weekends and
> > holidays off -- and broadcast this status over walkie-talkies -- does
> > NOT inspire confidence. It just doesn't get much dumber than that,
> > tactically.



Jim's thought about everybody's military taking normal time off to keep the
other side from getting suspicious is probably a big clue why we were so
open in our communications about ZULU and maintenance operations in general.
I really don't think our Air Force was incompetent. Where there was need to
keep things under wraps, we did a pretty good job of it. Remember how long
the F-117 had been flying before it was revealed publicly? I know of a few
other classified systems that we kept under wraps for some time until there
was no longer a need for them to be kept secret. Ever hear of Combat Tree?
It was a system we carried in our F-4s that could actively interrogate the
Soviets' IFF systems or passively listen in on Soviet IFF replies to their
own interrogations. It was a great thing for IDing and locating bogies. I
worked on that one in our jets, and I know it was kept classified for a lot
of years. We even had plastic "switch guards" we put on the control heads to
keep our WSOs from being able to select the active interrogation mode
accidentally, so the Soviets wouldn't detect the interrogation signal coming
from our side and give away the capability we had. It was declassified just
a few years ago.
To put Jim's thought another way, if we kept the normal number of jets on
alert and didn't work too hard at concealing what was going on in
day-to-day operations, the Soviets would have no reason to think we were
planning an attack and tensions between us could be kept low. I don't know
too much about how the Soviets conducted their day-to-day operations, but
everything I'd heard said that if they began preparing to attack NATO, we'd
have ample notice. It's virtually impossible these days to prepare for an
attack without undertaking preparations the other side is bound to detect.

It was very easy to notice the disconnect between what Reagan and our
government were saying about how dangerous the Soviets were and how
relatively unconcerned our command staff seemed to be in real life. We
certainly trained for combat, but I never felt as though war was imminent
aside from when we bombed Libya. Then it got a little scary.
Chernenko/Andropov/Gorbechev and the Soviet government were also
frequently telling their people how evil we were and how they had to be
prepared for a NATO attack, and I'd guess at the operational level they
were probably about as relaxed as we were, call it relaxed vigilance on
both sides. I used to be able to pick up Radio Moscow on my AM radio in my
car and at home, and listening to their propaganda made it easy to see the
exaggerations they told their people about us and start to see how a lot
of what we were being told about them by our government was probably
equally exaggerated. The threat of a Soviet invasion of NATO (and the
threat that Saddam, Kim Il Jong, and Iran pose or posed to us) was
certainly there but greatly exaggerated for our government's own purposes.
In my humble opinion, of course.

As for the incursions the Warsaw Pact did to check our responses, we did
indeed do similar things. See :
http://www.aiipowmia.com/koreacw/cw1.html
for a list of our aircraft that the Soviets shotdown while on recon
missions. There were other things we did that didn't involve overflying
their territory. A friend of mine who flew RF-4Cs out of the 26 TRW at
Zweibrucken once told me about one of his favorite missions, which he called
"a Banzai run". The 26th had several airplanes modified with an electronic
recon system called TEREC, which could detect and through triangulation
fairly precisely locate radar emitters. The Soviets were usually pretty good
about keeping most of their air defense radars turned off, so we wouldn't
know where they were. Of course in planning for a war you'd want to know
where ALL of their air defense radars are located. So on TEREC missions,
they had the TEREC RF-4C flying at low altitude near the border to escape
detection by the Soviets. In the meantime, another RF-4C flying over the
middle part of West Germany would suddenly turn toward the border and
accelerate as though they were going to blast across the border, turning
back away from the border at the last second. Of course the Soviet defenses
would immediately be put on alert, not knowing what this crazy American
fighter was going to do, and all their radars would light up. In the
meantime, the TEREC jet would pop up and cruise aong the border, recording
and locating all of the emitters.

For the question of the ANG operating the Air Defense units in the CONUS, I
found a fascinating history of that on the Air National Guard's website. I
was especially interested to see what Colin Powell as the Chairman of Joint
Chief of Staff thought about alert aircraft in CONUS. Here is the pertinent
section, from

http://www.ang.af.mil/history/Heritage/AfterTheStorm.asp

Maintaining the air defense and air sovereignty of the CONUS were federal
missions accomplished by 1st Air Force, a numbered air force (NAF) assigned
to the ACC. In 1994, the Air Guard had begun taking over 1st Air Force which
provided the command and control mechanisms for providing the air defense
and air sovereignty of the continental United States. The original
conversations proposing that transition had taken place between Maj. Gen.
Killey, then ANG Director, and Gen. Robert D. Russ, then Tactical Air
Command Commander, during 1990-1991. General Russ, a strong supporter of the
Air Guard, had originated the dialogue. He had noted that all the fighter
interceptor squadrons defending the CONUS by that time were ANG units.
Defense of the homeland had seemed a natural fit for the Guard. The Air
Force had wanted to transfer responsibility for resourcing that mission to
the ANG primarily for two reasons. First, it had needed to reduce its own
end strength because of post Cold War downsizing. Second, it had thought
that the ANG was in a better position to politically defend that mission
which had been coming under increasing attack as expensive and unnecessary.
For their part, Air Guard senior leaders wanted to maintain as much of its
fighter interceptor force structure as possible. Moreover, they needed to
find new missions for much of its combat communications and tactical air
control units which faced dramatic drawdowns in the early 1990s. The BRAC
report of March 1993 gave the transfer proposal additional impetus. It
directed the Air Force to either move the Northeast Air Defense Sector
(NEADS) from Griffiss AFB, New York or give it to the ANG. Since ACC did not
want to move it and was unable to consolidate it with another sector,
transfer to the ANG appeared to be a logical choice. Following discussions
between General Killey and senior Air Force leadership, agreement was
reached to transfer the entire responsibility for 1st Air Force to the ANG.
In September 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin approved the transfer.
On 28 January 1994, General Killey, who had just stepped down as Air Guard
Director, assumed command of 1st Air Force as directed by General Merrill A.
McPeak Air Force Chief of Staff. With that action, the main impetus for
completing the transition to Air Guard control shifted to Tyndall AFB,
Florida from the NGB, the Air Staff, NORAD, and Headquarters, ACC. However,
the transfer was also intended to place the Chief of the NGB and the ANG
Director in partnership with the Commander, 1st Air Force to assist the
transition. Throughout the conversion process, all affected units had to
maintain combat ready status.
On 1 December 1994, Headquarters NEADS was redesignated Headquarters
Northeast Air Defense Sector (ANG). During FY 1995, Air Force leadership
directed the acceleration of the transfer process and won approval from the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to hire an
additional 182 AGR personnel to help accomplish that. In October 1995, the
Southeast Air Defense Squadron and the Western Air Defense Squadron were
constituted and allotted to the NGB.
Command relationships for 1st Air Force were relatively complicated by
traditional Air Guard standards. The NAF came under ACC. As the force
provider to NORAD, ACC was responsible for providing organized, trained, and
equipped units that maintained the air defense and air sovereignty for the
Continental United States NORAD Region (CONAR). The NGB was responsible for
ensuring that 1st Air Force was properly resourced, particularly its
operations and maintenance as well as its military personnel budgets. ACC
remained responsible for major systems acquisition including modernization
of the NAF's sector and regional operations centers. NORAD continued as the
war-fighting command that 1st Air Force was responsible to in the execution
of its operational missions.
All of this was further complicated by the fact that most 1st Air Force
personnel were Guardsmen who remained in state status (Title 32, U.S. Code)
while organizing, training, and equipping for their federal missions. They
automatically converted to federal status (Title 10, U.S. Code) when
actually conducting federal missions such as doing intercepts of
unidentified aircraft entering U.S. air space because air defense and air
sovereignty remained federal, not National Guard, missions. Likewise,
certain officers including the ROC/SOC commanders always remained in Title
10 status to insure an unbroken federal chain of command.
The size and composition of 1st Air Force's flying unit force structure
continued to be a major issue during the transition. Over recent decades,
the air defense interceptor force defending North America had been
dramatically reduced from a high of 2,600 dedicated aircraft (including the
Royal Canadian Air Force) in 1958. It had shrunk to 20 ANG fighters at 10
alert locations for CONAR by February 1996. However, 1st Air Force continued
to face strong budgetary pressures to either eliminate or dramatically
reduce dedicated ANG fighter interceptor units for the air defense and air
sovereignty.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense rejected efforts to include language
in the FY 1996 and FY 1997 Defense Program Guidance to include air
sovereignty and air defense as a stated mission and to program resources for
them. In 1996, the General Accounting Office (GAO) criticized the Air Guard
for continuing to maintain 150 fighters in 10 dedicated air defense units to
defend the United States against invading enemy bombers at a cost of nearly
$500 million annually nearly a half-decade after the Soviet Union's demise.
The GAO urged that the 10 ANG units be either disbanded or given other
missions. That criticism was well established in Washington, D.C. Gen. Colin
Powell, while JCS Chairman, had advocated an end to dedicated continental
air defense force in 1993 as had the GAO a year later. Both had suggested
that general-purpose fighter forces of the Air Force, Navy and Marines --
active duty and reserve components -- could accomplish the mission.
By the end of FY 1997, the ANG had assumed total responsibility for all of
1st Air Force including its three Regional Operational Control Centers and
its Sector Operations Control Center as well as its NAF headquarters. The
transition to the Air Guard was officially complete. Air Guardsmen had
accomplished that unprecedented transition while retaining high readiness
levels throughout the process. It represented a major change in the Air
Guard's historic role, executing the command and control function for a
full-time Air Force mission. But, 1st Air Force faced a difficult balancing
act and an uncertain future. Continuing pressures to balance the federal
budget and the absence of an international peer competitor suggested that
the very survival of 1st Air Force, especially its dedicated
fighter-interceptor force, would remain an issue. General Killey turned over
responsibility for dealing with such questions when he relinquished command
of 1st Air Force to Brig Gen Larry K. Arnold upon his retirement from active
duty at Tyndall AFB, Florida effective 18 December 1997.

> > 3. Did word of the Soviet incursions into German air space ever leak
> > out at the time? *I don't remember reading anything about this, back
> > then -- and you'd think it would have been big news.
>
> Sigh, there were Soviet incursions into just about every part of
> European airspace, Asian airspace, and American airspace.
>
> They would turn around as soon as someone came out to greet them.
>
> It was all a game and both sides played.
>
> There were occasional pictures of Bear crews waving to the US fighters
> published in the military oriented aviation mags; it was no secret.

Sure, those intercepts were all over the periodicals at the time --
but they were usually up near Alaska, or off the coast near Cuba.
Never, to my recollection, did we hear about any along the highly
sensitive, highly defended East/West German border -- as the OP
discusses.

That would have been awfully big news, methinks.
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

Jay Honeck > wrote:
> > > 3. Did word of the Soviet incursions into German air space ever leak
> > > out at the time? ?I don't remember reading anything about this, back
> > > then -- and you'd think it would have been big news.
> >
> > Sigh, there were Soviet incursions into just about every part of
> > European airspace, Asian airspace, and American airspace.
> >
> > They would turn around as soon as someone came out to greet them.
> >
> > It was all a game and both sides played.
> >
> > There were occasional pictures of Bear crews waving to the US fighters
> > published in the military oriented aviation mags; it was no secret.

> Sure, those intercepts were all over the periodicals at the time --
> but they were usually up near Alaska, or off the coast near Cuba.
> Never, to my recollection, did we hear about any along the highly
> sensitive, highly defended East/West German border -- as the OP
> discusses.

What makes you think there is anything special about Germany?

Soviet Bloc aircraft routinely played the game with most of Western
Europe as well as Asia.

I tracked North Korean Migs playing the game on a regular basis while
in Korea.

Conversations with others who had been stationed in other places left
no doubt that it was the status quo around the world.

Soviet Bloc aircraft have been known to shadow airliners inbound to the
east coast out of the Atlantic to see how far they could get.

> That would have been awfully big news, methinks.

All this was hardly a secret but neither was it big news.

You probably never heard about the time I directed the ROK Navy to
a North Korean patrol boat in South Korean waters, which the ROK
Navy promptly sunk either. Not a secret but who in the world would
care about the incident?

--
Jim Pennino

Remove .spam.sux to reply.

schrieb:

> What makes you think there is anything special about Germany?

true.

> Soviet Bloc aircraft routinely played the game with most of Western
> Europe as well as Asia.

that leaves the question open: did the other side (NATO, USA) play the
same game, too?

#m
--
I am not a terrorist <http://www.casualdisobedience.com/>

Martin Hotze > wrote in news:fli28s$t4a$1
@kirk.hotze.com:

> schrieb:
>
>> What makes you think there is anything special about Germany?
>
> true.
>
>> Soviet Bloc aircraft routinely played the game with most of Western
>> Europe as well as Asia.
>
> that leaves the question open: did the other side (NATO, USA) play the
> same game, too?
>
> #m

From the beginning and even more so. Obviously the U2 flights, but as far
back as about 47 they were probing russias defences. They lost a lot of
airplanes, too.


Bertie

Jay Honeck > wrote in news:705723df-b4f1-45d7-ac21-
:

>> > 3. Did word of the Soviet incursions into German air space ever leak
>> > out at the time? *I don't remember reading anything about this, back
>> > then -- and you'd think it would have been big news.
>>
>> Sigh, there were Soviet incursions into just about every part of
>> European airspace, Asian airspace, and American airspace.
>>
>> They would turn around as soon as someone came out to greet them.
>>
>> It was all a game and both sides played.
>>
>> There were occasional pictures of Bear crews waving to the US fighters
>> published in the military oriented aviation mags; it was no secret.
>
> Sure, those intercepts were all over the periodicals at the time --
> but they were usually up near Alaska, or off the coast near Cuba.
> Never, to my recollection, did we hear about any along the highly
> sensitive, highly defended East/West German border -- as the OP
> discusses.
>
> That would have been awfully big news, methinks.
> --

Well, judging from your obvious lack of education on just about everythng,
you might have missed it since you obviously don't read anyhting more
educational than the back of your rice crispies box in the morning.


Bertie

> >> Soviet Bloc aircraft routinely played the game with most of Western
> >> Europe as well as Asia.
>
> > that leaves the question open: did the other side (NATO, USA) play the
> > same game, too?
>
> U2, Cuban Missile Crisis

<Big snip of scary stuff>

And my kids wonder why we were taught to prepare for nuclear war when
I was growing up.
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

Jay Honeck > wrote in news:95cf5955-5515-40c2-b450-
:

>> >> Soviet Bloc aircraft routinely played the game with most of Western
>> >> Europe as well as Asia.
>>
>> > that leaves the question open: did the other side (NATO, USA) play the
>> > same game, too?
>>
>> U2, Cuban Missile Crisis
>
> <Big snip of scary stuff>
>
> And my kids wonder why we were taught to prepare for nuclear war when
> I was growing up.


Because yor fjukkwit friends built loads of them and pointed ( and used)
them on other people. .


Bertie

Martin Hotze > wrote:
> schrieb:

> > What makes you think there is anything special about Germany?

> true.

> > Soviet Bloc aircraft routinely played the game with most of Western
> > Europe as well as Asia.

> that leaves the question open: did the other side (NATO, USA) play the
> same game, too?

Yes, but a bit more judiciously as the Soviet Bloc had a tendency to
shoot when they thought they could.

I don't recall any incident where the West shot down a Soviet Bloc
aircraft even when "legally" allowed.

I do recall many incidents where the Soviet Bloc shot down Western
aircraft, some of dubious "legality" such as the EC-121 shot down
over the Sea of Japan in the late 60's.

And the game was also played by boats in some places.

--
Jim Pennino

Remove .spam.sux to reply.

On Jan 1, 2:58*pm, Matt Whiting > wrote:
> wrote:
> > On *1-Jan-2008, Matt Whiting > wrote:
>
> >> Your post covered a lot of ground, but your point above is very
> >> important and not understood by Jay and others lacking knowledge of
> >> military tactics and capability. *It is very important to not be tricked
> >> into showing what your true capabilities are and letting your enemies
> >> think you have much less capability than you have is a very smart
> >> tactic. *The one exception was during the cold war when the MAD strategy
> >> required showing a fair bit of your capability to your enemy.
>
> >> Launching more aircraft than required for the threat at hand serves no
> >> purpose other than to convey a lot of information about your capability..
> >> * I still believe based on what I know from both public and private
> >> sources, the the main lag on 9/11 was a complete lack of any expectation
> >> about an attack of this sort and the fact that the military really
> >> wasn't prepared for it from a decision-making perspective more so than a
> >> fundamental capability basis.
>
> > I agree with you Matt, except for one point. I am completely sure that the
> > Soviets knew exactly how many jets were up on alert status at each of the
> > NATO bases, and could probably even give you the tail numbers of the jets on
> > alert on any given day. Our OPSEC (Operations Security) left a lot to be
> > desired. Any time a ZULU jet had a problem, Job Control radioed the fact
> > along with the tail number of the afflicted jet to us in our AMU so we could
> > dispatch someone over to fix it. And when the jet was repaired, the fact was
> > radioed to Job Control as well. When a scheduled tradeout of tail numbers
> > was to be done, that info was also talked about openly on our radio net. The
> > only thing I can figure is that USAFE and NATO were quite convinced the
> > Warsaw Pact would never actually attack us, contrary to the public posturing
> > put forth about the "imminent Soviet Threat." * I wonder if the whole
> > propaganda effort was just in order to keep their funding up, and continues
> > to this day supported by the paranoids in our government. I do know I came
> > away from that experience and several other experiences during my 10 years
> > Active Duty thinking that what we refer to as "Hawks" in our government
> > really don't know what they are talking about. To me they are just paranoid
> > beyond all reason. *Remember the "Domino Theory" and how it was so important
> > to stop the Communists in Vietnam to prevent the global spread of Communism?
> > *Well, the Communists won in Vietnam, and the dominos didn't fall. And all
> > the bluster about Saddam and Iraq from the Bush Administration leading up to
> > the invasion was simply ridiculous, and it's a shame that so many of our
> > people were paranoid enough to have bought into it. I believe it's our duty
> > to be skeptical of our government's claims of threats, they've proven
> > themselves not trustworthy in my view.
> > Scott Wilson
>
> Yes, certainly poor operational practice and meddling politics can muck
> up the best of systems.
>
> Matt- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

1.NORAD was staging exercises on 9/11. When informed of the Boston
hijackings a USAF officer replied on the radio "Cool".

2. Egypt Air 990 was piloted by an unauthorized
person...bucket..Nantucket.. in 1999. 9/11 wasn't the first case of
"unauthorized" pilots.

> And the game was also played by boats in some places.

like in this story, involing a rather big boat (and even a marginal mention
of aircraft, hence on topic :-)):

enjoy,
Friedrich

********************************************
SEA STORY - A true one experienced by Frenchy Corbeille USN(Ret)

It was Sunday afternoon, early in the month of August, 1968 when USS
Forrestal (CVA-59) was making her way through the Western
Mediterranean during the first days of a 7-month cruise. I was Officer
of the Deck (OOD) on the 1200 - 1600 bridge watch, there were no
ship's evolutions ongoing, and things looked like a ho-hum Sunday
afternoon at sea.

We were hosting the Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) of USS
Independence and our CO had gone with him to the Captain's In-Port
Cabin. Prior to departing the bridge, the CO and I had conversed
briefly and one of the subjects breeched was that we had been in the
Mediterranean for more than a week now and we had not yet seen one of
those pesky Russian trawlers. Our Navy had come to hope not to see one
because they had a way of getting in the way whenever we had things to
do, such as flight operations, or underway replenishment. This lack of
encounter was about to change.

At about 1500 I called the CO to advise him that we had picked up an
unidentified surface contact on radar, range 22,000 yards (11 nautical
miles). It appeared to be on our reciprocal course at a speed of 8
knots and in the absence of any changes, the closest point of approach
(CPA) would be 6,000 yards on our port beam.

"Very Well" and the customary "Thanks, Frenchy" constituted the CO's
response.

I had no more than hung up the phone when the contact changed course.
I could identify 2 sticks (masts) over the horizon, looking through
the 7X50 OOD standard equipment Bausch & Lomb's, but could make out
nothing of the vessel. However, the two sticks bore a strong
resemblance to the pictures we had on the bridge of known trawlers
that had frequented these waters.

I called the Captain back to advise him that the unidentified contact
had indeed made a 90-degree course change, was still doing 8 knots,
and his present course/speed would take him across our bow at 6,000
yards (3 miles). We were doing 20 knots, on some kind of a sustained
speed exercise for the engineers, and preferred to alter neither
course nor speed unless absolutely necessary. I advised the Captain
of my suspicions concerning the vessel's identity and advised him that
I had ordered the Intelligence Sighting Team to the bridge.

It being a Sunday stand down with little to occupy the idle time, we
soon had the entire Intelligence staff scattered about on the bridge
and the signal bridge, with a few photo types thrown in. The contact
was still hull-down over the horizon but the visible masts more and
more took on the resemblance of our Russian trawler pictures. I also
advised the Captain that, in accordance with the International Rules
of the Road, Forrestal was the privileged vessel; the vessel crossing
our bow was coming from our port side and was therefore the burdened
vessel. In accordance with the Rules, the privileged vessel is
REQUIRED to maintain course and speed. The burdened vessel is
responsible for maneuvering as necessary to avoid collision.

The Captain said "Very Well, call me back if he does anything funny,
and let me know what the intelligence folks come up with."

Only moments later I was back on the phone, advising the Captain that
we had positive ID on a Russian ELINT (Electronics Intelligence)
trawler, and he had indeed done something funny. He had reached our
intended track at a range of 6,000 yards, and had then executed
another 90-degree turn to port; he was now on the same course as
Forrestal, dead ahead, at speed 8 knots. So we had a 12-kt speed
advantage, and 3 miles to contact. That meant that in 15 minutes one
or the other of us must turn or he, the Russian trawler, would get run
over.

I advised the Captain that in accordance with the International Rules,
he was burdened when he came in from our port bow. Now that we are on
a course to overtake him, he would like us to believe that Forrestal,
as the overtaking vessel, is the newly ordained BURDENED vessel. I
reminded the Captain of another clause in the rules that says once a
vessel is burdened, it may not maneuver to shift the burden to the
other vessel. He stays burdened until danger of collision is past.

The Captain agreed with my assessment and asked what I recommended we
do. I recommended we hold course and speed until In Extremis that
sketchy point at which somebody has to do something or there's going
to be a crunch, then order up All Back Emergency Full, Right Full
Rudder, and we would miss him. I had identified that point as 400
yards astern but threw in 100 yards for cushion.

The Captain once more came back with his cheerful "Very Well" and
added, "If he's still there at 1,000 yards, give me a call back"

"AYE AYE, Sir!"

Now we've eaten up about 1/3 of our cushion and the squawk box came to
life.

"Bridge, Flag Bridge . When does Forrestal intend to maneuver to avoid
that privileged vessel ahead?"

There was no race by other members of the bridge team to answer that
one, so I got it myself.

"Flag Bridge, Bridge -This is the Officer of the Deck speaking. That
vessel ahead is not privileged he approached from our port side,
therefore is the burdened vessel, and he can no longer maneuver to
shift his burden to Forrestal.

" Flag Bridge Aye!"

I could envision some hot shot flag watch officer digging the
Admiral's shoe out of his ass, and smiled inwardly. I didn't hear the
Admiral's voice, but I knew he was watching from his favorite perch.

Somewhere about then I had the Signal Gang close up flag "Uniform" on
both halyards U is the international signal that says"You are standing
into danger."

Then our Navigator got into it. First he told me I was going to have
to turn the ship and he was working on our new course. Since he was a
commander and I was a lieutenant, I explained as tactfully as I could
that we were not going to turn, leastways not to a pre-planned course.
We were the privileged vessel, and as such, were REQUIRED to hold
course and speed.

Next thing I heard from him was, Mr. Corbeille, I'm ordering you to
turn this ship.

With no attempt at tact, I advised him, Commander, you cannot order me
to turn this ship. If you believe the ship to be sufficiently
endangered, you, as Navigator, can summarily relieve me as OOD. Then
you can turn left, turn right, or come dead in the water. But you
cannot order me to turn. Do you want to relieve me?

Rather truculently, he then asked if the Captain knew about all this.
I told him yes indeed, and at contact range of 1,000 yards, I was to
notify the Captain again.

You better call him again right now!

No Sir, we still have a few hundred yards to go.

At this stage, I don't recall the exact time, the bridge relief crew
was coming on deck, but no one was ready to be relieved. I spied my
relief OOD waiting in the wings and he wanted nothing more than to
stay out of the way.

Admittedly, I got a bit nervous, and I called the Captain back when
the trawler was 1,100 yards ahead. His only response was, I'm on my
way up. He arrived momentarily with the PCO of Independence following
in his wake. He hopped up in his chair and said, Boy, he is pretty
close, isn't he? Then he asked, And when do you plan to make your
big move? I told him that if it closes to 500 yards, we can order up
All Back Emergency Full, Right Full Rudder, and we will miss him.

He asked: "Is that what the book says?"

I told him, "No Sir, The book says 400 yards, but I was leaving in a
little cushion."

He said, "We need only to maneuver in extremis to MINIMIZE DAMAGE."

That is a slight departure from international rules, but was our
standing order, arrived at specifically to contend with harassment
vessels. This is kind of a delicate point here because International
Rules of the Road says the privileged vessel must maneuver when in
extremis to avoid collision. The USSR ( Soviet Union ) was not
signatory to the International Rules of the Road, therefore her
vessels were not bound by them. It must be pointed out that Russian
ships, merchantmen and men-of-war alike, followed the international
rules of the road anyway, and knew them well enough to play chicken
with U.S. ships, mostly to our embarrassment. That was a game that our
Navy had long since tired of, hence the new guidance to maneuver only
in extremis to minimize damage.

Naturally, it behooved one to be absolutely certain that he was
absolutely right, if he were going to take a Navy man-of-war down to
the wire in a potential collision situation. I'm sure there are
readers who have more background concerning our maneuvering
instructions, but we believed we understood them perfectly. I still
believe that we did.

Having thus indicated his intentions, the Captain then asked, So how
close can we take her? I told him 400 yards would provide a grazing
situation, and then ordered the engine room to stand by for Emergency
Backing Bells.

We were still closing and had reached the 500-yard mark when the
trawler put in left full rudder. His rudder was not the size of a barn
door it had to have looked like the side of the barn itself! That guy
turned 90 degrees left in a heartbeat! We never flinched, never
wavered, and the trawler passed close aboard to port so close, if
fact, that the hull was not visible alongside our flight deck. All
that was visible from the vantage point of our bridge were the two
masts as they went rapidly down our port beam. Then we launched a
helo for some photo work and a big sigh of relief went up from the
bridge.

The Navigator started lobbying for us to file a harassment report, but
since we had altered neither course nor speed to accommodate the
trawler, it was hard to make a case for harassment. I wanted to make
out a harassment report on the Navigator but the CO calmed me down on
that score. The Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) of Independence ,
bless his soul, took in the whole affair after arriving on the bridge
with our Captain, and never interjected one word. When it was all
over, he moved directly in front of me and said, loud enough for
almost everybody on the bridge to hear,No one could have done better.
Our CO joined right in and said Frenchy, you handled that perfectly.

At that point I realized I wasn't going to be a lieutenant forever, my
advice to the Captain had been sound, and I knew our Captain
appreciated it. My breathing gradually returned to normal.

For his part, Captain Hill, for that, as I recall, was his name, went
on to become CO USS Independence. He assumed command while anchored
in some Sicilian Bay , and when Independence stood out to sea under
new management, there was a Russian ELINT trawler, just outside
territorial waters, making slight way on Independence 's intended
track. A friend serving on that fine vessel told me that the new CO's
order to CIC was Combat, give me a collision course on that trawler at
30 knots! I heard the same refrain from several other people and I
believe it to be what happened.

For our part, we spent the remainder of our cruise unhampered in any
way by any Russian flagged ship. We continued to see an occasional
trawler, but when we came into the wind to launch and recover
aircraft, they vanished as if by magic. The word seemed to have leaked
out that this carrier has an attitude problem he'll run right over
you! And the Chief Engineer was happy because he got his
uninterrupted 4-hour sustained speed run at 20 knots.

Life was not the same for me after that. Our Captain made me Command
Duty Officer Underway. I was already the General Quarters OOD and Sea
and Anchor Detail OOD, so I wasn't sure what this new designation
would lead to. I soon learned that I was to be on the bridge whenever
Forrestal was in formation with other major combatants, (destroyers
didn't count, but cruisers did), and that I was to provide training to
all prospective Command Duty Officers. Anytime there was underway
replenishment, there was a formation, so I got to spend a lot of
valuable time on the bridge, learning all I could absorb. Our great
Captain, nameless up to now, was Robert Bemus Baldwin, born in
Bismarck , North Dakota . He was promoted to RADM upon leaving
Forrestal, and the last time I spoke with him he was Vice Admiral
Baldwin, COMNAVAIRPAC. I believe he lives in or near San Diego , and
remains the most admired man of my 30-plus year Navy career.

CAPT R. CLAUDE CORBEILLE, USN (RET) Castle Rock, WA

"Friedrich Ostertag" > wrote

Snipped a great
********************************************
> SEA STORY - A true one experienced by Frenchy Corbeille USN(Ret)
*********************************************
Thanks for taking the time to put that in print.

Although it is off topic, it deserves a place in any forum, IMHO.
--
Jim in NC