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SKSvilich
August 9th 03, 01:58 AM
All...I was wondering: have there been any guns-only air to air kills by US
aircraft since SE Asia?
As an aside, what are the thoughts of those who have been in combat? Are guns
on board nostalga, or, are they a practical weapon?

Thanks in advance.

Stefan
Humble Cessna Driver

JDupre5762
August 9th 03, 02:38 AM
>All...I was wondering: have there been any guns-only air to air kills by US
>aircraft since SE Asia?
>As an aside, what are the thoughts of those who have been in combat? Are
>guns
>on board nostalga, or, are they a practical weapon?

Duke Cunningham will tell you that if his Navy F-4 had a gun he might have got
three more kills in his famous day of fighting when he made ace. While not air
combat there were guns only strafing runs made in Afghanistan during a fight
over a downed helicopter.

While air to air and air to ground missiles are now far more reliable than
during Vietnam and far more capable than during Desert Storm I think history
shows us that whenever we think that some weapon is obsolete along comes a
conflict where that weapon is needed. Often the weapon is not used in its
original form but a good use is found for it.

In regards to combat aircraft guns there might come a time when the combat
arena is so circumscribed that beyond visual range weapons will not be
practical due to the chance of "collateral damage". Then only visual range
weapons could be used and the gun takes on a new importance. Imagine if in the
Balkans one of our opponents (I can't remember whose side we weren't on!) had
put up a decent aerial opposition, would we really have been launching a lot of
long range weapons in one of the most heavily air traveled areas of the world?

As in Afghanistan in a future conflict at the extreme of range for some
aircraft might make it necessary to use every weapon they brought along right
down to the guns when all other ordnance was expended. Not because they could
not loiter in terms of fuel but because it would take too long to return to
base and reload.

The gun will never again be a primary or even secondary weapon but as a
tertiary one it will have its uses and you can never be sure when that will be.

John Dupre'

Tex Houston
August 9th 03, 04:13 AM
"SKSvilich" > wrote in message
...
> All...I was wondering: have there been any guns-only air to air kills by
US
> aircraft since SE Asia?
> As an aside, what are the thoughts of those who have been in combat? Are
guns
> on board nostalga, or, are they a practical weapon?
>
> Thanks in advance.
>
> Stefan
> Humble Cessna Driver

A-10 vs helicopter. Desert Storm.

Tex

Tex Houston
August 9th 03, 05:57 AM
"Tex Houston" > wrote in message news:...
>
> "SKSvilich" > wrote in message
> ...
> > All...I was wondering: have there been any guns-only air to air kills by
> US
> > aircraft since SE Asia?
> > As an aside, what are the thoughts of those who have been in combat?
Are
> guns
> > on board nostalga, or, are they a practical weapon?
> >
> > Thanks in advance.
> >
> > Stefan
> > Humble Cessna Driver
>
> A-10 vs helicopter. Desert Storm.
>
> Tex


The more I think about this the more I think it may be wrong. I now think
they may have used bombs.

Sorry,

Tex

Guy Alcala
August 9th 03, 08:55 AM
Tex Houston wrote:

> "Tex Houston" > wrote in message news:...
> >
> > "SKSvilich" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > All...I was wondering: have there been any guns-only air to air kills by
> > US
> > > aircraft since SE Asia?
> > > As an aside, what are the thoughts of those who have been in combat?
> Are
> > guns
> > > on board nostalga, or, are they a practical weapon?
> > >
> > > Thanks in advance.
> > >
> > > Stefan
> > > Humble Cessna Driver
> >
> > A-10 vs helicopter. Desert Storm.
> >
> > Tex
>
> The more I think about this the more I think it may be wrong. I now think
> they may have used bombs.

No, you're correct the first time. There were two helo kills by A-10s using the
GAU-8. The LGB kill was by an F-15E.

Guy

Pechs1
August 9th 03, 02:12 PM
But to answer the question-<< As an aside, what are the thoughts of those who
have been in combat?
> Are
> > guns
> > > on board nostalga, or, are they a practical weapon? >><BR><BR>

Not been in combat but the onboard gun is a reliable and cheap weapon that is
essential if you find yourself close to your adversary or if you are armed A-A
only weapons-wise and you need to do some damage on the ground.
P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

Pechs1
August 9th 03, 02:15 PM
JDupres-<< In regards to combat aircraft guns there might come a time when the
combat
arena is so circumscribed that beyond visual range weapons will not be
practical due to the chance of "collateral damage" >><BR><BR>

Just like nuclear weapons making the world safe for conventional warfare, long
range missiles and the need to VID, makes the gun essential.


P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

Pechs1
August 9th 03, 02:21 PM
Lawrence-<< Some radars carried aboard fighters have the capability of ID-ing
an
enemy a/c simply from its radar-return. Hence it is considered safe to fire
from beyond visual range, which allows the avoidance of close-in
WWI-WWII-Korea dogfighting. >><BR><BR>

Sometimes...many friendly and foe A/C use the same engine, the basis of some
long range ID and it is not unusual for the good guys and bad guys to fly the
same A/C..Particularly after the fall of the Soviet Union...Flankers and
Fulcrums come to mind.

<< Nonetheless, most pilots desire to have some sort of reserve punch, just to
cover the odd case where missiles haven't done the job or have been
expended, and an opportunity to disengage successfully coud hinge on being
able to shoot your way out. >><BR><BR>

There hasn't been any actual swirling air battles for a while but if there is
another one, I don't think it will be an odd case at all..if the many v many
engagements I have seen in training is any indication...

Wandering around in a A-4, I was surprised how many really big fighters found
me in their rear view mirrors..
P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

Ed Rasimus
August 9th 03, 04:34 PM
While I agree in principle with what is stated here, I have to point
out some errors.

"Lawrence Dillard" > wrote:
>>
>Viet Nam warfare proved to be a learning experience for the US aviation
>community, which had come to believe, by the 1960's, that guided missiles
>were all that would prove to be needed to prosecute aerial warfare.

Let's note that there was really only one tactical jet procurred by
the "US aviation community" which was missile only. The F-4. In the
mid-60's when the Vietnam War expanded, the USAF was operating the
F-100, F-105, F-104. The USN was flying the A-4, F-8. All gun
equipped. Later (besides the F-4 B/C/D/J) there were the F-5, A-37,
A-1, A-7---all gun equipped.
>
>Alarming, if not distressing reports were received fairly early on that a
>number of US a/c downed over N Viet Nam had been shot down in error by US
>missiles fired from beyond range of positive visual identification by other
>US a/c.

ROE in MiG country until 1972--eight years into combat--always
required VID, except for a small number of Combat Tree,
close-controlled F-4s out of Udorn in '72. I can recall no
"distressing reports" of losses due to A/A fratricide. Simply didn't
happen.
>
>That led to a belatedly-responded-to request, in which a redesign of the F-4
>(which took over from the F-105) to include a useable integral cannon (F4E)
>was accomplished.

While the F-4 was certainly deployed in-theater in '66, it didn't
"take over" for the F-105 which continued to carry most of the iron
into NVN until 1968 when it was finally attrited to the point of no
longer being combat effective.

> The US aviation community learned that it had to be
>especially careful in reaching the decision to fire a missile at another
>a/c, if only because under the stress of "g"-forces, hurried identifications
>of fleetingly-sighted targets, occasional failures of IFF squawks, and the
>workload imposed on the friendly pilot team, enemy a/c were not so easy to
>distinguish from friendlies as it appeared to be in training.

If "under the stress of "g" forces" it would certainly mean visual
conditions and tail aspect in '66, '67. Certainly not a player for
AIM-7 shots and with the AIM-9B of the period, the firing limit was
max of 2.5 G.

IFF squawk was irrelevant to missile firing or fighter-to-fighter ID.
We didn't have that kind of equipment until a limited number of Combat
Tree birds showed up in '72.
>
>The solution was to close to ranges, before firing, at which a sound visual
>ID could be obtained. That measure not only tended to reduce friendly-fire
>losses, but also meant that rather often a US a/c would get so close to an
>enemy that the minimum firing distance for the missiles carried might be
>reached before the positive ID could be made. Under such circumstances, it
>made sense to have an onboard cannon so as to deal with the situation.

It wasn't just tactically sound, it was ROE required. I agree
completely.
>
>Missiles nowadays are far superior in reliability, and have much-improved
>ranges. Some radars carried aboard fighters have the capability of ID-ing an
>enemy a/c simply from its radar-return. Hence it is considered safe to fire
>from beyond visual range, which allows the avoidance of close-in
>WWI-WWII-Korea dogfighting. And that's good because it is hard enough to
>maintain situational awareness even at a distance from an opponent with the
>aid of positive control via AWACS, much less than in a complicated encounter
>at close range.
>
>Nonetheless, most pilots desire to have some sort of reserve punch, just to
>cover the odd case where missiles haven't done the job or have been
>expended, and an opportunity to disengage successfully coud hinge on being
>able to shoot your way out.

More important than what you've said regard reserve punch is the
tactical practice of having a gun to threaten your opponent into
predictable action. Firing sequence wisely should be--BVR radar
missile, BVR/WVR all-aspect IR missile, then high angle gun shot as
you blow through the merge. Turn-n-burn should be avoided at all
costs.

If in a X-v-X engagement, your wingman maneuvers to insure the gun
threat on your adversary to allow for safe separation--i.e. keep him
turning as you break away to separate.

If we've got a man in the seat, we need a gun in the nose.


>
>

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Red
August 9th 03, 11:04 PM
I have to add one thing to this discussion.

The R.O.E. will always require visual I.D. Why? Because somewhere there is
always someone with stars on his colar, (or who wants stars on his colar)
that is deathly afraid that someone will screw-up.

Ed Rasimus
August 9th 03, 11:15 PM
"Red" > wrote:

>I have to add one thing to this discussion.
>
>The R.O.E. will always require visual I.D. Why? Because somewhere there is
>always someone with stars on his colar, (or who wants stars on his colar)
>that is deathly afraid that someone will screw-up.
>
That once was arguably true, but with technology that makes ID
virtually certain (if we ain't there yet, we're darn close), the
guy/gal with stars on their collar who wants more of them will choose
beating the enemy to covering his/her posterior.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Tom Cooper
August 10th 03, 12:33 AM
"José Herculano" > wrote in message >...
> > All...I was wondering: have there been any guns-only air to air kills by
> US
> > aircraft since SE Asia?
> > As an aside, what are the thoughts of those who have been in combat? Are
> guns
> > on board nostalga, or, are they a practical weapon?
>
> 2 kills by A-10 over helos on DS only... but:
>
> a) The Israelis have got air-to-air gun kills with both F-16 and F-15;

Add to this several gun-kills scored by (US-built) F-4s, F-5s, and
F-14s in Iranian service, during the war with Iraq, in the 1980s.

As a matter of fact, the first kill ever scored by an F-14 was against
an Iraqi Mi-25 (export version of the Mi-24 "Hind"), shot down on 7
September 1980, by 20mm gunfire.

Iranian F-4s also scored their last known kill of that war (and thus
for all the Phantoms ever) with the gun: an Iraqi Su-22M-3K, in May
1988.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq; War in the Air, 1980-1988
http://www.schifferbooks.com/military/aviationjetage/0764316699.html

Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/title_detail.php/title=S6585

John Halliwell
August 10th 03, 03:32 AM
In article >, Red
> writes
>The R.O.E. will always require visual I.D. Why? Because somewhere there is
>always someone with stars on his colar, (or who wants stars on his colar)
>that is deathly afraid that someone will screw-up.

That's because going off recent events, someone will screw up,
particularly annoying when there's no enemy air activity anyway.

--
John

John Halliwell
August 10th 03, 03:45 AM
In article >, SKSvilich
> writes
>All...I was wondering: have there been any guns-only air to air kills by US
>aircraft since SE Asia?
>As an aside, what are the thoughts of those who have been in combat? Are guns
>on board nostalga, or, are they a practical weapon?

Sea Harriers over the Falklands made kills with their guns:

1x Pucara
2x A-4
1x A.109
1x C130 (hit by AIM 9L, finished off with the gun)

In addition one Puma was destroyed by the wake of a Sea Harrier.

It makes sense to stick at least one gun on to me.

--
John

Dudhorse
August 10th 03, 04:29 AM
"SKSvilich" > wrote in message
...
> All...I was wondering: have there been any guns-only air to air kills by
US
> aircraft since SE Asia?
> As an aside, what are the thoughts of those who have been in combat? Are
guns
> on board nostalga, or, are they a practical weapon?
>
> Thanks in advance.
>
> Stefan
> Humble Cessna Driver

.... maybe Israeli fighter jock(s) have scored with a gun but they are
tightlipped about their air ops.

Doug \Woody\ and Erin Beal
August 10th 03, 04:58 AM
On 8/9/03 9:32 PM, in article , "John
Halliwell" > wrote:

> In article >, Red
> > writes
>> The R.O.E. will always require visual I.D. Why? Because somewhere there is
>> always someone with stars on his colar, (or who wants stars on his colar)
>> that is deathly afraid that someone will screw-up.
>

Not true (in training and in the fleet).

> That's because going off recent events, someone will screw up,
> particularly annoying when there's no enemy air activity anyway.

But perhaps it should be. Consider the OIF Patriot battery operators.
Funny how we hear/see all this press about our dudes dropping bombs on
Canadians in Afghanistan, but don't hear about the Patriot operators (or
folks that gave them the OK to shoot) that shot a Tornado and a Hornet.

--Woody

Walt BJ
August 10th 03, 05:02 AM
(Pechs1) wrote in message >...
> But to answer the question-<< As an aside, what are the thoughts of those who
> have been in combat?
Snip:

I've been there and until someone comes up with a genuine Buck Rogers
disintegrator ray or plasma blaster or whatever I'd still want a gun.
Walt BJ

Doug \Woody\ and Erin Beal
August 10th 03, 05:06 AM
On 8/9/03 5:24 PM, in article
, "Eric Moore"
> wrote:

> <snip>
>
>> And that takes me to my biggest beef with Navy hardware choices of late:
>> although the USAF F-35A will have an internal gun, the Navy F-35B will not.
>> It will have the possibility of carrying a gun in a pod in one of the two
>> big internal bays, which is the same as saying it is not gona happen, babe.
>>
>> Lets hope for some high brass with a mean disposition to throw a stupendous
>> tantrum... put a gun on the F-35B right now, and, BTW, Boeing, come over
>> here and tell me why the Super Bug still has those 4 degrees toed-out
>> pylons!
>> _____________
>> José Herculano
>
>
> The Navy didn't go for an internal gun on the F-4J/S, or the A-6 either,
> how big of a disadvantage was that?

Would have helped to have a gun on an Intruder during Operation Preying
Mantis. Strafing is quite effective in close quarters and for SuW... And if
you don't have a gun in A/A it sucks to have to open the range and rely on
the min range missile shots.

There were a bunch of thankful troops on the ground in Afghanistan during
Operation Condor that the F/A-18 had a GAU.

The Navy fixed their error on the F-4J/S.

The F-35 doesn't have one (on the Navy version) but needs one. This is
another case of the engineers (and budgeteers) believing their own
arithmetic and sacrificing capability... Make it single engine and don't
install a gun... See? The numbers don't lie. It'll work.

Meanwhile operators are shaking their heads... again.

--Woody

> Didn't the F-106 and F-111 have provisions for a Vulcan cannon in the
> weapon bay? Was this setup ever used in anger?
> Have they decided what kind of gun the F-35 will have?
> Also, what's the status of the laser weapon that was to be fitted in
> the F-35 weapon bay?
> Just curious.

Dudhorse
August 10th 03, 05:32 AM
"JDupre5762" > wrote in message
...
> >All...I was wondering: have there been any guns-only air to air kills by
US
> >aircraft since SE Asia?
> >As an aside, what are the thoughts of those who have been in combat?
Are
> >guns
> >on board nostalga, or, are they a practical weapon?
>
> Duke Cunningham will tell you that if his Navy F-4 had a gun he might have
got
> three more kills in his famous day of fighting when he made ace. While
not air
> combat there were guns only strafing runs made in Afghanistan during a
fight
> over a downed helicopter.
>
> While air to air and air to ground missiles are now far more reliable than
> during Vietnam and far more capable than during Desert Storm I think
history
> shows us that whenever we think that some weapon is obsolete along comes a
> conflict where that weapon is needed. Often the weapon is not used in its
> original form but a good use is found for it.
>
> In regards to combat aircraft guns there might come a time when the combat
> arena is so circumscribed that beyond visual range weapons will not be
> practical due to the chance of "collateral damage". Then only visual
range
> weapons could be used and the gun takes on a new importance. Imagine if
in the
> Balkans one of our opponents (I can't remember whose side we weren't on!)
had
> put up a decent aerial opposition, would we really have been launching a
lot of
> long range weapons in one of the most heavily air traveled areas of the
world?
>
> As in Afghanistan in a future conflict at the extreme of range for some
> aircraft might make it necessary to use every weapon they brought along
right
> down to the guns when all other ordnance was expended. Not because they
could
> not loiter in terms of fuel but because it would take too long to return
to
> base and reload.
>
> The gun will never again be a primary or even secondary weapon but as a
> tertiary one it will have its uses and you can never be sure when that
will be.
>
> John Dupre'


.... it is my understanding that naval versions had a gun but the air force
did not but was later retrofitted with one.

Mike Kanze
August 10th 03, 03:55 PM
Woody,

>Would have helped to have a gun on an Intruder

I agree that having a gun would have been a good thing during Preying Mantis
(taking out oil platforms). I can't agree that the Intruder would have been
the right bird for guns. During 1988 the A-7 was still lurking about, so
it's not as if we didn't have gun assets available. I presume the A-6E
COULD carry rockets (as its predecessor Intruder variants could), and so
augment the gunfire from the Thalidomide Crusader.

Then there's the old conundrum about what tradeoffs you'd need to make, to
retrofit a gun into any aircraft not already "gun-ready". With the
Intruder, this would most likely have meant a pod. The expression, "sailors
and pods don't mix very well", was already gaining currency during the early
1970s with the intro of the EA-6B to the fleet.

Since the A-6's primary mission was all-wx attack a gun - at best - would
only have been a "nice to have".

Owl sends.
--
Mike Kanze

436 Greenbrier Road
Half Moon Bay, California 94019-2259
USA

650-726-7890

"Vegetarian (vej ' i târ ' ee en), n. Amerindian term meaning "lousy
hunter".


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" > wrote in message
...
> [rest snipped]

Doug \Woody\ and Erin Beal
August 11th 03, 12:00 AM
On 8/10/03 9:55 AM, in article , "Mike
Kanze" > wrote:

> Woody,
>
>> Would have helped to have a gun on an Intruder
>
> I agree that having a gun would have been a good thing during Preying Mantis
> (taking out oil platforms). I can't agree that the Intruder would have been
> the right bird for guns. During 1988 the A-7 was still lurking about, so
> it's not as if we didn't have gun assets available. I presume the A-6E
> COULD carry rockets (as its predecessor Intruder variants could), and so
> augment the gunfire from the Thalidomide Crusader.
>
> Then there's the old conundrum about what tradeoffs you'd need to make, to
> retrofit a gun into any aircraft not already "gun-ready". With the
> Intruder, this would most likely have meant a pod. The expression, "sailors
> and pods don't mix very well", was already gaining currency during the early
> 1970s with the intro of the EA-6B to the fleet.
>
> Since the A-6's primary mission was all-wx attack a gun - at best - would
> only have been a "nice to have".
>
> Owl sends.

Owl,

All very true. Oil platforms, Boghammers etc... They zig, you simply follow
them with bullets.

OBTW, never saw it except in TACMAN pictures, but the Intruder DID have a
gun pod designed for it. All the ordies and gunners I talked to had never
seen one either. Apparently, you dialed in a mil setting and fired it in
the manual mode with the pickle button--kinda goofy from a pilot/human
factors standpoint (my opinion only).

Of course as a former B/N, you already know that the A-6E did carry rockets.
In fact, I had the opportunity to employ every rocket delivery possible from
the Intruder... Straight Path, Manual, General, Loft (NOT High Loft
though)--both pilot and B/N designates--Zuni's and 2.75's. I'm not the ace
of the base, just happened to get scheduled for 3 rocket hops with 2 full
pods each and lots of range time. MAARP's were great in the old days.
Problem is WRT PREYING MANTIS: Rockets not allowed on ship. You wouldn't
believe how many of my Hornet contemporaries these days that have never even
SEEN a rocket pod (even though they should have during advanced strike in
A-4's).

There would have been some definite tradeoff to include a gun on the A-6
from its inception, but the design was a bit myopic from a mission
standpoint, so we got what we got. I was always a bit jealous of the A-7's
gun... Always seemed like it would have been a fun thing to strafe the wake
after mission tanking. Ah the reminiscing...

--Woody

Lawrence Dillard
August 11th 03, 12:52 AM
"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> While I agree in principle with what is stated here, I have to point
> out some errors.
>
> "Lawrence Dillard" > wrote:
> >>
> >Viet Nam warfare proved to be a learning experience for the US aviation
> >community, which had come to believe, by the 1960's, that guided missiles
> >were all that would prove to be needed to prosecute aerial warfare.
>
> Let's note that there was really only one tactical jet procurred by
> the "US aviation community" which was missile only. The F-4. In the
> mid-60's when the Vietnam War expanded, the USAF was operating the
> F-100, F-105, F-104.

Did the F-100 routinely operate over N Viet Nam in either the fighter-bomber
or the CAP role? Did the F-104? Of the three you mention, only the F-105
had to requisite combination of bomb-load, range (with tanker supporta) and
high speed necesary for operations over the North; the F-104 hadn't either
the legs or the weight-carrying capacity and the F-100 might not have been
able to carry the needed load far enough. (The interesting thing, to me, is
that all three "Century Series" aircraft, whether originally intended for
(fighter-bomber type) interdiction, air-superiority or tactical nuclear
attack, all featured an integral gun-armament, not as a retrofit , but from
the drawing board onward. There never seems to have been any question over
whether these a/c "needed" an integral gun armament).

Enter Mr Wonderful, SECDEV Mac Namara, who recognized the versatility of
the (missile-only) F-4 and on the basis of alleged cost-savings due to
"commonality", ordered it to equip the USAF as well.


The USN was flying the A-4, F-8. All gun
> equipped. Later (besides the F-4 B/C/D/J) there were the F-5, A-37,
> A-1, A-7---all gun equipped.

Of the a/c mentioned above, only the F-8 had the internal guns, legs and
performance necessary for the CAP role over the North. However, what was
needed at the time was aircraft capable of performing primarily the
fighter-bomber role, with a secondary aia-to-air role. The F-105 had the
load-carrying capaility, the performance, and (with tanking) the legs to
accomplish the mission.

> >
> >Alarming, if not distressing reports were received fairly early on that a
> >number of US a/c downed over N Viet Nam had been shot down in error by US
> >missiles fired from beyond range of positive visual identification by
other
> >US a/c.
>
> ROE in MiG country until 1972--eight years into combat--always
> required VID, except for a small number of Combat Tree,
> close-controlled F-4s out of Udorn in '72. I can recall no
> "distressing reports" of losses due to A/A fratricide. Simply didn't
> happen.

I do recall such reports, with the caveat that the sources for the reports
were newspapers. It appears that under the stress of engagement and of
identifying a/c while under "g"-forces, some mis-identifications were made.
Allegedly, from certain aspects under the stress of maneuvering conditions,
an F-4 could appear to resemble a Mig-21. Occasionally, however, after hasty
identification, it proved necessary to open the range in order to employ,
say, an early Sidewinder or Sparrow. It allegedly was under such
circumstances that the friendly-on-friendly errors were committed.

> >
> >That led to a belatedly-responded-to request, in which a redesign of the
F-4
> >(which took over from the F-105) to include a useable integral cannon
(F4E)
> >was accomplished.
>
> While the F-4 was certainly deployed in-theater in '66, it didn't
> "take over" for the F-105 which continued to carry most of the iron
> into NVN until 1968 when it was finally attrited to the point of no
> longer being combat effective.
>

Agreed, the F-4s didn't simply completely replace the F-105s all at once,
but were progressively introduced as the numbers became available.


> > The US aviation community learned that it had to be
> >especially careful in reaching the decision to fire a missile at another
> >a/c, if only because under the stress of "g"-forces, hurried
identifications
> >of fleetingly-sighted targets, occasional failures of IFF squawks, and
the
> >workload imposed on the friendly pilot team, enemy a/c were not so easy
to
> >distinguish from friendlies as it appeared to be in training.

>
> If "under the stress of "g" forces" it would certainly mean visual
> conditions and tail aspect in '66, '67. Certainly not a player for
> AIM-7 shots and with the AIM-9B of the period, the firing limit was
> max of 2.5 G.
>
> IFF squawk was irrelevant to missile firing or fighter-to-fighter ID.
> We didn't have that kind of equipment until a limited number of Combat
> Tree birds showed up in '72.

In that case, I must be mistaken, as I had been told that US a/c of the day
were fitted with an IFF which offered approximaely 2048 discrete "squawk"
codes, which aided in distinguishing friend from foe. If these devices went
inop, a friendly could not reliably be distinguished from an enemy
electronically; the pilot would have to rely on his eyes.

Recall, however, that during the 1950's there was a prominent human factors
case involving an F-100 on a training mission which downed its target-towing
a/c, instead of the intended trailing target, under visual engagement
conditions, because under "g"-loading in a pursuit curve, the towing a/c
appeared to the F-100 pilot to be the target. The incident was dramatized in
a television program.

> >
> >The solution was to close to ranges, before firing, at which a sound
visual
> >ID could be obtained. That measure not only tended to reduce
friendly-fire
> >losses, but also meant that rather often a US a/c would get so close to
an
> >enemy that the minimum firing distance for the missiles carried might be
> >reached before the positive ID could be made. Under such circumstances,
it
> >made sense to have an onboard cannon so as to deal with the situation.
>
> It wasn't just tactically sound, it was ROE required. I agree
> completely.

> >Missiles nowadays are far superior in reliability, and have much-improved
> >ranges.

I should have written "minimum engagement ranges".

Some radars carried aboard fighters have the capability of ID-ing an
> >enemy a/c simply from its radar-return. Hence it is considered safe to
fire
> >from beyond visual range, which allows the avoidance of close-in
> >WWI-WWII-Korea dogfighting. And that's good because it is hard enough to
> >maintain situational awareness even at a distance from an opponent with
the
> >aid of positive control via AWACS, much less than in a complicated
encounter
> >at close range.

> >Nonetheless, most pilots desire to have some sort of reserve punch, just
to
> >cover the odd case where missiles haven't done the job or have been
> >expended, and an opportunity to disengage successfully coud hinge on
being
> >able to shoot your way out.

>
> More important than what you've said regard reserve punch is the
> tactical practice of having a gun to threaten your opponent into
> predictable action. Firing sequence wisely should be--BVR radar
> missile, BVR/WVR all-aspect IR missile, then high angle gun shot as
> you blow through the merge. Turn-n-burn should be avoided at all
> costs.

I certainly agree with you. However, I am not sure that the immediately
above was generally understood or agreed upon until the advent of College
Dart, Top-Gun and Red Flag; air combat maneuvering at the speeds of Viet
Nam (and later) era a/c, in an environment of opposing SAMs threats and
enemy GCI-controlled interceptors, has proved to be a lot more complicated
and deadly than ever before. A dogfight can become unexpectedly hazardous in
a very short time.

>
> If in a X-v-X engagement, your wingman maneuvers to insure the gun
> threat on your adversary to allow for safe separation--i.e. keep him
> turning as you break away to separate.
>
You're undoubtedly correct. At times, especially at close ranges, a "gun
threat" can be more imposing than a missile, because while missiles can
malfunction, a well-aimed burst of cannon fire can mean only one thing.

> If we've got a man in the seat, we need a gun in the nose.

Agreed. A sentence worth a thousand images. How this truism was lost sight
of is beyond my ken.

Thomas Schoene
August 11th 03, 02:40 AM
"Eric Moore" > wrote in message
om

> Have they decided what kind of gun the F-35 will have?

Apparently the GAU-12/U 25mm Gatling, in place of the Bk27 27mm revolver
cannon originally planned. The Air Force gets an internal fitting; the
others have bolt-on versions of some sort or other. I've seen mention of
pods in one of the weapon bays or a conformal gun pack on a centerline
station. I really hope it's the latter.

BTW, the selection of GAU-12 is confirmed in this newsletter (pg 2).

http://www.lmaeronautics.com/products/combat_air/x-35/images/F-35JSFTeam03Su
m.pdf

> Also, what's the status of the laser weapon that was to be
> fitted in the F-35 weapon bay?
> Just curious.

The proposal was for a laser that would fit in the lift-fan bay, not the
weapon bay. It's still pretty much a PowerPoint slide. It depends on
scaling solid-state lasers from their current 1-10kW output to at least
100kW and repackaging them from lab test beds to functional weapons. The
Air Force says first opportunity is sometime in 2012, but that looks pretty
optimistic to me.

http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_military.jsp?view=story&id=new
s/masd0926.xml

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

Red
August 11th 03, 02:59 AM
"Lawrence Dillard" > wrote in message
...
SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP
> Enter Mr Wonderful, SECDEV Mac Namara, who recognized the versatility of
> the (missile-only) F-4 and on the basis of alleged cost-savings due to
> "commonality", ordered it to equip the USAF as well>

What a bunch of revisionist history crap this statement is. The USAF was
the driving force behind the adoption of the F-4, not MacNamara. The trials
were conducted in 1961, just as the F-4 was entering the Navy inventory. It
was the performance of the aircraft in weapons load, radar performance and
range that impressed the Air Force. The adoption of the F-4 by the Air Force
that became the arguement by MacMamra that if it could be done for one
aircraft it could be done for all of them. This lead to the TFX/F111 BS.

Lawrence Dillard
August 11th 03, 05:13 AM
"Red" > wrote in message
m...
>
> "Lawrence Dillard" > wrote in message
> ...
> SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP
> > Enter Mr Wonderful, SECDEV Mac Namara, who recognized the versatility
of
> > the (missile-only) F-4 and on the basis of alleged cost-savings due to
> > "commonality", ordered it to equip the USAF as well>

>
> What a bunch of revisionist history crap this statement is.

Thank you for this very kind and of course, wise, commentary.


The USAF was
> the driving force behind the adoption of the F-4, not MacNamara.

I have never before heard this one. In fact, the USAF was yary of the F-4,
for among other things, the following:

1) The F-4 called for twin engines.
2) The F-4 called for two crew members.
3) The F-4 had no integral provision for a gun.
4) The F-4 was to be constructed by McDonald-Douglas.

I have never heard other than that the USAF wanted no part of a design in
which it had had no input from the output and certainly did not want to be
in a position in which it would have to compete with its sister service for
production priorities, etc., on a "hand-me-down" product and was unfamiliar
with McD as a supplier; altogether, the USAF wanted to define its air
mission and to accomplish it with a/c designed from the outset with the USAF
usages and practices in mind.

The trials
> were conducted in 1961, just as the F-4 was entering the Navy inventory.
It
> was the performance of the aircraft in weapons load, radar performance and
> range that impressed the Air Force.

It was MacNamara who was impressed and who had called for the "trials". The
version I heard was that the trials were "fixed" so as to minimize or
ignore USAF objections, including that the USAF looked upon the use of two
J-79s as a step back (15,800-17,900 lbs thrust vs some 25,000 lbs for the
F-105's engine), and was yary of the idea of splitting cockpit duties
between two crewmen. The F-4's design had been initiated during the
mid-1950's, an attribute the USAF did not find attractive, and would need
substantial modifications to meet the USAF's established methods of
operation, including in-flight refueling. In despite of USAF objections,
the F-4 "won" (MacNamara's Rules).

Once MacNamara made his decision, however, the USAF was faced eating that
decision with a spoon and pretending to like it, or having to soldier on
with fewer modern a/c than it believed it needed. Same thing happened with
the F-111. (The contortions the English language can withstand in making
night appear to be day, are truly amazing).

The adoption of the F-4 by the Air Force
> that became the arguement by MacMamra that if it could be done for one
> aircraft it could be done for all of them. This lead to the TFX/F111 BS.

In fact, MacNamara, a bright man, came to his position with several firm but
addle-pated convictions on weapons and systems acquisition, most if not all
of which have been found to be fatally flawed and virtually
unworkable---F-111, C-5A, and IIRC, the Cheyenne helicopter, to name a few
egregious examples.

>
>

Pechs1
August 11th 03, 02:20 PM
lynn-<< The Navy fixed their error on the F-4J/S. >><BR><BR>

Error in the B,N,J,S-think he meant by having a gun in the Turkey and
Hornet...corrected the error in the USN F-4...
P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

Ed Rasimus
August 11th 03, 06:46 PM
"Lawrence Dillard" > wrote:

>
>> "Lawrence Dillard" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >> > Enter Mr Wonderful, SECDEV Mac Namara, who recognized the versatility
>> >>of the (missile-only) F-4 and on the basis of alleged cost-savings due to
>> > "commonality", ordered it to equip the USAF as well>
>
>> What a bunch of revisionist history crap this statement is.
>
>Thank you for this very kind and of course, wise, commentary.

Well, although the message was prefaced with a bit of flame, it's
substantially correct.
>
>The USAF was
>> the driving force behind the adoption of the F-4, not MacNamara.
>
>I have never before heard this one. In fact, the USAF was yary of the F-4,
>for among other things, the following:
>
>1) The F-4 called for twin engines.
>2) The F-4 called for two crew members.
>3) The F-4 had no integral provision for a gun.
>4) The F-4 was to be constructed by McDonald-Douglas.

The USAF liked the idea of twin-engine reliability. The USAF had lots
of experience with two-man crews in the F-101, F-89, etc. The USAF had
spent the previous decade and a half heavily involved in NORAD
concepts of fighting off the Soviet bomber threat, which tracked well
with a missile equipped airplane. The F-101 was a McDonnell-Douglas
airplane.

Additionally it should be noted that McNamara became SecDef under JFK
who took office in Jan '61 when the initial procurement contract for
the F-4C was already let. The first operational deliveries were taking
place in '62.
>
>I have never heard other than that the USAF wanted no part of a design in
>which it had had no input from the output and certainly did not want to be
>in a position in which it would have to compete with its sister service for
>production priorities, etc., on a "hand-me-down" product and was unfamiliar
>with McD as a supplier; altogether, the USAF wanted to define its air
>mission and to accomplish it with a/c designed from the outset with the USAF
>usages and practices in mind.

The airplane was aerodynamically superior to anything the AF had on
the drawing board, carried a bigger load of iron, had a better A/A
radar and with INS was a better strike platform. The USAF version from
the onset had nuke wiring and receptacle refueling. Most assuredly the
AF had a lot of input to the RFP..
>
> The trials
>> were conducted in 1961, just as the F-4 was entering the Navy inventory.
>It
>> was the performance of the aircraft in weapons load, radar performance and
>> range that impressed the Air Force.
>
>It was MacNamara who was impressed and who had called for the "trials". The
>version I heard was that the trials were "fixed" so as to minimize or
>ignore USAF objections, including that the USAF looked upon the use of two
>J-79s as a step back (15,800-17,900 lbs thrust vs some 25,000 lbs for the
>F-105's engine),

The two -79s of the F-4 give it a much superior T/W ratio over the 105
which from '58 on had been suffering serious growing pains. The 105
was viewed as decidedly unreliable, expensive to operate, overly
complex and a poor excursion into advanced technology.

> and was yary of the idea of splitting cockpit duties
>between two crewmen.

The 105 was proving that the technology had reached a point of crew
saturation and a two-man crew was a darn good idea if all of those
complex missions were to be done by one aircraft.

> The F-4's design had been initiated during the
>mid-1950's, an attribute the USAF did not find attractive, and would need
>substantial modifications to meet the USAF's established methods of
>operation, including in-flight refueling. In despite of USAF objections,
>the F-4 "won" (MacNamara's Rules).

Of course the design had started in the mid-50s, just as the 104 and
105 had been early fifties initiation. There wasn't anything else on
the boards (if we rule out the derivative of the F-100, the F-107), so
the Phantom was an advance.
>
>The adoption of the F-4 by the Air Force
>> that became the arguement by MacMamra that if it could be done for one
>> aircraft it could be done for all of them. This lead to the TFX/F111 BS.

Here, you are right on.
>
>In fact, MacNamara, a bright man, came to his position with several firm but
>addle-pated convictions on weapons and systems acquisition, most if not all
>of which have been found to be fatally flawed and virtually
>unworkable---F-111, C-5A, and IIRC, the Cheyenne helicopter, to name a few
>egregious examples.

Well, that's a leap of reason. Certainly the commonality of the F-111B
was a flawed idea, but the later variants of the F-111, the E and F
models were pretty darn good airplanes and the C-5 set a standard for
airlift and reliability. I don't do helicopters, so I'll let someone
else address Cheyenne.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Mike Kanze
August 11th 03, 07:04 PM
Woody,

Thanks for filling in some gaps in my dated knowledge.

>OBTW, never saw it except in TACMAN pictures, but the Intruder DID have a
gun pod designed for it.

Interesting. I can visualize the trenchant comments from the 1973 Green
Lizard Ordie Shop on THAT one.

>Of course as a former B/N, you already know that the A-6E did carry
rockets.

I always assumed this to be the case, but since my Intruder career ended in
1974 - with only A, B (PAT ARM) and K time in my logbook - I wasn't sure.
At the time the E Standard was just beginning to appear at Oceana but none
had come yet to Whidbey. And of course the E Standard was soon superseded
by the E TRAM.

All that we had on the Rock in 1974 was an E Standard cockpit mockup in the
VA-128 Ready Room that was no more informative than the $.50 kiddie rides
outside the Oak Harbor food stores.

>Rockets not allowed on ship.

What was the thinking behind that one - spurious ignition worries? Still
the case? Allowed ashore only?

To me, rockets are a great way of equipping a non-gun aircraft with a cheap
forward-firing air-to-surface weapon that consumes no internal space and
gives very good hitting power. Only question in my mind is - how often will
such a weapon be required in the future for air-to-surface work? (I know
our Marine Corps brethren have a ready answer to that question.)

Owl sends.
--
Mike Kanze

436 Greenbrier Road
Half Moon Bay, California 94019-2259
USA

650-726-7890

"Vegetarian (vej ' i târ ' ee en), n. Amerindian term meaning "lousy
hunter".


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" > wrote in message
...
> [rest snipped]

Jake Donovan
August 11th 03, 08:18 PM
You would have to have a time machine and change real events. The AF had
ordered the F4 BEFORE MacNamra took office.


"Lawrence Dillard" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Red" > wrote in message
> m...
> >
> > "Lawrence Dillard" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP
> > > Enter Mr Wonderful, SECDEV Mac Namara, who recognized the versatility
> of
> > > the (missile-only) F-4 and on the basis of alleged cost-savings due to
> > > "commonality", ordered it to equip the USAF as well>
>
> >
> > What a bunch of revisionist history crap this statement is.
>
> Thank you for this very kind and of course, wise, commentary.
>
>
> The USAF was
> > the driving force behind the adoption of the F-4, not MacNamara.
>
> I have never before heard this one. In fact, the USAF was yary of the F-4,
> for among other things, the following:
>
> 1) The F-4 called for twin engines.
> 2) The F-4 called for two crew members.
> 3) The F-4 had no integral provision for a gun.
> 4) The F-4 was to be constructed by McDonald-Douglas.
>
> I have never heard other than that the USAF wanted no part of a design in
> which it had had no input from the output and certainly did not want to be
> in a position in which it would have to compete with its sister service
for
> production priorities, etc., on a "hand-me-down" product and was
unfamiliar
> with McD as a supplier; altogether, the USAF wanted to define its air
> mission and to accomplish it with a/c designed from the outset with the
USAF
> usages and practices in mind.
>
> The trials
> > were conducted in 1961, just as the F-4 was entering the Navy inventory.
> It
> > was the performance of the aircraft in weapons load, radar performance
and
> > range that impressed the Air Force.
>
> It was MacNamara who was impressed and who had called for the "trials".
The
> version I heard was that the trials were "fixed" so as to minimize or
> ignore USAF objections, including that the USAF looked upon the use of
two
> J-79s as a step back (15,800-17,900 lbs thrust vs some 25,000 lbs for the
> F-105's engine), and was yary of the idea of splitting cockpit duties
> between two crewmen. The F-4's design had been initiated during the
> mid-1950's, an attribute the USAF did not find attractive, and would need
> substantial modifications to meet the USAF's established methods of
> operation, including in-flight refueling. In despite of USAF objections,
> the F-4 "won" (MacNamara's Rules).
>
> Once MacNamara made his decision, however, the USAF was faced eating that
> decision with a spoon and pretending to like it, or having to soldier on
> with fewer modern a/c than it believed it needed. Same thing happened with
> the F-111. (The contortions the English language can withstand in making
> night appear to be day, are truly amazing).
>
> The adoption of the F-4 by the Air Force
> > that became the arguement by MacMamra that if it could be done for one
> > aircraft it could be done for all of them. This lead to the TFX/F111 BS.
>
> In fact, MacNamara, a bright man, came to his position with several firm
but
> addle-pated convictions on weapons and systems acquisition, most if not
all
> of which have been found to be fatally flawed and virtually
> unworkable---F-111, C-5A, and IIRC, the Cheyenne helicopter, to name a few
> egregious examples.
>
> >
> >
>
>

Jake Donovan
August 11th 03, 08:36 PM
I hate when I get cut off :-)

Continuation -

The original AF proposal was for F-4Bs which the AF designated the F-110A.
These were upgraded to F-4C with small changes to the B model. J79-GE-15,
APQ-100 RADAR, wider tires, an AF friendly refueling boom and if I recall, a
change in the inertial nav system.

This version, the F-4C 1st flew in May of 1963.

The AF had operational F-4Bs in March of 62. Testing and procurement
started and progressed before MacNamara took office.

JD


"Lawrence Dillard" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Red" > wrote in message
> m...
> >
> > "Lawrence Dillard" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP
> > > Enter Mr Wonderful, SECDEV Mac Namara, who recognized the versatility
> of
> > > the (missile-only) F-4 and on the basis of alleged cost-savings due to
> > > "commonality", ordered it to equip the USAF as well>
>
> >
> > What a bunch of revisionist history crap this statement is.
>
> Thank you for this very kind and of course, wise, commentary.
>
>
> The USAF was
> > the driving force behind the adoption of the F-4, not MacNamara.
>
> I have never before heard this one. In fact, the USAF was yary of the F-4,
> for among other things, the following:
>
> 1) The F-4 called for twin engines.
> 2) The F-4 called for two crew members.
> 3) The F-4 had no integral provision for a gun.
> 4) The F-4 was to be constructed by McDonald-Douglas.
>
> I have never heard other than that the USAF wanted no part of a design in
> which it had had no input from the output and certainly did not want to be
> in a position in which it would have to compete with its sister service
for
> production priorities, etc., on a "hand-me-down" product and was
unfamiliar
> with McD as a supplier; altogether, the USAF wanted to define its air
> mission and to accomplish it with a/c designed from the outset with the
USAF
> usages and practices in mind.
>
> The trials
> > were conducted in 1961, just as the F-4 was entering the Navy inventory.
> It
> > was the performance of the aircraft in weapons load, radar performance
and
> > range that impressed the Air Force.
>
> It was MacNamara who was impressed and who had called for the "trials".
The
> version I heard was that the trials were "fixed" so as to minimize or
> ignore USAF objections, including that the USAF looked upon the use of
two
> J-79s as a step back (15,800-17,900 lbs thrust vs some 25,000 lbs for the
> F-105's engine), and was yary of the idea of splitting cockpit duties
> between two crewmen. The F-4's design had been initiated during the
> mid-1950's, an attribute the USAF did not find attractive, and would need
> substantial modifications to meet the USAF's established methods of
> operation, including in-flight refueling. In despite of USAF objections,
> the F-4 "won" (MacNamara's Rules).
>
> Once MacNamara made his decision, however, the USAF was faced eating that
> decision with a spoon and pretending to like it, or having to soldier on
> with fewer modern a/c than it believed it needed. Same thing happened with
> the F-111. (The contortions the English language can withstand in making
> night appear to be day, are truly amazing).
>
> The adoption of the F-4 by the Air Force
> > that became the arguement by MacMamra that if it could be done for one
> > aircraft it could be done for all of them. This lead to the TFX/F111 BS.
>
> In fact, MacNamara, a bright man, came to his position with several firm
but
> addle-pated convictions on weapons and systems acquisition, most if not
all
> of which have been found to be fatally flawed and virtually
> unworkable---F-111, C-5A, and IIRC, the Cheyenne helicopter, to name a few
> egregious examples.
>
> >
> >
>
>

Christopher Biow
August 12th 03, 04:45 AM
"Red" > wrote:

>The R.O.E. will always require visual I.D. Why? Because somewhere there is
>always someone with stars on his colar, (or who wants stars on his colar)
>that is deathly afraid that someone will screw-up.

Sure, so long as we face only severely overmatched, day-only, VFR-only
adversaries. Heck, we could probably have won every air battle since WWII
with ROE that permitted only pole arms, brickbats, and claws. (None o' that
namby-pamby stuff at hundreds of yards--ya gotta see the blood flow. Pass
me that there halberd and pop open the canopy!)

It was a sad joke in the late '80s, when we were flying >50% of our hours
at night, and the WWNam veterans who provided our Adult Supervision still
trained on the assumption that we'd never *really* get BVR clearance. We'd
always be driving around in two-ships, perhaps working up our ratios to 2:1
or so. Anything more complicated than a bracket violated KISS.

Perhaps it was a self-fulfilling prophecy for the Tomcats in the first Gulf
War. Let the Air Force do all the shooting, and there are fewer Navy
blue-on-blues! Meanwhile, we'll just CAP against the contingency of an
intervention from Mars.

However, there is one great advantage of 20MM contact-fuzed shells, which
still warrants putting them on combat jets. Unbeatable ECCM!

Joe Osman
August 12th 03, 05:05 PM
Walt BJ wrote:
>
> (Pechs1) wrote in message >...
> > But to answer the question-<< As an aside, what are the thoughts of those who
> > have been in combat?
> Snip:
>
> I've been there and until someone comes up with a genuine Buck Rogers
> disintegrator ray or plasma blaster or whatever I'd still want a gun.
> Walt BJ

I'll bet those Iraqi helicopters looked pretty disintegrated
after the GAU-8 was done with them.

Joe


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Lawrence Dillard
August 12th 03, 08:28 PM
Aw, gee, OJ, it was just a case of a (serious) memory failure. But
truthfully, I am a wee bit sensitive about RS MacNamara. So sorry if you are
offended.

I'm not sure whether I believe in a devil; but I've come to regard money
rather highly. Seem to have what I need, but not as much of it as I want.
In any event, I am grateful for all the corrections offered to my erroneous
portion of my post, which in contrast to some, was not offered in a mean or
spiteful spirit.


"Ogden Johnson III" > wrote in message
...
> "Jake Donovan" > wrote:
>
SNIP

> Shame on you Jake. How *dare* you bring up facts when Lawrence
> Dillard is on a roll? Obviously, Larry considers Robert McNamara to
> be third only to the Devil and love of money as the Root of All That
> Is Evil In The World.
>
> OJ III

Eric Moore
August 12th 03, 08:31 PM
"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message et>...
> "Eric Moore" > wrote in message
> om
>
> > Have they decided what kind of gun the F-35 will have?
>
> Apparently the GAU-12/U 25mm Gatling, in place of the Bk27 27mm revolver
> cannon originally planned. The Air Force gets an internal fitting; the
> others have bolt-on versions of some sort or other. I've seen mention of
> pods in one of the weapon bays or a conformal gun pack on a centerline
> station. I really hope it's the latter.
>
> BTW, the selection of GAU-12 is confirmed in this newsletter (pg 2).
>
> http://www.lmaeronautics.com/products/combat_air/x-35/images/F-35JSFTeam03Su
> m.pdf


Why didn't they go with the Mauser Bk-27? Cost escalation? Technical
problems?

Ogden Johnson III
August 13th 03, 12:53 AM
"Lawrence Dillard" > wrote:

>Aw, gee, OJ, it was just a case of a (serious) memory failure. But
>truthfully, I am a wee bit sensitive about RS MacNamara. So sorry if you are
>offended.

Not offended. It was more bemoaning the distance of time since I was
a hormone-ridden teen-ager, spending my HS years in the DC area and
actually paying attention to things like politics and the military -
being an Army/USMC brat as it were. I knew when the USAF jumped in on
the F4 and why, and that it preceded McNamara's ascent.

>I'm not sure whether I believe in a devil; but I've come to regard money
>rather highly. Seem to have what I need, but not as much of it as I want.
>In any event, I am grateful for all the corrections offered to my erroneous
>portion of my post, which in contrast to some, was not offered in a mean or
>spiteful spirit.

Mine was just an attempt to make you realize that McNamara was by no
means the most despicable person ever to have served as a President's
cabinet member. That characterization is reserved to Josephus
Daniels. Sorry if it came off as mean and/or spiteful.

OJ III

Mike Kanze
August 13th 03, 03:18 AM
OJ,

>Mine was just an attempt to make you realize that McNamara was by no means
the most despicable person ever to have served as a President's cabinet
member. That characterization is reserved to Josephus Daniels.

Is this a reference to the infamous General Order 19 - the
Prohibition-inspired directive that Daniels promulgated to do away with the
Demon Rum on shipboard? (Never completely worked, though. Many of us will
attest to discrete sessions in certain staterooms with the hair of the dog.)

Of course, without GO-19 and its successors the Brits / Aussies / etc.
wouldn't be able to play the great game of "Get The Yank Drunk" during our
visits to their wardrooms. <g>

Owl sends.
--

Mike Kanze

436 Greenbrier Road
Half Moon Bay, California 94019-2259
USA

650-726-7890

"Vegetarian (vej ' i târ ' ee en), n. Amerindian term meaning "lousy
hunter".


"Ogden Johnson III" > wrote in message
...
> [rest snipped]

Walt BJ
August 16th 03, 06:02 PM
Is there any reason why a SUU23 gun pod wouldn't work on any Navy
aircraft weapons station that can take a MER?
Walt BJ

Walt BJ
August 16th 03, 06:10 PM
Slightly off track but consonant with earlier comments:
Ogden, Josephus Daniels did bad things to the Navy. No booze
(officially)is one item. The infamous Robert S MacNamara still rankles
me more than anyone in recent history. I was reading 'Yankee Station'
where the author was discussing RM and I suddenly became conscious my
jaw was aching. Then I discovered I was grinding my teeth at reading
the same complaints about RM, from a carrier pilot, that we had in the
USAF. What a jerk RM is.
Walt BJ

Ogden Johnson III
August 16th 03, 09:53 PM
(Walt BJ) wrote:

>Slightly off track but consonant with earlier comments:
>Ogden, Josephus Daniels did bad things to the Navy. No booze
>(officially)is one item. The infamous Robert S MacNamara still rankles
>me more than anyone in recent history. I was reading 'Yankee Station'
>where the author was discussing RM and I suddenly became conscious my
>jaw was aching. Then I discovered I was grinding my teeth at reading
>the same complaints about RM, from a carrier pilot, that we had in the
>USAF. What a jerk RM is.

Oh, geez, how your sins live on!

It was a joke, Walt, a joke. With the point that *every* President,
starting with George Washington, has selected some stinkers as cabinet
members. Even if you limited it to SecDefs [or SecWar/SecNav in
pre-1947 days].

Let me state, for the record, gentlemen, that I am not now, nor have I
ever been, a member of the "We Love Robert S. McNamara" club. Not
now, not in 1961 when he was appointed, not in 1968 when he left.

I would want to point out that it wasn't all RM. A *lot* of people in
the White House, up to and including LBJ, took great delight and pride
in micromanaging the VN war, down to the grunt squad and section of
squadron aircraft levels at times.

OJ III

Pechs1
August 17th 03, 02:48 PM
walt-<< Is there any reason why a SUU23 gun pod wouldn't work on any Navy
aircraft weapons station that can take a MER? >><BR><BR>

2000 pound item, poor reliability, worse boresighting. When I flew with them in
the 61st TFS, we said that they wouldn't even hit the nose gear if it were
down, they were so poorly boresighted and bent up.

But it should go onto any hardpoint that would take a dropable weapon, and some
SUU-23s were!!!

I would hope the military has a better pgun pod now.
P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

Ed Rasimus
August 17th 03, 04:08 PM
(Pechs1) wrote:

>walt-<< Is there any reason why a SUU23 gun pod wouldn't work on any Navy
>aircraft weapons station that can take a MER? >><BR><BR>
>
>2000 pound item, poor reliability, worse boresighting. When I flew with them in
>the 61st TFS, we said that they wouldn't even hit the nose gear if it were
>down, they were so poorly boresighted and bent up.
>P. C. Chisholm
>CDR, USN(ret.)
>Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

One man's meat is another man's poison. Although I didn't fly SUU-16
or SUU-23 in combat, I did carry the gun to the range for four years
of driving F-4C's in Europe--Torrejon, Incirlik and Aviano.

During that time, I never had a SUU-23 malfunction. It was virtually
100% reliable. (I can't say the same for M61s mounted in F-105s or
F-4Es, although the malfunctions were rare.) Boresighting isn't a
"gun" factor, it's a "gun plumber" factor. If the gun hangers do their
job and the operator's take care of the fold down sight (F-4C), the
gun will shoot where you point it. (We made it a practice never to
fold the sight down, assuming that continually up/down cycling would
change the boresight). I could regularly shoot in the mid-to-high 80%
range with a SUU-23.

Similarly we carried the SUU-11 mini-gun on the Fighter Lead-In
AT-38B's. Same story. The little gun got me a mid-90% average for
nearly four years in that job.

As for combat effectiveness with the hung gun, an AF type, Dee
Simmonds killed two MiGs during the great SEA unpleasantness with one.
I see Dee every year at the River Rats Reunion.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Eric Moore
August 18th 03, 01:02 AM
Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
> (Pechs1) wrote:
>
> >walt-<< Is there any reason why a SUU23 gun pod wouldn't work on any Navy
> >aircraft weapons station that can take a MER? >><BR><BR>
> >
> >2000 pound item, poor reliability, worse boresighting. When I flew with them in
> >the 61st TFS, we said that they wouldn't even hit the nose gear if it were
> >down, they were so poorly boresighted and bent up.
> >P. C. Chisholm
> >CDR, USN(ret.)
> >Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer
>
> One man's meat is another man's poison. Although I didn't fly SUU-16
> or SUU-23 in combat, I did carry the gun to the range for four years
> of driving F-4C's in Europe--Torrejon, Incirlik and Aviano.
>
> During that time, I never had a SUU-23 malfunction. It was virtually
> 100% reliable. (I can't say the same for M61s mounted in F-105s or
> F-4Es, although the malfunctions were rare.) Boresighting isn't a
> "gun" factor, it's a "gun plumber" factor. If the gun hangers do their
> job and the operator's take care of the fold down sight (F-4C), the
> gun will shoot where you point it. (We made it a practice never to
> fold the sight down, assuming that continually up/down cycling would
> change the boresight). I could regularly shoot in the mid-to-high 80%
> range with a SUU-23.
>
> Similarly we carried the SUU-11 mini-gun on the Fighter Lead-In
> AT-38B's. Same story. The little gun got me a mid-90% average for
> nearly four years in that job.
>
> As for combat effectiveness with the hung gun, an AF type, Dee
> Simmonds killed two MiGs during the great SEA unpleasantness with one.
> I see Dee every year at the River Rats Reunion.
>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (ret)
> ***"When Thunder Rolled:
> *** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
> *** from Smithsonian Books
> ISBN: 1588341038


What about weapon-bay-mounted guns? I know the F-106 and the F-111
could accomodate a vulcan cannon in their weapon bays. How effective were
they?
Were setups like this ever used in anger?

Ed Rasimus
August 18th 03, 03:54 PM
(Eric Moore) wrote:

>Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
>>
>> As for combat effectiveness with the hung gun, an AF type, Dee
>> Simmonds killed two MiGs during the great SEA unpleasantness with one.
>> I see Dee every year at the River Rats Reunion.

> What about weapon-bay-mounted guns? I know the F-106 and the F-111
>could accomodate a vulcan cannon in their weapon bays. How effective were
>they?
> Were setups like this ever used in anger?

The F-106 holds the distinction of being one of only two USAF
inventory systems that did not see combat in SEA. (The other was the
B-58.) The weapon-bay installation occurred after SEA combat was over.

The F-111 never carried the gun in USAF combat. With it's large
planform, high wing loading, poor agility, ground map optimized radar
and rotten visibility, the Vark was remarkably unsuited for air-to-air
combat. Not even the most ardent Vark supporter would have wanted to
engage MiGs in one. The defense was high speed escape.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Guy Alcala
August 18th 03, 10:27 PM
Ed Rasimus wrote:

> (Eric Moore) wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
> >>
> >> As for combat effectiveness with the hung gun, an AF type, Dee
> >> Simmonds killed two MiGs during the great SEA unpleasantness with one.
> >> I see Dee every year at the River Rats Reunion.
>
> > What about weapon-bay-mounted guns? I know the F-106 and the F-111
> >could accomodate a vulcan cannon in their weapon bays. How effective were
> >they?
> > Were setups like this ever used in anger?
>
> The F-106 holds the distinction of being one of only two USAF
> inventory systems that did not see combat in SEA. (The other was the
> B-58.) The weapon-bay installation occurred after SEA combat was over.
>
> The F-111 never carried the gun in USAF combat.

Not correct. According to aircrew who flew the 'Pig' in SEA (see Thornborough: "F-111: Success in Action"),
they were required to carry the gun pod on every mission. No that they thought it was useful, given that
the mission involved going in at night/under the weather when the MiGs really couldn't play, and they
certanly had no intention of strafing, especially single-ship. But they were ordered to carry it anyway,
much as 7th AF ordered F-105F weasels to carry jammer pods which they virtually never used, and which
displaced a Shrike.


>With it's largeplanform, high wing loading, poor agility, ground map optimized radar

> and rotten visibility, the Vark was remarkably unsuited for air-to-air
> combat. Not even the most ardent Vark supporter would have wanted to
> engage MiGs in one. The defense was high speed escape.

Yup. If some MiG had been unfortunate enough to find itself in front of a Vark, then maybe the gun might
have been useful (as it was on the F-105 in similar circumstances), but the F-111 normally operated in very
different weather/visibility/tactical conditions than the F-105.

Guy

Pechs1
August 20th 03, 02:22 PM
Ed-<< Although I've got more combat hours in the F-4 than the F-105, I've
got more time engaged with MiGs in the 105 than the F-4. >><BR><BR>

can't let that pass...anything you can tell us about Mig engagements in the
Thud??
P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

Ed Rasimus
August 20th 03, 03:40 PM
(Pechs1) wrote:

>Ed-<< Although I've got more combat hours in the F-4 than the F-105, I've
>got more time engaged with MiGs in the 105 than the F-4. >><BR><BR>
>
>can't let that pass...anything you can tell us about Mig engagements in the
>Thud??
>P. C. Chisholm
>CDR, USN(ret.)
>Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

My "best" or possibly "worst" is described in When Thunder Rolled in
the chapter titled, "Of MiGs and Moustaches." You've got to buy the
book! There's also the description of my near rejoin one day on a
flight of three MiG-21s.

Seriously, anyone who went intentionally MiG hunting in a 105 was
judgementally flawed. Few folks had much in the way of air-to-air
training and the concepts that we take for granted today such as fluid
attack/loose deuce, energy manueverability, Ps management, etc. were
not understood very well and definitely not practiced. What A/A
experience we had was usually illegally boot-legged in unbriefed
hassles flown in the farthest reaches of the training area.

In the 105 we always had the gun, of course, but only seldom did we
carry AIM-9s and even then it was the AIM-9B which had a 2.5G firing
limit.

The good news was that if you flew your airplane properly, you
wouldn't always win, but you would never lose. That meant keeping your
airspeed up above your corner--for the 105 that was above about 480
KIAS. If you stayed that fast you had good turning capability. Anyone
in a MiG-17 couldn't keep up and in a -21 had a bigger turn radius.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Pechs1
August 21st 03, 03:00 PM
Ed-<< My "best" or possibly "worst" is described in When Thunder Rolled in
the chapter titled, "Of MiGs and Moustaches." You've got to buy the
book! There's also the description of my near rejoin one day on a
flight of three MiG-21s. >><BR><BR>

I will this WE-thanks-


P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

Pechs1
August 23rd 03, 01:41 PM
Got it yesterday and it looks like a great read(loved the part about the BOQ).
Any other books you can recommend about the air war in VN, other than the
excellent suggestions at the beginning of your book?
P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

Ed Rasimus
August 23rd 03, 03:48 PM
(Pechs1) wrote:

>Got it yesterday and it looks like a great read(loved the part about the BOQ).
>Any other books you can recommend about the air war in VN, other than the
>excellent suggestions at the beginning of your book?
>P. C. Chisholm
>CDR, USN(ret.)
>Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

Already back-channelled you this by email, but for the edification of
the rest of the group:

As history, the best I've seen so far is Wayne Thompson's "To Hanoi
and Back"--it's a good analysis of the air war from the start of
Rolling Thunder to the end of Linebacker.

For the F-105 story, G.I. Basel's relatively short "Pak Six" is
excellent as is Al Lenski's "Magic 100". Jack Broughton's two books,
"Going Downtown" and "Thud Ridge", particularly the latter, deal with
105s in '67, but tend to be a bit self-serving. Ken Bell's "100
Missions North" is a load of crap.

For Linebacker, Jeff Ethell's "One Day in a Long War" cover just
that--May 10th (or 11th?). A pretty intense day in which the AF
attacked the Doumer Bridge again and Cunningham got his three-bagger.
Also Marshall Michel's "11 Days of Christmas" which really hits SAC
leadership hard about the Linebacker II losses.

That's a short list to keep you busy until my second book gets to
print.

-----

Here's a few more I've recalled since then:

Zalin Grant's excellent book on F-8 ops from Oriskany, "Over The
Beach".

John Trotti, "Phantom Over Vietnam"--USMC ops, mostly in-country and
Southern panhandle of NVN.

Walter Kross, "Splash One: Air Victory Over Hanoi"--a thinly
fictionalized account of the January '67 "Bolo" raid led by Robin Olds
to sweep the sky of MiGs. Doesn't stretch very far from the historical
facts.

Any of Tom Wilson's excellent trilogy of F-105 Weasel books--"Termite
Hill", "Lucky's Bridge" and "Tango Uniform". Fiction, but heavily
based on Wilson's own experience as an F-105 Wild Weasel "Bear."


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Mike Kanze
August 23rd 03, 08:05 PM
Ed,

>F-105 Wild Weasel "Bear."

That's as in "trained bear" - F-105 WW backseater, right?

--
Mike Kanze

436 Greenbrier Road
Half Moon Bay, California 94019-2259
USA

650-726-7890

"I've had a lot of calls asking if my dog Ernest was running for Governor.
I explained to each caller that Ernest died several years ago, to which the
usual response has been, 'So what?' Come to think of it, would a dead dog
running for Governor make California look any more weird than it already
does?"

- Al Shugart, Chairman - Friends of Ernest (San José Mercury-News, 8-16-03)


"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>[snipped]

Ed Rasimus
August 23rd 03, 09:35 PM
"Mike Kanze" > wrote:

>Ed,
>
>>F-105 Wild Weasel "Bear."
>
>That's as in "trained bear" - F-105 WW backseater, right?

Mos' Definitely!

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

John Alger
August 24th 03, 02:39 PM
(Pechs1) wrote in message >...
> Got it yesterday and it looks like a great read(loved the part about the BOQ).
> Any other books you can recommend about the air war in VN, other than the
> excellent suggestions at the beginning of your book?

Don't know which are listed in Ed's book, so this list might be a
little redundant, but here are some I have in my library:

"Scream of Eagles: The Creation of Top Gun and the U.S. Air Victory in
Vietnam"
by Robert K. Wilcox - Out of print (listed on Amazon as used,
available)

"On Yankee Station" by CDR John B Nichols USN(ret)- stll available
from USNI Press.

The following are paperbacks I have - don't know availability.

"Alpha Strike Vietnam" by Jeffrey L. Levinson

"Over the Beach - The Air War in Vietnam" by Zalin Grant

"Feet Wet - Reflections of a Carrier Pilot" by RADM Paul T. Gilchrest.

All are excellent.

John Alger

Eric Scheie
August 28th 03, 04:02 AM
"John Alger" > wrote in message
om...
> (Pechs1) wrote in message
>...
> > Got it yesterday and it looks like a great read(loved the part about the
BOQ).
> > Any other books you can recommend about the air war in VN, other than
the
> > excellent suggestions at the beginning of your book?
>
>
> The following are paperbacks I have - don't know availability.
>
> "Alpha Strike Vietnam" by Jeffrey L. Levinson
>


If this ("Alpha Strike Vietnam") is the same book by the same title I read
several years ago, then I can't recommend it. I thought the first 1/3 was
good, but after that it sounded like a lot of whining. The tone ended up
sounding like: "We're carrier pilots and we're not appreciated enough".
Sorry, but after about the first 1/3 it really got irritating.

While not about Naval Aviators, a book I really did enjoy was "Thud Ridge"
by Jack Broughton.

Just my 2 cents.

Paul Michael Brown
December 6th 03, 06:20 PM
>> (Pechs1) queried:

>>Any other books you can recommend about the air war in VN?

>Ed Rasimus > replied:

> As history, the best I've seen so far is Wayne Thompson's "To Hanoi
> and Back"--it's a good analysis of the air war from the start of
> Rolling Thunder to the end of Linebacker.
>
> For the F-105 story, G.I. Basel's relatively short "Pak Six" is
> excellent as is Al Lenski's "Magic 100". Jack Broughton's two books,
> "Going Downtown" and "Thud Ridge", particularly the latter, deal with
> 105s in '67, but tend to be a bit self-serving. Ken Bell's "100
> Missions North" is a load of crap.
>
> For Linebacker, Jeff Ethell's "One Day in a Long War" cover just
> that--May 10th (or 11th?). A pretty intense day in which the AF
> attacked the Doumer Bridge again and Cunningham got his three-bagger.
> Also Marshall Michel's "11 Days of Christmas" which really hits SAC
> leadership hard about the Linebacker II losses.
>
> Zalin Grant's excellent book on F-8 ops from Oriskany, "Over The
> Beach".
>
> John Trotti, "Phantom Over Vietnam"--USMC ops, mostly in-country and
> Southern panhandle of NVN.
>
> Walter Kross, "Splash One: Air Victory Over Hanoi"--a thinly
> fictionalized account of the January '67 "Bolo" raid led by Robin Olds
> to sweep the sky of MiGs. Doesn't stretch very far from the historical
> facts.
>
> Any of Tom Wilson's excellent trilogy of F-105 Weasel books--"Termite
> Hill", "Lucky's Bridge" and "Tango Uniform". Fiction, but heavily
> based on Wilson's own experience as an F-105 Wild Weasel "Bear."

Coming to this thread months late, but I collect books about the air war
in Southeast Asia and I can HIGHLY recommend both of the books written by
Marshall Michael:

The Eleven Days of Christmas: America's Last Vietnam Battle

Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam 1965-1972

Both can be purchased at Amazon.com. See:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/index=books&field-author=Michel%2C%20Marshall%20L.%2C%20III/103-7840700-9179029

Of the books recommended by others, I can endorse "Over the Beach" by
Zalin Grant, for its detailed description of the VF guys in an F-8
squadron at the zenith of the air war. Unlike the most other books, which
focus exclusively on the operational aspects, Grant does a good job
describing the character of the men and their lives outside the ready
room.

Finally, any serious student of naval aviation in the Vietnam era should
read Wynn Foster's book entitled "Captain Hook," and "The Heart of a Man"
by Frank and Marilyn Elkins. The first is a memoir by a former A-4
squardron commander who was shot down and lost an arm -- only to return to
active duty. I found Foster's story inspirational without being
self-aggrandizing and that's a tough balance to strike in a memoir. The
Elkins' work is the journal of an A-4 guy who was shot down and killed in
1967. His wife published it posthumously. You cannot read this book and
not be impressed by the terrible cost that the war imposed on naval
aviators and their families. I defy you to read it without crying.

Pechs1
December 8th 03, 03:27 PM
PMB-<< The Eleven Days of Christmas: America's Last Vietnam Battle >><BR><BR>

Read this one and It was like watching 'Braveheart', and really disliking the
English(I am of Scottish heritage), and remembering how much I dislike the
USAF, specifically SAC, really just kidding but the book is excellent!!!


P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

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