How do carrier-based planes find the ship after a mission ?

[Al Dykes]

As an armchair admiral, I've always wondered how A/C in WWII knew how
to find the carrier after being away for a couple hours on a mission.
I assume the pilots were told, roughly, where the carrier plans to be,
but sh*t happens. I always assume the carrier doesn't broadcast any
radio signals.

How do they do it, today ?




--
a d y k e s @ p a n i x . c o m
----

[nafod40]

Al Dykes wrote:
> As an armchair admiral, I've always wondered how A/C in WWII knew how
> to find the carrier after being away for a couple hours on a mission.
> I assume the pilots were told, roughly, where the carrier plans to be,
> but sh*t happens. I always assume the carrier doesn't broadcast any
> radio signals.
>
> How do they do it, today ?

Couple of methods
1. Follow the trail of non-classifed floating trash behind ship
2. Follow your nose to that double cheeseburger with fried egg on top
waiting for you in dirty shirt
3. Look for Russians, follow them
4. Don't find it, and go to beach. Break something, and spend weekend
drinking beer in exotic foreign port.

[Charlie Wolf]

I'm not a WWII guy, but my guess is that they commonly used DR (Dead
Reckoning) as a primary method of figuring out approx. where to be.
Regards,

As for today - electronics. Mostly covered.
Regards,

On 28 Oct 2004 09:51:43 -0400, (Al Dykes) wrote:

>
>As an armchair admiral, I've always wondered how A/C in WWII knew how
>to find the carrier after being away for a couple hours on a mission.
>I assume the pilots were told, roughly, where the carrier plans to be,
>but sh*t happens. I always assume the carrier doesn't broadcast any
>radio signals.
>
>How do they do it, today ?

[etagg]

with a sextant and a compass they know ware the ship was and it's heading so
it was not hard to comput the heading to intersect ths ships heading......
"Al Dykes" > wrote in message
...
>
> As an armchair admiral, I've always wondered how A/C in WWII knew how
> to find the carrier after being away for a couple hours on a mission.
> I assume the pilots were told, roughly, where the carrier plans to be,
> but sh*t happens. I always assume the carrier doesn't broadcast any
> radio signals.
>
> How do they do it, today ?
>
>
>
>
> --
> a d y k e s @ p a n i x . c o m
> ----

[Keith Willshaw]

"etagg" > wrote in message
...
> with a sextant and a compass they know ware the ship was and it's heading
> so
> it was not hard to comput the heading to intersect ths ships heading......


Well if the ship steered a constant heading and there
were no cross winds or currents and the pilot kept a
running plot that might be true.

However ships that steer straight lines at constant speed
in wartime tend to collect torpedoes, winds doth
blow and pilots tend to have other things on their
mind from time to time so it wasnt quite that
simple.

I believe the normal procedure was to have a pre-arranged
rendezvous point but it could be a little dicey. I recall
one of the FAA pilots at Okinawa who found the
BPF by climbing to max height and spotting smoke on
the horizon. That wouldnt have worked so well in the
Atlantic in winter :(

Keith

[Mike Kanze]

>How do they do it, today ?

Same as they've always done it: springs and mirrors, with some Kentucky
windage thrown in. In a ziplip / EMCON environment, a good sense of
situational awareness, decent DR skills or just following the other guy will
usually do.

If you're especially unlucky or inept, no need to worry. The ship (or more
specifically, the ship's BARCAP) will find YOU.

--
Mike Kanze

"Do witches run spell-checkers?"

- Old word processing joke


"Al Dykes" > wrote in message
...
>
> As an armchair admiral, I've always wondered how A/C in WWII knew how
> to find the carrier after being away for a couple hours on a mission.
> I assume the pilots were told, roughly, where the carrier plans to be,
> but sh*t happens. I always assume the carrier doesn't broadcast any
> radio signals.
>
> How do they do it, today ?
>
>
>
>
> --
> a d y k e s @ p a n i x . c o m
> ----

[Harriet and John]

Anybody remember YE/YG beacons?

"Mike Kanze" > wrote in message
...
> >How do they do it, today ?
>
> Same as they've always done it: springs and mirrors, with some Kentucky
> windage thrown in. In a ziplip / EMCON environment, a good sense of
> situational awareness, decent DR skills or just following the other guy
will
> usually do.
>
> If you're especially unlucky or inept, no need to worry. The ship (or
more
> specifically, the ship's BARCAP) will find YOU.
>
> --
> Mike Kanze
>
> "Do witches run spell-checkers?"
>
> - Old word processing joke
>
>
> "Al Dykes" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > As an armchair admiral, I've always wondered how A/C in WWII knew how
> > to find the carrier after being away for a couple hours on a mission.
> > I assume the pilots were told, roughly, where the carrier plans to be,
> > but sh*t happens. I always assume the carrier doesn't broadcast any
> > radio signals.
> >
> > How do they do it, today ?
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > a d y k e s @ p a n i x . c o m
> > ----
>
>
>

[Guy Alcala]

Al Dykes wrote:

> As an armchair admiral, I've always wondered how A/C in WWII knew how
> to find the carrier after being away for a couple hours on a mission.
> I assume the pilots were told, roughly, where the carrier plans to be,
> but sh*t happens. I always assume the carrier doesn't broadcast any
> radio signals.

Surprised someone hasn't explained how "Point Option" works, but they were
typically given a mean line of advance and a mean speed of advance of the
carrier, e.g. 240/20 kts, and the point along that line where the carrier
expected to be at their ETA. So they'd fly to that point, then if nothing
was around, head back along the line of advance, and presumably the
carrier would be within a few miles of the line. This allowed the carrier
to maneuver relatively freely, provided they made good their mean
course/speed. Point Option generally allowed considerable time for
detours, to allow the carrier to still make it barring major damage or
attack.

All of this assumes that their navigation was good, which is one reason
why they typically flew at low altitudes early in the outbound leg and
during the return leg, so they could see the wind on the water and take
that into account. Given the often large uncertainties remaining, USN
strike radius missions included a 1 hour reserve for rendezvous, landing,
and milling around while deciding "I think maybe the carrier is over in
that direction".

In the mid/late '30s, finding the carrier was made considerably simpler
for US and British pilots. Both countries developed directional VHF radio
beacons, which could be used relatively freely in tactical situations
because they were line of sight, whereas MF/HF beacons could be DF'ed over
the horizon. I forget the details of the RN version (Type 79), but AIUI
the US YE beacon broadcast a different Morse letter for each 15 degree
segment (keyed to the ship's gyrocompass) around the ship. So the pilot
listened on his ZB receiver for the Morse letter, looked up on his code
card for the day which 15 degree segment the Morse letter referred to, and
then flew the reciprocal course. ISTR range was something like 45nm at
1,500 feet, which was more than adequate to eliminate all but the grossest
navigation errors. TACAN was the postwar UHF equivalent (VOR being the
civilian VHF version), which presented directional info visually and also
(with DME) showed range.

Of course, that assumes that both beacon and receiver are working -- HMS
Victorious' beacon was down when her strike returned from attacking the
Bismarck in poor visibility and twilight, and her Captain began shining
searchlights off the clouds until told to stop by the admiral. He then
began to make a very long signal by light, using his largest signal
projector. Fortunately, all of her Swordfish got back despite their
mostly inexperienced crews (some had made their very first carrier landing
the day the ship sailed to look for the Bismarck), although some of her
Fulmar fighters sent up to shadow Bismarck didn't find her or Victorious
and subsequently ditched.

Once VHF beacons were introduced, VHF radars and VHF voice radio weren't
far behind with the same LOS-only advantages, so the carrier could also
home lost a/c by radar and radio directions, without making herself
particularly vulnerable. Anyone with a VHF DF receiver was theoretically
able to pick up the radar transmissions as well as radio ones so the risk
was the same, and they had to face the possibility of a radar-directed CAP
showing up.

Finally, by 1943 both USN and RN strike a/c had surface search radar,
which served the same purpose of localisation but didn't require the
carrier herself to broadcast.

> How do they do it, today ?

I imagine Point Option is much the same, but given the advantages of
modern navigation/detection systems and the much higher speed of jets plus
their shorter endurance, a carrier won't move as far in relative terms
during a sortie as was the case in the piston-engine era. Nowadays the
carrier is typically programmed as a moving waypoint with the given course
and speed into the a/c's nav. system. With GPS/INS, everyone knows where
they are to within a few meters, assuming everything's working. All the
WW2-era systems and methods have their modern analogues.

Guy

[Rich]

(Al Dykes) wrote in message >...
> As an armchair admiral, I've always wondered how A/C in WWII knew how
> to find the carrier after being away for a couple hours on a mission.
> I assume the pilots were told, roughly, where the carrier plans to be,
> but sh*t happens. I always assume the carrier doesn't broadcast any
> radio signals.
>
> How do they do it, today ?

Well, for WWII USN carriers, generally pilots got a "Point Option"
that would give them a general idea where their carrier was supposed
to be. Then it became a matter of sorting out the homing signal.
Presume the RN worked the same way as they had similar homing
equipment. Don't think the Japanese used homing signals.

Rich

[W. D. Allen Sr.]

Good summary, Guy. I didn't realize how much I had forgotten.

WDA

end

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Al Dykes wrote:
>
>> As an armchair admiral, I've always wondered how A/C in WWII knew how
>> to find the carrier after being away for a couple hours on a mission.
>> I assume the pilots were told, roughly, where the carrier plans to be,
>> but sh*t happens. I always assume the carrier doesn't broadcast any
>> radio signals.
>
> Surprised someone hasn't explained how "Point Option" works, but they were
> typically given a mean line of advance and a mean speed of advance of the
> carrier, e.g. 240/20 kts, and the point along that line where the carrier
> expected to be at their ETA. So they'd fly to that point, then if nothing
> was around, head back along the line of advance, and presumably the
> carrier would be within a few miles of the line. This allowed the carrier
> to maneuver relatively freely, provided they made good their mean
> course/speed. Point Option generally allowed considerable time for
> detours, to allow the carrier to still make it barring major damage or
> attack.
>
> All of this assumes that their navigation was good, which is one reason
> why they typically flew at low altitudes early in the outbound leg and
> during the return leg, so they could see the wind on the water and take
> that into account. Given the often large uncertainties remaining, USN
> strike radius missions included a 1 hour reserve for rendezvous, landing,
> and milling around while deciding "I think maybe the carrier is over in
> that direction".
>
> In the mid/late '30s, finding the carrier was made considerably simpler
> for US and British pilots. Both countries developed directional VHF radio
> beacons, which could be used relatively freely in tactical situations
> because they were line of sight, whereas MF/HF beacons could be DF'ed over
> the horizon. I forget the details of the RN version (Type 79), but AIUI
> the US YE beacon broadcast a different Morse letter for each 15 degree
> segment (keyed to the ship's gyrocompass) around the ship. So the pilot
> listened on his ZB receiver for the Morse letter, looked up on his code
> card for the day which 15 degree segment the Morse letter referred to, and
> then flew the reciprocal course. ISTR range was something like 45nm at
> 1,500 feet, which was more than adequate to eliminate all but the grossest
> navigation errors. TACAN was the postwar UHF equivalent (VOR being the
> civilian VHF version), which presented directional info visually and also
> (with DME) showed range.
>
> Of course, that assumes that both beacon and receiver are working -- HMS
> Victorious' beacon was down when her strike returned from attacking the
> Bismarck in poor visibility and twilight, and her Captain began shining
> searchlights off the clouds until told to stop by the admiral. He then
> began to make a very long signal by light, using his largest signal
> projector. Fortunately, all of her Swordfish got back despite their
> mostly inexperienced crews (some had made their very first carrier landing
> the day the ship sailed to look for the Bismarck), although some of her
> Fulmar fighters sent up to shadow Bismarck didn't find her or Victorious
> and subsequently ditched.
>
> Once VHF beacons were introduced, VHF radars and VHF voice radio weren't
> far behind with the same LOS-only advantages, so the carrier could also
> home lost a/c by radar and radio directions, without making herself
> particularly vulnerable. Anyone with a VHF DF receiver was theoretically
> able to pick up the radar transmissions as well as radio ones so the risk
> was the same, and they had to face the possibility of a radar-directed CAP
> showing up.
>
> Finally, by 1943 both USN and RN strike a/c had surface search radar,
> which served the same purpose of localisation but didn't require the
> carrier herself to broadcast.
>
>> How do they do it, today ?
>
> I imagine Point Option is much the same, but given the advantages of
> modern navigation/detection systems and the much higher speed of jets plus
> their shorter endurance, a carrier won't move as far in relative terms
> during a sortie as was the case in the piston-engine era. Nowadays the
> carrier is typically programmed as a moving waypoint with the given course
> and speed into the a/c's nav. system. With GPS/INS, everyone knows where
> they are to within a few meters, assuming everything's working. All the
> WW2-era systems and methods have their modern analogues.
>
> Guy
>

[Laura O''Leary]

Today, we primarily use Tacan. However, knowing where the boat should be is
always a good preflight brief item to write down on your kneeboard card.
You never know when the "cake dryer" needs that "common" part that seems to
exist in the guts of the Tacan system.(or the ACLS/ICLS). However, the next
generation of carrier is supposed to have differential gps-like signal that
is transmitted so that aircraft don't need to be in T/R on the new nav
system. I think the name is JPALS (joint precision aircraft landing
system?). Eventually, all ships that have aircraft flying off of them
would have JPALS retrofitted onto the ships. Of course, it, much like other
procurement items, may not come to fruition.

"Rich" > wrote in message
om...
> (Al Dykes) wrote in message
> >...
>> As an armchair admiral, I've always wondered how A/C in WWII knew how
>> to find the carrier after being away for a couple hours on a mission.
>> I assume the pilots were told, roughly, where the carrier plans to be,
>> but sh*t happens. I always assume the carrier doesn't broadcast any
>> radio signals.
>>
>> How do they do it, today ?
>
> Well, for WWII USN carriers, generally pilots got a "Point Option"
> that would give them a general idea where their carrier was supposed
> to be. Then it became a matter of sorting out the homing signal.
> Presume the RN worked the same way as they had similar homing
> equipment. Don't think the Japanese used homing signals.
>
> Rich

[Joe Delphi]

"Mike Kanze" > wrote in message
...
> >How do they do it, today ?
>

Probably using GPS.

[Frank Minich]

"Al Dykes" > wrote in message
...
>
>
> How do they do it, today ?
>

In the late 70's, you just looked for the biggest cloud. The ship was
usually under it.

[Mike Kanze]

Guy,

Thanks for reminding the more forgetful of us about Point Option. This was
what I had in mind when I answered Al Dyke with the "DR" portion of my
response. In fact, that's what it is - a DR problem with a specific name.

>With GPS/INS, everyone knows where they are to within a few meters,
>assuming everything's working.

Of course it helps mightily if you have a reasonably accurate fix from the
ship before you launch - unlike the pre-launch (and pre-GPS) 40 nm-in-error
"fix" that the CORAL MARU gave a VA-95 crew during its 1975 cruise. (Sea
story previously shared in this NG.) If you don't know from where you
started, DR by itself isn't going to get you home. Worse if you THINK you
know from where you started - like the VA-95 crew, but are wrong and don't
know it.

--
Mike Kanze

"Do witches run spell-checkers?"

- Old word processing joke


"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Al Dykes wrote:
>
>> As an armchair admiral, I've always wondered how A/C in WWII knew how
>> to find the carrier after being away for a couple hours on a mission.
>> I assume the pilots were told, roughly, where the carrier plans to be,
>> but sh*t happens. I always assume the carrier doesn't broadcast any
>> radio signals.
>
> Surprised someone hasn't explained how "Point Option" works, but they were
> typically given a mean line of advance and a mean speed of advance of the
> carrier, e.g. 240/20 kts, and the point along that line where the carrier
> expected to be at their ETA. So they'd fly to that point, then if nothing
> was around, head back along the line of advance, and presumably the
> carrier would be within a few miles of the line. This allowed the carrier
> to maneuver relatively freely, provided they made good their mean
> course/speed. Point Option generally allowed considerable time for
> detours, to allow the carrier to still make it barring major damage or
> attack.
>
> All of this assumes that their navigation was good, which is one reason
> why they typically flew at low altitudes early in the outbound leg and
> during the return leg, so they could see the wind on the water and take
> that into account. Given the often large uncertainties remaining, USN
> strike radius missions included a 1 hour reserve for rendezvous, landing,
> and milling around while deciding "I think maybe the carrier is over in
> that direction".
>
> In the mid/late '30s, finding the carrier was made considerably simpler
> for US and British pilots. Both countries developed directional VHF radio
> beacons, which could be used relatively freely in tactical situations
> because they were line of sight, whereas MF/HF beacons could be DF'ed over
> the horizon. I forget the details of the RN version (Type 79), but AIUI
> the US YE beacon broadcast a different Morse letter for each 15 degree
> segment (keyed to the ship's gyrocompass) around the ship. So the pilot
> listened on his ZB receiver for the Morse letter, looked up on his code
> card for the day which 15 degree segment the Morse letter referred to, and
> then flew the reciprocal course. ISTR range was something like 45nm at
> 1,500 feet, which was more than adequate to eliminate all but the grossest
> navigation errors. TACAN was the postwar UHF equivalent (VOR being the
> civilian VHF version), which presented directional info visually and also
> (with DME) showed range.
>
> Of course, that assumes that both beacon and receiver are working -- HMS
> Victorious' beacon was down when her strike returned from attacking the
> Bismarck in poor visibility and twilight, and her Captain began shining
> searchlights off the clouds until told to stop by the admiral. He then
> began to make a very long signal by light, using his largest signal
> projector. Fortunately, all of her Swordfish got back despite their
> mostly inexperienced crews (some had made their very first carrier landing
> the day the ship sailed to look for the Bismarck), although some of her
> Fulmar fighters sent up to shadow Bismarck didn't find her or Victorious
> and subsequently ditched.
>
> Once VHF beacons were introduced, VHF radars and VHF voice radio weren't
> far behind with the same LOS-only advantages, so the carrier could also
> home lost a/c by radar and radio directions, without making herself
> particularly vulnerable. Anyone with a VHF DF receiver was theoretically
> able to pick up the radar transmissions as well as radio ones so the risk
> was the same, and they had to face the possibility of a radar-directed CAP
> showing up.
>
> Finally, by 1943 both USN and RN strike a/c had surface search radar,
> which served the same purpose of localisation but didn't require the
> carrier herself to broadcast.
>
>> How do they do it, today ?
>
> I imagine Point Option is much the same, but given the advantages of
> modern navigation/detection systems and the much higher speed of jets plus
> their shorter endurance, a carrier won't move as far in relative terms
> during a sortie as was the case in the piston-engine era. Nowadays the
> carrier is typically programmed as a moving waypoint with the given course
> and speed into the a/c's nav. system. With GPS/INS, everyone knows where
> they are to within a few meters, assuming everything's working. All the
> WW2-era systems and methods have their modern analogues.
>
> Guy
>

[Guy Alcala]

"W. D. Allen Sr." wrote:

> Good summary, Guy. I didn't realize how much I had forgotten.

It's a lot easier for me, as it's all just book larnin' with absolutely zero
personal experience. I've got nothing to forget, so it's easy to remember only
the details I want to ;-)

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

Mike Kanze wrote:

> Guy,
>
> Thanks for reminding the more forgetful of us about Point Option. This was
> what I had in mind when I answered Al Dyke with the "DR" portion of my
> response. In fact, that's what it is - a DR problem with a specific name.

See my reply to W.D. Allen.

> >With GPS/INS, everyone knows where they are to within a few meters,
> >assuming everything's working.
>
> Of course it helps mightily if you have a reasonably accurate fix from the
> ship before you launch - unlike the pre-launch (and pre-GPS) 40 nm-in-error
> "fix" that the CORAL MARU gave a VA-95 crew during its 1975 cruise. (Sea
> story previously shared in this NG.) If you don't know from where you
> started, DR by itself isn't going to get you home.

Sure isn't.

> Worse if you THINK you
> know from where you started - like the VA-95 crew, but are wrong and don't
> know it.

FWIW, here's an account of 1980s tech, by a Sea Harrier on a single-ship night
CAP mission from HMS Invincible during the Falklands War. SHARs didn't have a
real INS at the time, they used a twin-gyro nav platform that was easier to
align on board:

"As soon as I was turning and burning, I put the radar to 'Standby' to warm up
and called 'On deck'.

"'Roger. Ship's head is 340; now, now, now! Your position is 55 deg. 05' W and
51 deg. 12' S.' The communication link between Flyco and aircraft on deck was
via a wire, not radio.

"The information passed was necessary for aligning the NAVHARS platform. My HUD
had already showed me that the a/c was pointing 2 deg. to the left of the ship's
centerline, and so on the third 'now' I entered 338 deg. into the system.
Geographical coordinates were also entered, and I was ready for launch . . . .
[he flies an uneventful mission, actually the first night of the war while the
Vulcan bombs Port Stanley airfield]

"Recovering to the ship was going to be a little different from usual, the
difference being that none of the ships would have any lights on at all --
including Invincible. The carrier would only switch on the dimmest deck
lighting when the Sea Jet [SHAR] was about 200 yards from touchdown. Then, as
soon as the wheels touched the deck, it would be off with the lights and back to
darken ship.

"I descended to low level and, using my NAVHARS, navigated through the briefed
safety lane to where I expected Invincible's marshalling area to be. Switching
my radar to transmit, I found what I thought was Invincible amongst the many
contacts on my neat green radar display and called the Approach Controller. '003
estimating 6 miles on the approach. 800 feet, gear down and locked, 2200
pounds.' I had stacks of fuel.

"Roger, 003, I have you at 5 1/2 miles. Ship's head 320. Wind over the deck 18
knots."

And so on to recovery. And here's a night approach in poor weather a bit later
in the war:

"By the time I began my final descent towards the Carrier Group I was back
amongst the clouds. They were massive and very turbulent. After I had
descended to low level and was running in to the expected position of the ship
via the safety lane, I called, '004, on the way in. Estimating 280, 25 miles.
Over.'

"Tony was immediately on the air. 'Roger, 004, read you loud and clear. I have
no contact on you, repeat no contact. Clutter from snow clouds too intense.'
He was concerned. Good old Tony; there's a man you can really trust. He'd do
anything to get his pilots down safely.

"'Roger. I'll conduct my own approach and call out my ranges to go.' I was
feeling confident thanks to two important facts. Firstly, when Invincible gave
a ship's estimated position for the recovery of aircraft, you could bet your
pension on her being in that position when you returned from your flight,
especially in bad weather. So I was very sure in my mind that I could find the
deck using my NAVHARS information. The second fact was that I had practiced
self-homing to the deck on many occasions, and we had also carried out the
trials on the software for self-homing when ashore in the Trials Unit. It was
no higher workload for the pilot than following instructions from the ship's
precision approach controller.

On my radar screen, the Invincible 'position destination marker' that I had
selected on my nav computer sat less than 2 miles from one of the ship contacts
in view. I had already programmed the 'marker' with the ship's pre-briefed
recovery course and speed and was happy to see it was holding good formation on
the contact nearest to it. That had got to be Invincible -- I hadn't enough
fuel left to make any mistakes. There was enough for one approach only.

"It was a simple matter to update the radar marker's position by fixing the
radar onto the contact. The 'Self-Controlled Approach' programme in the NAVHARS
computer software was provided so that pilots could safely carry out their own
precision approach to a chosen destination. My chosen destination was the ship,
and as I lined up 5 miles astern of what I thought was Invincible, I selected
the precision approach mode on the HUD. I also locked the radar onto the ship
to keep the 'destination' information as accurate as possible . . .

"'Five miles on the approach.' I called.

"'Roger, still no contact.' Tony must be sweating buckets down there. I was at
800 feet and the world outside was black. Approaching 3 miles I prepared to
commence descent. The radar was firmly locked on to the contact ahead.

"'Three miles.'

"'Still no contact.'

"Was I on the right ship? I began to wonder as I started down the slope. My
jet was being tossed around a bit by turbulence from heavy clouds, which would
certainly account for the clutter Tony had mentioned. There was no other course
but to wait and see.

"'Have you now at 1 1/2 miles. On the glide slope.' Tony sounded relieved. I
was relieved.

"Tony continued with his calls all the way to half a mile. He had passed the
wind over the deck as 40 knots gusting 50. It felt like it in the cockpit,
too. The buffeting increased as I got lower.

"'Half a mile.' My head-up information said the same. I delayed selecting
hover-stop for a few seconds because of the strong head-wind, then nozzles down,
power going on. At a quarter of a mile I called 'Lights'. And there, behind
the radar cross in the HUD, appeared the ship's island. As usual the cross was
just about on Flyco. Radar off and concentrate on controlling the jet. As I
was moving sideways over the deck from alongside the wind backed through 30
deg. I ruddered the nose into it before settling onto the deck with an
uncharacteristic thud.

"'That's my excitement over for the night,' I thought. It was 0400 hours, and a
long day lay ahead."

For anyone who's interested, all the above is from "Sea Harrier over the
Falklands: A Maverick at War," by Commander (ret.) Nigel 'Sharkey' Ward, DSC,
AFC, RN.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

Harriet and John wrote:

> Anybody remember YE/YG beacons?

I know YG was the backup to YE, smaller and less powerful I believe, but I
don't know if it otherwise operated the same.

Guy

[nafod40]

Mike Kanze wrote:
> Of course it helps mightily if you have a reasonably accurate fix from the
> ship before you launch - unlike the pre-launch (and pre-GPS) 40 nm-in-error
> "fix" that the CORAL MARU gave a VA-95 crew during its 1975 cruise. (Sea
> story previously shared in this NG.) If you don't know from where you
> started, DR by itself isn't going to get you home. Worse if you THINK you
> know from where you started - like the VA-95 crew, but are wrong and don't
> know it.

We were doing blue water ops, and launched on an alert. I was a nugget
null-P in the E-2. The CAPC makes a big deal about grabbing an accurate
chart that's up to date before we going flying. We get airborne and he
opens the chart up...and it's all blue. Top to bottom, left to right. He
looks at it for a second, closes it back up and sticks it in the navbag
and says, "I guess we're there!"

[Allen Epps]

In article >, nafod40
> wrote:

> Mike Kanze wrote:
> > Of course it helps mightily if you have a reasonably accurate fix from the
> > ship before you launch - unlike the pre-launch (and pre-GPS) 40 nm-in-error
> > "fix" that the CORAL MARU gave a VA-95 crew during its 1975 cruise. (Sea
> > story previously shared in this NG.) If you don't know from where you
> > started, DR by itself isn't going to get you home. Worse if you THINK you
> > know from where you started - like the VA-95 crew, but are wrong and don't
> > know it.
>
> We were doing blue water ops, and launched on an alert. I was a nugget
> null-P in the E-2. The CAPC makes a big deal about grabbing an accurate
> chart that's up to date before we going flying. We get airborne and he
> opens the chart up...and it's all blue. Top to bottom, left to right. He
> looks at it for a second, closes it back up and sticks it in the navbag
> and says, "I guess we're there!"
>
The INS on the ICAP II Prowler was actually pretty good, aligned well,
rarely lost it's platform or ran away too badly (except when really
needed of course). But when getting a CV alignment you often found the
ship had given you the wrong position. The problem here is that you
need an accurate INS position to the real geography to steer the
jammers and give valid steering data to the HARM. So....... launch,
manually degrade the INS and get an accurate update off of something,
apply manual mag var and winds to keep the system as tight as possible,
then when it's time to go home to an EMCOM mom, upgrade to INS mode
again and even though it's not accurate to the real world, point 0 is
still reasonably close to where you left and then apply the recovery
PIM and hopefully the auto dawg machine was where you thought it was.
And when it's not, fess up and call the Hummer or look for the nastiest
thunderstorm around and the boats under it.......

Pugs

[Pechs1]

<< How do they do it, today ? >><BR><BR>

We had a Tacan.....most of the time that is.
P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

[John Carrier]

> We had a Tacan

Or not. A certain Adm Jerry Tuttle had an aversion to radiating from his
ships. EMCON night recoveries north of the arctic circle. Pitching deck,
70 knots of wind over the deck, and the most memorable night trap in my life
(yes, you CAN experience the 3 ultimate physical pleasures simultaneously).

The E-2 would set up the recovery (which typically included a misdirection
penatration followed by a 25-50 mile vector at 1200 feet). Pulse
single-scan could really help on the run in. Figure out the BRC/FB on
flyover, turn downwind and dirty up, time 30 seconds while descending to 600
feet. Level turn to FB, fiddle with lineup and descend when the ball looked
centered. Cut lights (hopefully just once) and fly the ball. Not bad when
the weather was reasonable. Not fun when it was not.

R / John

[John R Weiss]

"John Carrier" > wrote...
>
> Or not. A certain Adm Jerry Tuttle had an aversion to radiating from his
> ships. EMCON night recoveries north of the arctic circle. Pitching deck, 70
> knots of wind over the deck, and the most memorable night trap in my life
> (yes, you CAN experience the 3 ultimate physical pleasures simultaneously).

Hmmm... Tuttle must have been friends with Chuck McGrail when McGrail was CO of
Midway in the early 80s... EMCON recoveries (day and night) and "stealth
transits" were routine for a while!

I've heard of the "7 basic pleasures of life," and can only guess which of the 3
you refer to as "ultimate"... :-)


> The E-2 would set up the recovery (which typically included a misdirection
> penatration followed by a 25-50 mile vector at 1200 feet). Pulse single-scan
> could really help on the run in.

....but not available in the KA-6D, even for "cheating"...

[Laura O''Leary]

The block 89A version of the ICAP II Prowler has EGI (Embedded GPS/INS) so
you can actually realign airborne overhead mom when it is required. Of
course, marking your position overhead mom is still something we don't teach
our ECMOs to do. Of course, we don't teach our ECMOs much about the boat in
the RAG. They only get the very basics of CV ops and if they are lucky
enough, we would drag them along to ride in the backseat for CQ. Student
ECMOs don't know how dangerous CQ is and especially in the backseat of a
student pilot's jet.


"Allen Epps" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, nafod40
> > wrote:
>
>> Mike Kanze wrote:
>> > Of course it helps mightily if you have a reasonably accurate fix from
>> > the
>> > ship before you launch - unlike the pre-launch (and pre-GPS) 40
>> > nm-in-error
>> > "fix" that the CORAL MARU gave a VA-95 crew during its 1975 cruise.
>> > (Sea
>> > story previously shared in this NG.) If you don't know from where you
>> > started, DR by itself isn't going to get you home. Worse if you THINK
>> > you
>> > know from where you started - like the VA-95 crew, but are wrong and
>> > don't
>> > know it.
>>
>> We were doing blue water ops, and launched on an alert. I was a nugget
>> null-P in the E-2. The CAPC makes a big deal about grabbing an accurate
>> chart that's up to date before we going flying. We get airborne and he
>> opens the chart up...and it's all blue. Top to bottom, left to right. He
>> looks at it for a second, closes it back up and sticks it in the navbag
>> and says, "I guess we're there!"
>>
> The INS on the ICAP II Prowler was actually pretty good, aligned well,
> rarely lost it's platform or ran away too badly (except when really
> needed of course). But when getting a CV alignment you often found the
> ship had given you the wrong position. The problem here is that you
> need an accurate INS position to the real geography to steer the
> jammers and give valid steering data to the HARM. So....... launch,
> manually degrade the INS and get an accurate update off of something,
> apply manual mag var and winds to keep the system as tight as possible,
> then when it's time to go home to an EMCOM mom, upgrade to INS mode
> again and even though it's not accurate to the real world, point 0 is
> still reasonably close to where you left and then apply the recovery
> PIM and hopefully the auto dawg machine was where you thought it was.
> And when it's not, fess up and call the Hummer or look for the nastiest
> thunderstorm around and the boats under it.......
>
> Pugs

[Allen Epps]

In article <6lwgd.47$fw2.46@trndny01>, Laura O''Leary
> wrote:

> The block 89A version of the ICAP II Prowler has EGI (Embedded GPS/INS) so
> you can actually realign airborne overhead mom when it is required. Of
> course, marking your position overhead mom is still something we don't teach
> our ECMOs to do. Of course, we don't teach our ECMOs much about the boat in
> the RAG. They only get the very basics of CV ops and if they are lucky
> enough, we would drag them along to ride in the backseat for CQ. Student
> ECMOs don't know how dangerous CQ is and especially in the backseat of a
> student pilot's jet.
>
>
I flew the 89 for maybe 200 hours in VAQ-209 before I retired and while
it had it's strengths I never did really care for the CRT ADI after we
had to shoot a no gyro PAR at night in the goo into Roosy Roads because
of the DU overheat shutting down both displays. I could also never find
a really good illum level from the right seat that satisfied the pilot
and me. The 89A INS/GPS combo might make it all worthwhile though.

You're certainly right about being clueless in the backseat in the RAG
CQ. My first trip to the boat was with a Marine 1st lt to Indy. ended
up DQ'ing and I never had a clue how bad he was. I was just having a
great time finally feeling like I was finally seeing the big grey
boat. 500+ traps later I feel like I know a bit too much!

Pugs

[B.C. Mallam]

In the early 60's we used a CHART PLOTTING BOARD Mark 6A, it was about 14"
by 14". The ships course and speed and the flight plan could be plotted at
the same time. It was a hand job but it worked, most of the time. If it
didn't you started a square search at the point you were suppose to meet.
Also it opened up and was a good place for porn pictures!





On 28/10/04 5:46 PM, in article , "Frank Minich"
> wrote:

>
> "Al Dykes" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>>
>> How do they do it, today ?
>>
>
> In the late 70's, you just looked for the biggest cloud. The ship was
> usually under it.
>
>

[Mike Kanze]

Guy,

Great share. Thanks.

--
Mike Kanze

"Do witches run spell-checkers?"

- Old word processing joke


"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Mike Kanze wrote:
>
>> Guy,
>>
>> Thanks for reminding the more forgetful of us about Point Option. This
>> was
>> what I had in mind when I answered Al Dyke with the "DR" portion of my
>> response. In fact, that's what it is - a DR problem with a specific
>> name.
>
> See my reply to W.D. Allen.
>
>> >With GPS/INS, everyone knows where they are to within a few meters,
>> >assuming everything's working.
>>
>> Of course it helps mightily if you have a reasonably accurate fix from
>> the
>> ship before you launch - unlike the pre-launch (and pre-GPS) 40
>> nm-in-error
>> "fix" that the CORAL MARU gave a VA-95 crew during its 1975 cruise. (Sea
>> story previously shared in this NG.) If you don't know from where you
>> started, DR by itself isn't going to get you home.
>
> Sure isn't.
>
>> Worse if you THINK you
>> know from where you started - like the VA-95 crew, but are wrong and
>> don't
>> know it.
>
> FWIW, here's an account of 1980s tech, by a Sea Harrier on a single-ship
> night
> CAP mission from HMS Invincible during the Falklands War. SHARs didn't
> have a
> real INS at the time, they used a twin-gyro nav platform that was easier
> to
> align on board:
>
> "As soon as I was turning and burning, I put the radar to 'Standby' to
> warm up
> and called 'On deck'.
>
> "'Roger. Ship's head is 340; now, now, now! Your position is 55 deg. 05'
> W and
> 51 deg. 12' S.' The communication link between Flyco and aircraft on deck
> was
> via a wire, not radio.
>
> "The information passed was necessary for aligning the NAVHARS platform.
> My HUD
> had already showed me that the a/c was pointing 2 deg. to the left of the
> ship's
> centerline, and so on the third 'now' I entered 338 deg. into the system.
> Geographical coordinates were also entered, and I was ready for launch . .
> . .
> [he flies an uneventful mission, actually the first night of the war while
> the
> Vulcan bombs Port Stanley airfield]
>
> "Recovering to the ship was going to be a little different from usual, the
> difference being that none of the ships would have any lights on at all --
> including Invincible. The carrier would only switch on the dimmest deck
> lighting when the Sea Jet [SHAR] was about 200 yards from touchdown.
> Then, as
> soon as the wheels touched the deck, it would be off with the lights and
> back to
> darken ship.
>
> "I descended to low level and, using my NAVHARS, navigated through the
> briefed
> safety lane to where I expected Invincible's marshalling area to be.
> Switching
> my radar to transmit, I found what I thought was Invincible amongst the
> many
> contacts on my neat green radar display and called the Approach
> Controller. '003
> estimating 6 miles on the approach. 800 feet, gear down and locked, 2200
> pounds.' I had stacks of fuel.
>
> "Roger, 003, I have you at 5 1/2 miles. Ship's head 320. Wind over the
> deck 18
> knots."
>
> And so on to recovery. And here's a night approach in poor weather a bit
> later
> in the war:
>
> "By the time I began my final descent towards the Carrier Group I was back
> amongst the clouds. They were massive and very turbulent. After I had
> descended to low level and was running in to the expected position of the
> ship
> via the safety lane, I called, '004, on the way in. Estimating 280, 25
> miles.
> Over.'
>
> "Tony was immediately on the air. 'Roger, 004, read you loud and clear.
> I have
> no contact on you, repeat no contact. Clutter from snow clouds too
> intense.'
> He was concerned. Good old Tony; there's a man you can really trust.
> He'd do
> anything to get his pilots down safely.
>
> "'Roger. I'll conduct my own approach and call out my ranges to go.' I
> was
> feeling confident thanks to two important facts. Firstly, when Invincible
> gave
> a ship's estimated position for the recovery of aircraft, you could bet
> your
> pension on her being in that position when you returned from your flight,
> especially in bad weather. So I was very sure in my mind that I could
> find the
> deck using my NAVHARS information. The second fact was that I had
> practiced
> self-homing to the deck on many occasions, and we had also carried out the
> trials on the software for self-homing when ashore in the Trials Unit. It
> was
> no higher workload for the pilot than following instructions from the
> ship's
> precision approach controller.
>
> On my radar screen, the Invincible 'position destination marker' that I
> had
> selected on my nav computer sat less than 2 miles from one of the ship
> contacts
> in view. I had already programmed the 'marker' with the ship's
> pre-briefed
> recovery course and speed and was happy to see it was holding good
> formation on
> the contact nearest to it. That had got to be Invincible -- I hadn't
> enough
> fuel left to make any mistakes. There was enough for one approach only.
>
> "It was a simple matter to update the radar marker's position by fixing
> the
> radar onto the contact. The 'Self-Controlled Approach' programme in the
> NAVHARS
> computer software was provided so that pilots could safely carry out their
> own
> precision approach to a chosen destination. My chosen destination was the
> ship,
> and as I lined up 5 miles astern of what I thought was Invincible, I
> selected
> the precision approach mode on the HUD. I also locked the radar onto the
> ship
> to keep the 'destination' information as accurate as possible . . .
>
> "'Five miles on the approach.' I called.
>
> "'Roger, still no contact.' Tony must be sweating buckets down there. I
> was at
> 800 feet and the world outside was black. Approaching 3 miles I prepared
> to
> commence descent. The radar was firmly locked on to the contact ahead.
>
> "'Three miles.'
>
> "'Still no contact.'
>
> "Was I on the right ship? I began to wonder as I started down the slope.
> My
> jet was being tossed around a bit by turbulence from heavy clouds, which
> would
> certainly account for the clutter Tony had mentioned. There was no other
> course
> but to wait and see.
>
> "'Have you now at 1 1/2 miles. On the glide slope.' Tony sounded
> relieved. I
> was relieved.
>
> "Tony continued with his calls all the way to half a mile. He had passed
> the
> wind over the deck as 40 knots gusting 50. It felt like it in the
> cockpit,
> too. The buffeting increased as I got lower.
>
> "'Half a mile.' My head-up information said the same. I delayed
> selecting
> hover-stop for a few seconds because of the strong head-wind, then nozzles
> down,
> power going on. At a quarter of a mile I called 'Lights'. And there,
> behind
> the radar cross in the HUD, appeared the ship's island. As usual the
> cross was
> just about on Flyco. Radar off and concentrate on controlling the jet.
> As I
> was moving sideways over the deck from alongside the wind backed through
> 30
> deg. I ruddered the nose into it before settling onto the deck with an
> uncharacteristic thud.
>
> "'That's my excitement over for the night,' I thought. It was 0400 hours,
> and a
> long day lay ahead."
>
> For anyone who's interested, all the above is from "Sea Harrier over the
> Falklands: A Maverick at War," by Commander (ret.) Nigel 'Sharkey' Ward,
> DSC,
> AFC, RN.
>
> Guy
>
>
>

[Mike Kanze]

nafod40,

>"I guess we're there!"

In the case of the Green Lizard (VA-95) crew, "there" was practice
penetrations of Taiwanese airspace to exercise Nationalist air defense
capabilities. Due to the aforementioned ship's posit error, the Lizard crew
found themselves headed toward a Mainland China coast-in point. Fortunately
they 180ed and bustered for Mother before being "welcomed" by the PLAAF.

--
Mike Kanze

"Do witches run spell-checkers?"

- Old word processing joke


"nafod40" > wrote in message
...
> Mike Kanze wrote:
>> Of course it helps mightily if you have a reasonably accurate fix from
>> the ship before you launch - unlike the pre-launch (and pre-GPS) 40
>> nm-in-error "fix" that the CORAL MARU gave a VA-95 crew during its 1975
>> cruise. (Sea story previously shared in this NG.) If you don't know
>> from where you started, DR by itself isn't going to get you home. Worse
>> if you THINK you know from where you started - like the VA-95 crew, but
>> are wrong and don't know it.
>
> We were doing blue water ops, and launched on an alert. I was a nugget
> null-P in the E-2. The CAPC makes a big deal about grabbing an accurate
> chart that's up to date before we going flying. We get airborne and he
> opens the chart up...and it's all blue. Top to bottom, left to right. He
> looks at it for a second, closes it back up and sticks it in the navbag
> and says, "I guess we're there!"
>

[Mike Kanze]

John,

>north of the arctic circle.

A place where the wet compass is worse than its usual useless.

--
Mike Kanze

"Do witches run spell-checkers?"

- Old word processing joke


"John Carrier" > wrote in message
...
>> We had a Tacan
>
> Or not. A certain Adm Jerry Tuttle had an aversion to radiating from his
> ships. EMCON night recoveries north of the arctic circle. Pitching deck,
> 70 knots of wind over the deck, and the most memorable night trap in my
> life (yes, you CAN experience the 3 ultimate physical pleasures
> simultaneously).
>
> The E-2 would set up the recovery (which typically included a misdirection
> penatration followed by a 25-50 mile vector at 1200 feet). Pulse
> single-scan could really help on the run in. Figure out the BRC/FB on
> flyover, turn downwind and dirty up, time 30 seconds while descending to
> 600 feet. Level turn to FB, fiddle with lineup and descend when the ball
> looked centered. Cut lights (hopefully just once) and fly the ball. Not
> bad when the weather was reasonable. Not fun when it was not.
>
> R / John
>

[Mike Kanze]

John,

>...but not available in the KA-6D, even for "cheating"...

Amen.

One tactic would be to find a navigationally-competent friend up there and
promise some gas for a lead home. (Note I said "promise." <g>)

--
Mike Kanze

436 Greenbrier Road
Half Moon Bay, California 94019-2259
USA

650-726-7890

"Do witches run spell-checkers?"

- Old word processing joke


"John R Weiss" > wrote in message
news:sIugd.271445$wV.72828@attbi_s54...
> "John Carrier" > wrote...
>>
>> Or not. A certain Adm Jerry Tuttle had an aversion to radiating from his
>> ships. EMCON night recoveries north of the arctic circle. Pitching
>> deck, 70
>> knots of wind over the deck, and the most memorable night trap in my life
>> (yes, you CAN experience the 3 ultimate physical pleasures
>> simultaneously).
>
> Hmmm... Tuttle must have been friends with Chuck McGrail when McGrail was
> CO of
> Midway in the early 80s... EMCON recoveries (day and night) and "stealth
> transits" were routine for a while!
>
> I've heard of the "7 basic pleasures of life," and can only guess which of
> the 3
> you refer to as "ultimate"... :-)
>
>
>> The E-2 would set up the recovery (which typically included a
>> misdirection
>> penatration followed by a 25-50 mile vector at 1200 feet). Pulse
>> single-scan
>> could really help on the run in.
>
> ...but not available in the KA-6D, even for "cheating"...
>
>
>

[John R Weiss]

"Mike Kanze" > wrote...
>
>>...but not available in the KA-6D, even for "cheating"...
>
> Amen.
>
> One tactic would be to find a navigationally-competent friend up there and
> promise some gas for a lead home. (Note I said "promise." <g>)

Not usually a problem... Those Phantom phlyers could sniff a 0.5 give of JP5
from 100 miles away!

[Laura O''Leary]

The EADI intensity settings is still one of the biggest flaws in my opinion.
I can't count how many times the intensity setting didn't satisfy either the
myself or my ECMO1. Of course, equally numerous were unintentional changes
(sometimes due to a clumsy right seater but most often due to a fatigued
right seater) to the intensity setting either to completely blank or to
overwhelmingly bright on final at night at the boat (not really good for
that inside/outside scan). I also have had skippers change the displays to
what suited them which would have been fine if they had been paying
attention to why I set it the way I wanted in the first place (too many
chefs in the kitchen sort of thing). Either way, the EADI isn't the best
piece of gear in the world, but it does lend itself to getting more advanced
nav systems and displays. By the way, I believe they found the problem with
the DU cooling. However, I turn off the DUs whenever possible on deck. In
addition, I keep the intensity to a level that suits both ECMO1 and myself,
but not so bright as to overheat the things.

"Allen Epps" > wrote in message
et...
> In article <6lwgd.47$fw2.46@trndny01>, Laura O''Leary
> > wrote:
>
>> The block 89A version of the ICAP II Prowler has EGI (Embedded GPS/INS)
>> so
>> you can actually realign airborne overhead mom when it is required. Of
>> course, marking your position overhead mom is still something we don't
>> teach
>> our ECMOs to do. Of course, we don't teach our ECMOs much about the boat
>> in
>> the RAG. They only get the very basics of CV ops and if they are lucky
>> enough, we would drag them along to ride in the backseat for CQ. Student
>> ECMOs don't know how dangerous CQ is and especially in the backseat of a
>> student pilot's jet.
>>
>>
> I flew the 89 for maybe 200 hours in VAQ-209 before I retired and while
> it had it's strengths I never did really care for the CRT ADI after we
> had to shoot a no gyro PAR at night in the goo into Roosy Roads because
> of the DU overheat shutting down both displays. I could also never find
> a really good illum level from the right seat that satisfied the pilot
> and me. The 89A INS/GPS combo might make it all worthwhile though.
>
> You're certainly right about being clueless in the backseat in the RAG
> CQ. My first trip to the boat was with a Marine 1st lt to Indy. ended
> up DQ'ing and I never had a clue how bad he was. I was just having a
> great time finally feeling like I was finally seeing the big grey
> boat. 500+ traps later I feel like I know a bit too much!
>
> Pugs

[Bill Kambic]

"B.C. Mallam" wrote in message

> In the early 60's we used a CHART PLOTTING BOARD Mark 6A, it was about 14"
> by 14".

Ayup. I was taught and used in the S2 'till that platforms retirement in
'75. I know this 'cause I taught it!!!!! ;-)

The ships course and speed and the flight plan could be plotted at
> the same time. It was a hand job but it worked, most of the time.

It did require some "position sense" and somebody with a quick pencil. When
the ASN-30A worked it was great. But that device had a two cat
shot/arrestment warranty. :-( So you had to be ready with your backup.

If it
> didn't you started a square search at the point you were suppose to meet.

That was one way. Another was to drop a CODAR pair or a DIFAR bouy and look
for the "singing screw" on Mother.

> Also it opened up and was a good place for porn pictures!

I guess this kind of ties in the "singing screw."

Bill Kambic

VS-27, VS-30, VS-73, FASOTRAGRULANT

[Pechs1]

John-<< Or not. A certain Adm Jerry Tuttle had an aversion to radiating from
his
ships. >><BR><BR>

So did CAG Flatley..unless he was flying, that is.

We did night time, come into the break, type recoveries also. Why we were paid
flight pay.

P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

[Pechs1]

John-<< Hmmm... Tuttle must have been friends with Chuck McGrail when McGrail
was CO of
Midway in the early 80s... EMCON recoveries (day and night) and "stealth
transits" were routine for a while! >><BR><BR>

Was it McGrail that had us fly daytime/EMCON but you couldn't go outta sight of
the boat?

A true 'FAGAT'...fly around and get a trap?

One A-7 did and got lost??
P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

[Mike Kanze]

John,

>Those Phantom phlyers could sniff a 0.5 give of JP5 from 100 miles away!

....and howl like banshees when Tanker Control imposed an ex-post-facto "last
call" on our "give." <g>

The experienced fighter folks always assumed they'd get less than briefed,
and conducted themselves accordingly. It was usually the nuggets who made
the pained transmissions.

--
Mike Kanze

"Do witches run spell-checkers?"

- Old word processing joke


"John R Weiss" > wrote in message
news:pKBgd.22510$HA.1978@attbi_s01...
> "Mike Kanze" > wrote...
>>
>>>...but not available in the KA-6D, even for "cheating"...
>>
>> Amen.
>>
>> One tactic would be to find a navigationally-competent friend up there
>> and promise some gas for a lead home. (Note I said "promise." <g>)
>
> Not usually a problem... Those Phantom phlyers could sniff a 0.5 give of
> JP5 from 100 miles away!
>
>

[John Weiss]

"Pechs1" > wrote...
>
> Was it McGrail that had us fly daytime/EMCON but you couldn't go outta sight
> of
> the boat?


That may have been the rules at the beginning, until we proved most of us could
find our way back without dragging a Bear along...

> A true 'FAGAT'...fly around and get a trap?

Related to FACIT -- fly around and call it training.

[Yofuri]

You missed McGrail's Navy at it's best: when he had a gator-freighter
(Tripoli) and could have all kinds of fun and shake up the 'shoes but good.

The only time I ever really PO'd him was the day he told me he had been
given a choice between Midway and Kitty Hawk and couldn't decide which to
take. I asked him if he wanted to be CO or Ship's Janitor.

Rick

"John Weiss" > wrote in message
...
> "Pechs1" > wrote...
>>
>> Was it McGrail that had us fly daytime/EMCON but you couldn't go outta
>> sight of
>> the boat?
>
>
> That may have been the rules at the beginning, until we proved most of us
> could find our way back without dragging a Bear along...
>
>> A true 'FAGAT'...fly around and get a trap?
>
> Related to FACIT -- fly around and call it training.
>
>

[Guy Alcala]

Mike Kanze wrote:

> Guy,
>
> Great share. Thanks.

My pleasure.

Guy

[John Carrier]

> Why we were paid
> flight pay.

Yep. There were times (VF-126 ready room after a week of 3-a-days ACM) when
I'd think, "And they PAY us to do this!"

There were also times when my thoughts ran, "They can't pay us ENOUGH to do
this."

R / John

[Pechs1]

JR-<< That may have been the rules at the beginning, until we proved most of us
could
find our way back without dragging a Bear along... >><BR><BR>

Maybe the FID and F-14s...I did one hop where we were specifically told to stay
overhead making noise outta JP until our recovery time. Did that all day..maybe
during transit...I can't remember.

Really did like McGrail as CO tho. He brought the 'magic' back to Midway...much
better than the previous CO..who cancelled more events than we
flew...Owens....gee I remembered his name!!!
P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

[vincent p. norris]

>> with a sextant and a compass they know ware the ship was and it's heading
>> so it was not hard to comput the heading to intersect ths ships heading......

Carrier-based pilots did not use sextants. They used a "plotting
board" and returned to the boat by dead reckoning.

If you look at WW II documentaries, you will see the carrier pilots
running to their planes carrying a flat object that looks sort of like
a notebook. That's a plotting board. It slides into a slot under the
instrument panel, and could be pulled out like a drawer when in use,
or pushed back in.

>Well if the ship steered a constant heading and there
>were no cross winds or currents

Not required. Pilots could easilys account for changes in the boat's
course, and for cross winds, provided both were known before takeoff.

If you know how to draw a simple wind triangle, try doing this for
yourself. Not as easy as with a plotting board, but it can be done.

vince norris