Would you cycle the gear?

[Roy Smith]

I had an interesting experience the other day.

I was with a student in one of our club Arrows. We put the gear down
and got green lights for the 2 mains, but not for the nose.

The nose green light was flashing, as was the yellow "gear in transit"
light. Both were flashing about twice per second, and in opposition
(i.e. as the green went on, the yellow went off, and vice versa).

We ran the checklists in the POH, but did not try to cycle the gear. My
theory at the time was that since we had indication of both mains down
and locked, we should probably not mess with things any more.

On the one hand, cycling it might have fixed whatever was wrong.

On the other hand, what we had now (both mains down and locked) was not
only a survivable configuration, but one which would result in
relatively minor damage if the nose gear was indeed not locked (prop
strike). If something was jammed mechanically, cycling it could have
possibly resulted in no gear at all, or (worse) asymmetric extension).

We told the tower what was going on and requested a low pass so they
could look under the plane to see what was there. Tower reported all
three gear appeared to be down, so I just landed as gently as I could.
I was relieved when everything held together.

The maintenance people were unable to reproduce the problem and the
plane was returned to service. Best guess is a slight misalignment of
one of the limit switches.

What would you have done? Would you have cycled the gear hoping to fix
the problem, or would you have accepted the possible unlocked nosegear
in exchange for the known locked mains?

For those that are worried about such things, the outfall of our
declaring an emergency was about 2 minutes worth of paperwork. The fire
truck followed us to the ramp and the crew asked us a couple of
questions for their report. The tower also shut the runway until the
airport operations folks did a FOD inspection and declared it open again
(which must have taken all of about a minute).

[David Cartwright]

"Roy Smith" > wrote in message
...
> I was with a student in one of our club Arrows. We put the gear down
> and got green lights for the 2 mains, but not for the nose.
> We told the tower what was going on and requested a low pass so they
> could look under the plane to see what was there. Tower reported all
> three gear appeared to be down, so I just landed as gently as I could.
> I was relieved when everything held together.
> What would you have done? Would you have cycled the gear hoping to fix
> the problem, or would you have accepted the possible unlocked nosegear
> in exchange for the known locked mains?

I'd have made the same decision as you - stick with what seems to be a
pretty good situation (instead of risking cycling the gear and ending up
worse off), get the tower to have a shufti at your dangly bits, and on
receiving a promising report from them, attempt a gentle approach, holding
the nose off for as long as is practical.

The only thing I'd be tempted to do in addition, assuming your airfield is
big enough, you're experienced enough, and there's enough time to make it a
reasonably safe manoeuvre, is to make a power-off, glide landing, and to get
the second pair of hands in the cockpit (in this case your student) to crank
the propeller with the starter so it's roughly horizontal and thus won't
bash the runway. A prop strike will generally shock-load the engine and
necessitate a complete strip down.

This said, the usual rules apply: if in doubt, take the approach that is
most likely to get you walk away from the "landing", and if that means
shock-loading the engine, so be it.

> For those that are worried about such things, the outfall of our
> declaring an emergency was about 2 minutes worth of paperwork. The fire
> truck followed us to the ramp and the crew asked us a couple of
> questions for their report. The tower also shut the runway until the
> airport operations folks did a FOD inspection and declared it open again
> (which must have taken all of about a minute).

First rule of declaring an emergency: never, ever be afraid to do it. The
ATC people would rather you promptly report something that turns out to be a
false alarm, as it gives them more time to figure out what to do with that
line of 767s that's coming up fast behind you than would be the case if you
landed with a nasty splat on only 66.67% of your wheels. And even if the
fire crew's talents aren't needed, they get a bit of training value out of
the exercise. Of course, if you do it three times a week because of poor
maintenance, they have the right to be peeved :-)

D.

[MikeM]

David Cartwright wrote:


>
> The only thing I'd be tempted to do in addition, assuming your airfield is
> big enough, you're experienced enough, and there's enough time to make it a
> reasonably safe manoeuvre, is to make a power-off, glide landing, and to get
> the second pair of hands in the cockpit (in this case your student) to crank
> the propeller with the starter so it's roughly horizontal and thus won't
> bash the runway. A prop strike will generally shock-load the engine and
> necessitate a complete strip down.

Have you ever actually attempted to stop the prop while in flight?

[Ben Jackson]

In article >,
Roy Smith > wrote:
>The nose green light was flashing, as was the yellow "gear in transit"

There were two options: Cycle the gear, and try an emergency extension.
There are so many different gear systems out there it's hard to say what
would help.

I'd say a bad limit switch is a reasonable guess, but I wouldn't be so
quick to rule out an actual failure to lock. Some tiny last bit of
travel to get a cam overcenter or a lock in place.

Hydraulic and combination electric/hydraulic runs the risk of running
out of fluid if there's a leak. That's the case in the Arrow, right?
On the other hand, isn't the fluid just there to hold the gear *up*? In
theory it should just fall down (spring assist?). Some of the big Cessnas
can 'blow' the gear down with compressed gas if the hydraulics run out.

My Comanche's gear is all mechanically interconnected, and there is only
one down light. If it didn't light my first thought would be to slow way
down and try again (slowing down is part of the emergency extension anyway),
and follow through on the manual extension lever to help the electric motor.
If I felt the downlock through the lever I'd be tempted to leave the motor
engaged, since it helps hold the gear in place, and there's likely not much
more I could do with the lever alone. You can't re-engage the motor in
the air, you have to jack it up. After the flight you probably install one
of those little parabolic mirrors on the left wingtip for checking the
gear (every PA-24 I've flown but my own has had one :)

The Mooney is similar to the Comanche (ie I see no harm in cycling it,
other than the battery drain, since those big motors draw more than the
alternator can continuously supply). My brief Mooney gear training did
not include any caveats about the manual extension being "weaker" than
electric extension, so I'd be tempted to try it. It's a cable you pull
sort of like starting a lawnmower, and you get a gear down indication
through a little window. You *can* go back to electric gear in the air
if you change your mind.

--
Ben Jackson
>
http://www.ben.com/

[MC]

> I was with a student in one of our club Arrows. We put the gear down
> and got green lights for the 2 mains, but not for the nose.
>
> The nose green light was flashing, as was the yellow "gear in transit"
> light. Both were flashing about twice per second, and in opposition
> (i.e. as the green went on, the yellow went off, and vice versa).

> The maintenance people were unable to reproduce the problem and the
> plane was returned to service. Best guess is a slight misalignment of
> one of the limit switches.
>
> What would you have done? Would you have cycled the gear hoping to fix
> the problem, or would you have accepted the possible unlocked nosegear
> in exchange for the known locked mains?

My experience with an Arrow is that it's usually a misallignment of the
microswitches which causes the 'gear not-locked' indication(s).

Something else to try is to use the emergency 'drop-gear' lever and
also some porpoising to nudge the wheel into the locked-position.

[[email protected]]

On Tue, 30 Mar 2004 11:09:45 -0700, MikeM > wrote:

>
>Have you ever actually attempted to stop the prop while in flight?

Yup. Was the proud holder of a student certificate at the time.

Did it a 2 1/2-year-old Malibu Mirage at an altitude of approx. 5 feet
AGL at the approach end of a 4000 ft runway. While I secured the
engine, and then held the nose off, the guy in the right seat reached
between my knees and bumped the prop.

Engine had a little over 6 hours SNEW. Wouldn't have attempted it by
myself (moot point, at that time, I wasn't insurable in it by myself).

No nose indication on downwind. Guys on the ground reported that it
looked like it was down and was pointing in the proper direction (nose
wheel rotates about 90 degrees during extension/retraction) Retracted
landing gear, right seater verified pump operation sounded "normal".

Made one extra circuit around the pattern with the emergency checklist
in my lap. Emergency extension per the checklist netted no nose
indication. Retracted landing gear, tried one more normal extension,
right seater again verified pump cycled on and off normally. Did a
pre-final approach briefing discussing precisely who was doing what
and when.

Had three green when the airplane coasted to a stop. Have absolutely
no idea when in the sequence of events during touchdown when the light
lit and the gear horn stopped blowing. CFII/ATP-rated pilot in the
right seat didn't either. While not legally PIC, I remained the
PilotOperatingTheControlsAndMakingAllTheDecisions.

If I would have been without experienced help in the other front seat,
there is no way I would have screwed around with trying to "save" the
engine/prop.

FWIW, in the Arrow scenario, if the nose gear looked good from the
ground, and the green light/in transit light was cycling as described,
I would have landed with no attempt to "cycle the gear", holding the
nose off.

If the three green lights aren't lit in an Arrow, the pump will be
running (accompanied by the in transit/pump light). Worn bushings in
the nose trunnion pivot/retract/extend/downlock assembly will often
first cause the "cycling" effect when turning a corner on the ground.
First time it happened to me (Fall of 1989 in a Turbo 'Toga SP) I'm
pretty sure I pee-ed a little.

When the pump light is lit, hydraulic pressure will indeed assist in
helping the nose gear stay extended.

TC

[James M. Knox]

(Ben Jackson) wrote in news:Wljac.38295$JO3.30797@attbi_s04:
>
> Hydraulic and combination electric/hydraulic runs the risk of running
> out of fluid if there's a leak. That's the case in the Arrow, right?
> On the other hand, isn't the fluid just there to hold the gear *up*?

Right. It's held up by hydraulic pressure, falls down by gravity and
spring assist (if the pump isn't working).

The nose gear is the most problematic, because it has less "free fall"
weight and more air resistance. Personally, I would have gone out of the
pattern and "played with it" a bit. Retract it, then drop it again at low
airspeed with a small pull-up right at the end. Unlike a Cessna 210 (for
example) if the pump is dying or the the fluid is leaking out, it's not
really going to get any worse.

But there *is* a small chance of mechanical damage that is limiting
transit, and it might jam. Of course, in that case, the nose gear probably
isn't locked now anyway.

NONE of that is to say that you decision was in any way incorrect. Any
such decision is a guess based on limited information and I believe either
choice is justified.

-----------------------------------------------
James M. Knox
TriSoft ph 512-385-0316
1109-A Shady Lane fax 512-366-4331
Austin, Tx 78721
-----------------------------------------------

[jsmith]

Ahh, come on guys!
You go up to altitude and stall the airplane.
The reduced air pressure against the nose gear allows the spring and
gravity to force the gear forward.
If you still have a gear unsafe/in transit light, declare your emergency
and land as described.
This is common practice, though not publish, for some aircraft
(AeroCommander 112, for example).

[William W. Plummer]

I'm a bit confused. Why would you fail to follow the POH directions under
"Emergency Landing Gear Extension" in Section 4? For reference it says...

5. Reduce speed below 100 mph
6. Move landing gear selector switch to gear down position
7. If gear has failed to lock down, raise emergency gear lever to
"Override Engaged" position
8. If gear has still failed to lock down, move emergency gear lever to
"Emergency Down" position
9. If gear has still failed to lock down, yaw the airplane abruptly from
side to side with the rudder.

NOTE If all elctrical power has been lost, the landing gear m ust be
extended using the above emergency procedures. The landing gear position
indicator lights will not be operative.




"Roy Smith" > wrote in message
...
> I had an interesting experience the other day.
>
> I was with a student in one of our club Arrows. We put the gear down
> and got green lights for the 2 mains, but not for the nose.
>
> The nose green light was flashing, as was the yellow "gear in transit"
> light. Both were flashing about twice per second, and in opposition
> (i.e. as the green went on, the yellow went off, and vice versa).
>
> We ran the checklists in the POH, but did not try to cycle the gear. My
> theory at the time was that since we had indication of both mains down
> and locked, we should probably not mess with things any more.
>
> On the one hand, cycling it might have fixed whatever was wrong.
>
> On the other hand, what we had now (both mains down and locked) was not
> only a survivable configuration, but one which would result in
> relatively minor damage if the nose gear was indeed not locked (prop
> strike). If something was jammed mechanically, cycling it could have
> possibly resulted in no gear at all, or (worse) asymmetric extension).
>
> We told the tower what was going on and requested a low pass so they
> could look under the plane to see what was there. Tower reported all
> three gear appeared to be down, so I just landed as gently as I could.
> I was relieved when everything held together.
>
> The maintenance people were unable to reproduce the problem and the
> plane was returned to service. Best guess is a slight misalignment of
> one of the limit switches.
>
> What would you have done? Would you have cycled the gear hoping to fix
> the problem, or would you have accepted the possible unlocked nosegear
> in exchange for the known locked mains?
>
> For those that are worried about such things, the outfall of our
> declaring an emergency was about 2 minutes worth of paperwork. The fire
> truck followed us to the ramp and the crew asked us a couple of
> questions for their report. The tower also shut the runway until the
> airport operations folks did a FOD inspection and declared it open again
> (which must have taken all of about a minute).

[Roy Smith]

In article <%0ibc.61265$K91.149112@attbi_s02>,
"William W. Plummer" > wrote:

> I'm a bit confused. Why would you fail to follow the POH directions under
> "Emergency Landing Gear Extension" in Section 4?

We did indeed pull out the book and read those instructions. We
followed all of them except for the one which said to raise the
emergency gear lever. We had the mains down and locked and didn't want
to do anything which might compromise that.

Was that the right decision? In retrospect, I'm not sure, but that's
what we were thinking at the time.

[Capt. Wild Bill Kelso, USAAC]

Roy Smith wrote:
>
> In article <%0ibc.61265$K91.149112@attbi_s02>,
> "William W. Plummer" > wrote:
>
> > I'm a bit confused. Why would you fail to follow the POH directions under
> > "Emergency Landing Gear Extension" in Section 4?
>
> We did indeed pull out the book and read those instructions. We
> followed all of them except for the one which said to raise the
> emergency gear lever. We had the mains down and locked and didn't want
> to do anything which might compromise that.
>
> Was that the right decision? In retrospect, I'm not sure, but that's
> what we were thinking at the time.

I can tell you that if you were given that problem on a checkride, sim or
airplane, you prob. wouldn't have passed. Procedures were developed and tested
by manufacturers. Yes, as PIC you have the authority to decide NOT to follow
Emergency Procedures, but you will have to explain that to the Check
Airman/Examiner/Fed. In the airlines, we follow the QRH(Quick Reference
Handbook). If it says cycle the gear, we cycle the gear. If it doesn't lock
down, we retract and hit the Emerg.. Extension Switch and let it free-fall. If
it still doesn't work, we plan for a one, two, or all-wheels up landing.

What did the Fed say when you told him you didn't follow the checklist?

TJ, B757 I/P
PHX
================================================== ===============
Pilots track their lives by the number of hours in the air,
as if any other time isn't worth noting....
Michael Rarfit

[[email protected]]

On Sat, 03 Apr 2004 01:47:40 GMT, "Capt. Wild Bill Kelso, USAAC"
> wrote:

snip

>I can tell you that if you were given that problem on a checkride, sim or
>airplane, you prob. wouldn't have passed. Procedures were developed and tested
>by manufacturers. Yes, as PIC you have the authority to decide NOT to follow
>Emergency Procedures, but you will have to explain that to the Check
>Airman/Examiner/Fed. In the airlines, we follow the QRH(Quick Reference
>Handbook). If it says cycle the gear, we cycle the gear. If it doesn't lock
>down, we retract and hit the Emerg.. Extension Switch and let it free-fall. If
>it still doesn't work, we plan for a one, two, or all-wheels up landing.
>
>What did the Fed say when you told him you didn't follow the checklist?

FWIW, according to his accounting of events, the ONLY checklist item
that he skipped (engage auto extension override) would have no
mechanical effect on the operation/indication of the landing gear
system.

I agree that following published checklist procedures (especially
during abnormal/emergency operation) is important.

TC

[Richard Kaplan]

"David Cartwright" > wrote in message
...

> The only thing I'd be tempted to do in addition, assuming your airfield is
> big enough, you're experienced enough, and there's enough time to make it
a
> reasonably safe manoeuvre, is to make a power-off, glide landing, and to
get
> the second pair of hands in the cockpit (in this case your student) to
crank
> the propeller with the starter so it's roughly horizontal and thus won't
> bash the runway. A prop strike will generally shock-load the engine and
> necessitate a complete strip down.

And if you do this, you might very appropriately find the FAA filing an
enforcement action against you for careless and reckless operation.
Stopping the engine for economic reasons converts a situation with 100%
survivability potential to a situation where you have no ability to do a go
around or cushion a landing with power or add power if you are landing
short.

---
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Richard Kaplan]

"Roy Smith" > wrote in message
...

> I was with a student in one of our club Arrows. We put the gear down
> and got green lights for the 2 mains, but not for the nose.

Would activating the emergency gear extension system have been an option to
extend the nose gear in case it were down but not fully locked?

--
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Roy Smith]

In article >,
"Richard Kaplan" > wrote:

> "Roy Smith" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> > I was with a student in one of our club Arrows. We put the gear down
> > and got green lights for the 2 mains, but not for the nose.
>
> Would activating the emergency gear extension system have been an option to
> extend the nose gear in case it were down but not fully locked?

Indeed it would have been. In fact, we did that, it being one of the
items on the checklist in the POH.

[Richard Kaplan]

"Roy Smith" > wrote in message
...

> Indeed it would have been. In fact, we did that, it being one of the
> items on the checklist in the POH.

In that case, then I agree with what you did. The only likely situation
where the emergency gear extension would have left you without 3 wheels down
and locked would have been if there were a mechanical obstruction, and as
you pointed out it is possible that cycling the gear could have made the
situation worse in this case.

--
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Richard Kaplan]

"Capt. Wild Bill Kelso, USAAC" > wrote in message
...

> I can tell you that if you were given that problem on a checkride, sim or
> airplane, you prob. wouldn't have passed. Procedures were developed and
tested

In my sim he would have passed with flying colors --- he did not blindly
follow a generic checklist or rush to a pre-programmed course of action, but
instead he used his knowledge of airplane systems to develop a reasoned
response to his particular situation. A+ in my book for that

> by manufacturers. Yes, as PIC you have the authority to decide NOT to
follow
> Emergency Procedures, but you will have to explain that to the Check
> Airman/Examiner/Fed. In the airlines, we follow the QRH(Quick Reference

Particularly in general aviation airplanes, there are lots of situations not
covered in the POH or at least lots of nuances not covered in the POH.

For example, the POH for most single-engine piston airplanes says to land as
quickly as practical after an engine failure. But what should you do if you
have a partial engine faillure? The correct response as far as I am
concerned in my simulator is to immediately climb regardless of any prior
ATC clearance or instructions and I would venture to believe that most
pilots would agree with this, even though I am aware of no POH which
includes this in the published procedure.

Consider that airlines have a LOT more established emergency procedures and
a lot more equipment redundancy, so whereas you might be correct that in an
airline situation there is a proper checklist for almost every situation, in
piston general aviation the pilot may need to do more independent thinking
to solve a problem. And even in the airline world, there is a Capt. Haynes
who made a landing in South Dakota a number of years ago who probably agrees
as well that independent thinking by an airline pilot is a good thing.

--
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Dale]

In article >,
"Richard Kaplan" > wrote:


>
> And if you do this, you might very appropriately find the FAA filing an
> enforcement action against you for careless and reckless operation.
> Stopping the engine for economic reasons converts a situation with 100%
> survivability potential to a situation where you have no ability to do a go
> around or cushion a landing with power or add power if you are landing
> short.


Not to mention that the propellor probably won't stop turning to begin
with.

--
Dale L. Falk

There is nothing - absolutely nothing - half so much worth doing
as simply messing around with airplanes.

http://home.gci.net/~sncdfalk/flying.html

[Roy Smith]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote:

> For example, the POH for most single-engine piston airplanes says to land as
> quickly as practical after an engine failure.

As if you have a choice?

> But what should you do if you
> have a partial engine faillure? The correct response as far as I am
> concerned in my simulator is to immediately climb regardless of any prior
> ATC clearance or instructions and I would venture to believe that most
> pilots would agree with this, even though I am aware of no POH which
> includes this in the published procedure.

I'm going to play devil's advocate here, and ask why? The obvious
answer is "altitude is your friend", so you want to get as much of it as
you can while you still can. And, I certainly agree that in a situation
like this, I'll do whatever I think is best and let ATC fend for
themselves. But...

If there's something mechanically wrong with the engine, might adding
power for a climb make things worse?

[Richard Kaplan]

"Roy Smith" > wrote in message
...

> If there's something mechanically wrong with the engine, might adding
> power for a climb make things worse?

Yes, I agree, depending on the airplane. I would not add power if a
particular airplane's engine-failure checklist left the controls at less
than a full-power configuration; in that case, I would simply climb at the
maximum possible rate given the engine's performance.

In my airplane in particular, the first response to an engine failure is
"everything forward" -- partly because the throttle controls a variable
speed fuel pump which can fail at low speed only and partly because the
mixture controls an altitude-dependent fuel controller that has failures
modes with anything other than full rich. These correctable engine failure
modes justify "everything forward" for my airplane since the benefits of
correcting a partial engine failure usually outweight the risks of
converting a partial failure to a full failure.

While climbing I would proceed to the nearest airport and circle until I
were certain that I were in position for a successful deadstick landing if
necessary, and only then would I voluntarily reduce power.

--
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[James M. Knox]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote in
s.com:

> the airline world, there is a Capt. Haynes who made a landing in South
> Dakota a number of years ago who probably agrees as well that
> independent thinking by an airline pilot is a good thing.

Yeah, but he had a bit of a different situation. He had a POH which said
it couldn't happen!!! Heck, even after they managed to get patched in to
Boeing, the engineers kept telling him that he was wrong and that there
could not be anything wrong with the hydraulics.

As you said, sometimes the "man on the spot" just has to think for himself.

-----------------------------------------------
James M. Knox
TriSoft ph 512-385-0316
1109-A Shady Lane fax 512-366-4331
Austin, Tx 78721
-----------------------------------------------

[James M. Knox]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote in
s.com:

>> I was with a student in one of our club Arrows. We put the gear down
>> and got green lights for the 2 mains, but not for the nose.
>
> Would activating the emergency gear extension system have been an
> option to extend the nose gear in case it were down but not fully
> locked?

"Sort of..." Since the two mains were down and locked there was no
pressure left in the system. Pressing the emergency gear extension knob
does nothing but release pressure, and so nothing new would have happened.

The procedure would have been to RETRACT the gear (if possible), slow down,
pull the CB, and THEN push the emergency gear extension knob. If the pump
were failing, then this faster release of pressure might do the trick.
OTOH, if there were a mechanical problem, then there are any number of
hypothetical situations where it might not even come down as well as
before.

You pays yer dollahs, and takes yer chances! <G>

-----------------------------------------------
James M. Knox
TriSoft ph 512-385-0316
1109-A Shady Lane fax 512-366-4331
Austin, Tx 78721
-----------------------------------------------

[leslie]

Richard Kaplan ) wrote:

: And even in the airline world, there is a Capt. Haynes who made a landing
: in South Dakota a number of years ago who probably agrees as well that
: independent thinking by an airline pilot is a good thing.
:

You're thinking of United Flight 232, a DC-10 whose #2 engine failed
taking out all three hydraulic systems; the plane crashed in Sioux City,
Iowa:

http://www.airdisaster.com/special/special-ua232.shtml
AirDisaster.Com: Special Report: United Airlines Flight 232

--Jerry Leslie
Note: is invalid for email

[Richard Kaplan]

"leslie" > wrote in message
...

> You're thinking of United Flight 232, a DC-10 whose #2 engine failed
> taking out all three hydraulic systems; the plane crashed in Sioux City,
> Iowa:


Yes, I confused Sioux City with Sioux Falls... sorry.

--
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Richard Kaplan]

"Robert Moore" > wrote in message
. 6...

> Didn't have a POH in a DC-10 cockpit. He probably had an Aircraft Flight
> Manual, and I haven't seen an AFM yet that has said that something could
> not happen.

Very well... so the basic point stands, which is that indepdent thinking by
a pilot who know his airplane's systems can be a very good thing.


--
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Robert Moore]

"James M. Knox" > wrote

> Yeah, but he had a bit of a different situation. He had a POH which said
> it couldn't happen!!!

Didn't have a POH in a DC-10 cockpit. He probably had an Aircraft Flight
Manual, and I haven't seen an AFM yet that has said that something could
not happen.

> Heck, even after they managed to get patched in to Boeing,

Why did he call Boeing with a problem in a Douglas (MD) aircraft?

> the engineers kept telling him that he was wrong and that there
> could not be anything wrong with the hydraulics.

Maybe he should have talked to the engineers at McDonald-Douglas.

Bob Moore
ATP B-707, B-727, L-188
PanAm (retired)

[Tarver Engineering]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote in message
s.com...
>
>
> "Robert Moore" > wrote in message
> . 6...
>
> > Didn't have a POH in a DC-10 cockpit. He probably had an Aircraft
Flight
> > Manual, and I haven't seen an AFM yet that has said that something could
> > not happen.
>
> Very well... so the basic point stands, which is that indepdent thinking
by
> a pilot who know his airplane's systems can be a very good thing.

That all depends on how much engineering the Manufacturer puts into their
products.

[David Lesher]

Robert Moore > writes:


>Didn't have a POH in a DC-10 cockpit. He probably had an Aircraft Flight
>Manual, and I haven't seen an AFM yet that has said that something could
>not happen.

>> Heck, even after they managed to get patched in to Boeing,

>Why did he call Boeing with a problem in a Douglas (MD) aircraft?

Because Boeing owns MD, I suspect.

--
A host is a host from coast to
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

[Robert Moore]

David Lesher wrote

>>Why did he call Boeing with a problem in a Douglas (MD) aircraft?
>
> Because Boeing owns MD, I suspect.

Now yes...but then???

Bob Moore

[James M. Knox]

Robert Moore > wrote in
. 6:

>> Yeah, but he had a bit of a different situation. He had a POH which
>> said it couldn't happen!!!
>
> Didn't have a POH in a DC-10 cockpit. He probably had an Aircraft
> Flight Manual, and I haven't seen an AFM yet that has said that
> something could not happen.

Loose wording, I admit. But that's what he says in his talks... that there
is nothing in the manual for what to do, because they considered it
impossible. And that after they started consulting with the engineers,
they were repeatedly assured that it could NOT be a failure of the
hydraulic system.

>> Heck, even after they managed to get patched in to Boeing,
>
> Why did he call Boeing with a problem in a Douglas (MD) aircraft?

All the MacAir guys I know are wearing badges that say Boeing. That's why I
said Boeing.


-----------------------------------------------
James M. Knox
TriSoft ph 512-385-0316
1109-A Shady Lane fax 512-366-4331
Austin, Tx 78721
-----------------------------------------------

[Ron Natalie]

"David Lesher" > wrote in message ...
> Robert Moore > writes:
>
>
> >Didn't have a POH in a DC-10 cockpit. He probably had an Aircraft Flight
> >Manual, and I haven't seen an AFM yet that has said that something could
> >not happen.
>
> >> Heck, even after they managed to get patched in to Boeing,
>
> >Why did he call Boeing with a problem in a Douglas (MD) aircraft?
>
> Because Boeing owns MD, I suspect.
>
Not back when Al Haines was having problems.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ron Natalie" > wrote in message
m...
>
> "David Lesher" > wrote in message
...
> > Robert Moore > writes:
> >
> >
> > >Didn't have a POH in a DC-10 cockpit. He probably had an Aircraft
Flight
> > >Manual, and I haven't seen an AFM yet that has said that something
could
> > >not happen.
> >
> > >> Heck, even after they managed to get patched in to Boeing,
> >
> > >Why did he call Boeing with a problem in a Douglas (MD) aircraft?
> >
> > Because Boeing owns MD, I suspect.
> >
> Not back when Al Haines was having problems.

Boeing killed the airplane based on liability concerns, as liability is
based mostly on expectations. "If it ain't Boing I'm not going" is a very
high level of expectation.

AOPA seems to be taking the same track in letting the public know that small
GA should not be held to the same liability standard as airliner suppliers,
by lowering expectations of safety through education.

[Richard Kaplan]

> wrote in message
...

> I agree that following published checklist procedures (especially
> during abnormal/emergency operation) is important.

If there is a published checklist for "nose gear not down and locked" then I
agree.

If the only published checklist is for the different situation of "gear not
down and locked" (i.e. no gear down) then I disagree with you because the
checklist does not directly relate to the pilot's situation.

Which situation(s) are addressed in the Arrow checklist?


--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[William W. Plummer]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote in message
s.com...
>
> > wrote in message
> ...
>
> > I agree that following published checklist procedures (especially
> > during abnormal/emergency operation) is important.
>
> If there is a published checklist for "nose gear not down and locked" then
I
> agree.
>
> If the only published checklist is for the different situation of "gear
not
> down and locked" (i.e. no gear down) then I disagree with you because the
> checklist does not directly relate to the pilot's situation.
>
> Which situation(s) are addressed in the Arrow checklist?

A few days ago I posted an except from the Arrow POH, Section 4, entitled
"EMERGENCY LANDING GEAR EXTENSION". The introductory line reads, "If
landing gear does not check down and locked: ...."

Faced with any emergency I will always perform the POH procedure first. If
that fails, I'll get creative.

[Richard Kaplan]

"William W. Plummer" > wrote in message
news:QScdc.218801$Cb.1911757@attbi_s51...>


> Faced with any emergency I will always perform the POH procedure first.
If
> that fails, I'll get creative.

I think a better rule (borrowed from medicine but equally applicable to an
aviation emergency) is "First Do No Harm."

If the POH procedure is ambiguous and might refer to a no-wheels situation
but the pilot instead faces a no-nosegar situation, then I do not agree the
pilot should immediately follow the POH which may or may not apply to his
situation. A judgement call on the part of the pilot is quite appropriate
here, and that judgment may or may not apply to this situation.

An excellent analagous situation is one I posted about earlier: engine
failure. My POH only addresses "engine failure" and does not distinguish
between partial or complete engine failure. Surely you will agree that a
partial engine failure in a single-engine airplane should be treated
differently than a complete engine failure -- correct?

[Ryan R. Healy]

"Roy Smith" > wrote in message
...
> I had an interesting experience the other day.
>
> I was with a student in one of our club Arrows. We put the gear down
> and got green lights for the 2 mains, but not for the nose.

> What would you have done? Would you have cycled the gear hoping to fix
> the problem, or would you have accepted the possible unlocked nosegear
> in exchange for the known locked mains?

Roy,

I don't think you could have harmed anything further by cycling the gear.
Knowing how the PA28 gear system works, you can always free-fall them all
into position should you have a complete hydraulic failure.

Chances are, there was an out of rig microswitch on the nose gear, sending a
signal to the hydraulic power pack that the nose gear was not down and
locked. When the power pack received this signal, it re-energized for a
second until the microswitch was closed. When it de-energized, the
microswitch re-opened, sending the signal back to the power pack and the
vicious cycle repeated itself over and over again ... hence the cycling of
the 'in transit' (aka 'pump on') light. You could have verified all of this
by looking for a spike on the ammeter as the electric motor in the hydraulic
power pack cycled off and on.

In any case, the green light would have never illuminated at all for the
nose if it had not reached the locked position. Once it reaches the locked
position, it is not unlocking unless you select the gear up.

In either case, you were safe. It was simply an indication issue brought on
by an out of rig switch. Mx should have detected this and fixed it
otherwise it will likely occur again.

-RH

[Ryan R. Healy]

"Capt. Wild Bill Kelso, USAAC" > wrote in message
...

> I can tell you that if you were given that problem on a checkride, sim or
> airplane, you prob. wouldn't have passed. Procedures were developed and
tested
> by manufacturers. Yes, as PIC you have the authority to decide NOT to
follow
> Emergency Procedures, but you will have to explain that to the Check
> Airman/Examiner/Fed. In the airlines, we follow the QRH(Quick Reference
> Handbook). If it says cycle the gear, we cycle the gear. If it doesn't
lock
> down, we retract and hit the Emerg.. Extension Switch and let it
free-fall. If
> it still doesn't work, we plan for a one, two, or all-wheels up landing.
>
> What did the Fed say when you told him you didn't follow the checklist?

True enough, however, in an emergency situation, we may deviate from any
procedure, as necessary, to meet the given needs of the emergency.

I'm an airline driver too and page 1 of our AOM-1 (that's our aircraft
flight manual) specifically states that all of the given procedures may not
adequately address each and every problem we may encounter. It goes on to
say that we can utilize experience and judgement if/when we decide to
deviate from a procedure or expand upon one.

In the end, checklists are not all encompassing and sometimes we have to use
some of that 'pilot sh**' to save the day.

-RH

[Ryan R. Healy]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote in message
s.com...

> Consider that airlines have a LOT more established emergency procedures
and
> a lot more equipment redundancy, so whereas you might be correct that in
an
> airline situation there is a proper checklist for almost every situation,
in
> piston general aviation the pilot may need to do more independent thinking
> to solve a problem. And even in the airline world, there is a Capt.
Haynes
> who made a landing in South Dakota a number of years ago who probably
agrees
> as well that independent thinking by an airline pilot is a good thing.

You might be suprised Richard. I fly a relatively new design, all glass,
fully automated airliner. Out of all of the 'issues' I have had with this
aircraft, probably only 10% of them were actually corrected solely via an
Emerg/Abnormal checklist. Oftentimes, the problem is a little more compound
in nature and improvisation is definitely necessary and in fact encouraged.

As the old saying goes ... checklists are CHECKlists, not DOlists.

-RH

[Richard Kaplan]

"Ryan R. Healy" > wrote in message
...>

> I'm an airline driver too and page 1 of our AOM-1 (that's our aircraft
> flight manual) specifically states that all of the given procedures may
not
> adequately address each and every problem we may encounter. It goes on to
> say that we can utilize experience and judgement if/when we decide to
> deviate from a procedure or expand upon one.

I think that makes a lot of sense.

Does this philosophy carry over to your simulator-based recurrent training?

--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Michael Houghton]

Howdy!

In article >,
David Cartwright > wrote:
>"Roy Smith" > wrote in message
...
>> I was with a student in one of our club Arrows. We put the gear down
>> and got green lights for the 2 mains, but not for the nose.
>> We told the tower what was going on and requested a low pass so they
>> could look under the plane to see what was there. Tower reported all
>> three gear appeared to be down, so I just landed as gently as I could.
>> I was relieved when everything held together.
>> What would you have done? Would you have cycled the gear hoping to fix
>> the problem, or would you have accepted the possible unlocked nosegear
>> in exchange for the known locked mains?
>
>I'd have made the same decision as you - stick with what seems to be a
>pretty good situation (instead of risking cycling the gear and ending up
>worse off), get the tower to have a shufti at your dangly bits, and on
>receiving a promising report from them, attempt a gentle approach, holding
>the nose off for as long as is practical.
>
>The only thing I'd be tempted to do in addition, assuming your airfield is
>big enough, you're experienced enough, and there's enough time to make it a
>reasonably safe manoeuvre, is to make a power-off, glide landing, and to get
>the second pair of hands in the cockpit (in this case your student) to crank
>the propeller with the starter so it's roughly horizontal and thus won't
>bash the runway. A prop strike will generally shock-load the engine and
>necessitate a complete strip down.

....so you'd voluntarily turn a routine landing into a dead-stick landing?
Including the fun part of getting the prop to stop?

As long as the fan is keeping the pilot cool, why give it up?
>
>This said, the usual rules apply: if in doubt, take the approach that is
>most likely to get you walk away from the "landing", and if that means
>shock-loading the engine, so be it.

The big doubt above is getting the prop actually stopped while leaving
yourself in a position to make a reasonalbe approach and landing.

yours,
Michael


--
Michael and MJ Houghton | Herveus d'Ormonde and Megan O'Donnelly
| White Wolf and the Phoenix
Bowie, MD, USA | Tablet and Inkle bands, and other stuff
| http://www.radix.net/~herveus/

[Richard Kaplan]

"Michael Houghton" > wrote in message
...>

> The big doubt above is getting the prop actually stopped while leaving
> yourself in a position to make a reasonalbe approach and landing.

Don't do it. Sacrifice the prop/engine.



--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Ryan R. Healy]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote in message
s.com...
>
> "Ryan R. Healy" > wrote in message
> ...>
>
> > I'm an airline driver too and page 1 of our AOM-1 (that's our aircraft
> > flight manual) specifically states that all of the given procedures may
> not
> > adequately address each and every problem we may encounter. It goes on
to
> > say that we can utilize experience and judgement if/when we decide to
> > deviate from a procedure or expand upon one.
>
> I think that makes a lot of sense.
>
> Does this philosophy carry over to your simulator-based recurrent
training?
>
> --------------------
> Richard Kaplan, CFII
>
> www.flyimc.com
>


We fly and train in the same manner.

-RH