Skyguide traffic controller killed

[HECTOP]

http://news.airwise.com/stories/2004/02/1077659102.html

An assailant stabbed to death the air traffic controller who was on duty
when two planes collided over southern Germany in July 2002, killing 71
people, Swiss police said on Tuesday.

The 36-year old Danish national, whose name was unavailable, was employed by
Skyguide, the Swiss air traffic control in charge of monitoring parts of
Germany's airspace just across the border from Switzerland.

A spokesman for Skyguide said the man had been in charge of monitoring air
traffic in the region around Lake Constance when the two planes -- a Tupolev
TU154 operated by Bashkirian Airlines and a Boeing 757 cargo plane operated
by DHL -- collided in mid-air.

The victims were mostly Russian children. Zurich police said in a statement
an unknown man had called on the air traffic controller at his home outside
Zurich and, after a short verbal exchange, stabbed him to death.

A spokesman said it was "totally open" whether the crime was in any way
related to the air disaster. He said police were still looking for the
assailant, described as a dark-haired man in his early 50s who was speaking
"broken German".

Skyguide has been criticized for its role in the air accident after
investigators revealed that only one controller was on duty when it
happened, while his partner was on a break.

Investigators also said the agency's collision alert system was out of
action for maintenance, and work on its telephone system meant a warning
call from German colleagues never got through.

In a statement released just days after the accident, the air traffic
controller had acknowledged that errors in the traffic control network
contributed to the disaster.

(Reuters)




HECTOP
PP-ASEL-IA
http://www.maxho.com
maxho_at_maxho.com

[Dean Wilkinson]

My bet is that one of the fathers of the Russian children did it...

The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the
Russian jet to descend when the Russian crew told him they had an RA
instructing them to climb. Controllers are required to instruct
flight crews to follow the RA when an RA occurs, and crews are
required to follow the RA. The Russians don't appear to have given
proper training to their crews regarding the TCAS system because the
crew didn't ignore the controller like they should have and followed
the RA.

Any bets on whether the Russian government will extradite the perp to
Switzerland if he makes it back to Russia?

Dean

"HECTOP" > wrote in message >...
> http://news.airwise.com/stories/2004/02/1077659102.html
>
> An assailant stabbed to death the air traffic controller who was on duty
> when two planes collided over southern Germany in July 2002, killing 71
> people, Swiss police said on Tuesday.
>
> The 36-year old Danish national, whose name was unavailable, was employed by
> Skyguide, the Swiss air traffic control in charge of monitoring parts of
> Germany's airspace just across the border from Switzerland.
>
> A spokesman for Skyguide said the man had been in charge of monitoring air
> traffic in the region around Lake Constance when the two planes -- a Tupolev
> TU154 operated by Bashkirian Airlines and a Boeing 757 cargo plane operated
> by DHL -- collided in mid-air.
>
> The victims were mostly Russian children. Zurich police said in a statement
> an unknown man had called on the air traffic controller at his home outside
> Zurich and, after a short verbal exchange, stabbed him to death.
>
> A spokesman said it was "totally open" whether the crime was in any way
> related to the air disaster. He said police were still looking for the
> assailant, described as a dark-haired man in his early 50s who was speaking
> "broken German".
>
> Skyguide has been criticized for its role in the air accident after
> investigators revealed that only one controller was on duty when it
> happened, while his partner was on a break.
>
> Investigators also said the agency's collision alert system was out of
> action for maintenance, and work on its telephone system meant a warning
> call from German colleagues never got through.
>
> In a statement released just days after the accident, the air traffic
> controller had acknowledged that errors in the traffic control network
> contributed to the disaster.
>
> (Reuters)
>
>
>
>
> HECTOP
> PP-ASEL-IA
> http://www.maxho.com
> maxho_at_maxho.com

[Derek]

(Dean Wilkinson) wrote:

>My bet is that one of the fathers of the Russian children did it...
>
>The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the
>Russian jet to descend when the Russian crew told him they had an RA
>instructing them to climb. Controllers are required to instruct
>flight crews to follow the RA when an RA occurs, and crews are
>required to follow the RA. The Russians don't appear to have given
>proper training to their crews regarding the TCAS system because the
>crew didn't ignore the controller like they should have and followed
>the RA.
>
>Any bets on whether the Russian government will extradite the perp to
>Switzerland if he makes it back to Russia?
>
>Dean

I'm surprised the controller was still at the job after such a disastrous
screwup that cost the lives of so many innocent people, children in this case.
I figured he had been fired long ago.

Whatever happened to doing the honorable thing and hanging yourself after
killing so many others?

[Stefan]

Dean Wilkinson wrote:

> The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the

Interesting that you already know the culprit while the official report
is not yet published.

Stefan

[Stefan]

Derek wrote:

> I'm surprised the controller was still at the job after such a disastrous
> screwup

He didn't control traffic anymore but did some administrative work. The
official report isn't published yet, so how do you know he disastrously
screw up? Lynching at work?

Stefan

[Buff5200]

Ok, who among you have never had the urge?

Pilots: tell me that you have NEVER, in your life, had the urge to make
a pylon
turn around the tower from a Spooky Gunship.

And Controllers: Who among you have NEVER had the urge to go out on the
tower
balcony with a shoulder fired SAM?

[James Robinson]

Dean Wilkinson wrote:
>
> The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the
> Russian jet to descend when the Russian crew told him they had an RA
> instructing them to climb.

You might like to wait for the accident report, since that isn't what
the initial review of the CVR and FDR indicated.

The TCAS system had warned the Russian crew to climb, but just as they
started to comply, the controller instructed the aircraft to descend.
The Russian crew did not first tell the controller that they had an RA
instructing them to climb, so the controller did not override that
alert.

The DHL crew got an instruction to descend from their TCAS, and
announced that they were doing so.

> The Russians don't appear to have given proper training to their
> crews regarding the TCAS system because the crew didn't ignore the
> controller like they should have and followed the RA.

Again, you don't know what their training is. The pilot didn't follow
the instructions, but he might have done that on his own, contrary to
his training. There has also been some argument that the controller's
instructions should have priority over those of the on-board system.

Why not wait for the accident report instead of making rash, misinformed
accusations?

[Larry Dighera]

On Tue, 24 Feb 2004 23:31:26 -0500, "HECTOP" >
wrote in Message-Id: >:

>An assailant stabbed to death the air traffic controller who was on duty
>when two planes collided over southern Germany in July 2002, killing 71
>people, Swiss police said on Tuesday.

Did you hear what the survivors did to the pilots who crashed a
planeload of soccer players in the Andes in the '70s?

[Dean Wilkinson]

I read the preliminary findings, which included a transcript of the
communications... it was pretty clear.


Stefan > wrote in message >...
> Dean Wilkinson wrote:
>
> > The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the
>
> Interesting that you already know the culprit while the official report
> is not yet published.
>
> Stefan

[Dave Stadt]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 24 Feb 2004 23:31:26 -0500, "HECTOP" >
> wrote in Message-Id: >:
>
> >An assailant stabbed to death the air traffic controller who was on duty
> >when two planes collided over southern Germany in July 2002, killing 71
> >people, Swiss police said on Tuesday.
>
> Did you hear what the survivors did to the pilots who crashed a
> planeload of soccer players in the Andes in the '70s?

Two all pilot patties, special sauce, lettuce, cheese, pickles on a sesame
seed bun.

[Peter Duniho]

"Buff5200" > wrote in message
...
> Ok, who among you have never had the urge?
>
> Pilots: tell me that you have NEVER, in your life, had the urge to make
> a pylon turn around the tower from a Spooky Gunship.

Never. Not that the controller in question would have been sitting in the
tower cab anyway.

I've had controllers that I didn't care for, but life's too short to waste
time worrying about them. They will be out of my life soon enough, and it's
easy enough to humor them (or invoke my rights as pilot in command).

Pete

[Stefan]

Dean Wilkinson wrote:

> I read the preliminary findings, which included a transcript of the
> communications... it was pretty clear.

So the investigation crew are all idiots since they need a year more
than you to understand what was really going on?

Stefan

[Stefan]

Today, the police has arrested a suspect. Note: Until now, he's only a
suspect. He didn't confess nor has the police presented any "hard"
evidence.

This suspect is a 48 year old man who has lost his wife, a son and a
daughter in the crash. Very, very tragic. He must be desperate.

On the other hand, in Switzerland, self-justice has an extremely bad
reputation and is never accepted, on no account. If it turns out that he
has done it, he will have to stay the next couple of years in Switzerland.

Stefan

[Dean Wilkinson]

James Robinson > wrote in message >...
> Dean Wilkinson wrote:
> >
> > The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the
> > Russian jet to descend when the Russian crew told him they had an RA
> > instructing them to climb.
>
> You might like to wait for the accident report, since that isn't what
> the initial review of the CVR and FDR indicated.
>
Really? I read the initial review, and the CVR transcripts. It
appeared to me that the contoller gave bad advice, and Russian captain
made the mistake of heeding it.

> The TCAS system had warned the Russian crew to climb, but just as they
> started to comply, the controller instructed the aircraft to descend.
> The Russian crew did not first tell the controller that they had an RA
> instructing them to climb, so the controller did not override that
> alert.
>
> The DHL crew got an instruction to descend from their TCAS, and
> announced that they were doing so.
>
So, given that the DHL crew told the controller that they were
responding to a TCAS RA, the controller KNEW he had an RA on his hands
and that it applied to BOTH aircraft. Remember, the TCAS systems on
both planes communicate with each other over the transponder
frequency, if one had an RA, both had an RA.

> > The Russians don't appear to have given proper training to their
> > crews regarding the TCAS system because the crew didn't ignore the
> > controller like they should have and followed the RA.
>
> Again, you don't know what their training is. The pilot didn't follow
> the instructions, but he might have done that on his own, contrary to
> his training. There has also been some argument that the controller's
> instructions should have priority over those of the on-board system.
>
Actually, when I worked for Boeing it was pretty clear that the
Russians were installing TCAS to comply with the rules for flying in
European airspace, but that they weren't necessarily adopting the TCAS
philosophy...

> Why not wait for the accident report instead of making rash, misinformed
> accusations?

It is pretty rash of you to assume that I am misinformed...

[G.R. Patterson III]

Buff5200 wrote:
>

> Pilots: tell me that you have NEVER, in your life, had the urge to make
> a pylon turn around the tower from a Spooky Gunship.

Well, I have not, though I've probably made a few of *them* wish they had a
FLAK.

George Patterson
A diplomat is a person who can tell you to go to hell in such a way that
you look forward to the trip.

[HECTOP]

In rec.aviation.piloting Stefan > wrote:
> reputation and is never accepted, on no account. If it turns out that he
> has done it, he will have to stay the next couple of years in Switzerland.

One might argue that what they call a jail in Switzerland, is considered a
three-star resort in Russia. Can't justify what the guy did (if he did it),
but he's perfectly understandable.

--
HECTOP
PP-ASEL-IA
http://www.maxho.com
maxho_at_maxho.com

[Dean Wilkinson]

That is very rude of you to call the investigation team idiots, I'm
sure that they would not be amused....

The investigators are required to follow a rigorous investigation
process, no matter how clear cut a case may be. That takes a lot of
time.

Stefan > wrote in message >...
> Dean Wilkinson wrote:
>
> > I read the preliminary findings, which included a transcript of the
> > communications... it was pretty clear.
>
> So the investigation crew are all idiots since they need a year more
> than you to understand what was really going on?
>
> Stefan

[Stefan]

Dean Wilkinson wrote:

> That is very rude of you to call the investigation team idiots,

You obviously missed the question mark and the irony it implied.

> The investigators are required to follow a rigorous investigation
> process, no matter how clear cut a case may be. That takes a lot of
> time.

Hmmm... Wasn't it you that claimed that reading the preliminary finding
was enough to have a full understanding of the case?

Stefan

[Stefan]

HECTOP wrote:

> One might argue that what they call a jail in Switzerland, is considered a
> three-star resort in Russia.

Well, not exactly, you can't check out at your discretion. We just treat
our prisoners as human beings.

Stefan

[James Robinson]

Dean Wilkinson wrote:
>
> James Robinson wrote:
> >
> > Dean Wilkinson wrote:
> > >
> > > The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the
> > > Russian jet to descend when the Russian crew told him they had an RA
> > > instructing them to climb.
> >
> > You might like to wait for the accident report, since that isn't what
> > the initial review of the CVR and FDR indicated.
> >
> Really? I read the initial review, and the CVR transcripts. It
> appeared to me that the contoller gave bad advice, and Russian captain
> made the mistake of heeding it.

Not exactly. If the controller's advice had been followed in the
absence of TCAS, there likely wouldn't have been a collision, since the
Russian aircraft would have passed under the DHL. The problem was that
TCAS gave the initial RA to ascend just one second before the controller
urgently advised the aircraft to descend. After the controller made a
second urgent request to descend, the Russian crew chose to follow the
controller's instructions rather than TCAS. Meanwhile, the DHL started a
descent to comply with the TCAS RA on their aircraft. Hence both
aircraft descended into a collision.

That was only part of the overall problem, however, since there were
many procedural and technical problems at the control center, which
tends to turn the focus of the investigation on the controller's
employer. The controller was probably put into the position where he
couldn't adequately handle the traffic being offered, which led to his
mistakes.

Beyond that, the sequence of events in your initial post is wrong, based
on the transcripts that were released. The controller did not know the
Russian crew had an RA to climb, and issued his instruction based on the
information he had at hand. The Russian crew received the RA and
controller's instruction at practically the same time, and chose to
follow the controller. Here are a couple of interesting articles that
discuss this issue:

http://www.ainonline.com/issues/08_02/08_02_germancollpg16.html
http://www.ainonline.com/issues/09_02/09_02_contollerortcaspg12.html

> > The TCAS system had warned the Russian crew to climb, but just as they
> > started to comply, the controller instructed the aircraft to descend.
> > The Russian crew did not first tell the controller that they had an RA
> > instructing them to climb, so the controller did not override that
> > alert.
> >
> > The DHL crew got an instruction to descend from their TCAS, and
> > announced that they were doing so.
> >
> So, given that the DHL crew told the controller that they were
> responding to a TCAS RA, the controller KNEW he had an RA on his hands
> and that it applied to BOTH aircraft.

Yes, but the controller only knew after he had issued the descend
instruction to the Russian aircraft. He did not know that either plane
had a TCAS RA up to that point.

I have not seen a report on exactly when the DHL crew supposedly
announced that they were descending to comply with their TCAS RA, but
there is the question of whether the controller heard or understood it.
By the time the DHL aircraft announced he was descending, it was
probably too late for the controller to do anything more. The initial
RA was about 45 seconds before impact, and the Russian plane started to
descend about 15 seconds later, after the controller made a second call.

> > > The Russians don't appear to have given proper training to their
> > > crews regarding the TCAS system because the crew didn't ignore the
> > > controller like they should have and followed the RA.
> >
> > Again, you don't know what their training is. The pilot didn't follow
> > the instructions, but he might have done that on his own, contrary to
> > his training. There has also been some argument that the controller's
> > instructions should have priority over those of the on-board system.
> >
> Actually, when I worked for Boeing it was pretty clear that the
> Russians were installing TCAS to comply with the rules for flying in
> European airspace, but that they weren't necessarily adopting the TCAS
> philosophy...

If you read the second of the two articles cited above, you will see
that while the majority of pilots would follow TCAS, a substantial
percentage would still follow the controller's instructions, or ignore
both when they receive conflicting information. It therefore appears
that the TCAS philosophy was not universally accepted back then. I
wonder if the attitude has changed in the meantime?

> > Why not wait for the accident report instead of making rash, misinformed
> > accusations?
>
> It is pretty rash of you to assume that I am misinformed...

You were clearly putting most of the blame on the controller, perhaps
based on an incorrect sequence of events. What other conclusion could I
come to?

There were other things the controller did wrong, such as not giving
separation advice early enough, only notifying one aircraft to take
evasive action, and not notifying the aircraft of where the conflicting
traffic was. As I understand it, he did not, however, knowingly give
instructions to the crews that conflicted with the RAs they each heard.

Given that the cause of the accident was a sequence of events, the
investigators are probably looking at how all of them came together, and
what needs to be done to avoid similar problems in the future. If any
one of the links in the chain of events had been broken, the accident
wouldn't have happened. The controller was not entirely to blame. I'm
not even sure he was mostly to blame. That is what the accident report
should address.

[Andrew Gideon]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

James Robinson wrote:

> That was only part of the overall problem, however, since there were
> many procedural and technical problems at the control center, which
> tends to turn the focus of the investigation on the controller's
> employer. The controller was probably put into the position where he
> couldn't adequately handle the traffic being offered, which led to his
> mistakes.

It's funny that this came up now. I recently looked at the NTSB report on
the Nov, 2002 mid-air near KCDW. Since I was in that very same traffic
pattern shortly before this accident (and many times since), I was quite
interested.

The URL for this report is:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20021120X05496&key=2

As you can see, there were "errors" on the part of the controllers which,
loosely, mimic the errors at Skyguide. I write "loosely" because Skyguide
handles a different type of traffic and has more automation available.

But in both cases, there was a controller working alone which brought about
an overload condition.

Yet in the CDW case, you'll note, the pilots were listed as being at fault
(with the controller being a "factor"). Given that we're supposed to "see
& avoid", this is a reasonable conclusion in my opinion.

Now, "see & avoid" may not have applied in the Skyguide case. But if
pilot's are - by regulation - supposed to follow the RA instead of a
controller's instructions, then I can see a similar conclusion being drawn
there.

- Andrew

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFAPmMAsJzG+JC8BsgRAlhZAJ0Q+1WAhhkp+LZOxCeraF 9nW4rq6ACdFKHy
FStdBpO3Yu3WhwUFN3LvJNA=
=9Pbn
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

[G.R. Patterson III]

Stefan wrote:
>
> > The investigators are required to follow a rigorous investigation
> > process, no matter how clear cut a case may be. That takes a lot of
> > time.
>
> Hmmm... Wasn't it you that claimed that reading the preliminary finding
> was enough to have a full understanding of the case?

Yes, and what he's saying here is that a process must be followed, even if it's
just a waste of time.

George Patterson
A diplomat is a person who can tell you to go to hell in such a way that
you look forward to the trip.

[Dean Wilkinson]

Nope, never said such a thing. All I said was that it was clear that
the controller had screwed up... do you dispute that?

Stefan > wrote in message >...
> Dean Wilkinson wrote:
>
> > That is very rude of you to call the investigation team idiots,
>
> You obviously missed the question mark and the irony it implied.
>
> > The investigators are required to follow a rigorous investigation
> > process, no matter how clear cut a case may be. That takes a lot of
> > time.
>
> Hmmm... Wasn't it you that claimed that reading the preliminary finding
> was enough to have a full understanding of the case?
>
> Stefan

[Stefan]

Dean Wilkinson wrote:

> Nope, never said such a thing. All I said was that it was clear that
> the controller had screwed up... do you dispute that?

Yes. Nothing is clear before I've read the full report.

Stefan

[Dima Volodin]

Dean Wilkinson wrote:
>
> My bet is that one of the fathers of the Russian children did it...
>
> The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the
> Russian jet to descend when the Russian crew told him they had an RA
> instructing them to climb.

Did they really?

> Controllers are required to instruct
> flight crews to follow the RA when an RA occurs,

They are not.

> and crews are
> required to follow the RA.

Yes, they are.

> The Russians don't appear to have given
> proper training to their crews regarding the TCAS system because the
> crew didn't ignore the controller like they should have and followed
> the RA.

Yep.

> Dean

Dima

[C J Campbell]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
> Dean Wilkinson wrote:
>
> > Nope, never said such a thing. All I said was that it was clear that
> > the controller had screwed up... do you dispute that?
>
> Yes. Nothing is clear before I've read the full report.
>

In fact, the controller has not even been killed until the police finish
their report, right Stefan?

[C J Campbell]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
> Dean Wilkinson wrote:
>
> > The controller in this case clearly screwed up since he instructed the
>
> Interesting that you already know the culprit while the official report
> is not yet published.

It is interesting that you know who the murder victim was while the official
report is not yet published. In fact, it is interesting that you know there
was a murder at all.

The police will be investigating this incident for some time, perhaps years,
but you are willing to make a snap judgment based on a fragmentary report
printed in some newspaper. :-)

[Dean Wilkinson]

> In fact, the controller has not even been killed until the police finish
> their report, right Stefan?

LOL, very funny C.J.

Now, just so nobody misunderstands me, just because I believe that the
controller made a mistake, I do not believe that the controller
deserved to be stabbed to death. I also believe that the Captain of
the Russian flight made a mistake as well, and he should have listened
to his first officer who kept pointing out that the TCAS system said
climb.

The controller was put in a difficult situation by his employer,
Skyguide. The Russians could benefit from better training in the TCAS
system and better Crew Resource Management.

I think that this case is a good example of why privatizing air
traffic control in the U.S.A. is a bad idea. When safety takes a back
seat to cost controls and profit margins, people die.

Dean Wilkinson

"C J Campbell" > wrote in message >...
> "Stefan" > wrote in message
> ...
> > Dean Wilkinson wrote:
> >
> > > Nope, never said such a thing. All I said was that it was clear that
> > > the controller had screwed up... do you dispute that?
> >
> > Yes. Nothing is clear before I've read the full report.
> >
>
> In fact, the controller has not even been killed until the police finish
> their report, right Stefan?

[Stefan]

C J Campbell wrote:

> In fact, the controller has not even been killed until the police finish
> their report, right Stefan?

Actually, yes. That's how the legl system works here, and it does so for
good. There are libraries full of cases of people who innocently spent
years in prison or even have been executed and found to have been
unguilty later. Oh, and how was that with the "obvious" and "very clear"
fact that Iraq had WMDs? (Not to start a discussion about Iraq, please!)

So just let's wait what the final report will find.

Stefan

[Pizzaman]

Murder suspect haunted by family's air deaths

28 February 2004 07:17


Yuri Kaloyev knew his brother was a broken man even before he
disappeared a week ago. Two years after his wife, son and daughter,
victims of a head-on plane collision over the Swiss-German border, had
been laid to rest amid the sombre rows of a cemetery in their home
town of Vladikavkaz, in southern Russia, his family's ghosts still
haunted his nights. "You could find my brother, even at 2am, at the
cemetery crying on their gravestones," Yuri Kaloyev said. "He
suffered. He could not work. He locked himself away."

On Friday, however, the desolate truth about his brother began to
emerge. Descriptions given by the Swiss police of a man they have
arrested for the savage stabbing to death on Tuesday of the air
traffic controller widely blamed for the plane crash closely fit
Kaloyev.

He is 48. He lost his wife Svetlana, 10-year-old son Konstantin and
four-year-old daughter Diana in the disaster in July 2002, when the
Russian charter aircraft in which they were travelling ploughed into a
cargo plane in the night sky above Germany. While the Russian foreign
ministry have requested confirmation of the arrested man's identity,
the only other man who lost his entire family in the crash, Vladimir
Savchuck, has appeared on Russian TV, deploring the killing.

Before arresting their suspect on Wednesday, Swiss police admitted a
relative of one of the victims of the crash might have been
responsible. On Friday, however, as fresh details emerged, it appeared
that they were dealing with an unprecedented case -- of deliberate
slow-burning revenge by a grief-crazed relative who had nothing left
to lose.

According to investigators, on Tuesday last week Vitali Kaloyev phoned
a Swiss travel company and asked the firm to book him a hotel room
close to Zurich airport. On Saturday Kaloyev arrived in Zurich,
entirely legally, and checked into the Welcome-Inn hotel in the suburb
of Kloten.

Kaloyev, however, chose it for another, darker reason: the suburban
hotel is a short taxi ride away from where Peter Nielsen, the
36-year-old Danish air traffic controller widely blamed for the
catastrophic plane crash, lived with his wife and three children.

According to hotel staff, in the two days before the murder Kaloyev
did little to attract attention. "He was very quiet," the hotel's
manager, Simona Huonder, said on Friday. "We hardly saw him during the
time he stayed with us. He was on his own the whole time, mostly up in
his room." She added: "He didn't speak very good English. My colleague
who checked him in had to give him information slowly."

At breakfast Kaloyev ate alone, later flicking through brochures
offering city tours. "He seemed like any other tourist," Hounder said.
On Tuesday afternoon, however, Kaloyev left his hotel room -- No 316
-- and set off for Peter Nielsen's house, a half-hour's walk away. A
female neighbour of Nielsen spotted him. She then asked him what he
wanted. He waved a piece of paper with Nielsen's name on it. The
neighbour pointed to the air traffic controller's front door, but
instead of knocking on it, Kaloyev sat down in the front garden, near
a bench.

Nielsen, who had lived in Switzerland since 1995, had just returned
home from a trip to Geneva. His wife had picked him up from the
airport. He spotted the intruder, went outside, and asked him what he
wanted. Swiss detectives say that the couple's three children went
into the garden as well; the controller's wife then called them back,
and was inside herself when she heard a "kind of scream".

She rushed out to discover her husband lying in a pool of blood. The
victim and the killer who spoke "broken German" had had a brief
conversation; what they said, however, is unknown.

Nielsen's wife watched her husband's assailant run off; by the time
the police arrived at 6.17pm it was too late. The controller, who
suffered multiple injuries, had bled to death.

Clues for detectives were numerous. They had several good descriptions
-- of a burly, unshaven, dark-haired man in his late 40s or early 50s
who appeared to come from eastern Europe or Russia. They had a murder
weapon -- a 22cm jackknife with a 14cm blade that had been thrown away
near the scene. And they had a name: the chief suspect was a man who,
police said, had "behaved strangely" during the first anniversary of
the crash last summer in the German town of Überlingen. The man had
allegedly threatened officials from Skyguide -- the firm for which
Nielsen worked -- and described him as "scum".

So far, however, the suspect has denied involvement in the killing. On
Friday Kaloyev's brother said that in the months before the murder
Vitali had slowly fallen apart, despite support from his sisters, and
the traditional, strong family ties of Caucasus society. "His
condition was terrible. Imagine what you feel when you lose both your
beloved children and wife," he said. "He disappeared a week ago
without telling anyone. And that is all I know."

It is a tragic end to Kaloyev's seemingly endless grief at the loss of
his family. A native of Vladikavkaz, near the border with Chechnya, he
got a two-year contract to work as a builder and architect on a
project in Barcelona. Just as his contract ended, in June 2002, he
decided to prolong his stay in Spain, and asked his family to fly out
and join him for a month's holiday. He was waiting for them at
Barcelona airport when he learned of the crash.

Kaloyev was one of the first relatives to arrive at the scene, and
discovered the body of his daughter, still intact, almost two miles
from where the accident happened. "Diana dreamed of coming with her
mother and brother to see me," he wrote on a website commemorating the
crash's 71 victims, most of whom were Russian schoolchildren.

Remorse

Nielsen was the only person on duty when the disaster took place. He
had wrongly instructed the Bashkirian airlines plane to descend, even
though its onboard warning equipment told it to climb. The pilot
followed the controller's instructions and ploughed into a DHL cargo
plane that was descending in accordance with its own
collision-avoiding equipment. Nielsen expressed remorse at what had
happened, but in a statement issued after the tragedy pointed out that
he was not the only person responsible.

The apparent revenge killing, meanwhile, has shocked all those
involved in the still-unresolved fight to gain justice for the crash
victims. Yulia Fedotova, a lawyer representing the families, who lost
her own daughter Sofia (15) in the crash said she was "shocked" by the
controller's murder. She added: "We still do not have any official
confirmation that the murderer was Kaloyev. Mr Kaloyev's personal
trauma, however, was clear to those around him."

Margarita, wife to his brother Yuri, told the Izvestiya newspaper:
"Vitali suffered everything alone. And after two years, he was in such
a state that I would not be surprised if he would behave irrationally.
Anyone can put himself in his place: in a minute to lose all your
family."

Kaloyev's days in Vladikavkaz after the funeral appear to have slipped
by, marked by little more than visits to the cemetery. According to
Izvestiya, at the memorial service last year he took the head of
Skyguide, Alan Rossier, aside afterwards and asked him "uncomfortable
questions about who was to be blamed". Kaloyev agreed to come to the
Skyguide office the following day, the newspaper reported. According
to the paper's sources, "Kaloyev asked several times: do you think the
air controller is to blame? He also asked to meet him."

Yet his brother disputes the accounts. Yuri Kaloyev, who travelled
with him to Switzerland and Germany to collect his family's bodies
from the scene of the crash, reserves his own fury for the air traffic
control company Skyguide.

"All this talk and speculation in the newspapers about his abnormal
behaviour last year at the ceremony in Switzerland is rubbish. He was
fine. What is abnormal is the behaviour of Skyguide who did not sack
such an air controller and director as Alan Rossier."

The intensity of Kaloyev's grief remains clear in the internet eulogy
he wrote for his son.

Of Konstantin, who learned to speak at 18 months, read fairytales aged
three, loved dinosaurs and at aged five played computer games, he
wrote: "He would have become a good, well-educated person, useful to
society, were it not for this tragedy, which I cannot get over. I have
no strength."

- Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004

[Andrew Gideon]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Dean Wilkinson wrote:


> I think that this case is a good example of why privatizing air
> traffic control in the U.S.A. is a bad idea. When safety takes a back
> seat to cost controls and profit margins, people die.

What makes you think eliminating the profit issue - that is, leaving ATC in
government hands - would address the type of problem that occurred at
Skyguide? Having recently read the final report on a midair near KCDW a
while back, I can tell you: Federal Towers leave a single overworked
controller alone too.

- Andrew

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFAQTdosJzG+JC8BsgRAkJFAJ966od8E03gjqn7weGVUm nsihQ9UACglOln
lcOXqiCSAbyL0DqSHF7mw4c=
=XavA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

[Dean Wilkinson]

Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower
controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the
U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system
was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no
money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope
not...

Andrew Gideon > wrote in message e.com>...
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Dean Wilkinson wrote:
>
>
> > I think that this case is a good example of why privatizing air
> > traffic control in the U.S.A. is a bad idea. When safety takes a back
> > seat to cost controls and profit margins, people die.
>
> What makes you think eliminating the profit issue - that is, leaving ATC in
> government hands - would address the type of problem that occurred at
> Skyguide? Having recently read the final report on a midair near KCDW a
> while back, I can tell you: Federal Towers leave a single overworked
> controller alone too.
>
> - Andrew
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)
>
> iD8DBQFAQTdosJzG+JC8BsgRAkJFAJ966od8E03gjqn7weGVUm nsihQ9UACglOln
> lcOXqiCSAbyL0DqSHF7mw4c=
> =XavA
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

[Tom Sixkiller]

"Dean Wilkinson" > wrote in message
m...
> Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower
> controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the
> U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system
> was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no
> money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope
> not...

Do the airlines have redundant (backup) systems?

[Dean Wilkinson]

Yes, most of the avionics systems on airliners have at least one
backup if they serve a critical function. Some have more.

Autoland is a triple redundant system and all three boxes have to
agree in order to autoland the airplane. Nav/Com radios are also
triple redundant on the 777. The Air Data Intertial Reference Unit on
the 777 (ADIRU) is fault-tolerant, and it is backup up by the SAARU.
TCAS is also redundant on the 777. Faults are detectable by BITE
software.

Dean

"Tom Sixkiller" > wrote in message >...
> "Dean Wilkinson" > wrote in message
> m...
> > Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower
> > controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the
> > U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system
> > was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no
> > money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope
> > not...
>
> Do the airlines have redundant (backup) systems?

[Andrew Gideon]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Dean Wilkinson wrote:

> Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower
> controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the
> U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system
> was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no
> money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope
> not...

According to the NTSB report, the controller at CDW should not have been
left alone. So it "should not" happen there...yet it does.

Does it happen at Centers? I've no idea. But my point is that Federal
ownership doesn't seem to be a silver bullet. The government can mismanage
as well as anyone else.

- Andrew

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFAQjhMsJzG+JC8BsgRAlGgAJ4y3oOMTgIotWSrUqZylw PBSmU2IwCgj3RB
rksZWpA+5Mt+MH+nsREwRfM=
=DkyX
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

[Robert Moore]

(Dean Wilkinson) wrote

> Autoland is a triple redundant system and all three boxes have to
> agree in order to autoland the airplane.

It might have been more correct to state that Autoland from a Cat III
approach is a triple redundant system. I have flown many Autolands
from Cat II approaches in B-727s with only one Sperry autopilot, either
the SP-50 or the SP-150.
It is true that this one autoland approved autopilot was equipped with
an additional "roll monitor" card that became active whenever the
autoland function was engaged and the aircraft was below 500'AGL and it
had two elevator channels, one controlling the left elevator and the
other controlling the right elevator.
But, there was still just one autopilot with just one power source and
receiving ILS signals from one LOC/GS receiver.

Bob Moore

[Chip Jones]

"Dean Wilkinson" > wrote in message
m...
> Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower
> controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the
> U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system
> was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no
> money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope
> not...


1. Center controllers do indeed work alone in the US. We shouldn't, but
because we are very understaffed, we do. Two controllers per Area is the
staffing number for several midnight watches in my ARTCC. We don't have
both controllers on duty together all night long for an entire 8 hour shift.

2. We *routinely* operate on a back-up radar system on mid shifts while the
main bang is down for maintenance. This includes long periods of time where
the conflict warning system is down and a solo controller is on duty while
the other controller is on break. And yes, we generally have some air
traffic all night long...

Safe? Your call...

Chip, ZTL

[Snowbird]

Andrew Gideon > wrote in message e.com>...

> Dean Wilkinson wrote:
> > I think that this case is a good example of why privatizing air
> > traffic control in the U.S.A. is a bad idea. When safety takes a back
> > seat to cost controls and profit margins, people die.

> What makes you think eliminating the profit issue - that is, leaving ATC in
> government hands - would address the type of problem that occurred at
> Skyguide? Having recently read the final report on a midair near KCDW a
> while back, I can tell you: Federal Towers leave a single overworked
> controller alone too.

Andrew,

The problem is, I'm not sure that leaving ATC in government hands
"eliminates the profit issue" exactly. Or at least, while it's
not exactly a profit issue, I'm not so sure but that safety is
taking a back seat to cost controls, with complications from
ponderous Federal hiring and relocation rules. For example, I
understand that some unGodly large fraction of the Chicago TRACON
controllers are due to retire PDQ but trainees are in very short
supply, because overall staffing is defined as "adequate" -- which
I suppose means more desireable positions are fully or overstaffed,
and management is oversupplied, but due to budgetary limitations
on hiring or relocating, bodies can't be put where they're really
needed.

Just what I've heard -- NB that I'm not an ATCS for which the world
can be duly thankful.

Cheers,
Sydney

[Andrew Gideon]

Snowbird wrote:

> Or at least, while it's
> not exactly a profit issue, I'm not so sure but that safety is
> taking a back seat to cost controls, with complications from
> ponderous Federal hiring and relocation rules.

Yes, that's a better expression of my concern than I could provide.

- Andrew

[Marty]

Just curious guys &(or) gals,

How many airliners are equipped with Category III Autoland?
Percent wise.
Also how many airports are equipped to oblige them?

Marty

"Robert Moore" > wrote in message
. 7...
> (Dean Wilkinson) wrote
>
> > Autoland is a triple redundant system and all three boxes have to
> > agree in order to autoland the airplane.
>
> It might have been more correct to state that Autoland from a Cat III
> approach is a triple redundant system. I have flown many Autolands
> from Cat II approaches in B-727s with only one Sperry autopilot, either
> the SP-50 or the SP-150.
> It is true that this one autoland approved autopilot was equipped with
> an additional "roll monitor" card that became active whenever the
> autoland function was engaged and the aircraft was below 500'AGL and it
> had two elevator channels, one controlling the left elevator and the
> other controlling the right elevator.
> But, there was still just one autopilot with just one power source and
> receiving ILS signals from one LOC/GS receiver.
>
> Bob Moore