Towplane-Baron accident

[JP Stewart]

Odd circumstance: http://www.lagrangenews.com/news/home_top-news/3729615/Updated:-3-killed-in-plane-crash-at-LaGrange-Callaway-Airport

JP

[Bill T]

The title is deceiving. The tow plane was not involved in the accident according to the news paper article. It was operating on a different intersecting runway.

First impression from the article. The Baron was doing touch and goes, climbed 150-200 ft and nosed over. My "guess", trim was not reset from landing to takeoff, power up nose pitched up to a stall.

BillT

[JP Stewart]

How I read it, it sounded like they tried to avoid a collision and overacted or something similar. Speculation, sorry if the title doesn't fit but they article cited it as a factor.

JP

[Dave Nadler]

On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:50:49 PM UTC-5, Jp Stewart wrote:
> Odd circumstance: http://www.lagrangenews.com/news/home_top-news/3729615/Updated:-3-killed-in-plane-crash-at-LaGrange-Callaway-Airport
>
> JP

Explanation in this one (accuracy TBD):
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/three-killed-when-plane-trying-avoid-collision-crashes-n36371

[Dan Marotta]

Ooooooooooo... If it was in the newspaper, it must be true! It's a tragedy
whenever we lose a planeload of people, but it does no good to speculate
that a glider tow on a different runway was somehow part of the accident.

I'm still trying to figure out what a "nose dive" is. Is it related to a
"tail spin"?


"Dave Nadler" > wrote in message
...
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:50:49 PM UTC-5, Jp Stewart wrote:
>> Odd circumstance:
>> http://www.lagrangenews.com/news/home_top-news/3729615/Updated:-3-killed-in-plane-crash-at-LaGrange-Callaway-Airport
>>
>> JP
>
> Explanation in this one (accuracy TBD):
> http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/three-killed-when-plane-trying-avoid-collision-crashes-n36371

[Dave Nadler]

On Sunday, February 23, 2014 11:48:48 AM UTC-5, Dan Marotta wrote:
> Ooooooooooo... If it was in the newspaper, it must be true!
>... but it does no good to speculate...

Which is why I wrote "accuracy TBD"...
The consequences of the reported cause can
be severe, whether or not correct...
Very sad.

[Sean F (F2)]

I can see how this scenario has been presented by the media (per witness descriptions) but from what I have gathered, the Baron never got close enough to any other aircraft as to require such drastic maneuvering as a "pull up.." Pull up to severe stall (resulting in a fatal nose dive) from what exactly? Nothing? I am thinking that the Baron pilot (albeit tragic) really screwed up here.

The only reason I can see for major pull up resulting in a complete power on stall would be if there was an imminent collision. This was clearly not the case in this situation. This makes no sense to me unless aircraft missed each-other by a matter of feet.

Until the NTSB initial report comes out...

[[email protected]]

OK guys. I guess it's time to post some of what we really know. I'm the president of Southern eagles Soaring Club at LaGrange. We were not operating Saturday and I was not at the field. The Civil Air Patrol had been operating their L23 towed by their 172, for several hours from runway 3.

The Baron had been doing ILS low approaches to runway 31. They landed and refueled. There were various reports of what the Baron was doing before it crashed, including a missed approach from a practice ILS, a take off, and a go around. With all these reports, you can judge for your self the accuracy.. Everyone agreed that they did not hear any radio calls from the Baron.

The 172 and L23 were stopped on runway 3, south of runway 31. They never crossed the runway. The crews were very experienced, with 2 CFIG's in the L23 and a retired Air Force pilot and now Delta Captain flying the 172. One of the CFIGs is also a club member.

The crews saw the Baron at low altitude along runway 31. It pulled up very nose high, rolled to the left from 100-200 feet, and crashed in an approximate 60 degree nose down attitude. The front seat pilots were killed on impact. The passenger in the back later died at the hospital.

We do not now, nor will we ever know what made the PIC take the action that he did. They could have been flying simulated instruments, practicing single engine, had an engine failure, or any of a number of things.

Since the names have been release, we do know that the two co-owners were in the aircraft along with another pilot. Records show one of the co-owners was multi-engine rated. No records on the other co-owner. The third person did hold an ATP and instructors rating. We do not know the seating arrangement or who was at the controls.

All the noise about a glider being involved was from one person that was interviewed by two TV stations. He said the Baron was trying to avoid a glider. It unclear as to his actually seeing the crash. The only glider operating that day was sitting on runway 3 behind the tow plane.

Also to show the accuracy of the reporting, one of the stations reported the Baron had flown from Panama City, FL to LaGrange that morning. They used a screen shot from flightAware.com to confirm it. When we checked flightaware, it did indeed show a flight from Panama City as being the last flight they had recorded. Of course, That flight took place in October, 2013!

If any FACTS become available, I'll let you know. However, conjecture will not accomplish anything and could hurt our sport.

Charlie

[Dave Nadler]

On Sunday, February 23, 2014 4:11:56 PM UTC-5, wrote:
> ...conjecture will not accomplish anything and could hurt our sport.

More likely, has already hurt our sport.

Have you approached the TV station and demanded a retraction,
and pointed out that they have libeled 'you', with potential
financial consequences?

No idea if that would help...

[[email protected]]

I asked them nicely to review the facts and only report the facts. I also pointed out their 4 month error on the flight plan. So far, they have not changed anything.

On Sunday, February 23, 2014 4:26:52 PM UTC-5, Dave Nadler wrote:
> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 4:11:56 PM UTC-5, wrote:
>
> > ...conjecture will not accomplish anything and could hurt our sport.
>
>
>
> More likely, has already hurt our sport.
>
>
>
> Have you approached the TV station and demanded a retraction,
>
> and pointed out that they have libeled 'you', with potential
>
> financial consequences?
>
>
>
> No idea if that would help...

[Dave Nadler]

On Sunday, February 23, 2014 4:41:00 PM UTC-5, wrote:
> I asked them nicely to review the facts and only report the facts.
> I also pointed out their 4 month error on the flight plan.
> So far, they have not changed anything.

You are dealing with the media.
To get their attention requires a baseball bat...

[[email protected]]

It appears that the TV reporters eyewitness may have actually only been an earwitness. Additional investigation reports that he heard the crash then looked over and saw it. I thought I heard him say that the first time the TV station played the interview. I never heard it after that. They must have edited it. Of course, they were still playing the original report last I saw.

On Sunday, February 23, 2014 4:47:14 PM UTC-5, Dave Nadler wrote:
> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 4:41:00 PM UTC-5, wrote:
>
> > I asked them nicely to review the facts and only report the facts.
>
> > I also pointed out their 4 month error on the flight plan.
>
> > So far, they have not changed anything.
>
>
>
> You are dealing with the media.
>
> To get their attention requires a baseball bat...

[Sean F (F2)]

Do we have someone at the SSA who is designated to deal with media & accidents? Perhaps we should?

[Sean F (F2)]

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2565858/3-killed-Georgia-plane-crash-aircraft-tried-avoid-hitting-glider.html

This story, with the BOLD headline, "3 killed in Georgia plane crash as aircraft 'tried to avoid hitting a glider" is now being distributed worldwide via outlets as large as DailyMail UK.

This is out of control if the facts are as incredibly different as they are reporting. This is very damaging to the sport of soaring for sure.

[[email protected]]

I can't answer. I did contact the State Governor and Regional Director. Filled them in with know details and told them they could have anyone at SSA contact me, that they felt needed briefing.

On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:16:56 PM UTC-5, Sean F (F2) wrote:
> Do we have someone at the SSA who is designated to deal with media & accidents? Perhaps we should?

[Martin Gregorie[_5_]]

On Sun, 23 Feb 2014 16:30:33 -0800, Sean F (F2) wrote:

> This is out of control if the facts are as incredibly different as they
> are reporting. This is very damaging to the sport of soaring for sure.

I can't help wondering if it is common practise in the USA for an airport
with intersecting runways to have both active at the same time?


--
martin@ | Martin Gregorie
gregorie. | Essex, UK
org |

[Alan[_6_]]

In article > "Sean F (F2)" > writes:
>http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2565858/3-killed-Georgia-plane-crash-aircraft-tried-avoid-hitting-glider.html
>
>This story, with the BOLD headline, "3 killed in Georgia plane crash as
>aircraft 'tried to avoid hitting a glider" is now being distributed
>worldwide via outlets as large as DailyMail UK.
>
>This is out of control if the facts are as incredibly different as they
>are reporting. This is very damaging to the sport of soaring for sure.

Why? What did the glider operation do wrong?

One thing you may learn, as you go through life, is that in almost any
event where you know the actual story, you will see that the story published
in the media is wrong, frequently in extreme ways.

Another thing is that witnesses are generally of no credibility.

In this case, we recognize that there is no practice called "shoot
instrument approach". It gives us a clue that the writer didn't know
much about aviation.

One might get a correction published, but wouldn't you rather rely on
the very short memory of the collective population?

Alan

[Don Johnstone[_4_]]

At 08:56 24 February 2014, Alan wrote:
>In article "Sean F (F2)" writes:
>>http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2565858/3-killed-Georgia-plane-crash-aircraft-tried-avoid-hitting-glider.html
>>
>>This story, with the BOLD headline, "3 killed in Georgia plane crash as
>>aircraft 'tried to avoid hitting a glider" is now being distributed
>>worldwide via outlets as large as DailyMail UK.
>>
>>This is out of control if the facts are as incredibly different as they
>>are reporting. This is very damaging to the sport of soaring for sure.
>
> Why? What did the glider operation do wrong?
>
> One thing you may learn, as you go through life, is that in almost any
>event where you know the actual story, you will see that the story
>published
>in the media is wrong, frequently in extreme ways.
>
> Another thing is that witnesses are generally of no credibility.
>
> In this case, we recognize that there is no practice called "shoot
>instrument approach". It gives us a clue that the writer didn't know
>much about aviation.
>
> One might get a correction published, but wouldn't you rather rely on
>the very short memory of the collective population?
>
> Alan

Politicians oft refer to the 24 hour news cycle. You generally only
increase an item of news beyond 24 hours if you have something interesting
to add, often far wiser to let the story die of starvation

[Dan Marotta]

Good report - thank you!


> wrote in message
...
OK guys. I guess it's time to post some of what we really know. I'm the
president of Southern eagles Soaring Club at LaGrange. We were not operating
Saturday and I was not at the field. The Civil Air Patrol had been operating
their L23 towed by their 172, for several hours from runway 3.

The Baron had been doing ILS low approaches to runway 31. They landed and
refueled. There were various reports of what the Baron was doing before it
crashed, including a missed approach from a practice ILS, a take off, and a
go around. With all these reports, you can judge for your self the accuracy.
Everyone agreed that they did not hear any radio calls from the Baron.

The 172 and L23 were stopped on runway 3, south of runway 31. They never
crossed the runway. The crews were very experienced, with 2 CFIG's in the
L23 and a retired Air Force pilot and now Delta Captain flying the 172. One
of the CFIGs is also a club member.

The crews saw the Baron at low altitude along runway 31. It pulled up very
nose high, rolled to the left from 100-200 feet, and crashed in an
approximate 60 degree nose down attitude. The front seat pilots were killed
on impact. The passenger in the back later died at the hospital.

We do not now, nor will we ever know what made the PIC take the action that
he did. They could have been flying simulated instruments, practicing single
engine, had an engine failure, or any of a number of things.

Since the names have been release, we do know that the two co-owners were in
the aircraft along with another pilot. Records show one of the co-owners was
multi-engine rated. No records on the other co-owner. The third person did
hold an ATP and instructors rating. We do not know the seating arrangement
or who was at the controls.

All the noise about a glider being involved was from one person that was
interviewed by two TV stations. He said the Baron was trying to avoid a
glider. It unclear as to his actually seeing the crash. The only glider
operating that day was sitting on runway 3 behind the tow plane.

Also to show the accuracy of the reporting, one of the stations reported the
Baron had flown from Panama City, FL to LaGrange that morning. They used a
screen shot from flightAware.com to confirm it. When we checked flightaware,
it did indeed show a flight from Panama City as being the last flight they
had recorded. Of course, That flight took place in October, 2013!

If any FACTS become available, I'll let you know. However, conjecture will
not accomplish anything and could hurt our sport.

Charlie

[Dan Marotta]

Lagrange-Calloway airport in Georga is an uncontrolled airport, meaning no
control tower. At those, there is no active runway but more a preferred
runway which is used by consensus based upon wind or other conditions.
There is nothing to preclude a pilot from using a runway different from what
everyone else is using.

At Moriarty, NM, we routinely launch gliders on Rwy 26 for convenience even
with a 15 kt cross wind or with a slight tail wind due to more runway
available to the west than to the east. Regular power traffic will use Rwy
18-36 when we have a high crosswind, but, having no towout gear for our
Grobs, we use 8-26 until the wind gets too high and then we shut down. I've
towed visiting gliders on Rwy 18 and then landed on 26 to tow local gliders.
When crossing runways are in use, we use common courtesy and right of way
rules to avoid collisions.

"Shooting an approach" is a common slang term for executing an instrument
approach.

"Don Johnstone" > wrote in message
...
> At 08:56 24 February 2014, Alan wrote:
>>In article "Sean F (F2)" writes:
>>>http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2565858/3-killed-Georgia-plane-crash-aircraft-tried-avoid-hitting-glider.html
>>>
>>>This story, with the BOLD headline, "3 killed in Georgia plane crash as
>>>aircraft 'tried to avoid hitting a glider" is now being distributed
>>>worldwide via outlets as large as DailyMail UK.
>>>
>>>This is out of control if the facts are as incredibly different as they
>>>are reporting. This is very damaging to the sport of soaring for sure.
>>
>> Why? What did the glider operation do wrong?
>>
>> One thing you may learn, as you go through life, is that in almost any
>>event where you know the actual story, you will see that the story
>>published
>>in the media is wrong, frequently in extreme ways.
>>
>> Another thing is that witnesses are generally of no credibility.
>>
>> In this case, we recognize that there is no practice called "shoot
>>instrument approach". It gives us a clue that the writer didn't know
>>much about aviation.
>>
>> One might get a correction published, but wouldn't you rather rely on
>>the very short memory of the collective population?
>>
>> Alan
>
> Politicians oft refer to the 24 hour news cycle. You generally only
> increase an item of news beyond 24 hours if you have something interesting
> to add, often far wiser to let the story die of starvation
>

[cuflyer]

At LGC, 3-21 is the designated glider ops runway.
13-31 has the ILS and gets most of the power traffic.
Both runways are often used together very safely with constant radio contact.

Tim
1FL
Occasional LGC pilot



On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:34:28 PM UTC-4, Dan Marotta wrote:
> Lagrange-Calloway airport in Georga is an uncontrolled airport, meaning no
>
> control tower. At those, there is no active runway but more a preferred
>
> runway which is used by consensus based upon wind or other conditions.
>
> There is nothing to preclude a pilot from using a runway different from what
>
> everyone else is using.
>
>
>
>

[son_of_flubber]

Prelim NTSB report

http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20140222X51922&key=1

[[email protected]]

On Sunday, February 23, 2014 4:11:56 PM UTC-5, wrote:
> OK guys. I guess it's time to post some of what we really know. I'm the president of Southern eagles Soaring Club at LaGrange. We were not operating Saturday and I was not at the field. The Civil Air Patrol had been operating their L23 towed by their 172, for several hours from runway 3.
>
>
>
> The Baron had been doing ILS low approaches to runway 31. They landed and refueled. There were various reports of what the Baron was doing before it crashed, including a missed approach from a practice ILS, a take off, and a go around. With all these reports, you can judge for your self the accuracy. Everyone agreed that they did not hear any radio calls from the Baron.
>
>
>
> The 172 and L23 were stopped on runway 3, south of runway 31. They never crossed the runway. The crews were very experienced, with 2 CFIG's in the L23 and a retired Air Force pilot and now Delta Captain flying the 172. One of the CFIGs is also a club member.
>
>
>
> The crews saw the Baron at low altitude along runway 31. It pulled up very nose high, rolled to the left from 100-200 feet, and crashed in an approximate 60 degree nose down attitude. The front seat pilots were killed on impact. The passenger in the back later died at the hospital.
>
>
>
> We do not now, nor will we ever know what made the PIC take the action that he did. They could have been flying simulated instruments, practicing single engine, had an engine failure, or any of a number of things.
>
>
>
> Since the names have been release, we do know that the two co-owners were in the aircraft along with another pilot. Records show one of the co-owners was multi-engine rated. No records on the other co-owner. The third person did hold an ATP and instructors rating. We do not know the seating arrangement or who was at the controls.
>
>
>
> All the noise about a glider being involved was from one person that was interviewed by two TV stations. He said the Baron was trying to avoid a glider. It unclear as to his actually seeing the crash. The only glider operating that day was sitting on runway 3 behind the tow plane.
>
>
>
> Also to show the accuracy of the reporting, one of the stations reported the Baron had flown from Panama City, FL to LaGrange that morning. They used a screen shot from flightAware.com to confirm it. When we checked flightaware, it did indeed show a flight from Panama City as being the last flight they had recorded. Of course, That flight took place in October, 2013!
>
>
>
> If any FACTS become available, I'll let you know. However, conjecture will not accomplish anything and could hurt our sport.
>
>
>
> Charlie

please expound on "everyone" in your statement "agreed that they did not hear any radio calls from the Baron" because i have two witnesses who said they "distinctly" heard multiple radio calls from the baron 55 pertaining to traffic pattern radio calls. So your credibility of your "facts" directly conflict with mine, and i will tell you one thing, the hundreds of hours that i flew with my father, the pilot of the baron 55 who was killed, i can never recall a time when he failed to report an approach radio call, so either he screwed up that day or the CAP tow pilot was to incompetent to hear the oncoming traffic. PS. im always open for more info to find out if my dad screwed up bad or not, i just wanna know, and providing falsified information will not help.

[Henry Retting]

All pilots screw up son. With over 45,000 hours flying the smallest to the biggest and never scratching any paint, I have screwed up enough to be convince that a GOD does indeed exist and believe that today or tomorrow GOD could be too busy to help.
Your father did what all pilots do and reacted to the event the best way he could.
I would bet on my son's life that he was all in doing his very best.
If you feel he was a good pilot then he was and I also bet he knew and accepted the moment he got out of bed and went into motion risk began. The process of looking for answers to an aircraft accident is cutthroat. It has to be because deep down inside, we know we could be next. It is the 'slicing and dicing' that aviators do going back a hundred years that forces all of us to do our very best, to be held to scrutiny, even after death.
Any number of things could have contributed to the accident. Questions without answers. It's tough. But this much I can guarantee, everybody is paying attention and not thinking negative thoughts about your father.
Be at peace.
R

[[email protected]]

Wow, what a wonderful post!

I wish I had had the opportunity to read these words back in 1988 when my sister and her husband died in a Cessna crash on the side of a mountain in Utah. It took quite a while to come to the same conclusion that Henry points out here. Questions are many, answers are few and there is no way to change it.

Robert


On Wednesday, March 26, 2014 9:47:30 AM UTC-5, Henry Retting wrote:
> All pilots screw up son. With over 45,000 hours flying the smallest to the biggest and never scratching any paint, I have screwed up enough to be convince that a GOD does indeed exist and believe that today or tomorrow GOD could be too busy to help. Your father did what all pilots do and reacted to the event the best way he could. I would bet on my son's life that he was all in doing his very best. If you feel he was a good pilot then he was and I also bet he knew and accepted the moment he got out of bed and went into motion risk began. The process of looking for answers to an aircraft accident is cutthroat. It has to be because deep down inside, we know we could be next. It is the 'slicing and dicing' that aviators do going back a hundred years that forces all of us to do our very best, to be held to scrutiny, even after death. Any number of things could have contributed to the accident. Questions without answers. It's tough. But this much I can guarantee, everybody is paying attention and not thinking negative thoughts about your father. Be at peace. R

[[email protected]]

I am so very sorry for your loss. I think that all of us who strap ourselves into airplanes and sailplanes understands and accepts, at least on some level, that we may very well not get back out of that aircraft alive. We go on flying / soaring anyway because for a lot of us it is the passion of our lives. It's the one thing that makes everything else that we have to do...worthwhile. I don't know if this will offer you any comfort or not but I always told my wife and kids that if I died in an airplane accident that I did not want them to ever think or say anything bad about little airplanes or flying. If I had an accident it was probably my fault. I also
asked them to be mindful of how very special flying was to me and how much joy it brought me in my life. Even if I somehow knew that I would someday die flying, I would go on doing it anyway. It means that much to me. My guess is that your Dad would feel the same. My thoughts and prayers are with you and your family.

Brian k. Lott

[[email protected]]

On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:50:49 PM UTC-5, Jp Stewart wrote:
> Odd circumstance: http://www.lagrangenews.com/news/home_top-news/3729615/Updated:-3-killed-in-plane-crash-at-LaGrange-Callaway-Airport
>
>
>
> JP

ironically that was the last thing he asked me, "did you schedule a lesson for sunday" i didnt go to that lesson on that sunday but im starting back today, got 6 hours before my checkride. I know my mom will not like me flying but i love it too much, like you said, and i wont let this event ground me.

[SoaringXCellence]

JP,

My father, a highly competitive soaring pilot, died in a sailplane accident in 1978 during the US Nationals at Minden. I was told during his funeral that I would probably not take up flying My response has always been that events in the lives of other people are not restrictions on my life, but that there are always things to learn from tragic circumstances. Unfortunately, in my father's case, there has never been a clear explanation of the cause, (But JJ's article "Don't Smack the Mountain" is probably the best guess)

In spite of that, I've been flying since 1985, now with more than 5500 hours (more than three times my father's hours) and while I've had my share of close calls, I've enjoyed flying.

As noted above, each time we step into an aircraft we increase our risks. Some time in the future we may encounter a fatal error, perhaps not of our own making. In the mean time I'm delighted to be able to fly and experience the feelings it gives me.

I understand your loss, look for joy in the rest of life.

Mike

[[email protected]]

This federal district court report provides some detailed discussions and the legal outcome of this accident. The United States was found at fault; the CAP tow and glider pilots were on an Air Force assigned mission and thus covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act. https://www.scribd.com/document/356369671/Curtis-v-United-States

[[email protected]]

There is mitigating background to this matter:

The local airport authority (political appointees) had, for years, created a hostile operating environment for glider flying at KLGC. It began with attempting to restrict glider operations to weekend days only, along with other nitnoy demands like gliders could not be assembled in a grass area off to the side of seldom used taxiway (rather, they wanted us to assemble in the middle of the refueling area tarmac in the way of taxiing/refueling traffic). Then the club received a letter from the airport manager demanding that the club permanently relocate elsewhere.

The club refused the relocation notice, knowing that the airport had accepted federal funds on numerous occasions and thus was obliv

[[email protected]]

Your reply was cut off, and I definitely want to hear the rest of the story..

I found the court's account quite educational from a safety standpoint, yet riveting from a personal standpoint. Reading through the court's account of how to decide the pre-impact pain and suffering--the thoughts and feelings that must have been in their minds those few seconds--sent a chill down my spine.

I'm sorry for all involved. What a tragedy.

Troy

[[email protected]]

Sorry, must have prematurely hit the send button...

Continued:

....and thus KLGC was obligated to support all forms of aviation activity.

For decades, LaGrange, GA, was the ad hoc headquarters for the regional textile manufacturing business, that had all but been transferred overseas by the early 2000s. In its heyday, however, it was not uncommon for KLGC to have corporate bizjet sorties, along with the traffic conflicts that mixing jets and gliders periodically causes. The money, politics, and power wielded by the local textile companies continuously caused the glider flying to be considered as an undesirable nuisance at best and a safety threat at worst.

The glider club's stance that it had a right to operate at KLGC on an equal basis with every other aviation activity caused the airport authority to hire an aviation attorney. The lawyer counseled the airport authority that glider flying at KLGC could not be restricted.

That should have been the end of story. Yet, from this the airport aurhority enacted a set of glider operating rules (still posted at the KLGC website) to include the requirement for a "spotter" to be stationed at the intersection of the runways to verify there was no conflicting traffic prior to a towplane/glider launch. In essence, causing a degree of traffic pattern control at a FAA designated uncontrolled airport, to be done by an untrained/unqualified person. A usurpation of FAA standardized uncontrolled airport operating procedures and confusing established inflight right-of-way rules..

An public airport authority cannot mandate anything that is contrary to FAA regulations, and has no "authority" to enact any rules of flight. In essence, the KLGC airport authority attempted to introduce a degree of traffic pattern control at a designated uncontrolled airport to be performed by an untrained/unqualified person. This usurps FAA standardized uncontrolled airport operating procedures and confuses right-of-way rules.

A few other points to consider: 1) One airport authority board member would frequently attempt to control the traffic pattern using the CTAF, 2) Another board member is a local real estate broker with listings to sell vacated textile warehouses on the airport premises. At the time, KLGC was in the running for the KIA auto production plant eventually built in nearby West Point, GA, 3) Ironically, the airport authority had used glider sorties to count towards the traffic numbers it needed to procure federal funding, 4) ANY aviation activity utilizing the non-ILS runway had the potential to create a flight conflict at the intersecting runways; however, only the glider operators had to post a "spotter"?

IMO, the "legal" judgment ignores the fact that 1) Codefied FAA regulations clearly mandate that IF there was a flight conflict at, or near, intersecting runways, that the powered aircraft is supposed to give way to the towplane/glider combination, and 2) A public airport authority's "authority" is limited. A local airport authority cannot enact rules affecting flight operation--only the FAA can do that. Attempting to do so confuses universally applicable standard operating procedures to the detriment of the very flight safety those universal procedure were enacted to ensure.

I do hope the government's defense attorney made these points in court.

In hindsight, perhaps the glider club and the CAP should have pooled their resources to formally invalidate the unauthorized, conflictive local operating rules. Ignoring such a circumstance, no matter how obviously obtuse such local airport rules are to an aviator's sense of regulatory "legality", may have nonsensical consequences in an ill adept court of law.

Ray Cornay

[Jonathan St. Cloud]

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/three-killed-when-plane-trying-avoid-collision-crashes-n36371

On Sunday, June 3, 2018 at 8:37:49 AM UTC-7, wrote:
> Sorry, must have prematurely hit the send button...
>
> Continued:
>
> ...and thus KLGC was obligated to support all forms of aviation activity.
>
> For decades, LaGrange, GA, was the ad hoc headquarters for the regional textile manufacturing business, that had all but been transferred overseas by the early 2000s. In its heyday, however, it was not uncommon for KLGC to have corporate bizjet sorties, along with the traffic conflicts that mixing jets and gliders periodically causes. The money, politics, and power wielded by the local textile companies continuously caused the glider flying to be considered as an undesirable nuisance at best and a safety threat at worst.
>
> The glider club's stance that it had a right to operate at KLGC on an equal basis with every other aviation activity caused the airport authority to hire an aviation attorney. The lawyer counseled the airport authority that glider flying at KLGC could not be restricted.
>
> That should have been the end of story. Yet, from this the airport aurhority enacted a set of glider operating rules (still posted at the KLGC website) to include the requirement for a "spotter" to be stationed at the intersection of the runways to verify there was no conflicting traffic prior to a towplane/glider launch. In essence, causing a degree of traffic pattern control at a FAA designated uncontrolled airport, to be done by an untrained/unqualified person. A usurpation of FAA standardized uncontrolled airport operating procedures and confusing established inflight right-of-way rules.
>
> An public airport authority cannot mandate anything that is contrary to FAA regulations, and has no "authority" to enact any rules of flight. In essence, the KLGC airport authority attempted to introduce a degree of traffic pattern control at a designated uncontrolled airport to be performed by an untrained/unqualified person. This usurps FAA standardized uncontrolled airport operating procedures and confuses right-of-way rules.
>
> A few other points to consider: 1) One airport authority board member would frequently attempt to control the traffic pattern using the CTAF, 2) Another board member is a local real estate broker with listings to sell vacated textile warehouses on the airport premises. At the time, KLGC was in the running for the KIA auto production plant eventually built in nearby West Point, GA, 3) Ironically, the airport authority had used glider sorties to count towards the traffic numbers it needed to procure federal funding, 4) ANY aviation activity utilizing the non-ILS runway had the potential to create a flight conflict at the intersecting runways; however, only the glider operators had to post a "spotter"?
>
> IMO, the "legal" judgment ignores the fact that 1) Codefied FAA regulations clearly mandate that IF there was a flight conflict at, or near, intersecting runways, that the powered aircraft is supposed to give way to the towplane/glider combination, and 2) A public airport authority's "authority" is limited. A local airport authority cannot enact rules affecting flight operation--only the FAA can do that. Attempting to do so confuses universally applicable standard operating procedures to the detriment of the very flight safety those universal procedure were enacted to ensure.
>
> I do hope the government's defense attorney made these points in court.
>
> In hindsight, perhaps the glider club and the CAP should have pooled their resources to formally invalidate the unauthorized, conflictive local operating rules. Ignoring such a circumstance, no matter how obviously obtuse such local airport rules are to an aviator's sense of regulatory "legality", may have nonsensical consequences in an ill adept court of law.
>
> Ray Cornay

[Bruce Hoult]

On Monday, June 4, 2018 at 3:26:19 AM UTC+12, wrote:
> Your reply was cut off, and I definitely want to hear the rest of the story.
>
> I found the court's account quite educational from a safety standpoint, yet riveting from a personal standpoint. Reading through the court's account of how to decide the pre-impact pain and suffering--the thoughts and feelings that must have been in their minds those few seconds--sent a chill down my spine.
>
> I'm sorry for all involved. What a tragedy.

I'm quite troubled that the court ruled it's too much to expect a licensed pilot to be able to successfully execute a go-around without stalling and crashing.

[[email protected]]

I am with Bruce.
Go arounds/balked landings are part of flying, trained reguarly. All very sad but the main cause of the accident was not the tow combination being in the way although it was a factor.
Tom

[2G]

On Sunday, June 3, 2018 at 6:55:00 PM UTC-7, Bruce Hoult wrote:
> On Monday, June 4, 2018 at 3:26:19 AM UTC+12, wrote:
> > Your reply was cut off, and I definitely want to hear the rest of the story.
> >
> > I found the court's account quite educational from a safety standpoint, yet riveting from a personal standpoint. Reading through the court's account of how to decide the pre-impact pain and suffering--the thoughts and feelings that must have been in their minds those few seconds--sent a chill down my spine.
> >
> > I'm sorry for all involved. What a tragedy.
>
> I'm quite troubled that the court ruled it's too much to expect a licensed pilot to be able to successfully execute a go-around without stalling and crashing.

The decision was assignment of liability for the accident's cause, not a test of the deceased pilot's emergency responses. The judge considered this and rejected it. What it boiled down to is the Baron had the right-of-way. It is like someone ran a red light and you hit him. The other guy can argue that you might not have hit him if you had swerved, or applied your brakes sooner and more aggressively, but he will lose in court.

Tom

[[email protected]]

It's dangerous to speculate on a situation like this so I'll just pose a few questions, recognizing that some will conclude I'm looking for a way to assign blame. I'm not.

1. Does it make sense that the airport-authority-required spotter's primary reason was to watch for powered aircraft taking off on the cross runway? Wouldn't landing aircraft (like the Baron) be visible to the glider launch crew? Or are the sight lines that restricted there?
2. The Court mentioned the Baron was making a simulated instrument approach.. The Baron pilot was well acquainted with the airport and the glider operation located there. Does a simulated instrument approach mean he was probably "under the hood" and therefore unable to scan the cross runway on final for possible glider traffic as he might otherwise have done? Since he was apparently not operating under an IFR flight plan, should there have been a safety pilot watching for conflicts? The co-pilot was a CFI but apparently disqualified for medical reasons.

Very sad situation, for everyone involved.

Chip Bearden

[[email protected]]

All:

KLGC has been an uncontrolled airport with intersecting runways for many, many decades.
My understanding is at least as far back as a WW2 training base.

Aircraft operation from Rwy 3 have good line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31.

Due to the prevailing winds and runway length, power traffic typically uses Rwy 31.
So as not to congest the approach end of the "primary" runway, gliders typically operated from Rwy 21.
Aircraft departing from Rwy 21 do not have line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31; hence, justification for a local rule to require an "agent" to be stationed at the intersection to advise "that no apparent traffic conflict will be involved".
See: http://www.lagrangeairport.com/Home/Rules_Regulations

As I previously pointed, non-glider related aircraft utilizing Rwy 21 have the same inability to see the approach end of Rwy 31, but the airport rule does not require an "agent" to advise in such a case.

Furthermore, since an aircraft departing Rwy 3 has good line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31, the need for an agent to advise Rwy 3 glider ops is moot.

Regarding determination of right-of-way:

It is unclear to me from the court documents what phase of flight the Baron was at the intersection.

If the Baron was still on the ground from a touch and go, then it was still in the landing phase and thus had the right of way.
However, if the Baron was still on the ground by the intersection, that left precious little runway remaining to intiate a takeoff from that point.
The intersection of Rwy 31 & 3 is ~4000' from the approach end of Rwy 31.

If, as it seems from all accounts, the Baron was airborne at the intersection (~4000' from the approach end of Rwy 31), either from a go around, low approach, or touch and go, then the pilot probably wasn't intending to land within the remaining ~1500 of runway. The Baron was arguably no longer in the landing phase and, if a conflict with another airborne aircraft developed, standard right of way rules should have applied.

If auch an airborne conflict did occur at the intersection, standards dictate the less manuverable aircraft, being the tow plane with glider in tow, had the right of way.

IMO, there is too many specifics not known to be adamant about the Baron having the right of way.

My take, from the reports, is that the situation was not one of two airborne aircraft converging. Consequently, in flight right of way standards don't apply.

My take, from the reports, is that the cause of the crash is that the pilot of the Baron failed to maintain aircraft control. Other factors may be deemed contributory, but not causal. The only way the towplane could have caused the Baron to crash is if the towplane had impacted it. That did not happen.

The fact that a court of law can make an adamant ruling about the "cause" an aircraft accident, and assign liability therefom, without its discovery including an accurate determination about phase of flight, should concern every aviator, regardless of what type of aircraft they operate.

The fact that a local, political-appointed airport authority whose board members, who may or may not have flight training/experience, can independently institute rules specific to "their" public airport that conflict with FAA regulations but, nevertheless, will be used against you in a court of law should concern every aviator, regardless of what type of aircraft they operate.

Ray Cornay

[Bruce Hoult]

On Tuesday, June 5, 2018 at 6:40:11 AM UTC+12, wrote:
> All:
>
> KLGC has been an uncontrolled airport with intersecting runways for many, many decades.
> My understanding is at least as far back as a WW2 training base.
>
> Aircraft operation from Rwy 3 have good line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31.
>
> Due to the prevailing winds and runway length, power traffic typically uses Rwy 31.
> So as not to congest the approach end of the "primary" runway, gliders typically operated from Rwy 21.
> Aircraft departing from Rwy 21 do not have line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31; hence, justification for a local rule to require an "agent" to be stationed at the intersection to advise "that no apparent traffic conflict will be involved".
> See: http://www.lagrangeairport.com/Home/Rules_Regulations
>
> As I previously pointed, non-glider related aircraft utilizing Rwy 21 have the same inability to see the approach end of Rwy 31, but the airport rule does not require an "agent" to advise in such a case.
>
> Furthermore, since an aircraft departing Rwy 3 has good line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31, the need for an agent to advise Rwy 3 glider ops is moot.
>
> Regarding determination of right-of-way:
>
> It is unclear to me from the court documents what phase of flight the Baron was at the intersection.
>
> If the Baron was still on the ground from a touch and go, then it was still in the landing phase and thus had the right of way.
> However, if the Baron was still on the ground by the intersection, that left precious little runway remaining to intiate a takeoff from that point.
> The intersection of Rwy 31 & 3 is ~4000' from the approach end of Rwy 31.

I got the impression the Baron never made it as far as the intersection, and didn't overfly either the intersection or the runway the glider&towplane were on before impact.

Official landing distance for a Baron is 2490 ft (from 50') with 1440 ft ground roll. You'd think from a reasonably normal approach stopping within 4000 ft of the threshold shouldn't be an issue even if not planning a maximum performance stop. Takeoff performance (at gross weight of course) is actually a shorter distance: 1373 ft of ground roll and 2345 ft to clear a 50 ft obstacle.

So a well flown Baron could touch down, come to a dead stop, then accelerate takeoff and clear a 50 ft obstacle in a total of 3785 ft. That's less than the distance to the intersection. With any kind of speed kept in a touch-and-go or a missed approach it *should* be a doddle.

The airport altitude is 700 ft, which will have an effect on those numbers, but not a major one. It probably wasn't hot in Georgia in February.

[[email protected]]

Here's the NTSB report
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20140222X51922&AKey=1&RType=Final&IType=FA

An unfortunate event with plenty of opportunities for improvement on all sides.

CAP could have done better in showing their intentions and understanding the traffic situation.
The Barron pilot could have brushed up on landing before instrument stuff.
The Airport could have been clearer on why the spotter was important.

It's a public use airport with random pilots of limited skill and limited visibility. With the benefit of hindsight, there may still be a few possible ways to prevent this.
1) Use a spotter so the glider operation can 'see' 31 traffic.
2) Don't use runway 31 after the intersection. (The defacto plan?)
3) Positive handshake on the radio.
4) Do the glider ops from 31.

2 and 3 don't work with random pilots.
4 would require CAP to be efficient in their use of the runway.
Which leaves 1.

[[email protected]]

1. Why should the extraordinary effort to ensure no crossing runway traffic exists be the sole responsibility of just the glider aviation activity at KLGC?
2. Wouldn't the Baron pilot have overreacted similarly if the aborting traffic on Rwy 3 had been, say, a Cessna 172?
3. Why didn't the NTSB report discuss how locally mandated, non-standard airport procedures can be detrimental to safety of flight by counterintuitively conflicting with established, FAA mandated procedures, especially at uncontrolled airports where such standard procedures must be universally assumed and relied upon?
4. Why wasn't KLGC/Airport Authority/City of LaGrange/Troup County named as defendants due to its/their negligence for not ensuring all operators were 1) aware of "their" local airport rules and 2) that such local rules were were being adhered to?
5. Why wasn't Beechcraft Aircraft Corporation/Textron Aviation named as defendants due to its/their negligence for not building a foolproof airplane?5. Did the airport authority involve the CAP & glider club in the local rules making process?
6. Did the airport authority ever formally notify the CAP & glider club about the local rules pertaining to glider flying at KLGC?
7. Considering personnel/membership changeover, does the airport authority periodically remind the CAP & Glider club of the local rules pertaining to glider flight at KLGC?
8. Why wasn't the estate of the Baron's pilot in command not a named defendant due to his negligence by not maintaining situational awareness and aircraft control?
9. Why wasn't the estate of the CFI onboard the Baron not a named defendant due to his negligence by not ensuring situational awareness and safety of flight, not to mention performing his flight duty while having methadone in his system?
10. Why was is never mentioned that common side affects of the antihistamines found in the Baron pilot's system are dizziness, drowsiness, blurred vision?
11. Why did the court summarily dismiss the possibility [probability] the CAP operation made a takeoff radio call when witness testimony stated that CAP CTAF use was "constant"?
12. Why did the court summarily dismiss expert witness testimony that the Baron's "lift detector" (stall warning system?) was inoperative based on the [il]logic *because it always worked just fine before*?
13. How could a judge (or jury?) have read the NTSB report and still conclude the "cause" of the Baron crashing was strictly the towplane/glider abort?

Seems the burden of guilt continues to be squarely laid upon the CAP glider op, and that just ain't right in so many ways...

Ray Cornay

[Bob Whelan[_3_]]

"Way to go," Mr. Cornay for having the gumption and taking the time to raise
(on RAS, anyway) some serious and germane issues related to this
serious/tragic loss of 'aviation related' life.

It's so 'normally human' to wish for pat and neat resolutions to tragedies
like this...both within the piloting community and within the legal community
and within the far larger community who honestly hope in general to see
'perpetrators held accountable.' I'm no lawyer, but definitely inhabit the
other two categories.

Focusing responsibility on CAP/'the glider operation at the field' seems to me
- from my geographically-distant perspective - simplistic in the extreme.
Life/reality is more complicated...

Bob W.

---
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com

[Frank Whiteley]

On Tuesday, June 5, 2018 at 11:27:56 AM UTC-6, wrote:
> 1. Why should the extraordinary effort to ensure no crossing runway traffic exists be the sole responsibility of just the glider aviation activity at KLGC?
> 2. Wouldn't the Baron pilot have overreacted similarly if the aborting traffic on Rwy 3 had been, say, a Cessna 172?
> 3. Why didn't the NTSB report discuss how locally mandated, non-standard airport procedures can be detrimental to safety of flight by counterintuitively conflicting with established, FAA mandated procedures, especially at uncontrolled airports where such standard procedures must be universally assumed and relied upon?
> 4. Why wasn't KLGC/Airport Authority/City of LaGrange/Troup County named as defendants due to its/their negligence for not ensuring all operators were 1) aware of "their" local airport rules and 2) that such local rules were were being adhered to?
> 5. Why wasn't Beechcraft Aircraft Corporation/Textron Aviation named as defendants due to its/their negligence for not building a foolproof airplane?5. Did the airport authority involve the CAP & glider club in the local rules making process?
> 6. Did the airport authority ever formally notify the CAP & glider club about the local rules pertaining to glider flying at KLGC?
> 7. Considering personnel/membership changeover, does the airport authority periodically remind the CAP & Glider club of the local rules pertaining to glider flight at KLGC?
> 8. Why wasn't the estate of the Baron's pilot in command not a named defendant due to his negligence by not maintaining situational awareness and aircraft control?
> 9. Why wasn't the estate of the CFI onboard the Baron not a named defendant due to his negligence by not ensuring situational awareness and safety of flight, not to mention performing his flight duty while having methadone in his system?
> 10. Why was is never mentioned that common side affects of the antihistamines found in the Baron pilot's system are dizziness, drowsiness, blurred vision?
> 11. Why did the court summarily dismiss the possibility [probability] the CAP operation made a takeoff radio call when witness testimony stated that CAP CTAF use was "constant"?
> 12. Why did the court summarily dismiss expert witness testimony that the Baron's "lift detector" (stall warning system?) was inoperative based on the [il]logic *because it always worked just fine before*?
> 13. How could a judge (or jury?) have read the NTSB report and still conclude the "cause" of the Baron crashing was strictly the towplane/glider abort?
>
> Seems the burden of guilt continues to be squarely laid upon the CAP glider op, and that just ain't right in so many ways...
>
> Ray Cornay

Ray,

Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't Southern Eagles Soaring move from La Grange to Roosevelt Memorial Field precisely because of the airport's treatment of gliding operations and operational demands that prudent people could finally no longer tolerate?

Frank Whiteley

[[email protected]]

Dear Frank,

I was no longer a club member at the time it moved from the LaGrange airport to elsewhere.
One can presume the Baron accident/court finding against the CAP was a factor in that decision.

SES relocating away from all the hostility at KLGC is probably for the best.

Ray

[[email protected]]

Hi Frank,

I was no longer a club member at the time of its relocation.
I believe the relocation occurred after the Baron accident, and, if so, one can presume that was a catalyst.

SES getting away from all the hostility at KLGC is probably for the best.

I wonder if the CAP still operates from there?

Ray

[Frank Whiteley]

On Tuesday, June 5, 2018 at 2:00:20 PM UTC-6, wrote:
> Hi Frank,
>
> I was no longer a club member at the time of its relocation.
> I believe the relocation occurred after the Baron accident, and, if so, one can presume that was a catalyst.
>
> SES getting away from all the hostility at KLGC is probably for the best.
>
> I wonder if the CAP still operates from there?
>
> Ray

I thought the move was before this accident. FWIW, CAP has also operated at Roosevelt in recent years.

Frank

[Dan Marotta]

Never even played a lawyer on TV, but wasn't the court decision about
assigning liability and not about operations?Â* I read the court decision
end to end and, though deep inside I agree that the pilot of the Baron
screwed the pooch, the logic in the court's finding seemed sound to me.

Too bad that it happened at all...

On 6/5/2018 11:53 AM, Bob Whelan wrote:
> "Way to go," Mr. Cornay for having the gumption and taking the time to
> raise (on RAS, anyway) some serious and germane issues related to this
> serious/tragic loss of 'aviation related' life.
>
> It's so 'normally human' to wish for pat and neat resolutions to
> tragedies like this...both within the piloting community and within
> the legal community and within the far larger community who honestly
> hope in general to see 'perpetrators held accountable.' I'm no lawyer,
> but definitely inhabit the other two categories.
>
> Focusing responsibility on CAP/'the glider operation at the field'
> seems to me - from my geographically-distant perspective - simplistic
> in the extreme. Life/reality is more complicated...
>
> Bob W.
>
> ---
> This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
> https://www.avg.com
>

--
Dan, 5J

[waremark]

I thought people would be happy that it is government which has to pay out in this case. I hope the court would have managed to see this differently if the glider tow had been from the civilian club and could have destroyed the club.

To me as a total outsider, the operation as described sounds unacceptably dangerous, with the tragic outcome therefore reasonably foreseeable.

[chuck[_3_]]

> I wonder if the CAP still operates from there?

Hi Ray,
SES and CAP were forced to move by the locals after the accident. Both now operate at Warm Springs.
One point I’ve not seen made - CAP (and SES) were required to operate from 03/21 by the Airport Authority. They were basically prohibited from operating on the main runway. This was spelled out in the Operating Agreement the club was required to sign shortly after they moved there if I recall correctly. I’ll never understand how the Authority did not get sued as a result (not a lawyer and didn’t play one on TV either).

Nice to hear from you. Hope all is well.
Chuck

[John Foster]

On Saturday, February 22, 2014 at 7:50:49 PM UTC-7, Jp Stewart wrote:
> Odd circumstance: http://www.lagrangenews.com/news/home_top-news/3729615/Updated:-3-killed-in-plane-crash-at-LaGrange-Callaway-Airport
>
> JP

A question that has come to mind that I haven't seen discussed yet is one of visibility. How is a civilian airport even allowed to operate where two intersecting runways are in place where you can't see one from the other? I'm no expert here, but that just sounds like a disaster waiting to happen (which it did, in this case). Also (not a radio expert here) is the CTAF one that needs "line of sight" for the signal to be transmitted, or can the radio waves bend around land obstructions? Could it be that the land that obscures the view of the end of the other intersecting runway, could also obscure the transmission of radio waves, thus explaining why no one at the FBO or that both aircraft didn't hear each other's radio transmissions?

[2G]

On Tuesday, June 5, 2018 at 7:53:01 PM UTC-7, John Foster wrote:
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 at 7:50:49 PM UTC-7, Jp Stewart wrote:
> > Odd circumstance: http://www.lagrangenews.com/news/home_top-news/3729615/Updated:-3-killed-in-plane-crash-at-LaGrange-Callaway-Airport
> >
> > JP
>
> A question that has come to mind that I haven't seen discussed yet is one of visibility. How is a civilian airport even allowed to operate where two intersecting runways are in place where you can't see one from the other? I'm no expert here, but that just sounds like a disaster waiting to happen (which it did, in this case). Also (not a radio expert here) is the CTAF one that needs "line of sight" for the signal to be transmitted, or can the radio waves bend around land obstructions? Could it be that the land that obscures the view of the end of the other intersecting runway, could also obscure the transmission of radio waves, thus explaining why no one at the FBO or that both aircraft didn't hear each other's radio transmissions?

Radio communications are not 100% reliable. Pilots may be on the wrong frequency, have the squelch turned up, the volume down or step on each other. If you want to be sure, you must receive an affirmative reply. This was not done in this case, with tragic results.

Tom

[Ernst]

On Tuesday, June 5, 2018 at 12:27:56 PM UTC-5, wrote:

> 1. Why should.....


Why should plaintiff lawyers go after individuals and small organizations when it is easy to blame everything on an U.S. government organization and sue the U.S. of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act?
This trial was not about finding the true cause of the accident it was about extracting the most ROI.

Ernst

[[email protected]]

Glad to learn I'm not the only one uneasy with the outcome. It's natural for us glider pilots to object to a court decision that makes the glider operation solely liable. The court system doesn't always function logically, in particular in complex areas such as aviation. It's particularly frustrating when the NTSB appears to put the majority of the blame on the Baron pilot..

We don't have all the facts. But it seems the CAP also shares a substantial portion of the blame, whether because the airport authority required a spotter that they didn't use, or because landing aircraft always have the right of way (even over towing aircraft, AFAIK), or because one of the wing runner's big jobs is to look for approaching traffic before allowing the launch to begin. Nothing was said in the reports but could this have been a case where the towing operation thought they could get out before the Baron landed? I also don't recall seeing anything in the judgement or the NTSB report about the towing operation hearing the Baron's landing call. Did they not hear it or just ignore it. And did they miss seeing the Baron on final?

The Baron pilot appears to have overreacted, although I've seen very competent pilots be taken by surprise in similar situations. Still, the CAP created the situation the Baron pilot had to avoid.

Airports are no different than any other operation where the powers that be want to control everything despite common sense and the law. And it certainly sounds like there was no love lost between the authority and the glider operations. Yet I've launched from numerous airports with special rules we had to follow. Some benefited us (e.g., allowing operations from a taxiway) while others constrained us (as here). In every case, we've tried very hard to comply.

Where clubs have been involved, it's been our responsibility to communicate any special operating rules to our members and ensure their compliance, including modifying our operating procedures where necessary. In this case the local rules didn't conflict with good practice; they just enhanced it, except to the extent that knowing of the spotter might have tended to create a false sense of security among local pilots...which the Baron pilots were not.

I suspect the estates of the two other people killed in the crash did consider action against the pilot. Maybe there are other lawsuits winding their way through the system as we speak. I also assume the CAP (i.e., U.S. government) could now pursue the estate of the safety pilot--the CFI in the right seat--whose responsibility was alluded to in the NTSB report.

That the findings of the court in a civil action are inconsistent with other judicial or regulatory decisions isn't unique; e.g., the successful $33 million civil suit against O.J. Simpson after he was acquitted of criminal actions.

As for suing Beech because the Baron wasn't stall/spin-proof, good luck on that one. Frankly, I'm pretty cool on holding glider manufacturers liable if their aircraft will stall and spin.

I am, however, left wondering (in the absence of a detailed transcript) if the CAP/government were not well represented by counsel. There seem to be enough reasons to question the court's ultimate decision to wonder if the defendants' legal team(s) did their job properly. Any thoughts from the local folks on this?

Chip Bearden

[George Haeh]

The US has 11 million good reasons to file an appeal, but I don't know if they did before the filing deadline.

Radio transmissions commonly go unheard. Receivers on the ground (or anywhere else) only pick up what gets to the antenna.

On a practice instrument approach, there might be only a "beacon outbound" call. Even with a "beacon inbound" call, the plate shows a final approach time of 3:28 at 90 kt; 2:36 at 120 kt from FAF to Map some 5 nm from the threshold.

That's lots of of time for folks on the ground to lose track that there's traffic to the intersecting runway or conjecture that it's come and gone.

The towplane could have been shut down with the radio off until the hookup was done. There could have been plenty of time between the last transmission from the Baron to when the towplane had its radio on. The NTSB did not discuss this in the report; so we only have conjecture.

[[email protected]]

> I am, however, left wondering...

Here's a link for more court proceedings

https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/10724955/Rossetti_v_United_States_of_America_et_al

[[email protected]]

The link to court docs turns out to require signing up for a service (albeit with a free trial) to read them but it did reveal that the CAP was dismissed as a defendant by agreement of all parties. Interesting. It apparently didn't help keep the CAP's name out of the news about the trial, however.

http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2017/08/judge-awards-119-million-in-suit.html provides a little more info on the single sentence in the judge's order covering the CAPs knowledge of the local rules:

Per attorney Ranse Partin, lead counsel for the plaintiffs: "What was more frustrating was that the Civil Air Patrol pilots knew about rules, discussed whether they should abide by rules, and decided the rules didn't apply to them."

And further in the article:

"Before the trial, government lawyers stipulated that the Air Patrol pilots were aware of—but did not follow—the Lagrange-Callaway airport's rules prohibiting glider takeoffs when an aircraft is approaching to land and requiring them to employ a spotter to warn of possible air traffic at the airport, which has no air traffic control tower. They also failed to file a formal notice to other airmen that they intended to conduct glider takeoffs and landings. But government lawyers argued that the rules did not apply to Civil Air Patrol flights, according to Batten's order."

Chip Bearden

[[email protected]]

I've been out of CAP for a few years, but the "CAP being dismissed" is a purely legal distinction. This was an "Air Force Assigned Mission" (presumably a checkride) which means the Federal Tort Claims Act kicks in. They were at that point not flying for CAP, the civilian organization, but instead they were flying for the US Air Force. If they had been flying as a proficiency flight, it would have been CAP as a civilian organization that would have been at legal risk. Each CAP flight has to have a flight release in advance; the Air Force assigned missions have to be approved at a different level (with the intention to limit the Air Force's liability to only the missions of direct import for a USAF purpose and for which they want to assume legal risk).

[[email protected]]

On Tuesday, June 5, 2018 at 7:53:01 PM UTC-7, John Foster wrote:
> A question that has come to mind that I haven't seen discussed yet is one of visibility.
> How is a civilian airport even allowed to operate where two intersecting runways are in
> place where you can't see one from the other? I'm no expert here, but that just sounds
> like a disaster waiting to happen (which it did, in this case).

I would wager that a high percentage of airports with intersecting runways are like this.
At my airport, Inyokern (http://www.airnav.com/airport/KIYK), if one is at the departure end of 20, neither end of 33/15 is visible. One due to hangars, the other due to brush. We can see aircraft on approach, but not on the ground.

Many airports have a hump in the center of the runway, so one can't see the other end. In calm wind conditions it's possible to have two aircraft arriving/departing in opposite directions. Just gotta do the best to maintain situation awareness, and be prepared for anything.

Tom

[[email protected]]

On Saturday, February 22, 2014 at 6:50:49 PM UTC-8, Jp Stewart wrote:
> Odd circumstance: http://www.lagrangenews.com/news/home_top-news/3729615/Updated:-3-killed-in-plane-crash-at-LaGrange-Callaway-Airport
>
> JP

Gliding operations and General Aviation are so different that they are difficult to mix safely at one airport. It can be done. A successful example is Lasham in the UK.