Boeing Niner Zero Niner AwwwYEAH! [Archive]

gatt

June 17th 04, 08:56 PM

Today shooting ILS approaches at McMinnville, with the blinder on, I had a
close encounter. There was a lot of chatter and people stepping on each
other, but I heard one aircraft rumbling calling out over McMinnville
looking for the traffic on approach (me). Didn't catch his call numbers.

A few minutes later I was flying outbound from the runway at 2,400 and Delcy
said "I have the traffic...whoa! That's a BIG ASS airplane" and then ('cause
I was under the hood and couldn't see out the window) "Whoa! Look at that!
What's it doing here?" My eyeballs threatened to slither out of their
sockets, down my cheeks and out the window, so I raised the blinder and
looked...

A camera in my head went *snap* and the view was unforgettable. At ten
o'clock low to my nose, against the valley floor, was the B-17 Nine-O-Nine.
Her red tail and wingtips cut across the yellow and green fields and the
black, bending river below, and she passed low and slow; probably a thousand
feet, along the instrument approach. So close I could see the glint off
the plexiglass turret and the black traction tape and red gas caps on her
olive wings. 60 years ago, I'd be thankful I wasn't German. Today I am
simply thankful.

We aborted the approach and circled high because she was too close. I
tailgated a B-17 Flying Fortress! And didn't spazz out and auger the plane!

She passed around and I got back under the hood. I was flying in the
McMinnville pattern with a B-17 and a I had a damned blinder on! She was
right out there, and I could not see it. NNNOOOooooo!!!

I was freaking out 'cause I'd just seen the Joe DiMaggio of warbirds, AND I
still had to turn 180 degrees and fly the approach down to the runway.

It turned and banked away, and we were down at about the same altitude then,
and her red tail sliced across the landscape again like a bloody fin. Back
under the hood and headed for the Newburg VOR, Delcy covered up the
directional indicator and the artificial horizon. Harsh. Did one form of
approach for Aurora, (nailed it), circled around and did the instrument
landing approach. Passed the airfield at about 500' and she says "Whoa!
There's that airplane again. There's two of them!"

Down on the tarmac at Aurora airfield (next to I-5 south of Newburg) are the
WWII B-17 Nine-O-Nine and the B-24 Dragon and Its Tail. It is my not so
humble opinion that Nine-O-Nine is the single most beautiful flying aircraft
in the entire world. It's the very same airplane that we rode on with my
grandfather on June 17, 1993, which was the happiest I remember seeing him
and the first time he'd ridden one since crashing into a French countryside
50 years previous.

For years, somehow, the airplane and I always cross paths, but this is the
first time I've ever seen one flying from above.

Awesome!

-c

Jack Allison

June 17th 04, 10:40 PM

Very cool! Same B-17 and B-24 that were buzzing my house at 1000 ft. just
prior to the Memorial day weekend. I don't know how many trips I made to
the front and back yard when I heard that wonderful growl of multiple radial
engines.

I had a nice surprise last year when (unknown to me) they were at my home
airport after I'd come back from an overnight xc flight. I go to enter the
pattern and turning from the 45 for a left downwind, I notice both planes on
the ramp. Not something you see every day. Of course, I just had to hang
around the airport after I gassed up the plane and tied it down.

Glad you got to peek out form under the hood and catch the action.

--
Jack Allison
PP-ASEL, IA Student

"When once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the Earth
with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there
you will always long to return"
- Leonardo Da Vinci

(Remove the obvious from address to reply via e-mail)

Teacherjh

June 18th 04, 02:34 AM

Coolest one I ever saw was the guppy, cruising down the Hudson corridor at, oh,
600-700 feet. That's also a view not to be forgotten.

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

Dan Truesdell

June 18th 04, 03:09 AM

About 6 weeks ago, I was at CNH (Claremont, NH) when a plane called in
to announce an over-fly. The transmission went something like:
"Claremont traffic, Liberator XXXX is 5 miles to the east, overflying
the field at 1000'." I sat and contemplated just what a "Liberator"
was, since the only one I was familiar with was the B24. In a few short
seconds, a beautiful B-24 swept in over the airport, then headed north.
Wish I had my camera.

gatt wrote:
> Today shooting ILS approaches at McMinnville, with the blinder on, I had a
> close encounter. There was a lot of chatter and people stepping on each
> other, but I heard one aircraft rumbling calling out over McMinnville
> looking for the traffic on approach (me). Didn't catch his call numbers.
>
> A few minutes later I was flying outbound from the runway at 2,400 and Delcy
> said "I have the traffic...whoa! That's a BIG ASS airplane" and then ('cause
> I was under the hood and couldn't see out the window) "Whoa! Look at that!
> What's it doing here?" My eyeballs threatened to slither out of their
> sockets, down my cheeks and out the window, so I raised the blinder and
> looked...
>
> A camera in my head went *snap* and the view was unforgettable. At ten
> o'clock low to my nose, against the valley floor, was the B-17 Nine-O-Nine.
> Her red tail and wingtips cut across the yellow and green fields and the
> black, bending river below, and she passed low and slow; probably a thousand
> feet, along the instrument approach. So close I could see the glint off
> the plexiglass turret and the black traction tape and red gas caps on her
> olive wings. 60 years ago, I'd be thankful I wasn't German. Today I am
> simply thankful.
>
> We aborted the approach and circled high because she was too close. I
> tailgated a B-17 Flying Fortress! And didn't spazz out and auger the plane!
>
> She passed around and I got back under the hood. I was flying in the
> McMinnville pattern with a B-17 and a I had a damned blinder on! She was
> right out there, and I could not see it. NNNOOOooooo!!!
>
> I was freaking out 'cause I'd just seen the Joe DiMaggio of warbirds, AND I
> still had to turn 180 degrees and fly the approach down to the runway.
>
> It turned and banked away, and we were down at about the same altitude then,
> and her red tail sliced across the landscape again like a bloody fin. Back
> under the hood and headed for the Newburg VOR, Delcy covered up the
> directional indicator and the artificial horizon. Harsh. Did one form of
> approach for Aurora, (nailed it), circled around and did the instrument
> landing approach. Passed the airfield at about 500' and she says "Whoa!
> There's that airplane again. There's two of them!"
>
> Down on the tarmac at Aurora airfield (next to I-5 south of Newburg) are the
> WWII B-17 Nine-O-Nine and the B-24 Dragon and Its Tail. It is my not so
> humble opinion that Nine-O-Nine is the single most beautiful flying aircraft
> in the entire world. It's the very same airplane that we rode on with my
> grandfather on June 17, 1993, which was the happiest I remember seeing him
> and the first time he'd ridden one since crashing into a French countryside
> 50 years previous.
>
> For years, somehow, the airplane and I always cross paths, but this is the
> first time I've ever seen one flying from above.
>
> Awesome!
>
> -c
>
>

--
Remove "2PLANES" to reply.

[email protected]

June 18th 04, 01:50 PM

On Thu, 17 Jun 2004 12:56:09 -0700, "gatt"
> wrote:

> So close I could see the glint off
>the plexiglass turret and the black traction tape and red gas caps on her
>olive wings. 60 years ago, I'd be thankful I wasn't German. Today I am
>simply thankful.

I'm thankful I didn't have to fly one in combat. B-17's are beautiful
airplanes but during WWII, they were big slow targets. The Germans
swatted them out of the sky in huge numbers. Several missions
resulted in 60 airplanes being shot down out of about 300 that made
the mission. During another mission in which more bombers sortied,
over 80 were knocked down.

That era is gone forever. All those guys could count the number of
people lost and calculate their chances for staying alive till their
tour was over, they weren't good. Yet most went anyway. Some didn't,
a lot of men cracked up psychologically and a number of bombers were
flown to neutral countries to be interned rather than complete the
mission or bail out over enemy territory. Can't say I blame them, the
psychological stress of having to sit their and be shot at without the
ability to maneuver to escape the fire must have been enormous.

Overall, some 12,000 heavy bombers from both Britain and the US were
shot down during the war. Mull that number over for a second, it
represents an incredible effort and loss of life.

Corky Scott

Bill Denton

June 18th 04, 02:40 PM

My Dad's brother was one of those "swatted out of the sky". "His" plane was
a B-17G, "Quarterback", but for some reason he was flying "Plain Mister
Yank" IIRC, when he went down.

I was born well after WW II, so I never knew him, but we had some uniforms,
his medals, and a few pictures.

And the pictures used to fascinate me: they had an octagonal "cut-out" of
the nose of the aircraft. This was to prevent our enemies from examining
purloined pictures to get the details of the Norden bombsite, which was one
of the keys to our bombing successes.

Flash forward to around 1975...

I was working as a disk jockey. We frequently received electronics surplus
catalogues at the station, and I was flipping through one while the records
were playing.

One of the hot items being offered was Norden bombsites, for only $29.95.
Interesting, but I really didn't have any use for one.

A couple of hours later I grabbed the copy for a newscast off the teletype,
sat down, and started reading. At the end of the copy there were always a
few very short stories to enable us to properly time our newscasts. I was
running a little short so I started reading these filler stories.

And one of these filler stories turned out to be interesting: it seems that
one of the men who was part of a plot to steal the Norden bombsight during
the War had just been released from prison.

I thought there was a certain irony that this guy had spent more than 30
years in prison for trying to steal something I could now buy for less than
$30!

> wrote in message
...
> On Thu, 17 Jun 2004 12:56:09 -0700, "gatt"
> > wrote:
>
> > So close I could see the glint off
> >the plexiglass turret and the black traction tape and red gas caps on her
> >olive wings. 60 years ago, I'd be thankful I wasn't German. Today I am
> >simply thankful.
>
> I'm thankful I didn't have to fly one in combat. B-17's are beautiful
> airplanes but during WWII, they were big slow targets. The Germans
> swatted them out of the sky in huge numbers. Several missions
> resulted in 60 airplanes being shot down out of about 300 that made
> the mission. During another mission in which more bombers sortied,
> over 80 were knocked down.
>
> That era is gone forever. All those guys could count the number of
> people lost and calculate their chances for staying alive till their
> tour was over, they weren't good. Yet most went anyway. Some didn't,
> a lot of men cracked up psychologically and a number of bombers were
> flown to neutral countries to be interned rather than complete the
> mission or bail out over enemy territory. Can't say I blame them, the
> psychological stress of having to sit their and be shot at without the
> ability to maneuver to escape the fire must have been enormous.
>
> Overall, some 12,000 heavy bombers from both Britain and the US were
> shot down during the war. Mull that number over for a second, it
> represents an incredible effort and loss of life.
>
> Corky Scott
>

gatt

June 18th 04, 06:18 PM

"Teacherjh" > wrote in message
...
> Coolest one I ever saw was the guppy, cruising down the Hudson corridor
at, oh,
> 600-700 feet. That's also a view not to be forgotten.

They had a Guppy or SuperGuppy (used to haul Atlas rockets) at the Tillamook
Air Museum. Can you believe the coastal wind PUSHED the airplane against
the blimp hangar?

Minor damage, but still amazing.

-c

[email protected]

June 18th 04, 06:22 PM

On Fri, 18 Jun 2004 08:40:18 -0500, "Bill Denton"
> wrote:

>
>And the pictures used to fascinate me: they had an octagonal "cut-out" of
>the nose of the aircraft. This was to prevent our enemies from examining
>purloined pictures to get the details of the Norden bombsite, which was one
>of the keys to our bombing successes.
>
>Flash forward to around 1975...
>
>I was working as a disk jockey. We frequently received electronics surplus
>catalogues at the station, and I was flipping through one while the records
>were playing.
>
>One of the hot items being offered was Norden bombsites, for only $29.95.
>Interesting, but I really didn't have any use for one.
>
>A couple of hours later I grabbed the copy for a newscast off the teletype,
>sat down, and started reading. At the end of the copy there were always a
>few very short stories to enable us to properly time our newscasts. I was
>running a little short so I started reading these filler stories.
>
>And one of these filler stories turned out to be interesting: it seems that
>one of the men who was part of a plot to steal the Norden bombsight during
>the War had just been released from prison.
>
>I thought there was a certain irony that this guy had spent more than 30
>years in prison for trying to steal something I could now buy for less than
>$30!

Like most legends, the accuracy of the Norden bombsight has been
hugely overblown.

The Norden was developed prior to WWII and it was fiendishly difficult
to manufacture due to the high number of close tolerance fittings,
bearings and shafts that went into it. Plus, it was extremely
intolerant of dust and shocks which are endemic in a combat zone of
course, not to mention the constant upkeep it required while in the
combat zone, which was limited in that there were only so many expert
technicians and a lot of sights. In addition, the training for the
use of the sight occured in the desert southwest where flying weather
was nearly perfect. The bombing runs were conducted at altitudes
normally lower than 10,000 feet. So the target was visible to the
crews for a long time during the approach, the altitude at which they
bombed was very low compared to the height they would bomb from in
actual combat, and nothing disturbed the bomb run.

In actual combat, the heavy bomber crews found things VERY different.
They bombed from *at least* 22,000 feet (many times they were higher
than that), they almost never actually saw the primary target due to
wretched northern European weather and with the Norden you actually
had to SEE the target in order to hit it, they were opposed by vicious
fighter attacks which disrupted the formations not to mention shooting
down numerous bombers, the flak barrages were often deadly accurate
and unavoidable, and the bombs themselves were not aerodynamically
very stable and often wafted away from their intended target.

In addition there was the major problem with daylight bombing over
Europe: If every bomber bombed individually as per training, that
meant each bomber had to approach the target singly, which was
obviously not going to happen as it would string the bombers out for
hundreds of miles and leave them all vulnerable to fighters and flack.
So the bombers bombed from formation. But while in formation, the
bombardiers could not all do their own bomb runs because once the bomb
run was initiated, the bombardier flew the airplane through a linkup
with the auto pilot and the bombsight. You can't have each bombardier
flying his own bombrun while in tight formation or there would have
been many midair collisions. So only the lead bombardier flew the
bomb run. Every other bomber in the formation dropped when they saw
the lead bomber's bombs go, or upon radio signal. The accuracy of the
drop depended on the skill of the lead bombardier (if he was still
alive at that point, the Germans pointedly attacked the lead aircraft
in all formations), and how tight the formation was at the time of the
group drop.

In the meantime the Germans were making smoke upwind of the city, and
the first bomb strikes often caused enough smoke to obscure the actual
target so that the follow on squadrons had to somewhat blindly toggle
into the smoke.

Even when the bombers actually accurately hit the intended target, it
turned out that machine tools of they day were extremely resistant to
blast damage. The Germans also turned out to be extremely good at
repairing damage and renuing production. They also got very good at
dispersing the factories and moving them underground.

The result of all this, and more, was that the heavy bombing campaign
was far less effective at doing what the Army Air Force leaders
postulated they could do at the outset of the war.

The bottom line is that accurate strategic bombing, whether it be
daylight or night, visually or radar guided, did not occur except in a
few very isolated cases, during WWII.

That did not stop the AAF not only from claiming that they exclusively
targeted factories and war related industries only, not city centers,
even though that was patently false. They also claimed that strategic
bombing effectively shortened the war. This despite the fact that
Germany's wartime military production ramped up throughout the war and
actually peaked in late 1944 at the absolute height of daylight and
nightime bombing.

The leaders of the Air Force believed in the fallacy of strategic
bombing throughout the 50's and 60's and a case I think could be made
that they continue to overbelieve in the effectiveness of bombing even
today.

Corky Scott

PS, the Germans had no need for something as complicated as the Norden
bombsight because they did not bomb from great heights nor did they
posses a heavy bomber. Their bombers were for the most part, medium
battlefield support aircraft and dive bombers.

gatt

June 18th 04, 06:39 PM

> I'm thankful I didn't have to fly one in combat. B-17's are beautiful
> airplanes but during WWII, they were big slow targets.

Particularly for flak. Every B-17 vet I've ever talked to (dozens) said
they'd have rather shoot it out with the Luftwaffe than ride through a flak
storm on any given day. Over Germany, they generally got both, sometimes
simultaneously.

> All those guys could count the number of people lost and calculate their
chances for staying >alive till their tour was over, they weren't good.

Seven missions was the average, which is about a month. 25, then 30, then
35 were the requirement to rotate. They had the highest casualty percentages
for the allies according to some sources, although I know one veteran who
nearly completed two tours. (Had a nut shot off.)

The B-24 is a magnifent airplane and worthy of a better place in history,
but it's sad that the B-17 airframe couldn't stick around longer in greater
civilian duties. I think they're one of the most majestic airplanes ever
flown.

For Christmas, though, I'd settle for a B-25 or even a P-38. BTW, they
gave the bomber visit good press on the news last night.

-c

No Such User

June 19th 04, 12:55 AM

In article >, gatt wrote:
>
>but it's sad that the B-17 airframe couldn't stick around longer in greater
>civilian duties. I think they're one of the most majestic airplanes ever
>flown.
>
Well, it was an old design even during the war. B-17's were commonly used
in firebombing until the 1970's. Zillions of them were sold as surplus
around the world. I, for one, thought it remarkable that people would fly
in a plane where the official starting procedure required a crewman to
stand next to each engine with a fire extinguisher.

I think we should all marvel that there are so many of them still flying.
How many other planes designed in the 1930's are still around?

No Such User

June 19th 04, 01:08 AM

In article <pm56d059pv74ax.com>, wrote:
>
>Like most legends, the accuracy of the Norden bombsight has been
>hugely overblown.
>
But it was an exquisite piece of machine work. The gyroscopes were
things of beauty, that could run for half an hour after the power
was disconnected.

>That did not stop the AAF not only from claiming that they exclusively
>targeted factories and war related industries only, not city centers,
>even though that was patently false. They also claimed that strategic
>bombing effectively shortened the war. This despite the fact that
>Germany's wartime military production ramped up throughout the war and
>actually peaked in late 1944 at the absolute height of daylight and
>nightime bombing.
>
They did what they could to target factories, but the technology to
do this accurately just wasn't there. American bombing was certainly
"precision bombing" compared to the British, nighttime bombing that
aimed for easily located targets like large cities.

>The leaders of the Air Force believed in the fallacy of strategic
>bombing throughout the 50's and 60's and a case I think could be made
>that they continue to overbelieve in the effectiveness of bombing even
>today.
>
When the man who jumped naked into a cactus patch was asked why he would
do such a thing, he answered, "it seemed like a good idea at the time."
It wasn't until after WWII, when the bomb damage could be accurately
assessed, that the shortcomings of bombing became apparent. In the
fifties, strategic bombing meant nuking whole cities, and the horror of
that just might have kept the Cold War cold, so it may have been quite
successful indeed. By the sixties, "smart bombs" were coming into
existence, and nowadays armies can hit individual buildings from the other
side of the world, so it's not anywhere near the same as it was in
the forties.

gatt

June 21st 04, 08:28 PM

"No Such User" > wrote in message news:cavvec$7g6t7

> Zillions of them were sold as surplus
> around the world.

That is true. Here in Portland there was a guy who bought one to use as the
roof of his gas station. He bought one as surplus for $5000, flew it into
Portland and wrecked in on landing. The government felt bad for him, and
gave him a second one at no cost. It's still there, except they took the
nose off to restore it, so now there's a nose-less B-17 sitting over what
used to be gas station pump islands.

-c

[email protected]

June 21st 04, 09:25 PM

On 19 Jun 2004 00:08:13 GMT, (No Such User) wrote:

>They did what they could to target factories, but the technology to
>do this accurately just wasn't there. American bombing was certainly
>"precision bombing" compared to the British, nighttime bombing that
>aimed for easily located targets like large cities.

There's a lot of irony here: The British, by the end of the war, could
actually target precision targets with greater accuracy at night than
the US bombers could while bombing during daylight from high altitude,
but they did not, except for a very few missions, do so.

Arthur Harris insisted right up to the end of the war that his bombers
bomb city centers as the most effective method of bringing the war to
the Germans and shorten it, if not cause them to surrender.

He was mistaken. For instance, when Hamburg was bombed in late 1943,
Bomber Command managed to create the worlds first "firestorm" with
it's bombing tactics. The blaze wiped out the center of Hamburg and
killed many thousands of people. Gale force winds feeding the raging
fire were so powerful they literally ripped babies from mothers arms
and wafted them into the blaze.

But did the damage halt Hamburg from producing war materials? Maybe
for a week or two. A lot of people lost their jobs and their homes
because what got destroyed was center city businesses and residences,
but they were for the most part not producing war materials. The
survivors now turned to the factories which were barely touched, and
worked there instead. For the remainder of the war, Hamburg continued
to contribute mightily to the war machine.

Harris thought the decimation of Hamburg was a great victory. He'd
show visitors stereo pictures of gutted German cities, implying that
the roofless buildings indicated how effective his force of bombers
was. He called this type of bombing "dehousing" the German workers
and thought that they'd have to leave the cities to survive. Most of
the people who lost their homes did not die, they survived and turned
to the factories for work and shelter regardless Harris's conjecture.

The British bomber pilots and crew suffered enormously for their
effort. Too bad the concept was so flawed.

Corky Scott

No Such User

June 21st 04, 10:42 PM

In article >, wrote:
>
>Arthur Harris insisted right up to the end of the war that his bombers
>bomb city centers as the most effective method of bringing the war to
>the Germans and shorten it, if not cause them to surrender.
>
The really sad part was he had the example of the London Blitz right in
front of him. Bombing London did nothing to shake civilian resolve, and
probably had the opposite result.

>for a week or two. A lot of people lost their jobs and their homes
>because what got destroyed was center city businesses and residences,

The British called this 'Baedeker Bombing,' i.e., targeting city centers
where all the tourist attractions were located.

>but they were for the most part not producing war materials. The
>survivors now turned to the factories which were barely touched, and
>
I talked to survivors of the war in Berlin who told me the homeless would
pick the longest subway route (between Spandau and Gruenau) and ride all
night for a few pennies.

>The British bomber pilots and crew suffered enormously for their
>effort. Too bad the concept was so flawed.
>
The blame for those deaths should include the blunder of sending out the
bombers with no fighter protection. Had the allies invested a little
more in creating long-range fighters, this would have been quite different.

Paul Sengupta

June 22nd 04, 04:28 PM

> wrote in message
...
> On 19 Jun 2004 00:08:13 GMT, (No Such User) wrote:
> Arthur Harris insisted right up to the end of the war that his bombers
> bomb city centers as the most effective method of bringing the war to
> the Germans and shorten it, if not cause them to surrender.
>
> He was mistaken. For instance, when Hamburg was bombed in late 1943,
> Bomber Command managed to create the worlds first "firestorm" with
> it's bombing tactics. The blaze wiped out the center of Hamburg and
> killed many thousands of people. Gale force winds feeding the raging
> fire were so powerful they literally ripped babies from mothers arms
> and wafted them into the blaze.
>
> But did the damage halt Hamburg from producing war materials? Maybe
> for a week or two.

http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Strategic_bombing

Read the bit under "Effectiveness". While the bombing was wildly
inaccurate (this was known at the time, that's why tactics were
switched to area bombing) it was relentless, with the British bombing
at night, the Americans in the day. German survivors said it had a
huge affect on them...the couldn't work effectively and were constantly
tired and weary. There was a huge diversion of resources.

Production may have increased, but the bombing ensured that the "new"
German weapons of mass destruction didn't come on-line or were
severely limited. One of the aircraft under development allegedly went to
South America (or the plans did) after the war only to be copied (allegedly)
by the Soviets. This became the Mig 15.

The relentless bombing was all part of the "total war" that was being
unleashed upon Germany.

http://makeashorterlink.com/?F30934F98

This makes interesting reading if anyone has the time to read it!

Inhuman? Yes. Ineffective? No.

Paul

Paul Sengupta

June 22nd 04, 05:02 PM

"No Such User" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
wrote:
> >
> >Arthur Harris insisted right up to the end of the war that his bombers
> >bomb city centers as the most effective method of bringing the war to
> >the Germans and shorten it, if not cause them to surrender.
> >
> The really sad part was he had the example of the London Blitz right in
> front of him. Bombing London did nothing to shake civilian resolve, and
> probably had the opposite result.
>
> >for a week or two. A lot of people lost their jobs and their homes
> >because what got destroyed was center city businesses and residences,
>
> The British called this 'Baedeker Bombing,' i.e., targeting city centers
> where all the tourist attractions were located.

This was the German tactic:
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Baedeker%20Blitz
http://modena.intergate.ca/business/boport/cbctv/

Quote:
By 1941 cities throughout Europe had been bombed by the Luftwaffe,

and helpless refugees had been machine-gunned from the air. These missions

were flown with the sole objective of terrorising the civilian population,
and

breaking any will to resist. In 1940-42 the Luftwaffe devastated London,

Coventry, Southampton, Bristol, Plymouth, Sheffield, Liverpool,Cardiff,

Glasgow and many other British cities. From April 1942 its raids on Britain

were specifically redirected against cities distinguished by three stars in
the

Baedeker guidebook as being "of outstanding historic or artistic interest."

The "three stars" thing is a quote from Nazi propagandist Baron Gustav

Braun von Sturm who said: "We shall go out and bomb every building in

Britain marked with three stars in the Baedeker Guide."

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1892714.stm

Paul

G.R. Patterson III

June 22nd 04, 05:19 PM

Paul Sengupta wrote:
>
> Read the bit under "Effectiveness". While the bombing was wildly
> inaccurate (this was known at the time, that's why tactics were
> switched to area bombing) ....

And, as Bert Harris pointed out (with tongue firmly in cheek), the Americans also
opted for area bombing just as soon as they had a big enough bomb.

George Patterson
None of us is as dumb as all of us.

Paul Sengupta

June 22nd 04, 05:20 PM

> wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 18 Jun 2004 08:40:18 -0500, "Bill Denton"
> > wrote:
> PS, the Germans had no need for something as complicated as the Norden
> bombsight because they did not bomb from great heights nor did they
> posses a heavy bomber. Their bombers were for the most part, medium
> battlefield support aircraft and dive bombers.

This may have been how they started out, but it wasn't how
they came to be used. The only reason that Germany didn't
produce heavy 4 engined bombers was their thought that it
was more beneficial to produce twice the number of twin
engined ones, the limiting factor at the time being engines.

Oh, just a quick reference, the inaccuracy of the bombing
was detailed in the Butt report of August 1941.
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/bombercommand/buttreport.aspx
The report was criticised at the time for potentially lowering
morale within Bomber Command, but it turned out to be what
was needed. As well as switching to area bombardment, new
ways were found to increase bomb accuracy, and some great
technological achievents came about.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/air_war_bombers_02.shtml

Another quote from:
http://modena.intergate.ca/business/boport/cbctv/

Bomber Command's attacks, initially a mere nuisance, became what Hitler's
armaments minister, Albert Speer, called "the greatest battle that we lost."
On May 15, 1940, 93 bombers set out for the Krupp works at Essen. In a later
asssessment it was calculated that the proportion of bombs that actually it
the vast factories was 3 percent. In contrast, in a massive attack by 705
"heavies" on July 25, 1943, marked by Oboe-equipped Pathfinders, the
proportion was assessed at 96 percent.

Paul

gatt

June 22nd 04, 08:19 PM

"Paul Sengupta" > wrote in message

> Read the bit under "Effectiveness". While the bombing was wildly
> inaccurate (this was known at the time, that's why tactics were
> switched to area bombing) it was relentless, with the British bombing
> at night, the Americans in the day.

It's also relevant to point out that the allies DID aim for and strike
specific targets such as sub pens, shipyards and heavy water plants that
would have, in fact, impaired the german war machine more than bombing an
oilfield, railyard or even a ball bearing factory. U-boats didn't get built
overnight, and the strikes on the heavy water facilities would be more
historically noteworthy, perhaps, had they not happened, allowing that
technology to develop.

The 96th sent half its group out looking for the battleship Scharnhorst, but
couldn't find it through the overcast so IIRC they bombed Gdynia, Poland
instead.

-c

[email protected]

June 23rd 04, 05:40 PM

On Tue, 22 Jun 2004 16:28:07 +0100, "Paul Sengupta"
> wrote:

>Inhuman? Yes. Ineffective? No.

If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
been the other way around?

Corky Scott

Peter Duniho

June 23rd 04, 06:19 PM

Granted, I'm no WWII historian, so I don't know how the analysis comes out,
but...

> wrote in message
...
> >Inhuman? Yes. Ineffective? No.
>
> If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
> amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
> bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
> been the other way around?

You cannot simply look at the German production numbers and claim that
because they were higher at one point in time than an earlier point in time,
the bombing was ineffective. It's entirely possible that their production
would have been even higher than it was, if not for the bombing.

If you use the reasoning that production would be constant, and you can
judge the effectiveness of the bombing by the production change over time,
then the conclusion one must arrive at is that the bombing actually *helped*
Germany's production. Obviously that's not the case.

So, given that Germany took steps to increase production in spite of the
bombing, it's not possible to say just by looking at the total production
numbers that the bombing wasn't effective. You need to look at what
Germany's production would have been without the bombing.

That's where someone like you, with your obviously greater interest and time
spent researching the events of WWII comes in. I don't know what Germany's
production would have been without the bombing. That said, assuming the
bombs did manage to hit any component of Germany's production stream, it
seems to me it should be taken as obvious that the bombs hurt the production
stream, and that production would have been even higher had the bombing not
occurred.

Pete

Casey Wilson

June 23rd 04, 06:37 PM

> If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
> amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
> bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
> been the other way around?
>
> Corky Scott

What is your source for German production in the above statement?

G.R. Patterson III

June 23rd 04, 06:58 PM

wrote:
>
> On Tue, 22 Jun 2004 16:28:07 +0100, "Paul Sengupta"
> > wrote:
>
> >Inhuman? Yes. Ineffective? No.
>
> If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
> amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
> bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
> been the other way around?

Well, for one thing, the bombing didn't reach it's peak until '44 either. Most
British bombing prior to the adoption of the area bombing strategy in early 1942 was
woefully ineffective. In addition, Bomber Command had only a little over 300 bombers
by early '42, most of which were twins. 1942 saw a gradual buildup of squadrons in
Bomber Command, the introduction of navaids such as "Gee", and the gradual shift to
heavies such as the Lancaster and Stirling. The U.S. wasn't even in the picture in
'42 - we were still building bases and running training missions. Early '43 saw
Bomber Command really beginning to work seriously on the area bombing campaign. The
USAAF started bombing targets in France. By second quarter '43, the USAAF was
seriously working on the problem of fighter escort, starting out with Spitfires
borrowed from the RAF, but the worst losses ever suffered were taken in October of
that year going after targets which were outside fighter range. The P-51 was brought
into the theater in November, but it was not until 1944 that enough squadrons were
available to be effective.

One can almost say that German production fell just as soon as we were able to
regularly put several hundred to a thousand plus bombers over their cities, but, of
course, both the buildup of force and the damage increases were gradual.

George Patterson
None of us is as dumb as all of us.

[email protected]

June 23rd 04, 08:43 PM

On Wed, 23 Jun 2004 17:37:23 GMT, "Casey Wilson" >
wrote:

>
>> If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
>> amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
>> bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
>> been the other way around?
>>
>> Corky Scott
>
> What is your source for German production in the above statement?

The postwar strategic bombing assesement survey. It basically
shredded the hallowed tenents that founded the US strategic bombing
campaign.

Here is the main conclusion:

Aviation: "In 1944 the German air force is reported to have accepted a
total of 39,807 aircraft of all types -- compared with 8,295 in 1939,
or 15,596 in 1942 before the plants suffered any attack." According to
the report, almost none of the aircraft produced in 1944 were used in
combat and some may have been imaginary.
Armor production "reached its wartime peak in December 1944, when
1,854 tanks and armored vehicles were produced. This industry
continued to have relatively high production through February 1945."
Ball bearings: "There is no evidence that the attacks on the
ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war
production."
Steel: The bombing greatly reduced production, but the resulting
shortage had no contribution to the defeat.
Consumer goods: "In the early years of the war -- the soft war period
for Germany -- civilian consumption remained high. Germans continued
to try for both guns and butter. The German people entered the period
of the air war well stocked with clothing and other consumer goods.
Although most consumer goods became increasingly difficult to obtain,
Survey studies show that fairly adequate supplies of clothing were
available for those who had been bombed out until the last stages of
disorganization. Food, though strictly rationed, was in nutritionally
adequate supply throughout the war. The Germans' diet had about the
same calories as the British."
The survey concluded that one reason German production rose in so many
areas was in part that the German economy did not go on a complete war
footing until late 1942 and 1943. Up until then, factories had been on
a single shift in many industries and the German economy was generally
inefficient and not operating at full capacity.

Please note, some aspects of the bombing were very effective. The Oil
production bombing, more so than any other aspect, hugely curtailed
the ability of the German military forces to fight or train to fight.
Oil was not originally the top priority of the bomber forces.

Primarily the problem with Strategic Bombing, as visualized by the
leaders of the Army Air Forces, was that it was an untried concept.
Hundreds of thousands of airmen, in both British forces and US forces
died trying to accomplish something that turned out to be
unattainable, at least in terms of 1940 to 45 technology.

Of course, the bombing campaign affected the outcome of the war. It's
just that the manner of the affect wasn't how the leaders designed it.
They thought that if they could destroy the war making industries,
Germany would loose it's ability to wage war. That part did not
happen. But Germany spent so much time and effort attempting to stop
the bombing campaign, that their ground forces suffered. The skies
over Germany became a charnel house for the German aviators and
without an effective air force, the German army lost a lot of
effectiveness. Germany withdrew enormous numbers of flack guns from
the Russian front to ring their cities for protection. This proved
dire for the bombers, but also reduced the effectiveness of the German
army to counter the hundreds of thousands of tanks the Russians now
sent against their forces.

In the end, hard as this is to swallow, the huge Russian armies likely
would have ground out a victory which would have been even more costly
for them than it was, were it not for the air war against Germany.

Against the Japanese, any likeness to precision bombing was abandoned
when the concept broke against the realities of weather and B-29
maladies.

The Strategic Bombing Survey, as you can imagine, became as
politicized a document and process as is humanly possible. The Army
Air Force was already planning to become an independent military force
at that time and made all kinds of interpretations from the survey
that they felt justified their existance and the concept of an
independent air force.

George Ball and John Kenneth Galbreath were members of the bombing
survey. Galbreath in particular adamantly argued that the strategic
bombing of Germany was far less effective than trumpeted by the
leaders of the Army Air Corps. The Air Corps members, of course,
disagreed.

Corky Scott

gatt

June 23rd 04, 09:13 PM

"Peter Duniho" > wrote in message

> You cannot simply look at the German production numbers and claim that
> because they were higher at one point in time than an earlier point in
time,
> the bombing was ineffective. It's entirely possible that their production
> would have been even higher than it was, if not for the bombing.

That's what I think. The Germans used disposable slave labor so bombing
railyards just caused delays while they rounded up more prisoners to do the
repairs, BUT, it can be argued, every factory that was built was X-number of
fighter planes, tanks, bullets, ball bearings, rifles, submarines or other
equipment that didn't make it to the front line to reenforce the German
forces. If the bombing campaign did nothing but curtail the growth or
resupply of the German infantry and Panzer divisions, it saved American
lives on the ground.

I have photographs of bf109s destroyed in the factories by allied bombing
raids. Those 109s never left the ground to shoot down folks like my
grandfather, so calling the air campaign a complete failure is a disservice
to not only the guys who endured the flak guns and FW-190s and Me262s in the
air war, but the guys on the ground who didn't have to face those Tigers,
artillery, etc.
-c

Casey Wilson

June 23rd 04, 10:28 PM

> wrote in message
...

> The postwar strategic bombing assesement survey. It basically
> shredded the hallowed tenents that founded the US strategic bombing
> campaign.
>
> Here is the main conclusion:
>
> Aviation: "In 1944 the German air force is reported to have accepted a
> total of 39,807 aircraft of all types -- compared with 8,295 in 1939,
> or 15,596 in 1942 before the plants suffered any attack." According to
> the report, almost none of the aircraft produced in 1944 were used in
> combat and some may have been imaginary.
> Armor production "reached its wartime peak in December 1944, when
> 1,854 tanks and armored vehicles were produced. This industry
> continued to have relatively high production through February 1945."

>>> Big Snip <<<

>
> Please note, some aspects of the bombing were very effective. The Oil
> production bombing, more so than any other aspect, hugely curtailed
> the ability of the German military forces to fight or train to fight.
> Oil was not originally the top priority of the bomber forces.
>
> Primarily the problem with Strategic Bombing, as visualized by the
> leaders of the Army Air Forces, was that it was an untried concept.
> Hundreds of thousands of airmen, in both British forces and US forces
> died trying to accomplish something that turned out to be
> unattainable, at least in terms of 1940 to 45 technology.
>
> Of course, the bombing campaign affected the outcome of the war. It's
> just that the manner of the affect wasn't how the leaders designed it.
> They thought that if they could destroy the war making industries,
> Germany would loose it's ability to wage war. That part did not
> happen. But Germany spent so much time and effort attempting to stop
> the bombing campaign, that their ground forces suffered.

>>> More Big Snip <<<
>
> Corky Scott

I did some checking at http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/ and
found data that conflicts with the armor production figures you put in at
the top. Interestingly, the site I found almost triples the numbers in
favor of your argument for 1944. The disparity may be that the site I found
goes all the way from Panzer I through V and includes the Ferdinand. It also
includes the figures for armor manufactured in Czechoslovakia and other
plants outside Germany. Those latter numbers must be tallied into the
overall picture, I think.
Good argument, Corky. You made me look at a whole new perspective. The
real nut is in the latter paragraphs you included.

>
>
>

G.R. Patterson III

June 24th 04, 02:50 AM

gatt wrote:
>
> If the bombing campaign did nothing but curtail the growth or
> resupply of the German infantry and Panzer divisions, it saved American
> lives on the ground.

And it did much more than that. Hundreds of the best pilots and aircraft were
withdrawn from the Russian front during Operation Barbarossa to attempt to counter
the growing daylight bombing campaign in the west. Hundreds of thousands of artillery
pieces were devoted to anti-aircraft batteries instead of being sent to the front
lines as anti-tank guns (the difference between an 88mm FLAK and 88mm PAK was
negligible). One week of the daylight bombing campaign was devoted simply to drawing
the Luftwaffe up for our fighters to ensure that none of them could interfere with
D-day. Without that effort, it's quite possible that we could not have remained in
France for long.

George Patterson
None of us is as dumb as all of us.

Paul Sengupta

June 24th 04, 10:54 AM

"Paul Sengupta" > wrote in message
...
> One of the aircraft under development allegedly went to
> South America (or the plans did) after the war only to be copied
(allegedly)
> by the Soviets. This became the Mig 15.

Replying to myself, I've found a reference for this:
http://www.luft46.com/fw/ta183-i.html

The whole site lists other planes which may have come on-line
had the war gone on for another year.

http://www.luft46.com/

Paul

[email protected]

June 24th 04, 01:40 PM

On Wed, 23 Jun 2004 13:13:26 -0700, "gatt"
> wrote:

>I have photographs of bf109s destroyed in the factories by allied bombing
>raids. Those 109s never left the ground to shoot down folks like my
>grandfather, so calling the air campaign a complete failure is a disservice
>to not only the guys who endured the flak guns and FW-190s and Me262s in the
>air war, but the guys on the ground who didn't have to face those Tigers,
>artillery, etc.

Please, no one called the bombing a complete failure. What was a
failure was the concept of strategic bombing, as conceptualized by
people like Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet and fully believed by Hap
Arnold and Ira Eaker. They believed that strategic bombing would
cause such terror and destruction in the enemy camp, that they would
surrender. That bombing their vital war making industries would cause
the Wermacht to shrivel on the vine for lack of supplies. That idea
proved a failure in the crucible of war, except for the oil campaign
and the destruction of the transportation system (which was carried
out most effectively by marauding fighter bombers, not strategic
bombers), and the oil campaign wasn't actually part of the original
plan.

What also was a failure was the fanciful idea that bombers could
protect themselves against intercepters. In 1943, the AAF even
developed a purely defensive version of the B-17 called the YB-40. It
had an extra power turret where the radio operator normally stood, a
power chin turret and each waist position sported dual 50 caliber
machine guns rather than singles. That gave it 14 heavy machine guns.
Plus, it had added armor around the engines and to protect the gunners
and pilots, and a LOT more ammunition, but no bombs. The idea was for
this flying pillbox to accompany the squadrons and lend it's massive
firepower to their protection. Didn't work. The bomber was as heavy
as the normally loaded B-17F's with their bombloads. When the normal
bombers dropped their loads over the target, they suddenly became 4 to
5 thousand pounds lighter, but the YB-40's didn't. The normal bombers
turned off the target and opened up their throttles to get the hell
out of there, and the YB-40's couldn't keep up. They were quietly
retired after a few months of evaluation. The chin turret, however,
was deemed a success and was installed in the next model of B-17, the
G.

A little talked about problem with the massive formations of bombers
was the apparently frequent collateral damage from friendly fire as
the gunners hosed bullets all over the sky in a desperate effort to
protect themselves from the German fighters which often passed by
missing by mere feet occasionally. With so many airplanes occupying
airspace in so narrow an area and the speed with which the fighters
approached and flashed by, it's not surprising that the counter fire
would hit neighboring bombers accidentally. I know of no statistics
covering this situation, but it was apparently so serious a problem
that by the middle of 1944, the waist gunners were reduced from two to
one, and eventually to none. The bombardier, unless he was the lead
or deputy bombardier, really did not need to be trained to aim bombs
because only the lead bomber in each group actually did the aiming,
all the rest of the bombers dropped on his signal, or when they
sighted the bombs dropping from the lead bomber. So he became a
gunner/toggler. By that time as we all know, the bombers were being
protected all the way to the target by P-51's so high command may have
decided to kill two birds with one stone: eliminate the now
unnecessary gunners/ammo and save weight while adding to the bomb
load.

In the end, it was Allied soldiers capturing German territory that
forced the German surrender. Bombing them from afar was literally all
the Allies could do to claim they were taking the war to the Germans
during the first part of the war because they did not have the
infantry assets to confront them after their initial defeats.

Corky Scott

William W. Plummer

June 24th 04, 03:19 PM

wrote:
> On Wed, 23 Jun 2004 13:13:26 -0700, "gatt"
> > wrote:
>
>> I have photographs of bf109s destroyed in the factories by allied
>> bombing raids. Those 109s never left the ground to shoot down folks
>> like my grandfather, so calling the air campaign a complete failure
>> is a disservice to not only the guys who endured the flak guns and
>> FW-190s and Me262s in the air war, but the guys on the ground who
>> didn't have to face those Tigers, artillery, etc.
>
> Please, no one called the bombing a complete failure. What was a
> failure was the concept of strategic bombing, as conceptualized by
> people like Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet and fully believed by Hap
> Arnold and Ira Eaker. They believed that strategic bombing would
> cause such terror and destruction in the enemy camp, that they would
> surrender. That bombing their vital war making industries would cause
> the Wermacht to shrivel on the vine for lack of supplies. That idea
> proved a failure in the crucible of war, except for the oil campaign
> and the destruction of the transportation system (which was carried
> out most effectively by marauding fighter bombers, not strategic
> bombers), and the oil campaign wasn't actually part of the original
> plan.
>
> What also was a failure was the fanciful idea that bombers could
> protect themselves against intercepters. In 1943, the AAF even
> developed a purely defensive version of the B-17 called the YB-40. It
> had an extra power turret where the radio operator normally stood, a
> power chin turret and each waist position sported dual 50 caliber
> machine guns rather than singles. That gave it 14 heavy machine guns.
> Plus, it had added armor around the engines and to protect the gunners
> and pilots, and a LOT more ammunition, but no bombs. The idea was for
> this flying pillbox to accompany the squadrons and lend it's massive
> firepower to their protection. Didn't work. The bomber was as heavy
> as the normally loaded B-17F's with their bombloads. When the normal
> bombers dropped their loads over the target, they suddenly became 4 to
> 5 thousand pounds lighter, but the YB-40's didn't. The normal bombers
> turned off the target and opened up their throttles to get the hell
> out of there, and the YB-40's couldn't keep up. They were quietly
> retired after a few months of evaluation. The chin turret, however,
> was deemed a success and was installed in the next model of B-17, the
> G.
>
> A little talked about problem with the massive formations of bombers
> was the apparently frequent collateral damage from friendly fire as
> the gunners hosed bullets all over the sky in a desperate effort to
> protect themselves from the German fighters which often passed by
> missing by mere feet occasionally. With so many airplanes occupying
> airspace in so narrow an area and the speed with which the fighters
> approached and flashed by, it's not surprising that the counter fire
> would hit neighboring bombers accidentally. I know of no statistics
> covering this situation, but it was apparently so serious a problem
> that by the middle of 1944, the waist gunners were reduced from two to
> one, and eventually to none. The bombardier, unless he was the lead
> or deputy bombardier, really did not need to be trained to aim bombs
> because only the lead bomber in each group actually did the aiming,
> all the rest of the bombers dropped on his signal, or when they
> sighted the bombs dropping from the lead bomber. So he became a
> gunner/toggler. By that time as we all know, the bombers were being
> protected all the way to the target by P-51's so high command may have
> decided to kill two birds with one stone: eliminate the now
> unnecessary gunners/ammo and save weight while adding to the bomb
> load.
>
> In the end, it was Allied soldiers capturing German territory that
> forced the German surrender. Bombing them from afar was literally all
> the Allies could do to claim they were taking the war to the Germans
> during the first part of the war because they did not have the
> infantry assets to confront them after their initial defeats.
>
> Corky Scott

A book by Mierjewski (Air University) that asserts WW II was won because of
the strategic bombing of the railroads. This cut off the coal supply that
powered the underground munitions factories, crippling the war effort. This
illustrates "Effects Based Operations" and "cascading effects" which are hot
topics these days.

gatt

June 24th 04, 10:19 PM

> wrote in message

> Please, no one called the bombing a complete failure.

Not on this group. Sorry if I made it sound like you suggested that. In
other forums, the air campaign has been likened to genocide against the
Germans/Japanese and called a complete failure.

The air campaign did not, as you say, cause the Germans to give up, but it
surely seemed like a good idea at the time (even though the British survived
the Battle of Britain.)

> What also was a failure was the fanciful idea that bombers could
> protect themselves against intercepters.

Well, they did a pretty good job. The ability to knock an interceptor out
of its pursuit curve saved countless airmen. For an interceptor to strike
it had to fly a predictable path and if a gunner made the guy flinch, or
pull out, or the gunner's bullets occupied the same space in the curve as
the intercepter, the plane was effectively defended. It forced the Luftwaffe
to use head-on attacks which made them equally vulnerable and reduced the
time with which they could fire. 'Course, that created a whole host of
problems such as incoming bullets tearing the the length of the fuselage,
etc.

Anecdote: My grandfather's crew came in over Sampigny, France struggling to
hold altitude with three engines knocked out by flak over Schweinfurt. At
about 250' AGL they flew over a Luftwaffe airfield that wasn't on their map,
and, as the pilot wrote, Jerry was sending up every odd plane and hanger
queen that had for an easy kill. Fortunately, the Germans were apparently
so eager to get them that the fighters didn't get up their combat energy and
attacked low and slow, and the bomber crew knocked down an unusual number of
varied aircraft. The tailgunner was credited with a Ju88, my grandfather a
109 and the pilot wrote that they had about half a dozen 110s circling for
them, and, according to the bombardier, and bullets from a FW-190 on a
head-on with its cowl and a piston head shot away tore through them like a
bull in a china cabinet before he passed underneath inverted. The
tailgunner saw that one exit and none of them could figure out how that
pilot didn't auger, being inverted at maybe 150 feet AGL. (After they
crashed and exited the plane, Bye wrote, the 190 came around and rather than
strafing as they expected, executed a precise eight-point roll over them.)

According to pilot Ray Bye, they pulled up to avoid some power lines and the
bomber stalled out and crashed into a ditch, on fire but with no loss of
life. A cannon round from a 109 exploded in front of my grandfather's
temple, but he was in luck that day because a gunner from the crew of Wabbit
Twacks, having competed their 25th mission, gave him an armored RAF crew
helmet that morning when the crews loaded up for Schweinfurt. He was
banging away at the 109 when a "house, and then a barn, flew between them,
and the airplanes crashed within a couple hundred yards of each other." The
interesting thing about that is that the 109 had finished firing and was
merely flying alongside. My grandfather could see his tracers bouncing off
the fuselage below the cockpit, and the canopy had been shot away because he
could see a stocking tied around the pilot's neck trailing him. I believe
the German thought that the B-17 was surrendering when he was hit. He ended
up in a hospital in France next to another 96th crewman who reported later
that the guy survived a .50 round through his lung! (Ray, the pilot, heard
through a French farmer in 1990 or so that one of the Luftwaffe pilots had
visisted the crash site and wanted to contact the American pilot, but before
they could meet in France, Ray died.)

Hell of a war story, huh? I've heard it from my grandfather, the pilot, the
tailgunner and the bombardier and they all have equally dramatic
perspectives.

In any case, had it not been for the guns in the bomber, they'd have been
dead before they hit the ground.

-c