Seeking anecdotes about "instructor in command"

[Andrew Gideon]

Hi, all:

I'm giving a presentation on what someone here called "instructor in
command" syndrome: a pilot getting complacent because there's an instructor
in the aircraft.

I've found a number of good ones here, but any more - esp. with something
"interesting" - would be welcome.

I'd also appreciate it if someone could point me at a reference to something
that I've been told occurred. A CFI was sitting in the back of an aircraft
that made a bad landing. Even though the CFI had no role in the flight, he
bore some of the brunt from the FAA.

Thanks...

Andrew

[zatatime]

On Wed, 30 Jun 2004 14:00:33 -0400, Andrew Gideon
> wrote:

>I'd also appreciate it if someone could point me at a reference to something
>that I've been told occurred. A CFI was sitting in the back of an aircraft
>that made a bad landing. Even though the CFI had no role in the flight, he
>bore some of the brunt from the FAA.

I've heard similar stories, but they all involve an ATP, not a CFI.

z

[Teacherjh]

>>
I'm giving a presentation on what someone here called "instructor in
command" syndrome: a pilot getting complacent because there's an instructor
in the aircraft.
>>

(it was me who called it that). Not so much "complacent" as "trusting"... you
are there to learn, and you must trust the instructor to take you beyond your
level of comfort in order to do this. Some can get complacent too, but that's
not necessary for bad things to happen.

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Andrew Gideon]

Teacherjh wrote:

> (it was me who called it that). Not so much "complacent" as "trusting"...
> you are there to learn, and you must trust the instructor to take you
> beyond your
> level of comfort in order to do this. Some can get complacent too, but
> that's not necessary for bad things to happen.

I'm drawing a very important distinction between "trusting" and
"complacent". That is, in fact, the entire point I want to get across:
that trust is good, but taking it into complacency is bad.

Sure, that's obvious when I write it that way <laugh>. But it's not
something I see discussed, and I've been looking for it recently. More,
the line can be tough to define, although I'm trying (as you'll see below).

It is absolutely necessary that a pilot trust an instructor to get the best
use out of that instructor. The example you and I are both using - going
past one's personal "envelope" with an instructor as guide - is one such
very good use.

However, this idea of the instructor as a safety mechanism can be taken too
far with the pilot has in his mind, even if quietly, "if this was bad, he'd
say something".

This is similar to some of what I've been reading about CRM, in that the
recommendation is that the concerns of the least confortable pilot are
paramount. That is, if one of two pilots think conditions (ie. weather)
are bad, then they're treated as bad - even if the other pilot is
comfortable with the conditions.

But a pilot with an instructor that accepts an uncomfortable situation - or
that stops looking for them - because the instructor is in the aircraft is
giving away that safety net.

It's a bit of a vague line between "going past the envelope" and "least
comfortable rules". As best I can see, the difference is in intent. I
might plan, for example, to go past my comfort level in x-wind landings
with an instructor. That's different from attempting a landing possibly
outside my skill level because "if this was bad, he'd say something".

With intent comes communication. For example: "I've never landed in gusts
this severe; shall we try?".

- Andrew

[Teacherjh]

>>
As best I can see, the difference is in intent. I might plan,
for example, to go past my comfort level in x-wind landings
with an instructor. That's different from attempting a landing possibly
outside my skill level because "if this was bad, he'd say something".

With intent comes communication. For example: "I've never landed in gusts
this severe; shall we try?".
<<

Well put. The key is how much the instructor knows of the student (and how
much the student tells him). "If this were bad, he'd say something" is
perfectly valid, if the instructor knows he's taking the student outside the
envelops (and is thus extra vigilant). But this puts the onus on the
instructor to be vigilant after the student says so. Now who's "in command"?

A similar issue comes up with an IFR safety pilot. I was in a situation where
I was under the hood with a safety pilot, VFR under an overcast. My safety
pilot says "ok, you can take the hood off now, we're in the clouds".

WHAT????

I was PIC - if I merged with another target, it would be my rear in the sling
(before going into the casket). But I was trusting another.

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Andrew Gideon]

Teacherjh wrote:

> Well put.

Thanks. I don't think I've quite said it in a way which which I'm
completely happy, which is why I'm still trying.

> The key is how much the instructor knows of the student (and
> how
> much the student tells him). "If this were bad, he'd say something" is
> perfectly valid, if the instructor knows he's taking the student outside
> the
> envelops (and is thus extra vigilant). But this puts the onus on the
> instructor to be vigilant after the student says so. Now who's "in
> command"?

I'm not clear what point(s) you're making here. I assume that we're both
hoping that the instructor is fully vigilant for the entire flight. Is
that what you mean?

But I'm looking more from the non-instructing pilot's perspective. The
distinction, perhaps, is a difference between an explicit choice to go
beyond one's envelope and a less than explicit relaxation of the care with
which one is operating (because the instructor is there to catch mistakes).

Even if the instructor is perfect, this is still an increase in risk (as the
number of careful pilots in the plane is unnecessarily reduced {8^). More,
complacency can become a habit.

[...]

> I was PIC - if I merged with another target, it would be my rear in the
> sling
> (before going into the casket). But I was trusting another.

To me, this is a separate issue. Misplaced trust is absolutely a risk. I
used to fly with someone (a pilot; not an instructor). When I finally
realized that this was not wise - because he'd habits I viewed as unsafe as
I came to know them - I stopped.

After that occurred, I had a chance to sit right seat with someone new to
me. It was when I first joined my club, and I thought riding along with
someone would be a good and fun way to learn various club procedures.

It wasn't until I was preparing for the flight that I realized how
uncomfortable I was. What if I was putting myself in the right seat next
to an untrustworthy pilot? Again.

[Happily, it all worked out well - he's a fine and safe pilot, and we had a
nice time.]

- Andrew

[Gary Drescher]

"Teacherjh" > wrote in message
...
> A similar issue comes up with an IFR safety pilot. I was in a situation
where
> I was under the hood with a safety pilot, VFR under an overcast. My
safety
> pilot says "ok, you can take the hood off now, we're in the clouds".

Wow. Had he let that happen intentionally? Or was that just his lighthearted
way of alerting you to an accidental cloud penetration?

--Gary

[Teacherjh]

>>
> ...if the instructor knows he's taking the student outside
> the envelops (and is thus extra vigilant)...

I assume that we're both
hoping that the instructor is
fully vigilant for the entire flight.
<<

Well, only sort of. I expect the instructor (absent other issues) to be paying
attention to how I am flying the plane, not so much to how the plane is being
flown. The distinction is subtle, but consider that if the instructor were
the pilot flying (and I were baggage) the instructor's attention would be fully
occupied by the instruments and the view outside the window. When I take over
that task, I expect the instructor to be trying to make me a better pilot, not
so much trying to make this flight a safer flight.

An instructor will let different amounts of deviation go uncorrected, depending
on the level of the student. A new student can't recover very well from an
unstable approach, but a more experienced pilot can probably salvage approaches
that he shouldn't have screwed up in the first place. If an experienced pilot
makes a less than perfect approach, the instructor may not think all that much
of it, assuming the pilot flying can (and will) recover. So, here the
instructor is assuming more skill on the part of the pilot, and the pilot is
assuming the instructor will catch his mistakes (after all, that's what he went
up with an instructor for).

In this case, pilot and instructor do not agree as to where the edge of the
envelope is, and problems ensue. You can have the opposite scenario, where an
instructor is constantly correcting or taking over for minor deviations, which
could even be a matter of style (coming in steeply or shallowly for example).
Here the instructor isn't letting the pilot flying have enough rope, in the
other example there is too much rope.

When I talk about "instructor in command", I include also the cases where the
instructor says, for example on a cross country training flight, "let's go
under the overcast" (rather than file IFR and go through it, or fly on top of
it). The pilot might not be comfortable doing what he considers scud running,
and the instructor might be completely comfortable with the conditions. The
instructor gives no thought to the pilot's envelope (or decides that he's there
to stretch it a bit), and the pilot flying figures that this is the instruction
he's paying for, and goes ahead under the overcast (which he never would have
done alone).

The instructor has no reason to believe this is a problem for the student, and
the student expects that since the conditions are within the instructor's
limits, he will learn something.

Jose








--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Teacherjh]

>>
> My safety pilot says "ok, you can take the
> hood off now, we're in the clouds".

Wow. Had he let that happen intentionally? Or was that just his lighthearted
way of alerting you to an accidental cloud penetration?
<<

I think it was intentional. He seemed pleased, in the same sense that an
instructor giving training (under an IFR flight plan) is pleased when actual
conditions are encountered. I don't think he realized that nobody was
separating aluminum at that point (though he knew we were VFR and I made it
clear that we were to remain VFR).

It's not all that easy to judge 500 feet from the bottoms of a cloud - they
always look closer than they are, and maybe he misjudged or overcompensated.

Ok.. what do I do? Climb, descend, turn around? We were pretty low to descend
blind out of the clouds, but my safety pilot said we had ground contact and I
descended out of it pretty quickly, told approach we were IMC, descending out
of it and turning around for home and went back to the home airport, where I
shot a practice approach there. I also made it clear that my safety pilot's
job was to keep us sufficiently clear of clouds, granite, and aluminum.

Although I stayed mostly under the hood, I did peek more than occasionally to
be sure we were sufficiently clear of these impediments to good times. In
retrospect, perhaps I should have ripped off the hood, bonked him with it, and
tossed him outside. Ironically, he's very safety conscious when it comes to
equipment - wanting backups for the vacuum and electrical system, and the
latest and greatest in GPS technology. (seems to be a trend - nobody looks at
the sectionals any more), so I was unprepared for this particular event.

Jose



--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Michael]

Andrew Gideon > wrote
> I'm drawing a very important distinction between "trusting" and
> "complacent".

I'm not sure you can effectively do that.

> Sure, that's obvious when I write it that way <laugh>. But it's not
> something I see discussed, and I've been looking for it recently. More,
> the line can be tough to define, although I'm trying (as you'll see below).

I'm glad you realize it's tough, but I think it's worse than that. I
think the line is impossible to define in a manner useful to the
student, because almost by definition it will require a level of
knowledge and judgment that the student will not posess.

> It is absolutely necessary that a pilot trust an instructor to get the best
> use out of that instructor. The example you and I are both using - going
> past one's personal "envelope" with an instructor as guide - is one such
> very good use.

But in order to trust the instructor, you have to believe the
instructor really knows best. In other words, you have to believe
that while you are operating outside your envelope, the instructor is
well within his. This is made more difficult because there are many
documented cases where this was not true. All I can say is, choose
your instructor carefully. Just because the FAA gives a guy a piece
of paper doesn't mean he's qualified.

> However, this idea of the instructor as a safety mechanism can be taken too
> far with the pilot has in his mind, even if quietly, "if this was bad, he'd
> say something".

Now you're changing the situation. Yes, poor communications can be
deadly. It is indeed quite possible for the student to see something
the instructor has missed. It is absolutely legitimate and proper for
the student to bring this up. However, it is equally legitimate for
the instructor to say "Yes, I'm aware of this, and it's not a problem
because..." and you either trust the instructor and keep going or you
get another instructor.

> This is similar to some of what I've been reading about CRM, in that the
> recommendation is that the concerns of the least confortable pilot are
> paramount.

And that's fine - as long as you don't translate this to mean that the
most scared pilot makes the decision.

> That is, if one of two pilots think conditions (ie. weather)
> are bad, then they're treated as bad - even if the other pilot is
> comfortable with the conditions.

And that's fine - unless you interpret it to mean that the least
comfortable pilot gets to decide that a diversion, precautionary
landing, or 180 will be done when it's not necessary.

Consider an extreme case - a low time VFR-only pilot is flying with an
ATP. The visibility ahead is terrible and the ceilings are low. The
ATP decides this is no big deal, files IFR, and proceeds to his
destination. Should his decision change because of the low time
VFR-only pilot in the right seat? Does it matter if the pilot in the
right seat is acting as copilot - maybe tuning radios and keeping
track of maps?

If the answer is yes, that's a great rule - if you never need to
accomplish anything (as the more experienced pilot) or never need to
learn anything (as the less experienced pilot). The whole point of
becoming a better pilot is to develop the skill and knowledge that
will allow you to complete a flight when others can't. The whole
point of carrying a copilot is to be able to offload some tasks onto
that copilot, which reduces your workload and allows you to extend
your capability without giving up the safety margin. The whole point
of riding copilot with a more experienced pilot is to learn from the
more experienced pilot and extend your capability. The least
comfortable pilot rule works against these goals.

The concerns of the copilot should be addressed, but the ultimate
decisionmaking authority remains with the captain. Always. And yes,
somtimes that means pressing on when the copilot is uncomfortable
because the captain is comfortable.

> But a pilot with an instructor that accepts an uncomfortable situation - or
> that stops looking for them - because the instructor is in the aircraft is
> giving away that safety net.

I think you need to separate the two. The student who stops paying
attention becuase the instructor is there does indeed increase the
risk unnecessarily. He should vocalize his concerns, both because
there is a possibility that the instructor missed something, and
because this will allow the instructor to determine where the
student's weaknesses are and address them. However, operating outside
one's own envelope by definition means accepting an uncomfortable
situation. Let's say in the above case that the ATP lets the VFR-only
pilot fly. I assure you that VFR-only pilot will be uncomfortable as
he negotiates the transition to instruments and flies in the bumps and
rain. However, it will be a spectacular learning experience for him -
even if he never goes on to get an instrument rating, it will improve
his odds of successfully handling a VFR-into-IMC emergency.

> It's a bit of a vague line between "going past the envelope" and "least
> comfortable rules". As best I can see, the difference is in intent. I
> might plan, for example, to go past my comfort level in x-wind landings
> with an instructor. That's different from attempting a landing possibly
> outside my skill level because "if this was bad, he'd say something".
>
> With intent comes communication. For example: "I've never landed in gusts
> this severe; shall we try?".

I think the real difference is not intent but communication.

When operating outside one's envelope, there is unavoidable risk. I
feel this risk is justified by the gains to be made in skill and
knowledge, which will increase capability and reduce risk on future
flights, but let's not lose sight of the fact that not all risk is
avoidable.

The risk caused by poor communication in such a situation IS
avoidable, and should be avoided.

It is said that two CFI's in a primary trainer equal half a student
pilot, and I can tell you from experience that this can be very true.
When I decided that I wanted to be a tailwheel instructor (a REAL one,
not just what the FAA considers legal) a friend of mine, who is a real
tailwheel instructor, gave me some dual in his Champ. I was already a
CFI and a tailwheel pilot at the time - in fact I had hundreds of
landings in a taildragger - but there is a difference between being
good enough to do it and good enough to teach it. But first we did
some brushup - on a narrow paved obstructed runway of course, since
grass is too easy. We almost lost the airplane.

My experience had been in a 7ECA Champ (no, not a Citabria - there was
such a thing as a 7ECA Champ) which had toe brakes and a big engine.
We were flying a 7BCM Champ, with heel brakes and a smaller engine. I
got a bit off center, botched the rudder correction (not being used to
heel brakes - I only ever had a few hours in a heel-brake Cub and that
was years ago), and the small burst of throttle didn't do what I was
used to. Fortunately, my friend caught it before we hit the trees.

This was a perfect example of poor communication. He thought I
already knew how to do it. I thought it would be fine because he was
there. We've been a lot more careful about preflight briefings when
we fly together since then. However, even after we rebriefed and I
expressed my concerns that the runway was too narrow and too
obstructed - we kept flying. I was outside my comfort zone, but not
outside his.

Basically, I think you're invoking intent when what we're really
dealing with is just communication. The intent was the same first and
second time around; it's just that the first time around we botched
the communication and nearly put a wing in the trees.

As a corollary to this, I don't think it makes sense to place the
communication burden entirely on the student or copilot. The
instructor or captain also has a responsibility to communicate.
Ideally, he should anticipate the concerns of the student or copilot
and address them pre-emptively.

Michael

[Andrew Gideon]

Michael wrote:

>
> But in order to trust the instructor, you have to believe the
> instructor really knows best. In other words, you have to believe
> that while you are operating outside your envelope, the instructor is
> well within his. This is made more difficult because there are many
> documented cases where this was not true. All I can say is, choose
> your instructor carefully. Just because the FAA gives a guy a piece
> of paper doesn't mean he's qualified.

You're absolutely right about making the right instructor choice.

But I still think that there's a line here that can be drawn, if not easily.
Yes, we're trusting the intructor. But there's still a difference, at
least as I see it, between (1) deliberately going past one's envelope with
the backup of an instructor, and (2) letting one get out of one's envelope
due to complacency. One is an intentional - and communicated, but I'm
thinking this is merely a consequence of intent - act while the other
occurs through a relaxation of one's attention/care/responsibility.

>
>> However, this idea of the instructor as a safety mechanism can be taken
>> too far with the pilot has in his mind, even if quietly, "if this was
>> bad, he'd say something".
>
> Now you're changing the situation. Yes, poor communications can be
> deadly.

Yes. But I'm thinking that this - communication - is more a symptom than
cause in the "syndrome" I'm trying to define.

> It is indeed quite possible for the student to see something
> the instructor has missed. It is absolutely legitimate and proper for
> the student to bring this up. However, it is equally legitimate for
> the instructor to say "Yes, I'm aware of this, and it's not a problem
> because..." and you either trust the instructor and keep going or you
> get another instructor.

But this is a perfect example of "trust" and not "complacency". To turn
this into "complacency", the student would either (1) not notice because
he's paying less attention or (2) not tell the instructor. Either could
result from the student assuming that if there really were a problem, the
instructor would say something.

[...]

> The concerns of the copilot should be addressed, but the ultimate
> decisionmaking authority remains with the captain. Always. And yes,
> somtimes that means pressing on when the copilot is uncomfortable
> because the captain is comfortable.

This is something on which I'm not yet clear. In my reading, some of the
accident descriptions include the captain overriding the copilot's
discomfort. In one example, the last words on the CVR were "I told you
so". I think that what's being offered is that sometimes the more
comfortable pilot *should* be overridden.

However, an instructional flight is - as you note - obviously a different
situation. There's the expectation of discomfort, if you will. As long
as "envelope excursions" are made explicitly, this is "trust". It's the
unawared excursion that's the problem.

[...]
> I think you need to separate the two.

Right. That's exactly what I'm doing <grin>.

[...]
> When operating outside one's envelope, there is unavoidable risk.

That is a good point. Justified, but there nevertheless.

[...]

> This was a perfect example of poor communication.

Yes. Thanks for sharing it.

[...]
> Basically, I think you're invoking intent when what we're really
> dealing with is just communication. The intent was the same first and
> second time around; it's just that the first time around we botched
> the communication and nearly put a wing in the trees.

Perhaps. In this example, you accepted going past your envelope explicitly,
even though there was a communication failure. I still believe that
there's "more room for error": performing a task outside the envelope w/o
explicitly realizing/considering that fact.

Of course, failure to realize something will cause that non-realization to
not be communicated.

- Andrew

[Teacherjh]

>>
I think that what's being offered is that sometimes the more
comfortable pilot *should* be overridden.
<<

But when?

Jose


--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Andrew Gideon]

Teacherjh wrote:

>>>
> I think that what's being offered is that sometimes the more
> comfortable pilot *should* be overridden.
> <<
>
> But when?

Good question. I don't yet have an answer. It may be that the literature
doesn't provide a clear answer, but I'm not yet ready to say that.

- Andrew

[Michael]

Andrew Gideon > wrote
> Yes, we're trusting the intructor. But there's still a difference, at
> least as I see it, between (1) deliberately going past one's envelope with
> the backup of an instructor, and (2) letting one get out of one's envelope
> due to complacency. One is an intentional - and communicated, but I'm
> thinking this is merely a consequence of intent - act while the other
> occurs through a relaxation of one's attention/care/responsibility.

So what you're postulating is the existence of a pilot who stops
asessing risk just because the instructor is there, even though he's
actually a pilot who is already able to fly on his own, and thus
necessarily able to asess and manage risk? Are you sure this actually
happens? Because from my point of view, that's like abdicating one's
responsibility as a pilot, and dropping to the level of a passenger
who is allowed to manipulate the controls or share some cockpit tasks.

If that's what you mean, well, I admit there is a difference between
that and simply poor communication - but are you sure this actually
happens?

> But this is a perfect example of "trust" and not "complacency". To turn
> this into "complacency", the student would either (1) not notice because
> he's paying less attention

But in training, it's fairly common and perfectly legitimate to force
the student to operate at task saturation for extended periods. This
will cause him not to notice things because he is paying less
attention - but this is the unavoidable price of teaching the
emergency survival skill of flying at task saturation.

> (2) not tell the instructor. Either could
> result from the student assuming that if there really were a problem, the
> instructor would say something.

And that may be part of the ground rules of the flight.

For example, a hooded pilot abdicates the responsibility for collision
avoidance to the safety pilot. He can pretty much keep on trucking
unless the safety pilot says something.

> > This was a perfect example of poor communication.
> Yes. Thanks for sharing it.

But do you see that there was no complacency involved? We both fully
understood that we were undertaking envelope expansion - that we would
be operating within his envelope but outside mine. Yet we still
screwed it up.

> Perhaps. In this example, you accepted going past your envelope explicitly,
> even though there was a communication failure. I still believe that
> there's "more room for error": performing a task outside the envelope w/o
> explicitly realizing/considering that fact.

I simply have a hard time imagining how it would happen. I mean, if
what you're doing is within your envelope, why do you have the
instructor there? You could simply do it yourself.

Michael

[Michael]

Andrew Gideon > wrote
> > I think that what's being offered is that sometimes the more
> > comfortable pilot *should* be overridden.
> >
> > But when?
>
> Good question. I don't yet have an answer.

I will suggest one for you - when more comfortable does not mean more
capable. The problem is how to measure capability.

I will also suggest that nothing is perfect, and that just because
something bad happens after the less comfortable pilot predicted it
would does not mean that his reasoning was not faulty. I offer for
your consideration the famous warning, "Beware the Ides of March."

Michael

[Teacherjh]

>So what you're postulating is the existence of a pilot who stops
>asessing risk just because the instructor is there, even though he's
>actually a pilot who is already able to fly on his own, and thus
>necessarily able to asess and manage risk? Are you sure this actually
>happens? Because from my point of view, that's like abdicating one's
>responsibility as a pilot, and dropping to the level of a passenger
>who is allowed to manipulate the controls or share some cockpit tasks.

Yes, I think that's exactly what is being postulated. I think there's a
continuum between the extreme case of becoming a passenger, and the other
extreme case of ignoring the instructor's existance.

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Andrew Gideon]

Michael wrote:

> If that's what you mean, well, I admit there is a difference between
> that and simply poor communication - but are you sure this actually
> happens?

No, I am absolutely *not* sure.

[...]
> I simply have a hard time imagining how it would happen. I mean, if
> what you're doing is within your envelope, why do you have the
> instructor there? You could simply do it yourself.

One possible example: landing after an instrument lesson. Normally, the
landing would be well within a pilot's envelope. But if the wind is more
gusty than comfortable to this instrument student, and he doesn't really
evaluate this because he's depending upon the instructor...

- Andrew

[Andrew Gideon]

Michael wrote:

> I offer for
> your consideration the famous warning, "Beware the Ides of March."

You don't check with soothsayers as a part of your preflight? If only
Caesar had received a full briefing...

- Andrew

[G.R. Patterson III]

Andrew Gideon wrote:
>
> You don't check with soothsayers as a part of your preflight?

Well, the FARs *do* say "all available information".

Lessee here ... where'd I put the horoscope page......

George Patterson
In Idaho, tossing a rattlesnake into a crowded room is felony assault.
In Tennessee, it's evangelism.

[Michael]

(Teacherjh) wrote
> Yes, I think that's exactly what is being postulated. I think there's a
> continuum between the extreme case of becoming a passenger, and the other
> extreme case of ignoring the instructor's existance.

I think that's a false continuum. Either you are flight crew, or you
are a passenger, but not both.

Michael

[Robert M. Gary]

Andrew Gideon > wrote in message e.com>...
> Hi, all:
>
> I'm giving a presentation on what someone here called "instructor in
> command" syndrome: a pilot getting complacent because there's an instructor
> in the aircraft.
>
> I've found a number of good ones here, but any more - esp. with something
> "interesting" - would be welcome.


When I was checking out in a 182RG the CFI took me to an airport that
was in a bowl (rising terrain on either end of the runway). He was a
very high time CFI but I was an experienced pilot. The visual ques of
the terrain caused me to be way too high on final. I asked the CFI if
I should go around and he didn't respond. I assumed that meant I was
ok (since he knew the plane more than I). He assumed I knew short
fields better than him (I'd probably done more real short field
flying). We touched down 1/2 way down the runway and were just able to
stop in time with the elevator back and the brakes cooking (did I
mention the runway was 300 feet shorter due to some repaving on the
end:) ).

>
> I'd also appreciate it if someone could point me at a reference to something
> that I've been told occurred. A CFI was sitting in the back of an aircraft
> that made a bad landing. Even though the CFI had no role in the flight, he
> bore some of the brunt from the FAA.

I've heard this to and have decided it must be an Urban legend. I have
heard similar but none of them seemed as bad as the story went.

-Robert, CFI

[Paul Sengupta]

"Michael" > wrote in message
om...
> So what you're postulating is the existence of a pilot who stops
> asessing risk just because the instructor is there, even though he's
> actually a pilot who is already able to fly on his own, and thus
> necessarily able to asess and manage risk? Are you sure this actually
> happens?

I've noticed this happening to me...maybe there's something I can do
well when I'm on my own, but with an instructor there I seem to not
do so well.

Why? Because I become more passive. Maybe it's because I don't
"have" to do it. Maybe it's because I'm waiting for approval to do it
or waiting for confirmation I'm doing the right thing, or rather not
getting shouted at for doing the wrong thing. Maybe it's a less
heightened state of awareness. It introduces a slight delay, maybe akin
to getting an hour's less sleep!

Paul

[Paul Sengupta]

"Michael" > wrote in message
om...
> I simply have a hard time imagining how it would happen. I mean, if
> what you're doing is within your envelope, why do you have the
> instructor there? You could simply do it yourself.

Checking out in a new aircraft. Checking out in the same type of
aircraft but owned by a different club/FBO/person. A BFR. Going
up after a break think you'd be rusty but actually you find that you'd
have done ok (and did worse because the instructor was there?).

Several reasons.

I got checked out in a 172 recently after having not flown a 172 for
about 2 years. I can fly 172s (honestly!). But for a fair bit of the
checkout, I didn't feel like I was totally in control. I think I was less
in tune with the aircraft than I would have been had I just taken it
up on my own. My landings were very good, I got the sign off and
found that the next time I got in (on my own) it was as if I'd never
been away from 172s.

A few years ago I tried to do a checkout in the club 172 at Cardiff.
I didn't do that well, and the instructor suggested I needed more
practise before she would sign me off. A short while later, I got the
use of another 172 at Cardiff. It didn't require a checkout and there
was no one to check me out anyway. I just got in and flew it perfectly
(or as perfectly as I'd ever flown anything! :-) ).

Paul