Reducing the Accident Rate

[Snowbird]

Hi All,

Just got back from the national convention of my type
club (insert glowing comments about beautiful planes,
wonderful people, fun activities, helpful FBO here)

So here's a topic related to Jay's thread "Scary". At
the membership meeting, the club's Safety Director rightly
pointed out something many here have commented on: every
GA accident is "news" these days, and if we want to keep
flying (and keep being able to buy insurance) we pilots,
as a group, need to lower the accident rate.

So how? I have a great deal of respect for this man. He's
a stand-up guy, a pilot with breadth and depth of experience,
and a long-time CFI. But his "solution" is to have a one-day
course, associated with the National Convention, in which
pilots pay a hefty fee ($100-$200) for 'recurrant training'
done by "national names".

Call me a skeptic, but I feel this goes along with WINGS
seminars: it's 'preaching to the choir', to a large extent.
Maybe 10 or at most, 20% of the membership makes it to the
conventions. The ones who would pay to take this course
are, like the pilots who show up at the WINGS seminars,
those who have already made a mental committment to recurrant
training and who, if every safety seminar in the country
became extinct, would "roll their own" out of books and magazines
and discussions with pilots and CFIs they respect.

Most of the pilots who are taking off without proper respect
for DA or flying into ice/tstorms/IMC or buzzing their buddy's
house, I think, aren't coming to these things. Maybe I'm wrong?
Maybe they come, and think "oh, well, only ignorant low-hours
pilots have trouble when they try to run cows around with their
plane, I'm a super-skilled high-time pilot so *I* can do it just
fine" (insert analogous phrase about other activities)?

Anyway, here's the question: how DO we reduce the accident
rate? How do we preach, not just to the choir, but to the
80-90% of pilots who *don't* attend WINGS seminars or other
recurrant training?

Cheers,
Sydney

[Bob Gardner]

I agree that just about all safety seminars are attended by people who do
not need encouragement to fly safely, and I am at a loss as to how to reach
the others except by person-to-person contact. Few of us are willing to take
the bull by the horns and talk to miscreants, so the next best has to be
calling in the FSDO safety program manager or an accident prevention
counselor. I hope that Jay recorded the clueless VFR pilot's tail number,
name, or whatever in order to pass the info on to someone at the FBO where
he rented the plane and ultimately to his instructor if possible. This was
such an egregious violation that half-measures won't do the job.

Bob Gardner

"Snowbird" > wrote in message
om...
> Hi All,
>
> Just got back from the national convention of my type
> club (insert glowing comments about beautiful planes,
> wonderful people, fun activities, helpful FBO here)
>
> So here's a topic related to Jay's thread "Scary". At
> the membership meeting, the club's Safety Director rightly
> pointed out something many here have commented on: every
> GA accident is "news" these days, and if we want to keep
> flying (and keep being able to buy insurance) we pilots,
> as a group, need to lower the accident rate.
>
> So how? I have a great deal of respect for this man. He's
> a stand-up guy, a pilot with breadth and depth of experience,
> and a long-time CFI. But his "solution" is to have a one-day
> course, associated with the National Convention, in which
> pilots pay a hefty fee ($100-$200) for 'recurrant training'
> done by "national names".
>
> Call me a skeptic, but I feel this goes along with WINGS
> seminars: it's 'preaching to the choir', to a large extent.
> Maybe 10 or at most, 20% of the membership makes it to the
> conventions. The ones who would pay to take this course
> are, like the pilots who show up at the WINGS seminars,
> those who have already made a mental committment to recurrant
> training and who, if every safety seminar in the country
> became extinct, would "roll their own" out of books and magazines
> and discussions with pilots and CFIs they respect.
>
> Most of the pilots who are taking off without proper respect
> for DA or flying into ice/tstorms/IMC or buzzing their buddy's
> house, I think, aren't coming to these things. Maybe I'm wrong?
> Maybe they come, and think "oh, well, only ignorant low-hours
> pilots have trouble when they try to run cows around with their
> plane, I'm a super-skilled high-time pilot so *I* can do it just
> fine" (insert analogous phrase about other activities)?
>
> Anyway, here's the question: how DO we reduce the accident
> rate? How do we preach, not just to the choir, but to the
> 80-90% of pilots who *don't* attend WINGS seminars or other
> recurrant training?
>
> Cheers,
> Sydney

[Dan Luke]

"Snowbird" wrote:
> Anyway, here's the question: how DO we reduce
> the accident rate? How do we preach, not just to
> the choir, but to the 80-90% of pilots who *don't*
> attend WINGS seminars or other
> recurrant training?


Wow, talk about your $64 question!

I dunno Sydney, I think we might have reached a natural, human factors
limit on GA safety under the current regulations: note the more-or-less
flat statistics of recent years. And it really doesn't appear that new
technology is the answer, NASA's pipedreams notwithstanding.

Unless we want to have more stringent rules that further restrict what
private pilots can do, I can't think of a way we can reach the less
safety conscious members of the pilot population, unless it's with
heat-seeking missiles.
--
Dan
C172RG at BFM

[Michael 182]

"Snowbird" > wrote in message
om...
> Hi All,
>
> Just got back from the national convention of my type
> club (insert glowing comments about beautiful planes,
> wonderful people, fun activities, helpful FBO here)
>
> So here's a topic related to Jay's thread "Scary". At
> the membership meeting, the club's Safety Director rightly
> pointed out something many here have commented on: every
> GA accident is "news" these days, and if we want to keep
> flying (and keep being able to buy insurance) we pilots,
> as a group, need to lower the accident rate.

I'm not sure I agree with this. Although GA accidents are reported somewhat
hysterically by the news media, have the press reports led to a reduction in
my flying privileges? I don't think so.

With regard to insurance, I believe they respond to actuarial statistics,
not press reports. Assuming our collective accident rates don't change there
is no reason to assume insurance rates will change either - unless you are
saying the rates are already prohibitive and we need to lower them.

Safer planes will probably eventually start to make a difference, as the
fleet slowly upgrades. But this will take a long time, both for the
equipment upgrades and the training to use the equipment.

> Most of the pilots who are taking off without proper respect
> for DA or flying into ice/tstorms/IMC or buzzing their buddy's
> house, I think, aren't coming to these things. Maybe I'm wrong?
> Maybe they come, and think "oh, well, only ignorant low-hours
> pilots have trouble when they try to run cows around with their
> plane, I'm a super-skilled high-time pilot so *I* can do it just
> fine" (insert analogous phrase about other activities)?

I wonder if this population of "cowboy pilots" is really significant. Sure
we have all run into one or two, but I'm sure the vast majority of pilots we
all meet are safety conscious and reasonably diligent. That said, even if
the cowboys are much more accident prone (which they probably are) the vast
majority of accidents probably happen to normal pilots who just find
themselves temporarily overmatched by some chain of events. Which is not at
all surprising. Almost everyone has, at some point, screwed up and cracked
up their car, boat, motorcycle. On a simpler level, we have all missed
appointments, dropped plates and broken bones. Perhaps we are already at the
point of "accidents happen" - it's just that in aviation the accidents tend
cause a higher price.

Anyway, FWIW, I suspect that the single biggest factor in reducing accidents
is to increase currency requirements, especially for IFR. That said, I
certainly don't want it to happen - I'll live with the current accident
rates and take my chances.


Michael

[C J Campbell]

I don't think that I would pay $100 or $200 to attend a one-day seminar run
by 'big names.' I am not convinced that it would be helpful in any way. Of
course, I fly every day, read everything I can get my hands on, and study
the regulations and manuals constantly.

Back in the 1970s I remember an FAA guy saying that we can give pilots the
best equipment, the best training, the best weather information and air
traffic control, but we can't give them good judgment. It is difficult
enough with the dolts posting here who show all the dangerous attitudes:
macho, anti-authority, complacency and all the rest. Some of the guys who
constantly criticize instructors, the FAA, maintenance, and everybody else
really concern me. The "I have ten thousand hours and I don't care what some
pup says" syndrome (even when the 'pup' is more than 50 years old and has
decades of flying experience of his own) is evident here in full force. At
least they appear to care a little bit about flight safety.

I am beginning to think that there really isn't anything you can do with
some people. All this week we have been working with a woman who wants to
commit suicide (she is clinically depressed). What she does is she takes all
her anti-depressant medication with beer. Well, this won't kill her, but it
is likely to lower the oxygen levels in her blood sufficiently to cause
permanent brain damage. Apparently she would rather live the rest of her
life having somebody feed her, wipe her bib, and change her diaper rather
than face her rather minor problems.

I think some pilots are like that. They can't be motivated to even open
their mail, let alone attend a safety seminar. They would rather die. And
some of them will.

I gave a commercial student a stage check -- the final one before his check
ride. He had been very insistent that he is ready for the commercial check
ride and had been demanding that we sign him off for it. His instructor
finally tired of his complaints and sent him to me for the stage check,
hoping that I would reinforce what the instructor had already been telling
him -- that he was not ready. The student did terribly on the oral quizzing,
unable to demonstrate even rudimentary knowledge of aircraft systems, FARs,
or weather. Apparently the only studying he did was to read one of those ASA
oral exam guides and memorize the answers. If you deviated even slightly
from the questions in that book he was unable to answer them.

His flying was the same. Although the clouds were reported as 1200 few and
4900 broken, it was easy to see that the 'few' became scattered to broken
the moment you left the vicinity of the airport in any direction. He did not
know how to start the Cutlass properly, missed or screwed up several other
checklist items starting the engine, did not know how the GPS worked but
attempted to program it anyway, taxied with the mixture full rich and then
did not know how to clear the resultant fouled plug, then departed straight
into the clouds. As he was starting to enter the clouds he turned to me and
said, "What do I do now?" He stopped being pilot in command! He did not
leave himself an 'out' if he got into trouble. I had to take over the plane
to keep him from going VFR into the clouds, and then direct him back to the
airport which was less than a mile away. The interesting thing was that
there was plenty of room to deviate around the low clouds, but he did not
attempt to do this, nor did he try to fly to a clear area. Instead, he
departed straight for the heaviest and thickest clouds in the area and did
not deviate at all because he had not planned for it. Overall, I found his
performance very disappointing. On the ground he refused to admit that he
had made any errors and offered all kinds of excuses.

I think that is part of the real problem. Some people just don't accept the
idea of being pilot in command. They can't control themselves, let alone an
airplane. They blame everybody else for their problems. They think the FAA,
the instructors, the FBOs, the mechanics, the government, and the 'system'
are all incompetent. After I explained to this student that he was in real
danger and just why, and told him that I expected that he know how to fly an
airplane instead of passing a test, he showed some change of heart and a
determination to study harder. I hope he meant it.

[Jay Honeck]

> I think that is part of the real problem. Some people just don't accept
the
> idea of being pilot in command.

Wow, ain't it the truth -- in all aspects of life.

There are drivers, and there are the driven.
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

[Andrew Gideon]

Dan Luke wrote:

> Unless we want to have more stringent rules that further restrict what
> private pilots can do, I can't think of a way we can reach the less
> safety conscious members of the pilot population, unless it's with
> heat-seeking missiles.

Maybe. But I'd start with a different question: why don't those that don't
attend WINGs programs (and the like) attend WINGs programs (and the like)?
I find myself astonished that so many don't (is the 80-90% number
accurate?).

Perhaps I'm just lucky, in that I'm located in an area where seminars are
plentiful and frequent. Attending seminars was just a natural thing to do,
even if only as an opportunity to hang out with pilots. Perhaps this isn't
so everywhere?

Why else not attend?

- Andrew

[SeeAndAvoid]

I just got done reading a book called "They Called It Pilot Error"
and boy are we in trouble if some of the knuckleheads that
are in this book are in any numbers out there. Gladly, most
of the really stupid ones died in the accidents mentioned in
this book, but you know if those existed, theres 10x that many
that just havent crashed or had close ones yet.
Pilots on drugs and alcohol, with expired licenses/medicals,
blatantly breaking reg after reg, making up their own
approaches and rules, and of course the comical one about
those drunk dudes shooting holes through their own wings.

They have to really skew the averages, so I dont see any
hope of reducing the accident rate as long as these boneheads
are among us. And of course the media jump on these stories
like flies on sh*t, which of course they themselves are.
On this recent really long trip I took, I got flight following
everywhere that I wasn't IFR, and I heard a lot of 'lost' sounding
pilots on freq, not literally, but as if they had no clue as to
what they were up to. And controllers having to repeatedly
ask them. And of course while on the sector I hear stuff
that make me wonder how fun can it possibly be for this
pilot who sounds as if he's 100 miles behind the airplane and
no clue what's right ahead of him (hills/weather). I brush
some of that off as poor radio technique or nerves, some of
it, not all of it.

I dont see the rate going down, not with an aging fleet, and an
aging group of pilots. Mathematically, isnt that impossible
anyway? Less airplanes and even with a level number of
crashes? Assuming the airplanes involved are no longer in
service?

Anyway, I'm rambling, and the only accident rate I care about
is my personal rate. But check out that book, it's pretty sad,
and of course the author and NASA rep seem to have an
axe to grind.

Chris

[C J Campbell]

"SeeAndAvoid" > wrote in message
link.net...
> I just got done reading a book called "They Called It Pilot Error"
> and boy are we in trouble if some of the knuckleheads that
> are in this book are in any numbers out there.

The only knucklehead in the book that is really out there is the author, who
despite his claims to being an experienced pilot manages to confuse an HSI
with the attitude indicator, does not appear to understand the goals of
fundamental flight training, and generally seems to know little about
aviation except for a few buzzwords that he does not really understand their
meaning.

All the stories are fiction, though some of them are kind of fun to read.
The only place you will find where he admits that the book is entirely
fiction is an oblique mention of it in the introduction. You will not find
any of the incidents in the NTSB database.

[Philip Sondericker]

in article , C J Campbell at
wrote on 7/9/04 9:54 PM:


> All the stories are fiction, though some of them are kind of fun to read.
> The only place you will find where he admits that the book is entirely
> fiction is an oblique mention of it in the introduction. You will not find
> any of the incidents in the NTSB database.

I'm glad somebody else noticed this. I felt distinctly ripped off after I
brought the book home and discovered halfway through the introduction that
it was a work of fiction. Why the subterfuge? Frankly, I found it to be
false advertising.

[C J Campbell]

"Philip Sondericker" > wrote in message
...
> in article , C J Campbell at
> wrote on 7/9/04 9:54 PM:
>
>
> > All the stories are fiction, though some of them are kind of fun to
read.
> > The only place you will find where he admits that the book is entirely
> > fiction is an oblique mention of it in the introduction. You will not
find
> > any of the incidents in the NTSB database.
>
> I'm glad somebody else noticed this. I felt distinctly ripped off after I
> brought the book home and discovered halfway through the introduction that
> it was a work of fiction. Why the subterfuge? Frankly, I found it to be
> false advertising.
>

There is a real incident where a hunter shot himself down. It may not be as
funny as the story of the drunken hunters, but at least this one really
happened:

NTSB Identification: SEA02LA058.
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact
Public Inquiries
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, March 25, 2002 in Fort Peck, MT
Probable Cause Approval Date: 9/9/2002
Aircraft: Piper PA-18-150, registration: N22EV
Injuries: 2 Serious.
The pilot was conducting a predator (coyote) control flight over private
rangeland. During the flight, at a reported altitude of approximately 40
feet above ground level (AGL), the passenger inadvertently discharged a
semiautomatic 12-gauge shotgun. The pilot, who was seated in the forward
seat, reported that the gun fired 3-4 times, striking the right wing, fuel
tank and aileron assembly. He reported that the damage resulted in a loss of
aileron and elevator control. The airplane entered a descending turn to the
right and subsequently impacted terrain in a nose-low attitude. The pilot
reported the aircraft was on fire upon touchdown and continued to burn after
the impact. The pilot reported that there were no preexisting mechanical
malfunctions or failures that contributed to the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of
this accident as follows:

The pilot's inability to maintain aircraft control and foreign object damage
to the aileron and wing. The restricted movement of the flight controls was
a factor.

[smpharmanaut]

mandatory continuing education for pilot license.

It works in the medical professions.

It doesn't have to be a seminar, it could be on-line courses.


(Snowbird) wrote in
om:

> Hi All,
>

*snip*


> Anyway, here's the question: how DO we reduce the accident
> rate? How do we preach, not just to the choir, but to the
> 80-90% of pilots who *don't* attend WINGS seminars or other
> recurrant training?
>
> Cheers,
> Sydney

[Paul Sengupta]

"Snowbird" > wrote in message
om...
> Call me a skeptic, but I feel this goes along with WINGS
> seminars: it's 'preaching to the choir'

Like I've said before, apparently the opening line for CAA safety
seminars here in the UK is usually "For just turning up tonight,
you're 20 times less likely to suffer a fatal accident before I've
even said a word...ok, you can all go home now!".

Paul

[Andrew Gideon]

Paul Sengupta wrote:

> Like I've said before, apparently the opening line for CAA safety
> seminars here in the UK is usually "For just turning up tonight,
> you're 20 times less likely to suffer a fatal accident before I've
> even said a word...ok, you can all go home now!".

So what can be done to encourage more use of the WINGs program (and other
forms of "post-certification education)?

I could be wrong - it's been a while - but I don't recall my primary CFI
recommending anything outside of "basic" training. In contrast, my CFII
was a real bear about WINGs programs, extra reading, and such. I bump into
him at a lot of these seminars, so he's taking his own advice.

I don't recall ever bumping into the younger "aviation career oriented" CFIs
- but I admit I've not been looking for the few I still know around here.

- Andrew

[Snowbird]

smpharmanaut > wrote in message >...
> mandatory continuing education for pilot license.
> It works in the medical professions.
> It doesn't have to be a seminar, it could be on-line courses.

There is mandatory continuing ed for pilots in the form
of BFR. Evidently it doesn't suffice.

What form and how much, at what interval, do you suggest?

> (Snowbird) wrote in
> om:
> > Anyway, here's the question: how DO we reduce the accident
> > rate? How do we preach, not just to the choir, but to the
> > 80-90% of pilots who *don't* attend WINGS seminars or other
> > recurrant training?

Cheers,
Sydney

[G.R. Patterson III]

smpharmanaut wrote:
>
> mandatory continuing education for pilot license.

It's called a "flight review". For many of us, it happens once every two years.

George Patterson
In Idaho, tossing a rattlesnake into a crowded room is felony assault.
In Tennessee, it's evangelism.

[Richard Kaplan]

"Andrew Gideon" > wrote in message
online.com...>

> Why else not attend?

I think there is a reasonable subset of pilots who frankly enjoy a bit of
danger; these pilots may be hard to reach in a safety seminar.

Have you ever asked around your airport to see the % of pilots who ride
motorcycles? The percentage is astoundingly high. I think this gives a
bit of perspective as to the risk management profile of some pilots.


--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Bob Noel]

In article >, "Richard Kaplan"
> wrote:

> "Andrew Gideon" > wrote in message
> online.com...>
>
> > Why else not attend?
>
> I think there is a reasonable subset of pilots who frankly enjoy a bit of
> danger; these pilots may be hard to reach in a safety seminar.
>
> Have you ever asked around your airport to see the % of pilots who ride
> motorcycles? The percentage is astoundingly high. I think this gives a
> bit of perspective as to the risk management profile of some pilots.

hmmmm, I've attended most of the Wings seminars in the local area
when I can. I also attend the aeroclub's monthly safety meetings
even though I don't have to maintain currency in club aircraft.
I recently bought a (small) motorcycle - but only after
passing a rider safety course.

I'm wondering what riding a motorcycle reveals...

--
Bob Noel

[The Weiss Family]

> Anyway, here's the question: how DO we reduce the accident
> rate? How do we preach, not just to the choir, but to the
> 80-90% of pilots who *don't* attend WINGS seminars or other
> recurrant training?

As a low time PP-ASEL, one thing that has helped immeasurably (believe it or
not) is reading the rec.aviation newsgroups.

It's an easy way to tap the pulse of GA.
It's also a great way to see what is important to and getting the attention
of more experienced pilots/owners.

Each time I get in the plane now, I can usually think of something I've read
here that helps me out.

Adam

[Richard Russell]

On Sun, 11 Jul 2004 19:59:22 -0400, "Richard Kaplan"
> wrote:

>
>
>"Andrew Gideon" > wrote in message
online.com...>
>
>> Why else not attend?
>
>I think there is a reasonable subset of pilots who frankly enjoy a bit of
>danger; these pilots may be hard to reach in a safety seminar.
>
>Have you ever asked around your airport to see the % of pilots who ride
>motorcycles? The percentage is astoundingly high. I think this gives a
>bit of perspective as to the risk management profile of some pilots.
>
>
>--------------------
>Richard Kaplan, CFII

>www.flyimc.com
>
>
That is an interesting comment. I have driven motorcycles for 35
years and have been flying for 2 years. I attend every Wings (or
other) safety seminar that I can. I think my years of motorcycle
riding have predisposed me to a safety concious attitude. You are
correct, I believe, that the percentage of motorcycle riders in the
pilot community is greater than it is in the general population but I
suspect that many of those riders are also very safety concious prior
to becoming pilots. The question that I would like to know the answer
to is this; is the percentage of motorcycle driving pilots that
attends safety seminars different than the percentage of motorcycle
driving pilots that do not. I'm not sure that there are any valid
conclusions that can be drawn here.
Rich Russell
P.S. Jay, help me out here.

[G.R. Patterson III]

Richard Russell wrote:
>
> That is an interesting comment. I have driven motorcycles for 35
> years and have been flying for 2 years. I attend every Wings (or
> other) safety seminar that I can. I think my years of motorcycle
> riding have predisposed me to a safety concious attitude.

You *have* to have a safety concious attitude to survive riding bikes for 35 years.
That, plus an accurate understanding that everybody else is trying to kill you.

George Patterson
In Idaho, tossing a rattlesnake into a crowded room is felony assault.
In Tennessee, it's evangelism.

[Michael]

"Michael 182" > wrote
> I'm not sure I agree with this. Although GA accidents are reported somewhat
> hysterically by the news media, have the press reports led to a reduction in
> my flying privileges? I don't think so.

I think you are 100% right. The only erosion in our flying privileges
in recent history has been the result of things that happened with
airliners, not GA airplanes.

> With regard to insurance, I believe they respond to actuarial statistics,
> not press reports.

Rght again, and in reality the stock market has more impact on our
rates than the accident rate.

> Safer planes will probably eventually start to make a difference, as the
> fleet slowly upgrades. But this will take a long time, both for the
> equipment upgrades and the training to use the equipment.

Another good point. Our airplanes are mostly designed to 1950's
safety standards - even most of the ones being built now. There have
been a few minor changes, but only a few. Mostly, that's the fault of
the FAA. It's so difficult and expensive to certify anything really
new that progress has ground to a halt. In fact, I would have to say
that the biggest factor in our high accident rate is the FAA. If we
ever get airplanes that are as up to date as a 1995 Honda Civic, the
situation will improve.

> I wonder if this population of "cowboy pilots" is really significant. Sure
> we have all run into one or two, but I'm sure the vast majority of pilots we
> all meet are safety conscious and reasonably diligent. That said, even if
> the cowboys are much more accident prone (which they probably are) the vast
> majority of accidents probably happen to normal pilots who just find
> themselves temporarily overmatched by some chain of events.

Again, I agree 100%. I know very few cowboy pilots, and most of them
are highly skilled and able to mostly offset their poor judgment with
excellent skill. I knew one cowboy pilot who wrecked an airplane; I
know MANY aviation safety counselors who have. We've all made
mistakes - combine them all into a single flight, and any of us would
have crashed. Both our airplanes and the national airspace system we
fly in are full of "gotchas" and sometimes even the best pilots are
not up to dealing with all the gotchas, especially when the weather
goes bad.

> Anyway, FWIW, I suspect that the single biggest factor in reducing accidents
> is to increase currency requirements, especially for IFR.

Again, I mostly agree (should I have simply quoted the whole post and
added "me too?"). It's not so much IFR as bad weather - wether you
choose to handle it by flying IFR in IMC or low VFR under IMC, the
workload increases dramatically over what is required to drone along
in clear and a million. Most pilots don't fly often enough to stay
proficient enough for that kind of flying. Restricting those pilots
to bluebird days certainly would lower the accident rate.

> That said, I
> certainly don't want it to happen - I'll live with the current accident
> rates and take my chances.

Thank you for a voice of sanity.

Michael

[Richard Russell]

On Mon, 12 Jul 2004 14:12:41 GMT, "G.R. Patterson III"
> wrote:

>
>
>Richard Russell wrote:
>>
>> That is an interesting comment. I have driven motorcycles for 35
>> years and have been flying for 2 years. I attend every Wings (or
>> other) safety seminar that I can. I think my years of motorcycle
>> riding have predisposed me to a safety concious attitude.
>
>You *have* to have a safety concious attitude to survive riding bikes for 35 years.
>That, plus an accurate understanding that everybody else is trying to kill you.
>
>George Patterson
> In Idaho, tossing a rattlesnake into a crowded room is felony assault.
> In Tennessee, it's evangelism.

You're right on the money with that one. That's exactly the thought
that I ride with, that everyone I see has been given the assignment to
kill me. I commute daily into Philadelphia so a good bit of my riding
is in less than relaxing conditions. I think this mindset helped when
I began to fly. Other habits and skills that keep you alive on a bike
also help with flying, such as being weather concious, leaning into
turns and maintaining separation.
Rich Russell

[Paul Sengupta]

"Andrew Gideon" > wrote in message
online.com...
> Paul Sengupta wrote:
>
> > Like I've said before, apparently the opening line for CAA safety
> > seminars here in the UK is usually "For just turning up tonight,
> > you're 20 times less likely to suffer a fatal accident before I've
> > even said a word...ok, you can all go home now!".
>
> So what can be done to encourage more use of the WINGs program (and other
> forms of "post-certification education)?

This is the question though. Some people are safety oriented, some
aren't. Those who aren't, those "statistics waiting to happen"...would
attending seminars change their behaviour?

Paul

[Michael 182]

"Michael" > wrote in message >
> Thank you for a voice of sanity.
>
> Michael

lol - thank you - something I've rarely been accused of...

Michael

[Michael]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote
> I think there is a reasonable subset of pilots who frankly enjoy a bit of
> danger

I think that subset includes 100% of all pilots that fly for fun
except for some total idiots.

Why do I make the exception? Well, it would take a total idiot not to
realize that every flight, regardless of the manner in which it is
conducted, means some danger. Further, since the flight is for fun
rather than a matter of necessity, the danger is unnecessary. Even if
the trip itself is made for good reason (rather than simply a $100
burger) almost any other means of making the trip is safer.

> these pilots may be hard to reach in a safety seminar.

On the contrary - a bit of danger is one thing, but taking large
pointless risks is quite another. It is probably the pilots who are
most aware of the danger who are most careful about managing the
risks. But to reach these people, you have to offer something better
than "Just say no."

> Have you ever asked around your airport to see the % of pilots who ride
> motorcycles? The percentage is astoundingly high.

Why go that far? Any auto insurance company will tell you that the
safest, most risk-averse drivers are middle aged married women. How
many private pilots fit that profile? The percentage is astoundingly
low.

Aviation has inherent risk to it, and those people who are not
comfortable with the added risk soon leave aviation. Those who are
left are comfortable with it.

Michael

[Andrew Gideon]

Michael wrote:

> "Richard Kaplan" > wrote
>> I think there is a reasonable subset of pilots who frankly enjoy a bit of
>> danger
>
> I think that subset includes 100% of all pilots that fly for fun
> except for some total idiots.

You exclude all those that recognize the risk, and accept the risk as
payment for the various benefits, but that would be even happier to gain
those benefits w/o the risk.

[...]
> Aviation has inherent risk to it, and those people who are not
> comfortable with the added risk soon leave aviation. Those who are
> left are comfortable with it.

"Comfort" does not imply "enjoyment".

- Andrew

[Snowbird]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote in message >...
> "Andrew Gideon" > wrote in message
> online.com...>
>
> > Why else not attend?
>
> I think there is a reasonable subset of pilots who frankly enjoy a bit of
> danger; these pilots may be hard to reach in a safety seminar.
>
> Have you ever asked around your airport to see the % of pilots who ride
> motorcycles? The percentage is astoundingly high. I think this gives a
> bit of perspective as to the risk management profile of some pilots.

I'm not sure I take your point, Richard?

As a matter of fact, our CFI rides a motorcycle. He tries to "manage
the risk" in the same manner he manages flight risks, and do so as
safely as possible.

But I do think you've got a fundamental point: if some pilots actually
aren't *interested* in trying to fly as safely as possible, but would
rather perceive flying as a daredevil, risky activity, they aren't
likely to take much from a safety seminar even if they go.

FWIW,
Sydney

[Icebound]

"Snowbird" > wrote in message
om...
> Hi All,
>
> Just got back from the national convention of my type
> club (insert glowing comments about beautiful planes,
> wonderful people, fun activities, helpful FBO here)
>
> So here's a topic related to Jay's thread "Scary". At
> the membership meeting, the club's Safety Director rightly
> pointed out something many here have commented on: every
> GA accident is "news" these days, and if we want to keep
> flying (and keep being able to buy insurance) we pilots,
> as a group, need to lower the accident rate.
>
> So how? I have a great deal of respect for this man. He's
> a stand-up guy, a pilot with breadth and depth of experience,
> and a long-time CFI. But his "solution" is to have a one-day
> course, associated with the National Convention, in which
> pilots pay a hefty fee ($100-$200) for 'recurrant training'
> done by "national names".
>
> Call me a skeptic, but I feel this goes along with WINGS
> seminars: it's 'preaching to the choir', to a large extent.
> Maybe 10 or at most, 20% of the membership makes it to the
> conventions. The ones who would pay to take this course
> are, like the pilots who show up at the WINGS seminars,
> those who have already made a mental committment to recurrant
> training and who, if every safety seminar in the country
> became extinct, would "roll their own" out of books and magazines
> and discussions with pilots and CFIs they respect.
>
> Most of the pilots who are taking off without proper respect
> for DA or flying into ice/tstorms/IMC or buzzing their buddy's
> house, I think, aren't coming to these things. Maybe I'm wrong?
> Maybe they come, and think "oh, well, only ignorant low-hours
> pilots have trouble when they try to run cows around with their
> plane, I'm a super-skilled high-time pilot so *I* can do it just
> fine" (insert analogous phrase about other activities)?
>
> Anyway, here's the question: how DO we reduce the accident
> rate? How do we preach, not just to the choir, but to the
> 80-90% of pilots who *don't* attend WINGS seminars or other
> recurrant training?
>
> Cheers,
> Sydney

The NTSB report

http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2003/ARG0302.pdf

is informative.


Stencil the following into the center of the yoke at the next annual
inspection

"watch your fuel amount, mixture, carb-heat;
keep out of bad weather;
anticipate the wind;
watch your airspeed...
.....and you will avoid a lot of the preventable accidents".

[Icebound]

"Snowbird" > wrote in message
om...
> Hi All,
>
> Just got back from the national convention of my type
> club (insert glowing comments about beautiful planes,
> wonderful people, fun activities, helpful FBO here)
>
> So here's a topic related to Jay's thread "Scary". At
> the membership meeting, the club's Safety Director rightly
> pointed out something many here have commented on: every
> GA accident is "news" these days, and if we want to keep
> flying (and keep being able to buy insurance) we pilots,
> as a group, need to lower the accident rate.
>
> So how? I have a great deal of respect for this man. He's
> a stand-up guy, a pilot with breadth and depth of experience,
> and a long-time CFI. But his "solution" is to have a one-day
> course, associated with the National Convention, in which
> pilots pay a hefty fee ($100-$200) for 'recurrant training'
> done by "national names".
>
> Call me a skeptic, but I feel this goes along with WINGS
> seminars: it's 'preaching to the choir', to a large extent.
> Maybe 10 or at most, 20% of the membership makes it to the
> conventions. The ones who would pay to take this course
> are, like the pilots who show up at the WINGS seminars,
> those who have already made a mental committment to recurrant
> training and who, if every safety seminar in the country
> became extinct, would "roll their own" out of books and magazines
> and discussions with pilots and CFIs they respect.
>
> Most of the pilots who are taking off without proper respect
> for DA or flying into ice/tstorms/IMC or buzzing their buddy's
> house, I think, aren't coming to these things. Maybe I'm wrong?
> Maybe they come, and think "oh, well, only ignorant low-hours
> pilots have trouble when they try to run cows around with their
> plane, I'm a super-skilled high-time pilot so *I* can do it just
> fine" (insert analogous phrase about other activities)?
>
> Anyway, here's the question: how DO we reduce the accident
> rate? How do we preach, not just to the choir, but to the
> 80-90% of pilots who *don't* attend WINGS seminars or other
> recurrant training?
>


The NTSB report

http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2003/ARG0302.pdf

is information.

Out of 1900 accidents:
The leading cause is power problems 500.
Weather as a factor in about 360, but only about 120 or so "IMC", most
others are wind, carb-icing, and density altitude.
Over a 100 accidents were fuel management.

So the message is not long...have it stenciled into the center of the yoke
at the next annual:

"Watch your fuel amount, mixture, carb-heat;
Do not fly into bad weather;
Anticipate the wind;
Watch your airspeed
.... and you will avoid most preventable accidents"

[Icebound]

Apologies for the double post.

Got an error saying post was rejected by server and it disappeared. When I
re-composed and re-posted, the old one reappeared as posted okay...

[Richard Kaplan]

"Andrew Gideon" > wrote in message
online.com...>

> Why else not attend?

I think there is a reasonable subset of pilots who frankly enjoy a bit of
danger; these pilots may be hard to reach in a safety seminar.

Have you ever asked around your airport to see the % of pilots who ride
motorcycles? The percentage is astoundingly high. I think this gives a
bit of perspective as to the risk management profile of some pilots -- not
that
motorcycle riders cannot also be safe pilot, but the huge % of pilots who
ride
motorcycles does suggest there is a certain subset of pilots who are
risk-seekers.


--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Richard Kaplan]

"Snowbird" > wrote in message
m...>

> As a matter of fact, our CFI rides a motorcycle. He tries to "manage
> the risk" in the same manner he manages flight risks, and do so as
> safely as possible.

To what extent is this possible? In aviation the vast majority of the risk
can be managed by the pilot in choosing weather minimums and flight
procedures. In motorcycle riding, there will always remain the major
non-manageable risk that someone will hit the motorcyclist in a much larger
vehicle even if the motorcyclist practices defensive driving. Even worse, a
60 mph collision while riding a motorcycle almost always results in a fatal
or extremely serious injury, whereas there are lots of survival airplane
accidents.


> But I do think you've got a fundamental point: if some pilots actually
> aren't *interested* in trying to fly as safely as possible, but would
> rather perceive flying as a daredevil, risky activity, they aren't
> likely to take much from a safety seminar even if they go.

Correct... maybe the motorcycle comparison is a bad one... but in any event
there is clearly a significant group of pilots not particularly interested
in flying safety.

Look at it this way -- Flight Safety used to say (maybe still says?) that no
holder of their "Gold Card" had ever been involved in an airplane accident.
Is that to Flight Safety's credit, or to a large extent does pilot
self-selection play a role?



--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Richard Kaplan]

"smpharmanaut" > wrote in message
.51...>


> It works in the medical professions.

No, it doesn't "work" in the medical profession.

Most doctors are self-motivated and attend CME courses out of their own
interest.

Those docs who are not interested in CME have lots of ways to go on a ski
vacation and get credit for the CME course anyway.

The same happens with CFI renewal courses right now and would happen with
mandatory pilot CME -- those who would benefit don't need the mandate.



--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Richard Kaplan]

"Icebound" > wrote in message
.cable.rogers.com...>


> Weather as a factor in about 360, but only about 120 or so "IMC", most
> others are wind, carb-icing, and density altitude.

But fatal accidents disproportionately involve weather.

And lots of "power related" accidents are truly fuel exhaustion.

And most power-reltaed "accidents" are not fatals.

Weather and pilot judgment remain the biggest potentially fixable issues.

I also strongly suspect that lots of "power related" accidents are related
to owners who are marginally able to afford to maintain their airplanes
optimally. I wonder how much of supposed turbine engine reliability is
related to the turbine engine itself vs. to open-checkbook by-the-book
maintenance.


--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Michael]

Andrew Gideon > wrote
> You exclude all those that recognize the risk, and accept the risk as
> payment for the various benefits, but that would be even happier to gain
> those benefits w/o the risk.

I sometimes wonder how many of those there really are.

Think about how you feel when you pull off a landing with a lot of
gusty crosswind and squeak it on, right on target. Or when you make
an approach to minimums with the needle(s) dead centered all the way
and the runway is right there. Intellectually, you know that you just
completed an increased-risk operation - and what made it an
increased-risk operation was the increased degree of difficulty. But
you still feel good - you were faced with a challenge and you were up
to it. You wouldn't feel nearly as good making that approach/landing
in calm winds/CAVU.

How many pilots don't feel that way?

> "Comfort" does not imply "enjoyment".

I wonder.

In any case - whether they enjoy it or not (and I think most do, at
some level) the fact that they are comfortable with a certain amount
of risk means that most pilots are not too interested in reducing that
risk if it means a reduction in capability. Just say no doesn't cut
it. To have acceptance and value, a safety seminar has to show you
how to reduce risk without reducing capability. That's much harder,
and in my opinion few safety seminars accomplish this. I think that's
why most people don't go.

Most (if not all) pilots I know have been to at least one. They
didn't come back because they were not impressed.

I think the real solution is to have safety seminars that actually
teach you to increase safety without decreasing capability. Then
people will come and pay attention. However, you don't accomplish an
increase in safety without a reduction in capability with rules - you
accomplish it with skill and knowledge. That means we need a very
different method for choosing the people who teach these safety
seminars.

Michael

[Andrew Gideon]

Michael wrote:

> Andrew Gideon > wrote
>> You exclude all those that recognize the risk, and accept the risk as
>> payment for the various benefits, but that would be even happier to gain
>> those benefits w/o the risk.
>
> I sometimes wonder how many of those there really are.
>
> Think about how you feel when you pull off a landing with a lot of
> gusty crosswind and squeak it on, right on target. Or when you make
> an approach to minimums with the needle(s) dead centered all the way
> and the runway is right there. Intellectually, you know that you just
> completed an increased-risk operation - and what made it an
> increased-risk operation was the increased degree of difficulty. But
> you still feel good - you were faced with a challenge and you were up
> to it. You wouldn't feel nearly as good making that approach/landing
> in calm winds/CAVU.

In fact, I do feel pretty damned good making an excellent approach under the
hood too. There's less risk, which I like, and there's also the same
satisfaction of having met well the challenge.

I enjoy when I nail a simulated power failure landing too...but I don't long
for real opportunities to test my skills.

>
> How many pilots don't feel that way?
>
>> "Comfort" does not imply "enjoyment".
>
> I wonder.
>
> In any case - whether they enjoy it or not (and I think most do, at
> some level) the fact that they are comfortable with a certain amount
> of risk means that most pilots are not too interested in reducing that
> risk if it means a reduction in capability.

Ah, now here we're in complete agreement. I see the risk as payment for the
capability, and the current trade-off is fine for me. Of course, my risk
profile is different from some random other pilot's, but that's each of us
making our own individual choices.

> Just say no doesn't cut
> it. To have acceptance and value, a safety seminar has to show you
> how to reduce risk without reducing capability. That's much harder,
> and in my opinion few safety seminars accomplish this. I think that's
> why most people don't go.

I think that many don't "spoon feed" this, true. For example, I attended
one seminar which was a dissection of a midair. There was no conclusion
with a set of rules that would reduce risk, but I think that the
presentation and discussion provided useful information. Seeing what
occurred offers us the chance to catch the same pattern, and "break the
chain".

I think a fair number of seminars fall into this category.

[...]
> I think the real solution is to have safety seminars that actually
> teach you to increase safety without decreasing capability. Then
> people will come and pay attention. However, you don't accomplish an
> increase in safety without a reduction in capability with rules - you
> accomplish it with skill and knowledge. That means we need a very
> different method for choosing the people who teach these safety
> seminars.

I think I'm seeing what you mean. In your experience, seminars often
present rules of the form "thou shall not". I've been to some, but I've
also been to some which draw no such simple conclusions, and that simply do
provide knowledge (perhaps from the mistakes of others).

Still, I'm going to take this perspective to the next few seminars, and see
if I note more of what you're describing.

- Andrew

[Michael]

Andrew Gideon > wrote
> > You wouldn't feel nearly as good making that approach/landing
> > in calm winds/CAVU.
>
> In fact, I do feel pretty damned good making an excellent approach under the
> hood too. There's less risk, which I like, and there's also the same
> satisfaction of having met well the challenge.

Ah - but do you feel AS good? Is it really the same? Sure, it's
still a challenge - but I don't think you can compare the feeling you
get after you land out of an ILS in 200 and 2000 RVR, where you roll
out and still can't see the far end of the runway, and doing it under
the hood - even to 100 ft.

> I enjoy when I nail a simulated power failure landing too...but I don't long
> for real opportunities to test my skills.

I doubt anyone does - but when it happened to me, I did feel really
good about having nailed it - much more so than when I do a practice
one. Of course I also felt like a real idiot for having put myself in
that situation too, since I had no options. The approach to mins
didn't bother me at all because I knew I had plenty of fuel to reach
much better conditions.

Here's the difference - an engine failure is a genuine emergency, and
nobody I know wants one of those. A real approach to minimums? We
all know it's an increased-risk operation, but I know more than a few
people who seek it out, for "training value" and we think nothing of
it. In fact, we consider it good training. When I intentionally
choose the lowest local ceilings and visibilities for instrument
training, is that about enjoying a bit of danger or providing the
best, most challenging training available? And how do you separate
the two?

> I think that many don't "spoon feed" this, true. For example, I attended
> one seminar which was a dissection of a midair. There was no conclusion
> with a set of rules that would reduce risk, but I think that the
> presentation and discussion provided useful information.

Did it? Did it even provide correct information? I once went to a
seminar that dissected a crash. I knew the pilot, and I knew how it
happened. The seminar was very interesting, in the sense that a work
of fiction can be interesting. It had nothing at all to do with what
really happened.

That's almost beside the point, though. Assuming the information
presented was accurate, there is clearly value in examining past
accidents. But is a safety seminar the best venue for this? I would
suggest that it is not - that the optimal venue is hangar flying.

> I think I'm seeing what you mean. In your experience, seminars often
> present rules of the form "thou shall not".

Either that or quite obviously imply them.

> I've been to some, but I've
> also been to some which draw no such simple conclusions, and that simply do
> provide knowledge (perhaps from the mistakes of others).

I've been to a couple like that. There was one on flying over the
Gulf and the Caribbean by a guy who does it every year. I learned a
lot. But flying over the Gulf has inherent risks, and while I suppose
if you're going to go anyway you're better off going to the seminar
than doing it cold, I can honestly say that all his seminar did was
encourage me to cut across the Gulf when the opportunity presented
itself. Turned out that there were things he didn't cover and there
were a few tense moments there. I suppose he did a good enough job,
since I'm still here and would go again (doing it a bit differently
this time) but I can't in good conscience call it a safety seminar.

Michael

[Michael]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote
> Weather and pilot judgment remain the biggest potentially fixable issues.

Frankly, I think that's only true if we accept that the aircraft are
not going to improve. Highway fatality rates have improved
dramatically in the last few decades, and it is generally accepted
that the improvements are almost wholly due to the cars, not the
drivers.

Michael

[Richard Kaplan]

"Michael" > wrote in message
om...>

> accomplish it with skill and knowledge. That means we need a very
> different method for choosing the people who teach these safety
> seminars.

Or choose what seminars you go to.

For example the Forums at Oshkosh often serve this purpose.

--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Richard Kaplan]

"Michael" > wrote in message
om...>


> Frankly, I think that's only true if we accept that the aircraft are
> not going to improve. Highway fatality rates have improved

Well airbags in seatbelts are one nice up and coming possibility for a
safety improvement.

Perhaps terrain avoidance systems can help prevent CFIT accidents, but is
that an airplane improvement or a pilot improvement?

Perhaps weather datalink can help reduce weather accidents, but really that
is providing info to the pilot, not improving the airplane per se.

In any event, it will take a really long time for this to trickle down to
the majority of the GA fleet... airplanes have a much longer average useful
life than cars.

Economics has a lot to do with this of course... there is no doubt in my
mind that adding TKS to all GA airplanes would significantly reduce icing
accidents... but that is not practical.

So I do think focusing on pilots is more important than focusing on
airplanes. And weather/judgment by far cause a disproportionate number of
accidents and have for years.


--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Andrew Gideon]

Michael wrote:

> Andrew Gideon > wrote
>> > You wouldn't feel nearly as good making that approach/landing
>> > in calm winds/CAVU.
>>
>> In fact, I do feel pretty damned good making an excellent approach under
>> the
>> hood too. There's less risk, which I like, and there's also the same
>> satisfaction of having met well the challenge.
>
> Ah - but do you feel AS good? Is it really the same?

I believe that I feel better after the safer approach, as I don't have to
feel the same risk factor leading into the completion. But to be honest, I
really cannot say. I've not been able to perform a side-by-side
comparison.

[...]
> Here's the difference - an engine failure is a genuine emergency, and
> nobody I know wants one of those. A real approach to minimums? We
> all know it's an increased-risk operation, but I know more than a few
> people who seek it out, for "training value" and we think nothing of
> it. In fact, we consider it good training. When I intentionally
> choose the lowest local ceilings and visibilities for instrument
> training, is that about enjoying a bit of danger or providing the
> best, most challenging training available? And how do you separate
> the two?

To my mind, easily.

[...]
> I once went to a
> seminar that dissected a crash. I knew the pilot, and I knew how it
> happened. The seminar was very interesting, in the sense that a work
> of fiction can be interesting. It had nothing at all to do with what
> really happened.

Lacking the direct knowledge you had, I cannot say. Since the pilots didn't
survive in the example I used, we all knew that some guesswork was involved
on that side of things.

> That's almost beside the point, though. Assuming the information
> presented was accurate, there is clearly value in examining past
> accidents. But is a safety seminar the best venue for this? I would
> suggest that it is not - that the optimal venue is hangar flying.

Hanger flying wouldn't have easily afforded the recordings, video and audio,
that were presented.

That said, of course informal discussions are good too.

[...]
> I've been to a couple like that. There was one on flying over the
> Gulf and the Caribbean by a guy who does it every year. I learned a
> lot. But flying over the Gulf has inherent risks, and while I suppose
> if you're going to go anyway you're better off going to the seminar
> than doing it cold, I can honestly say that all his seminar did was
> encourage me to cut across the Gulf when the opportunity presented
> itself. Turned out that there were things he didn't cover and there
> were a few tense moments there. I suppose he did a good enough job,
> since I'm still here and would go again (doing it a bit differently
> this time) but I can't in good conscience call it a safety seminar.

I'm not clear on your point, here. What would you call it?

- Andrew

[Richard Kaplan]

"Snowbird" > wrote in message
om...>


> and a long-time CFI. But his "solution" is to have a one-day
> course, associated with the National Convention, in which
> pilots pay a hefty fee ($100-$200) for 'recurrant training'
> done by "national names".

I think perhaps a much more relevant and successful approach would be to
have this course be relevant to your specific airplane type.

Whether the program is done by a "national name" or not, how about a
specific review of accidents related to your airplane type and then a
discussion of how those accidents can be prevented?

This seems to me to be more "doable" than a generic "aviation safety"
program and it also seems to me that this would be more relevant to your
particular type association.



--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[smpharmanaut]

Of course it will only work for those motivated to continue learning.
Still, it will at least provide continued exposure to information for
those that are motivated, and hopefully even those not so motivated will
benefit from that exposure. In my profession, you can pick and choose
which CE's to complete. Some are brainless, some are challenging. Some
are not applicable to a particular branch of the profession.

I'd like to have access to standardized lesson plans for CE in piloting
that would be applicable to my level of flying (single engine, light
aircraft). I know it would help me.

Now there will be those that will go for the brainless, easy lessons.
"You can lead a horse to water..."

I think it would be an economic way to improve pilot skills.



"Richard Kaplan" > wrote in
:

>
> "smpharmanaut" > wrote in message
> .51...>
>
>
>> It works in the medical professions.
>
> No, it doesn't "work" in the medical profession.
>
> Most doctors are self-motivated and attend CME courses out of their
> own interest.
>
> Those docs who are not interested in CME have lots of ways to go on a
> ski vacation and get credit for the CME course anyway.
>
> The same happens with CFI renewal courses right now and would happen
> with mandatory pilot CME -- those who would benefit don't need the
> mandate.
>
>
>
> --------------------
> Richard Kaplan, CFII
>
> www.flyimc.com
>
>

[Gary Drescher]

"smpharmanaut" > wrote in message
.51...
> mandatory continuing education for pilot license.

After I'd been flying for awhile, I began to notice a disturbing decline in
the proportion of my time spent looking outside (flying VFR). In retrospect,
it's easy to see how that could happen: there's no overt feedback to remind
you that you're doing something wrong when your eyes linger inside the
cockpit, so a bad habit of neglecting the exterior scan can easily creep up
on you.

I made a conscious effort to monitor and correct the problem. But I wonder
what other bad habits might develop unnoticed. I suspect that recurrent
training every two years is inadequate to catch such problems in a timely
manner.

One possibility, of course, is to fly with an instructor (or at least
another pilot) far more often. Another would be to compile an list of bad
habits that can develop in the absence of corrective feedback, and
explicitly monitor for them. Or perhaps it'd be beneficial to videotape
oneself while flying, and review the tape afterwards (perhaps showing
representative portions to an instructor) to watch for any lapses.

--Gary

[Teacherjh]

>>
I began to notice a disturbing decline in
the proportion of my time spent looking outside (flying VFR).
<<

Try covering up most of the instruments. VFR you don't really need much.

Jose


--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Michael]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote
> Well airbags in seatbelts are one nice up and coming possibility for a
> safety improvement.

Why go so far? The reality is that a huge chunk of the fleet is still
flying around without shoulder harnesses. Ever wonder why? I don't.
I've installed two sets. Both were ridiculously expensive and poorly
designed. Why? FAA.

> Perhaps terrain avoidance systems can help prevent CFIT accidents, but is
> that an airplane improvement or a pilot improvement?

It's an airplane improvement. While it's always the pilot's
responsibility to avoid terrain, the truth is that no pilot (suicides
excepted) ever intentionally pointed his airplane at terrain. The
easier it is to maintain situational awareness, the less likely the
pilot is to do it.

In fact, I believe the whole issue of workload deserves a lot more
consideration. The more a pilot has to do, the more likely he is to
make a mistake. Do you realize that every car sold in the past 10
years has highly reliable, very efficient FADEC with single-lever
control? Why are they a rartiy on airplanes? FAA.

> Perhaps weather datalink can help reduce weather accidents, but really that
> is providing info to the pilot, not improving the airplane per se.

But it is improving the airplane. Pilots do not intentionally fly
into weather they can't handle. They fly into weather they think they
can handle, and they are wrong - IMO usually about the weather, not
their capabilities. The more accurate, timely, and user-friendly the
weather-update system becomes, the less likely pilots will be to make
these mistakes.

> In any event, it will take a really long time for this to trickle down to
> the majority of the GA fleet... airplanes have a much longer average useful
> life than cars.

Why? FAA.

> Economics has a lot to do with this of course... there is no doubt in my
> mind that adding TKS to all GA airplanes would significantly reduce icing
> accidents... but that is not practical.

Why not? Frankly, there's just not that much to the system. Most of
the system cost is regulatory compliance. In other words, FAA.

> So I do think focusing on pilots is more important than focusing on
> airplanes.

No, I think that's the wrong focus. If we're going to make a major
effort to address a systemic problem, it should be the correct
systemic problem. The FAA.

Michael

[Gary Drescher]

"Teacherjh" > wrote in message
...
> >>
> I began to notice a disturbing decline in
> the proportion of my time spent looking outside (flying VFR).
> <<
>
> Try covering up most of the instruments. VFR you don't really need much.

The problem wasn't that I was paying too much attention to the instruments.
Rather, I was starting to spend too much contiguous time on other tasks
(tuning radios to initiate flight following or open my flight plan; looking
at charts, etc.) with only a cursory glance out the window. I also noticed
that my visual scan would pause unnecessarily while I was talking over the
radio--kind of like drivers with cell phones, I guess.

--Gary

[Michael]

Andrew Gideon > wrote
> > When I intentionally
> > choose the lowest local ceilings and visibilities for instrument
> > training, is that about enjoying a bit of danger or providing the
> > best, most challenging training available? And how do you separate
> > the two?
>
> To my mind, easily.

Then spell it out for me. Which am I doing, and why?

> Lacking the direct knowledge you had, I cannot say. Since the pilots didn't
> survive in the example I used, we all knew that some guesswork was involved
> on that side of things.

But there's a difference between guesswork and outright twisting of
the facts to support a point. John Galban posted an interesting story
about how the latter happened with regard to an accident he was
involved with.

> > I've been to a couple like that. There was one on flying over the
> > Gulf and the Caribbean by a guy who does it every year.
> > I can't in good conscience call it a safety seminar.
>
> I'm not clear on your point, here. What would you call it?

Advanced training? Encouraging dangerous behavior? It all depends on
your point of view.

Going across the Gulf is really not for the novice pilot, IMO. First
off, it's not really something you do in a single engine airplane
(since an engine failure leaves you basically no chances at all - the
route I flew had me 50-120 miles from land for over 2 hours) so as a
minimum you're looking at being a twin pilot. Second, even in a twin,
there are issues. You are out of RADAR contact for hours, and have
only very limited radio contact (relays via airliners passing
overhead). There is effectively no way to update the weather picture,
so you have a greatly increased likelihood of encountering adverse
weather, while at the same time greatly reduced options for both
landing and ATC assistance. It's all doable, but my point is that
really the safest solution is not to do it. When you have a seminar
that basically tells you how to do it, it's hard to call it a safety
seminar.

Suppose I put on a seminar about how to scud run. I might include
tips like not flying at the bases of the clouds, where the vis is
worst. I might cover route planning - instead of the usual
VFR-direct, how to choose roads to follow for supplemental nav, being
prepared for obstructions, etc. I would likely cover low altitude
diversions - how to get to a nearby airport in a hurry. I might cover
emergency procedures - off field precautionary landings with power and
how to choose a field, an emergency instrument climb and what to
expect from ATC, etc. I might discuss various techniques for slowing
the plane down - when a notch of flaps might be appropriate, for
example. I've been there and done that, and if you're going to scud
run, I assure you that you're way better off going to this seminar
than just doing it cold and figuring it out as you go along. But
would it be a safety seminar?

Michael

[Bob Noel]

In article >,
(Michael) wrote:

[snip]
> Why? FAA.
>
[snip]
> Why are they a rartiy on airplanes? FAA.
>
[snip]
> Why? FAA.
>
[snip]
> In other words, FAA.
>
[snip]
> it should be the correct
> systemic problem. The FAA.

wow! no other causes?

hmmmm, if the FAA is the problem, then
why aren't aircraft in other nations safer?

--
Bob Noel

[Dave Stadt]

"Bob Noel" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> (Michael) wrote:
>
> [snip]
> > Why? FAA.
> >
> [snip]
> > Why are they a rartiy on airplanes? FAA.
> >
> [snip]
> > Why? FAA.
> >
> [snip]
> > In other words, FAA.
> >
> [snip]
> > it should be the correct
> > systemic problem. The FAA.
>
> wow! no other causes?
>
> hmmmm, if the FAA is the problem, then
> why aren't aircraft in other nations safer?
>
> --
> Bob Noel

Two reasons:

1. Most nations fly planes designed to meet FAA regulations or planes built
in the US which obviously implies they are built to meet FAA regulations.
2. Most nations pattern their aviation agency after the FAA.

[G.R. Patterson III]

smpharmanaut wrote:
>
> Now there will be those that will go for the brainless, easy lessons.
> "You can lead a horse to water..."

Or, as one of Heinlein's characters succinctly put it, "You can lead a student to
knowledge, but you cannot make him think."

George Patterson
In Idaho, tossing a rattlesnake into a crowded room is felony assault.
In Tennessee, it's evangelism.

[G.R. Patterson III]

Michael wrote:
>
> Frankly, I think that's only true if we accept that the aircraft are
> not going to improve. Highway fatality rates have improved
> dramatically in the last few decades, and it is generally accepted
> that the improvements are almost wholly due to the cars, not the
> drivers.

All of the improvements in automobile safety come with a weight penalty. There's not
a whole lot of room to improve aircraft in this way without cutting the carrying
capacity of each plane by significant amounts.

George Patterson
In Idaho, tossing a rattlesnake into a crowded room is felony assault.
In Tennessee, it's evangelism.

[Teacherjh]

>>
Suppose I put on a seminar about how to scud run. [...]
been there and done that, and if you're going to scud
run, I assure you that you're way better off going to this seminar
than just doing it cold and figuring it out as you go along. But
would it be a safety seminar?
<<

Yes. It might save your butt one day. Distinguish between attitude and
ability. Seminars that increase ones ability to do something that, under at
least some circumstances are dangerous, are still useful. They should perhaps
come with a part that indicates when not to do this, since it is certainly the
case that the more you hear how to do something, the more acceptable the
something becomes.

How about the new icing seminar? It gives lots of information about flying in
icing conditions, and may well save somebody's butt. And here in the
northeast, icing is hard to avoid. Is =that= a safey seminar?

Jose





--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Snowbird]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote in message >...
> "Snowbird" > wrote in message
> om...>
> > and a long-time CFI. But his "solution" is to have a one-day
> > course, associated with the National Convention, in which
> > pilots pay a hefty fee ($100-$200) for 'recurrant training'
> > done by "national names".

> I think perhaps a much more relevant and successful approach would be to
> have this course be relevant to your specific airplane type.

Well, I'm hazy on the details, but I think the idea is to somehow have
it be more "Grumman Specific".

The thing is:
1) something like 10% of the membership attends the convention
2) of that 10%, I think the fraction likely to pay $100 to attend
a safety seminar are likely to be the fraction most interested
in safety/recurrant training in any case.

Our type club already has an excellent pilot familiarization program
taught by type-familiar CFIs all over the country. I believe many of
the accidents involve pilots who either don't avail themselves of the
program, or who did so years ago (and have forgotten or gotten rusty
on what they learned).

I don't have great ideas, just the hunch a safety seminar may be a
good and useful thing, but I don't think it's going to address the
overall accident rate for our type (or any type) too much.

Cheers,
Sydney

[Richard Kaplan]

"Snowbird" > wrote in message
om...>

> I don't have great ideas, just the hunch a safety seminar may be a
> good and useful thing, but I don't think it's going to address the
> overall accident rate for our type (or any type) too much.

This is true of most recurrent training. It can be extremely helpful to
increase airplane utilization and/or improve safety for the self-selected
group which chooses to attend, but that is probably not a large enough group
from which to gather statistics. But addressing the overall accident rate
would require addressing pilot attitudes and also would probably require a
more realistic assessment by pilots of how much money they should spend on
maintenance -- both are uphill battles not likely to be won in a safety
seminar.


--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Michael]

"G.R. Patterson III" > wrote
> All of the improvements in automobile safety come with a weight penalty.

In other words, everything weighs something. That's actually not true
- software weighs nothing.

In any case - today's cars are both safer AND lighter than they were
40 years ago, or even 20. I suppose they could be lighter still if
they weren't any safer, but obviously if you allow modern technology
to be used without having to prove to a federal bureaucrat who doesn't
understand it that it's acceptable, you can reduce weight AND improve
safety.

Michael

[G.R. Patterson III]

Dave Stadt wrote:
>
> "Bob Noel" > wrote in message
> > hmmmm, if the FAA is the problem, then
> > why aren't aircraft in other nations safer?
> >
> > --
> > Bob Noel
>
> Two reasons:
>
> 1. Most nations fly planes designed to meet FAA regulations or planes built
> in the US which obviously implies they are built to meet FAA regulations.
> 2. Most nations pattern their aviation agency after the FAA.

Most nations built their agencies long before the U.S. had anything of the sort. Even
if your argument were true in all respects, we can simply check out the safety record
in the former Soviet Union. Their agencies and aircraft were developed completely
independently of ours.

George Patterson
In Idaho, tossing a rattlesnake into a crowded room is felony assault.
In Tennessee, it's evangelism.

[Jack]

Bob Noel wrote:

>>Have you ever asked around your airport to see the % of pilots who ride
>>motorcycles? The percentage is astoundingly high. I think this gives a
>>bit of perspective as to the risk management profile of some pilots.

Is management the same as avoidance? The layman probably wouldn't say
so. The goal isn't part of the "management" equation. How you get there is.


Jack

[Michael]

"G.R. Patterson III" > wrote
> Most nations built their agencies long before the U.S. had anything of the sort. Even
> if your argument were true in all respects, we can simply check out the safety record
> in the former Soviet Union. Their agencies and aircraft were developed completely
> independently of ours.

While the Soviet Union existed, it had absolutely no crashes of
privately owned aircraft at all. Not one.

Michael

[Snowbird]

> In article >,
> (Michael) wrote:
>
> [snip]
> > Why? FAA.
> >
> [snip]
> > Why are they a rartiy on airplanes? FAA.
> >
> [snip]
> > Why? FAA.
> >
> [snip]
> > In other words, FAA.
> >
> [snip]
> > it should be the correct
> > systemic problem. The FAA.

Michael, I sometimes feel like I must live in a parallel universe
to you. In your universe, the FAA is the root of all evil, their
employees are all bureaucrats without technical understanding, all
accident investigations are worthless, WINGS and other safety seminars
are useless, and CFIs are almost uniformly incompetent.

In the world I live in, things aren't nearly so black-and-white.

Cheers,
Sydney

[Snowbird]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote in message >...
> "Snowbird" > wrote in message
> om...>
> > I don't have great ideas, just the hunch a safety seminar may be a
> > good and useful thing, but I don't think it's going to address the
> > overall accident rate for our type (or any type) too much.

> This is true of most recurrent training. It can be extremely helpful to
> increase airplane utilization and/or improve safety for the self-selected
> group which chooses to attend, but that is probably not a large enough group
> from which to gather statistics. But addressing the overall accident rate
> would require addressing pilot attitudes and also would probably require a
> more realistic assessment by pilots of how much money they should spend on
> maintenance -- both are uphill battles not likely to be won in a safety
> seminar.

For our type anyway, supposedly the accidents can be traced to pilot
judgement.

It's a pretty simple aircraft to maintain, anyway, Sen. Inhofe's propeller
notwithstanding. That was a simple case of his A&Ps not following the
maint. manual procedure, not of insufficient money on maint.

Cheers,
Sydney

[Richard Kaplan]

"Snowbird" > wrote in message
om...>

> For our type anyway, supposedly the accidents can be traced to pilot
> judgement.

No doubt pilot judgment is a major cause of accidents.

> It's a pretty simple aircraft to maintain, anyway, Sen. Inhofe's propeller
> notwithstanding. That was a simple case of his A&Ps not following the
> maint. manual procedure, not of insufficient money on maint.

It may be a simple airplane to maintain, but does that mean there are not
accidents due to insufficient maintenance? Even something as simple as a
worn tire can lead to an accident. Lots of "simple" airplanes are flown
well beyond TBO or have pencil-whipped annuals or even pencil-whipped engine
overhauls.

--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Andrew Gideon]

Michael wrote:

> Andrew Gideon > wrote
>> > When I intentionally
>> > choose the lowest local ceilings and visibilities for instrument
>> > training, is that about enjoying a bit of danger or providing the
>> > best, most challenging training available? And how do you separate
>> > the two?
>>
>> To my mind, easily.
>
> Then spell it out for me. Which am I doing, and why?

I cannot tell you which you're doing <laugh>. I do that for the training
(it's the model introduced by my CFII). Others may do it precisely for the
"thrill". Yet we end up doing the same thing, which makes discerning the
motive a little tough.

Obviously, you've nothing but my word that I'm not a thrill seeker. And you
can even believe that I'm insufficiently self-aware, and that I've merely
hidden my thrill-seeking tendencies from myself. How could I argue with
that?

But I don't think it the case.

>> Lacking the direct knowledge you had, I cannot say. Since the pilots
>> didn't survive in the example I used, we all knew that some guesswork was
>> involved on that side of things.
>
> But there's a difference between guesswork and outright twisting of
> the facts to support a point. John Galban posted an interesting story
> about how the latter happened with regard to an accident he was
> involved with.

That's true. More, there've been a number of posts on rather...liberal
descriptions in NTSB reports.

Obviously, accuracy is important.

>
>> > I've been to a couple like that. There was one on flying over the
>> > Gulf and the Caribbean by a guy who does it every year.
>> > I can't in good conscience call it a safety seminar.
>>
>> I'm not clear on your point, here. What would you call it?
>
> Advanced training? Encouraging dangerous behavior? It all depends on
> your point of view.

You'd call the talk given by that guy "encouraging dangerous behavior"? I'd
agree that that would not be a "safety seminar".

Could you also call it "advanced training"? That would imply that it's
providing useful information, but information not applicable to safety.
Okay...I can see that, and I can even see that such things are useful.

Still...anything which helps one fly is going to aid safety, no? I mean, if
you were planning to fly the Gulf anyway, wasn't the information provided -
even if incomplete - useful?

Or is the problem that he made it seem complete, which tempted you to do
something you'd otherwise not?

[...]
> Suppose I put on a seminar about how to scud run. I might include
> tips like not flying at the bases of the clouds, where the vis is
> worst. I might cover route planning - instead of the usual
> VFR-direct, how to choose roads to follow for supplemental nav, being
> prepared for obstructions, etc. I would likely cover low altitude
> diversions - how to get to a nearby airport in a hurry. I might cover
> emergency procedures - off field precautionary landings with power and
> how to choose a field, an emergency instrument climb and what to
> expect from ATC, etc. I might discuss various techniques for slowing
> the plane down - when a notch of flaps might be appropriate, for
> example. I've been there and done that, and if you're going to scud
> run, I assure you that you're way better off going to this seminar
> than just doing it cold and figuring it out as you go along. But
> would it be a safety seminar?

I'd vote "yes". It's another tool in my belt. It's *my* choice whether or
not to use it, but your seminar would sharpen that tool.

I think of stall practice as similar to this. I've *no* intention of
stalling while (for example) making a base-to-final turn. Practicing so
that I can recover quickly from a stall isn't going to change that.

Or health insurance. I've no plans to get sick, and I do certain things to
preserve my health. Having insurance doesn't alter than behavior.

- Andrew

[Michael]

(Snowbird) wrote
> Michael, I sometimes feel like I must live in a parallel universe
> to you. In your universe, the FAA is the root of all evil, their
> employees are all bureaucrats without technical understanding, all
> accident investigations are worthless, WINGS and other safety seminars
> are useless, and CFIs are almost uniformly incompetent.

Well, I'm glad you used at least one qualifier - almost uniformly - to
describe my world. You should have used more, because really you came
up with a straw man argument.

> In the world I live in, things aren't nearly so black-and-white.

Nor are they in mine. Do I think the FAA is the root of ALL evil?
No, but I think it's the single biggest safety problem in personal
aviation. That's not to say there are not others, but it makes sense
to tackle the biggest problem first. Do I think all FAA employees are
bureaucrats without technical understanding - no, but that's the
majority. Interestingly, there is at least one person I know who has
a lower opinion of FAA engineering competence than I do. He designs
electronic components for GA aircraft for a living. I've bought some
of them, and I'm way more impressed with them than I am with anything
the FAA ever did. Do I think ALL accident investigations are
worthless? No, but given the ones where I have first hand knowledge,
it's clearly more the rule than the exception. Do I believe ALL WINGS
and other safety seminars are useless? Clearly not, since I've
mentioned that there were at least a couple I attended where I learned
useful things. That doesn't change my opinion of the majority of
them. Do I belive CFIs are almost uniformly incompetent? No, I
belive the level of incompetence is highly variable, a minority are
actually competent for the kind of instruction they do, and a tiny
percentage are actually very good.

But just because it's never all black or all white, it's a mistake to
say it's all shades of gray. At some point you have to say it's close
enough to black or white. The FAA's long term contribution to
personal aviation safety has been overwhelmingly negative. Does it
mean the FAA never did anything positive? Of course not. Is it
different for commercial aviation? Maybe. Probably. I don't care.
We're not discussing how we can reduce the accident rate in commercial
operations but private ones, therefore for the purposes of this
discussion only the FAA's impact on private operations matters.

You can't fix the problem unless you correctly identify it. One of
the first rules of fixing problems in large groups is this - if the
problem is widespread, it's a problem with the process, not the
people.

Michael

[Michael]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote
> It may be a simple airplane to maintain, but does that mean there are not
> accidents due to insufficient maintenance?

I think that's really the wrong question. The right question is - are
the majority of the accidents due to insufficient maintenance? Is it
the single biggest cause? Second biggest cause? Or is it down in the
decimal dust?

My experience suggests decimal dust.

Michael

[Michael]

Andrew Gideon > wrote
> I cannot tell you which you're doing <laugh>. I do that for the training
> (it's the model introduced by my CFII). Others may do it precisely for the
> "thrill". Yet we end up doing the same thing, which makes discerning the
> motive a little tough.

Or maybe it calls into question the entire concept of "motive."

> Obviously, you've nothing but my word that I'm not a thrill seeker. And you
> can even believe that I'm insufficiently self-aware, and that I've merely
> hidden my thrill-seeking tendencies from myself. How could I argue with
> that?

You can't. In reality, you don't know - and neither do I.
Motivations are things that psychologists spend a lot of time arguing
about, and they have yet to reach consensus. What chance do we have?

> That's true. More, there've been a number of posts on rather...liberal
> descriptions in NTSB reports.
>
> Obviously, accuracy is important.

I would argue that accuracy is not only important but essential, and
an inacurate report is worse than useless - it is actively dangerous.
I would further argue that distorting the facts of an accident to
advance an agenda is never justified. However, I know it happens -
and therefore I distrust the reports. Given my experience and that of
others, I consider the distrust justified.

> You'd call the talk given by that guy "encouraging dangerous behavior"? I'd
> agree that that would not be a "safety seminar".

Well, isn't flying a light plane on a long overwater leg dangerous
behavior? Or are you suggesting it's safe? See the problem here?

> Could you also call it "advanced training"? That would imply that it's
> providing useful information, but information not applicable to safety.
> Okay...I can see that, and I can even see that such things are useful.

Think instrument rating. It gives you capability you didn't have and
teaches you skills and (hopefully) knowledge new to you. But it also
encourages you to operate in weather you would otherwise avoid. Is it
safety training? Is it advanced training? Is it encouraging
dangerous behavior? You will find many, many pilots who consider
single engine IFR dangerous behavior.

> Still...anything which helps one fly is going to aid safety, no? I mean, if
> you were planning to fly the Gulf anyway, wasn't the information provided -
> even if incomplete - useful?

Sure it was. But would I have flown the Gulf anyway?

> Or is the problem that he made it seem complete, which tempted you to do
> something you'd otherwise not?

I'm not enough of a fool to believe a two hour seminar on anything of
any complexity can ever be complete. And in truth, it was complete
enough.

> > Suppose I put on a seminar about how to scud run...
> > would it be a safety seminar?
>
> I'd vote "yes". It's another tool in my belt. It's *my* choice whether or
> not to use it, but your seminar would sharpen that tool.

Then by that definition, any skill/knowledge training is safety
training.

Michael

[Richard Kaplan]

"Michael" > wrote in message
om...>

> My experience suggests decimal dust.

I think it is hard to know how many accidents are due to maintenance issues
by reading NTSB reports, just like they are inaccurate for other reasons
you stated.

It is one thing for the NTSB to determine that an airplane was "airworthy"
and "in annual." It is another to hangar fly and hear stories of engine
failures in an airplane where it is local knowledge that a given mechanic
does pencil-whip annuals or that a given airplane owner often cut corners on
maintenance.

Anecdotally I hear about a lot less engine failures among people flying
engines within TBO by hours and also under 10 years old than with older
engines... it would be interesting to tabulate the data someday in a
statistically valid manner.


--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

[Michael]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote
> > My experience suggests decimal dust.
> I think it is hard to know how many accidents are due to maintenance issues
> by reading NTSB reports

I concur, and do not base my opinion on NTSB reports.

> Anecdotally I hear about a lot less engine failures among people flying
> engines within TBO by hours and also under 10 years

That's because few airplanes reach hourly TBO within 10 years. My
experience indicates that those engines fail about as often - there
are just fewer of them.

> it would be interesting to tabulate the data someday in a
> statistically valid manner.

Yes it would. The very fact that the manufacturers COULD do it if
they chose, and choose not to, indicates that they don't want the
facts known. That suggests to me that the failures (a) happen far
more often than is generally believed and (b) are not prevented by
regular factory overhauls.

Fundamentally, I think most failures are a design problem rather than
a maintenance problem. So why are we still using clearly obsolete
designs? FAA.

Michael

[Richard Kaplan]

"Michael" > wrote in message
om...>


> Fundamentally, I think most failures are a design problem rather than
> a maintenance problem. So why are we still using clearly obsolete
> designs? FAA.

What piston engine design would be more reliable? (Economics make turbine
engine comparisons unfair, even if turbines are more reliable -- and I am
not certain that they are.)

I have experienced a lot more engine problems driving cars than flying
airplanes for sure.

Experimental airplanes do not seem to have any lower incidence of engine
failures anecdotally, nor do I recall reading any data to suggest there
exists a more reliable experimental piston engine design.


--------------------
Richard Kaplan

www.flyimc.com

[Richard Kaplan]

"Michael" > wrote in message
om...>

> new that progress has ground to a halt. In fact, I would have to say
> that the biggest factor in our high accident rate is the FAA. If we
> ever get airplanes that are as up to date as a 1995 Honda Civic, the
> situation will improve.

Homebuilts do not have a better safety record.

If you think a safer plane can be developed without FAA regulation, why
don't you buy or build an experimental airplane and install the appropriate
safety equipment so it is safer than your Twin Comanche?


--------------------
Richard Kaplan

www.flyimc.com

[Michael]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote
> What piston engine design would be more reliable? (Economics make turbine
> engine comparisons unfair, even if turbines are more reliable -- and I am
> not certain that they are.)

First off, turbine engines are not out of the questions at all. The
reason they are so incredibly expensive has a lot to do with the FAA
and milspecs. Second, turbine engines are inherently more reliable -
there are far fewer moving parts, and no reversals of direction. In
addition, they separate the combustion stages (suck, squeeze, bang,
blow) in space rather than in time - and that means only a relatively
small part of the engine has to be tough enough to accomodate the most
difficult portion of the cycle. In other words, pound for pound the
turbine will always be more reliable.

Second, we've learned a lot about piston engine reliability in the
past half century. Little of that has made it into aircraft engine
designs. For example, separate cylinders are disasters. There's not
sufficient mechanical stability, so everything moves too much. Note
that the two modern aviation piston engines - the Thielert and Orenda
- have abandoned that nonsense.

That's just one example. There are countless others in the ignition,
fuel, and other systems.

> I have experienced a lot more engine problems driving cars than flying
> airplanes for sure.

Driving cars made in the last 20 years? I find that amazing.

> Experimental airplanes do not seem to have any lower incidence of engine
> failures anecdotally, nor do I recall reading any data to suggest there
> exists a more reliable experimental piston engine design.

Experimentals are amateur-designed. The engine installations are
amateur-designed too. The very fact that after the first 50 hours are
flown off the accident rate appears to even out with the certified
airplanes should suggest to you what a disaster the FAA-mandated
professional engineering is. Amateurs can do almost as well working
in their garages.

Michael

[G.R. Patterson III]

Michael wrote:
>
> Yes it would. The very fact that the manufacturers COULD do it if
> they chose, and choose not to, indicates that they don't want the
> facts known.

What makes you think the manufacturers could do that? Many, if not most engine
repairs and overhauls are not performed by the manufacturer, so they have no little
data. You're expecting a manufacturer to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to
research a report which provides no benefit to the manufacturer. The fact that they
"choose not to" merely indicates that they don't want to waste their money.

George Patterson
In Idaho, tossing a rattlesnake into a crowded room is felony assault.
In Tennessee, it's evangelism.

[Andrew Gideon]

Michael wrote:

> I would argue that accuracy is not only important but essential, and
> an inacurate report is worse than useless - it is actively dangerous.
> I would further argue that distorting the facts of an accident to
> advance an agenda is never justified. However, I know it happens -
> and therefore I distrust the reports. Given my experience and that of
> others, I consider the distrust justified.

Fair enough on all counts.

>> You'd call the talk given by that guy "encouraging dangerous behavior"?
>> I'd agree that that would not be a "safety seminar".
>
> Well, isn't flying a light plane on a long overwater leg dangerous
> behavior? Or are you suggesting it's safe? See the problem here?

I see a linguistic trap. Nothing is safe but death (and I'm not even sure
of that {8^). The question is whether the decrease in safety of a given
act is balanced by whatever benefit is accrued. Put another way, is it
(whatever "it" is) "safe enough".

I know that you know this given what I've read from you. But perhaps making
this more explicit would help explain my own perspective on the matter of
"safety" and the question "is it safe".

[...]

> Then by that definition, any skill/knowledge training is safety
> training.

Yes. Failing an example which disproves this, that is my opinion.

- Andrew

[Michael]

"G.R. Patterson III" > wrote
> You're expecting a manufacturer to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to
> research a report which provides no benefit to the manufacturer.

A report that showed that the engine was extremely reliable when
maintained and overhauled in accordance with the manufacturer's
recommendations (that's all SB's/TBO's are to Part 91 operators) would
have great benefit to the manufacturer.

Of course I don't believe that's what the report will show.

Michael

[Michael]

Andrew Gideon > wrote
> > Well, isn't flying a light plane on a long overwater leg dangerous
> > behavior? Or are you suggesting it's safe? See the problem here?
>
> I see a linguistic trap. Nothing is safe but death (and I'm not even sure
> of that {8^).

Right. That's why I don't believe that there is any such thing as a
safety seminar. The only really valid safety advice it could give is
to hide under the bed. It would be different if we HAD to fly.
Professional pilots, who MUST fly, can speak of safety and safety
seminars. For us, they basically have no meaning.

> The question is whether the decrease in safety of a given
> act is balanced by whatever benefit is accrued. Put another way, is it
> (whatever "it" is) "safe enough".

Right again. But if what you're doing is primarily recreational,
which is true of most flying most of us do, safe enough really means
that the fun is worth the risk.

> I know that you know this given what I've read from you. But perhaps making
> this more explicit would help explain my own perspective on the matter of
> "safety" and the question "is it safe".

And the point I'm trying to get across is that there is no such thing
as safe. When you're flying for fun, you're taking unnecessary risks.
I don't have a problem with that, obviously, but I think you should
be honest about it.

> > Then by that definition, any skill/knowledge training is safety
> > training.
>
> Yes. Failing an example which disproves this, that is my opinion.

There won't be an example to disprove it. There can't be. Whatever
kind of flying you do, you're going to be safer if you get training
than if you don't. It's not a crap shoot, after all. But the reality
is that some kinds of flying present more risk than others.

Michael

[Teacherjh]

>> For example, separate cylinders are disasters.

What are "separate cylinders" and what's the alternative? (unless you mean the
wankel)

Jose


--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Richard Kaplan]

"Michael" > wrote in message
om...>

> First off, turbine engines are not out of the questions at all. The
> reason they are so incredibly expensive has a lot to do with the FAA
> and milspecs. Second, turbine engines are inherently more reliable -

So why hasn't someone developed an inexpensive, reliable turbine engine for
experiental airplanes?


> sufficient mechanical stability, so everything moves too much. Note
> that the two modern aviation piston engines - the Thielert and Orenda
> - have abandoned that nonsense.

What planes are these used in? Do you have any references about these?

> Driving cars made in the last 20 years? I find that amazing.

Well as one example I experienced a sudden catastrophic engine failure this
year in my 1999 Toyota minivan. An engine cooling fan circuit malfunctioned
and the engine overheated while driving in a snowstorm. I pulled over right
away but nonetheless the engine block had melted and I needed a new block
and new cylinders... $8000 in warranty work repairing the engine due to
failure of a $125 part.

> Experimentals are amateur-designed. The engine installations are
> amateur-designed too. The very fact that after the first 50 hours are
> flown off the accident rate appears to even out with the certified
> airplanes should suggest to you what a disaster the FAA-mandated
> professional engineering is. Amateurs can do almost as well working
> in their garages.

Well can anyone do BETTER than FAA certified airplanes? Who in your mind
can produce an airplane with a more reliable engine than an FAA certified
engine?



--------------------
Richard Kaplan

www.flyimc.com

[Dan Luke]

"Richard Kaplan" wrote:
> I have experienced a lot more engine problems driving
> cars than flying airplanes for sure.

Another Jaguar driver!
--
Dan
C172RG at BFM

[G.R. Patterson III]

Teacherjh wrote:
>
> >> For example, separate cylinders are disasters.
>
> What are "separate cylinders" and what's the alternative? (unless you mean the
> wankel)

Each cylinder on a typical Lycoming or Continental engine can be removed
independently. All of the cylinders in a typical automobile engine are cast in a
single unit (known as the block). This is also true of many water-cooled aircraft
engines and many motorcycle engines.

George Patterson
In Idaho, tossing a rattlesnake into a crowded room is felony assault.
In Tennessee, it's evangelism.

[Michael]

(Teacherjh) wrote
> What are "separate cylinders" and what's the alternative? (unless you mean the
> wankel)

Separate cylinders are exactly that - you can unbolt a cylinder from
an engine and replace it without affecting the other cylinders. The
alternative is an engine block.

Michael

[Michael]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote
> So why hasn't someone developed an inexpensive, reliable turbine engine for
> experiental airplanes?

First off, that's in process. There's already an RV-4 flying with
one, and there's a company now developing them.

> > sufficient mechanical stability, so everything moves too much. Note
> > that the two modern aviation piston engines - the Thielert and Orenda
> > - have abandoned that nonsense.
>
> What planes are these used in? Do you have any references about these?

The Thielert is used in the new Diamond twin. The Orenda is used in
certain agricultural aircraft, and is an STC'd replacement for the
King Air.

> Well as one example I experienced a sudden catastrophic engine failure this
> year in my 1999 Toyota minivan. An engine cooling fan circuit malfunctioned
> and the engine overheated while driving in a snowstorm. I pulled over right
> away but nonetheless the engine block had melted and I needed a new block
> and new cylinders... $8000 in warranty work repairing the engine due to
> failure of a $125 part.

You are the only person I know who has had that happen. It's
extremely rare. On the other hand, I can name quite a few such
situations with certified engines that happened to people I know.
I've had an engine die because a little rust clogged the fuel
injectors. Turns out the drain plug in the fuel servo was steel. No,
it was not an illegal replacement - it was steel by design. If I were
to replace it with non-rusting brass or aluminum, that would be
illegal. A friend had an engine die because the drive to his dual-mag
sheared. Bad metal. Another had an engine die on takeoff because the
scat tube that carried the air collapsed. It was an STC'd
installation. When he replaced the scat tube with aluminum, that was
illegal. I could go on and on.

> Well can anyone do BETTER than FAA certified airplanes? Who in your mind
> can produce an airplane with a more reliable engine than an FAA certified
> engine?

Any professional operation. Toyota, Honda, GM, Ford, Bombadier -
ANYONE. But not some guy working in his garage. The fact that some
guy working in his garage on a shoestring budget can come close should
tell you what a disaster the certified engine is.

Michael

[Teacherjh]

Thanks... now why are separate cylinders a disaster?

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Corky Scott]

On 20 Jul 2004 07:53:04 -0700, (Michael) wrote:

>> Well as one example I experienced a sudden catastrophic engine failure this
>> year in my 1999 Toyota minivan. An engine cooling fan circuit malfunctioned
>> and the engine overheated while driving in a snowstorm. I pulled over right
>> away but nonetheless the engine block had melted and I needed a new block
>> and new cylinders... $8000 in warranty work repairing the engine due to
>> failure of a $125 part.

Hmmm, wait, you were driving in winter and the engine overheated
because the cooling fan malfunctioned? My cooling fan never comes on
in the winter. As long as I'm moving at any speed, the air through
the radiator alone is way more than enough to cool the engine without
the cooling fan coming on. It's only when I stop and idle for a while
that the fan may come on, and that only happens if it's relatively
warm (40 degrees).

Something isn't adding up.

Corky Scott

[Andrew Gideon]

Michael wrote:

> Andrew Gideon > wrote
>> > Well, isn't flying a light plane on a long overwater leg dangerous
>> > behavior? Or are you suggesting it's safe? See the problem here?
>>
>> I see a linguistic trap. Nothing is safe but death (and I'm not even
>> sure of that {8^).
>
> Right. That's why I don't believe that there is any such thing as a
> safety seminar. The only really valid safety advice it could give is
> to hide under the bed.

I don't see this. It sounds like you're requiring that a safety seminar
provide a means to achieve absolute safety. That doesn't seem reasonable.
We'd call those "absolute safety seminars", I expect <laugh>.

[...]

> And the point I'm trying to get across is that there is no such thing
> as safe. When you're flying for fun, you're taking unnecessary risks.
> I don't have a problem with that, obviously, but I think you should
> be honest about it.

Flying for any purpose involves unnecessary risk. Driving involves
unnecessary risk. Walking involves unnecessary risk (at least where I
live, given that we can have food delivered {8^).

But we don't really want to think about the risks involved in eating, do we
<laugh>?

I think we're in agreement in all areas but your definition of "safety
seminar". I don't see it as necessary that one such provide absolute
safety, nor do I have a problem with one describing how to increase the
safety involved in performing an unnecessary act.

- Andrew

[Richard Kaplan]

"Michael" > wrote in message
om...

> Why? FAA.

I say again... The FAA has few limitations on experimental airplanes.

Why hasn't someone developed an experimental airplane with a stellar safety
record by addressing all the safety issues you mentioned which are being
thrwarted by the FAA?


--------------------
Richard Kaplan

www.flyimc.com

[Snowbird]

(Michael) wrote in message >...
<snip>
> Right. That's why I don't believe that there is any such thing as a
> safety seminar. The only really valid safety advice it could give is
> to hide under the bed. It would be different if we HAD to fly.
> Professional pilots, who MUST fly, can speak of safety and safety
> seminars. For us, they basically have no meaning.

Michael, I have to poke in here for a minute to comment this seems
like a very non-standard usage of the word "safety".

You seem to be saying that it's not valid to speak of safety
for non-essential (or recreational) activities, and/or that
it's not valid to give safety advice except in absolute terms
("hide under the bed" = "take no unnecessary risks"??)

But there are many non-essential activities which can be carried
out in a manner which carries more risk, or a manner which decreases
risk, and it's quite common and accepted usage to speak of that
relative risk management as "safety" and to consider courses and
seminars which discuss the risks and provide advice about how to
manage them as valid and meaningful.

Basically, it seems to me that the only way you can assert that
"for us they basically have no meaning" or aren't valid, is to
define "safety" and "safety seminar" in a non-standard, individualistic
way which excludes non-essential activities, then argue from the
perspective of your own, unique definition.

FWIW,
Sydney

[Michael]

(Teacherjh) wrote
> Thanks... now why are separate cylinders a disaster?

Because the engine comes out either too heavy or not rigid enough.
The engine block provides rigidity. Separate cylinders provide none -
they just hang out there by themselves.

Insufficient rigidity is the cause of many ills. For example, if you
manage to crack the block on an engine, it will still continue to make
some power for at least a few minutes. Crack a cylinder, and you can
easily jam the piston/rod and seize the engine. Does that really
happen? Yes, I've lost friends that way.

Insufficient rigidity also contributes to valve/seat/guide problems.

Note that NONE of the new aviation engines (Orenda, Thielert, Honda,
Bombadier) have separate cylinders. No automotive engines do this
either. In fact, ONLY obsolete aviation engines do this.

The reason? It's a rare aviation cylinder, especially on a big
engine, that is built well enough to make TBO. The quality assurance
process mandated by the FAA is a bad joke, and in fact keeps
manufacturers from being able to improve the process.

Michael

[G.R. Patterson III]

Michael wrote:
>
> Note that NONE of the new aviation engines (Orenda, Thielert, Honda,
> Bombadier) have separate cylinders.

Just a quick look with Yahoo turned up the Morane Renault, Zoche, and Jabiru engines
- all new designs with separate cylinders. I'd bet the guys going to Oshkosh will be
able to provide other examples when they get back.

In general, separate cylinders are advantageous for air-cooled engines and blocks are
preferred for water-cooled designs, but this is not a universal rule.

George Patterson
In Idaho, tossing a rattlesnake into a crowded room is felony assault.
In Tennessee, it's evangelism.

[Richard Kaplan]

"Michael" > wrote in message
om...>

> Note that NONE of the new aviation engines (Orenda, Thielert, Honda,
> Bombadier) have separate cylinders. No automotive engines do this
> either. In fact, ONLY obsolete aviation engines do this.

So why dont' we see lots of homebuilts eliminating separate cylinders?
There are some great minds in the homebuilt community and minimal FAA
regulation.

--------------------
Richard Kaplan

www.flyimc.com

[Corky Scott]

On Wed, 21 Jul 2004 17:27:38 -0400, "Richard Kaplan"
> wrote:

>So why dont' we see lots of homebuilts eliminating separate cylinders?
>There are some great minds in the homebuilt community and minimal FAA
>regulation.

Are you kidding Richard? There are hundreds and hundreds of
homebuilts flying with Chevy V-6's, Ford V-6's, Subaru fours and sixes
and numerous other types of auto conversions. There must be at least
six companies producing firewall forward "turnkey" engines.

Corky Scott

[Michael]

"Richard Kaplan" > wrote
> So why dont' we see lots of homebuilts eliminating separate cylinders?

They do. Look at Rotax. It is essentially the standard for little
(Cub size and down) airplanes.

Also consider the Leeza Air-Cam. It is a professionally designed
airframe, purpose built as a camera platform twin for flight over
terrain that offered few viable forced landing options. Engine cost
wasn't really an issue. So what top-of-the-line certfied engines were
used? Right, none. They used Rotax.

Michael

[Michael]

"G.R. Patterson III" > wrote
> Just a quick look with Yahoo turned up the Morane Renault, Zoche, and Jabiru engines
> - all new designs with separate cylinders.

A Jabiru is an all-new design? Looks loke a Lycoming shrunk to take
advantage of better metallurgy. Besides, it's a certified engine in
Australia, and I bet they have their own version of the FAA modeled
largely on ours.

I've been hearing about Zoche for years - long before I ever heard of
Thielert. Thielert now has actual production engines on actual
production aircraft. How about Zoche?

> In general, separate cylinders are advantageous for air-cooled engines and blocks are
> preferred for water-cooled designs, but this is not a universal rule.

I don't agree that it's a rule at all. If it were, we would see
separate cylinders SOMEWHERE outside aviation. And no, engines of
less than 4 cylinders don't count.

Michael