Pilot deviations and a new FAA reality

[Chip Jones]

OK pilots, try this one on for size. As you likely know, there is a wide
and growing rift between the career FAA bureaucrats (aka FAA Management) who
run the monstrosity called the federal Air Traffic Organization, and the
career FAA air traffic controllers who make that monstrosity work in the NAS
on a daily basis. Regardless of where you stand on the politics of US air
traffic control (funding, privatization, user-fees, labor issues, whatever),
the ugly, on-going feud between Management and Labor in air traffic control
may finally have reached a point where you as a pilot will be personally
affected.

This just in:

***
Notice to all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees Please Post This notice
is intended to advise all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees of recent
occurrence in the Eastern Service Area. Controllers have been
encouraged, through the actions of supervisors, to look the other way
when it came to pilot deviations that did not result in a loss of
separation. We have all heard supervisors say "no harm, no foul" on
more than one occasion.

Until now, this has not created problems for bargaining unit
employees. Recently a facility in the Southern Region issued formal
discipline (Letter of Reprimand) to a NATCA bargaining unit employee
for failure to report a pilot deviation. An aircraft (Air Carrier) was
told to hold short of a runway, read it back, and proceeded to go onto
the runway. This resulted in a go-around with no loss of separation.

In the reprimand, the manager acknowledged that the controller was in
no way at fault operationally, but that he had violated an FAA order
by not reporting the deviation, and as such, was being issued
disciplinary action. During recent third level reviews, the Agency has
held steadfast to their position.

As your [NATCA title deleted], the only advice I can give you
is to protect yourself and your career. Your failure to advise your
supervisor of a pilot deviation may result in disciplinary action.
Even if no loss of separation occurs. Inform your supervisor
immediately if you witness a pilot deviation. Put the responsibility
on their backs.

Be warned!! Taking a "no harm, no foul" attitude with pilots could
result in harm to yourself.
***


Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots help
controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an old
clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
antagonistic Management.

Regards,

Chip, ZTL

[Larry Dighera]

On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 15:08:08 GMT, "Chip Jones"
> wrote:

>Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
>small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
>because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots help
>controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an old
>clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
>that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
>antagonistic Management.

Can you provide a pointer to the specific FAA Order that mandates that
ATC report all pilot deviations?

[Larry Dighera]

On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 15:08:08 GMT, "Chip Jones"
> wrote:

>Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
>small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
>because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots help
>controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an old
>clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
>that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
>antagonistic Management.

Can you provide a pointer to the specific FAA Order that mandates that
ATC report all pilot deviations?

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Chip Jones" > wrote in message
link.net...
>
> OK pilots, try this one on for size. As you likely know, there is a wide
> and growing rift between the career FAA bureaucrats (aka FAA Management)
> who
> run the monstrosity called the federal Air Traffic Organization, and the
> career FAA air traffic controllers who make that monstrosity work in the
> NAS
> on a daily basis. Regardless of where you stand on the politics of US air
> traffic control (funding, privatization, user-fees, labor issues,
> whatever),
> the ugly, on-going feud between Management and Labor in air traffic
> control
> may finally have reached a point where you as a pilot will be personally
> affected.
>
> This just in:
>
> ***
> Notice to all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees Please Post This notice
> is intended to advise all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees of recent
> occurrence in the Eastern Service Area. Controllers have been
> encouraged, through the actions of supervisors, to look the other way
> when it came to pilot deviations that did not result in a loss of
> separation. We have all heard supervisors say "no harm, no foul" on
> more than one occasion.
>
> Until now, this has not created problems for bargaining unit
> employees. Recently a facility in the Southern Region issued formal
> discipline (Letter of Reprimand) to a NATCA bargaining unit employee
> for failure to report a pilot deviation. An aircraft (Air Carrier) was
> told to hold short of a runway, read it back, and proceeded to go onto
> the runway. This resulted in a go-around with no loss of separation.
>
> In the reprimand, the manager acknowledged that the controller was in
> no way at fault operationally, but that he had violated an FAA order
> by not reporting the deviation, and as such, was being issued
> disciplinary action. During recent third level reviews, the Agency has
> held steadfast to their position.
>
> As your [NATCA title deleted], the only advice I can give you
> is to protect yourself and your career. Your failure to advise your
> supervisor of a pilot deviation may result in disciplinary action.
> Even if no loss of separation occurs. Inform your supervisor
> immediately if you witness a pilot deviation. Put the responsibility
> on their backs.
>
> Be warned!! Taking a "no harm, no foul" attitude with pilots could
> result in harm to yourself.
> ***
>
>
> Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots help
> controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an old
> clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
> that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
> antagonistic Management.
>

Pilot deviations come in a variety of flavors. A pilot may bust his
altitude but if there's no other traffic around there's no hazard. No harm,
no foul, no loss of separation.

At the other extreme a pilot blowing a runway hold short as another aircraft
is about to touch down can be disastrous.

On what side of the line should be placed the situation where there was no
loss of separation only because an alert controller stepped in?

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Chip Jones" > wrote in message
link.net...
>
> OK pilots, try this one on for size. As you likely know, there is a wide
> and growing rift between the career FAA bureaucrats (aka FAA Management)
> who
> run the monstrosity called the federal Air Traffic Organization, and the
> career FAA air traffic controllers who make that monstrosity work in the
> NAS
> on a daily basis. Regardless of where you stand on the politics of US air
> traffic control (funding, privatization, user-fees, labor issues,
> whatever),
> the ugly, on-going feud between Management and Labor in air traffic
> control
> may finally have reached a point where you as a pilot will be personally
> affected.
>
> This just in:
>
> ***
> Notice to all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees Please Post This notice
> is intended to advise all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees of recent
> occurrence in the Eastern Service Area. Controllers have been
> encouraged, through the actions of supervisors, to look the other way
> when it came to pilot deviations that did not result in a loss of
> separation. We have all heard supervisors say "no harm, no foul" on
> more than one occasion.
>
> Until now, this has not created problems for bargaining unit
> employees. Recently a facility in the Southern Region issued formal
> discipline (Letter of Reprimand) to a NATCA bargaining unit employee
> for failure to report a pilot deviation. An aircraft (Air Carrier) was
> told to hold short of a runway, read it back, and proceeded to go onto
> the runway. This resulted in a go-around with no loss of separation.
>
> In the reprimand, the manager acknowledged that the controller was in
> no way at fault operationally, but that he had violated an FAA order
> by not reporting the deviation, and as such, was being issued
> disciplinary action. During recent third level reviews, the Agency has
> held steadfast to their position.
>
> As your [NATCA title deleted], the only advice I can give you
> is to protect yourself and your career. Your failure to advise your
> supervisor of a pilot deviation may result in disciplinary action.
> Even if no loss of separation occurs. Inform your supervisor
> immediately if you witness a pilot deviation. Put the responsibility
> on their backs.
>
> Be warned!! Taking a "no harm, no foul" attitude with pilots could
> result in harm to yourself.
> ***
>
>
> Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots help
> controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an old
> clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
> that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
> antagonistic Management.
>

Pilot deviations come in a variety of flavors. A pilot may bust his
altitude but if there's no other traffic around there's no hazard. No harm,
no foul, no loss of separation.

At the other extreme a pilot blowing a runway hold short as another aircraft
is about to touch down can be disastrous.

On what side of the line should be placed the situation where there was no
loss of separation only because an alert controller stepped in?

[Gary Drescher]

A car that runs a red light can get ticketed even if no collision or even
near-collision happens to occur. It wouldn't upset me if pilot deviations
were treated similarly, as long as the penalties are not disproportionately
harsh.

--Gary

[Gary Drescher]

A car that runs a red light can get ticketed even if no collision or even
near-collision happens to occur. It wouldn't upset me if pilot deviations
were treated similarly, as long as the penalties are not disproportionately
harsh.

--Gary

[C Kingsbury]

In most states you can get ticketed for "failure to stop at a stop sign" for
something as simple as not coming to a complete stop. You slow to less than
a crawl and the cop sees you look both ways carefully, but if your wheels
don't stop turning it's a moving violation. Of course, the cop can also
choose to just tell you to watch it. It saves him time that he can use to
pursue more important offenders.

What Chip's talking about is basically removing some of that discretionary
power from controllers. Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes, they'll
simply start punting things too, so the "no harm, no foul" policy just gets
shifted to a new desk. But in the meantime the volume of trees slaughtered
will increase, and with it the hours spent on pointless paperwork for
everybody. Safety will probably not benefit.

-cwk.

"Gary Drescher" > wrote in message
news:CrU9d.96803$He1.7786@attbi_s01...
> A car that runs a red light can get ticketed even if no collision or even
> near-collision happens to occur. It wouldn't upset me if pilot deviations
> were treated similarly, as long as the penalties are not
disproportionately
> harsh.
>
> --Gary
>
>

[C Kingsbury]

In most states you can get ticketed for "failure to stop at a stop sign" for
something as simple as not coming to a complete stop. You slow to less than
a crawl and the cop sees you look both ways carefully, but if your wheels
don't stop turning it's a moving violation. Of course, the cop can also
choose to just tell you to watch it. It saves him time that he can use to
pursue more important offenders.

What Chip's talking about is basically removing some of that discretionary
power from controllers. Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes, they'll
simply start punting things too, so the "no harm, no foul" policy just gets
shifted to a new desk. But in the meantime the volume of trees slaughtered
will increase, and with it the hours spent on pointless paperwork for
everybody. Safety will probably not benefit.

-cwk.

"Gary Drescher" > wrote in message
news:CrU9d.96803$He1.7786@attbi_s01...
> A car that runs a red light can get ticketed even if no collision or even
> near-collision happens to occur. It wouldn't upset me if pilot deviations
> were treated similarly, as long as the penalties are not
disproportionately
> harsh.
>
> --Gary
>
>

[Larry Dighera]

On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 18:39:39 GMT, "C Kingsbury"
> wrote in
. net>::

>In most states you can get ticketed for "failure to stop at a stop sign" for
>something as simple as not coming to a complete stop. You slow to less than
>a crawl and the cop sees you look both ways carefully, but if your wheels
>don't stop turning it's a moving violation. Of course, the cop can also
>choose to just tell you to watch it. It saves him time that he can use to
>pursue more important offenders.

Actually, there is a rational reason for making a complete stop at a
boulevard stop sign. If a motorist fails to make a complete stop, how
can another motorist at the same intersection know which vehicle was
the first to stop? As you'll recall, it is the first vehicle to stop
at the intersection that has the right of way. The vehicle on the
right only has the right of way when it's a dead heat.


>What Chip's talking about is basically removing some of that discretionary
>power from controllers.

Because the FAA is taking action against the controller who failed to
report the PD, there is probably regulatory language that mandates
s/he do so. I've posted a request for reference to it if it exists,
but have received no reply as yet.

>Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
>reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes,

Because mode c transponders only report altitude in even hundreds,
that isn't very likely.

>they'll
>simply start punting things too, so the "no harm, no foul" policy just gets
>shifted to a new desk. But in the meantime the volume of trees slaughtered
>will increase, and with it the hours spent on pointless paperwork for
>everybody. Safety will probably not benefit.

The increased workload may be sufficient to stimulate demand for
additional ATC personnel hiring. The change in policy of reporting
PDs may be the result of PATCO pressure or something else. Until we
know the language of the regulations governing ATC reporting PDs, it
is difficult to form an opinion as to the appropriateness of the
change in policy.

>-cwk.
>
>"Gary Drescher" > wrote in message
>news:CrU9d.96803$He1.7786@attbi_s01...
>> A car that runs a red light can get ticketed even if no collision or even
>> near-collision happens to occur. It wouldn't upset me if pilot deviations
>> were treated similarly, as long as the penalties are not
>disproportionately
>> harsh.
>>
>> --Gary
>>
>>
>

[Larry Dighera]

On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 18:39:39 GMT, "C Kingsbury"
> wrote in
. net>::

>In most states you can get ticketed for "failure to stop at a stop sign" for
>something as simple as not coming to a complete stop. You slow to less than
>a crawl and the cop sees you look both ways carefully, but if your wheels
>don't stop turning it's a moving violation. Of course, the cop can also
>choose to just tell you to watch it. It saves him time that he can use to
>pursue more important offenders.

Actually, there is a rational reason for making a complete stop at a
boulevard stop sign. If a motorist fails to make a complete stop, how
can another motorist at the same intersection know which vehicle was
the first to stop? As you'll recall, it is the first vehicle to stop
at the intersection that has the right of way. The vehicle on the
right only has the right of way when it's a dead heat.


>What Chip's talking about is basically removing some of that discretionary
>power from controllers.

Because the FAA is taking action against the controller who failed to
report the PD, there is probably regulatory language that mandates
s/he do so. I've posted a request for reference to it if it exists,
but have received no reply as yet.

>Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
>reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes,

Because mode c transponders only report altitude in even hundreds,
that isn't very likely.

>they'll
>simply start punting things too, so the "no harm, no foul" policy just gets
>shifted to a new desk. But in the meantime the volume of trees slaughtered
>will increase, and with it the hours spent on pointless paperwork for
>everybody. Safety will probably not benefit.

The increased workload may be sufficient to stimulate demand for
additional ATC personnel hiring. The change in policy of reporting
PDs may be the result of PATCO pressure or something else. Until we
know the language of the regulations governing ATC reporting PDs, it
is difficult to form an opinion as to the appropriateness of the
change in policy.

>-cwk.
>
>"Gary Drescher" > wrote in message
>news:CrU9d.96803$He1.7786@attbi_s01...
>> A car that runs a red light can get ticketed even if no collision or even
>> near-collision happens to occur. It wouldn't upset me if pilot deviations
>> were treated similarly, as long as the penalties are not
>disproportionately
>> harsh.
>>
>> --Gary
>>
>>
>

[Gary Drescher]

"C Kingsbury" > wrote in message
link.net...
> In most states you can get ticketed for "failure to stop at a stop sign"
> for
> something as simple as not coming to a complete stop. You slow to less
> than
> a crawl and the cop sees you look both ways carefully, but if your wheels
> don't stop turning it's a moving violation. Of course, the cop can also
> choose to just tell you to watch it. It saves him time that he can use to
> pursue more important offenders.
>
> What Chip's talking about is basically removing some of that discretionary
> power from controllers. Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
> reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes, they'll
> simply start punting things too, so the "no harm, no foul" policy just
> gets
> shifted to a new desk. But in the meantime the volume of trees slaughtered
> will increase, and with it the hours spent on pointless paperwork for
> everybody. Safety will probably not benefit.

Hm, I assumed that it's not a deviation if the pilot is within PTS
standards; hence, being off by 50' in cruise wouldn't count.

--Gary

>
> -cwk.
>
> "Gary Drescher" > wrote in message
> news:CrU9d.96803$He1.7786@attbi_s01...
>> A car that runs a red light can get ticketed even if no collision or even
>> near-collision happens to occur. It wouldn't upset me if pilot deviations
>> were treated similarly, as long as the penalties are not
> disproportionately
>> harsh.
>>
>> --Gary
>>
>>
>
>

[Gary Drescher]

"C Kingsbury" > wrote in message
link.net...
> In most states you can get ticketed for "failure to stop at a stop sign"
> for
> something as simple as not coming to a complete stop. You slow to less
> than
> a crawl and the cop sees you look both ways carefully, but if your wheels
> don't stop turning it's a moving violation. Of course, the cop can also
> choose to just tell you to watch it. It saves him time that he can use to
> pursue more important offenders.
>
> What Chip's talking about is basically removing some of that discretionary
> power from controllers. Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
> reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes, they'll
> simply start punting things too, so the "no harm, no foul" policy just
> gets
> shifted to a new desk. But in the meantime the volume of trees slaughtered
> will increase, and with it the hours spent on pointless paperwork for
> everybody. Safety will probably not benefit.

Hm, I assumed that it's not a deviation if the pilot is within PTS
standards; hence, being off by 50' in cruise wouldn't count.

--Gary

>
> -cwk.
>
> "Gary Drescher" > wrote in message
> news:CrU9d.96803$He1.7786@attbi_s01...
>> A car that runs a red light can get ticketed even if no collision or even
>> near-collision happens to occur. It wouldn't upset me if pilot deviations
>> were treated similarly, as long as the penalties are not
> disproportionately
>> harsh.
>>
>> --Gary
>>
>>
>
>

[Bob Gardner]

Insert NATCA vice PATCO. You must have a long memory.

Bob Gardner

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 18:39:39 GMT, "C Kingsbury"
> > wrote in
> . net>::
>
>>In most states you can get ticketed for "failure to stop at a stop sign"
>>for
>>something as simple as not coming to a complete stop. You slow to less
>>than
>>a crawl and the cop sees you look both ways carefully, but if your wheels
>>don't stop turning it's a moving violation. Of course, the cop can also
>>choose to just tell you to watch it. It saves him time that he can use to
>>pursue more important offenders.
>
> Actually, there is a rational reason for making a complete stop at a
> boulevard stop sign. If a motorist fails to make a complete stop, how
> can another motorist at the same intersection know which vehicle was
> the first to stop? As you'll recall, it is the first vehicle to stop
> at the intersection that has the right of way. The vehicle on the
> right only has the right of way when it's a dead heat.
>
>
>>What Chip's talking about is basically removing some of that discretionary
>>power from controllers.
>
> Because the FAA is taking action against the controller who failed to
> report the PD, there is probably regulatory language that mandates
> s/he do so. I've posted a request for reference to it if it exists,
> but have received no reply as yet.
>
>>Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
>>reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes,
>
> Because mode c transponders only report altitude in even hundreds,
> that isn't very likely.
>
>>they'll
>>simply start punting things too, so the "no harm, no foul" policy just
>>gets
>>shifted to a new desk. But in the meantime the volume of trees slaughtered
>>will increase, and with it the hours spent on pointless paperwork for
>>everybody. Safety will probably not benefit.
>
> The increased workload may be sufficient to stimulate demand for
> additional ATC personnel hiring. The change in policy of reporting
> PDs may be the result of PATCO pressure or something else. Until we
> know the language of the regulations governing ATC reporting PDs, it
> is difficult to form an opinion as to the appropriateness of the
> change in policy.
>
>>-cwk.
>>
>>"Gary Drescher" > wrote in message
>>news:CrU9d.96803$He1.7786@attbi_s01...
>>> A car that runs a red light can get ticketed even if no collision or
>>> even
>>> near-collision happens to occur. It wouldn't upset me if pilot
>>> deviations
>>> were treated similarly, as long as the penalties are not
>>disproportionately
>>> harsh.
>>>
>>> --Gary
>>>
>>>
>>
>

[Bob Gardner]

Insert NATCA vice PATCO. You must have a long memory.

Bob Gardner

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 18:39:39 GMT, "C Kingsbury"
> > wrote in
> . net>::
>
>>In most states you can get ticketed for "failure to stop at a stop sign"
>>for
>>something as simple as not coming to a complete stop. You slow to less
>>than
>>a crawl and the cop sees you look both ways carefully, but if your wheels
>>don't stop turning it's a moving violation. Of course, the cop can also
>>choose to just tell you to watch it. It saves him time that he can use to
>>pursue more important offenders.
>
> Actually, there is a rational reason for making a complete stop at a
> boulevard stop sign. If a motorist fails to make a complete stop, how
> can another motorist at the same intersection know which vehicle was
> the first to stop? As you'll recall, it is the first vehicle to stop
> at the intersection that has the right of way. The vehicle on the
> right only has the right of way when it's a dead heat.
>
>
>>What Chip's talking about is basically removing some of that discretionary
>>power from controllers.
>
> Because the FAA is taking action against the controller who failed to
> report the PD, there is probably regulatory language that mandates
> s/he do so. I've posted a request for reference to it if it exists,
> but have received no reply as yet.
>
>>Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
>>reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes,
>
> Because mode c transponders only report altitude in even hundreds,
> that isn't very likely.
>
>>they'll
>>simply start punting things too, so the "no harm, no foul" policy just
>>gets
>>shifted to a new desk. But in the meantime the volume of trees slaughtered
>>will increase, and with it the hours spent on pointless paperwork for
>>everybody. Safety will probably not benefit.
>
> The increased workload may be sufficient to stimulate demand for
> additional ATC personnel hiring. The change in policy of reporting
> PDs may be the result of PATCO pressure or something else. Until we
> know the language of the regulations governing ATC reporting PDs, it
> is difficult to form an opinion as to the appropriateness of the
> change in policy.
>
>>-cwk.
>>
>>"Gary Drescher" > wrote in message
>>news:CrU9d.96803$He1.7786@attbi_s01...
>>> A car that runs a red light can get ticketed even if no collision or
>>> even
>>> near-collision happens to occur. It wouldn't upset me if pilot
>>> deviations
>>> were treated similarly, as long as the penalties are not
>>disproportionately
>>> harsh.
>>>
>>> --Gary
>>>
>>>
>>
>

[C Kingsbury]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 18:39:39 GMT, "C Kingsbury"
> > wrote in
> . net>::
>
> >In most states you can get ticketed for "failure to stop at a stop sign"
for
> >something as simple as not coming to a complete stop. You slow to less
than
>
> Actually, there is a rational reason for making a complete stop at a
> boulevard stop sign.

There is no rational reason when you can clearly see there is no conflicting
traffic within a mile, unless you count the slippery-slope theory, and I
don't.

> >Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
> >reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes,
>
> Because mode c transponders only report altitude in even hundreds,
> that isn't very likely.

OK, 51' then. You get my point. There are deviations that clearly require
reporting and others that can be pretty effectively addressed by an ATC
tonguelashing. Unless someone shows me evidence that safety is being
degraded by failure to report every possible PD I'm going to say that the
way things work today are fine.

> The increased workload may be sufficient to stimulate demand for
> additional ATC personnel hiring.

No, it will stimulate demand for more desk-bound paper-pushing "inspectors"
whose biggest concern is a loss of separation between them and their lunch
break. No government bureaucracy has ever responded to added workload by
becoming more efficient.

> Until we
> know the language of the regulations governing ATC reporting PDs, it
> is difficult to form an opinion as to the appropriateness of the
> change in policy.

Well, I wouldn't say so. There is a perfectly good argument to (a) have a
regulation that requires reporting every PD and (b) routinely ignore it.
Basically, you need to have the rule, so that you can go after a controller
who reports nobody no matter what because he's lazy. OTOH, reporting every
single incident when not necessary in the controller's view is just
paper-chasing and serves no end.

I will abort this line of argument if someone can show me that there is a
real safety issue here backed by something more than a gut instinct.

-cwk.

[C Kingsbury]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 18:39:39 GMT, "C Kingsbury"
> > wrote in
> . net>::
>
> >In most states you can get ticketed for "failure to stop at a stop sign"
for
> >something as simple as not coming to a complete stop. You slow to less
than
>
> Actually, there is a rational reason for making a complete stop at a
> boulevard stop sign.

There is no rational reason when you can clearly see there is no conflicting
traffic within a mile, unless you count the slippery-slope theory, and I
don't.

> >Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
> >reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes,
>
> Because mode c transponders only report altitude in even hundreds,
> that isn't very likely.

OK, 51' then. You get my point. There are deviations that clearly require
reporting and others that can be pretty effectively addressed by an ATC
tonguelashing. Unless someone shows me evidence that safety is being
degraded by failure to report every possible PD I'm going to say that the
way things work today are fine.

> The increased workload may be sufficient to stimulate demand for
> additional ATC personnel hiring.

No, it will stimulate demand for more desk-bound paper-pushing "inspectors"
whose biggest concern is a loss of separation between them and their lunch
break. No government bureaucracy has ever responded to added workload by
becoming more efficient.

> Until we
> know the language of the regulations governing ATC reporting PDs, it
> is difficult to form an opinion as to the appropriateness of the
> change in policy.

Well, I wouldn't say so. There is a perfectly good argument to (a) have a
regulation that requires reporting every PD and (b) routinely ignore it.
Basically, you need to have the rule, so that you can go after a controller
who reports nobody no matter what because he's lazy. OTOH, reporting every
single incident when not necessary in the controller's view is just
paper-chasing and serves no end.

I will abort this line of argument if someone can show me that there is a
real safety issue here backed by something more than a gut instinct.

-cwk.

[Larry Dighera]

On Sat, 9 Oct 2004 13:14:38 -0700, "Bob Gardner" >
wrote in >::

>Insert NATCA vice PATCO. You must have a long memory.

Thanks, Bob. You're a true diplomat.

[Larry Dighera]

On Sat, 9 Oct 2004 13:14:38 -0700, "Bob Gardner" >
wrote in >::

>Insert NATCA vice PATCO. You must have a long memory.

Thanks, Bob. You're a true diplomat.

[Larry Dighera]

On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 20:43:24 GMT, "C Kingsbury"
> wrote in
. net>::

>There is a perfectly good argument to (a) have a
>regulation that requires reporting every PD and (b) routinely ignore it.
>Basically, you need to have the rule, so that you can go after a controller
>who reports nobody no matter what because he's lazy. OTOH, reporting every
>single incident when not necessary in the controller's view is just
>paper-chasing and serves no end.

That argument begs the question: Who's subjective opinion determines
which PDs are reported and which are not? The current system (if it
requires _all_ PDs to be reported) is more objective.

Don't get me wrong. I'm not looking forward to more PDs being
reported. I'm just interested in enhancing safety.

I think you are looking at the subject from a more realistic viewpoint
and I from the more theoretical. If we don't attempt to strive for
the best that we are capable, we will certainly create an imperfect
system.

[Larry Dighera]

On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 20:43:24 GMT, "C Kingsbury"
> wrote in
. net>::

>There is a perfectly good argument to (a) have a
>regulation that requires reporting every PD and (b) routinely ignore it.
>Basically, you need to have the rule, so that you can go after a controller
>who reports nobody no matter what because he's lazy. OTOH, reporting every
>single incident when not necessary in the controller's view is just
>paper-chasing and serves no end.

That argument begs the question: Who's subjective opinion determines
which PDs are reported and which are not? The current system (if it
requires _all_ PDs to be reported) is more objective.

Don't get me wrong. I'm not looking forward to more PDs being
reported. I'm just interested in enhancing safety.

I think you are looking at the subject from a more realistic viewpoint
and I from the more theoretical. If we don't attempt to strive for
the best that we are capable, we will certainly create an imperfect
system.

[Matt Whiting]

Chip Jones wrote:
> OK pilots, try this one on for size. As you likely know, there is a wide
> and growing rift between the career FAA bureaucrats (aka FAA Management) who
> run the monstrosity called the federal Air Traffic Organization, and the
> career FAA air traffic controllers who make that monstrosity work in the NAS
> on a daily basis. Regardless of where you stand on the politics of US air
> traffic control (funding, privatization, user-fees, labor issues, whatever),
> the ugly, on-going feud between Management and Labor in air traffic control
> may finally have reached a point where you as a pilot will be personally
> affected.
>
> This just in:
>
> ***
> Notice to all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees Please Post This notice
> is intended to advise all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees of recent
> occurrence in the Eastern Service Area. Controllers have been
> encouraged, through the actions of supervisors, to look the other way
> when it came to pilot deviations that did not result in a loss of
> separation. We have all heard supervisors say "no harm, no foul" on
> more than one occasion.
>
> Until now, this has not created problems for bargaining unit
> employees. Recently a facility in the Southern Region issued formal
> discipline (Letter of Reprimand) to a NATCA bargaining unit employee
> for failure to report a pilot deviation. An aircraft (Air Carrier) was
> told to hold short of a runway, read it back, and proceeded to go onto
> the runway. This resulted in a go-around with no loss of separation.
>
> In the reprimand, the manager acknowledged that the controller was in
> no way at fault operationally, but that he had violated an FAA order
> by not reporting the deviation, and as such, was being issued
> disciplinary action. During recent third level reviews, the Agency has
> held steadfast to their position.
>
> As your [NATCA title deleted], the only advice I can give you
> is to protect yourself and your career. Your failure to advise your
> supervisor of a pilot deviation may result in disciplinary action.
> Even if no loss of separation occurs. Inform your supervisor
> immediately if you witness a pilot deviation. Put the responsibility
> on their backs.
>
> Be warned!! Taking a "no harm, no foul" attitude with pilots could
> result in harm to yourself.
> ***
>
>
> Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots help
> controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an old
> clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
> that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
> antagonistic Management.

No offense, Chip, but runway incursions are a pretty serious deviation.
I'm not sure I can fault the Feds for wanting these reported given
some of the past fatal accidents caused by them.


Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Chip Jones wrote:
> OK pilots, try this one on for size. As you likely know, there is a wide
> and growing rift between the career FAA bureaucrats (aka FAA Management) who
> run the monstrosity called the federal Air Traffic Organization, and the
> career FAA air traffic controllers who make that monstrosity work in the NAS
> on a daily basis. Regardless of where you stand on the politics of US air
> traffic control (funding, privatization, user-fees, labor issues, whatever),
> the ugly, on-going feud between Management and Labor in air traffic control
> may finally have reached a point where you as a pilot will be personally
> affected.
>
> This just in:
>
> ***
> Notice to all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees Please Post This notice
> is intended to advise all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees of recent
> occurrence in the Eastern Service Area. Controllers have been
> encouraged, through the actions of supervisors, to look the other way
> when it came to pilot deviations that did not result in a loss of
> separation. We have all heard supervisors say "no harm, no foul" on
> more than one occasion.
>
> Until now, this has not created problems for bargaining unit
> employees. Recently a facility in the Southern Region issued formal
> discipline (Letter of Reprimand) to a NATCA bargaining unit employee
> for failure to report a pilot deviation. An aircraft (Air Carrier) was
> told to hold short of a runway, read it back, and proceeded to go onto
> the runway. This resulted in a go-around with no loss of separation.
>
> In the reprimand, the manager acknowledged that the controller was in
> no way at fault operationally, but that he had violated an FAA order
> by not reporting the deviation, and as such, was being issued
> disciplinary action. During recent third level reviews, the Agency has
> held steadfast to their position.
>
> As your [NATCA title deleted], the only advice I can give you
> is to protect yourself and your career. Your failure to advise your
> supervisor of a pilot deviation may result in disciplinary action.
> Even if no loss of separation occurs. Inform your supervisor
> immediately if you witness a pilot deviation. Put the responsibility
> on their backs.
>
> Be warned!! Taking a "no harm, no foul" attitude with pilots could
> result in harm to yourself.
> ***
>
>
> Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots help
> controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an old
> clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
> that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
> antagonistic Management.

No offense, Chip, but runway incursions are a pretty serious deviation.
I'm not sure I can fault the Feds for wanting these reported given
some of the past fatal accidents caused by them.


Matt

[C Kingsbury]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...

> That argument begs the question: Who's subjective opinion determines
> which PDs are reported and which are not? The current system (if it
> requires _all_ PDs to be reported) is more objective.

Objective does not imply intelligent, or productive. In my view, the burden
of proof should rest with the people who want to change established
practice. They need to prove that the way things are being done today is
wrong AND that their changes will not cause other, more damaging effects.

> Don't get me wrong. I'm not looking forward to more PDs being
> reported. I'm just interested in enhancing safety.

As am I. This doesn't smell like it has anything to do with safety, but
that's just my opinion, and it's worth about as much as you're paying for
it.

> I think you are looking at the subject from a more realistic viewpoint
> and I from the more theoretical. If we don't attempt to strive for
> the best that we are capable, we will certainly create an imperfect
> system.

Imperfection is for certain. The real question is, how badly can we screw it
up? When people start fixing things that aren't broken, you never know what
will happen.

-cwk.

[C Kingsbury]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...

> That argument begs the question: Who's subjective opinion determines
> which PDs are reported and which are not? The current system (if it
> requires _all_ PDs to be reported) is more objective.

Objective does not imply intelligent, or productive. In my view, the burden
of proof should rest with the people who want to change established
practice. They need to prove that the way things are being done today is
wrong AND that their changes will not cause other, more damaging effects.

> Don't get me wrong. I'm not looking forward to more PDs being
> reported. I'm just interested in enhancing safety.

As am I. This doesn't smell like it has anything to do with safety, but
that's just my opinion, and it's worth about as much as you're paying for
it.

> I think you are looking at the subject from a more realistic viewpoint
> and I from the more theoretical. If we don't attempt to strive for
> the best that we are capable, we will certainly create an imperfect
> system.

Imperfection is for certain. The real question is, how badly can we screw it
up? When people start fixing things that aren't broken, you never know what
will happen.

-cwk.

[Larry Dighera]

On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 22:27:14 GMT, "C Kingsbury"
> wrote in
. net>::

>
>"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
>
>> That argument begs the question: Who's subjective opinion determines
>> which PDs are reported and which are not? The current system (if it
>> requires _all_ PDs to be reported) is more objective.
>
>Objective does not imply intelligent, or productive.

Perhaps, but it does imply impartial justice.

And you haven't answered the question. In the absence of an impartial
standard, who should be tasked with the subjective judgment?

>In my view, the burden of proof should rest with the people who want to
>change established practice.

If I understand you correctly, you're saying that if it cannot be
shown that enforcing _all_ PDs will result in a reduced annual
accident/incident rate, the tacit policy of 'no harm no foul" should
be retained. That seems reasonable, but wouldn't it require a test
period to assess the results?

>They need to prove that the way things are being done today is
>wrong AND that their changes will not cause other, more damaging effects.

It would seem reasonable that reporting errant pilots for remedial
training would result in fewer accidents/incidents, but who knows?

What "more damaging effects" do you envision?

>> Don't get me wrong. I'm not looking forward to more PDs being
>> reported. I'm just interested in enhancing safety.
>
>As am I. This doesn't smell like it has anything to do with safety,

What other objective do think the policy change may have other than
safety? Do you think it's an airline ploy to reduce the number of GA
operations?

>but that's just my opinion, and it's worth about as much as you're paying for
>it.
>
>> I think you are looking at the subject from a more realistic viewpoint
>> and I from the more theoretical. If we don't attempt to strive for
>> the best that we are capable, we will certainly create an imperfect
>> system.
>
>Imperfection is for certain.

Unfortunately, that's true, but failing to attempt our best is likely
to exacerbate the imperfection rather than mitigate it.

>The real question is, how badly can we screw it up?

I get the feeling that you feel that ATC reporting _all_ PDs will
"screw it up," but for whom, the airlines, the military, GA, or all of
the above? It would be interesting to know which of those three
categories the test case Chip mentioned is a member.

>When people start fixing things that aren't broken, you never know what
>will happen.

Umm...

[Larry Dighera]

On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 22:27:14 GMT, "C Kingsbury"
> wrote in
. net>::

>
>"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
>
>> That argument begs the question: Who's subjective opinion determines
>> which PDs are reported and which are not? The current system (if it
>> requires _all_ PDs to be reported) is more objective.
>
>Objective does not imply intelligent, or productive.

Perhaps, but it does imply impartial justice.

And you haven't answered the question. In the absence of an impartial
standard, who should be tasked with the subjective judgment?

>In my view, the burden of proof should rest with the people who want to
>change established practice.

If I understand you correctly, you're saying that if it cannot be
shown that enforcing _all_ PDs will result in a reduced annual
accident/incident rate, the tacit policy of 'no harm no foul" should
be retained. That seems reasonable, but wouldn't it require a test
period to assess the results?

>They need to prove that the way things are being done today is
>wrong AND that their changes will not cause other, more damaging effects.

It would seem reasonable that reporting errant pilots for remedial
training would result in fewer accidents/incidents, but who knows?

What "more damaging effects" do you envision?

>> Don't get me wrong. I'm not looking forward to more PDs being
>> reported. I'm just interested in enhancing safety.
>
>As am I. This doesn't smell like it has anything to do with safety,

What other objective do think the policy change may have other than
safety? Do you think it's an airline ploy to reduce the number of GA
operations?

>but that's just my opinion, and it's worth about as much as you're paying for
>it.
>
>> I think you are looking at the subject from a more realistic viewpoint
>> and I from the more theoretical. If we don't attempt to strive for
>> the best that we are capable, we will certainly create an imperfect
>> system.
>
>Imperfection is for certain.

Unfortunately, that's true, but failing to attempt our best is likely
to exacerbate the imperfection rather than mitigate it.

>The real question is, how badly can we screw it up?

I get the feeling that you feel that ATC reporting _all_ PDs will
"screw it up," but for whom, the airlines, the military, GA, or all of
the above? It would be interesting to know which of those three
categories the test case Chip mentioned is a member.

>When people start fixing things that aren't broken, you never know what
>will happen.

Umm...

[Chip Jones]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 15:08:08 GMT, "Chip Jones"
> > wrote:
>
> >Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> >small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> >because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots
help
> >controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an old
> >clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
> >that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
> >antagonistic Management.
>
> Can you provide a pointer to the specific FAA Order that mandates that
> ATC report all pilot deviations?
>

That order is FAAO 7210.56, "Air Traffic Quality Assurance." Here's a
link: http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATQ/INDEX.htm

Buried deep within this tome, which 90% of line controllers have likely
never even heard of, is paragraph 5-1-2, which reads:

" 5-1-2. SUSPECTED EVENT
a. In order to maintain an effective Air Traffic System, it is
imperative that we identify all deficiencies within our system and take
appropriate corrective actions necessary to fix any associated problems.
Operational errors and deviations are reported for just that reason, so
those problems (either systemic or individual) can be corrected to enhance
system integrity. The identification of operational errors and deviations
without fear of reprisal is an absolute requirement and is the
responsibility of all of us who work within our system.

b. Accordingly, it remains Air Traffic Policy that any
employee who is aware of any occurrence that may be an operational error,
deviation, or air traffic incident (as defined in paragraph 4-1-1,
Definitions), immediately report the occurrence to any available supervisor,
controller-in-charge (CIC) or management official.

c. Employees' shall verbally provide the preliminary
information, of which they have knowledge, when requested by the supervisor,
controller-in-charge (CIC) or management official to make an initial
determination as to whether an investigation is warranted. This phase is
meant only to determine the need of an investigation and is not
investigatory. Therefore, Union representation is not required at this
time."


The key words in 5-1-2 are in the word group
"air traffic incident", which is defined in 4-4-1 to include pilot
deviations. Pilot deviations are defined in this order as "the actions of a
pilot that result in the violation of a Federal Aviation Regulation or a
North American Aerospace Defense (Command Air Defense Identification Zone)
tolerance."

Thus, if you bust your altitude at 3 in the morning, with no traffic within
100 miles of you, I am apparently supposed to turn you in for a pilot
deviation (failure to adhere to clearance), or else risk formal
discipline...



Chip, ZTL

[Chip Jones]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 15:08:08 GMT, "Chip Jones"
> > wrote:
>
> >Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> >small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> >because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots
help
> >controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an old
> >clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
> >that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
> >antagonistic Management.
>
> Can you provide a pointer to the specific FAA Order that mandates that
> ATC report all pilot deviations?
>

That order is FAAO 7210.56, "Air Traffic Quality Assurance." Here's a
link: http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATQ/INDEX.htm

Buried deep within this tome, which 90% of line controllers have likely
never even heard of, is paragraph 5-1-2, which reads:

" 5-1-2. SUSPECTED EVENT
a. In order to maintain an effective Air Traffic System, it is
imperative that we identify all deficiencies within our system and take
appropriate corrective actions necessary to fix any associated problems.
Operational errors and deviations are reported for just that reason, so
those problems (either systemic or individual) can be corrected to enhance
system integrity. The identification of operational errors and deviations
without fear of reprisal is an absolute requirement and is the
responsibility of all of us who work within our system.

b. Accordingly, it remains Air Traffic Policy that any
employee who is aware of any occurrence that may be an operational error,
deviation, or air traffic incident (as defined in paragraph 4-1-1,
Definitions), immediately report the occurrence to any available supervisor,
controller-in-charge (CIC) or management official.

c. Employees' shall verbally provide the preliminary
information, of which they have knowledge, when requested by the supervisor,
controller-in-charge (CIC) or management official to make an initial
determination as to whether an investigation is warranted. This phase is
meant only to determine the need of an investigation and is not
investigatory. Therefore, Union representation is not required at this
time."


The key words in 5-1-2 are in the word group
"air traffic incident", which is defined in 4-4-1 to include pilot
deviations. Pilot deviations are defined in this order as "the actions of a
pilot that result in the violation of a Federal Aviation Regulation or a
North American Aerospace Defense (Command Air Defense Identification Zone)
tolerance."

Thus, if you bust your altitude at 3 in the morning, with no traffic within
100 miles of you, I am apparently supposed to turn you in for a pilot
deviation (failure to adhere to clearance), or else risk formal
discipline...



Chip, ZTL

[Chip Jones]

"Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
...
> Chip Jones wrote:
> >
> >
> > Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> > small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> > because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots
help
> > controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an
old
> > clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
> > that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
> > antagonistic Management.
>
> No offense, Chip, but runway incursions are a pretty serious deviation.
> I'm not sure I can fault the Feds for wanting these reported given
> some of the past fatal accidents caused by them.
>

Matt, no offense taken. I agree with you that runway incursions are a
pretty serious deviation, but where do you draw the line for a "pretty
serious" pilot deviation? It is my opinion that the controller working the
situation, the person who issued the ignored hold short instruction, is the
Fed on the scene. Not the tower chief coming in on the scene a few days
later, If the person issuing ATC clearances sees no harm, no foul and
gives the crew a pass, why not leave it there? No loss of separation
occurred in this event. In FAA speak, "Safety was never compromised." No
harm done. Why crucify the controller for not crucifying the pilot and
crew?

And if you go after the controller for not narcing on the flight crew in
this case, then you have to go after every controller in every case of every
observed but unreported pilot deviation. To me, such a policy is
counter-productive to air safety because it builds an adversarial
relationship between ATC and pilots. After all, the controller got a paper
slap on the wrist compared to the likely loss of pay and possible loss of
employment for the captain and FO of the airliner in question. I prefer "no
harm, no foul" unless actual harm was committed.

Chip, ZTL

[Chip Jones]

"Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
...
> Chip Jones wrote:
> >
> >
> > Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> > small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> > because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots
help
> > controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an
old
> > clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
> > that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
> > antagonistic Management.
>
> No offense, Chip, but runway incursions are a pretty serious deviation.
> I'm not sure I can fault the Feds for wanting these reported given
> some of the past fatal accidents caused by them.
>

Matt, no offense taken. I agree with you that runway incursions are a
pretty serious deviation, but where do you draw the line for a "pretty
serious" pilot deviation? It is my opinion that the controller working the
situation, the person who issued the ignored hold short instruction, is the
Fed on the scene. Not the tower chief coming in on the scene a few days
later, If the person issuing ATC clearances sees no harm, no foul and
gives the crew a pass, why not leave it there? No loss of separation
occurred in this event. In FAA speak, "Safety was never compromised." No
harm done. Why crucify the controller for not crucifying the pilot and
crew?

And if you go after the controller for not narcing on the flight crew in
this case, then you have to go after every controller in every case of every
observed but unreported pilot deviation. To me, such a policy is
counter-productive to air safety because it builds an adversarial
relationship between ATC and pilots. After all, the controller got a paper
slap on the wrist compared to the likely loss of pay and possible loss of
employment for the captain and FO of the airliner in question. I prefer "no
harm, no foul" unless actual harm was committed.

Chip, ZTL

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Gary Drescher" > wrote in message
news:tEW9d.211481$MQ5.87982@attbi_s52...
>>
>> What Chip's talking about is basically removing some of that
>> discretionary
>> power from controllers. Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
>> reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes, they'll
>> simply start punting things too, so the "no harm, no foul" policy just
>> gets
>> shifted to a new desk. But in the meantime the volume of trees
>> slaughtered
>> will increase, and with it the hours spent on pointless paperwork for
>> everybody. Safety will probably not benefit.
>>
>
> Hm, I assumed that it's not a deviation if the pilot is within PTS
> standards; hence, being off by 50' in cruise wouldn't count.
>

Being off by 50' in cruise wouldn't be noticed.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Gary Drescher" > wrote in message
news:tEW9d.211481$MQ5.87982@attbi_s52...
>>
>> What Chip's talking about is basically removing some of that
>> discretionary
>> power from controllers. Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
>> reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes, they'll
>> simply start punting things too, so the "no harm, no foul" policy just
>> gets
>> shifted to a new desk. But in the meantime the volume of trees
>> slaughtered
>> will increase, and with it the hours spent on pointless paperwork for
>> everybody. Safety will probably not benefit.
>>
>
> Hm, I assumed that it's not a deviation if the pilot is within PTS
> standards; hence, being off by 50' in cruise wouldn't count.
>

Being off by 50' in cruise wouldn't be noticed.

[Teacherjh]

>>
>Objective does not imply intelligent, or productive.

Perhaps, but it does imply impartial justice.
<<

I thought this was supposed to be about safety. Now it's about =justice=?
This scares me.

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Teacherjh]

>>
>Objective does not imply intelligent, or productive.

Perhaps, but it does imply impartial justice.
<<

I thought this was supposed to be about safety. Now it's about =justice=?
This scares me.

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[C Kingsbury]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
>
> And you haven't answered the question. In the absence of an impartial
> standard, who should be tasked with the subjective judgment?

The person closest to the event, i.e., the controller who witnesses the PD.
Much like the cop on the beat, he is the best-equipped to judge whether it
is a serious event or not.

> >In my view, the burden of proof should rest with the people who want to
> >change established practice.
>
> If I understand you correctly, you're saying that if it cannot be
> shown that enforcing _all_ PDs will result in a reduced annual
> accident/incident rate, the tacit policy of 'no harm no foul" should
> be retained. That seems reasonable, but wouldn't it require a test
> period to assess the results?

No, no. Real life is never that scientific. What I'm looking for is some
clear argument indicating that the "no harm, no foul" approach is causing
safety problems. Are we getting more loss of separation reports? Are runway
incursions on the rise? Can you find a couple of controllers who will speak
to a risky change in attitudes? My mind is open but I want material
evidence, not theory.

> What "more damaging effects" do you envision?

Let's say violations start hitting regularly- word gets around that if
you're not 100% on flying IFR you've got a good chance of getting busted,
even for just a trivial matter. Will that not increase the odds that someone
will choose to push VFR minimums rather than going IFR and "risk losing my
ticket because I let my altitude wander a little bit."

A few years ago some group was pushing to require airline pax traveling with
small children to put the kid in a child seat instead of carrying them in
their lap, because in a crash, the kid is pretty much toast if they're not
in a child seat. So far so good, right? Some think tank did a study and came
up with the finding that this would actually lead to more children dying, as
families who couldn't afford to buy that extra ticket chose to make the trip
by car instead, where the risk of dying in a crash would actually be higher.

> What other objective do think the policy change may have other than
> safety? Do you think it's an airline ploy to reduce the number of GA
> operations?

Actually, the more I read that memo Chip posted, the more this sounds to me
like a union put-up job. A runway incursion that leads to a go-around could
easily be the sort of PD that should be reported, and we don't know any of
the context that helps determine what is and is not appropriate. In my
experience, one of the key functions of any union is to protect its weakest
members, in this case, the least competent. Perhaps this guy deserved to get
nailed, but the union has decided to defend him, or at least pick a fight
with management over the issue, so they issue a "scare" memo. Perhaps their
goal is to deluge management with so many PD reports that it forces them to
alter the system. Who knows. Politics of these things can get very tricky
and I have no inside info. For all I know it's management playing some other
game entirely. Personally, I don't trust either side to be too honest.


> I get the feeling that you feel that ATC reporting _all_ PDs will
> "screw it up," but for whom, the airlines, the military, GA, or all of
> the above? It would be interesting to know which of those three
> categories the test case Chip mentioned is a member.

I don't see it helping anybody, frankly. It certainly won't help GA, except
perhaps for the insurance companies who get a new excuse to raise premiums,
while the airlines and the military get to waste a lot mroe time deciding
what to do about a crewmember who gets violated. Every violation will
produce a long paper trail that everyone has to chase down.

Best,
-cwk.

[C Kingsbury]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
>
> And you haven't answered the question. In the absence of an impartial
> standard, who should be tasked with the subjective judgment?

The person closest to the event, i.e., the controller who witnesses the PD.
Much like the cop on the beat, he is the best-equipped to judge whether it
is a serious event or not.

> >In my view, the burden of proof should rest with the people who want to
> >change established practice.
>
> If I understand you correctly, you're saying that if it cannot be
> shown that enforcing _all_ PDs will result in a reduced annual
> accident/incident rate, the tacit policy of 'no harm no foul" should
> be retained. That seems reasonable, but wouldn't it require a test
> period to assess the results?

No, no. Real life is never that scientific. What I'm looking for is some
clear argument indicating that the "no harm, no foul" approach is causing
safety problems. Are we getting more loss of separation reports? Are runway
incursions on the rise? Can you find a couple of controllers who will speak
to a risky change in attitudes? My mind is open but I want material
evidence, not theory.

> What "more damaging effects" do you envision?

Let's say violations start hitting regularly- word gets around that if
you're not 100% on flying IFR you've got a good chance of getting busted,
even for just a trivial matter. Will that not increase the odds that someone
will choose to push VFR minimums rather than going IFR and "risk losing my
ticket because I let my altitude wander a little bit."

A few years ago some group was pushing to require airline pax traveling with
small children to put the kid in a child seat instead of carrying them in
their lap, because in a crash, the kid is pretty much toast if they're not
in a child seat. So far so good, right? Some think tank did a study and came
up with the finding that this would actually lead to more children dying, as
families who couldn't afford to buy that extra ticket chose to make the trip
by car instead, where the risk of dying in a crash would actually be higher.

> What other objective do think the policy change may have other than
> safety? Do you think it's an airline ploy to reduce the number of GA
> operations?

Actually, the more I read that memo Chip posted, the more this sounds to me
like a union put-up job. A runway incursion that leads to a go-around could
easily be the sort of PD that should be reported, and we don't know any of
the context that helps determine what is and is not appropriate. In my
experience, one of the key functions of any union is to protect its weakest
members, in this case, the least competent. Perhaps this guy deserved to get
nailed, but the union has decided to defend him, or at least pick a fight
with management over the issue, so they issue a "scare" memo. Perhaps their
goal is to deluge management with so many PD reports that it forces them to
alter the system. Who knows. Politics of these things can get very tricky
and I have no inside info. For all I know it's management playing some other
game entirely. Personally, I don't trust either side to be too honest.


> I get the feeling that you feel that ATC reporting _all_ PDs will
> "screw it up," but for whom, the airlines, the military, GA, or all of
> the above? It would be interesting to know which of those three
> categories the test case Chip mentioned is a member.

I don't see it helping anybody, frankly. It certainly won't help GA, except
perhaps for the insurance companies who get a new excuse to raise premiums,
while the airlines and the military get to waste a lot mroe time deciding
what to do about a crewmember who gets violated. Every violation will
produce a long paper trail that everyone has to chase down.

Best,
-cwk.

[Larry Dighera]

On 10 Oct 2004 03:00:40 GMT, (Teacherjh)
wrote in >::

>>>
>>Objective does not imply intelligent, or productive.
>
>Perhaps, but it does imply impartial justice.
><<
>
>I thought this was supposed to be about safety.

Actually, the topic is the change in the "no harm, no foul" (NHNF = no
loss of separation occurred; safety was not compromised) concept of
enforcing pilot/controller deviations/errors as mandated in FAAO
7210.56, "Air Traffic Quality Assurance" 5-1-2 SUSPECTED EVENT, IIRC.

That FAAO mentions: "The identification of operational errors and
deviations without fear of reprisal is an absolute requirement and is
the responsibility of all of us who work within our [NAS] system."
The words "absolute requirement" are particularly pertinent to the
change in enforcement Mr. Jones mentions, IMO.

Due to the past NHNF policy, selective enforcement (an injustice) has
occurred, as reported by Mr. Jones. If the FAAO were uniformly
enforced, it would be more just, but probably unworkable. IIRC,
motorists commit ~37 vehicle code violations on an average trip. If
these were all cited and enforced, this would be a nation of court
houses. It's not an easy issue.

Controllers have an FAA form for reporting suspected PDs (Form 8020-17
Preliminary Pilot Deviation Report); airmen must write a letter* to
the Administrator to report ATC operational errors.


The NTSB has recommended that the FAA:

...
Formally evaluate all reported safety-related events for potential
air traffic control performance deficiencies and assign
responsibility for the classification of all such events that
occur within the National Airspace System to an internal oversight
function that is independent of the Air Traffic Service. (A-00-36)

Amend Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65, “Air
Traffic Control,” (ATC) to require that controllers ask any member
of a flight crew receiving ATC services who expresses concern
about the proximity of another aircraft if he or she
desires to file a formal near midair collision report. (A-00-37)
Modify Federal Aviation Administration Form 8020-21, “Preliminary
Near Midair Collision Report,” to include a section describing air
traffic control actions relevant to the incident. (A-00-38)

Amend Federal Aviation Administration Orders 7210.3, “Facility
Operation and Administration,” and 8020.11, “Aircraft Accident and
Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting,” to require
that air traffic control facilities retain recorded voice
communications and radar data for 45 days. (A-00-39)

Amend Federal Aviation Administration Order 7210.3, “Facility
Operation and Administration,” to require that all telephone
conversations with personnel at air traffic control (ATC)
facilities relating to an aircraft accident, incident, or ATC
performance shall be conducted on recorded telephone lines.
(A-00-40)
http://www.avweb.com/other/ntsb0025a1.pdf


>Now it's about =justice=? This scares me.

Why would it scare you? You are protected from your government by
your Constitutional assurances, right? :-)




*
Sec. 13.5 Formal complaints.

(a) Any person may file a complaint with the Administrator with
respect to anything done or omitted to be done by any person in
contravention of any provision of any Act or of any regulation or
order issued under it, as to matters within the jurisdiction of the
Administrator. This section does not apply to complaints against the
Administrator or employees of the FAA acting within the scope of their
employment.
(b) Complaints filed under this section must--
(1) Be submitted in writing and identified as a complaint filed
for the purpose of seeking an appropriate order or other enforcement
action;
(2) Be submitted to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office
of the Chief Counsel, Attention: Enforcement Docket (AGC-10), 800
Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591;
(3) Set forth the name and address, if known, of each person who
is the subject of the complaint and, with respect to each person, the
specific provisions of the Act or regulation or order that the
complainant believes were violated;
(4) Contain a concise but complete statement of the facts relied
upon to substantiate each allegation;
(5) State the name, address and telephone number of the person
filing the complaint; and
(6) Be signed by the person filing the complaint or a duly
authorized representative.
(c) Complaints which do not meet the requirements of paragraph
(b)of this section will be considered reports under Sec. 13.1.
(d) Complaints which meet the requirements of paragraph (b) of
this section will be docketed and a copy mailed to each person named
in the complaint.
(e) Any complaint filed against a member of the Armed Forces of
the United States acting in the performance of official duties shall
be referred to the Secretary of the Department concerned for action in
accordance with the procedures set forth in Sec. 13.21 of this part.
(f) The person named in the complaint shall file an answer
within 20 days after service of a copy of the complaint.
(g) After the complaint has been answered or after the allotted
time in which to file an answer has expired, the Administrator shall
determine if there are reasonable grounds for investigating the
complaint.
(h) If the Administrator determines that a complaint does not
state facts which warrant an investigation or action, the complaint
may be dismissed without a hearing and the reason for the dismissal
shall be given, in writing, to the person who filed the complaint and
the person named in the complaint.
(i) If the Administrator determines that reasonable grounds
exist, an informal investigation may be initiated or an order of
investigation may be issued in accordance with Subpart F of this part,
or both. Each person named in the complaint shall be advised which
official has been delegated the responsibility under Sec. 13.3(b) or
(c) for conducting the investigation.
(j) If the investigation substantiates the allegations set forth
in the complaint, a notice of proposed order may be issued or other
enforcement action taken in accordance with this part.
(k) The complaint and other pleadings and official FAA records
relating to the disposition of the complaint are maintained in current
docket form in the Enforcement Docket (AGC-209), Office of the Chief
Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue,
S.W., Washington, D. C. 20591. Any interested person may examine any
docketed material at that office, at any time after the docket is
established, except material that is ordered withheld from the public
under applicable law or regulations, and may obtain a photostatic or
duplicate copy upon paying the cost of the copy.

The full text can be found here:
http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=003fb677c0a48e5d8e83f114f95023f5&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title14/14cfr13_main_02.tpl

[Larry Dighera]

On 10 Oct 2004 03:00:40 GMT, (Teacherjh)
wrote in >::

>>>
>>Objective does not imply intelligent, or productive.
>
>Perhaps, but it does imply impartial justice.
><<
>
>I thought this was supposed to be about safety.

Actually, the topic is the change in the "no harm, no foul" (NHNF = no
loss of separation occurred; safety was not compromised) concept of
enforcing pilot/controller deviations/errors as mandated in FAAO
7210.56, "Air Traffic Quality Assurance" 5-1-2 SUSPECTED EVENT, IIRC.

That FAAO mentions: "The identification of operational errors and
deviations without fear of reprisal is an absolute requirement and is
the responsibility of all of us who work within our [NAS] system."
The words "absolute requirement" are particularly pertinent to the
change in enforcement Mr. Jones mentions, IMO.

Due to the past NHNF policy, selective enforcement (an injustice) has
occurred, as reported by Mr. Jones. If the FAAO were uniformly
enforced, it would be more just, but probably unworkable. IIRC,
motorists commit ~37 vehicle code violations on an average trip. If
these were all cited and enforced, this would be a nation of court
houses. It's not an easy issue.

Controllers have an FAA form for reporting suspected PDs (Form 8020-17
Preliminary Pilot Deviation Report); airmen must write a letter* to
the Administrator to report ATC operational errors.


The NTSB has recommended that the FAA:

...
Formally evaluate all reported safety-related events for potential
air traffic control performance deficiencies and assign
responsibility for the classification of all such events that
occur within the National Airspace System to an internal oversight
function that is independent of the Air Traffic Service. (A-00-36)

Amend Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65, “Air
Traffic Control,” (ATC) to require that controllers ask any member
of a flight crew receiving ATC services who expresses concern
about the proximity of another aircraft if he or she
desires to file a formal near midair collision report. (A-00-37)
Modify Federal Aviation Administration Form 8020-21, “Preliminary
Near Midair Collision Report,” to include a section describing air
traffic control actions relevant to the incident. (A-00-38)

Amend Federal Aviation Administration Orders 7210.3, “Facility
Operation and Administration,” and 8020.11, “Aircraft Accident and
Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting,” to require
that air traffic control facilities retain recorded voice
communications and radar data for 45 days. (A-00-39)

Amend Federal Aviation Administration Order 7210.3, “Facility
Operation and Administration,” to require that all telephone
conversations with personnel at air traffic control (ATC)
facilities relating to an aircraft accident, incident, or ATC
performance shall be conducted on recorded telephone lines.
(A-00-40)
http://www.avweb.com/other/ntsb0025a1.pdf


>Now it's about =justice=? This scares me.

Why would it scare you? You are protected from your government by
your Constitutional assurances, right? :-)




*
Sec. 13.5 Formal complaints.

(a) Any person may file a complaint with the Administrator with
respect to anything done or omitted to be done by any person in
contravention of any provision of any Act or of any regulation or
order issued under it, as to matters within the jurisdiction of the
Administrator. This section does not apply to complaints against the
Administrator or employees of the FAA acting within the scope of their
employment.
(b) Complaints filed under this section must--
(1) Be submitted in writing and identified as a complaint filed
for the purpose of seeking an appropriate order or other enforcement
action;
(2) Be submitted to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office
of the Chief Counsel, Attention: Enforcement Docket (AGC-10), 800
Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591;
(3) Set forth the name and address, if known, of each person who
is the subject of the complaint and, with respect to each person, the
specific provisions of the Act or regulation or order that the
complainant believes were violated;
(4) Contain a concise but complete statement of the facts relied
upon to substantiate each allegation;
(5) State the name, address and telephone number of the person
filing the complaint; and
(6) Be signed by the person filing the complaint or a duly
authorized representative.
(c) Complaints which do not meet the requirements of paragraph
(b)of this section will be considered reports under Sec. 13.1.
(d) Complaints which meet the requirements of paragraph (b) of
this section will be docketed and a copy mailed to each person named
in the complaint.
(e) Any complaint filed against a member of the Armed Forces of
the United States acting in the performance of official duties shall
be referred to the Secretary of the Department concerned for action in
accordance with the procedures set forth in Sec. 13.21 of this part.
(f) The person named in the complaint shall file an answer
within 20 days after service of a copy of the complaint.
(g) After the complaint has been answered or after the allotted
time in which to file an answer has expired, the Administrator shall
determine if there are reasonable grounds for investigating the
complaint.
(h) If the Administrator determines that a complaint does not
state facts which warrant an investigation or action, the complaint
may be dismissed without a hearing and the reason for the dismissal
shall be given, in writing, to the person who filed the complaint and
the person named in the complaint.
(i) If the Administrator determines that reasonable grounds
exist, an informal investigation may be initiated or an order of
investigation may be issued in accordance with Subpart F of this part,
or both. Each person named in the complaint shall be advised which
official has been delegated the responsibility under Sec. 13.3(b) or
(c) for conducting the investigation.
(j) If the investigation substantiates the allegations set forth
in the complaint, a notice of proposed order may be issued or other
enforcement action taken in accordance with this part.
(k) The complaint and other pleadings and official FAA records
relating to the disposition of the complaint are maintained in current
docket form in the Enforcement Docket (AGC-209), Office of the Chief
Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue,
S.W., Washington, D. C. 20591. Any interested person may examine any
docketed material at that office, at any time after the docket is
established, except material that is ordered withheld from the public
under applicable law or regulations, and may obtain a photostatic or
duplicate copy upon paying the cost of the copy.

The full text can be found here:
http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=003fb677c0a48e5d8e83f114f95023f5&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title14/14cfr13_main_02.tpl

[C Kingsbury]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
news:ze1ad.13857
>
> Being off by 50' in cruise wouldn't be noticed.
>

OK, to be precise, 100'+/- is OK, and encoders click over at 51', right? So
you'd have to be 151' off for it to show as outside tolerance. Fly over some
building cumulus in a 172 sometime- that can left your skirts 100' before
you know it. Better have that altitude nailed or you've violated your
clearance.

-cwk.

[C Kingsbury]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
news:ze1ad.13857
>
> Being off by 50' in cruise wouldn't be noticed.
>

OK, to be precise, 100'+/- is OK, and encoders click over at 51', right? So
you'd have to be 151' off for it to show as outside tolerance. Fly over some
building cumulus in a 172 sometime- that can left your skirts 100' before
you know it. Better have that altitude nailed or you've violated your
clearance.

-cwk.

[Chip Jones]

"C Kingsbury" > wrote in message
link.net...
>
{snipped}
>
> Actually, the more I read that memo Chip posted, the more this sounds to
me
> like a union put-up job. A runway incursion that leads to a go-around
could
> easily be the sort of PD that should be reported, and we don't know any of
> the context that helps determine what is and is not appropriate. In my
> experience, one of the key functions of any union is to protect its
weakest
> members, in this case, the least competent. Perhaps this guy deserved to
get
> nailed, but the union has decided to defend him, or at least pick a fight
> with management over the issue, so they issue a "scare" memo. Perhaps
their
> goal is to deluge management with so many PD reports that it forces them
to
> alter the system. Who knows. Politics of these things can get very tricky
> and I have no inside info. For all I know it's management playing some
other
> game entirely. Personally, I don't trust either side to be too honest.

That's a wise point of view, IMO. I don't trust either side either.
However, I posted this as a safety issue, not to make a point for NATCA.
Who is in a better position than the tower controller involved to determine
if this PD should have been reported? The corporate culture of FAA's air
traffic control has always been "no harm, no foul" when dealing with pilot
deviations that do not lead to loss of separation. Frankly, there are just
too many PD's to go after, and controllers aren't cops. This poilicy seems
to force them to report, "or else."

Chip, ZTL

[Chip Jones]

"C Kingsbury" > wrote in message
link.net...
>
{snipped}
>
> Actually, the more I read that memo Chip posted, the more this sounds to
me
> like a union put-up job. A runway incursion that leads to a go-around
could
> easily be the sort of PD that should be reported, and we don't know any of
> the context that helps determine what is and is not appropriate. In my
> experience, one of the key functions of any union is to protect its
weakest
> members, in this case, the least competent. Perhaps this guy deserved to
get
> nailed, but the union has decided to defend him, or at least pick a fight
> with management over the issue, so they issue a "scare" memo. Perhaps
their
> goal is to deluge management with so many PD reports that it forces them
to
> alter the system. Who knows. Politics of these things can get very tricky
> and I have no inside info. For all I know it's management playing some
other
> game entirely. Personally, I don't trust either side to be too honest.

That's a wise point of view, IMO. I don't trust either side either.
However, I posted this as a safety issue, not to make a point for NATCA.
Who is in a better position than the tower controller involved to determine
if this PD should have been reported? The corporate culture of FAA's air
traffic control has always been "no harm, no foul" when dealing with pilot
deviations that do not lead to loss of separation. Frankly, there are just
too many PD's to go after, and controllers aren't cops. This poilicy seems
to force them to report, "or else."

Chip, ZTL

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"C Kingsbury" > wrote in message
link.net...
>
> OK, to be precise, 100'+/- is OK, and encoders click over at 51', right?
> So
> you'd have to be 151' off for it to show as outside tolerance. Fly over
> some
> building cumulus in a 172 sometime- that can left your skirts 100' before
> you know it. Better have that altitude nailed or you've violated your
> clearance.
>

Call ATC with a PIREP on the turbulence.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"C Kingsbury" > wrote in message
link.net...
>
> OK, to be precise, 100'+/- is OK, and encoders click over at 51', right?
> So
> you'd have to be 151' off for it to show as outside tolerance. Fly over
> some
> building cumulus in a 172 sometime- that can left your skirts 100' before
> you know it. Better have that altitude nailed or you've violated your
> clearance.
>

Call ATC with a PIREP on the turbulence.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Chip Jones" > wrote in message
hlink.net...
>
> That's a wise point of view, IMO. I don't trust either side either.
> However, I posted this as a safety issue, not to make a point for NATCA.
> Who is in a better position than the tower controller involved to
> determine
> if this PD should have been reported?
>

This PD required a go around to avert a collision on the runway. If he's
not going to report a deviation like this one, what kind of PD would he
report?

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Chip Jones" > wrote in message
hlink.net...
>
> That's a wise point of view, IMO. I don't trust either side either.
> However, I posted this as a safety issue, not to make a point for NATCA.
> Who is in a better position than the tower controller involved to
> determine
> if this PD should have been reported?
>

This PD required a go around to avert a collision on the runway. If he's
not going to report a deviation like this one, what kind of PD would he
report?

[Kyler Laird]

"C Kingsbury" > writes:

>> >Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
>> >reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes,
>>
>> Because mode c transponders only report altitude in even hundreds,
>> that isn't very likely.

>OK, 51' then.

Plus the maximum allowed deviation for the encoder at your altitude. I
forget the table but I recall it being quite significant above 14,000'.
(I got a transponder check letter when mine wasn't making good contact
with my encoder.)

>I will abort this line of argument if someone can show me that there is a
>real safety issue here backed by something more than a gut instinct.

I'd like to think we'd all change our assumptions given sufficient
evidence to the contrary.

--kyler

[Kyler Laird]

"C Kingsbury" > writes:

>> >Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
>> >reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes,
>>
>> Because mode c transponders only report altitude in even hundreds,
>> that isn't very likely.

>OK, 51' then.

Plus the maximum allowed deviation for the encoder at your altitude. I
forget the table but I recall it being quite significant above 14,000'.
(I got a transponder check letter when mine wasn't making good contact
with my encoder.)

>I will abort this line of argument if someone can show me that there is a
>real safety issue here backed by something more than a gut instinct.

I'd like to think we'd all change our assumptions given sufficient
evidence to the contrary.

--kyler

[Matt Whiting]

Chip Jones wrote:

> "Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>Chip Jones wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
>>>small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
>>>because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots
>
> help
>
>>>controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an
>
> old
>
>>>clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
>>>that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
>>>antagonistic Management.
>>
>>No offense, Chip, but runway incursions are a pretty serious deviation.
>> I'm not sure I can fault the Feds for wanting these reported given
>>some of the past fatal accidents caused by them.
>>
>
>
> Matt, no offense taken. I agree with you that runway incursions are a
> pretty serious deviation, but where do you draw the line for a "pretty
> serious" pilot deviation? It is my opinion that the controller working the
> situation, the person who issued the ignored hold short instruction, is the
> Fed on the scene. Not the tower chief coming in on the scene a few days
> later, If the person issuing ATC clearances sees no harm, no foul and
> gives the crew a pass, why not leave it there? No loss of separation
> occurred in this event. In FAA speak, "Safety was never compromised." No
> harm done. Why crucify the controller for not crucifying the pilot and
> crew?
>
> And if you go after the controller for not narcing on the flight crew in
> this case, then you have to go after every controller in every case of every
> observed but unreported pilot deviation. To me, such a policy is
> counter-productive to air safety because it builds an adversarial
> relationship between ATC and pilots. After all, the controller got a paper
> slap on the wrist compared to the likely loss of pay and possible loss of
> employment for the captain and FO of the airliner in question. I prefer "no
> harm, no foul" unless actual harm was committed.
>
> Chip, ZTL
>
>

If it was close enough to require a go-around, that seems close enough
to me to warrant a report. If nobody else was within 10 miles of the
airport, then I might feel differently.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Chip Jones wrote:

> "Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>Chip Jones wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
>>>small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
>>>because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots
>
> help
>
>>>controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an
>
> old
>
>>>clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
>>>that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
>>>antagonistic Management.
>>
>>No offense, Chip, but runway incursions are a pretty serious deviation.
>> I'm not sure I can fault the Feds for wanting these reported given
>>some of the past fatal accidents caused by them.
>>
>
>
> Matt, no offense taken. I agree with you that runway incursions are a
> pretty serious deviation, but where do you draw the line for a "pretty
> serious" pilot deviation? It is my opinion that the controller working the
> situation, the person who issued the ignored hold short instruction, is the
> Fed on the scene. Not the tower chief coming in on the scene a few days
> later, If the person issuing ATC clearances sees no harm, no foul and
> gives the crew a pass, why not leave it there? No loss of separation
> occurred in this event. In FAA speak, "Safety was never compromised." No
> harm done. Why crucify the controller for not crucifying the pilot and
> crew?
>
> And if you go after the controller for not narcing on the flight crew in
> this case, then you have to go after every controller in every case of every
> observed but unreported pilot deviation. To me, such a policy is
> counter-productive to air safety because it builds an adversarial
> relationship between ATC and pilots. After all, the controller got a paper
> slap on the wrist compared to the likely loss of pay and possible loss of
> employment for the captain and FO of the airliner in question. I prefer "no
> harm, no foul" unless actual harm was committed.
>
> Chip, ZTL
>
>

If it was close enough to require a go-around, that seems close enough
to me to warrant a report. If nobody else was within 10 miles of the
airport, then I might feel differently.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

C Kingsbury wrote:

> "Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
> news:ze1ad.13857
>
>>Being off by 50' in cruise wouldn't be noticed.
>>
>
>
> OK, to be precise, 100'+/- is OK, and encoders click over at 51', right? So
> you'd have to be 151' off for it to show as outside tolerance. Fly over some
> building cumulus in a 172 sometime- that can left your skirts 100' before
> you know it. Better have that altitude nailed or you've violated your
> clearance.
>
> -cwk.
>
>
>
>

Last I knew, you had 300' of tolerance before a violation was a concern.
Has this changed recently?

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

C Kingsbury wrote:

> "Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
> news:ze1ad.13857
>
>>Being off by 50' in cruise wouldn't be noticed.
>>
>
>
> OK, to be precise, 100'+/- is OK, and encoders click over at 51', right? So
> you'd have to be 151' off for it to show as outside tolerance. Fly over some
> building cumulus in a 172 sometime- that can left your skirts 100' before
> you know it. Better have that altitude nailed or you've violated your
> clearance.
>
> -cwk.
>
>
>
>

Last I knew, you had 300' of tolerance before a violation was a concern.
Has this changed recently?

Matt

[Stan Prevost]

"Chip Jones" > wrote in message
link.net...
> OK pilots, try this one on for size. As you likely know, there is a wide
> and growing rift between the career FAA bureaucrats (aka FAA Management)
who
> run the monstrosity called the federal Air Traffic Organization, and the
> career FAA air traffic controllers who make that monstrosity work in the
NAS
> on a daily basis. Regardless of where you stand on the politics of US air
> traffic control (funding, privatization, user-fees, labor issues,
whatever),
> the ugly, on-going feud between Management and Labor in air traffic
control
> may finally have reached a point where you as a pilot will be personally
> affected.
>

Chip, increased emphasis on reporting of pilot deviations seems to lead to a
need for increased pilot understanding of what constitutes a deviation from
an ATC point of view. I doubt that controllers are required to know the
FARs to the depth required to determine if a pilot is operating within the
regulations that apply to pilots in all cases, so a large part of it would
seem to fall back on reporting deviations from an ATC instruction or
clearance. So what constitutes a deviation? As an example, what deviation
in altitude constitutes a reportable deviation, if no loss of separation
occurs? It has been suggested in this thread that the Instrument PTS
standard of +/- 100 ft applies, but I doubt if controllers are familiar with
the PTS. So is there an ATC document that defines deviation limits? How
far off the centerline of an airway can I be before being reported? How
much heading error? How long a delay is allowed before I begin a descent
after being instructed to do so? If I am VFR in Class E airspace, and using
flight following, will I be reported for flying WAFDOF? Should we expect a
report on every student pilot doing T&Gs and landing without clearance,
rather than being scolded for a one-time error, if no problem occured?

Looks like a big can of worms to me.

Sta

[Stan Prevost]

"Chip Jones" > wrote in message
link.net...
> OK pilots, try this one on for size. As you likely know, there is a wide
> and growing rift between the career FAA bureaucrats (aka FAA Management)
who
> run the monstrosity called the federal Air Traffic Organization, and the
> career FAA air traffic controllers who make that monstrosity work in the
NAS
> on a daily basis. Regardless of where you stand on the politics of US air
> traffic control (funding, privatization, user-fees, labor issues,
whatever),
> the ugly, on-going feud between Management and Labor in air traffic
control
> may finally have reached a point where you as a pilot will be personally
> affected.
>

Chip, increased emphasis on reporting of pilot deviations seems to lead to a
need for increased pilot understanding of what constitutes a deviation from
an ATC point of view. I doubt that controllers are required to know the
FARs to the depth required to determine if a pilot is operating within the
regulations that apply to pilots in all cases, so a large part of it would
seem to fall back on reporting deviations from an ATC instruction or
clearance. So what constitutes a deviation? As an example, what deviation
in altitude constitutes a reportable deviation, if no loss of separation
occurs? It has been suggested in this thread that the Instrument PTS
standard of +/- 100 ft applies, but I doubt if controllers are familiar with
the PTS. So is there an ATC document that defines deviation limits? How
far off the centerline of an airway can I be before being reported? How
much heading error? How long a delay is allowed before I begin a descent
after being instructed to do so? If I am VFR in Class E airspace, and using
flight following, will I be reported for flying WAFDOF? Should we expect a
report on every student pilot doing T&Gs and landing without clearance,
rather than being scolded for a one-time error, if no problem occured?

Looks like a big can of worms to me.

Sta

[Larry Dighera]

On Sun, 10 Oct 2004 09:32:24 -0400, Matt Whiting
> wrote in >::

>
>If it was close enough to require a go-around, that seems close enough
>to me to warrant a report.

I would have to agree if separation were lost.

Here is a report from the AOPA web site with information on the FAA's
Runway Incursion Immunity policy for pilots. I'm not sure it applies
to controllers.


Pilot Counsel

FAA immunity for runway incursions

By John S. Yodice (From AOPA Pilot, June 2000.)

It seems that we can expect more uncomfortable one-on-one discussions
between pilots and FAA inspectors about possible regulatory
violations. We previously reported on the relatively new FAA
Streamlined Administrative Action Process (SAAP) program now in effect
(see "Pilot Counsel: FAA’s Ticket Program," September 1999 Pilot) and
offered some legal guidance to pilots. Now pilots may need some legal
guidance about participating in another new FAA program, the Runway
Incursion Information and Evaluation Program (RIIEP).

The title of the program tells us the purpose of the program—to gather
and evaluate information on runway incursions. It was announced on
March 19, 2000, and runs through March 19, 2001. The announcement
encourages pilots (and others) to give information to the FAA that
could help the agency get at the root causes of runway incursions.
Under the program, FAA field inspectors will seek to interview pilots
involved in such incidents, either in person or by telephone. In
exchange, the FAA offers cooperating pilots a limited immunity against
FAA enforcement.

No pilot needs to be convinced that the threat of a collision between
an aircraft taking off or landing and another aircraft, or vehicle, or
person, or other object on the runway is a serious safety problem.
According to the FAA, there has been an increase in such incidents in
recent years. The FAA says that pilot deviations are the leading cause
of runway incursions, increasing by 38 percent from 1997 to 1998. Not
surprisingly, the runway incursions most likely to cause accidents
generally occur at complex, high-volume airports.

The FAA usually has little problem in learning about runway incursions
and the pilots involved, since they happen at airports with control
towers. And the FAA has little trouble finding some infraction of the
federal aviation regulations that it can charge against one or more of
the pilots involved. The usual procedure in the past has been for an
FAA inspector to open an investigation when a controller reports a
runway incursion. An investigation often resulted in a suspension of
the certificate of one or more of the pilots, or less drastically, an
administrative action in the form of a warning notice or letter of
correction sent to the pilots.

This new program presents a dilemma for pilots. We certainly want to
cooperate with the FAA to solve the problem of runway incursions; but
in the process we don’t want to be cooperating ourselves into a
suspension of our pilot certificates or a black mark on our FAA
records. In the program, the FAA attempts to resolve this dilemma for
pilots by giving assurances that the usual enforcement action will not
be taken.

The FAA assurances take two forms. First, if a pilot cooperates,
subject to certain qualifications, "the FAA ordinarily does not expect
to take punitive legal enforcement action." Second, the FAA "does not
expect to use information provided by airmen during interviews
conducted by FAA inspectors under the RIIEP in any FAA punitive legal
enforcement action," according to the program.

Unfortunately, the assurances don’t seem to go far enough, using
qualifying words such as ordinarily and does not expect. They don’t
provide as much protection for the pilot as does the Aviation Safety
Reporting System, which is the time-honored method for anonymously and
confidentially getting safety information to the FAA in exchange for a
waiver of a disciplinary action.

So, what should a pilot do who gets a call from the tower or some FAA
inspector wanting to talk about an incident that is, or seems to be, a
"runway incursion"? In making a decision whether to cooperate, a pilot
needs to know his or her legal rights and the specifics of the
assurances that the FAA is offering. As we will see, the answer to
this question is complicated by the fact that a great deal of
discretion is given to the individual inspector in interpreting these
assurances.

To their credit, most pilots instinctively want to cooperate with the
FAA. That instinct is a good one. But pilots should understand that
participation in the program is strictly voluntary. A pilot has no
legal obligation to respond to an FAA inspector’s questions on a
possible runway incursion incident. Yet, answering the inspector’s
questions could cause the inspector to conclude that the program’s
immunity does not apply, or it could open the door to other
incriminating facts and circumstances.

Here is some general guidance. If there is anything aggravated about
the incident, it is probably best not to participate. For example, if
the circumstances are such that the FAA could allege that the
infraction was intentional (I don’t know of a runway incursion that
was intentional, but that is within the discretion of the inspector to
determine), the limited immunity would not apply. Or if there was an
accident as a result of the incursion, the immunity aspect of the
program would not apply. A pilot could be facing an enforcement
action to suspend or revoke the pilot certificate. The pilot should
seek some legal help before talking to the FAA, and before completing
an NTSB accident report.

The question becomes a muddy one if the incident is clearly
unintentional but does raise a question about the pilot’s
qualifications—for example, a runway incursion under circumstances
that suggest to the FAA that the pilot does not understand the air
traffic rules that govern an aircraft operating at an airport with a
control tower. The FAA will then ask the pilot to consent to a
reexamination or suffer a suspension of the pilot certificate. The
program says: "If alleged violation(s) resulting from the runway
incursion or the circumstances surrounding the runway incursion
demonstrate, or raise a question of, a lack of qualification of the
airman, then the FAA will proceed with appropriate remedial action,
which might include reexamination and/or certificate revocation or
certificate suspension pending reexamination."

If the incursion was unintentional, and the pilot does understand the
rules but just became confused or disoriented—which should be the case
in the majority of such events involving a pilot deviation—then
participation in the program is probably in order. That is a situation
where the FAA should be able to benefit most from an interview with
the pilot. We should expect that a reasonable inspector would take no
enforcement or administrative action against a cooperating pilot.
However, pilots should understand that even in such a situation, the
inspector has the discretion under the program of taking an
administrative action against the pilot. An administrative action does
not suspend or revoke a pilot certificate, but it will take the form
of a warning notice or letter of correction, which will be a matter of
record against the pilot for two years.

In any event, whether a pilot cooperates in the RIIEP or not, there
would seem to be no good reason not to file a NASA Safety Report (do
not report an accident or criminal activity, however) on NASA ARC Form
277 and get whatever immunity, anonymity, and confidentiality that is
available through that program.


Posted Friday, May 19, 2000 11:53:26 AM
©1995-2000 Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

[Larry Dighera]

On Sun, 10 Oct 2004 09:32:24 -0400, Matt Whiting
> wrote in >::

>
>If it was close enough to require a go-around, that seems close enough
>to me to warrant a report.

I would have to agree if separation were lost.

Here is a report from the AOPA web site with information on the FAA's
Runway Incursion Immunity policy for pilots. I'm not sure it applies
to controllers.


Pilot Counsel

FAA immunity for runway incursions

By John S. Yodice (From AOPA Pilot, June 2000.)

It seems that we can expect more uncomfortable one-on-one discussions
between pilots and FAA inspectors about possible regulatory
violations. We previously reported on the relatively new FAA
Streamlined Administrative Action Process (SAAP) program now in effect
(see "Pilot Counsel: FAA’s Ticket Program," September 1999 Pilot) and
offered some legal guidance to pilots. Now pilots may need some legal
guidance about participating in another new FAA program, the Runway
Incursion Information and Evaluation Program (RIIEP).

The title of the program tells us the purpose of the program—to gather
and evaluate information on runway incursions. It was announced on
March 19, 2000, and runs through March 19, 2001. The announcement
encourages pilots (and others) to give information to the FAA that
could help the agency get at the root causes of runway incursions.
Under the program, FAA field inspectors will seek to interview pilots
involved in such incidents, either in person or by telephone. In
exchange, the FAA offers cooperating pilots a limited immunity against
FAA enforcement.

No pilot needs to be convinced that the threat of a collision between
an aircraft taking off or landing and another aircraft, or vehicle, or
person, or other object on the runway is a serious safety problem.
According to the FAA, there has been an increase in such incidents in
recent years. The FAA says that pilot deviations are the leading cause
of runway incursions, increasing by 38 percent from 1997 to 1998. Not
surprisingly, the runway incursions most likely to cause accidents
generally occur at complex, high-volume airports.

The FAA usually has little problem in learning about runway incursions
and the pilots involved, since they happen at airports with control
towers. And the FAA has little trouble finding some infraction of the
federal aviation regulations that it can charge against one or more of
the pilots involved. The usual procedure in the past has been for an
FAA inspector to open an investigation when a controller reports a
runway incursion. An investigation often resulted in a suspension of
the certificate of one or more of the pilots, or less drastically, an
administrative action in the form of a warning notice or letter of
correction sent to the pilots.

This new program presents a dilemma for pilots. We certainly want to
cooperate with the FAA to solve the problem of runway incursions; but
in the process we don’t want to be cooperating ourselves into a
suspension of our pilot certificates or a black mark on our FAA
records. In the program, the FAA attempts to resolve this dilemma for
pilots by giving assurances that the usual enforcement action will not
be taken.

The FAA assurances take two forms. First, if a pilot cooperates,
subject to certain qualifications, "the FAA ordinarily does not expect
to take punitive legal enforcement action." Second, the FAA "does not
expect to use information provided by airmen during interviews
conducted by FAA inspectors under the RIIEP in any FAA punitive legal
enforcement action," according to the program.

Unfortunately, the assurances don’t seem to go far enough, using
qualifying words such as ordinarily and does not expect. They don’t
provide as much protection for the pilot as does the Aviation Safety
Reporting System, which is the time-honored method for anonymously and
confidentially getting safety information to the FAA in exchange for a
waiver of a disciplinary action.

So, what should a pilot do who gets a call from the tower or some FAA
inspector wanting to talk about an incident that is, or seems to be, a
"runway incursion"? In making a decision whether to cooperate, a pilot
needs to know his or her legal rights and the specifics of the
assurances that the FAA is offering. As we will see, the answer to
this question is complicated by the fact that a great deal of
discretion is given to the individual inspector in interpreting these
assurances.

To their credit, most pilots instinctively want to cooperate with the
FAA. That instinct is a good one. But pilots should understand that
participation in the program is strictly voluntary. A pilot has no
legal obligation to respond to an FAA inspector’s questions on a
possible runway incursion incident. Yet, answering the inspector’s
questions could cause the inspector to conclude that the program’s
immunity does not apply, or it could open the door to other
incriminating facts and circumstances.

Here is some general guidance. If there is anything aggravated about
the incident, it is probably best not to participate. For example, if
the circumstances are such that the FAA could allege that the
infraction was intentional (I don’t know of a runway incursion that
was intentional, but that is within the discretion of the inspector to
determine), the limited immunity would not apply. Or if there was an
accident as a result of the incursion, the immunity aspect of the
program would not apply. A pilot could be facing an enforcement
action to suspend or revoke the pilot certificate. The pilot should
seek some legal help before talking to the FAA, and before completing
an NTSB accident report.

The question becomes a muddy one if the incident is clearly
unintentional but does raise a question about the pilot’s
qualifications—for example, a runway incursion under circumstances
that suggest to the FAA that the pilot does not understand the air
traffic rules that govern an aircraft operating at an airport with a
control tower. The FAA will then ask the pilot to consent to a
reexamination or suffer a suspension of the pilot certificate. The
program says: "If alleged violation(s) resulting from the runway
incursion or the circumstances surrounding the runway incursion
demonstrate, or raise a question of, a lack of qualification of the
airman, then the FAA will proceed with appropriate remedial action,
which might include reexamination and/or certificate revocation or
certificate suspension pending reexamination."

If the incursion was unintentional, and the pilot does understand the
rules but just became confused or disoriented—which should be the case
in the majority of such events involving a pilot deviation—then
participation in the program is probably in order. That is a situation
where the FAA should be able to benefit most from an interview with
the pilot. We should expect that a reasonable inspector would take no
enforcement or administrative action against a cooperating pilot.
However, pilots should understand that even in such a situation, the
inspector has the discretion under the program of taking an
administrative action against the pilot. An administrative action does
not suspend or revoke a pilot certificate, but it will take the form
of a warning notice or letter of correction, which will be a matter of
record against the pilot for two years.

In any event, whether a pilot cooperates in the RIIEP or not, there
would seem to be no good reason not to file a NASA Safety Report (do
not report an accident or criminal activity, however) on NASA ARC Form
277 and get whatever immunity, anonymity, and confidentiality that is
available through that program.


Posted Friday, May 19, 2000 11:53:26 AM
©1995-2000 Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
>>
>>If it was close enough to require a go-around, that seems close enough
>>to me to warrant a report.
>>
>
> I would have to agree if separation were lost.
>

Separation isn't going to be lost as long as the aircraft executes the go
around. Of course, if the aircraft doesn't execute the go around, a
collision on the runway could result.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
>>
>>If it was close enough to require a go-around, that seems close enough
>>to me to warrant a report.
>>
>
> I would have to agree if separation were lost.
>

Separation isn't going to be lost as long as the aircraft executes the go
around. Of course, if the aircraft doesn't execute the go around, a
collision on the runway could result.

[Larry Dighera]

On Sun, 10 Oct 2004 14:50:09 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
> wrote in
.net>::

>
>"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
>>>
>>>If it was close enough to require a go-around, that seems close enough
>>>to me to warrant a report.
>>>
>>
>> I would have to agree if separation were lost.
>>
>
>Separation isn't going to be lost as long as the aircraft executes the go
>around.

Given:

FAA considers crossing a hold short line, if another aircraft is
within 3,000 feet, as an incursion, even if no collision hazard
exists.

The implication being, that a Loss Of Separation occurs if a
landing and/or departing Category I or II aircraft, and the
Category I aircraft operating contrary to ATC instruction, come
within the FAA Order 7110.65 '3-9-6. SAME RUNWAY SEPARATION'
paragraph 'a'mandated 3,000 foot separation of each other,
results in a Category D Runway Incursion regardless if there is a
collision hazard or not. If a Category III is involved, the
mandatory separation is 6,000 feet. If the runway is clear of
aircraft, paragraph 'b' removes the mandate for separation.

How can you be sure that the landing aircraft and the aircraft that
necessitated the go around couldn't come within 3,000' of each other?



Here's some relevant information:
------------------------------------
http://www1.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATC/index.htm

http://www1.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATC/Chp3/atc0309.html

3-9-5. ANTICIPATING SEPARATION

Takeoff clearance needs not be withheld until prescribed separation
exists if there is a reasonable assurance it will exist when the
aircraft starts takeoff roll.


3-9-6. SAME RUNWAY SEPARATION

Separate a departing aircraft from a preceding departing or arriving
aircraft using the same runway by ensuring that it does not begin
takeoff roll until:

a. The other aircraft has departed and crossed the runway end or
turned to avert any conflict. If you can determine distances by
reference to suitable landmarks, the other aircraft needs only
be airborne if the following minimum distance exists between aircraft:
(See FIG 3-9-1 and FIG 3-9-2.)

1. When only Category I aircraft are involved- 3,000 feet.

2. When a Category I aircraft is preceded by a Category II aircraft-
3,000 feet.

3. When either the succeeding or both are Category II aircraft- 4,500
feet.

4. When either is a Category III aircraft- 6,000 feet.

5. When the succeeding aircraft is a helicopter, visual separation may
be applied in lieu of using distance minima.

FIG 3-9-1

Same Runway Separation
[View 1]


FIG 3-9-2

Same Runway Separation
[View 2]


NOTE-
Aircraft same runway separation (SRS) categories are specified in
Appendices A, B, and C and based upon the following definitions:

CATEGORY I- small aircraft weighing 12,500 lbs. or less, with a single
propeller driven engine, and all helicopters.

CATEGORY II- small aircraft weighing 12,500 lbs. or less, with
propeller driven twin-engines.

CATEGORY III- all other aircraft.

b. A preceding landing aircraft is clear of the runway. (See FIG
3-9-3.)

FIG 3-9-3

Preceding Landing Aircraft Clear of Runway


REFERENCE-
P/CG Term- Clear of the Runway.

--------------------------------------------



Runway Incursion
A Runway Incursion is defined as any occurrence at an airport
involving an aircraft, vehicle, person or object on the ground that
creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of separation with an
aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to
land.

Surface Incident
A Surface Incident is defined as any event where unauthorized or
unapproved movement occurs within the movement area or an occurrence
in the movement area associated with the operation of an aircraft that
affects or could affect the safety of flight. Surface incidents result
from Pilot Deviations (PDs), Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations (VPDs), or
Operational Error/Deviations (OEs/ODs).

Differences between a runway incursion and a surface incident are: A
Runway Incursion occurs on a runway. A Surface Incident may occur on a
runway or a taxiway. A Runway Incursion has to have a collision hazard
or a loss of separation. The FAA categorizes Runway Incursions in four
categories depending on the potential for collision. These categories
are:

A Separation decreases and participants take extreme action to
narrowly avoid a collision.

B Separation decreases and there is a significant potential for
collision.

C Separation decreases but there is ample time and distance to avoid a
potential collision.

D Little or no chance of collision but meets the definition of a
runway incursion.

When defining a runway incursion it is recognized that a wide range of
variables dramatically impact the relative severity of a runway
incursion. Of these many variables, five key parameters were selected
to add dimension to the evaluation of relative severity.
The five operational dimensions are interdependent; for example,
aircraft speed will affect available reaction time. These five
operational dimensions (listed below) formed the basis for developing
the runway incursion categories that capture the spectrum of
severity.

Operational Dimensions Affecting Runway Incursion Severity

Operational Dimensions Description

Available Reaction Time Available Reaction Time
considers how much time the pilot, controllers, and/or vehicle
operators had to react to the situation based on aircraft type, phase
of flight, and separation distance.

Evasive or Corrective Action Evasive or Corrective Action
considers the need for and type of evasive or corrective maneuvers
required to avoid a runway collision by pilots and/or air traffic
controllers.

Environmental Conditions Environmental Conditions
considers visibility, surface conditions, and light conditions.

Speed of Aircraft and/or Vehicle Speed of Aircraft and/or
Vehicle – speed as a function of aircraft type and phase of flight
(taxi, takeoff, landing)

Proximity of Aircraft and/or Vehicle Proximity of Aircraft and/or
Vehicle, or their separation distance from one another.

--------------------------------------



>Of course, if the aircraft doesn't execute the go around, a
>collision on the runway could result.

That statement seems a little banal, or perhaps I'm missing its point.

[Larry Dighera]

On Sun, 10 Oct 2004 14:50:09 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
> wrote in
.net>::

>
>"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
>>>
>>>If it was close enough to require a go-around, that seems close enough
>>>to me to warrant a report.
>>>
>>
>> I would have to agree if separation were lost.
>>
>
>Separation isn't going to be lost as long as the aircraft executes the go
>around.

Given:

FAA considers crossing a hold short line, if another aircraft is
within 3,000 feet, as an incursion, even if no collision hazard
exists.

The implication being, that a Loss Of Separation occurs if a
landing and/or departing Category I or II aircraft, and the
Category I aircraft operating contrary to ATC instruction, come
within the FAA Order 7110.65 '3-9-6. SAME RUNWAY SEPARATION'
paragraph 'a'mandated 3,000 foot separation of each other,
results in a Category D Runway Incursion regardless if there is a
collision hazard or not. If a Category III is involved, the
mandatory separation is 6,000 feet. If the runway is clear of
aircraft, paragraph 'b' removes the mandate for separation.

How can you be sure that the landing aircraft and the aircraft that
necessitated the go around couldn't come within 3,000' of each other?



Here's some relevant information:
------------------------------------
http://www1.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATC/index.htm

http://www1.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATC/Chp3/atc0309.html

3-9-5. ANTICIPATING SEPARATION

Takeoff clearance needs not be withheld until prescribed separation
exists if there is a reasonable assurance it will exist when the
aircraft starts takeoff roll.


3-9-6. SAME RUNWAY SEPARATION

Separate a departing aircraft from a preceding departing or arriving
aircraft using the same runway by ensuring that it does not begin
takeoff roll until:

a. The other aircraft has departed and crossed the runway end or
turned to avert any conflict. If you can determine distances by
reference to suitable landmarks, the other aircraft needs only
be airborne if the following minimum distance exists between aircraft:
(See FIG 3-9-1 and FIG 3-9-2.)

1. When only Category I aircraft are involved- 3,000 feet.

2. When a Category I aircraft is preceded by a Category II aircraft-
3,000 feet.

3. When either the succeeding or both are Category II aircraft- 4,500
feet.

4. When either is a Category III aircraft- 6,000 feet.

5. When the succeeding aircraft is a helicopter, visual separation may
be applied in lieu of using distance minima.

FIG 3-9-1

Same Runway Separation
[View 1]


FIG 3-9-2

Same Runway Separation
[View 2]


NOTE-
Aircraft same runway separation (SRS) categories are specified in
Appendices A, B, and C and based upon the following definitions:

CATEGORY I- small aircraft weighing 12,500 lbs. or less, with a single
propeller driven engine, and all helicopters.

CATEGORY II- small aircraft weighing 12,500 lbs. or less, with
propeller driven twin-engines.

CATEGORY III- all other aircraft.

b. A preceding landing aircraft is clear of the runway. (See FIG
3-9-3.)

FIG 3-9-3

Preceding Landing Aircraft Clear of Runway


REFERENCE-
P/CG Term- Clear of the Runway.

--------------------------------------------



Runway Incursion
A Runway Incursion is defined as any occurrence at an airport
involving an aircraft, vehicle, person or object on the ground that
creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of separation with an
aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to
land.

Surface Incident
A Surface Incident is defined as any event where unauthorized or
unapproved movement occurs within the movement area or an occurrence
in the movement area associated with the operation of an aircraft that
affects or could affect the safety of flight. Surface incidents result
from Pilot Deviations (PDs), Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations (VPDs), or
Operational Error/Deviations (OEs/ODs).

Differences between a runway incursion and a surface incident are: A
Runway Incursion occurs on a runway. A Surface Incident may occur on a
runway or a taxiway. A Runway Incursion has to have a collision hazard
or a loss of separation. The FAA categorizes Runway Incursions in four
categories depending on the potential for collision. These categories
are:

A Separation decreases and participants take extreme action to
narrowly avoid a collision.

B Separation decreases and there is a significant potential for
collision.

C Separation decreases but there is ample time and distance to avoid a
potential collision.

D Little or no chance of collision but meets the definition of a
runway incursion.

When defining a runway incursion it is recognized that a wide range of
variables dramatically impact the relative severity of a runway
incursion. Of these many variables, five key parameters were selected
to add dimension to the evaluation of relative severity.
The five operational dimensions are interdependent; for example,
aircraft speed will affect available reaction time. These five
operational dimensions (listed below) formed the basis for developing
the runway incursion categories that capture the spectrum of
severity.

Operational Dimensions Affecting Runway Incursion Severity

Operational Dimensions Description

Available Reaction Time Available Reaction Time
considers how much time the pilot, controllers, and/or vehicle
operators had to react to the situation based on aircraft type, phase
of flight, and separation distance.

Evasive or Corrective Action Evasive or Corrective Action
considers the need for and type of evasive or corrective maneuvers
required to avoid a runway collision by pilots and/or air traffic
controllers.

Environmental Conditions Environmental Conditions
considers visibility, surface conditions, and light conditions.

Speed of Aircraft and/or Vehicle Speed of Aircraft and/or
Vehicle – speed as a function of aircraft type and phase of flight
(taxi, takeoff, landing)

Proximity of Aircraft and/or Vehicle Proximity of Aircraft and/or
Vehicle, or their separation distance from one another.

--------------------------------------



>Of course, if the aircraft doesn't execute the go around, a
>collision on the runway could result.

That statement seems a little banal, or perhaps I'm missing its point.

[Tom S.]

"C Kingsbury" > wrote in message
link.net...
>
> "Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
> news:ze1ad.13857
> >
> > Being off by 50' in cruise wouldn't be noticed.
> >
>
> OK, to be precise, 100'+/- is OK, and encoders click over at 51', right?
So
> you'd have to be 151' off for it to show as outside tolerance. Fly over
some
> building cumulus in a 172 sometime- that can left your skirts 100' before
> you know it. Better have that altitude nailed or you've violated your
> clearance.
>
Hell, I remember vertical deviations of a lot more than that, with the VSI
being dam near pegged on the climb/descend scale in some sizeable twins,
during some turbulence.

I was on an Embrarer 55 out of Houston and heard the warning horn going off
in the cockpit during turbulence that I think got us zero gravity at a
couple of points.

[Tom S.]

"C Kingsbury" > wrote in message
link.net...
>
> "Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
> news:ze1ad.13857
> >
> > Being off by 50' in cruise wouldn't be noticed.
> >
>
> OK, to be precise, 100'+/- is OK, and encoders click over at 51', right?
So
> you'd have to be 151' off for it to show as outside tolerance. Fly over
some
> building cumulus in a 172 sometime- that can left your skirts 100' before
> you know it. Better have that altitude nailed or you've violated your
> clearance.
>
Hell, I remember vertical deviations of a lot more than that, with the VSI
being dam near pegged on the climb/descend scale in some sizeable twins,
during some turbulence.

I was on an Embrarer 55 out of Houston and heard the warning horn going off
in the cockpit during turbulence that I think got us zero gravity at a
couple of points.

[Tom S.]

"Kyler Laird" > wrote in message
...
>
> I'd like to think we'd all change our assumptions given sufficient
> evidence to the contrary.
>
Haven't been around Usenet very long, have 'ya? :~)

[Tom S.]

"Kyler Laird" > wrote in message
...
>
> I'd like to think we'd all change our assumptions given sufficient
> evidence to the contrary.
>
Haven't been around Usenet very long, have 'ya? :~)

[Everett M. Greene]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > writes:
> "Chip Jones" > wrote
[snip]
> > Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> > small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> > because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots help
> > controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an old
> > clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
> > that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
> > antagonistic Management.
>
> Pilot deviations come in a variety of flavors. A pilot may bust his
> altitude but if there's no other traffic around there's no hazard. No harm,
> no foul, no loss of separation.
>
> At the other extreme a pilot blowing a runway hold short as another aircraft
> is about to touch down can be disastrous.
>
> On what side of the line should be placed the situation where there was no
> loss of separation only because an alert controller stepped in?

I thought the FAA was under the gun to gain better and more
info regarding runway incursions. It sounds as if a controller
may have been admonished/penalized/whatever for failure to make
a "required" report of a runway incursion, not just a simple
pilot deviation. It seems as if the cited incident was quite
serious even though the system worked and no untoward harm
came to any of the parties involved.

[Everett M. Greene]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > writes:
> "Chip Jones" > wrote
[snip]
> > Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> > small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> > because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots help
> > controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an old
> > clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
> > that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
> > antagonistic Management.
>
> Pilot deviations come in a variety of flavors. A pilot may bust his
> altitude but if there's no other traffic around there's no hazard. No harm,
> no foul, no loss of separation.
>
> At the other extreme a pilot blowing a runway hold short as another aircraft
> is about to touch down can be disastrous.
>
> On what side of the line should be placed the situation where there was no
> loss of separation only because an alert controller stepped in?

I thought the FAA was under the gun to gain better and more
info regarding runway incursions. It sounds as if a controller
may have been admonished/penalized/whatever for failure to make
a "required" report of a runway incursion, not just a simple
pilot deviation. It seems as if the cited incident was quite
serious even though the system worked and no untoward harm
came to any of the parties involved.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Everett M. Greene" > wrote in message
...
>
> I thought the FAA was under the gun to gain better and more
> info regarding runway incursions. It sounds as if a controller
> may have been admonished/penalized/whatever for failure to make
> a "required" report of a runway incursion, not just a simple
> pilot deviation. It seems as if the cited incident was quite
> serious even though the system worked and no untoward harm
> came to any of the parties involved.
>

Yup, runway incursions has been the hot item for several years.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Everett M. Greene" > wrote in message
...
>
> I thought the FAA was under the gun to gain better and more
> info regarding runway incursions. It sounds as if a controller
> may have been admonished/penalized/whatever for failure to make
> a "required" report of a runway incursion, not just a simple
> pilot deviation. It seems as if the cited incident was quite
> serious even though the system worked and no untoward harm
> came to any of the parties involved.
>

Yup, runway incursions has been the hot item for several years.

[TJ Girl]

Larry Dighera > wrote in message >...

> That FAAO mentions: "The identification of operational errors and
> deviations without fear of reprisal is an absolute requirement and is
> the responsibility of all of us who work within our [NAS] system."

Careful of pulling this from context. The word "operational" above
applies to both "errors" and "deviations".
An operational deviation is NOT the equivilent of a pilot deviation.
An operational deviation would be something like a controller letting
a pilot enter another controller's airspace without a handoff or other
form of coordination.

Operational deviations are what are required to be reported under that
section, not pilot deviations.

[TJ Girl]

Larry Dighera > wrote in message >...

> That FAAO mentions: "The identification of operational errors and
> deviations without fear of reprisal is an absolute requirement and is
> the responsibility of all of us who work within our [NAS] system."

Careful of pulling this from context. The word "operational" above
applies to both "errors" and "deviations".
An operational deviation is NOT the equivilent of a pilot deviation.
An operational deviation would be something like a controller letting
a pilot enter another controller's airspace without a handoff or other
form of coordination.

Operational deviations are what are required to be reported under that
section, not pilot deviations.

[zatatime]

On 10 Oct 2004 16:07:45 -0700, (TJ Girl) wrote:

>Operational deviations are what are required to be reported under that
>section, not pilot deviations.


I wonder if this could be where some of the confusion is coming from
by asking pilots to give a reason for their flight deviations.

z

[zatatime]

On 10 Oct 2004 16:07:45 -0700, (TJ Girl) wrote:

>Operational deviations are what are required to be reported under that
>section, not pilot deviations.


I wonder if this could be where some of the confusion is coming from
by asking pilots to give a reason for their flight deviations.

z

[Matt Young]

WAFDOF?

Stan Prevost wrote:
> "Chip Jones" > wrote in message
> link.net...
>
>>OK pilots, try this one on for size. As you likely know, there is a wide
>>and growing rift between the career FAA bureaucrats (aka FAA Management)
>
> who
>
>>run the monstrosity called the federal Air Traffic Organization, and the
>>career FAA air traffic controllers who make that monstrosity work in the
>
> NAS
>
>>on a daily basis. Regardless of where you stand on the politics of US air
>>traffic control (funding, privatization, user-fees, labor issues,
>
> whatever),
>
>>the ugly, on-going feud between Management and Labor in air traffic
>
> control
>
>>may finally have reached a point where you as a pilot will be personally
>>affected.
>>
>
>
> Chip, increased emphasis on reporting of pilot deviations seems to lead to a
> need for increased pilot understanding of what constitutes a deviation from
> an ATC point of view. I doubt that controllers are required to know the
> FARs to the depth required to determine if a pilot is operating within the
> regulations that apply to pilots in all cases, so a large part of it would
> seem to fall back on reporting deviations from an ATC instruction or
> clearance. So what constitutes a deviation? As an example, what deviation
> in altitude constitutes a reportable deviation, if no loss of separation
> occurs? It has been suggested in this thread that the Instrument PTS
> standard of +/- 100 ft applies, but I doubt if controllers are familiar with
> the PTS. So is there an ATC document that defines deviation limits? How
> far off the centerline of an airway can I be before being reported? How
> much heading error? How long a delay is allowed before I begin a descent
> after being instructed to do so? If I am VFR in Class E airspace, and using
> flight following, will I be reported for flying WAFDOF? Should we expect a
> report on every student pilot doing T&Gs and landing without clearance,
> rather than being scolded for a one-time error, if no problem occured?
>
> Looks like a big can of worms to me.
>
> Sta
>
>

[Matt Young]

WAFDOF?

Stan Prevost wrote:
> "Chip Jones" > wrote in message
> link.net...
>
>>OK pilots, try this one on for size. As you likely know, there is a wide
>>and growing rift between the career FAA bureaucrats (aka FAA Management)
>
> who
>
>>run the monstrosity called the federal Air Traffic Organization, and the
>>career FAA air traffic controllers who make that monstrosity work in the
>
> NAS
>
>>on a daily basis. Regardless of where you stand on the politics of US air
>>traffic control (funding, privatization, user-fees, labor issues,
>
> whatever),
>
>>the ugly, on-going feud between Management and Labor in air traffic
>
> control
>
>>may finally have reached a point where you as a pilot will be personally
>>affected.
>>
>
>
> Chip, increased emphasis on reporting of pilot deviations seems to lead to a
> need for increased pilot understanding of what constitutes a deviation from
> an ATC point of view. I doubt that controllers are required to know the
> FARs to the depth required to determine if a pilot is operating within the
> regulations that apply to pilots in all cases, so a large part of it would
> seem to fall back on reporting deviations from an ATC instruction or
> clearance. So what constitutes a deviation? As an example, what deviation
> in altitude constitutes a reportable deviation, if no loss of separation
> occurs? It has been suggested in this thread that the Instrument PTS
> standard of +/- 100 ft applies, but I doubt if controllers are familiar with
> the PTS. So is there an ATC document that defines deviation limits? How
> far off the centerline of an airway can I be before being reported? How
> much heading error? How long a delay is allowed before I begin a descent
> after being instructed to do so? If I am VFR in Class E airspace, and using
> flight following, will I be reported for flying WAFDOF? Should we expect a
> report on every student pilot doing T&Gs and landing without clearance,
> rather than being scolded for a one-time error, if no problem occured?
>
> Looks like a big can of worms to me.
>
> Sta
>
>

[Roy Smith]

In article et>,
Matt Young > wrote:

> WAFDOF?

Wrong Altitude For Direction Of Flight, flying westbound at 7500 instead
of 6500.

[Roy Smith]

In article et>,
Matt Young > wrote:

> WAFDOF?

Wrong Altitude For Direction Of Flight, flying westbound at 7500 instead
of 6500.

[Chip Jones]

"Stan Prevost" > wrote in message
...
>
> Chip, increased emphasis on reporting of pilot deviations seems to lead to
a
> need for increased pilot understanding of what constitutes a deviation
from
> an ATC point of view. I doubt that controllers are required to know the
> FARs to the depth required to determine if a pilot is operating within the
> regulations that apply to pilots in all cases, so a large part of it would
> seem to fall back on reporting deviations from an ATC instruction or
> clearance. So what constitutes a deviation? As an example, what
deviation
> in altitude constitutes a reportable deviation, if no loss of separation
> occurs? It has been suggested in this thread that the Instrument PTS
> standard of +/- 100 ft applies, but I doubt if controllers are familiar
with
> the PTS. So is there an ATC document that defines deviation limits?

We give you 200 feet, plus the change if I remember correctly. When you get
to 300 feet above or below assigned altitude, your data block "breaks" and
ATC considers that you've busted your altitude.

>How
> far off the centerline of an airway can I be before being reported?

4 miles...


>How
> much heading error?

Good question. As a Center guy, I don't have a ready answer. To me, it
depends on whether you are assigned a heading/vector for traffic or if you
are navigating airways or point to point own nav. If you're on an assigned
vector, say 30 degrees left for traffic, and I never see you make the turn,
to me you have deviated your clearance. However, for FSDO you will likely
never get stuck with a PD, because I can't prove where the winds are etc.
Too many variables in all of these categories for me.

> How long a delay is allowed before I begin a descent
> after being instructed to do so?

US Airways, Delta and Northwest have all been guilty in my ARTCC of reading
back descent clearances and then remaining at the original altitude for over
five minutes before staring a descent. To the controllers involved who
subsequently were charged with operational errors when USA, DAL and NWA lost
vertical separation with traffic, the crews were guilty of PD's for not
adhering to clearance. In all three cases, FSDO refused to prosecute PD's,
even though the AIM (non-regulatory) was not complied with by the pilots who
read back those clearances. Sadky, I have no idea how long a delay is
allowed, and neither does anyone else in the system. I know what I think
constitutes as PD here, but I'm biased towards you starting a descent as
soon as you acknowledge the clearance. FSDO doesn't agree with me in this
area of the country.


> If I am VFR in Class E airspace, and using
> flight following, will I be reported for flying WAFDOF?

Well, according to the ATC QA Order you should be reported if you are
violating any FAR's.

> Should we expect
>a
> report on every student pilot doing T&Gs and landing without clearance,
> rather than being scolded for a one-time error, if no problem occured?

Really productive for air safety, ain't it?

>
> Looks like a big can of worms to me.

It's all a huge can of worms better left unopened, IMO.

Chip, ZTL

[Chip Jones]

"Stan Prevost" > wrote in message
...
>
> Chip, increased emphasis on reporting of pilot deviations seems to lead to
a
> need for increased pilot understanding of what constitutes a deviation
from
> an ATC point of view. I doubt that controllers are required to know the
> FARs to the depth required to determine if a pilot is operating within the
> regulations that apply to pilots in all cases, so a large part of it would
> seem to fall back on reporting deviations from an ATC instruction or
> clearance. So what constitutes a deviation? As an example, what
deviation
> in altitude constitutes a reportable deviation, if no loss of separation
> occurs? It has been suggested in this thread that the Instrument PTS
> standard of +/- 100 ft applies, but I doubt if controllers are familiar
with
> the PTS. So is there an ATC document that defines deviation limits?

We give you 200 feet, plus the change if I remember correctly. When you get
to 300 feet above or below assigned altitude, your data block "breaks" and
ATC considers that you've busted your altitude.

>How
> far off the centerline of an airway can I be before being reported?

4 miles...


>How
> much heading error?

Good question. As a Center guy, I don't have a ready answer. To me, it
depends on whether you are assigned a heading/vector for traffic or if you
are navigating airways or point to point own nav. If you're on an assigned
vector, say 30 degrees left for traffic, and I never see you make the turn,
to me you have deviated your clearance. However, for FSDO you will likely
never get stuck with a PD, because I can't prove where the winds are etc.
Too many variables in all of these categories for me.

> How long a delay is allowed before I begin a descent
> after being instructed to do so?

US Airways, Delta and Northwest have all been guilty in my ARTCC of reading
back descent clearances and then remaining at the original altitude for over
five minutes before staring a descent. To the controllers involved who
subsequently were charged with operational errors when USA, DAL and NWA lost
vertical separation with traffic, the crews were guilty of PD's for not
adhering to clearance. In all three cases, FSDO refused to prosecute PD's,
even though the AIM (non-regulatory) was not complied with by the pilots who
read back those clearances. Sadky, I have no idea how long a delay is
allowed, and neither does anyone else in the system. I know what I think
constitutes as PD here, but I'm biased towards you starting a descent as
soon as you acknowledge the clearance. FSDO doesn't agree with me in this
area of the country.


> If I am VFR in Class E airspace, and using
> flight following, will I be reported for flying WAFDOF?

Well, according to the ATC QA Order you should be reported if you are
violating any FAR's.

> Should we expect
>a
> report on every student pilot doing T&Gs and landing without clearance,
> rather than being scolded for a one-time error, if no problem occured?

Really productive for air safety, ain't it?

>
> Looks like a big can of worms to me.

It's all a huge can of worms better left unopened, IMO.

Chip, ZTL

[J Haggerty]

C Kingsbury wrote:

> "Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 18:39:39 GMT, "C Kingsbury"
> wrote in
. net>::
>>
>>
>>>In most states you can get ticketed for "failure to stop at a stop sign"
>
> for
>
>>>something as simple as not coming to a complete stop. You slow to less
>
> than
>
>>Actually, there is a rational reason for making a complete stop at a
>>boulevard stop sign.
>
>
> There is no rational reason when you can clearly see there is no conflicting
> traffic within a mile, unless you count the slippery-slope theory, and I
> don't.

Yeah, the guy that ran into my bike with his van as I went through the
intersection thought he slowed enough to see all traffic, too. If he had
stopped completely, he would have seen me. Unfortunately, he rolled
through, and did not see me because I was hidden from his sight by his
"A" pillar, which was keeping me hidden from his view (in his blind
spot) because he kept moving through the stop sign. This is one good
reason why you should come to a stop at a stop sign. Of course the few
seconds he might have saved ended up being an expensive proposition for
him, and a painful visit to the hospital for me.

>
>
>>>Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
>>>reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes,
>>
>>Because mode c transponders only report altitude in even hundreds,
>>that isn't very likely.
>
>
> OK, 51' then. You get my point. There are deviations that clearly require
> reporting and others that can be pretty effectively addressed by an ATC
> tonguelashing. Unless someone shows me evidence that safety is being
> degraded by failure to report every possible PD I'm going to say that the
> way things work today are fine.
>

Actually, as a controller, I never considered or questioned an enroute
altitude deviation unless it exceeded 300' or was a threat to another
aircraft. At that point a controller has to determine if the pilots mode
C is incorrect or if he has just deviated from the assigned altitude.

>
>>The increased workload may be sufficient to stimulate demand for
>>additional ATC personnel hiring.
>
>
> No, it will stimulate demand for more desk-bound paper-pushing "inspectors"
> whose biggest concern is a loss of separation between them and their lunch
> break. No government bureaucracy has ever responded to added workload by
> becoming more efficient.
>
>
>>Until we
>>know the language of the regulations governing ATC reporting PDs, it
>>is difficult to form an opinion as to the appropriateness of the
>>change in policy.
>
>
> Well, I wouldn't say so. There is a perfectly good argument to (a) have a
> regulation that requires reporting every PD and (b) routinely ignore it.
> Basically, you need to have the rule, so that you can go after a controller
> who reports nobody no matter what because he's lazy. OTOH, reporting every
> single incident when not necessary in the controller's view is just
> paper-chasing and serves no end.
>
> I will abort this line of argument if someone can show me that there is a
> real safety issue here backed by something more than a gut instinct.

The example Chip gave was something that should have been reported
without a second thought. The example included another pilot having to
take evasive action because an aircraft entered the runway without
approval. Whether the pilot initiated the go-around or it was directed
by ATC is irrelevant, plus runway incursions are a hot topic in the FAA
these days, generating their own special reporting.


JPH
>
> -cwk.
>
>

[J Haggerty]

C Kingsbury wrote:

> "Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 18:39:39 GMT, "C Kingsbury"
> wrote in
. net>::
>>
>>
>>>In most states you can get ticketed for "failure to stop at a stop sign"
>
> for
>
>>>something as simple as not coming to a complete stop. You slow to less
>
> than
>
>>Actually, there is a rational reason for making a complete stop at a
>>boulevard stop sign.
>
>
> There is no rational reason when you can clearly see there is no conflicting
> traffic within a mile, unless you count the slippery-slope theory, and I
> don't.

Yeah, the guy that ran into my bike with his van as I went through the
intersection thought he slowed enough to see all traffic, too. If he had
stopped completely, he would have seen me. Unfortunately, he rolled
through, and did not see me because I was hidden from his sight by his
"A" pillar, which was keeping me hidden from his view (in his blind
spot) because he kept moving through the stop sign. This is one good
reason why you should come to a stop at a stop sign. Of course the few
seconds he might have saved ended up being an expensive proposition for
him, and a painful visit to the hospital for me.

>
>
>>>Now, perhaps when management gets deluged with
>>>reports of 50' altitude deviations and other trivial mistakes,
>>
>>Because mode c transponders only report altitude in even hundreds,
>>that isn't very likely.
>
>
> OK, 51' then. You get my point. There are deviations that clearly require
> reporting and others that can be pretty effectively addressed by an ATC
> tonguelashing. Unless someone shows me evidence that safety is being
> degraded by failure to report every possible PD I'm going to say that the
> way things work today are fine.
>

Actually, as a controller, I never considered or questioned an enroute
altitude deviation unless it exceeded 300' or was a threat to another
aircraft. At that point a controller has to determine if the pilots mode
C is incorrect or if he has just deviated from the assigned altitude.

>
>>The increased workload may be sufficient to stimulate demand for
>>additional ATC personnel hiring.
>
>
> No, it will stimulate demand for more desk-bound paper-pushing "inspectors"
> whose biggest concern is a loss of separation between them and their lunch
> break. No government bureaucracy has ever responded to added workload by
> becoming more efficient.
>
>
>>Until we
>>know the language of the regulations governing ATC reporting PDs, it
>>is difficult to form an opinion as to the appropriateness of the
>>change in policy.
>
>
> Well, I wouldn't say so. There is a perfectly good argument to (a) have a
> regulation that requires reporting every PD and (b) routinely ignore it.
> Basically, you need to have the rule, so that you can go after a controller
> who reports nobody no matter what because he's lazy. OTOH, reporting every
> single incident when not necessary in the controller's view is just
> paper-chasing and serves no end.
>
> I will abort this line of argument if someone can show me that there is a
> real safety issue here backed by something more than a gut instinct.

The example Chip gave was something that should have been reported
without a second thought. The example included another pilot having to
take evasive action because an aircraft entered the runway without
approval. Whether the pilot initiated the go-around or it was directed
by ATC is irrelevant, plus runway incursions are a hot topic in the FAA
these days, generating their own special reporting.


JPH
>
> -cwk.
>
>

[J Haggerty]

Chip Jones wrote:

> "Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
>>No offense, Chip, but runway incursions are a pretty serious deviation.
>> I'm not sure I can fault the Feds for wanting these reported given
>>some of the past fatal accidents caused by them.
>>
>
>
> Matt, no offense taken. I agree with you that runway incursions are a
> pretty serious deviation, but where do you draw the line for a "pretty
> serious" pilot deviation? It is my opinion that the controller working the
> situation, the person who issued the ignored hold short instruction, is the
> Fed on the scene. Not the tower chief coming in on the scene a few days
> later, If the person issuing ATC clearances sees no harm, no foul and
> gives the crew a pass, why not leave it there? No loss of separation
> occurred in this event. In FAA speak, "Safety was never compromised." No
> harm done. Why crucify the controller for not crucifying the pilot and
> crew?

Chip, you mentioned "no harm, no foul", but you also said the arriving
aircraft was given a go-around because this aircraft had taxied onto the
runway. That doesn't sound like "no harm no foul" to me. It sounds like
without the go-around, loss of separation would have occurred,
otherwise, a go-around would not have been needed?
For a pilot of an air carrier to taxi onto the runway after being told
to hold short and reading back the hold short instructions is a major
screw-up. Next time it might be IFR where you can't see the aircraft and
you wouldn't be aware that you have to issue a go-around to the
arriving aircraft.
What's worse is that you mentioned the aircraft had an FO? That means 2
people weren't paying attention and the FO didn't catch the pilots error
or was afraid to override the pilot (that happened at Tenerife several
years ago, too)
Or maybe the controller made a mistake and was worried that reporting
the error would reveal his error when the tapes were transcribed.
Sounds like your NATCA rep was just saying you should report it to your
supervisor and put it on his back. Good advice, unless you're willing
to take the responsibility for ignoring regulations.

JPH

>
> And if you go after the controller for not narcing on the flight crew in
> this case, then you have to go after every controller in every case of every
> observed but unreported pilot deviation. To me, such a policy is
> counter-productive to air safety because it builds an adversarial
> relationship between ATC and pilots. After all, the controller got a paper
> slap on the wrist compared to the likely loss of pay and possible loss of
> employment for the captain and FO of the airliner in question. I prefer "no
> harm, no foul" unless actual harm was committed.
>
> Chip, ZTL
>
>

[J Haggerty]

Chip Jones wrote:

> "Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
>>No offense, Chip, but runway incursions are a pretty serious deviation.
>> I'm not sure I can fault the Feds for wanting these reported given
>>some of the past fatal accidents caused by them.
>>
>
>
> Matt, no offense taken. I agree with you that runway incursions are a
> pretty serious deviation, but where do you draw the line for a "pretty
> serious" pilot deviation? It is my opinion that the controller working the
> situation, the person who issued the ignored hold short instruction, is the
> Fed on the scene. Not the tower chief coming in on the scene a few days
> later, If the person issuing ATC clearances sees no harm, no foul and
> gives the crew a pass, why not leave it there? No loss of separation
> occurred in this event. In FAA speak, "Safety was never compromised." No
> harm done. Why crucify the controller for not crucifying the pilot and
> crew?

Chip, you mentioned "no harm, no foul", but you also said the arriving
aircraft was given a go-around because this aircraft had taxied onto the
runway. That doesn't sound like "no harm no foul" to me. It sounds like
without the go-around, loss of separation would have occurred,
otherwise, a go-around would not have been needed?
For a pilot of an air carrier to taxi onto the runway after being told
to hold short and reading back the hold short instructions is a major
screw-up. Next time it might be IFR where you can't see the aircraft and
you wouldn't be aware that you have to issue a go-around to the
arriving aircraft.
What's worse is that you mentioned the aircraft had an FO? That means 2
people weren't paying attention and the FO didn't catch the pilots error
or was afraid to override the pilot (that happened at Tenerife several
years ago, too)
Or maybe the controller made a mistake and was worried that reporting
the error would reveal his error when the tapes were transcribed.
Sounds like your NATCA rep was just saying you should report it to your
supervisor and put it on his back. Good advice, unless you're willing
to take the responsibility for ignoring regulations.

JPH

>
> And if you go after the controller for not narcing on the flight crew in
> this case, then you have to go after every controller in every case of every
> observed but unreported pilot deviation. To me, such a policy is
> counter-productive to air safety because it builds an adversarial
> relationship between ATC and pilots. After all, the controller got a paper
> slap on the wrist compared to the likely loss of pay and possible loss of
> employment for the captain and FO of the airliner in question. I prefer "no
> harm, no foul" unless actual harm was committed.
>
> Chip, ZTL
>
>

[J Haggerty]

Wrong altitude for direction of flight.

JPH

Matt Young wrote:

> WAFDOF?
>

[J Haggerty]

Wrong altitude for direction of flight.

JPH

Matt Young wrote:

> WAFDOF?
>

[Howard Nelson]

> Actually, as a controller, I never considered or questioned an enroute
> altitude deviation unless it exceeded 300' or was a threat to another
> aircraft. At that point a controller has to determine if the pilots mode
> C is incorrect or if he has just deviated from the assigned altitude.

I knew about this. My altimeter shows my "actual" altitude and after
recycling my transponder will closely agree.

>I know what I think constitutes as PD here, but I'm biased towards you
starting a descent as
>soon as you acknowledge the clearance. FSDO doesn't agree with me in this
area of the country.

I didn't know about this. So is the lesson to be learned "don't acknowledge
a clearance until ready to comply".

Just kidding. :)

I do hope that controllers are left with reasonable discretion on what to
formally report and what to let pass. "Work to rule" on the part of Managers
or Controllers will be counterproductive for everyone involved.

Howard


---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.775 / Virus Database: 522 - Release Date: 10/8/2004

[Howard Nelson]

> Actually, as a controller, I never considered or questioned an enroute
> altitude deviation unless it exceeded 300' or was a threat to another
> aircraft. At that point a controller has to determine if the pilots mode
> C is incorrect or if he has just deviated from the assigned altitude.

I knew about this. My altimeter shows my "actual" altitude and after
recycling my transponder will closely agree.

>I know what I think constitutes as PD here, but I'm biased towards you
starting a descent as
>soon as you acknowledge the clearance. FSDO doesn't agree with me in this
area of the country.

I didn't know about this. So is the lesson to be learned "don't acknowledge
a clearance until ready to comply".

Just kidding. :)

I do hope that controllers are left with reasonable discretion on what to
formally report and what to let pass. "Work to rule" on the part of Managers
or Controllers will be counterproductive for everyone involved.

Howard


---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.775 / Virus Database: 522 - Release Date: 10/8/2004

[John Clonts]

"Matt Young" > wrote in message ink.net...
> WAFDOF?
>

www.acronymfinder.com

[John Clonts]

"Matt Young" > wrote in message ink.net...
> WAFDOF?
>

www.acronymfinder.com

[Michael]

"Chip Jones" > wrote
> Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> small slice of the NAS.

Breaking news story - pilots are human and make mistakes. In other
news, the sun rose this morning.

> I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality.

And frankly, I think that's an inherently wrong approach. These
deviation should be reported and tracked - because by studying them
(not as individual deviations but as patterns and trends) we might
discover a lot of things. We might discover what sorts of
circumstances significantly increase the likelihood of a deviation.
We might discover which kinds of deviations are most likely to lead to
an accident, by knowing how often the different ones occur. We might
learn a lot of things.

But we won't, because the people who will receive these reports of
deviation are a bunch of useless bloody loonies (to quote Douglas
Adams) and the only thing they will use these reports of pilot
deviation to do is bust pilots they don't like.

Therefore, your "no harm, no foul" approach is really for the best -
because anything else really will do nothing but create an adversarial
relationship between pilots and controllers with no benefit
whatsoever.

Michael

[Michael]

"Chip Jones" > wrote
> Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> small slice of the NAS.

Breaking news story - pilots are human and make mistakes. In other
news, the sun rose this morning.

> I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality.

And frankly, I think that's an inherently wrong approach. These
deviation should be reported and tracked - because by studying them
(not as individual deviations but as patterns and trends) we might
discover a lot of things. We might discover what sorts of
circumstances significantly increase the likelihood of a deviation.
We might discover which kinds of deviations are most likely to lead to
an accident, by knowing how often the different ones occur. We might
learn a lot of things.

But we won't, because the people who will receive these reports of
deviation are a bunch of useless bloody loonies (to quote Douglas
Adams) and the only thing they will use these reports of pilot
deviation to do is bust pilots they don't like.

Therefore, your "no harm, no foul" approach is really for the best -
because anything else really will do nothing but create an adversarial
relationship between pilots and controllers with no benefit
whatsoever.

Michael

[Matt Whiting]

J Haggerty wrote:

> Actually, as a controller, I never considered or questioned an enroute
> altitude deviation unless it exceeded 300' or was a threat to another
> aircraft. At that point a controller has to determine if the pilots mode
> C is incorrect or if he has just deviated from the assigned altitude.

And that is why smart pilots start correcting their altitude just as
soon as the controller asks you to "recycle your transponder!"

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

J Haggerty wrote:

> Actually, as a controller, I never considered or questioned an enroute
> altitude deviation unless it exceeded 300' or was a threat to another
> aircraft. At that point a controller has to determine if the pilots mode
> C is incorrect or if he has just deviated from the assigned altitude.

And that is why smart pilots start correcting their altitude just as
soon as the controller asks you to "recycle your transponder!"

Matt

[Capt.Doug]

>"Chip Jones" wrote in message =
> It's all a huge can of worms better left unopened, IMO.

It seems to be opened already. Being privy to our union's safety reports, I
know that PDs without loss of seperation are being investigated much more
frequently in recent months. Most of these result in counseling and
training. That is good for safety as most of these reports involve the lower
rung of the professional spectrum. However, I am old school like yourself
and believe that we shouldn't be forced to play policeman. We all have bad
days. I still carry NASA forms in my flight case. The nature of NASA forms
is too coerce pilots and controllers into telling the whole story of what
went wrong so that it can be fixed. Pitting ATC against aircrews could
ultimately prove to compromise safety as the communication breakdown imposed
by defense lawyers will not allow the full story to come out and therefore
no meaningful data can be gathered to improve safety for the future.

D.

[Capt.Doug]

>"Chip Jones" wrote in message =
> It's all a huge can of worms better left unopened, IMO.

It seems to be opened already. Being privy to our union's safety reports, I
know that PDs without loss of seperation are being investigated much more
frequently in recent months. Most of these result in counseling and
training. That is good for safety as most of these reports involve the lower
rung of the professional spectrum. However, I am old school like yourself
and believe that we shouldn't be forced to play policeman. We all have bad
days. I still carry NASA forms in my flight case. The nature of NASA forms
is too coerce pilots and controllers into telling the whole story of what
went wrong so that it can be fixed. Pitting ATC against aircrews could
ultimately prove to compromise safety as the communication breakdown imposed
by defense lawyers will not allow the full story to come out and therefore
no meaningful data can be gathered to improve safety for the future.

D.

[Larry Dighera]

On 10 Oct 2004 16:07:45 -0700, (TJ Girl) wrote in
>::

>Larry Dighera > wrote in message >...
>
>> That FAAO mentions: "The identification of operational errors and
>> deviations without fear of reprisal is an absolute requirement and is
>> the responsibility of all of us who work within our [NAS] system."
>
>Careful of pulling this from context. The word "operational" above
>applies to both "errors" and "deviations".
>An operational deviation is NOT the equivilent of a pilot deviation.
>An operational deviation would be something like a controller letting
>a pilot enter another controller's airspace without a handoff or other
>form of coordination.
>
>Operational deviations are what are required to be reported under that
>section, not pilot deviations.

If what you say is true, can you provide a pointer to the correct
regulation/order that does mandate that ATC controllers report all
PDs?

[Larry Dighera]

On 10 Oct 2004 16:07:45 -0700, (TJ Girl) wrote in
>::

>Larry Dighera > wrote in message >...
>
>> That FAAO mentions: "The identification of operational errors and
>> deviations without fear of reprisal is an absolute requirement and is
>> the responsibility of all of us who work within our [NAS] system."
>
>Careful of pulling this from context. The word "operational" above
>applies to both "errors" and "deviations".
>An operational deviation is NOT the equivilent of a pilot deviation.
>An operational deviation would be something like a controller letting
>a pilot enter another controller's airspace without a handoff or other
>form of coordination.
>
>Operational deviations are what are required to be reported under that
>section, not pilot deviations.

If what you say is true, can you provide a pointer to the correct
regulation/order that does mandate that ATC controllers report all
PDs?

[BuzzBoy]

The FAA is filling up with incompetent minorities
That is your big problem


Chip Jones wrote:

> OK pilots, try this one on for size. As you likely know, there is a wide
> and growing rift between the career FAA bureaucrats (aka FAA Management) who
> run the monstrosity called the federal Air Traffic Organization, and the
> career FAA air traffic controllers who make that monstrosity work in the NAS
> on a daily basis. Regardless of where you stand on the politics of US air
> traffic control (funding, privatization, user-fees, labor issues, whatever),
> the ugly, on-going feud between Management and Labor in air traffic control
> may finally have reached a point where you as a pilot will be personally
> affected.
>
> This just in:
>
> ***
> Notice to all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees Please Post This notice
> is intended to advise all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees of recent
> occurrence in the Eastern Service Area. Controllers have been
> encouraged, through the actions of supervisors, to look the other way
> when it came to pilot deviations that did not result in a loss of
> separation. We have all heard supervisors say "no harm, no foul" on
> more than one occasion.
>
> Until now, this has not created problems for bargaining unit
> employees. Recently a facility in the Southern Region issued formal
> discipline (Letter of Reprimand) to a NATCA bargaining unit employee
> for failure to report a pilot deviation. An aircraft (Air Carrier) was
> told to hold short of a runway, read it back, and proceeded to go onto
> the runway. This resulted in a go-around with no loss of separation.
>
> In the reprimand, the manager acknowledged that the controller was in
> no way at fault operationally, but that he had violated an FAA order
> by not reporting the deviation, and as such, was being issued
> disciplinary action. During recent third level reviews, the Agency has
> held steadfast to their position.
>
> As your [NATCA title deleted], the only advice I can give you
> is to protect yourself and your career. Your failure to advise your
> supervisor of a pilot deviation may result in disciplinary action.
> Even if no loss of separation occurs. Inform your supervisor
> immediately if you witness a pilot deviation. Put the responsibility
> on their backs.
>
> Be warned!! Taking a "no harm, no foul" attitude with pilots could
> result in harm to yourself.
> ***
>
>
> Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots help
> controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an old
> clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
> that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
> antagonistic Management.
>
> Regards,
>
> Chip, ZTL
>
>

[BuzzBoy]

The FAA is filling up with incompetent minorities
That is your big problem


Chip Jones wrote:

> OK pilots, try this one on for size. As you likely know, there is a wide
> and growing rift between the career FAA bureaucrats (aka FAA Management) who
> run the monstrosity called the federal Air Traffic Organization, and the
> career FAA air traffic controllers who make that monstrosity work in the NAS
> on a daily basis. Regardless of where you stand on the politics of US air
> traffic control (funding, privatization, user-fees, labor issues, whatever),
> the ugly, on-going feud between Management and Labor in air traffic control
> may finally have reached a point where you as a pilot will be personally
> affected.
>
> This just in:
>
> ***
> Notice to all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees Please Post This notice
> is intended to advise all NATCA Bargaining Unit employees of recent
> occurrence in the Eastern Service Area. Controllers have been
> encouraged, through the actions of supervisors, to look the other way
> when it came to pilot deviations that did not result in a loss of
> separation. We have all heard supervisors say "no harm, no foul" on
> more than one occasion.
>
> Until now, this has not created problems for bargaining unit
> employees. Recently a facility in the Southern Region issued formal
> discipline (Letter of Reprimand) to a NATCA bargaining unit employee
> for failure to report a pilot deviation. An aircraft (Air Carrier) was
> told to hold short of a runway, read it back, and proceeded to go onto
> the runway. This resulted in a go-around with no loss of separation.
>
> In the reprimand, the manager acknowledged that the controller was in
> no way at fault operationally, but that he had violated an FAA order
> by not reporting the deviation, and as such, was being issued
> disciplinary action. During recent third level reviews, the Agency has
> held steadfast to their position.
>
> As your [NATCA title deleted], the only advice I can give you
> is to protect yourself and your career. Your failure to advise your
> supervisor of a pilot deviation may result in disciplinary action.
> Even if no loss of separation occurs. Inform your supervisor
> immediately if you witness a pilot deviation. Put the responsibility
> on their backs.
>
> Be warned!! Taking a "no harm, no foul" attitude with pilots could
> result in harm to yourself.
> ***
>
>
> Folks, I see at *least* one pilot deviation a week working traffic in my
> small slice of the NAS. I don't report them unless separation is lost,
> because I was trained under the "no harm, no foul" mentality. Pilots help
> controllers, controllers help pilots, and the NAS ticks along like an old
> clock. I'm not changing the way I do business, but I wanted you to know
> that other controllers might, in order to cover themsleves against
> antagonistic Management.
>
> Regards,
>
> Chip, ZTL
>
>

[Larry Dighera]

On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 01:32:38 -0400, BuzzBoy >
wrote in >::

>
>The FAA is filling up with incompetent minorities
>That is your big problem

Don't all government employees have to pass the same employment test?
FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and an
additional 5% for a Purple Heart, so there can be a maximum 10%
advantage given to those applicants. But other than that, the playing
field should be level.

[Larry Dighera]

On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 01:32:38 -0400, BuzzBoy >
wrote in >::

>
>The FAA is filling up with incompetent minorities
>That is your big problem

Don't all government employees have to pass the same employment test?
FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and an
additional 5% for a Purple Heart, so there can be a maximum 10%
advantage given to those applicants. But other than that, the playing
field should be level.

[Chip Jones]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 01:32:38 -0400, BuzzBoy >
> wrote in >::
>
> >
> >The FAA is filling up with incompetent minorities
> >That is your big problem
>
> Don't all government employees have to pass the same employment test?
> FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and an
> additional 5% for a Purple Heart, so there can be a maximum 10%
> advantage given to those applicants. But other than that, the playing
> field should be level.
>

When I took the entrance exam back in the late '80's, FAA was "fast
tracking" certain types of applicants. These included women and minorities
but not white males. The idea was apparently to speed up the hiring process
of certain personnel types. Exam score played a lesser role in this hiring
process than it might have otherwise. For example, I scored a 98 on the
civil service controller entrance exam. To this was added an extra 5% for
military service, which gave me a 103 on a test where 100 was the top score.
This put me in the top percent of the huge pool of applicants. However, it
didn't appear to do anything to speed up getting hired. I sat around for
months. Then, I went to the Persian Gulf War. As soon as FAA realized I
was in theater, they "fast tracked" my application and I had a job waiting
on me when I returned. As soon as I was discharged from active duty, I had
a job interview literally within 30 days. Within 90 days I was hired and
with 150 days I was at the Academy. In the meantime, scores of other
"fast-tracked" minority and female applicants with lower test scores had
been hired before me.

When you start applying for staff and management jobs, your minority status
or lack thereof becomes a huge factor. Management has been mostly white and
male since the CAA days. There has been a 15 year push to "normalize"
management by promoting women and minorities over white males, so that FAA
management "reflects the face of America." These days, the nickname
"Fast-track" is derisively applied to our ATC "stars" who spend a year or
two as controllers and then get "promoted" into traffic management or the
supervisor ranks. They are literally like the shake and bake staff NCO's
and 2nd Lieutenants of the early '70's.

In spite of this push, it has to be pointed out that the FAA is currently
*still* being run by a host of incompetent conservative, reactionary white
male feather merchants in upper and middle management. Good controllers
control airplanes. Poor controllers run as fast as they can from
controlling airplanes. The guys currently running FAA from the helms of
upper and middle management were among the worst controllers of their
classes. Also, they have received little to no training in management.
They were promoted under the white male good-old-boy yes-man brown-nosing
patronage system, just as bad IMO as promoting on the base of race or gender
rather than merit, which neither method seems to consider as the primary
qualification. That is our big problem, and it hasn't changed since 1981.

I'm starting to believe that the US Government ought to create a job
specialty called "FAA Management", offer high initial pay, and start
recruiting MBA college post-graduates strait into FAA management. Promotion
out of the ATC ranks would be limited to first level supervisor. The MBA
kids could then slowly start taking over the helm and all sub-departments of
managing the federal air traffic control system. The ATC feather merchants
these MBA's replace could either get a headset and return to work as a line
controller, or they could leave federal service with a swift kick in the
ass. This would leave air traffic controllers to control traffic, allowing
the government to fire or demote the weak controllers instead of promoting
them. Maybe then, FAA would do a hell of a lot better at not wasting tax
money on poorly managed technology projects and poor operational budgeting.
Also, it's possible that people trained in business management at college
would be more savvy at labor relations then the current crop of failed
controllers running the system. At least they would know that it is good
form to kiss labor before you screw labor. Finally, we could privatize all
of the ATC towers across the country. This would allow FAA to move swivel
heads from privatized FAA towers out into the field, where they would serve
as desperately needed radar controller reinforcements at critically
understaffed FAA Tracon and ARTCC facilities, saving the government a wad of
money in controller personnel costs.

Chip, ZTL

[Larry Dighera]

On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 15:17:46 GMT, "Chip Jones"
> wrote in
et>::

>
>"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
>> On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 01:32:38 -0400, BuzzBoy >
>> wrote in >::
>>
>> >
>> >The FAA is filling up with incompetent minorities
>> >That is your big problem
>>
>> Don't all government employees have to pass the same employment test?
>> FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and an
>> additional 5% for a Purple Heart, so there can be a maximum 10%
>> advantage given to those applicants. But other than that, the playing
>> field should be level.
>>
>
>When I took the entrance exam back in the late '80's, FAA was "fast
>tracking" certain types of applicants. These included women and minorities
>but not white males. The idea was apparently to speed up the hiring process
>of certain personnel types. Exam score played a lesser role in this hiring
>process than it might have otherwise. For example, I scored a 98 on the
>civil service controller entrance exam. To this was added an extra 5% for
>military service, which gave me a 103 on a test where 100 was the top score.
>This put me in the top percent of the huge pool of applicants. However, it
>didn't appear to do anything to speed up getting hired. I sat around for
>months. Then, I went to the Persian Gulf War. As soon as FAA realized I
>was in theater, they "fast tracked" my application and I had a job waiting
>on me when I returned. As soon as I was discharged from active duty, I had
>a job interview literally within 30 days. Within 90 days I was hired and
>with 150 days I was at the Academy. In the meantime, scores of other
>"fast-tracked" minority and female applicants with lower test scores had
>been hired before me.
>
>When you start applying for staff and management jobs, your minority status
>or lack thereof becomes a huge factor. Management has been mostly white and
>male since the CAA days. There has been a 15 year push to "normalize"
>management by promoting women and minorities over white males, so that FAA
>management "reflects the face of America." These days, the nickname
>"Fast-track" is derisively applied to our ATC "stars" who spend a year or
>two as controllers and then get "promoted" into traffic management or the
>supervisor ranks. They are literally like the shake and bake staff NCO's
>and 2nd Lieutenants of the early '70's.
>
>In spite of this push, it has to be pointed out that the FAA is currently
>*still* being run by a host of incompetent conservative, reactionary white
>male feather merchants in upper and middle management. Good controllers
>control airplanes. Poor controllers run as fast as they can from
>controlling airplanes. The guys currently running FAA from the helms of
>upper and middle management were among the worst controllers of their
>classes. Also, they have received little to no training in management.
>They were promoted under the white male good-old-boy yes-man brown-nosing
>patronage system, just as bad IMO as promoting on the base of race or gender
>rather than merit, which neither method seems to consider as the primary
>qualification. That is our big problem, and it hasn't changed since 1981.
>
>I'm starting to believe that the US Government ought to create a job
>specialty called "FAA Management", offer high initial pay, and start
>recruiting MBA college post-graduates strait into FAA management. Promotion
>out of the ATC ranks would be limited to first level supervisor. The MBA
>kids could then slowly start taking over the helm and all sub-departments of
>managing the federal air traffic control system. The ATC feather merchants
>these MBA's replace could either get a headset and return to work as a line
>controller, or they could leave federal service with a swift kick in the
>ass. This would leave air traffic controllers to control traffic, allowing
>the government to fire or demote the weak controllers instead of promoting
>them. Maybe then, FAA would do a hell of a lot better at not wasting tax
>money on poorly managed technology projects and poor operational budgeting.
>Also, it's possible that people trained in business management at college
>would be more savvy at labor relations then the current crop of failed
>controllers running the system. At least they would know that it is good
>form to kiss labor before you screw labor. Finally, we could privatize all
>of the ATC towers across the country. This would allow FAA to move swivel
>heads from privatized FAA towers out into the field, where they would serve
>as desperately needed radar controller reinforcements at critically
>understaffed FAA Tracon and ARTCC facilities, saving the government a wad of
>money in controller personnel costs.
>
>Chip, ZTL
>

Thank you for the information. I wasn't aware of the FAA fast-track
"normalization" practice. Personally, I'd prefer hiring of
safety-critical personnel to be based SOLELY ON MERIT, but with the
pro veteran bias policy long in place, the door was open to open it
further to accommodate "normalization" I suppose. If this sort of
corruption of the merit system is further exploited in the future,
there will be little need for examinations at all. :-(

[W P Dixon]

Yes It is true any federal Job pushes the affirmative action program. The
same was true when I worked on gevernment contracts building aircraft. Very
little or no experience was hired just on the basis on skin color or gender.
Myself I can see wanting to make sure there is no discrimination, but to use
discrimination to stop discrimination is no the answer and is just "wrong".

Patrick
"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 15:17:46 GMT, "Chip Jones"
> > wrote in
> et>::
>
> >
> >"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 01:32:38 -0400, BuzzBoy >
> >> wrote in >::
> >>
> >> >
> >> >The FAA is filling up with incompetent minorities
> >> >That is your big problem
> >>
> >> Don't all government employees have to pass the same employment test?
> >> FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and an
> >> additional 5% for a Purple Heart, so there can be a maximum 10%
> >> advantage given to those applicants. But other than that, the playing
> >> field should be level.
> >>
> >
> >When I took the entrance exam back in the late '80's, FAA was "fast
> >tracking" certain types of applicants. These included women and
minorities
> >but not white males. The idea was apparently to speed up the hiring
process
> >of certain personnel types. Exam score played a lesser role in this
hiring
> >process than it might have otherwise. For example, I scored a 98 on the
> >civil service controller entrance exam. To this was added an extra 5%
for
> >military service, which gave me a 103 on a test where 100 was the top
score.
> >This put me in the top percent of the huge pool of applicants. However,
it
> >didn't appear to do anything to speed up getting hired. I sat around for
> >months. Then, I went to the Persian Gulf War. As soon as FAA realized I
> >was in theater, they "fast tracked" my application and I had a job
waiting
> >on me when I returned. As soon as I was discharged from active duty, I
had
> >a job interview literally within 30 days. Within 90 days I was hired and
> >with 150 days I was at the Academy. In the meantime, scores of other
> >"fast-tracked" minority and female applicants with lower test scores had
> >been hired before me.
> >
> >When you start applying for staff and management jobs, your minority
status
> >or lack thereof becomes a huge factor. Management has been mostly white
and
> >male since the CAA days. There has been a 15 year push to "normalize"
> >management by promoting women and minorities over white males, so that
FAA
> >management "reflects the face of America." These days, the nickname
> >"Fast-track" is derisively applied to our ATC "stars" who spend a year or
> >two as controllers and then get "promoted" into traffic management or the
> >supervisor ranks. They are literally like the shake and bake staff NCO's
> >and 2nd Lieutenants of the early '70's.
> >
> >In spite of this push, it has to be pointed out that the FAA is currently
> >*still* being run by a host of incompetent conservative, reactionary
white
> >male feather merchants in upper and middle management. Good controllers
> >control airplanes. Poor controllers run as fast as they can from
> >controlling airplanes. The guys currently running FAA from the helms of
> >upper and middle management were among the worst controllers of their
> >classes. Also, they have received little to no training in management.
> >They were promoted under the white male good-old-boy yes-man brown-nosing
> >patronage system, just as bad IMO as promoting on the base of race or
gender
> >rather than merit, which neither method seems to consider as the primary
> >qualification. That is our big problem, and it hasn't changed since
1981.
> >
> >I'm starting to believe that the US Government ought to create a job
> >specialty called "FAA Management", offer high initial pay, and start
> >recruiting MBA college post-graduates strait into FAA management.
Promotion
> >out of the ATC ranks would be limited to first level supervisor. The MBA
> >kids could then slowly start taking over the helm and all sub-departments
of
> >managing the federal air traffic control system. The ATC feather
merchants
> >these MBA's replace could either get a headset and return to work as a
line
> >controller, or they could leave federal service with a swift kick in the
> >ass. This would leave air traffic controllers to control traffic,
allowing
> >the government to fire or demote the weak controllers instead of
promoting
> >them. Maybe then, FAA would do a hell of a lot better at not wasting tax
> >money on poorly managed technology projects and poor operational
budgeting.
> >Also, it's possible that people trained in business management at college
> >would be more savvy at labor relations then the current crop of failed
> >controllers running the system. At least they would know that it is good
> >form to kiss labor before you screw labor. Finally, we could privatize
all
> >of the ATC towers across the country. This would allow FAA to move
swivel
> >heads from privatized FAA towers out into the field, where they would
serve
> >as desperately needed radar controller reinforcements at critically
> >understaffed FAA Tracon and ARTCC facilities, saving the government a wad
of
> >money in controller personnel costs.
> >
> >Chip, ZTL
> >
>
> Thank you for the information. I wasn't aware of the FAA fast-track
> "normalization" practice. Personally, I'd prefer hiring of
> safety-critical personnel to be based SOLELY ON MERIT, but with the
> pro veteran bias policy long in place, the door was open to open it
> further to accommodate "normalization" I suppose. If this sort of
> corruption of the merit system is further exploited in the future,
> there will be little need for examinations at all. :-(
>
>

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
>>
>>Separation isn't going to be lost as long as the aircraft executes the go
>>around.
>>
>
> Given:
>
> FAA considers crossing a hold short line, if another aircraft is
> within 3,000 feet, as an incursion, even if no collision hazard
> exists.
>

A collision hazard definitely exists with an aircraft on the runway that
another aircraft has been cleared to land on.


>
> The implication being, that a Loss Of Separation occurs if a
> landing and/or departing Category I or II aircraft, and the
> Category I aircraft operating contrary to ATC instruction, come
> within the FAA Order 7110.65 '3-9-6. SAME RUNWAY SEPARATION'
> paragraph 'a'mandated 3,000 foot separation of each other,
> results in a Category D Runway Incursion regardless if there is a
> collision hazard or not. If a Category III is involved, the
> mandatory separation is 6,000 feet. If the runway is clear of
> aircraft, paragraph 'b' removes the mandate for separation.
>

The runway was not clear of aircraft.


>
> How can you be sure that the landing aircraft and the aircraft that
> necessitated the go around couldn't come within 3,000' of each other?
>

An aircraft executing a go around does not occupy the runway, it is not a
landing aircraft.


>
> Here's some relevant information:
> ------------------------------------
> http://www1.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATC/index.htm
>
> http://www1.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATC/Chp3/atc0309.html
>
> 3-9-5. ANTICIPATING SEPARATION
>
> Takeoff clearance needs not be withheld until prescribed separation
> exists if there is a reasonable assurance it will exist when the
> aircraft starts takeoff roll.
>
>
> 3-9-6. SAME RUNWAY SEPARATION
>
> Separate a departing aircraft from a preceding departing or arriving
> aircraft using the same runway by ensuring that it does not begin
> takeoff roll until:
>
> a. The other aircraft has departed and crossed the runway end or
> turned to avert any conflict. If you can determine distances by
> reference to suitable landmarks, the other aircraft needs only
> be airborne if the following minimum distance exists between aircraft:
> (See FIG 3-9-1 and FIG 3-9-2.)
>
> 1. When only Category I aircraft are involved- 3,000 feet.
>
> 2. When a Category I aircraft is preceded by a Category II aircraft-
> 3,000 feet.
>
> 3. When either the succeeding or both are Category II aircraft- 4,500
> feet.
>
> 4. When either is a Category III aircraft- 6,000 feet.
>
> 5. When the succeeding aircraft is a helicopter, visual separation may
> be applied in lieu of using distance minima.
>
> FIG 3-9-1
>
> Same Runway Separation
> [View 1]
>
>
> FIG 3-9-2
>
> Same Runway Separation
> [View 2]
>
>
> NOTE-
> Aircraft same runway separation (SRS) categories are specified in
> Appendices A, B, and C and based upon the following definitions:
>
> CATEGORY I- small aircraft weighing 12,500 lbs. or less, with a single
> propeller driven engine, and all helicopters.
>
> CATEGORY II- small aircraft weighing 12,500 lbs. or less, with
> propeller driven twin-engines.
>
> CATEGORY III- all other aircraft.
>
> b. A preceding landing aircraft is clear of the runway. (See FIG
> 3-9-3.)
>
> FIG 3-9-3
>
> Preceding Landing Aircraft Clear of Runway
>
>
> REFERENCE-
> P/CG Term- Clear of the Runway.
>
> --------------------------------------------
>
>
>
> Runway Incursion
> A Runway Incursion is defined as any occurrence at an airport
> involving an aircraft, vehicle, person or object on the ground that
> creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of separation with an
> aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to
> land.
>
> Surface Incident
> A Surface Incident is defined as any event where unauthorized or
> unapproved movement occurs within the movement area or an occurrence
> in the movement area associated with the operation of an aircraft that
> affects or could affect the safety of flight. Surface incidents result
> from Pilot Deviations (PDs), Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations (VPDs), or
> Operational Error/Deviations (OEs/ODs).
>
> Differences between a runway incursion and a surface incident are: A
> Runway Incursion occurs on a runway. A Surface Incident may occur on a
> runway or a taxiway. A Runway Incursion has to have a collision hazard
> or a loss of separation. The FAA categorizes Runway Incursions in four
> categories depending on the potential for collision. These categories
> are:
>
> A Separation decreases and participants take extreme action to
> narrowly avoid a collision.
>
> B Separation decreases and there is a significant potential for
> collision.
>
> C Separation decreases but there is ample time and distance to avoid a
> potential collision.
>
> D Little or no chance of collision but meets the definition of a
> runway incursion.
>
> When defining a runway incursion it is recognized that a wide range of
> variables dramatically impact the relative severity of a runway
> incursion. Of these many variables, five key parameters were selected
> to add dimension to the evaluation of relative severity.
> The five operational dimensions are interdependent; for example,
> aircraft speed will affect available reaction time. These five
> operational dimensions (listed below) formed the basis for developing
> the runway incursion categories that capture the spectrum of
> severity.
>
> Operational Dimensions Affecting Runway Incursion Severity
>
> Operational Dimensions Description
>
> Available Reaction Time Available Reaction Time
> considers how much time the pilot, controllers, and/or vehicle
> operators had to react to the situation based on aircraft type, phase
> of flight, and separation distance.
>
> Evasive or Corrective Action Evasive or Corrective Action
> considers the need for and type of evasive or corrective maneuvers
> required to avoid a runway collision by pilots and/or air traffic
> controllers.
>
> Environmental Conditions Environmental Conditions
> considers visibility, surface conditions, and light conditions.
>
> Speed of Aircraft and/or Vehicle Speed of Aircraft and/or
> Vehicle - speed as a function of aircraft type and phase of flight
> (taxi, takeoff, landing)
>
> Proximity of Aircraft and/or Vehicle Proximity of Aircraft and/or
> Vehicle, or their separation distance from one another.
>
> --------------------------------------
>

How is it relevant?


>>
>>Of course, if the aircraft doesn't execute the go around, a
>>collision on the runway could result.
>>
>
> That statement seems a little banal, or perhaps I'm missing its point.
>

The point is that no harm does not necessarily mean there was no foul. How
are safety concerns to be identified if fouls are not reported unless they
result in catastrophe?

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
>
> Don't all government employees have to pass the same employment test?
> FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and an
> additional 5% for a Purple Heart, so there can be a maximum 10%
> advantage given to those applicants. But other than that, the playing
> field should be level.
>

I think the playing field is level now. Twenty years ago, if a white male
controller trainee demonstrated incompetence he was washed out while female
and minority trainees checked out. Now everybody eventually checks out
without regard to race, gender, or competence.

[Newps]

BuzzBoy wrote:
> The FAA is filling up with incompetent minorities
> That is your big problem

That's right. Center controllers are minorities, there's a lot more of
us tower controllers out here.

[Robert Briggs]

John Clonts wrote:
> Matt Young wrote:
>
> > WAFDOF?
>
> www.acronymfinder.com

Well said, sir!

I also wondered what it meant, but very quickly found the answer
from that site.

[Robert Briggs]

Larry Dighera wrote:

> Don't all government employees have to pass the same employment test?
> FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and an
> additional 5% for a Purple Heart, so there can be a maximum 10%
> advantage given to those applicants. But other than that, the playing
> field should be level.

Modest credit for prior military service seems fair enough (if it
is *relevant* service, at least), but how does *getting injured*
make you a better candidate?

[TJ Girl]

Larry Dighera > wrote in message >...

> If what you say is true, can you provide a pointer to the correct
> regulation/order that does mandate that ATC controllers report all
> PDs?

No, because one does not exist.
It's typical FAA starting to enforce something that someone up "high"
in the chain thinks is a good idea without a basis.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Robert Briggs" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> Don't all government employees have to pass the same employment test?
>> FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and an
>> additional 5% for a Purple Heart, so there can be a maximum 10%
>> advantage given to those applicants. But other than that, the playing
>> field should be level.
>>
>
> Modest credit for prior military service seems fair enough (if it
> is *relevant* service, at least), but how does *getting injured*
> make you a better candidate?
>

What in the previous message suggested points were given for getting
injured?

[Newps]

Chip Jones wrote:

For example, I scored a 98 on the
> civil service controller entrance exam. To this was added an extra 5% for
> military service, which gave me a 103 on a test where 100 was the top score.
> This put me in the top percent of the huge pool of applicants. However, it
> didn't appear to do anything to speed up getting hired. I sat around for
> months.

I scored an 89 on my test sometime in 1986. First day on the job was
11/8/88, hired by the Great Lakes Region. Lots of sittin' around waiting.

[Teacherjh]

>>
What in the previous message suggested points were given for getting
injured?
<<

The credit for a purple heart.

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[G.R. Patterson III]

"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
>
> What in the previous message suggested points were given for getting
> injured?

The Purple Heart is awarded for injuries received as the direct result of enemy
action.

George Patterson
If a man gets into a fight 3,000 miles away from home, he *had* to have
been looking for it.

[Robert Briggs]

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
> Robert Briggs wrote:

> > > FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and
> > > an additional 5% for a Purple Heart ...

> > Modest credit for prior military service seems fair enough (if it
> > is *relevant* service, at least), but how does *getting injured*
> > make you a better candidate?
>
> What in the previous message suggested points were given for getting
> injured?

The bit about the Purple Heart.

From http://www.purpleheart.org/Awd_of_PH.htm:

2-8 b. (4)

Examples of enemy-related injuries which clearly justify
award of the Purple Heart are as follows:

(a) Injury caused by enemy bullet, shrapnel, or other
projectile created by enemy action.

(b) Injury caused by enemy placed mine or trap.

(c) Injury caused by enemy released chemical,
biological or nuclear agent.

(d) Injury caused by vehicle or aircraft accident
resulting from enemy fire.

(e) Concussion injuries caused as a result of enemy
generated explosions.

Yes, I omitted the qualification regarding enemy action, but the
basic question remains.

How does *getting injured* make you a better candidate?

Imagine two guys going through the same battles together, one of
whom gets hit by an enemy bullet while the other isn't. Now, I
can see how their *experience of battle* may be relevant when
applying for a job, but I don't see how a single bullet wound
makes the one better suited than the other.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Teacherjh" > wrote in message
...
>>>
> What in the previous message suggested points were given for getting
> injured?
> <<
>
> The credit for a purple heart.
>

A Purple Heart is not awarded for injuries received while serving in the
military, it's awarded for wounds received in combat.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"G.R. Patterson III" > wrote in message
...
>
>
> "Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
>>
>> What in the previous message suggested points were given for getting
>> injured?
>
> The Purple Heart is awarded for injuries received as the direct result of
> enemy
> action.
>

Correct.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Robert Briggs" > wrote in message
...
> Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
>> Robert Briggs wrote:
>
>> > > FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and
>> > > an additional 5% for a Purple Heart ...
>
>> > Modest credit for prior military service seems fair enough (if it
>> > is *relevant* service, at least), but how does *getting injured*
>> > make you a better candidate?
>>
>> What in the previous message suggested points were given for getting
>> injured?
>
> The bit about the Purple Heart.
>

The Purple Heart is awarded for injuries received due to enemy action.


>
> From http://www.purpleheart.org/Awd_of_PH.htm:
>
> 2-8 b. (4)
>
> Examples of enemy-related injuries which clearly justify
> award of the Purple Heart are as follows:
>
> (a) Injury caused by enemy bullet, shrapnel, or other
> projectile created by enemy action.
>
> (b) Injury caused by enemy placed mine or trap.
>
> (c) Injury caused by enemy released chemical,
> biological or nuclear agent.
>
> (d) Injury caused by vehicle or aircraft accident
> resulting from enemy fire.
>
> (e) Concussion injuries caused as a result of enemy
> generated explosions.
>
> Yes, I omitted the qualification regarding enemy action, but the
> basic question remains.
>

Exactly.


>
> How does *getting injured* make you a better candidate?
>

It doesn't. Nor does military service.


>
> Imagine two guys going through the same battles together, one of
> whom gets hit by an enemy bullet while the other isn't. Now, I
> can see how their *experience of battle* may be relevant when
> applying for a job, but I don't see how a single bullet wound
> makes the one better suited than the other.
>

I don't see how either one is a better candidate than one with no military
service.

[Teacherjh]

>>
A Purple Heart is not awarded for injuries received while serving in the
military, it's awarded for wounds received in combat.
<<

All well and good; the context of the OP (which I don't have handy) implied
combat, but I suppose I could remember incorrectly. It does not make the
person a better candidate, I suspect the additional points are a sort of "thank
you for your sacrifice" thing.

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Teacherjh" > wrote in message
...
>>>
> A Purple Heart is not awarded for injuries received while serving in the
> military, it's awarded for wounds received in combat.
> <<
>
> All well and good; the context of the OP (which I don't have handy)
> implied
> combat, but I suppose I could remember incorrectly.
>

I do have it handy, you remember incorrectly.

"Modest credit for prior military service seems fair enough (if it is
*relevant* service, at least), but how does *getting injured* make you a
better candidate?"

[Teacherjh]

>>
I do have it handy
<<

What is the quote from the OP?

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Teacherjh" > wrote in message
...
>>>
> I do have it handy
> <<
>
> What is the quote from the OP?
>

It's the part of my message that you snipped.

[Teacherjh]

>> It's the part of my message that you snipped.

No it's not.







Ok, let's not play games. Here's the OP relating to the purple heart:

===

Subject: Re: Pilot deviations and a new FAA reality
From: Larry Dighera
Date: 10/13/04 7:28 AM Eastern Daylight Time
Message-id: >

On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 01:32:38 -0400, BuzzBoy >
wrote in >::

>
>The FAA is filling up with incompetent minorities
>That is your big problem

Don't all government employees have to pass the same employment test?
FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and an
additional 5% for a Purple Heart, so there can be a maximum 10%
advantage given to those applicants. But other than that, the playing
field should be level.

===

You then ask:

What in the previous message suggested points were given for getting
injured?

.... in your message:

===
Subject: Re: Pilot deviations and a new FAA reality
From: "Steven P. McNicoll"
Date: 10/14/04 1:47 PM Eastern Daylight Time
Message-id: et>


"Robert Briggs" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> Don't all government employees have to pass the same employment test?
>> FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and an
>> additional 5% for a Purple Heart, so there can be a maximum 10%
>> advantage given to those applicants. But other than that, the playing
>> field should be level.
>>
>
> Modest credit for prior military service seems fair enough (if it
> is *relevant* service, at least), but how does *getting injured*
> make you a better candidate?
>

What in the previous message suggested points were given for getting
injured?

===

In order to get a purple heart, you must have been injured. (it must have been
under specific circumstances, but for now this is irrelevant). The context of
"getting injured" in this post is military. The context implies (though it
does not require) combat. The purple heart requires combat, but that's
irrelevant to the question being asked.

Whether in combat or not, receiving an injury does not make one a better
candidate. It can be argued that being in combat makes one a better candidate.
I won't argue that either way. I see it instead sort of as a reward for
service and an apology for injuries. Whether this is good or bad I won't argue
either.

In any case, the quote from the OP was not in the part of your message that I
snipped.

ObAviation - went up leaf peeping from DXR to the Catskills. The DXR area was
still pretty green as was much of the Hudson Valley, but the Catskills were
gorgeous. Not much wind either, so I could fly low over the mountains.

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Teacherjh" > wrote in message
...
>>> It's the part of my message that you snipped.
>
> No it's not.
>

Yes it is.


>
>
>
>
>
>
> Ok, let's not play games.
>

....He says, just before he starts playing games.


>
> Here's the OP relating to the purple heart:
>
> ===
>
> Subject: Re: Pilot deviations and a new FAA reality
> From: Larry Dighera
> Date: 10/13/04 7:28 AM Eastern Daylight Time
> Message-id: >
>
> On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 01:32:38 -0400, BuzzBoy >
> wrote in >::
>
>>
>>The FAA is filling up with incompetent minorities
>>That is your big problem
>
> Don't all government employees have to pass the same employment test?
> FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and an
> additional 5% for a Purple Heart, so there can be a maximum 10%
> advantage given to those applicants. But other than that, the playing
> field should be level.
>
> ===
>
> You then ask:
>
> What in the previous message suggested points were given for getting
> injured?
>
> ... in your message:
>
> ===
> Subject: Re: Pilot deviations and a new FAA reality
> From: "Steven P. McNicoll"
> Date: 10/14/04 1:47 PM Eastern Daylight Time
> Message-id: et>
>
>
> "Robert Briggs" > wrote in message
> ...
>>>
>>> Don't all government employees have to pass the same employment test?
>>> FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and an
>>> additional 5% for a Purple Heart, so there can be a maximum 10%
>>> advantage given to those applicants. But other than that, the playing
>>> field should be level.
>>>
>>
>> Modest credit for prior military service seems fair enough (if it
>> is *relevant* service, at least), but how does *getting injured*
>> make you a better candidate?
>>
>
> What in the previous message suggested points were given for getting
> injured?
>
> ===
>
> In order to get a purple heart, you must have been injured. (it must have
> been
> under specific circumstances, but for now this is irrelevant). The
> context of
> "getting injured" in this post is military. The context implies (though
> it
> does not require) combat. The purple heart requires combat, but that's
> irrelevant to the question being asked.
>
> Whether in combat or not, receiving an injury does not make one a better
> candidate. It can be argued that being in combat makes one a better
> candidate.
> I won't argue that either way. I see it instead sort of as a reward for
> service and an apology for injuries. Whether this is good or bad I won't
> argue
> either.
>
> In any case, the quote from the OP was not in the part of your message
> that I
> snipped.
>
> ObAviation - went up leaf peeping from DXR to the Catskills. The DXR area
> was
> still pretty green as was much of the Hudson Valley, but the Catskills
> were
> gorgeous. Not much wind either, so I could fly low over the mountains.
>
> Jose
>
> --
> (for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Robert Briggs]

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
> Robert Briggs wrote:
> > Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
> > > Robert Briggs wrote:
> > >
> > > > > FAA applicants are only given 5% for prior military service and
> > > > > an additional 5% for a Purple Heart ...
> >
> > > > Modest credit for prior military service seems fair enough (if it
> > > > is *relevant* service, at least), but how does *getting injured*
> > > > make you a better candidate?

> > Imagine two guys going through the same battles together, one of
> > whom gets hit by an enemy bullet while the other isn't. Now, I
> > can see how their *experience of battle* may be relevant when
> > applying for a job, but I don't see how a single bullet wound
> > makes the one better suited than the other.
>
> I don't see how either one is a better candidate than one with no
> military service.

Well, air traffic control (which is, after all, the specific field in
which we are interested in this thread) requires rather more in the
way of discipline than do many jobs and I would expect prior military
service to correlate positively with this, and it is no bad thing at
all for controllers to be able to cope well "under fire", whether or
not they actually get hit by any bullets.

While I believe that *modest* credit for prior military service is no
bad thing in itself, it must clearly not be allowed undue influence:
for example, a former military controller might get his 5% for the
*military* aspect, but his *experience as a controller* should count
for much more, as should a Canadian civil controller's experience of
handling cross-border traffic.

[Newps]

Robert Briggs wrote:


>
> Well, air traffic control (which is, after all, the specific field in
> which we are interested in this thread) requires rather more in the
> way of discipline than do many jobs

No it doesn't. ATC is no different than any other job. You may or may
not be well suited to it.


and I would expect prior military
> service to correlate positively with this, and it is no bad thing at
> all for controllers to be able to cope well "under fire", whether or
> not they actually get hit by any bullets.

Under fire is simply another term for stress.


>
> While I believe that *modest* credit for prior military service is no
> bad thing in itself, it must clearly not be allowed undue influence:
> for example, a former military controller might get his 5% for the
> *military* aspect, but his *experience as a controller* should count
> for much more, as should a Canadian civil controller's experience of
> handling cross-border traffic.

Military controllers washed out at a much higher rate than guys off the
street with zero experience, back when we washed people out.