Some accidents... (Part 2)

[Hilton]

Hi,

As I had predicted, the NTSB looked through the 'fire' story and called it
"VFR into IMC" in mountainous terrain.

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20030618X00901&key=1

Hilton

[BTIZ]

the fire did not cause the accident.. continued flight in IFR weather caused
the accident..
the fire may have been a contributing factor... but not the cause..
the low weather could have been a contributing factor.. but not the cause..

BT

"Hilton" > wrote in message
nk.net...
> Hi,
>
> As I had predicted, the NTSB looked through the 'fire' story and called it
> "VFR into IMC" in mountainous terrain.
>
> http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20030618X00901&key=1
>
> Hilton
>
>

[[email protected]]

> the fire may have been a contributing factor... but not the cause..
> the low weather could have been a contributing factor.. but not the
cause..
>
> BT

Yes, but I think it is strange that it was not listed as a contributing
factor. You know that fire didn't make flying into IMC any easier.
One would think that these pilots probably could have handled VFR into
IMC (they were instrument rated) under most other circumstances.

[C J Campbell]

"Hilton" > wrote in message
nk.net...
> Hi,
>
> As I had predicted, the NTSB looked through the 'fire' story and called it
> "VFR into IMC" in mountainous terrain.

Apparently they don't believe that there was a fire before the crash. The
CFI says that the passenger saw a fire; the passenger says he can't
remember. No soot streaks or anything indicating that the airplane was
moving while it was on fire. They were flying through a winding mountain
pass with low ceilings and visibility less than a mile, possibly visibility
as low as 300 feet, though the witness may not be all that reliable.

The landing gear was extended, though, so it appears they were expecting to
land.

[Hilton]

C J Campbell wrote:
> The landing gear was extended, though, so it appears they were expecting
to land.

CJ,

This one confused me. Here are these guys flying VFR into IMC, at *full
throttle* and *full mixture*. That sure seems like a climb out of IMC
(stratus layer) - usually up to 1500-2500' here), or at least a 'fast
cruise'. So why then was the gear down?

But I don't believe the gear was down. Allow me to explain. The following
quotes are from the NTSB I originally gave. "The landing gear are extended
and retracted via a hydraulic system.", "In the down position the main mount
actuators are retracted...", "When the landing gear is retracted the main
landing gear hydraulic actuators are extended..." and "The landing gear
actuator was extended." - so it appears that 'actuator extended' means that
the gear was retracted and vice versa. I'd be happy to hear from Commander
experts if I got anything wrong.

I've been following this accident closely because he took off from my home
airport, I am *very* familiar with route, I took note of the weather that
day when I heard about the accident, I watched the aircraft fly along Hwy
101 around (usually below) 1000' MSL for about 30 miles (on SJC's RADAR),
and the 'fire' story added mystery. It's very sad that a pilot lost his
life and the question that remains to be answered is why no IFR clearance
out of RHV? Plane not IFR capable (at the time), pilots not current, a
delay getting out of RHV, something else?

Anyway, just thought I'd update the group.

Hilton

[BTIZ]

not when you are already scud running and can't see that rock... if they had
been up at altitude and already above MEA.. then they would not have hit the
rock so fast.. might have been able to handle the in-flight fire.. or at
least had time to handle it.. scud running low altitude is not the best time
to get an in-flight emergency..

BT

> wrote in message
ups.com...
>
>
>> the fire may have been a contributing factor... but not the cause..
>> the low weather could have been a contributing factor.. but not the
> cause..
>>
>> BT
>
> Yes, but I think it is strange that it was not listed as a contributing
> factor. You know that fire didn't make flying into IMC any easier.
> One would think that these pilots probably could have handled VFR into
> IMC (they were instrument rated) under most other circumstances.
>

[ThomasH]

Hilton wrote:
>
[...]
>
> I've been following this accident closely because he took off from my home
> airport, I am *very* familiar with route, I took note of the weather that
> day when I heard about the accident, I watched the aircraft fly along Hwy
> 101 around (usually below) 1000' MSL for about 30 miles (on SJC's RADAR),
> and the 'fire' story added mystery. It's very sad that a pilot lost his
> life and the question that remains to be answered is why no IFR clearance
> out of RHV? Plane not IFR capable (at the time), pilots not current, a
> delay getting out of RHV, something else?

A few years ago weather fooled me to fly across these hills toward
Hollister. I was coming from the opposite direction, flying home to
SJC. In the Central Valley sky was overcast, but at higher elevation,
10-12 thousand feet if I recall it correctly, so I maintained my altitude
without a problem. As I was close to Panoche I saw that the clouds
over the hills were darker, however I could see the sun patches on
the Ocean from beneath them. I saw no high buildup and I estimated
the height of this layer to be approx. 1000' at max. I saw a jet
descending between this low layer and the high elevation overcast.
I listened to Hollister traffic, many people were flying over there,
and so I attempted to cross toward Hollister/Gilroy.

That was a mistake. As I entered the valley close to Panoche VOR, in
just a few minutes the ceiling became literally closing on me. The air
became violent and I decided that its enough of the foolishness with
this "somehow scraping the ceiling and going home anyway." I made a
180. But behind me clouds were also already so low that I could not
see the sides of the pass. I went into a climb and I was forced to
enter IMC conditions for at least a half of this turn before I was
atop of the cloud layer. I flew back toward Harris Ranch and I stayed
there overnight.

So I got my big scare and I was astonished and angry about myself
that I brought myself into such risky situation. During the
entire evening, while enjoying an opulent dinner at Harris Ranch,
I tried to understand and to summarize my mistakes. My top list
is:

a) I called Flight Watch as I passed Tehachapi Pass and I saw that
weather was completely different on this side of the Sierras.
They warned against attempting to fly VFR further than to Fresno.
My personal assessment of the high ceiling and the presence of
sunny patches seduced me to ignore their expertise and to push
it too far. This was probably the classic "I wanna reach my
destination" syndrome.
b) Never try to enter passes or otherwise fly over hills with a
low ceiling over them, especially if the due point is close to
the temperature. Clear passage might be only an optical illusion,
moist air might turn into clouds in a matter of minutes.
c) You/me/us are not more clever that *them*. If *their* brains
failed to properly assess a possible danger, you can do the same
kind of mistake and possibly make one more entry in the NTSB
statistics. Thus stay away from marginal situations.

While reading this NTSB report I wonder if the pilots of the
Commander have also underestimated the speed in which visibility
might deteriorate under such conditions, and that's why they did
not bothered to obtain IFR clearance on takeoff from RHV.

Thomas

>
> Anyway, just thought I'd update the group.
>
> Hilton

[Jose]

> a) I called Flight Watch as I passed Tehachapi Pass and I saw that
> weather was completely different on this side of the Sierras.
> They warned against attempting to fly VFR further than to Fresno.
> My personal assessment of the high ceiling and the presence of
> sunny patches seduced me to ignore their expertise and to push
> it too far. This was probably the classic "I wanna reach my
> destination" syndrome.

It's also the classic "They always say "VFR not reccomended". I've
learned not to pay attention to that kind of disclaimer because it's
so overused it's meaningless, and doesn't seem to represent "their
expertise" so much as "their lawyers".

Sometimes they're right, but you can't tell from that statement when
it will be. You need to interpret the rest of what they are saying,
and then, aren't you making your own personal assessment anyway?

Jose
--
Money: What you need when you run out of brains.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[Hilton]

BT,

> not when you are already scud running and can't see that rock... if they
had
> been up at altitude and already above MEA.. then they would not have hit
the
> rock so fast.. might have been able to handle the in-flight fire.. or at
> least had time to handle it.. scud running low altitude is not the best
time
> to get an in-flight emergency..

There was no 'in-flight fire (according to the evidence and the NTSB).
These guys scud ran for about 30 miles down 101 (I saw the RADAR plot),
turned left into a valleyish kind of area (where they crashed), encountered
worsening conditions (see rescuers' reports), went full power (see NTSB
report) and hit the ground. There was no physical evidence of fire (see
NTSB report), nor were the throttle and mixture positioned to indicate a
fire (see NTSB report).

On top of all that, the assertion by the CFI that after scud-running, flying
in a valley in worsening weather conditions, about to pick up an IFR
clearence - that "He could not recall the airplane's flight altitude or
configuration because he was not the one flying."... Sure...

Hilton