VX-4 phantom loads [Archive]

Bob

March 9th 05, 04:33 PM

Hi Rob,
What kind of load-outs did VX-4 have for their Phantoms? I can give
you some insight for the time frame 1968 to 1972. The only unusual
Paint job was the black F-4J that later had the playboy bunny on the
vertical stabilizer. It was painted black in response to a Marine
request to see if all black would be better at night for CAS missions
in South Vietnam. The paint used was a polyurethane and it was hoped
it would give a better, longer lasting corrsion protection than the
acryllic then used. Black proved to be slightly harder to see at
night. Any airplane without lights is hard to see at night and the
black was very visable in daylight. In air combat maneuvering tests
the black plane always gathered the most bad guys behind it. Like a
magnet. The poly paint was much better for anti-corrosion and lasted
several times longer than acryllic. But, the downside was, it cost
severals times as much and was hazardous to the health of appliers. To
my knowledge no other Navy airplane was painted black.

The Navy did not use wing tanks on their F-4's. The normal external
tank configuration was the single centerline tank. The reason was that
wing tanks made the already cumbersome F-4 even harder to turn. Roll
rate was reduced and nose high maneuvers were harder. Normally each
F-4 carried 2 Aim-7 missiles in the under fuselage cavities and four
Aim-9H or G missiles on under wing pylons. Air-to-ground ordnance was
hung in TERs (triple ejector racks) under the wings. MERs (multiple
ejector racks) could be carried but normally weren't. VX-4 Phantoms
tested all varities of these Aim missiles which all looked the same
externally. A very large towed target was also tested. It was towed
with an underwing mounted reel. This target wasn't accepted for
service use. A M-60 gun pod (SU-23) was tested. This pod was about
the size of a centerline fuel tank, fired 20mm bullets and was mainly
tested to get some gun data on the M-60 which was then used exclusively
by the USAF. The Navy did not choose to use these pgun pods but all
internal gun systems in their future airplanes used this M-60 gun.
Another pod was carried when testing the ACMR (air combat maneuvering
range). This pod trnsmitted airplane dat like speed, altitude, angle
of attack, attitude, weapons select and other info needed to
reconstruct real time ACM engagements. Another small centerline pod
was called a "blivet" and carried crews luggage on cross country
flights. This blivet also carried a variety of things, like booze
(pre-PC Navy) animal carcasses from hunting trips, etc.

There were more unusual loads on VX-4 Phantoms but these are a few of
the more common.

Ed Rasimus

March 9th 05, 05:18 PM

On 9 Mar 2005 08:33:25 -0800, "Bob" > wrote:

>The Navy did not use wing tanks on their F-4's. The normal external
>tank configuration was the single centerline tank. The reason was that
>wing tanks made the already cumbersome F-4 even harder to turn. Roll
>rate was reduced and nose high maneuvers were harder.

The Navy bought a different centerline tank than USAF did. (Not sure,
but as I recall it was a MacAir tank for USN and a Sargent-Fletcher
for AF). The Navy tank was stressed for close to aircraft limits and
with lower drag than a pair of outboard 370s made for better
efficiency all around.

The USAF tank was a true "gas bag"--good for only four G empty and
just over two when full with very poor assymetric or "rolling" G
allowance. It was seldom used in other than ferry configurations for
peacetime/training missions. In combat ops it was always jettisoned
when empty.

As for "already combersome F-4 even harder to turn", I can only say,
"huh???" The 370s weren't all that noticeable and, except when we had
very long time-on-target requirements in the SAM suppression mission,
we almost always retained them. Roll aug off, however, was standard
for any manuevering.

> Normally each
>F-4 carried 2 Aim-7 missiles in the under fuselage cavities and four
>Aim-9H or G missiles on under wing pylons.

Here you highlight one shortcoming of the C/L tank option. Two of the
four missile wells couldn't be used.

> Air-to-ground ordnance was
>hung in TERs (triple ejector racks) under the wings. MERs (multiple
>ejector racks) could be carried but normally weren't.

Are you saying it was Navy practice to carry TERs on the outboard
stations rather than MERs? Never saw it done in the USAF. Seems like
it would create a very forward C/G.

> A M-60 gun pod (SU-23) was tested. This pod was about
>the size of a centerline fuel tank, fired 20mm bullets and was mainly
>tested to get some gun data on the M-60 which was then used exclusively
>by the USAF.

Both SUU-23 and SUU-19 were carried by USAF F-4C and D models. Only
major difference was that the -19 was RAT driven while the 23 was
electrically spun. Good guns that could be very effective against
ground targets.

> Another pod was carried when testing the ACMR (air combat maneuvering
>range). This pod trnsmitted airplane dat like speed, altitude, angle
>of attack, attitude, weapons select and other info needed to
>reconstruct real time ACM engagements.

Basically an AIM-9 shape without fins and with a pointy antenna nose
rather than the ogival IR seeker head.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

José Herculano

March 9th 05, 08:19 PM

> The USAF tank was a true "gas bag"--good for only four G empty and
> just over two when full with very poor assymetric or "rolling" G
> allowance. It was seldom used in other than ferry configurations for
> peacetime/training missions. In combat ops it was always jettisoned
> when empty.

In the Phantom's twilight service, F-4E and F-4G were flown with F-15 tanks
on the centerline. No maneuvering restrictions, although I am not sure if
they did anything to the rear Sparrow firing problem...

_____________
José Herculano

Ed Rasimus

March 9th 05, 08:50 PM

On Wed, 9 Mar 2005 20:19:24 -0000, "José Herculano"
> wrote:

>> The USAF tank was a true "gas bag"--good for only four G empty and
>> just over two when full with very poor assymetric or "rolling" G
>> allowance. It was seldom used in other than ferry configurations for
>> peacetime/training missions. In combat ops it was always jettisoned
>> when empty.
>
>In the Phantom's twilight service, F-4E and F-4G were flown with F-15 tanks
>on the centerline. No maneuvering restrictions, although I am not sure if
>they did anything to the rear Sparrow firing problem...
>
>_____________
>José Herculano
>
I know that the F-4G flew with the much better MacAir tank. It's a
good bet that the later E-equipped units would have gotten the better
tanks as well.

With drag considerations, the single center-line tank would give much
better range/endurance than the two outboard configuration.
Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

richard goldsberry

March 10th 05, 12:44 PM

I hate to differ about the Navy never using wing tanks but....
I was the Gunner in VF-74, 171, and 102 at NAS Oceana and aboard the USS
Independence and Nimitz during the 1970's. We used the Sargent Fletcher
wing tanks when towing targets. They did have a bad habit of leaking.

"Bob" > wrote in message
oups.com...
> Hi Rob,
> What kind of load-outs did VX-4 have for their Phantoms? I can give
> you some insight for the time frame 1968 to 1972. The only unusual
> Paint job was the black F-4J that later had the playboy bunny on the
> vertical stabilizer. It was painted black in response to a Marine
> request to see if all black would be better at night for CAS missions
> in South Vietnam. The paint used was a polyurethane and it was hoped
> it would give a better, longer lasting corrosion protection than the
> acrylic then used. Black proved to be slightly harder to see at
> night. Any airplane without lights is hard to see at night and the
> black was very visible in daylight. In air combat maneuvering tests
> the black plane always gathered the most bad guys behind it. Like a
> magnet. The poly paint was much better for anti-corrosion and lasted
> several times longer than acrylic. But, the downside was, it cost
> several times as much and was hazardous to the health of appliers. To
> my knowledge no other Navy airplane was painted black.
>
> The Navy did not use wing tanks on their F-4's. The normal external
> tank configuration was the single centerline tank. The reason was that
> wing tanks made the already cumbersome F-4 even harder to turn. Roll
> rate was reduced and nose high maneuvers were harder. Normally each
> F-4 carried 2 Aim-7 missiles in the under fuselage cavities and four
> Aim-9H or G missiles on under wing pylons. Air-to-ground ordnance was
> hung in TERs (triple ejector racks) under the wings. MERs (multiple
> ejector racks) could be carried but normally weren't. VX-4 Phantoms
> tested all varieties of these Aim missiles which all looked the same
> externally. A very large towed target was also tested. It was towed
> with an underwing mounted reel. This target wasn't accepted for
> service use. A M-60 gun pod (SU-23) was tested. This pod was about
> the size of a centerline fuel tank, fired 20mm bullets and was mainly
> tested to get some gun data on the M-60 which was then used exclusively
> by the USAF. The Navy did not choose to use these gun pods but all
> internal gun systems in their future airplanes used this M-60 gun.
> Another pod was carried when testing the ACMR (air combat maneuvering
> range). This pod transmitted airplane data like speed, altitude, angle
> of attack, attitude, weapons select and other info needed to
> reconstruct real time ACM engagements. Another small centerline pod
> was called a "blivet" and carried crews luggage on cross country
> flights. This blivet also carried a variety of things, like booze
> (pre-PC Navy) animal carcasses from hunting trips, etc.
>
> There were more unusual loads on VX-4 Phantoms but these are a few of
> the more common.
>

Phormer Phighter Phlyer

March 10th 05, 02:23 PM

Rufus wrote:
> Phormer Phighter Phlyer wrote:
>
>> Rob van Riel wrote:
>>
>>> VX-4 has created some of the most spectacular paintjobs seen on F-4
>>> Phantoms, and as such are prime subjects for scale models. I could of
>>> course build such planes with nothing, or only fuel tanks under the
>>> wings,
>>> I prefer to have a little more variation in loadouts. Given that VX-4
>>> was
>>> a test squadron, I would imagine they put some a-typical, and therefore
>>> interesting loads under their Phantoms.
>>>
>>> Does anyone out there have information on what they tested on their
>>> Phantoms? Maybe even some pictures?
>>>
>>> Thanks in advance for any info
>>>
>>> Rob
>>>
>>
>> No pix but I was XO of VX-4 from Apr '88 till Dec '89. I and the CO
>> flew the F-4S' we had 3 of them. Used for launch of high speed targets
>> or targets for the F-14/18, radar type. No testing still being done
>> for the F-4S.
>>
>> We flew with a centerline and LAU-7s.
>
>
> I just missed you...I was at Mugu during the summer of '86...I think. I
> was working with the PMTC guys.
>

Great tour, our 'boss' was COMOPTEVFOR, a 2 star, our administrative
boss was COMFITFUD, but as an ecelon II command, we could do what we
wanted. Lots of parts, lots of $.

I flew the F-14, F-4 and also we leased three Cessna T-210s to move
project guys around. Great fun getting low over the desert on the way to
China Lake, making cars think you were the CHP.

Phormer Phighter Phlyer

March 10th 05, 02:26 PM

Bob wrote:
> The Navy did not use wing tanks on their F-4's.

Oh really?

We had at least one bird with wing tanks in both fleet F-4 sqadrons I
was ion. VF-33 and VF-151. We used them for checking the forward AIM-7
fuselage stations and also when we carried a camera.

Phormer Phighter Phlyer

March 10th 05, 02:31 PM

Ed Rasimus wrote:
> On 9 Mar 2005 08:33:25 -0800, "Bob" > wrote:
>
>
>>The Navy did not use wing tanks on their F-4's. The normal external
>>tank configuration was the single centerline tank. The reason was that
>>wing tanks made the already cumbersome F-4 even harder to turn. Roll
>>rate was reduced and nose high maneuvers were harder.
>
>
> The Navy bought a different centerline tank than USAF did. (Not sure,
> but as I recall it was a MacAir tank for USN and a Sargent-Fletcher
> for AF). The Navy tank was stressed for close to aircraft limits and
> with lower drag than a pair of outboard 370s made for better
> efficiency all around.
>
> The USAF tank was a true "gas bag"--good for only four G empty and
> just over two when full with very poor assymetric or "rolling" G
> allowance. It was seldom used in other than ferry configurations for
> peacetime/training missions. In combat ops it was always jettisoned
> when empty.
>
> As for "already combersome F-4 even harder to turn", I can only say,
> "huh???" The 370s weren't all that noticeable and, except when we had
> very long time-on-target requirements in the SAM suppression mission,
> we almost always retained them. Roll aug off, however, was standard
> for any manuevering.
>
>
>
>> Normally each
>>F-4 carried 2 Aim-7 missiles in the under fuselage cavities and four
>>Aim-9H or G missiles on under wing pylons.
>
>
> Here you highlight one shortcoming of the C/L tank option. Two of the
> four missile wells couldn't be used.
>
>
>> Air-to-ground ordnance was
>>hung in TERs (triple ejector racks) under the wings. MERs (multiple
>>ejector racks) could be carried but normally weren't.
>
>
> Are you saying it was Navy practice to carry TERs on the outboard
> stations rather than MERs? Never saw it done in the USAF. Seems like
> it would create a very forward C/G.
>
>
>>A M-60 gun pod (SU-23) was tested. This pod was about
>>the size of a centerline fuel tank, fired 20mm bullets and was mainly
>>tested to get some gun data on the M-60 which was then used exclusively
>>by the USAF.
>
>
> Both SUU-23 and SUU-19 were carried by USAF F-4C and D models. Only
> major difference was that the -19 was RAT driven while the 23 was
> electrically spun. Good guns that could be very effective against
> ground targets.
>
>
>>Another pod was carried when testing the ACMR (air combat maneuvering
>>range). This pod trnsmitted airplane dat like speed, altitude, angle
>>of attack, attitude, weapons select and other info needed to
>>reconstruct real time ACM engagements.
>
>
> Basically an AIM-9 shape without fins and with a pointy antenna nose
> rather than the ogival IR seeker head.
>
>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Gotta agree with Ed. Wing tanks didn't make the F-4 any harder to roll.
Roll rate in a word was fantastic, clean, wing tanks, CL.

I have never seen MERS on the F-4s I flew but I was post Vietnam. We had
Ters on station 2 and 8, AIM-9s on the Lau7s, 2 AIM-7 in the aft
fusealge stations and a CL..CL was 600/1.6 IMN, 6+ and 0 neg G limited.

Guy Alcala

March 10th 05, 10:52 PM

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On 9 Mar 2005 08:33:25 -0800, "Bob" > wrote:
>
> >The Navy did not use wing tanks on their F-4's. The normal external
> >tank configuration was the single centerline tank. The reason was that
> >wing tanks made the already cumbersome F-4 even harder to turn. Roll
> >rate was reduced and nose high maneuvers were harder.
>
> The Navy bought a different centerline tank than USAF did. (Not sure,
> but as I recall it was a MacAir tank for USN and a Sargent-Fletcher
> for AF).

From an RF-4C stores limitation chart, the USAF used McAir and Royal Jet C/L
tanks. McAir and Sargent-Fletcher made the wing tanks. The McAir C/L
limits are somewhat higher than the Royal Jet's, but the jettison limits are
the same.

> The Navy tank was stressed for close to aircraft limits and
> with lower drag than a pair of outboard 370s made for better
> efficiency all around.

Drag appears to be the same as a pair of 370s.

<snip>

> > Normally each
> >F-4 carried 2 Aim-7 missiles in the under fuselage cavities and four
> >Aim-9H or G missiles on under wing pylons.
>
> Here you highlight one shortcoming of the C/L tank option. Two of the
> four missile wells couldn't be used.

Considering the reliability of AIM-7s after a few cat shots and traps, I
imagine it wasn't a big deal. And you could always punch the tank. By 1972
USAFf-4s were normally just carrying a pair of AIM-7s in the aft wells, with
jamming or camera pods in the forward wells. and unlike the USAF, the navy
had already modified their I/B pylons to carry AIM-9s and other ordnance
simulataneously. Cunningham/Driscoll had been carrying Rockeyes on I/B TERs
(plus a C/L, 2 AIM-7s and 4 x AIM-9Gs) when they claimed 3 MiGs with AIM-9s
on 10 May.

> > Air-to-ground ordnance was
> >hung in TERs (triple ejector racks) under the wings. MERs (multiple
> >ejector racks) could be carried but normally weren't.
>
> Are you saying it was Navy practice to carry TERs on the outboard
> stations rather than MERs?

I've got more than a few shots of TERs O/B on navy F-4s in Vietnam, but I've
also got a couple showing them carrying MERS (and bombs) there.

> Never saw it done in the USAF. Seems like
> it would create a very forward C/G.

ISTR reading that one of the reasons the navy didn't like to carry wing
tanks was apparently due to overrotation following the cat shot, probably
owing to fuel slosh creating an aft Cg, so a more forward Cg would seem to
be a good thing for their purposes.

> > A M-60 gun pod (SU-23) was tested. This pod was about
> >the size of a centerline fuel tank, fired 20mm bullets and was mainly
> >tested to get some gun data on the M-60 which was then used exclusively
> >by the USAF.
>
> Both SUU-23 and SUU-19 were carried by USAF F-4C and D models. Only
> major difference was that the -19 was RAT driven while the 23 was
> electrically spun. Good guns that could be very effective against
> ground targets.

Ed, you meant SUU-16, not -19.

Guy

Ed Rasimus

March 10th 05, 11:31 PM

On Thu, 10 Mar 2005 22:52:45 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> On 9 Mar 2005 08:33:25 -0800, "Bob" > wrote:
>>
>> >The Navy did not use wing tanks on their F-4's. The normal external
>> >tank configuration was the single centerline tank. The reason was that
>> >wing tanks made the already cumbersome F-4 even harder to turn. Roll
>> >rate was reduced and nose high maneuvers were harder.
>>
>> The Navy bought a different centerline tank than USAF did. (Not sure,
>> but as I recall it was a MacAir tank for USN and a Sargent-Fletcher
>> for AF).
>
>From an RF-4C stores limitation chart, the USAF used McAir and Royal Jet C/L
>tanks. McAir and Sargent-Fletcher made the wing tanks. The McAir C/L
>limits are somewhat higher than the Royal Jet's, but the jettison limits are
>the same.

You are correct--it was the Royal Jet tank, not Sargent-Fletcher. But,
the flight load limits for the RJ tank are a lot lower than the McAir.

As far as jettison limits (which hadn't been addressed until this
point), let me suggest that anyone who was jettisoning the RJ tank at
the published flight conditions was looking for a belly bumping
experience. The 'rule-of-thumb' we used with good results was one G
for every 100 knots of airspeed at jettison. Going 400 KIAS? Then pull
to 4 G before hitting the button. Clean separation guaranteed.

I'll confess to only having done it about 100 times, so others may
have different experiences.
>
>> The Navy tank was stressed for close to aircraft limits and
>> with lower drag than a pair of outboard 370s made for better
>> efficiency all around.
>
>Drag appears to be the same as a pair of 370s.

Drag index of 12.8 for two 370s. Drag of 9.6 for one C/L 600.
>
><snip>
>
>> > Normally each
>> >F-4 carried 2 Aim-7 missiles in the under fuselage cavities and four
>> >Aim-9H or G missiles on under wing pylons.
>>
>> Here you highlight one shortcoming of the C/L tank option. Two of the
>> four missile wells couldn't be used.
>
>Considering the reliability of AIM-7s after a few cat shots and traps, I
>imagine it wasn't a big deal. And you could always punch the tank. By 1972
>USAFf-4s were normally just carrying a pair of AIM-7s in the aft wells, with
>jamming or camera pods in the forward wells.

By 1972, I was just checking out in the F-4 and arriving in theater.
We were NORMALLY carrying three AIM-7s on all missions with one pod in
a forward missile well. No camera pods.

> > A M-60 gun pod (SU-23) was tested. This pod was about
>> >the size of a centerline fuel tank, fired 20mm bullets and was mainly
>> >tested to get some gun data on the M-60 which was then used exclusively
>> >by the USAF.
>>
>> Both SUU-23 and SUU-19 were carried by USAF F-4C and D models. Only
>> major difference was that the -19 was RAT driven while the 23 was
>> electrically spun. Good guns that could be very effective against
>> ground targets.
>
>Ed, you meant SUU-16, not -19.

You are correct. SUU-16.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Rufus

March 11th 05, 02:19 AM

Phormer Phighter Phlyer wrote:
> Rufus wrote:
>
>> Phormer Phighter Phlyer wrote:
>>
>>> Rob van Riel wrote:
>>>
>>> No pix but I was XO of VX-4 from Apr '88 till Dec '89. I and the CO
>>> flew the F-4S' we had 3 of them. Used for launch of high speed
>>> targets or targets for the F-14/18, radar type. No testing still
>>> being done for the F-4S.
>>>
>>> We flew with a centerline and LAU-7s.
>>
>>
>>
>> I just missed you...I was at Mugu during the summer of '86...I think.
>> I was working with the PMTC guys.
>>
>
> Great tour, our 'boss' was COMOPTEVFOR, a 2 star, our administrative
> boss was COMFITFUD, but as an ecelon II command, we could do what we
> wanted. Lots of parts, lots of $.
>
> I flew the F-14, F-4 and also we leased three Cessna T-210s to move
> project guys around. Great fun getting low over the desert on the way to
> China Lake, making cars think you were the CHP.

Heh...I sent a Harrier out with a DLQ pod and he blew up a CHP radar gun
once by mistake. Cop's mistake...what should you expect, pointing a
radar at a tactical aircraft? Big hammer, no supervision. Yup...life
was good...

Yeah - Mugu is a great place to be stationed. I was there as a civvie
with the PMTC crowd for a bit...a Hornet baby amongst the Tomcat guys.
But it was fun to get a look at the B model Toms - had a brief brush
with the AB controls on that engine while I was at GE. Was nice to see
it in an airplane.

You didn't happen to flow through VX-5 by any chance? We could have
crossed paths there...

--
- Rufus

Guy Alcala

March 11th 05, 05:08 AM

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On Thu, 10 Mar 2005 22:52:45 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >
> >> On 9 Mar 2005 08:33:25 -0800, "Bob" > wrote:
> >>
> >> >The Navy did not use wing tanks on their F-4's. The normal external
> >> >tank configuration was the single centerline tank. The reason was that
> >> >wing tanks made the already cumbersome F-4 even harder to turn. Roll
> >> >rate was reduced and nose high maneuvers were harder.
> >>
> >> The Navy bought a different centerline tank than USAF did. (Not sure,
> >> but as I recall it was a MacAir tank for USN and a Sargent-Fletcher
> >> for AF).
> >
> >From an RF-4C stores limitation chart, the USAF used McAir and Royal Jet C/L
> >tanks. McAir and Sargent-Fletcher made the wing tanks. The McAir C/L
> >limits are somewhat higher than the Royal Jet's, but the jettison limits are
> >the same.
>
> You are correct--it was the Royal Jet tank, not Sargent-Fletcher. But,
> the flight load limits for the RJ tank are a lot lower than the McAir.

Here's what the chart has --
(limits are Carriage KIAS/Mach/Sym. G/Unsym G/Roll Rate/Stick Throw/Jettison
limits Min KIAS/Max. KIAS/Mach. Note: "->" means basic airframe limits apply.
Jettison limits list 3 values for below 35,000 ft., then 3 values above 35,000
feet. "NE" means "Not established"):

McAir, 0% - 10% full: ->/->/+ -> & -2.0/->/200/Full/NE/375 KIAS/NE/NE/420
KIAS/NE

10% - 75% full: ->/->/+6.5 & -2.0/+5.2 & 0.0/150/one half/Not authorized/Not
authorized

75% - full: ->/->/+5.0 & -2.0/+4.0 & 0.0/150/one half/NE/375/NE/NE/420/NE

RJ, 0% -10% full: 600/1.8/+5.0 & 0.0/+4.0 & +1.0/**/**/NE/375 KIAS/NE/NE/420/NE

10% - 75% full: 600/1.8/+5.0 & 0.0/+4.0 & +1.0/**/**/Not authorized/Not
authorized

75% - Full: 600/1.8/+3.0 & 0.0/+1.0 & +1.0/**/**/NE/375/NE/NE/420/NE

> As far as jettison limits (which hadn't been addressed until this
> point), let me suggest that anyone who was jettisoning the RJ tank at
> the published flight conditions was looking for a belly bumping
> experience. The 'rule-of-thumb' we used with good results was one G
> for every 100 knots of airspeed at jettison. Going 400 KIAS? Then pull
> to 4 G before hitting the button. Clean separation guaranteed.
>
> I'll confess to only having done it about 100 times, so others may
> have different experiences.

I've read similar comments by other pilotsas to actual procedures.

> >> The Navy tank was stressed for close to aircraft limits and
> >> with lower drag than a pair of outboard 370s made for better
> >> efficiency all around.
> >
> >Drag appears to be the same as a pair of 370s.
>
> Drag index of 12.8 for two 370s. Drag of 9.6 for one C/L 600.

My source may be in error. I was going by the sample planning problems in the
T.O. 1F-4C-34-1-1, which list the same drag, 9.6, for a pair of 370s or a single
600 C/L, but that may be a mistake. OTOH, it does show different weights for the
two, 269lb. for the empty C/L vs. 680 lb. for a pair of empty 370s.

> >
> ><snip>
> >
> >> > Normally each
> >> >F-4 carried 2 Aim-7 missiles in the under fuselage cavities and four
> >> >Aim-9H or G missiles on under wing pylons.
> >>
> >> Here you highlight one shortcoming of the C/L tank option. Two of the
> >> four missile wells couldn't be used.
> >
> >Considering the reliability of AIM-7s after a few cat shots and traps, I
> >imagine it wasn't a big deal. And you could always punch the tank. By 1972
> >USAFf-4s were normally just carrying a pair of AIM-7s in the aft wells, with
> >jamming or camera pods in the forward wells.
>
> By 1972, I was just checking out in the F-4 and arriving in theater.
> We were NORMALLY carrying three AIM-7s on all missions with one pod in
> a forward missile well. No camera pods.

You had a different mission (H/K). Judging by photo frequency, strikers and
strike escorts were often carrying a pair of ALQ-87s in the forward wells by that
time, if they weren't carrying a strike camera in place of one of the jammers.
For instance, I've got a shot of Coe and Webb's 34th TFS F-4E waiting to tank P/S
after they'd gotten their MiG-21 on 5 Oct. 1972. They were tasked as strike
escort, and theyre carrying four AIM-9Es, plus two ALQ-87s forward and a single
AIM-7E-2 aft (they got the MiG with the other). Course, they had to sit there
and wait for the SAMs and MiGs to a greater extent than you did, plus they turned
the pods ON, so I imagine carrying a pair of them was a lot more valuable to them
than an extra (and unlikely to be used) AIM-7. The Strike escorts seem to have
felt that they were primarily there as Atoll absorbers for the strikers, and
comments by COM 7th AF (or maybe it was CINCPACAF, I forget) at the time seem to
confirm that was the case.

The 432nd MiGCAP guys seem to have carried a full load of AIM-7s and AIM-9s, but
also carried two ALQ-87s or -100s, one on each I/B.

Guy

Guy Alcala

March 11th 05, 12:32 PM

Guy Alcala wrote:

<snip>

> RJ, 0% -10% full: 600/1.8/+5.0 & 0.0/+4.0 & +1.0/**/**/NE/375 KIAS/NE/NE/420/NE
>
> 10% - 75% full: 600/1.8/+5.0 & 0.0/+4.0 & +1.0/**/**/Not authorized/Not
> authorized
>
> 75% - Full: 600/1.8/+3.0 & 0.0/+1.0 & +1.0/**/**/NE/375/NE/NE/420/NE

Forgot -- the "**" means "Only gradual coordinated turns are permitted".

Guy

Phormer Phighter Phlyer

March 11th 05, 02:24 PM

Rufus wrote:
> Phormer Phighter Phlyer wrote:
>
>> Rufus wrote:
>>
>>> Phormer Phighter Phlyer wrote:
>>>
>>>> Rob van Riel wrote:
>>>>
>>>> No pix but I was XO of VX-4 from Apr '88 till Dec '89. I and the CO
>>>> flew the F-4S' we had 3 of them. Used for launch of high speed
>>>> targets or targets for the F-14/18, radar type. No testing still
>>>> being done for the F-4S.
>>>>
>>>> We flew with a centerline and LAU-7s.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I just missed you...I was at Mugu during the summer of '86...I
>>> think. I was working with the PMTC guys.
>>>
>>
>> Great tour, our 'boss' was COMOPTEVFOR, a 2 star, our administrative
>> boss was COMFITFUD, but as an ecelon II command, we could do what we
>> wanted. Lots of parts, lots of $.
>>
>> I flew the F-14, F-4 and also we leased three Cessna T-210s to move
>> project guys around. Great fun getting low over the desert on the way
>> to China Lake, making cars think you were the CHP.
>
>
> Heh...I sent a Harrier out with a DLQ pod and he blew up a CHP radar gun
> once by mistake. Cop's mistake...what should you expect, pointing a
> radar at a tactical aircraft? Big hammer, no supervision. Yup...life
> was good...
>
> Yeah - Mugu is a great place to be stationed. I was there as a civvie
> with the PMTC crowd for a bit...a Hornet baby amongst the Tomcat guys.
> But it was fun to get a look at the B model Toms - had a brief brush
> with the AB controls on that engine while I was at GE. Was nice to see
> it in an airplane.
>
> You didn't happen to flow through VX-5 by any chance? We could have
> crossed paths there...
>

Visited VX-5 lots, taking project guys there but was at Mugu only.

Phormer Phighter Phlyer

March 11th 05, 02:27 PM

Guy Alcala wrote:
> Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>
>>On 9 Mar 2005 08:33:25 -0800, "Bob" > wrote:
>>
>>
>>>The Navy did not use wing tanks on their F-4's. The normal external
>>>tank configuration was the single centerline tank. The reason was that
>>>wing tanks made the already cumbersome F-4 even harder to turn. Roll
>>>rate was reduced and nose high maneuvers were harder.
>>
>>The Navy bought a different centerline tank than USAF did. (Not sure,
>>but as I recall it was a MacAir tank for USN and a Sargent-Fletcher
>>for AF).
>
>
> From an RF-4C stores limitation chart, the USAF used McAir and Royal Jet C/L
> tanks. McAir and Sargent-Fletcher made the wing tanks. The McAir C/L
> limits are somewhat higher than the Royal Jet's, but the jettison limits are
> the same.
>
>
>>The Navy tank was stressed for close to aircraft limits and
>>with lower drag than a pair of outboard 370s made for better
>>efficiency all around.
>
>
> Drag appears to be the same as a pair of 370s.
>
> <snip>
>
>>> Normally each
>>>F-4 carried 2 Aim-7 missiles in the under fuselage cavities and four
>>>Aim-9H or G missiles on under wing pylons.
>>
>>Here you highlight one shortcoming of the C/L tank option. Two of the
>>four missile wells couldn't be used.
>
>
> Considering the reliability of AIM-7s after a few cat shots and traps, I
> imagine it wasn't a big deal. And you could always punch the tank. By 1972
> USAFf-4s were normally just carrying a pair of AIM-7s in the aft wells, with
> jamming or camera pods in the forward wells. and unlike the USAF, the navy
> had already modified their I/B pylons to carry AIM-9s and other ordnance
> simulataneously. Cunningham/Driscoll had been carrying Rockeyes on I/B TERs
> (plus a C/L, 2 AIM-7s and 4 x AIM-9Gs) when they claimed 3 MiGs with AIM-9s
> on 10 May.
>
>
>>> Air-to-ground ordnance was
>>>hung in TERs (triple ejector racks) under the wings. MERs (multiple
>>>ejector racks) could be carried but normally weren't.
>>
>>Are you saying it was Navy practice to carry TERs on the outboard
>>stations rather than MERs?
>
>
> I've got more than a few shots of TERs O/B on navy F-4s in Vietnam, but I've
> also got a couple showing them carrying MERS (and bombs) there.
>
>
>>Never saw it done in the USAF. Seems like
>>it would create a very forward C/G.
>
>
> ISTR reading that one of the reasons the navy didn't like to carry wing
> tanks was apparently due to overrotation following the cat shot, probably
> owing to fuel slosh creating an aft Cg, so a more forward Cg would seem to
> be a good thing for their purposes.
>
>

Wing tanks were frowned upon because they got beat up by the deck crew
and were twice the problem of a CL w/o any real advantage. As for
'blowing off the CL...no-no-do that a few times and you'll be outta CL
tanks. It may have been common in the USAF, with a warehouse full of
them but not so on a CV.

Ed Rasimus

March 11th 05, 03:54 PM

On Fri, 11 Mar 2005 05:08:21 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>>
>> By 1972, I was just checking out in the F-4 and arriving in theater.
>> We were NORMALLY carrying three AIM-7s on all missions with one pod in
>> a forward missile well. No camera pods.
>
>You had a different mission (H/K).

We didn't have the luxury of configuring specific jets for specific
missions other than with regard to the mission expendables themselves.
By that I mean a H/K F-4E during Linebacker was loaded with 4xCBU-52
on the inboard TERs (two on each), three fuel tanks, three AIM-7E-2,
and ONE ECM pod in the (usually) left forward missile well.

If squadron airplanes were tasked for other missions (by 1 Oct '72 we
only had one F-4 squadron at Korat--the 34th), they got different bomb
loads but the AIM-7 and ECM pod configuration remained constant.

An escort mission (the other primary mission tasking of the 34th TFS)
would load three tanks, four AIM-9E on the inboard MAU-32s and the
same three Sparrows and ECM.

> Judging by photo frequency, strikers and
>strike escorts were often carrying a pair of ALQ-87s in the forward wells by that
>time, if they weren't carrying a strike camera in place of one of the jammers.

Over the years there were a lot of different configurations. Some
places and times carried ECM on an inboard wing station. Some carried
two pods. Various models of pods were carried and, yes, strike cameras
were occasionally hung.

>For instance, I've got a shot of Coe and Webb's 34th TFS F-4E waiting to tank P/S
>after they'd gotten their MiG-21 on 5 Oct. 1972.

I was in the 34th at the time, although not flying that day. While
that may be the tail number and it might even be a picture with Coe
and Webb flying it, I'm not sure that you could guarantee the
pedigree. Seems highly fortuitous that someone could have been there
with a camera to take the picture on the day of the kill. (Was it a
shot from the boomer?)

> They were tasked as strike
>escort, and theyre carrying four AIM-9Es, plus two ALQ-87s forward and a single
>AIM-7E-2 aft (they got the MiG with the other). Course, they had to sit there
>and wait for the SAMs and MiGs to a greater extent than you did, plus they turned
>the pods ON, so I imagine carrying a pair of them was a lot more valuable to them
>than an extra (and unlikely to be used) AIM-7.

You are making a bad assumption here. A/A escort flights flew as
"out-riggers" on a set of bomb-droppers, usually three or four flights
of four. They went in with the bombers and out with the bombers.

H/K flights were "first-in/last-out", sweeping ahead of the strikers
and remaining in the area until the package was clear--and often
beyond that if fuel allowed to do visual armed recce for SAM sites.

They did run pods "ON" and we never turned them on except as a
last-ditch defense in a SAM-dance. But, as mentioned above, we did not
have the luxury of uploading and downloading ECM pods for the day's
mission. They were bolted on (unjettisonable) and stayed on.

As for the likelihood of use--since we were not configured with
AIM-9s, we were at least as likely as the escort guys to need an
AIM-7.

> The Strike escorts seem to have
>felt that they were primarily there as Atoll absorbers for the strikers, and
>comments by COM 7th AF (or maybe it was CINCPACAF, I forget) at the time seem to
>confirm that was the case.

Strike escort guys more commonly felt themselves used (abused?) as
"herders" to create a situation to turn the MiGs to a place where the
fair-haired boys of the 555th could get their shots. We didn't even
get to talk to Teaball.

>
>The 432nd MiGCAP guys seem to have carried a full load of AIM-7s and AIM-9s, but
>also carried two ALQ-87s or -100s, one on each I/B.

They also had "Agile Eagle" aircraft, the first increment of TCTO-566
modded airplanes with LES and TISEO. And, they had Combat Tree,
dedicated GCI support and a serious public-relations corps to make a
USAF ace. They were mostly 555th TFS and mostly Fighter Weapons School
grads and instructors, so they were arguably the best trained,
qualified and equipped to do that mission.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Rufus

March 11th 05, 06:30 PM

Phormer Phighter Phlyer wrote:
> Rufus wrote:
>
>> Phormer Phighter Phlyer wrote:
>>
>>> Rufus wrote:
>>>
>>>> Phormer Phighter Phlyer wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Rob van Riel wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> No pix but I was XO of VX-4 from Apr '88 till Dec '89. I and the CO
>>>>> flew the F-4S' we had 3 of them. Used for launch of high speed
>>>>> targets or targets for the F-14/18, radar type. No testing still
>>>>> being done for the F-4S.
>>>>>
>>>>> We flew with a centerline and LAU-7s.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I just missed you...I was at Mugu during the summer of '86...I
>>>> think. I was working with the PMTC guys.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Great tour, our 'boss' was COMOPTEVFOR, a 2 star, our administrative
>>> boss was COMFITFUD, but as an ecelon II command, we could do what we
>>> wanted. Lots of parts, lots of $.
>>>
>>> I flew the F-14, F-4 and also we leased three Cessna T-210s to move
>>> project guys around. Great fun getting low over the desert on the way
>>> to China Lake, making cars think you were the CHP.
>>
>>
>>
>> Heh...I sent a Harrier out with a DLQ pod and he blew up a CHP radar
>> gun once by mistake. Cop's mistake...what should you expect, pointing
>> a radar at a tactical aircraft? Big hammer, no supervision.
>> Yup...life was good...
>>
>> Yeah - Mugu is a great place to be stationed. I was there as a civvie
>> with the PMTC crowd for a bit...a Hornet baby amongst the Tomcat guys.
>> But it was fun to get a look at the B model Toms - had a brief brush
>> with the AB controls on that engine while I was at GE. Was nice to
>> see it in an airplane.
>>
>> You didn't happen to flow through VX-5 by any chance? We could have
>> crossed paths there...
>>
>
> Visited VX-5 lots, taking project guys there but was at Mugu only.

It's a small world...always wondering who'll jog my memory next.

--
- Rufus

Guy Alcala

March 11th 05, 11:48 PM

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On Fri, 11 Mar 2005 05:08:21 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >>
> >> By 1972, I was just checking out in the F-4 and arriving in theater.
> >> We were NORMALLY carrying three AIM-7s on all missions with one pod in
> >> a forward missile well. No camera pods.
> >
> >You had a different mission (H/K).
>
> We didn't have the luxury of configuring specific jets for specific
> missions other than with regard to the mission expendables themselves.
> By that I mean a H/K F-4E during Linebacker was loaded with 4xCBU-52
> on the inboard TERs (two on each), three fuel tanks, three AIM-7E-2,
> and ONE ECM pod in the (usually) left forward missile well.

Yes, I know, but we're talking about the majority of F-4s, not just your H/K birds.
Loads varied depending on the unit and the tasking.

> If squadron airplanes were tasked for other missions (by 1 Oct '72 we
> only had one F-4 squadron at Korat--the 34th), they got different bomb
> loads but the AIM-7 and ECM pod configuration remained constant.
>
> An escort mission (the other primary mission tasking of the 34th TFS)
> would load three tanks, four AIM-9E on the inboard MAU-32s and the
> same three Sparrows and ECM.
>
> > Judging by photo frequency, strikers and
> >strike escorts were often carrying a pair of ALQ-87s in the forward wells by that
> >time, if they weren't carrying a strike camera in place of one of the jammers.
>
> Over the years there were a lot of different configurations. Some
> places and times carried ECM on an inboard wing station. Some carried
> two pods. Various models of pods were carried and, yes, strike cameras
> were occasionally hung.
>
> >For instance, I've got a shot of Coe and Webb's 34th TFS F-4E waiting to tank P/S
> >after they'd gotten their MiG-21 on 5 Oct. 1972.
>
> I was in the 34th at the time, although not flying that day. While
> that may be the tail number and it might even be a picture with Coe
> and Webb flying it, I'm not sure that you could guarantee the
> pedigree. Seems highly fortuitous that someone could have been there
> with a camera to take the picture on the day of the kill. (Was it a
> shot from the boomer?)

No, from another F-4, probably Coe's wingman. The photo appears in Squadron/Signal's
"and kill MiGs" by Lou Drendel, on page 34 of my second edition. The caption reads
"F-4E of DickCoe refueling on egress from North vietnam after kill. Note missing
AIM-7!"

While I'm normally careful about trusting captions as to details, in the background is
a KC-135 along with 3 F-4D strikers, all of which appear to be from the 25 TFS (FA),
one of which is on the boom. Coe's a/c, "JJ" 68-0493 is missing an AIM-7E-2 from the
aft left well, plus all the tanks, and is presumably waiting his turn on that or
another tanker. Oh, and Drendel's source for the photo is Coe himself, so I think in
this case we can trust that the date and details are correct;-) Coe himself says he
was tasked as the only spare flight lead "for three MiGCAP flights [Sic. Presumably he
means escort, as is clearer below] and two flights in support of the Wild Weasels. As
soon as I got on the Ground frequency, the leader of the last flight in support of the
bombers aborted. He told me to go ahead and take his flight."

> > They were tasked as strike
> >escort, and theyre carrying four AIM-9Es, plus two ALQ-87s forward and a single
> >AIM-7E-2 aft (they got the MiG with the other). Course, they had to sit there
> >and wait for the SAMs and MiGs to a greater extent than you did, plus they turned
> >the pods ON, so I imagine carrying a pair of them was a lot more valuable to them
> >than an extra (and unlikely to be used) AIM-7.
>
> You are making a bad assumption here. A/A escort flights flew as
> "out-riggers" on a set of bomb-droppers, usually three or four flights
> of four. They went in with the bombers and out with the bombers.

> H/K flights were "first-in/last-out", sweeping ahead of the strikers
> and remaining in the area until the package was clear--and often
> beyond that if fuel allowed to do visual armed recce for SAM sites.

We have no disagreement here, Ed. I wasn't referring to duration of time you spent in
Indian country, I was referring to the relative freedom to maneuver of the H/K (and
MiGCAP) flights compared to strikers, chaffers and escorts. The escorts were tied to
the chaffers and strikers, couldn't maneuver freely, and were usually on the edge of
the chaff corridor (as you said, outriggers) so the extra jamming power would come in
handy. As Coe says, he was tasked as spare flight lead for either strike or WW
escort, and his a/c is carrying a pair of pods.

> They did run pods "ON" and we never turned them on except as a
> last-ditch defense in a SAM-dance. But, as mentioned above, we did not
> have the luxury of uploading and downloading ECM pods for the day's
> mission. They were bolted on (unjettisonable) and stayed on.

Well, this and other a/c with the same mission have two "bolted on" in that time
frame, judging by the photos.

> As for the likelihood of use--since we were not configured with
> AIM-9s, we were at least as likely as the escort guys to need an
> AIM-7.

Given that the AIM-7s were your only missiles, far more so.

> > The Strike escorts seem to have
> >felt that they were primarily there as Atoll absorbers for the strikers, and
> >comments by COM 7th AF (or maybe it was CINCPACAF, I forget) at the time seem to
> >confirm that was the case.
>
> Strike escort guys more commonly felt themselves used (abused?) as
> "herders" to create a situation to turn the MiGs to a place where the
> fair-haired boys of the 555th could get their shots. We didn't even
> get to talk to Teaball.

Given the number of frequencies you guys had to monitor, I'd say that was a reasonable
decision. After all, presumably the escort guys needed to have one radio on the
strike (or chaffer, if that was a different frequency), monitor Guard, plus be able to
talk to Disco/Red Crown. MiGCAPs were free to engage and AFAIK didn't need tobe on
the strike frequency, so letting them talk directly to Teaball makes sense.

But it's instructive to look at the 1972 losses to MiGs, and see which taskings took
the losses. In Linebacker I strike/chaff escorts suffered exactly half the losses to
MiGs, 9/18.

> >The 432nd MiGCAP guys seem to have carried a full load of AIM-7s and AIM-9s, but
> >also carried two ALQ-87s or -100s, one on each I/B.
>
> They also had "Agile Eagle" aircraft, the first increment of TCTO-566
> modded airplanes with LES and TISEO. And, they had Combat Tree,
> dedicated GCI support and a serious public-relations corps to make a
> USAF ace. They were mostly 555th TFS and mostly Fighter Weapons School
> grads and instructors, so they were arguably the best trained,
> qualified and equipped to do that mission.

Sure. In particular, the 13th/555th Combat Tree F-4Ds used as flight leads always
carried a full bag of AIM-7s, because they were the most likely to be able to take a
BVR or at least a head-on shot. My point was that, as flights operating well away
from the chaff and mass jamming support of the strike flights, and lacking any ability
to suppress/destroy SAM and AAA radars, they _needed_ two pods. They seem to have
usually had noise/deception ALQ-101s instead of the pure noise jamming -87s which were
usually given to the strike and escort flights, which also makes sense.

Guy

richard goldsberry

March 12th 05, 12:48 PM

....and then there was always the threat of "bridle-slap" into the CL tank
off the waist cats.
At night was quite a show...

"Phormer Phighter Phlyer" > wrote in message
news:1110551117.df4c0e0d2d0180affc7668b7b7146eb0@t eranews...
> Guy Alcala wrote:
> > Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >
> >
> >>On 9 Mar 2005 08:33:25 -0800, "Bob" > wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>The Navy did not use wing tanks on their F-4's. The normal external
> >>>tank configuration was the single centerline tank. The reason was that
> >>>wing tanks made the already cumbersome F-4 even harder to turn. Roll
> >>>rate was reduced and nose high maneuvers were harder.
> >>
> >>The Navy bought a different centerline tank than USAF did. (Not sure,
> >>but as I recall it was a MacAir tank for USN and a Sargent-Fletcher
> >>for AF).
> >
> >
> > From an RF-4C stores limitation chart, the USAF used McAir and Royal Jet
C/L
> > tanks. McAir and Sargent-Fletcher made the wing tanks. The McAir C/L
> > limits are somewhat higher than the Royal Jet's, but the jettison limits
are
> > the same.
> >
> >
> >>The Navy tank was stressed for close to aircraft limits and
> >>with lower drag than a pair of outboard 370s made for better
> >>efficiency all around.
> >
> >
> > Drag appears to be the same as a pair of 370s.
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> >>> Normally each
> >>>F-4 carried 2 Aim-7 missiles in the under fuselage cavities and four
> >>>Aim-9H or G missiles on under wing pylons.
> >>
> >>Here you highlight one shortcoming of the C/L tank option. Two of the
> >>four missile wells couldn't be used.
> >
> >
> > Considering the reliability of AIM-7s after a few cat shots and traps, I
> > imagine it wasn't a big deal. And you could always punch the tank. By
1972
> > USAFf-4s were normally just carrying a pair of AIM-7s in the aft wells,
with
> > jamming or camera pods in the forward wells. and unlike the USAF, the
navy
> > had already modified their I/B pylons to carry AIM-9s and other ordnance
> > simulataneously. Cunningham/Driscoll had been carrying Rockeyes on I/B
TERs
> > (plus a C/L, 2 AIM-7s and 4 x AIM-9Gs) when they claimed 3 MiGs with
AIM-9s
> > on 10 May.
> >
> >
> >>> Air-to-ground ordnance was
> >>>hung in TERs (triple ejector racks) under the wings. MERs (multiple
> >>>ejector racks) could be carried but normally weren't.
> >>
> >>Are you saying it was Navy practice to carry TERs on the outboard
> >>stations rather than MERs?
> >
> >
> > I've got more than a few shots of TERs O/B on navy F-4s in Vietnam, but
I've
> > also got a couple showing them carrying MERS (and bombs) there.
> >
> >
> >>Never saw it done in the USAF. Seems like
> >>it would create a very forward C/G.
> >
> >
> > ISTR reading that one of the reasons the navy didn't like to carry wing
> > tanks was apparently due to overrotation following the cat shot,
probably
> > owing to fuel slosh creating an aft Cg, so a more forward Cg would seem
to
> > be a good thing for their purposes.
> >
> >
>
> Wing tanks were frowned upon because they got beat up by the deck crew
> and were twice the problem of a CL w/o any real advantage. As for
> 'blowing off the CL...no-no-do that a few times and you'll be outta CL
> tanks. It may have been common in the USAF, with a warehouse full of
> them but not so on a CV.

Phormer Phighter Phlyer

March 12th 05, 03:06 PM

richard goldsberry wrote:
> ...and then there was always the threat of "bridle-slap" into the CL tank
> off the waist cats.
> At night was quite a show...
>
>
>
>

Not just off the waist, off any cat with the vanzelm holdback...It was
called a 'bridle slap' but it was one of the brass things that was
attached to the bridle via rope to prevent the bridle from going over
the side. I have about 5-6 of them on Indy and Midway(bow cats only).
WAS quite a show, out of A/B, fire out.

I also had a smack of the horseshoe thing that was placed over the cat
assembly to allow the bridle to be retracted...By a deck ape, who left
it on the cat track, at night. My nose wheel hit it, threw it into the
C/L, lots of noise and flame, I blew off everything, 2 and 2 plus
CL...VERY exciting.

My CO, Fox Farrell, slamed me for blowing everything off for a 'bridle
slap'. I knew it was something else. The Safety Officer, 'Snuffy' Smith
did a great investigation and came up with the true cause.

WmB

March 12th 05, 06:16 PM

"Rob van Riel" > wrote in message
...
> VX-4 has created some of the most spectacular paintjobs seen on F-4
> Phantoms

Two thoughts I've had as I've read this thread:

1) It is awesome knowing the guys that actually slung the Phantom around in
the air and in the hangars are among us, and that they recall all of the
detail with such clarity.

2) I hope you never get to judge one of my F-4 builds. ;-)

Seriously, enjoyed reading this thread.

WmB

Ed Rasimus

March 12th 05, 07:00 PM

On Fri, 11 Mar 2005 23:48:34 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> We didn't have the luxury of configuring specific jets for specific
>> missions other than with regard to the mission expendables themselves.
>> By that I mean a H/K F-4E during Linebacker was loaded with 4xCBU-52
>> on the inboard TERs (two on each), three fuel tanks, three AIM-7E-2,
>> and ONE ECM pod in the (usually) left forward missile well.
>
>Yes, I know, but we're talking about the majority of F-4s, not just your H/K birds.
>Loads varied depending on the unit and the tasking.

My point is that aircraft scheduled for Hunter/Killer and aircraft
scheduled for A/A escort, and aircraft that were scheduled as bomb
droppers all came out of the basic 27 aircraft that were available to
the 34th TFS--24 UE plus 3 attrition spares.

Before 1 October '72, when the 469th was still around, the two
squadrons were equipped at 18 UE, so the frag drew from those 36
aircraft for whatever mission was required.
>
>> > Judging by photo frequency, strikers and
>> >strike escorts were often carrying a pair of ALQ-87s in the forward wells by that
>> >time, if they weren't carrying a strike camera in place of one of the jammers.
>>
>> Over the years there were a lot of different configurations. Some
>> places and times carried ECM on an inboard wing station. Some carried
>> two pods. Various models of pods were carried and, yes, strike cameras
>> were occasionally hung.
>>
>> >For instance, I've got a shot of Coe and Webb's 34th TFS F-4E waiting to tank P/S
>> >after they'd gotten their MiG-21 on 5 Oct. 1972.

>No, from another F-4, probably Coe's wingman. The photo appears in Squadron/Signal's
>"and kill MiGs" by Lou Drendel, on page 34 of my second edition. The caption reads
>"F-4E of DickCoe refueling on egress from North vietnam after kill. Note missing
>AIM-7!"
>
>While I'm normally careful about trusting captions as to details, in the background is
>a KC-135 along with 3 F-4D strikers, all of which appear to be from the 25 TFS (FA),
>one of which is on the boom. Coe's a/c, "JJ" 68-0493 is missing an AIM-7E-2 from the
>aft left well, plus all the tanks, and is presumably waiting his turn on that or
>another tanker. Oh, and Drendel's source for the photo is Coe himself, so I think in
>this case we can trust that the date and details are correct;-) Coe himself says he
>was tasked as the only spare flight lead "for three MiGCAP flights [Sic. Presumably he
>means escort, as is clearer below] and two flights in support of the Wild Weasels. As
>soon as I got on the Ground frequency, the leader of the last flight in support of the
>bombers aborted. He told me to go ahead and take his flight."

Curiosity got the better of me, so I dug out Don Logan's excellent
photo anthology, "The 388th Tactical Fighter Wing" by Schiffer
Publishing. (As an aside, Don was shot down about three days before I
arrived at Korat in '72. I moved into his hootch room even before his
personal effects were packed up.)

What surprised me was the number of F-4E photos both ground and
in-flight in which aircraft had NO ECM pod. Even in photos indicating
that they were taken after the commencement of Linebacker operations
there is no evidence of a pod.

There is a brief account of the Coe/Webb victory, but no mention of
pod configuration nor of tank jettisoning. Apparently from that
account, he was vectored by Disco to the vicinity of a pair of MiG-21s
cruising along in route formation. He sliced down into their six
o'clock and got an auto-aq lock-on and fired one AIM-7 for his kill.
(So much for the dog-fighting....)

All the pictures of pods in Don's book show the pod carried in a
forward missile well--none on an inboard wing station (at least at
Korat at that time.) In none could I discern carrying two pods.
>
>> > They were tasked as strike
>> >escort, and theyre carrying four AIM-9Es, plus two ALQ-87s forward and a single
>> >AIM-7E-2 aft (they got the MiG with the other). Course, they had to sit there
>> >and wait for the SAMs and MiGs to a greater extent than you did, plus they turned
>> >the pods ON, so I imagine carrying a pair of them was a lot more valuable to them
>> >than an extra (and unlikely to be used) AIM-7.
>>
>> You are making a bad assumption here. A/A escort flights flew as
>> "out-riggers" on a set of bomb-droppers, usually three or four flights
>> of four. They went in with the bombers and out with the bombers.
>
>> H/K flights were "first-in/last-out", sweeping ahead of the strikers
>> and remaining in the area until the package was clear--and often
>> beyond that if fuel allowed to do visual armed recce for SAM sites.
>
>We have no disagreement here, Ed. I wasn't referring to duration of time you spent in
>Indian country, I was referring to the relative freedom to maneuver of the H/K (and
>MiGCAP) flights compared to strikers, chaffers and escorts. The escorts were tied to
>the chaffers and strikers, couldn't maneuver freely, and were usually on the edge of
>the chaff corridor (as you said, outriggers) so the extra jamming power would come in
>handy. As Coe says, he was tasked as spare flight lead for either strike or WW
>escort, and his a/c is carrying a pair of pods.

I'm not enough of an electronic warfare guru to comment on whether
carrying a second pod would provide either additional jamming power or
broader frequency coverage. Clearly with a straight noise jammer the
advantage would be delayed burn-through, but by the time of the ALQ-87
and 101, there was at least as much deception output as noise (as
evidenced by the demise of the dreaded "pod roll-in" tactics.)

Since resolution pod formation depended on four-ship, there wouldn't
have been much benefit to a second pod on what was essentially an
autonomous two-ship formation.
>
>> They did run pods "ON" and we never turned them on except as a
>> last-ditch defense in a SAM-dance. But, as mentioned above, we did not
>> have the luxury of uploading and downloading ECM pods for the day's
>> mission. They were bolted on (unjettisonable) and stayed on.
>
>Well, this and other a/c with the same mission have two "bolted on" in that time
>frame, judging by the photos.
>
>> As for the likelihood of use--since we were not configured with
>> AIM-9s, we were at least as likely as the escort guys to need an
>> AIM-7.
>
>Given that the AIM-7s were your only missiles, far more so.
>
>> > The Strike escorts seem to have
>> >felt that they were primarily there as Atoll absorbers for the strikers, and
>> >comments by COM 7th AF (or maybe it was CINCPACAF, I forget) at the time seem to
>> >confirm that was the case.
>>
>> Strike escort guys more commonly felt themselves used (abused?) as
>> "herders" to create a situation to turn the MiGs to a place where the
>> fair-haired boys of the 555th could get their shots. We didn't even
>> get to talk to Teaball.
>
>Given the number of frequencies you guys had to monitor, I'd say that was a reasonable
>decision. After all, presumably the escort guys needed to have one radio on the
>strike (or chaffer, if that was a different frequency), monitor Guard, plus be able to
>talk to Disco/Red Crown. MiGCAPs were free to engage and AFAIK didn't need tobe on
>the strike frequency, so letting them talk directly to Teaball makes sense.

The F-4 add a "one and a half" UHF radio--meaning a transmit/receive
primary radio and a receive-only auxiliary channel (with a limited
number of pre-set channel choices.) Plus Guard channel, of course.

All strike flights after tanker drop-off were on strike primary
frequency--Weasels, escorts, bombers, chaffers, jammers, et. al. Disco
and Red Crown broadcast on Guard--never any need to talk to them, so
that's not a factor. Teaball could have simulcast MiG calls on strike
primary to let the guys being targetted know what was going on. They
could have let the players know what the MiGCAP was doing. There was
no need to talk back to Teaball since we weren't being vectored by
them, but to deny guys in the arena essential elements of situational
awareness is unconscionable.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

José Herculano

March 12th 05, 08:41 PM

> Curiosity got the better of me, so I dug out Don Logan's excellent
> photo anthology, "The 388th Tactical Fighter Wing" by Schiffer
> Publishing. (As an aside, Don was shot down about three days before I
> arrived at Korat in '72. I moved into his hootch room even before his
> personal effects were packed up.)

Don's a member of some Yahoo groups I subscribe to, great guy!
_____________
José Herculano

Rufus

March 12th 05, 11:51 PM

Phormer Phighter Phlyer wrote:

> richard goldsberry wrote:
>
>> ...and then there was always the threat of "bridle-slap" into the CL tank
>> off the waist cats.
>> At night was quite a show...
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> Not just off the waist, off any cat with the vanzelm holdback...It was
> called a 'bridle slap' but it was one of the brass things that was
> attached to the bridle via rope to prevent the bridle from going over
> the side. I have about 5-6 of them on Indy and Midway(bow cats only).
> WAS quite a show, out of A/B, fire out.
>
> I also had a smack of the horseshoe thing that was placed over the cat
> assembly to allow the bridle to be retracted...By a deck ape, who left
> it on the cat track, at night. My nose wheel hit it, threw it into the
> C/L, lots of noise and flame, I blew off everything, 2 and 2 plus
> CL...VERY exciting.
>
> My CO, Fox Farrell, slamed me for blowing everything off for a 'bridle
> slap'. I knew it was something else. The Safety Officer, 'Snuffy' Smith
> did a great investigation and came up with the true cause.

Worst I've heard of lately (a bit ago, but more recently) was a Hornet
that went down the stroke with the rubber track mat (I don't know what
it's called, but it's there to protect the cat when not in use - a
weather protector) still in place. Took some of it down one
intake...with the obvious results.

Made it back around and back aboard though - but I think the jet ended
up a strike.

--
- Rufus

Guy Alcala

March 13th 05, 02:32 AM

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On Fri, 11 Mar 2005 23:48:34 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >
> >> We didn't have the luxury of configuring specific jets for specific
> >> missions other than with regard to the mission expendables themselves.
> >> By that I mean a H/K F-4E during Linebacker was loaded with 4xCBU-52
> >> on the inboard TERs (two on each), three fuel tanks, three AIM-7E-2,
> >> and ONE ECM pod in the (usually) left forward missile well.
> >
> >Yes, I know, but we're talking about the majority of F-4s, not just your H/K birds.
> >Loads varied depending on the unit and the tasking.
>
> My point is that aircraft scheduled for Hunter/Killer and aircraft
> scheduled for A/A escort, and aircraft that were scheduled as bomb
> droppers all came out of the basic 27 aircraft that were available to
> the 34th TFS--24 UE plus 3 attrition spares.

Be that as it may, Coe's a/c wound up with a pair of pods, and it's not the only one. I've
got another shot of a 34th bird (68-0498) with a pure A/G load: Mk.84s on the O/Bs, 2 CBUs
on each I/B, a C/L, pods in both forward wells, and NO AIM-7s. Both of the 34th TFS birds
I've mentioned, Coe's 0493 and 0498, have the long gun blast fairing (given the serials it
had to be a retrofit, as they weren't installed on the production line until 69-7261) and
formation strip lights, so these photos almost certainly date to the latter half of 1972.
I once asked Dweezil when they got the long fairings and striplights, and IIRR he thought
not before 1972 for the fairings; I don't remember what he said about the strip lights, but
it's clear from photos that neither was a universal fit in 1972, as numerous a/c lack them,
especially some of the TDY units like the squadrons from the 4th TFW. Do you remember if
both features were present (on at least some a/c) when you arrived in July?

I also have shots of A/A loaded 421st F-4Es (per the captions, after the move from DaNang
toTakhli) with the same 2 pod/2 AIM-7/4 AIM-9 as Coe's a/c.

> Before 1 October '72, when the 469th was still around, the two
> squadrons were equipped at 18 UE, so the frag drew from those 36
> aircraft for whatever mission was required.
> >
> >> > Judging by photo frequency, strikers and
> >> >strike escorts were often carrying a pair of ALQ-87s in the forward wells by that
> >> >time, if they weren't carrying a strike camera in place of one of the jammers.
> >>
> >> Over the years there were a lot of different configurations. Some
> >> places and times carried ECM on an inboard wing station. Some carried
> >> two pods. Various models of pods were carried and, yes, strike cameras
> >> were occasionally hung.
> >>
> >> >For instance, I've got a shot of Coe and Webb's 34th TFS F-4E waiting to tank P/S
> >> >after they'd gotten their MiG-21 on 5 Oct. 1972.
>
> >No, from another F-4, probably Coe's wingman. The photo appears in Squadron/Signal's
> >"and kill MiGs" by Lou Drendel, on page 34 of my second edition. The caption reads
> >"F-4E of DickCoe refueling on egress from North vietnam after kill. Note missing
> >AIM-7!"
> >
> >While I'm normally careful about trusting captions as to details, in the background is
> >a KC-135 along with 3 F-4D strikers, all of which appear to be from the 25 TFS (FA),
> >one of which is on the boom. Coe's a/c, "JJ" 68-0493 is missing an AIM-7E-2 from the
> >aft left well, plus all the tanks, and is presumably waiting his turn on that or
> >another tanker. Oh, and Drendel's source for the photo is Coe himself, so I think in
> >this case we can trust that the date and details are correct;-) Coe himself says he
> >was tasked as the only spare flight lead "for three MiGCAP flights [Sic. Presumably he
> >means escort, as is clearer below] and two flights in support of the Wild Weasels. As
> >soon as I got on the Ground frequency, the leader of the last flight in support of the
> >bombers aborted. He told me to go ahead and take his flight."
>
> Curiosity got the better of me, so I dug out Don Logan's excellent
> photo anthology, "The 388th Tactical Fighter Wing" by Schiffer
> Publishing. (As an aside, Don was shot down about three days before I
> arrived at Korat in '72. I moved into his hootch room even before his
> personal effects were packed up.)
>
> What surprised me was the number of F-4E photos both ground and
> in-flight in which aircraft had NO ECM pod. Even in photos indicating
> that they were taken after the commencement of Linebacker operations
> there is no evidence of a pod.

I've got a fair number of those too (always A/G birds, usually from the 1968-1971 period),
and I've always assumed that podless a/c were being sent to SVN or Laos. Presumably you had
a limited number of (working) pods, so a/c assignments and tasking would reflect that.
These a/c often have a KB-18 in the forward right AIM-7 well, and often no AIM-7s, which
again would indicate that they weren't being sent into areas with nothing but
manually-aimed AAA.

> There is a brief account of the Coe/Webb victory, but no mention of
> pod configuration nor of tank jettisoning. Apparently from that
> account, he was vectored by Disco to the vicinity of a pair of MiG-21s
> cruising along in route formation. He sliced down into their six
> o'clock and got an auto-aq lock-on and fired one AIM-7 for his kill.
> (So much for the dog-fighting....)

Well, sort of. Coe's account in "and kill MiGs" goes into a lot more detail. Coe says he
was at about M1.6 and estimates the MiGs were at about M1.1 when he shot, and Webb called a
break immediately after the shot, which caused another pair of MiG-21s to overshoot over
the top of him (these were probably the ones that had been called merged by Disco, and
which caused at least one of the strikers to jettison when the strike flight spotted
them). BTW, I believe this is the highest speed attained during a kill in Vietnam, and
very possibly the highest speed attained by a tactical a/c during a combat mission.

> All the pictures of pods in Don's book show the pod carried in a
> forward missile well--none on an inboard wing station (at least at
> Korat at that time.) In none could I discern carrying two pods.

The 388th carried pods on the I/B prior to the introduction of the pod adapter for the
forward wells, at which point the 388th seems to change over completely to carriage in the
forward well(s). Judging by the dates in photo captions the adapter wasn't available much
before 1972, because I can't find photos of a/c from any of the wings carrying them there
prior to that.

> >> > They were tasked as strike
> >> >escort, and theyre carrying four AIM-9Es, plus two ALQ-87s forward and a single
> >> >AIM-7E-2 aft (they got the MiG with the other). Course, they had to sit there
> >> >and wait for the SAMs and MiGs to a greater extent than you did, plus they turned
> >> >the pods ON, so I imagine carrying a pair of them was a lot more valuable to them
> >> >than an extra (and unlikely to be used) AIM-7.
> >>
> >> You are making a bad assumption here. A/A escort flights flew as
> >> "out-riggers" on a set of bomb-droppers, usually three or four flights
> >> of four. They went in with the bombers and out with the bombers.
> >
> >> H/K flights were "first-in/last-out", sweeping ahead of the strikers
> >> and remaining in the area until the package was clear--and often
> >> beyond that if fuel allowed to do visual armed recce for SAM sites.
> >
> >We have no disagreement here, Ed. I wasn't referring to duration of time you spent in
> >Indian country, I was referring to the relative freedom to maneuver of the H/K (and
> >MiGCAP) flights compared to strikers, chaffers and escorts. The escorts were tied to
> >the chaffers and strikers, couldn't maneuver freely, and were usually on the edge of
> >the chaff corridor (as you said, outriggers) so the extra jamming power would come in
> >handy. As Coe says, he was tasked as spare flight lead for either strike or WW
> >escort, and his a/c is carrying a pair of pods.
>
> I'm not enough of an electronic warfare guru to comment on whether
> carrying a second pod would provide either additional jamming power or
> broader frequency coverage. Clearly with a straight noise jammer the
> advantage would be delayed burn-through, but by the time of the ALQ-87
> and 101, there was at least as much deception output as noise (as
> evidenced by the demise of the dreaded "pod roll-in" tactics.)

Checking Jenkins book on the F-105 confirmed my memory that the -87 didn't have deception
capability; that was the -101. He writes "Besides laying down a continuous jamming barrage,
the ALQ-87 also had a sweep modulator that could introduce random bursts of reinforcing
noise in a so-called pulse power option. The pod could simultaneously perform any two of
three functions: denying range and azimuth data to Fire Can; depriving Fan Song of range,
altitude and azimuth; and jamming the position beacon installed in the sustainer section of
the Guideline missile." so carrying a pair of them would certainly add to the
jammingpowerandcapability, even if each pod was able to cover the entire threat frequency
spectrum (I don't know if they could). Re the -101, he writes "This pod could perform
either deception or noise-barrage jamming, and was specifically intended for activities
such as Iron Hand [Guy: Also used for MiGCAP by the 432nd in 1972, for the same reason]
where formation flying wasn't feasible."

Hopefully Bob Payette or others with personal experience of the pods can comment/correct as
to band coverage. I've got various conflicting sources.

> Since resolution pod formation depended on four-ship, there wouldn't
> have been much benefit to a second pod on what was essentially an
> autonomous two-ship formation.

See above.

<snip>

> >> > The Strike escorts seem to have
> >> >felt that they were primarily there as Atoll absorbers for the strikers, and
> >> >comments by COM 7th AF (or maybe it was CINCPACAF, I forget) at the time seem to
> >> >confirm that was the case.
> >>
> >> Strike escort guys more commonly felt themselves used (abused?) as
> >> "herders" to create a situation to turn the MiGs to a place where the
> >> fair-haired boys of the 555th could get their shots. We didn't even
> >> get to talk to Teaball.
> >
> >Given the number of frequencies you guys had to monitor, I'd say that was a reasonable
> >decision. After all, presumably the escort guys needed to have one radio on the
> >strike (or chaffer, if that was a different frequency), monitor Guard, plus be able to
> >talk to Disco/Red Crown. MiGCAPs were free to engage and AFAIK didn't need tobe on
> >the strike frequency, so letting them talk directly to Teaball makes sense.
>
> The F-4 add a "one and a half" UHF radio--meaning a transmit/receive
> primary radio and a receive-only auxiliary channel (with a limited
> number of pre-set channel choices.) Plus Guard channel, of course.
>
> All strike flights after tanker drop-off were on strike primary
> frequency--Weasels, escorts, bombers, chaffers, jammers, et. al. Disco
> and Red Crown broadcast on Guard--never any need to talk to them, so
> that's not a factor. Teaball could have simulcast MiG calls on strike
> primary to let the guys being targetted know what was going on. They
> could have let the players know what the MiGCAP was doing. There was
> no need to talk back to Teaball since we weren't being vectored by
> them, but to deny guys in the arena essential elements of situational
> awareness is unconscionable.

The 8th tried using the aux. receiver during Bolo for MiG calls. From the summary of the
8th's now de-classified Operation Bolo report:

"The Aux. receiver was set up to receive the MiG warnings and other coded calls. However,
the west force received very few transmissions over the Aux. Receiver. The east force had
satisfactory Aux reception. This was the first time the Aux Receiver had been used for
this purpose. Post mission evaluation indicates that the Aux Receiver is too limited in
range to fulfill the requirement. The east force was much closer to the transmitting
source, therefore, the reception was adequate. The Aux Receiver was designed primarily as
a back-up recovery receiver and works off the ADF antenna. It does not have sufficient
range capability to be used for this purpose.

As for transmitting Teaball on strike primary, crews were already complaining about having
their ears blown off and being fed a lot of useless info that didn't apply to them by
BigEye/Disco/Red Crown on Guard; would it really make sense for Teaball to routinely step
on everyone else on strike primary for info that may only be of interest to the
free-ranging MiCAPs, thus potentially blocking a more time-sensitive transmission of
greater interest to the strikers?

Besides, Teaball appears to have been ballyhooed as much more effective than it was. Other
measures seem to have responsible for the improvements which were largely credited to
Teaball.

Guy

Ed Rasimus

March 13th 05, 06:13 PM

On Sun, 13 Mar 2005 02:32:12 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 11 Mar 2005 23:48:34 GMT, Guy Alcala
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
>> >
>> >> We didn't have the luxury of configuring specific jets for specific
>> >> missions other than with regard to the mission expendables themselves.
>> >> By that I mean a H/K F-4E during Linebacker was loaded with 4xCBU-52
>> >> on the inboard TERs (two on each), three fuel tanks, three AIM-7E-2,
>> >> and ONE ECM pod in the (usually) left forward missile well.
>> >
>> >Yes, I know, but we're talking about the majority of F-4s, not just your H/K birds.
>> >Loads varied depending on the unit and the tasking.
>>
>> My point is that aircraft scheduled for Hunter/Killer and aircraft
>> scheduled for A/A escort, and aircraft that were scheduled as bomb
>> droppers all came out of the basic 27 aircraft that were available to
>> the 34th TFS--24 UE plus 3 attrition spares.
>
>Be that as it may, Coe's a/c wound up with a pair of pods, and it's not the only one. I've
>got another shot of a 34th bird (68-0498) with a pure A/G load: Mk.84s on the O/Bs, 2 CBUs
>on each I/B, a C/L, pods in both forward wells, and NO AIM-7s. Both of the 34th TFS birds
>I've mentioned, Coe's 0493 and 0498, have the long gun blast fairing (given the serials it
>had to be a retrofit, as they weren't installed on the production line until 69-7261) and
>formation strip lights, so these photos almost certainly date to the latter half of 1972.
>I once asked Dweezil when they got the long fairings and striplights, and IIRR he thought
>not before 1972 for the fairings; I don't remember what he said about the strip lights, but
>it's clear from photos that neither was a universal fit in 1972, as numerous a/c lack them,
>especially some of the TDY units like the squadrons from the 4th TFW. Do you remember if
>both features were present (on at least some a/c) when you arrived in July?

I arrived at Korat in June of '72. I'd gone through the quicky
check-out at Luke flying C-models in May-June. All the airplanes I
encountered had the strip lights. I didn't register the gun fairing
difference at the time, so couldn't comment. I don't know if it was a
local mod (Logan mentions it in a photo caption and since he was
downed in July of '72, it had to have been on at least some of the
birds by that time. We got TCTO-556, the new conventional weapons
switchology in July/Aug of '72.

As for that load on 0498, I never encountered a mix of -84s and CBU.
When I carried CBU and GP bombs, it was always 6xMK-82 on a C/L MER
and 4xCBU in pairs on the I/B TERs.

I just looked at my form 5 and found that I flew 498 one time in my
year at Korat--what are the odds of that, not hitting a tail number in
9 months of single-squadron operation?
>
>> Curiosity got the better of me, so I dug out Don Logan's excellent
>> photo anthology, "The 388th Tactical Fighter Wing" by Schiffer
>> Publishing. (As an aside, Don was shot down about three days before I
>> arrived at Korat in '72. I moved into his hootch room even before his
>> personal effects were packed up.)
>>
>> What surprised me was the number of F-4E photos both ground and
>> in-flight in which aircraft had NO ECM pod. Even in photos indicating
>> that they were taken after the commencement of Linebacker operations
>> there is no evidence of a pod.
>
>I've got a fair number of those too (always A/G birds, usually from the 1968-1971 period),
>and I've always assumed that podless a/c were being sent to SVN or Laos. Presumably you had
>a limited number of (working) pods, so a/c assignments and tasking would reflect that.
>These a/c often have a KB-18 in the forward right AIM-7 well, and often no AIM-7s, which
>again would indicate that they weren't being sent into areas with nothing but
>manually-aimed AAA.

During the period between the end of Rolling Thunder (1968) and the
beginning of Linebacker (1972) there was virtually no SAM threat and
no MiG threat. Heaviest defenses were in Barrel Roll and the northern
half of Steel Tiger region of Laos.

Wear and tear on the AIM-7 from landing and take-off jolting wouldn't
be balanced against the probability of needing the weapon. Despite
this husbanding of resources, when Linebacker started, the mechanical
reliability of the AIM-7 was abysmal.
>
>Well, sort of. Coe's account in "and kill MiGs" goes into a lot more detail. Coe says he
>was at about M1.6 and estimates the MiGs were at about M1.1 when he shot, and Webb called a
>break immediately after the shot, which caused another pair of MiG-21s to overshoot over
>the top of him (these were probably the ones that had been called merged by Disco, and
>which caused at least one of the strikers to jettison when the strike flight spotted
>them). BTW, I believe this is the highest speed attained during a kill in Vietnam, and
>very possibly the highest speed attained by a tactical a/c during a combat mission.

We all get taller, smarter, braver and better looking as the years
pass. I'm just a bit skeptical of the M1.6 estimate. Starting with
three tanks and wall-to-wall missiles from 420 KIAS in the escort role
and then being able to configure to clean, accelerate and hit that
kind so speed at the typical altitude would be very unlikely. To get
M1.6 with the missiles, the pods and the altitude under FL 400 just
doesn't seem within the realm of capability of the airplane.
>
>Checking Jenkins book on the F-105 confirmed my memory that the -87 didn't have deception
>capability; that was the -101. He writes "Besides laying down a continuous jamming barrage,
>the ALQ-87 also had a sweep modulator that could introduce random bursts of reinforcing
>noise in a so-called pulse power option. The pod could simultaneously perform any two of
>three functions: denying range and azimuth data to Fire Can; depriving Fan Song of range,
>altitude and azimuth; and jamming the position beacon installed in the sustainer section of
>the Guideline missile." so carrying a pair of them would certainly add to the
>jammingpowerandcapability, even if each pod was able to cover the entire threat frequency
>spectrum (I don't know if they could). Re the -101, he writes "This pod could perform
>either deception or noise-barrage jamming, and was specifically intended for activities
>such as Iron Hand [Guy: Also used for MiGCAP by the 432nd in 1972, for the same reason]
>where formation flying wasn't feasible."

Well, as much as I respect the considerable research that Jenkins did
on the F-105, as we've often discussed, the use of pods by Iron Hand
flights was much more the exception than the rule.
>

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

richard goldsberry

March 14th 05, 11:42 AM

>
> Wear and tear on the AIM-7 from landing and take-off jolting wouldn't
> be balanced against the probability of needing the weapon. Despite
> this husbanding of resources, when Linebacker started, the mechanical
> reliability of the AIM-7 was abysmal.

"Cold-soaking" was a big problem in the Sparrow at the time.

Guy Alcala

March 15th 05, 06:41 AM

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On Sun, 13 Mar 2005 02:32:12 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:

<snip>

> >> My point is that aircraft scheduled for Hunter/Killer and aircraft
> >> scheduled for A/A escort, and aircraft that were scheduled as bomb
> >> droppers all came out of the basic 27 aircraft that were available to
> >> the 34th TFS--24 UE plus 3 attrition spares.
> >
> >Be that as it may, Coe's a/c wound up with a pair of pods, and it's not the only one. I've
> >got another shot of a 34th bird (68-0498) with a pure A/G load: Mk.84s on the O/Bs, 2 CBUs
> >on each I/B, a C/L, pods in both forward wells, and NO AIM-7s. Both of the 34th TFS birds
> >I've mentioned, Coe's 0493 and 0498, have the long gun blast fairing (given the serials it
> >had to be a retrofit, as they weren't installed on the production line until 69-7261) and
> >formation strip lights, so these photos almost certainly date to the latter half of 1972.
> >I once asked Dweezil when they got the long fairings and striplights, and IIRR he thought
> >not before 1972 for the fairings; I don't remember what he said about the strip lights, but
> >it's clear from photos that neither was a universal fit in 1972, as numerous a/c lack them,
> >especially some of the TDY units like the squadrons from the 4th TFW. Do you remember if
> >both features were present (on at least some a/c) when you arrived in July?
>
> I arrived at Korat in June of '72. I'd gone through the quicky
> check-out at Luke flying C-models in May-June. All the airplanes I
> encountered had the strip lights. I didn't register the gun fairing
> difference at the time, so couldn't comment. I don't know if it was a
> local mod (Logan mentions it in a photo caption and since he was
> downed in July of '72, it had to have been on at least some of the
> birds by that time. We got TCTO-556, the new conventional weapons
> switchology in July/Aug of '72.

Okay, thanks. After trying various search words on google, I found Dweezil's post from several
years ago, in reply to one of mine:
-------------------------------------------
writes:

[ big snip ]

> Of course, the a/c could be assigned to the 8th in 1972, but there's a
> couple of details that make me think not. For one, it's lacking the
> electro-luminescent formation-keeping light strips. While apparently
> not universally installed by 1972, they were on many if not most a/c by
> then (BTW, anyone know when they first appeared? I'm tentatively saying
> 1970, although one photo purportedly taken in November 1968 shows an a/c
> with them. I've got my doubts on the date).

I'm not absolutely certain, but I seem to recall that F-4E 69-7551's
arrival at Korat early in 1971 marked the first time I saw the EL
panels. (It was eerily "ghostlike" taxiing at night...)
That same aircraft (fresh from the factory) also boasted the first
extended gun fairing I had seen. It was the only one on base with it.
----------------------------------------------

The above would agree with the information I have that 69-7261, the first Block 44 a/c, was the
first a/c to be factory fit with the long blast fairing. 69-7551 was also from Block 44, which
totaled 64 a/c. Possibly the EL strips came in at the same time in the factory as the blast
fairing, with the rest of the a/c retrofitted with them and the blast fairing as they rotated
through IRAN.

> As for that load on 0498, I never encountered a mix of -84s and CBU.
> When I carried CBU and GP bombs, it was always 6xMK-82 on a C/L MER
> and 4xCBU in pairs on the I/B TERs.

I've always thought 0498's load in that photo was somewhat odd; if the Mk.84s had had fuse
extenders I would have guessed it was for an LZ prep, but these Mk.84s appear to have the
standard Mk. 904 nose fuses. The only other mission that occurs to me would be road
interdiction on the HCM trail; You clearly wouldn't plan to drop Mk.84s and the CBUs in the same
pass, so presumably the 84s would be used to crater the road or bury it in a landslide, while
the CBUs would be dropped on trucks or any likely patch of trees, or else used to mine it. I
can't for the life of me imagine what other use would be made of that combo in the same sortie.

> I just looked at my form 5 and found that I flew 498 one time in my
> year at Korat--what are the odds of that, not hitting a tail number in
> 9 months of single-squadron operation?

How early on did you fly it? Perhaps it was shot down or severely damaged before you could fly
it again?

<snip>

> >Well, sort of. Coe's account in "and kill MiGs" goes into a lot more detail. Coe says he
> >was at about M1.6 and estimates the MiGs were at about M1.1 when he shot, and Webb called a
> >break immediately after the shot, which caused another pair of MiG-21s to overshoot over
> >the top of him (these were probably the ones that had been called merged by Disco, and
> >which caused at least one of the strikers to jettison when the strike flight spotted
> >them). BTW, I believe this is the highest speed attained during a kill in Vietnam, and
> >very possibly the highest speed attained by a tactical a/c during a combat mission.
>
> We all get taller, smarter, braver and better looking as the years
> pass. I'm just a bit skeptical of the M1.6 estimate. Starting with
> three tanks and wall-to-wall missiles from 420 KIAS in the escort role
> and then being able to configure to clean, accelerate and hit that
> kind so speed at the typical altitude would be very unlikely.

> To get
> M1.6 with the missiles, the pods and the altitude under FL 400 just
> doesn't seem within the realm of capability of the airplane.

You may be right. Coe says they were cruising at 450 knots @ 20kft with the strike flight at
350-400, and the escorts were weaving to stay with the strike. If those speeds are KIAS or
KCAS, the escorts would be cruising at something upwards of .9. Those speeds seem kind of low
to me to be TAS for F-4s, even fully loaded.

Anyway, after one of the strikers called MiGs and broke, he says he jettisoned his tanks and
went burner, while beginning a descending turn. He says he made about two turns, ending up at
about 15kft with the strike flight out in front of him (they'd been turning too), when he saw a
pair of 21s out in front and above at about 20kft. He'd loosened up the turns as no Migs had
appeared immediately, so would have gained considerable speed, although perhaps not to1.6, which
does seem a bit fast for 15kft. What do you think -- could he have gotten that fast relatively
clean, in a diving, non-windup turn? I don't have a -1-1 for the F-4, so can't do a ballpark
estimate of the accel.

> >Checking Jenkins book on the F-105 confirmed my memory that the -87 didn't have deception
> >capability; that was the -101. He writes "Besides laying down a continuous jamming barrage,
> >the ALQ-87 also had a sweep modulator that could introduce random bursts of reinforcing
> >noise in a so-called pulse power option. The pod could simultaneously perform any two of
> >three functions: denying range and azimuth data to Fire Can; depriving Fan Song of range,
> >altitude and azimuth; and jamming the position beacon installed in the sustainer section of
> >the Guideline missile." so carrying a pair of them would certainly add to the
> >jammingpowerandcapability, even if each pod was able to cover the entire threat frequency
> >spectrum (I don't know if they could). Re the -101, he writes "This pod could perform
> >either deception or noise-barrage jamming, and was specifically intended for activities
> >such as Iron Hand [Guy: Also used for MiGCAP by the 432nd in 1972, for the same reason]
> >where formation flying wasn't feasible."
>
> Well, as much as I respect the considerable research that Jenkins did
> on the F-105, as we've often discussed, the use of pods by Iron Hand
> flights was much more the exception than the rule.

Use of, yes, but mandated carriage of, no. 7th AF required pod carriage by all a/c going into
NVN, even the Weasels, despite their protests that this limited them to a single Shrike and they
were rarely turned on in any case, as the jammers interfered with reception by the Weasel gear.
I've got shots of 105Fs carrying single ALQ-101s in '68 or so. The dual Shrike launcher also
seems to have been developed in response to this silly mandate, but the pilots disliked the
vibration and drag.

The order for Weasels to carry a pod led to the requirement for an internal jammer for the 105F
to recover a weapon station, which became the ALQ-105 scab mount on the 105G, essentially an
ALQ-101 split in half lengthwise. They still rarely turned it on, but could once again carry
Shrikes on both O/Bs.

Guy

Ed Rasimus

March 15th 05, 03:58 PM

On Tue, 15 Mar 2005 06:41:38 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> On Sun, 13 Mar 2005 02:32:12 GMT, Guy Alcala
>> > wrote:

>> I arrived at Korat in June of '72. I'd gone through the quicky
>> check-out at Luke flying C-models in May-June. All the airplanes I
>> encountered had the strip lights. I didn't register the gun fairing
>> difference at the time, so couldn't comment. I don't know if it was a
>> local mod (Logan mentions it in a photo caption and since he was
>> downed in July of '72, it had to have been on at least some of the
>> birds by that time. We got TCTO-556, the new conventional weapons
>> switchology in July/Aug of '72.
>
>Okay, thanks. After trying various search words on google, I found Dweezil's post from several
>years ago, in reply to one of mine:
>-------------------------------------------
writes:
>
> I'm not absolutely certain, but I seem to recall that F-4E 69-7551's
> arrival at Korat early in 1971 marked the first time I saw the EL
> panels. (It was eerily "ghostlike" taxiing at night...)
> That same aircraft (fresh from the factory) also boasted the first
> extended gun fairing I had seen. It was the only one on base with it.

That would be "Marcia"--one of only two F-4Es at Korat in '72 with a
name. I "owned" the other one, "Arnold" named for the pig on Green
Acres. Marcia was named for a black, Captain, female squadron
maintenance officer in the 469th TFS. She had PCS'd before my arrival,
but I've seen some pictures and heard that she was well respected by
all of the guys.

>> I just looked at my form 5 and found that I flew 498 one time in my
>> year at Korat--what are the odds of that, not hitting a tail number in
>> 9 months of single-squadron operation?
>
>How early on did you fly it? Perhaps it was shot down or severely damaged before you could fly
>it again?

I flew it in November of '72. That means it survived through
Linebacker and it wasn't lost during Linebacker II either.

>
>> >Well, sort of. Coe's account in "and kill MiGs" goes into a lot more detail. Coe says he
>> >was at about M1.6 and estimates the MiGs were at about M1.1 when he shot, and Webb called a
>> >break immediately after the shot, which caused another pair of MiG-21s to overshoot over
>> >the top of him (these were probably the ones that had been called merged by Disco, and
>> >which caused at least one of the strikers to jettison when the strike flight spotted
>> >them). BTW, I believe this is the highest speed attained during a kill in Vietnam, and
>> >very possibly the highest speed attained by a tactical a/c during a combat mission.
>>
>> We all get taller, smarter, braver and better looking as the years
>> pass. I'm just a bit skeptical of the M1.6 estimate. Starting with
>> three tanks and wall-to-wall missiles from 420 KIAS in the escort role
>> and then being able to configure to clean, accelerate and hit that
>> kind so speed at the typical altitude would be very unlikely.
>
>> To get
>> M1.6 with the missiles, the pods and the altitude under FL 400 just
>> doesn't seem within the realm of capability of the airplane.
>
>You may be right. Coe says they were cruising at 450 knots @ 20kft with the strike flight at
>350-400, and the escorts were weaving to stay with the strike. If those speeds are KIAS or
>KCAS, the escorts would be cruising at something upwards of .9. Those speeds seem kind of low
>to me to be TAS for F-4s, even fully loaded.

They would be indicated, not true. Typically at that point in a
mission the bomb droppers would be trying to maintain 480 ground speed
which translates to 8 miles/minute. That would be tempered by
time-to-go to TOT and distance read out on the INS. The escorts would
be trying to keep 420 indicated which was an approximation of corner
velocity.
>
>Anyway, after one of the strikers called MiGs and broke, he says he jettisoned his tanks and
>went burner, while beginning a descending turn. He says he made about two turns, ending up at
>about 15kft with the strike flight out in front of him (they'd been turning too), when he saw a
>pair of 21s out in front and above at about 20kft. He'd loosened up the turns as no Migs had
>appeared immediately, so would have gained considerable speed, although perhaps not to1.6, which
>does seem a bit fast for 15kft. What do you think -- could he have gotten that fast relatively
>clean, in a diving, non-windup turn? I don't have a -1-1 for the F-4, so can't do a ballpark
>estimate of the accel.

No way to get to that speed at that altitude. I'd readily accept 1.2M,
but can't imagine getting to 1.6 and would really find it tactically a
mistake to get going that fast even if you could.
>
>
>> Well, as much as I respect the considerable research that Jenkins did
>> on the F-105, as we've often discussed, the use of pods by Iron Hand
>> flights was much more the exception than the rule.
>
>Use of, yes, but mandated carriage of, no. 7th AF required pod carriage by all a/c going into
>NVN, even the Weasels, despite their protests that this limited them to a single Shrike and they
>were rarely turned on in any case, as the jammers interfered with reception by the Weasel gear.
>I've got shots of 105Fs carrying single ALQ-101s in '68 or so. The dual Shrike launcher also
>seems to have been developed in response to this silly mandate, but the pilots disliked the
>vibration and drag.
>
>The order for Weasels to carry a pod led to the requirement for an internal jammer for the 105F
>to recover a weapon station, which became the ALQ-105 scab mount on the 105G, essentially an
>ALQ-101 split in half lengthwise. They still rarely turned it on, but could once again carry
>Shrikes on both O/Bs.

Well, we had been talking about the F-4E portion of the Hunter/Killer
team and the carriage of dual pods. My original point was that some
equipment like ECM pods and AIM-7s were standard throughout the
squadron and not adjusted for the particular role of a tail number on
a particularl day--hence, H/Ks carried a pod even if we weren't going
to use it.

I pointed out the minor error in Jenkin's quote that you offered
regarding emphasis on a pod for Iron Hand applications.

You are correct, however that the ALQ-105 blister pods on the G-model
F-105 were a response to the need to retain a weapon station for
Shrike use.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Guy Alcala

March 16th 05, 06:30 AM

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On Tue, 15 Mar 2005 06:41:38 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >
> >> On Sun, 13 Mar 2005 02:32:12 GMT, Guy Alcala
> >> > wrote:

<snip>

> >> I just looked at my form 5 and found that I flew 498 one time in my
> >> year at Korat--what are the odds of that, not hitting a tail number in
> >> 9 months of single-squadron operation?
> >
> >How early on did you fly it? Perhaps it was shot down or severely damaged before you could fly
> >it again?
>
> I flew it in November of '72. That means it survived through
> Linebacker and it wasn't lost during Linebacker II either.

Luck of the draw then, I guess.

<snip>

> >> We all get taller, smarter, braver and better looking as the years
> >> pass. I'm just a bit skeptical of the M1.6 estimate. Starting with
> >> three tanks and wall-to-wall missiles from 420 KIAS in the escort role
> >> and then being able to configure to clean, accelerate and hit that
> >> kind so speed at the typical altitude would be very unlikely.
> >
> >> To get
> >> M1.6 with the missiles, the pods and the altitude under FL 400 just
> >> doesn't seem within the realm of capability of the airplane.
> >
> >You may be right. Coe says they were cruising at 450 knots @ 20kft with the strike flight at
> >350-400, and the escorts were weaving to stay with the strike. If those speeds are KIAS or
> >KCAS, the escorts would be cruising at something upwards of .9. Those speeds seem kind of low
> >to me to be TAS for F-4s, even fully loaded.
>
> They would be indicated, not true. Typically at that point in a
> mission the bomb droppers would be trying to maintain 480 ground speed
> which translates to 8 miles/minute.

In that case, 350-400 KIAS for the strikers would be about right. At 20 kft ISA 350 KCAS works out
to 480 kt., or 465 kt. after taking compressibility error into account. Given the typical hotter
than ISA conditions, 350KCAS (which I think is what the ASI actually gave you in the F-4) @ 20kft.
would be right around 480 kt.

> That would be tempered by
> time-to-go to TOT and distance read out on the INS. The escorts would
> be trying to keep 420 indicated which was an approximation of corner
> velocity.

Wouldn't they want some extra E over corner, because they'd be bound to **** it off quickly with any
hard maneuvering?

> >Anyway, after one of the strikers called MiGs and broke, he says he jettisoned his tanks and
> >went burner, while beginning a descending turn. He says he made about two turns, ending up at
> >about 15kft with the strike flight out in front of him (they'd been turning too), when he saw a
> >pair of 21s out in front and above at about 20kft. He'd loosened up the turns as no Migs had
> >appeared immediately, so would have gained considerable speed, although perhaps not to1.6, which
> >does seem a bit fast for 15kft. What do you think -- could he have gotten that fast relatively
> >clean, in a diving, non-windup turn? I don't have a -1-1 for the F-4, so can't do a ballpark
> >estimate of the accel.
>
> No way to get to that speed at that altitude. I'd readily accept 1.2M,
> but can't imagine getting to 1.6 and would really find it tactically a
> mistake to get going that fast even if you could.

Okay, although since he was rear aspect on the MiGs who seem to have been doing their usual
supersonic (or at least, high transonic) missile pass and blow through, being well above transonic
would seem to be necessary if he was going to catch them. It would certainly give his AIM-7 a better
chance of overhauling them. Do you ever see him at Rats reunions? If so, maybe you could ask him
about it.

> >> Well, as much as I respect the considerable research that Jenkins did
> >> on the F-105, as we've often discussed, the use of pods by Iron Hand
> >> flights was much more the exception than the rule.
> >
> >Use of, yes, but mandated carriage of, no. 7th AF required pod carriage by all a/c going into
> >NVN, even the Weasels, despite their protests that this limited them to a single Shrike and they
> >were rarely turned on in any case, as the jammers interfered with reception by the Weasel gear.
> >I've got shots of 105Fs carrying single ALQ-101s in '68 or so. The dual Shrike launcher also
> >seems to have been developed in response to this silly mandate, but the pilots disliked the
> >vibration and drag.
> >
> >The order for Weasels to carry a pod led to the requirement for an internal jammer for the 105F
> >to recover a weapon station, which became the ALQ-105 scab mount on the 105G, essentially an
> >ALQ-101 split in half lengthwise. They still rarely turned it on, but could once again carry
> >Shrikes on both O/Bs.
>
> Well, we had been talking about the F-4E portion of the Hunter/Killer
> team and the carriage of dual pods. My original point was that some
> equipment like ECM pods and AIM-7s were standard throughout the
> squadron and not adjusted for the particular role of a tail number on
> a particularl day--hence, H/Ks carried a pod even if we weren't going
> to use it.

No argument there. I still don't know how I easily managed to find shots of two different 34th TFS
a/c (as well as one from the 421st) carrying two pods in that era, if it was as unusual as you state.
Just one more minor mystery that's unlikely to be solved.

> I pointed out the minor error in Jenkin's quote that you offered
> regarding emphasis on a pod for Iron Hand applications.

<snip>

I think we're talking past each other here. My point was that the higher commanders/people who wrote
the requirement for the ALQ-101 very likely* did so for exactly the reasons Jenkins claimed, i.e. to
provide better protection for a/c that weren't able to benefit from mutual jamming. Subsequent
priority deployment of the ALQ-101 to those a/c tasked with such detached missions, i.e. Iron
Hand/MiGCAP/Recon, indicates that Jenkins' comments about the perceived need for the development of
the 101, _regardless of whether it was actually turned on by the crews_, is correct.

*I say "very likely" because I don't have Jenkins here, and don't know what his sources were for this
statement, if he gave them.

Offhand, I don't recall seeing photos of a/c other than F-105WW or MiGCAPs carrying ALQ-101s from
1968-1973, although it may have happened. But even if there are some shots of same, the vast
majority of photos I have of strikers/chaffers/escorts during LB I/II show them carrying pure noise
jamming pods, and not ALQ-101s. I don't think I have a single photo of a 388th F-4E carrying an
ALQ-101 during the bombing halt and LB periods. I know that the 388th had them when they were still
equipped with Thuds, because there's a photo in Larry Davis' "Wild Weasel", taken at Korat, of a
whole rack of ALQ-101s waiting to be loaded on a/c, with Thud tails visible above the revetments in
the background. Presumably there were only limited numbers of -101s available in the theater, so if
those pods weren't at the 388th in 1972 they must have been somewhere else. From photo evidence it
appears that "somewhere else" was the 432nd at Udorn, the unit tasked with MiGCAP and Recon over the
north, which is right in line with the intended deployment of the -101 described by Jenkins (the
F-105Gs had their own " -101s" by this time, the ALQ-105).

Along that line, I could only find a single shot of a 67th TFS F-4CWW carrying a pod, and it's an
-87. The sample size is way too small to reach any definite conclusions, but I'd guess that there
may not have been enough 101s to go around. The 67th was apparently tasked to do a lot of pre-emptive
Shrike firings, which would have kept them out of the worst threats. Alternatively, Davis has
illustrations showing them carrying ALQ-119s, which may have been just entering service at the time.
The F-4Cs at Spangdahlem carried -119s a few years later, but I don't know when they became
available.

Guy

Phormer Phighter Phlyer

March 16th 05, 02:24 PM

>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com

For Ed-I'm reading 'To Hanoi and back, the USAF and North VietNam,
1966-1973, Wayne Thompson, and in the first chapter he mentions that the
late model F-4E had a rudimentary fly by wire back up for pitch control,
for emergencies when PC-1/2 were gone...ever heard of this?

Ed Rasimus

March 16th 05, 04:20 PM

On Wed, 16 Mar 2005 06:30:15 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> That would be tempered by
>> time-to-go to TOT and distance read out on the INS. The escorts would
>> be trying to keep 420 indicated which was an approximation of corner
>> velocity.
>
>Wouldn't they want some extra E over corner, because they'd be bound to **** it off quickly with any
>hard maneuvering?

It's always going to be a compromise between what you want and what
you can have. In any A/A mission I always like to be very fast at
entry--in those days you could bleed off airspeed a lot easier than
gain it (not so for most aircraft today!)

In the escort role, the constraint was to maintain station on the
escorted force. So, with a bit of maneuver you could hold near corner
and plan on having a minute or two to accelerate upon getting a Disco
call or hearing of a MiG spotting somewhere in the package. Worst case
would be as the intercept target with no warning. C/L tanks would be
gone as soon as they got empty, so first move would be a slice into
the attack with full reheat, then a conversion of the fight into a
vertical rather than horizontal engagment.

MiGCAP suprisingly orbited slower than escorts usually depending upon
GCI vectoring to give them acceleration and configuration time (tank
jettison). Sweep missions would be faster than corner from the time
they hit the Red River flatlands.
>
>> No way to get to that speed at that altitude. I'd readily accept 1.2M,
>> but can't imagine getting to 1.6 and would really find it tactically a
>> mistake to get going that fast even if you could.
>
>Okay, although since he was rear aspect on the MiGs who seem to have been doing their usual
>supersonic (or at least, high transonic) missile pass and blow through, being well above transonic
>would seem to be necessary if he was going to catch them. It would certainly give his AIM-7 a better
>chance of overhauling them. Do you ever see him at Rats reunions? If so, maybe you could ask him
>about it.

Attendance at Rat reunions seems, at least to me, to be more weighted
toward earlier participants and definitely toward multiple tour guys.
I don't see that many from the Korat Linebacker days. Haven't seen
either of these guys since 1973.

>> Well, we had been talking about the F-4E portion of the Hunter/Killer
>> team and the carriage of dual pods. My original point was that some
>> equipment like ECM pods and AIM-7s were standard throughout the
>> squadron and not adjusted for the particular role of a tail number on
>> a particularl day--hence, H/Ks carried a pod even if we weren't going
>> to use it.
>
>No argument there. I still don't know how I easily managed to find shots of two different 34th TFS
>a/c (as well as one from the 421st) carrying two pods in that era, if it was as unusual as you state.
>Just one more minor mystery that's unlikely to be solved.

421st F-4s were never (at least to my knowledge) at Korat. The war
lasted a long time and the only consistency was constant change. I can
only report on what I encountered from July of '72 to July of '73 at
Korat.
>
>> I pointed out the minor error in Jenkin's quote that you offered
>> regarding emphasis on a pod for Iron Hand applications.
>
><snip>
>
>I think we're talking past each other here. My point was that the higher commanders/people who wrote
>the requirement for the ALQ-101 very likely* did so for exactly the reasons Jenkins claimed, i.e. to
>provide better protection for a/c that weren't able to benefit from mutual jamming. Subsequent
>priority deployment of the ALQ-101 to those a/c tasked with such detached missions, i.e. Iron
>Hand/MiGCAP/Recon, indicates that Jenkins' comments about the perceived need for the development of
>the 101, _regardless of whether it was actually turned on by the crews_, is correct.
>
>*I say "very likely" because I don't have Jenkins here, and don't know what his sources were for this
>statement, if he gave them.
>
>Offhand, I don't recall seeing photos of a/c other than F-105WW or MiGCAPs carrying ALQ-101s from
>1968-1973, although it may have happened. But even if there are some shots of same, the vast
>majority of photos I have of strikers/chaffers/escorts during LB I/II show them carrying pure noise
>jamming pods, and not ALQ-101s. I don't think I have a single photo of a 388th F-4E carrying an
>ALQ-101 during the bombing halt and LB periods.

Whew, what a load of my senile mind! That's consistent with my
recollection of Korat in '72-3. I don't recall the big ALQ-101 until I
arrived at Torrejon and we had them with the F-4Cs that we received in
October of '73 when the E-models were realigned at Bitburg. We carried
them for about 2 years and then began getting a few of the ALQ-119
pods.

> I know that the 388th had them when they were still
>equipped with Thuds, because there's a photo in Larry Davis' "Wild Weasel", taken at Korat, of a
>whole rack of ALQ-101s waiting to be loaded on a/c, with Thud tails visible above the revetments in
>the background.

Davis book is hard to reference since it isn't indexed, but I did find
the section you refer to. The pods are noted as arriving in July of
'68 (which is about the time of cessation of NVN bombing and the end
of Rolling Thunder.)

Tony Thornborough in "Iron Hand" notes the 7AF demand for carriage of
pods and the Weasel's resistance because of both interference with
RHAW equipment and loss of a Shrike station.

It should be noted as well that not all two-seat aircraft at Korat by
1968 were Weasels. There were Ryan's Raider aircraft, Combat Nail,
T-Stick II, etc. Some of these might have had good applications of the
-101 pod, if they were going to SAM country.

> Presumably there were only limited numbers of -101s available in the theater, so if
>those pods weren't at the 388th in 1972 they must have been somewhere else. From photo evidence it
>appears that "somewhere else" was the 432nd at Udorn, the unit tasked with MiGCAP and Recon over the
>north, which is right in line with the intended deployment of the -101 described by Jenkins (the
>F-105Gs had their own " -101s" by this time, the ALQ-105).
>
>Along that line, I could only find a single shot of a 67th TFS F-4CWW carrying a pod, and it's an
>-87. The sample size is way too small to reach any definite conclusions, but I'd guess that there
>may not have been enough 101s to go around. The 67th was apparently tasked to do a lot of pre-emptive
>Shrike firings, which would have kept them out of the worst threats. Alternatively, Davis has
>illustrations showing them carrying ALQ-119s, which may have been just entering service at the time.
>The F-4Cs at Spangdahlem carried -119s a few years later, but I don't know when they became
>available.

When the 67th deployed to Korat for Linebacker II, they were barely
operational. Only the need for additional 24-hour/day Weaseling made
it necessary to deploy them to the war. Higher priority missions in
SEA would have kept the Kadena guys from getting the latest equipment.

I don't know about pre-emptive Shrike firings. I never heard of it
during a lot of Weasel supporting. The first I recall consideration of
the tactic was several years later (around '75-'76) when Shrike supply
levels had stabilized and there were sufficient numbers to expand in
that manner.

Unless you had a very tight, single-thrust, strike package on a very
explicit timeline, I think it would be pretty hard to safely
coordinate a pre-emption program.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Ed Rasimus

March 16th 05, 04:27 PM

On Wed, 16 Mar 2005 07:24:32 -0700, Phormer Phighter Phlyer
> wrote:

>
>>
>>
>> Ed Rasimus
>> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
>> "When Thunder Rolled"
>> www.thunderchief.org
>> www.thundertales.blogspot.com
>
>For Ed-I'm reading 'To Hanoi and back, the USAF and North VietNam,
>1966-1973, Wayne Thompson, and in the first chapter he mentions that the
>late model F-4E had a rudimentary fly by wire back up for pitch control,
>for emergencies when PC-1/2 were gone...ever heard of this?

First, Wayne's book may be one of the best ever done on the air war in
the North. It's an excellent addition to anyone's serious history of
the period.

No, I never heard of a system like that in the F-4E. I was flying the
F-4 through 1977 and it hadn't been mentioned by that time. (I left
the E-model in July of '73, however, so shouldn't be considered an
absolute final word on the question.)

But, there was a system on the F-105--installed in '67 for emergency
recovery from bad-guy land. When engaged, the system positioned the
slab at an approximation of a 350 knot angle of attack. Pitch was then
controlled by throttle--advance throttle, speed builds, nose rises;
reduce throttle, speed drops, nose falls to return to trimmed
airspeed. Roll was controlled by a "rudimentary fly-by-wire"--when the
recovery system was engaged, the ailerons were locked in neutral and
roll control was done by a toggle switch that provided differential
trailing edge flap movement (the F-105 flaps were electrical, not
hydraulically actuated!)

I mention the loss of Wayne Fullam in the final chapter of When
Thunder Rolled as related to the system. His last reported radio call
was "how do you get the nose up?"

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Guy Alcala

March 17th 05, 12:48 AM

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On Wed, 16 Mar 2005 06:30:15 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >
> >> That would be tempered by
> >> time-to-go to TOT and distance read out on the INS. The escorts would
> >> be trying to keep 420 indicated which was an approximation of corner
> >> velocity.
> >
> >Wouldn't they want some extra E over corner, because they'd be bound to **** it off quickly with any
> >hard maneuvering?
>
> It's always going to be a compromise between what you want and what
> you can have. In any A/A mission I always like to be very fast at
> entry--in those days you could bleed off airspeed a lot easier than
> gain it (not so for most aircraft today!)
>
> In the escort role, the constraint was to maintain station on the
> escorted force. So, with a bit of maneuver you could hold near corner
> and plan on having a minute or two to accelerate upon getting a Disco
> call or hearing of a MiG spotting somewhere in the package. Worst case
> would be as the intercept target with no warning. C/L tanks would be
> gone as soon as they got empty, so first move would be a slice into
> the attack with full reheat, then a conversion of the fight into a
> vertical rather than horizontal engagment.

In that case, his claim of maintaining 450 while weaving is at least possible.

> >> No way to get to that speed at that altitude. I'd readily accept 1.2M,
> >> but can't imagine getting to 1.6 and would really find it tactically a
> >> mistake to get going that fast even if you could.
> >
> >Okay, although since he was rear aspect on the MiGs who seem to have been doing their usual
> >supersonic (or at least, high transonic) missile pass and blow through, being well above transonic
> >would seem to be necessary if he was going to catch them. It would certainly give his AIM-7 a better
> >chance of overhauling them. Do you ever see him at Rats reunions? If so, maybe you could ask him
> >about it.
>
> Attendance at Rat reunions seems, at least to me, to be more weighted
> toward earlier participants and definitely toward multiple tour guys.
> I don't see that many from the Korat Linebacker days. Haven't seen
> either of these guys since 1973.
>
> >> Well, we had been talking about the F-4E portion of the Hunter/Killer
> >> team and the carriage of dual pods. My original point was that some
> >> equipment like ECM pods and AIM-7s were standard throughout the
> >> squadron and not adjusted for the particular role of a tail number on
> >> a particularl day--hence, H/Ks carried a pod even if we weren't going
> >> to use it.
> >
> >No argument there. I still don't know how I easily managed to find shots of two different 34th TFS
> >a/c (as well as one from the 421st) carrying two pods in that era, if it was as unusual as you state.
> >Just one more minor mystery that's unlikely to be solved.
>
> 421st F-4s were never (at least to my knowledge) at Korat.

No, thea/c in question was at Takhli, after the 421st moved from Danang (and the 366th was closed down).
My point was that dual pod carriage was not limited to the 388th; I've got photos of 421st, 388th, and
432nd a/c so equipped, i.e. those from 3 different bases, all with escort or MiGCAP tasking.

> The war
> lasted a long time and the only consistency was constant change. I can
> only report on what I encountered from July of '72 to July of '73 at
> Korat.

Sure.

> >> I pointed out the minor error in Jenkin's quote that you offered
> >> regarding emphasis on a pod for Iron Hand applications.
> >
> ><snip>
> >
> >I think we're talking past each other here. My point was that the higher commanders/people who wrote
> >the requirement for the ALQ-101 very likely* did so for exactly the reasons Jenkins claimed, i.e. to
> >provide better protection for a/c that weren't able to benefit from mutual jamming. Subsequent
> >priority deployment of the ALQ-101 to those a/c tasked with such detached missions, i.e. Iron
> >Hand/MiGCAP/Recon, indicates that Jenkins' comments about the perceived need for the development of
> >the 101, _regardless of whether it was actually turned on by the crews_, is correct.
> >
> >*I say "very likely" because I don't have Jenkins here, and don't know what his sources were for this
> >statement, if he gave them.
> >
> >Offhand, I don't recall seeing photos of a/c other than F-105WW or MiGCAPs carrying ALQ-101s from
> >1968-1973, although it may have happened. But even if there are some shots of same, the vast
> >majority of photos I have of strikers/chaffers/escorts during LB I/II show them carrying pure noise
> >jamming pods, and not ALQ-101s. I don't think I have a single photo of a 388th F-4E carrying an
> >ALQ-101 during the bombing halt and LB periods.
>
> Whew, what a load of my senile mind! That's consistent with my
> recollection of Korat in '72-3. I don't recall the big ALQ-101 until I
> arrived at Torrejon and we had them with the F-4Cs that we received in
> October of '73 when the E-models were realigned at Bitburg.

Not sure what you mean by the "big ALQ-101". Are you referring to the longer versions starting with the
(V)3, as opposed to the original short versions like the ones shown in Davis? I've got a shot of a 4th
TFS bird carrying an ALQ-101(V)-3 according to the caption, on the left I/B. It's got the strip lights
but the short gun fairing. It may have one on the right I/B as well, but the angle is wrong. Oddly, the
a/c has three tanks, but apparently no weapons. BTW, most of the photos of 388th F-4Es I have are in the
Warbird Tech series book titled "F-4 Gun Nosed Phantoms".

> We carried
> them for about 2 years and then began getting a few of the ALQ-119
> pods.
>
> > I know that the 388th had them when they were still
> >equipped with Thuds, because there's a photo in Larry Davis' "Wild Weasel", taken at Korat, of a
> >whole rack of ALQ-101s waiting to be loaded on a/c, with Thud tails visible above the revetments in
> >the background.
>
> Davis book is hard to reference since it isn't indexed, but I did find
> the section you refer to. The pods are noted as arriving in July of
> '68 (which is about the time of cessation of NVN bombing and the end
> of Rolling Thunder.)

Yes, which is probably why there are so few photos showing them being carried by Thuds (or any other a/c).

> Tony Thornborough in "Iron Hand" notes the 7AF demand for carriage of
> pods and the Weasel's resistance because of both interference with
> RHAW equipment and loss of a Shrike station.

Uh Huh.

> It should be noted as well that not all two-seat aircraft at Korat by
> 1968 were Weasels. There were Ryan's Raider aircraft, Combat Nail,
> T-Stick II, etc. Some of these might have had good applications of the
> -101 pod, if they were going to SAM country.

I've only got a single shot of a Combat Martin a/c, a 357th a/c, and it's carrying what appears to be an
ALQ-71 on the left O/B (and probably on the right I/B also), but the shot is from the left wing so it
can't be seen. Ryan's Raiders', I don't know. I'd think they'd want to keep the jammers turned off (ISTR
that the Vark pilots normally kept their's off, even though they were loaded with a pair of -87s in
Vietnam). The idea was to give the minimum warning that they were coming, and rely on terrain masking to
beak any locks. Although at least one 'Vark pilot from that era has said that coming in under the radar
was a joke, and that the RWR was lit up solid for several minutes prior to the target and on the way out.

> > Presumably there were only limited numbers of -101s available in the theater, so if
> >those pods weren't at the 388th in 1972 they must have been somewhere else. From photo evidence it
> >appears that "somewhere else" was the 432nd at Udorn, the unit tasked with MiGCAP and Recon over the
> >north, which is right in line with the intended deployment of the -101 described by Jenkins (the
> >F-105Gs had their own " -101s" by this time, the ALQ-105).
> >
> >Along that line, I could only find a single shot of a 67th TFS F-4CWW carrying a pod, and it's an
> >-87. The sample size is way too small to reach any definite conclusions, but I'd guess that there
> >may not have been enough 101s to go around. The 67th was apparently tasked to do a lot of pre-emptive
> >Shrike firings, which would have kept them out of the worst threats. Alternatively, Davis has
> >illustrations showing them carrying ALQ-119s, which may have been just entering service at the time.
> >The F-4Cs at Spangdahlem carried -119s a few years later, but I don't know when they became
> >available.
>
> When the 67th deployed to Korat for Linebacker II, they were barely
> operational. Only the need for additional 24-hour/day Weaseling made
> it necessary to deploy them to the war. Higher priority missions in
> SEA would have kept the Kadena guys from getting the latest equipment.
>
> I don't know about pre-emptive Shrike firings. I never heard of it
> during a lot of Weasel supporting. The first I recall consideration of
> the tactic was several years later (around '75-'76) when Shrike supply
> levels had stabilized and there were sufficient numbers to expand in
> that manner.
>
> Unless you had a very tight, single-thrust, strike package on a very
> explicit timeline, I think it would be pretty hard to safely
> coordinate a pre-emption program.

Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th, and IIRR they described their
pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a statement from a contemporary
briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild Weasel in vietnam", by Maj.
William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings beginning in about April 1972,
accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type, number fired, type of firing, and
results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678 Shrike launches were pre-emptive
in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257, and 0/165 in the same period.
IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the USAF started to use it.

Guy

Tex Houston

March 17th 05, 01:58 AM

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th,
> and IIRR they described their
> pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a
> statement from a contemporary
> briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild
> Weasel in vietnam", by Maj.
> William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings
> beginning in about April 1972,
> accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type,
> number fired, type of firing, and
> results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678
> Shrike launches were pre-emptive
> in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257,
> and 0/165 in the same period.
> IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the
> USAF started to use it.
>
> Guy
>
Guy and Ed,

If you are interested in all things Weasel, Ed Rock's book is now available
at http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore/ItemDetail.aspx?bookid=28149 .

Regards,

Tex Houston

Guy Alcala

March 17th 05, 10:04 AM

Tex Houston wrote:

> "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> . ..
> > Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th,
> > and IIRR they described their
> > pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a
> > statement from a contemporary
> > briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild
> > Weasel in vietnam", by Maj.
> > William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings
> > beginning in about April 1972,
> > accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type,
> > number fired, type of firing, and
> > results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678
> > Shrike launches were pre-emptive
> > in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257,
> > and 0/165 in the same period.
> > IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the
> > USAF started to use it.
> >
> > Guy
> >
> Guy and Ed,
>
> If you are interested in all things Weasel, Ed Rock's book is now available
> at http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore/ItemDetail.aspx?bookid=28149 .

Thanks for the link. The preview is very interesting, as the date shows that
it is describing the first attack on SAM sites after the first US a/c, an F-4
(or maybe it was an RF-4), had been downed by an SA-2 on 24 July 1965. A real
cluster**** by all accounts, and now we've got the details that explain why.

Guy

Ed Rasimus

March 17th 05, 04:49 PM

On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 00:48:11 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>>
>> Whew, what a load off my senile mind! That's consistent with my
>> recollection of Korat in '72-3. I don't recall the big ALQ-101 until I
>> arrived at Torrejon and we had them with the F-4Cs that we received in
>> October of '73 when the E-models were realigned at Bitburg.
>
>Not sure what you mean by the "big ALQ-101". Are you referring to the longer versions starting with the
>(V)3, as opposed to the original short versions like the ones shown in Davis? I've got a shot of a 4th
>TFS bird carrying an ALQ-101(V)-3 according to the caption, on the left I/B. It's got the strip lights
>but the short gun fairing. It may have one on the right I/B as well, but the angle is wrong. Oddly, the
>a/c has three tanks, but apparently no weapons. BTW, most of the photos of 388th F-4Es I have are in the
>Warbird Tech series book titled "F-4 Gun Nosed Phantoms".

By "big" I mean relative to the much shorter ALQ-87. The 101 was
almost twice as long.

I'm not familiar with that book, but hope that it has good
documentation regarding dates and conditions to accompany the
pictures. While descriptions of block numbers, munition loads, etc.
are helpful, it's also necessary to relate it to time and place. If
you haven't had the chance, take a look at Don Logan's book on the
388th TFW. He managed to get pix of nearly all the aircraft at Korat
during his time there, both on the ground and inflight. He couples it
with some good descriptive text and, since he did the picture taking
it pretty well aligns with some fixed dates.
>

>I've only got a single shot of a Combat Martin a/c, a 357th a/c, and it's carrying what appears to be an
>ALQ-71 on the left O/B (and probably on the right I/B also), but the shot is from the left wing so it
>can't be seen. Ryan's Raiders', I don't know. I'd think they'd want to keep the jammers turned off (ISTR
>that the Vark pilots normally kept their's off, even though they were loaded with a pair of -87s in
>Vietnam). The idea was to give the minimum warning that they were coming, and rely on terrain masking to
>beak any locks. Although at least one 'Vark pilot from that era has said that coming in under the radar
>was a joke, and that the RWR was lit up solid for several minutes prior to the target and on the way out.

Whether or not a pod would be on for a mission would be a tactical
choice. If single-ship, the pods of the period would be a good means
of waking up the bad guys that you were inbound. OTOH, if in a
formation, the pods could be used to mask the number as well as to
deny range/azimuth info to the defenses.

If low-level on ingress, it would be a good plan to run silent, but
you might want to light up the pods for the target area, particularly
if popping up fdor weapon delivery.

By "one 'Vark pilot from that era" are you talking about the first
deployment in '68 or the second deployment in '72? Coming in under
the radar certainly wouldn't mean all radars--there were simply too
many. But, it most assuredly could mean avoiding Fan Song radars,
denying SA-2 guidance, breaking lock, creating intermittent returns,
etc.

And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can
say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be
pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks
and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the
target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or
AS (Azimuth-Sector)?

Knowing what the situation was and what the RWR was telling you was
definitely an acquired skill--one which calmed the nerves after first
encounters with real RWR indications in combat.
>
>Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th, and IIRR they described their
>pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a statement from a contemporary
>briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild Weasel in vietnam", by Maj.
>William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings beginning in about April 1972,
>accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type, number fired, type of firing, and
>results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678 Shrike launches were pre-emptive
>in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257, and 0/165 in the same period.
>IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the USAF started to use it.

My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity
for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we
didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G
Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels.

I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something.
In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72
(shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't
mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown
in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for
pre-emptive firing.

When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at
night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of
"detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels
separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship,
engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or
preplanned pre-emptions.

It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much
further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted. That
is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive
radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM
airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down.
Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes
maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar
during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as
a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism.

Hewitt may be using "pre-emptive" as meaning firing at an emitter
before the emitter has had an opportunity to launch its own weapon.
That would be a common application of the Shrike. (But, if that is the
definition, it doesn't account for the Standard numbers--Standard
required some in-flight programming for most launches and would be a
poor choice for pre-emption by my definition.)

Ed
Wild Weasel #2488

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Ed Rasimus

March 17th 05, 04:56 PM

On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 10:04:08 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Tex Houston wrote:
>> >
>> Guy and Ed,
>>
>> If you are interested in all things Weasel, Ed Rock's book is now available
>> at http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore/ItemDetail.aspx?bookid=28149 .
>
>Thanks for the link. The preview is very interesting, as the date shows that
>it is describing the first attack on SAM sites after the first US a/c, an F-4
>(or maybe it was an RF-4), had been downed by an SA-2 on 24 July 1965. A real
>cluster**** by all accounts, and now we've got the details that explain why.
>
>Guy

I saw some galley's of Ed Rock's anthology of Weaseling two years ago
at River Rats in Las Vegas. It should have some interesting stories in
the package--a lot like Don Shepard's "Misty" on the F-100 Fast-FAC
business.

For some more details on the mission in the preview, take a look
around p. 90 of Tom Clancy/Chuck Horner's collaborative work, "Every
Man a Tiger". Horner and Roger Myhrum were on the mission.

Ed Rock was an instructor of mine at Nellis in '65-66 and arrived at
Korat in June of '66 as one of the first contingent of F-105F Wild
Weasels. (He wasn't on that mission that is excerpted for the book.)
He flew his 100 mission tour in the summer and fall of '66 and became
one of the first Weasels to survive the experience.

Ed was back at Korat in '72 when I returned in the F-4. At that time
he was commander of the 17th Wild Weasel Squadron (combined with the
561st WWS). He flew in both Linebacker I and II and we shared the
experience on a couple of trips North together.

He is probably one of the most unlikely looking fighter pilots you
would ever meet.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Phormer Phighter Phlyer

March 18th 05, 02:27 PM

Phormer Phighter Phlyer wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Ed Rasimus
>> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
>> "When Thunder Rolled"
>> www.thunderchief.org
>> www.thundertales.blogspot.com
>
>
> For Ed-I'm reading 'To Hanoi and back, the USAF and North VietNam,
> 1966-1973, Wayne Thompson, and in the first chapter he mentions that the
> late model F-4E had a rudimentary fly by wire back up for pitch control,
> for emergencies when PC-1/2 were gone...ever heard of this?

Can ya try again Ed, I got an 'error' for your answer-you can email direct.

Guy Alcala

March 20th 05, 03:15 PM

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 00:48:11 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Whew, what a load off my senile mind! That's consistent with my
> >> recollection of Korat in '72-3. I don't recall the big ALQ-101 until I
> >> arrived at Torrejon and we had them with the F-4Cs that we received in
> >> October of '73 when the E-models were realigned at Bitburg.
> >
> >Not sure what you mean by the "big ALQ-101". Are you referring to the longer versions starting with the
> >(V)3, as opposed to the original short versions like the ones shown in Davis? I've got a shot of a 4th
> >TFS bird carrying an ALQ-101(V)-3 according to the caption, on the left I/B. It's got the strip lights
> >but the short gun fairing. It may have one on the right I/B as well, but the angle is wrong. Oddly, the
> >a/c has three tanks, but apparently no weapons. BTW, most of the photos of 388th F-4Es I have are in the
> >Warbird Tech series book titled "F-4 Gun Nosed Phantoms".
>
> By "big" I mean relative to the much shorter ALQ-87. The 101 was
> almost twice as long.

The original one wasn't; it was the (V)-3 et. seq. that were the size you describe.

> I'm not familiar with that book, but hope that it has good
> documentation regarding dates and conditions to accompany the
> pictures.

It does, with photos from first arrival at Korat up through1972, as well as shots of other units over the
years. But there are more of the 388th in that era than any other unit or time.

> While descriptions of block numbers, munition loads, etc.
> are helpful, it's also necessary to relate it to time and place. If
> you haven't had the chance, take a look at Don Logan's book on the
> 388th TFW. He managed to get pix of nearly all the aircraft at Korat
> during his time there, both on the ground and inflight. He couples it
> with some good descriptive text and, since he did the picture taking
> it pretty well aligns with some fixed dates.

I'll try and find a copy.

> >I've only got a single shot of a Combat Martin a/c, a 357th a/c, and it's carrying what appears to be an
> >ALQ-71 on the left O/B (and probably on the right I/B also), but the shot is from the left wing so it
> >can't be seen. Ryan's Raiders', I don't know. I'd think they'd want to keep the jammers turned off (ISTR
> >that the Vark pilots normally kept their's off, even though they were loaded with a pair of -87s in
> >Vietnam). The idea was to give the minimum warning that they were coming, and rely on terrain masking to
> >beak any locks. Although at least one 'Vark pilot from that era has said that coming in under the radar
> >was a joke, and that the RWR was lit up solid for several minutes prior to the target and on the way out.
>
> Whether or not a pod would be on for a mission would be a tactical
> choice. If single-ship, the pods of the period would be a good means
> of waking up the bad guys that you were inbound. OTOH, if in a
> formation, the pods could be used to mask the number as well as to
> deny range/azimuth info to the defenses.
>
> If low-level on ingress, it would be a good plan to run silent, but
> you might want to light up the pods for the target area, particularly
> if popping up fdor weapon delivery.

That's when they were most vulnerable, all right. They especially hated carrying Mk.84s, as they weren't
available with Snakeye fins and the ballute was at most a gleam in the eye of the designers. So they had to
pop to 2,500 feet or so for the delivery owing to the frag envelope, making them the sole attraction and star
of the show.

> By "one 'Vark pilot from that era" are you talking about the first
> deployment in '68 or the second deployment in '72?

'72 IIRR. Thornborough's F-111 book (the first, small one, not the later big one, although it's probably in
there also) has the comments by some of the crews, including that particular one. He also talked to some of the
'68 crews so I could be confusing things, but I think not.

> Coming in under
> the radar certainly wouldn't mean all radars--there were simply too
> many. But, it most assuredly could mean avoiding Fan Song radars,
> denying SA-2 guidance, breaking lock, creating intermittent returns,
> etc.
>
> And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can
> say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be
> pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks
> and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the
> target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or
> AS (Azimuth-Sector)?

I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN
were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make
the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there
was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know;
there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they
apparently figured that one out.

>Knowing what the situation was and what the RWR was telling you was

> definitely an acquired skill--one which calmed the nerves after first
> encounters with real RWR indications in combat.

From what I recall most of the '72 crews had BTDT in prior tours, so I don't think that was an issue.

> >Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th, and IIRR they described their
> >pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a statement from a contemporary
> >briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild Weasel in vietnam", by Maj.
> >William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings beginning in about April 1972,
> >accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type, number fired, type of firing, and
> >results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678 Shrike launches were pre-emptive
> >in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257, and 0/165 in the same period.
> >IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the USAF started to use it.
>
> My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity
> for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we
> didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G
> Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels.
>
> I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something.
> In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72
> (shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't
> mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown
> in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for
> pre-emptive firing.
>
> When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at
> night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of
> "detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels
> separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship,
> engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or
> preplanned pre-emptions.

Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the
(revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book.

> It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much
> further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted.

> That
> is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive
> radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM
> airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down.
> Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes
> maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar
> during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as
> a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism.

That's the definition.

> Hewitt may be using "pre-emptive" as meaning firing at an emitter
> before the emitter has had an opportunity to launch its own weapon.
> That would be a common application of the Shrike. (But, if that is the
> definition, it doesn't account for the Standard numbers--Standard
> required some in-flight programming for most launches and would be a
> poor choice for pre-emption by my definition.)

No, your first definition was the correct one. Lofting them into an area where SAMs were known to be (or had
been), to keep the Fan Songsoff the air.

Guy

Guy Alcala

March 20th 05, 03:18 PM

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 10:04:08 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >Tex Houston wrote:
> >> >
> >> Guy and Ed,
> >>
> >> If you are interested in all things Weasel, Ed Rock's book is now available
> >> at http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore/ItemDetail.aspx?bookid=28149 .
> >
> >Thanks for the link. The preview is very interesting, as the date shows that
> >it is describing the first attack on SAM sites after the first US a/c, an F-4
> >(or maybe it was an RF-4), had been downed by an SA-2 on 24 July 1965. A real
> >cluster**** by all accounts, and now we've got the details that explain why.
> >
> >Guy
>
> I saw some galley's of Ed Rock's anthology of Weaseling two years ago
> at River Rats in Las Vegas. It should have some interesting stories in
> the package--a lot like Don Shepard's "Misty" on the F-100 Fast-FAC
> business.
>
> For some more details on the mission in the preview, take a look
> around p. 90 of Tom Clancy/Chuck Horner's collaborative work, "Every
> Man a Tiger". Horner and Roger Myhrum were on the mission.

Yeah, now that you mention it, I remember reading that.

<snip>

Guy

Ed Rasimus

March 20th 05, 06:06 PM

On Sun, 20 Mar 2005 15:15:52 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can
>> say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be
>> pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks
>> and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the
>> target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or
>> AS (Azimuth-Sector)?
>
>I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN
>were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make
>the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there
>was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know;
>there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they
>apparently figured that one out.

The whole point of terrain masking was to hide or interfere with
weapon guidance. Breaking the lock of the tracking radar by getting
below the antenna depression minimum or putting something solid
between the airplane and the defender.

Coming in undetected was not on the table for consideration. Everyone
pretty much knew we were coming and when. Simple HUMINT reports from
the Thailand bases or ground observers under the refueling tracks
would cover the TOT windows +/- 20 minutes or so.

>
>
>>Knowing what the situation was and what the RWR was telling you was
>> definitely an acquired skill--one which calmed the nerves after first
>> encounters with real RWR indications in combat.
>
>From what I recall most of the '72 crews had BTDT in prior tours, so I don't think that was an issue.

Just looked at Hobson. He reports six F-111s lost during Linebacker
I/II.

28 Sept 72--Major AC and 1/Lt WSO
16 Oct --Capt AC and 1/Lt WSO
7 Nov-- Maj AC and Maj WSO
20 Nov-- Capt and Capt
18 Dec-- Lt Col and Major
22 Dec--Capt and 1/Lt

So, we've got at least three first-timers and three more probable (the
Captains.)

Certainly at Korat in the F-105 community, the force was split 50/50
with experience and FNGs. In the F-4 side of the house we had probably
25% with previous tours and the rest were first timers (including,
unbelievably, a couple of Majors with as much as 9 years experience in
the F-4 and no previous combat!)

Consider also that only BTDT crews who had participated in Rolling
Thunder would be SAM and radar-guided defense experienced. Lots of
previous tour guys had flown in S. Vietnam or during protracted
bombing pauses and had never seen a real-world RWR indication.

We actually had a half-dozen brand new 1/Lt arrivals both front and
back cockpit, straight out of training in the F-4 going to RP VI on
their first combat missions. Mike Stevens, squadron Ops Officer in the
34th went to Pack VI as a R/C/P flight lead/instructor pilot for some
of the Linebacker II sorties. (That was something I flat refused to
do!)
>
>> My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity
>> for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we
>> didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G
>> Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels.
>>
>> I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something.
>> In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72
>> (shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't
>> mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown
>> in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for
>> pre-emptive firing.
>>
>> When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at
>> night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of
>> "detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels
>> separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship,
>> engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or
>> preplanned pre-emptions.
>
>Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the
>(revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book.

"Iron Hand"
>
>> It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much
>> further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted.
>
>> That
>> is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive
>> radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM
>> airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down.
>> Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes
>> maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar
>> during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as
>> a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism.
>
>That's the definition.

If that's the definition, I categorically state that I never saw it
done. Never. Not even considered in discussions of how to improve our
tactics. First time I ever heard it suggested was around '74-'75 when
we were going to use it (simulated) in missions against CVBG forces in
the Mediterranean. (I discuss the tactic in my Air Command/Staff
College paper, "Sink the Kiev" as a means of rolling back the defenses
and providing suppression during an attack against a Soviet battle
group.)

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Guy Alcala

March 27th 05, 10:02 AM

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On Sun, 20 Mar 2005 15:15:52 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >
> >> And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can
> >> say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be
> >> pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks
> >> and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the
> >> target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or
> >> AS (Azimuth-Sector)?
> >
> >I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN
> >were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make
> >the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there
> >was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know;
> >there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they
> >apparently figured that one out.
>
> The whole point of terrain masking was to hide or interfere with
> weapon guidance. Breaking the lock of the tracking radar by getting
> below the antenna depression minimum or putting something solid
> between the airplane and the defender.
>
> Coming in undetected was not on the table for consideration. Everyone
> pretty much knew we were coming and when. Simple HUMINT reports from
> the Thailand bases or ground observers under the refueling tracks
> would cover the TOT windows +/- 20 minutes or so.

Sorry for the delayed reply; I've been waiting to get Thornborough's 2nd Ed. "thePhantom Story" from the library,
so I could check my memory against it. AFAIR the Varks didn't need to tank on the way in, and they were usually
operating at night (on solo missions to RP VI) in any case, so I don't think the warning time was anywhere near
what it was for the typical Alpha Strike.

> >> My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity
> >> for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we
> >> didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G
> >> Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels.
> >>
> >> I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something.
> >> In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72
> >> (shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't
> >> mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown
> >> in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for
> >> pre-emptive firing.
> >>
> >> When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at
> >> night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of
> >> "detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels
> >> separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship,
> >> engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or
> >> preplanned pre-emptions.
> >
> >Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the
> >(revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book.
>
> "Iron Hand"
> >
> >> It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much
> >> further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted.
> >
> >> That
> >> is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive
> >> radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM
> >> airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down.
> >> Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes
> >> maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar
> >> during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as
> >> a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism.
> >
> >That's the definition.
>
> If that's the definition, I categorically state that I never saw it
> done. Never. Not even considered in discussions of how to improve our
> tactics. First time I ever heard it suggested was around '74-'75 when
> we were going to use it (simulated) in missions against CVBG forces in
> the Mediterranean. (I discuss the tactic in my Air Command/Staff
> College paper, "Sink the Kiev" as a means of rolling back the defenses
> and providing suppression during an attack against a Soviet battle
> group.)

As it turns out, my memory was off; "The Phantom Story" doesn't include any accounts of pre-emptive firing by the
67th TFS in 1972. Knowing that I hadn't dreamed reading an account bya participant who stated they did so, I went
looking on googlegroups and lo and behold found this in a past discussion involving you, Dweezil, Kurt Plummer and
several others on the same subject. You had stated that you were unaware of any, and then we got these posts:
----------------------------------------------------------------

matheson
Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options

Ed Rasimus wrote in message et>...
>Kurt Plummer > wrote:

>snippage<

>I NEVER heard of pre-emptive lofting of Shrikes either in early Weasel
>days as a 105-driver or during Linebacker as a Phantom Pilot in H/K
>teams. The first consideration of pre-emptive ARM firing that I can
>recall was in tactics manuals that I researched while at Command &
>Staff in '77-78 writing about anti-ship operations.

That's funny, as the Israelis used pre-emptive shrikes at high altitude and
absolute max range (and time of flight) to great advantage in 1967 attacks
on Egyptian SAM sites. Again in '73.

When I started flying C model F-4 Weasels in '78 the pre-emptive shot was
dogma, especially in PACAF, and every check ride we were expected to
calculate a point in space from which to preempt a -45 so as to impact just
prior to strike force bombs on target (supposedly they would unmask and get
the trons on the air and the -45 would hit before reaction time of the
system.

Les
--------------------------------------
Even more relevant was this one:
--------------------------------------

Robert W. King
Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options

Hi Ed!

Ed Rasimus > wrote in message

t...

[stuff snipped]

>I NEVER heard of pre-emptive lofting of Shrikes either in early Weasel
>days as a 105-driver or during Linebacker as a Phantom Pilot in H/K
>teams. The first consideration of pre-emptive ARM firing that I can
>recall was in tactics manuals that I researched while at Command &
>Staff in '77-78 writing about anti-ship operations.

In the 561st TFS flying from Khorat RTAFB in 1972, we lofted pre-emptive
Shrikes on a fairly regular basis on force goes to high threat areas. We
also briefed this tactic to the the non-Weasel guys because we had a couple
of incidents where the MIGCAP or strike guys saw the Shrike in flight,
yelled "SAM" and called for a break.

I vaguely recall it being discussed as a possible tactic among the Weasel
crews as early as my tour with the 333rd at Takhli in 1968, but I don't
recall ever actually deliberately launching in that mode on that tour. Of
course, there was the day that Bob Beckpre-empted a Shrike from level flight
on a "patrol the border" mission over Laos after the bombing pause was
ordered by the President in November 68.

(Bob was Major Robert J. Beck, Command Bar-Stooler and highly experienced
Thud driver previously stationed at Spangdahlem AB. He was a sierra hotel
dive bomber.)

It was a couple of months later when that happened. My memory says it was in
Feb 1969 but I'm too lazy to dig out my log book. It was mid-morning. We
were crusing at altitude southbound over Laos a few miles west of the west
end of the DMZ. I had my head down in the cockpit updating the Doppler when
from the corner of my eye, I saw the Shrike come off the outboard station.
Being the Wild Weasel bear of our little crew and in charge of listening for
enemy radar signals (There were none.) and being an all-around alert chap, I
said "What the hell was that!" and then asked Bob what he was shooting at.
He mumbled a bit and then said "We'll talk about it at the debrief." So I
held my water until we got on the ground.

In the step-van on the way in from the flight line to debrief, I got the
whole story. As you know, there aren't a lot of suitable locations to stash
loose items such as checklists, maps and what-not in the cockpit of the
Thud. Bob's solution for map storage when it was not in use was to stick it
under his left thigh. In the course of stretching, he had shifted his weight
on the seat and the map had slid off the seat to the left between the seat
and left console. He tried picking it up with his left hand. He could only
touch the edge of the map with his fingertips.

So in an effort to force his left hand a bit further into the narrow space
between the seat and the console and recapture the map, he moved his right
hand from its normal position on the stick and re-gripped it with his right
wrist rotated so that the thumb was pointed down instead of up. In that
unfamiliar configuration -- while fishing for a map near the cockpit floor
with his left hand -- his right pinkie came in contact with the pickle
button on the stick. The Shrike, ever obedient to its electrical signals,
launched on a independent search and destroy mission over southern Laos.

It was astonishing how much attention we garnered after landing back at
Takhli without that AGM-45 hanging on the outboard. With the bombing halt
still in progress, the Weasels hadn't expended a Shrike in months. As Bob
put it later that night at the bar, "I've been on this base nine months but
I had to debrief guys I'd never seen or heard of before this afternoon."

--
Robert W. King
I'm an ingenieur, NOT a bloody locomotive driver!
------------------------------------------------------

So it appears that it was common at least among the 67th TFS guys, and you were unaware of it at the time. This
suggests that it might also have been happening among the F-105G crews in the April-December period, since the 67th
crews flew with the105Gs at first (as theater indoctrination and to bone up on the latest techniques before they
started flying separate missions).

Guy

Ed Rasimus

March 27th 05, 05:34 PM

On Sun, 27 Mar 2005 09:02:41 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> On Sun, 20 Mar 2005 15:15:52 GMT, Guy Alcala
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>Sorry for the delayed reply; I've been waiting to get Thornborough's 2nd Ed. "thePhantom Story" from the library,
>so I could check my memory against it. AFAIR the Varks didn't need to tank on the way in, and they were usually
>operating at night (on solo missions to RP VI) in any case, so I don't think the warning time was anywhere near
>what it was for the typical Alpha Strike.

You are correct, the -111s didn't tank routinely and they preferred
night solo. But, my point was that even given that you weren't at high
altitude, the HUMINT reports for the bad guys from the bases as well
as ground observers along the rather limited route options would be
more than enough to let the target area know someone was coming.
>
>>
>> If that's the definition, I categorically state that I never saw it
>> done. Never. Not even considered in discussions of how to improve our
>> tactics. First time I ever heard it suggested was around '74-'75 when
>> we were going to use it (simulated) in missions against CVBG forces in
>> the Mediterranean. (I discuss the tactic in my Air Command/Staff
>> College paper, "Sink the Kiev" as a means of rolling back the defenses
>> and providing suppression during an attack against a Soviet battle
>> group.)
>
>As it turns out, my memory was off; "The Phantom Story" doesn't include any accounts of pre-emptive firing by the
>67th TFS in 1972. Knowing that I hadn't dreamed reading an account bya participant who stated they did so, I went
>looking on googlegroups and lo and behold found this in a past discussion involving you, Dweezil, Kurt Plummer and
>several others on the same subject. You had stated that you were unaware of any, and then we got these posts:
>----------------------------------------------------------------
>
>matheson
> Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options
>
>
> Ed Rasimus wrote in message et>...
> >Kurt Plummer > wrote:
>
> >snippage<
>
> >I NEVER heard of pre-emptive lofting of Shrikes either in early Weasel
> >days as a 105-driver or during Linebacker as a Phantom Pilot in H/K
> >teams. The first consideration of pre-emptive ARM firing that I can
> >recall was in tactics manuals that I researched while at Command &
> >Staff in '77-78 writing about anti-ship operations.
>
> That's funny, as the Israelis used pre-emptive shrikes at high altitude and
> absolute max range (and time of flight) to great advantage in 1967 attacks
> on Egyptian SAM sites. Again in '73.

That demonstrates that my statements have been consistent for lo these
many years. And, it also points out that the IAF had a better concept
of tactics as well as a better supply chain than we did. Since their
wars tended to be of the week or less variety, they probably could
expend a bit more aggressively. (I know, the week or less comment is a
bit of exaggeration.)
>
> When I started flying C model F-4 Weasels in '78 the pre-emptive shot was
> dogma, especially in PACAF, and every check ride we were expected to
> calculate a point in space from which to preempt a -45 so as to impact just
> prior to strike force bombs on target (supposedly they would unmask and get
> the trons on the air and the -45 would hit before reaction time of the
> system.
>
> Les

You might note that '78 is a mere six years after the end of LB II.
And, I mention writing about it in '77 at ACSC.
>--------------------------------------
>Even more relevant was this one:
>--------------------------------------
>
>Robert W. King
> Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options
>
>
> Hi Ed!
>
> Ed Rasimus > wrote in message
>
> t...
>
> [stuff snipped]
>
>
> In the 561st TFS flying from Khorat RTAFB in 1972, we lofted pre-emptive
> Shrikes on a fairly regular basis on force goes to high threat areas. We
> also briefed this tactic to the the non-Weasel guys because we had a couple
> of incidents where the MIGCAP or strike guys saw the Shrike in flight,
> yelled "SAM" and called for a break.

While I've got great respect for Bear King's experience, I've got to
say that as one of about eight crews of H/K specialists in the F-4
squadron at the time, I would have seen it done or at least briefed
during the summer and fall of '72.

And, while the AGM-78 "Standard ARM" often got a SAM call from newbies
in the area, a Shrike shot was way too short in duration and too small
for most folks to see. If someone did see it, the greater probability
would be an "Atoll" call. (The Standard sightings were enough of a
problem that Weasels began to alert the force with a call of "Shotgun"
prior to firing the big brute.)
>
> I vaguely recall it being discussed as a possible tactic among the Weasel
> crews as early as my tour with the 333rd at Takhli in 1968, but I don't
> recall ever actually deliberately launching in that mode on that tour. Of
> course, there was the day that Bob Beckpre-empted a Shrike from level flight
> on a "patrol the border" mission over Laos after the bombing pause was
> ordered by the President in November 68.

So, an inadvertent firing recount and a confirmation that it wasn't
done in '68.
>
>
>So it appears that it was common at least among the 67th TFS guys, and you were unaware of it at the time. This
>suggests that it might also have been happening among the F-105G crews in the April-December period, since the 67th
>crews flew with the105Gs at first (as theater indoctrination and to bone up on the latest techniques before they
>started flying separate missions).
>
>Guy

The 67th deployment was late in the year. (I'm too lazy to look it up
this AM, but I'd say Oct-Nov of '72). They did some pairings with the
561st/17th F-105G guys for local orientation, but that was mostly to
lower Route Packs and very brief.

When they finally got thrown into LB II, there was so much activity
upon arrival in RP-VI that pre-empting would have been virtually
impossible. And, if you're going to have all sort of hot sites on the
scope, why not target specific ones?

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com