RAF Bomber Command was right to ignore Freeman Dyson’s foolish idea - Lancaster bomber of the Royal Air Force, 1942.jpg

[Miloch]

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/08/raf-bomber-command-was-right-to-ignore-freeman-dysons-foolish-idea

In your obituary of Freeman Dyson (Theoretical physicist and mathematician with
far-fetched ideas about the future, Journal, 4 March), you note correctly that
Bomber Command “ignored” the 19-year-old Dyson’s proposal, in 1943, to remove
the gun turrets from Lancaster bombers. But it was – like some of Dyson’s later
wheezes, such as powering a spaceship with nuclear bombs, or planting trees on
comets – an unsound notion.

https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/mar/01/freeman-dyson-obituary

Dyson claimed that the Lancaster would gain 50mph in cruise speed, but
experience with unarmed Lancasters on the transatlantic mail route showed that
the actual gain was just 15mph-20mph, not enough to stay ahead of German night
fighters. (Dyson may have been misled by the high eastbound ground speeds of the
mail Lancasters, but these were assisted by the prevailing winds. The westbound
flights were slower.)

In addition, Luftwaffe records later showed that half of all night-fighter
interceptions failed because the Royal Air Force gunners saw the fighter coming
and enabled the bomber to evade.

If Dyson’s suggestion had been adopted, the fighters would have doubled their
success rate and destroyed Bomber Command in short order. As it was, Lancaster
losses totalled only 2% from 156,000 sorties and the monthly intake of new
Lancasters and crews was, as a rule, twice the loss rate. In only one month,
January 1944, at the height of the battle of Berlin, did Lancaster losses exceed
production, and then only by five units.

On the other hand, monthly production of the main German night fighter, the
Messerschmitt 110, was below the loss rate as often as not, and the
non-accidental losses were usually due to RAF air gunners. Dyson’s modest
proposal is much cited, but it was foolish, and Bomber Command was right to
dismiss it.

Hugo Barnacle
London



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[Mitchell Holman[_9_]]

Miloch > wrote in
:

> https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/08/raf-bomber-command-was-ri
> ght-to-ignore-freeman-dysons-foolish-idea
>
> In your obituary of Freeman Dyson (Theoretical physicist and
> mathematician with far-fetched ideas about the future, Journal, 4
> March), you note correctly that Bomber Command “ignored” the
> 19-year-old Dyson’s proposal, in 1943, to remove the gun turrets from
> Lancaster bombers. But it was – like some of Dyson’s later wheezes,
> such as powering a spaceship with nuclear bombs, or planting trees on
> comets – an unsound notion.
>
> https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/mar/01/freeman-dyson-obituary
>
> Dyson claimed that the Lancaster would gain 50mph in cruise speed, but
> experience with unarmed Lancasters on the transatlantic mail route
> showed that the actual gain was just 15mph-20mph, not enough to stay
> ahead of German night fighters. (Dyson may have been misled by the
> high eastbound ground speeds of the mail Lancasters, but these were
> assisted by the prevailing winds. The westbound flights were slower.)
>
> In addition, Luftwaffe records later showed that half of all
> night-fighter interceptions failed because the Royal Air Force gunners
> saw the fighter coming and enabled the bomber to evade.
>
> If Dyson’s suggestion had been adopted, the fighters would have
> doubled their success rate and destroyed Bomber Command in short
> order. As it was, Lancaster losses totalled only 2% from 156,000
> sorties and the monthly intake of new Lancasters and crews was, as a
> rule, twice the loss rate. In only one month, January 1944, at the
> height of the battle of Berlin, did Lancaster losses exceed
> production, and then only by five units.
>
> On the other hand, monthly production of the main German night
> fighter, the Messerschmitt 110, was below the loss rate as often as
> not, and the non-accidental losses were usually due to RAF air
> gunners. Dyson’s modest proposal is much cited, but it was foolish,
> and Bomber Command was right to dismiss it.


Didn't LeMay increase the B-29 speed by
taking out the guns?

[Miloch]

In article >, Mitchell Holman
says...
>
>Miloch > wrote in
:
>
>> https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/08/raf-bomber-command-was-ri
>> ght-to-ignore-freeman-dysons-foolish-idea
>>
>> In your obituary of Freeman Dyson (Theoretical physicist and
>> mathematician with far-fetched ideas about the future, Journal, 4
>> March), you note correctly that Bomber Command “ignored” the
>> 19-year-old Dyson’s proposal, in 1943, to remove the gun turrets from
>> Lancaster bombers. But it was – like some of Dyson’s later wheezes,
>> such as powering a spaceship with nuclear bombs, or planting trees on
>> comets – an unsound notion.
>>
>> https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/mar/01/freeman-dyson-obituary
>>
>> Dyson claimed that the Lancaster would gain 50mph in cruise speed, but
>> experience with unarmed Lancasters on the transatlantic mail route
>> showed that the actual gain was just 15mph-20mph, not enough to stay
>> ahead of German night fighters. (Dyson may have been misled by the
>> high eastbound ground speeds of the mail Lancasters, but these were
>> assisted by the prevailing winds. The westbound flights were slower.)
>>
>> In addition, Luftwaffe records later showed that half of all
>> night-fighter interceptions failed because the Royal Air Force gunners
>> saw the fighter coming and enabled the bomber to evade.
>>
>> If Dyson’s suggestion had been adopted, the fighters would have
>> doubled their success rate and destroyed Bomber Command in short
>> order. As it was, Lancaster losses totalled only 2% from 156,000
>> sorties and the monthly intake of new Lancasters and crews was, as a
>> rule, twice the loss rate. In only one month, January 1944, at the
>> height of the battle of Berlin, did Lancaster losses exceed
>> production, and then only by five units.
>>
>> On the other hand, monthly production of the main German night
>> fighter, the Messerschmitt 110, was below the loss rate as often as
>> not, and the non-accidental losses were usually due to RAF air
>> gunners. Dyson’s modest proposal is much cited, but it was foolish,
>> and Bomber Command was right to dismiss it.
>
>
> Didn't LeMay increase the B-29 speed by
>taking out the guns?
>

from https://www.skytamer.com/Boeing_B-29.html

"With the revolutionary Central Fire Control System (CFCS), the B-29 had four
remote controlled turrets, each armed with two .50 cal M2/AN machine guns. Four
gunners were able to control these turrets with the use of four General
Electric-made analog computers, one above the Norden bombsight in the nose and
three in a pressurized compartment in the rear fuselage which incorporated clear
blown sighting blisters. The gunner manning the sight in the upper rear station
was the "Central Fire Control gunner" whose job was to allocate turrets to each
of the other three gunners, avoiding confusion in the heat of battle. The CFCS
had (at that time) a highly advanced analog computer which corrected for the
B-29s Airspeed, the target's speed, target lead, gravity, temperature, barrel
wear, and humidity. Because of this, the .50 caliber machine guns of the B-29
had a maximum effective range of 1,000 yards (910 m), double the range of the
manually-aimed machine guns of the B-17 Flying Fortress. The tail gunner could
only control his own weapons (two M2/AN Brownings plus, in early production
B-29s, a 20 mm M2 cannon) and the lower rear turret. In post World War II, the
tail guns eventually got their own APG-15 gun control radar sets.

"In early 1945, with a change of role from high altitude day bomber to low
altitude night bomber, LeMay reportedly ordered the removal of most of the
defensive armament and remote controlled sighting equipment from his B-29s so
that they could carry greater fuel and bomb loads. As a consequence of this
requirement Bell, Marietta (BM) produced a series of 311 B-29Bs which had the
turrets and sighting equipment removed, except for the tail position which
initially had the two .50 cal Browning machine guns and single M2 cannon with
the APG-15 radar fitted as standard. This armament was quickly changed to three
..50 caliber Brownings. This version also had an improved APQ-7 Eagle
bombing-through-overcast radar fitted in an airfoil shaped radome under the
fuselage. Most of these aircraft were assigned to the 315th Bomb Wing, Northwest
Field, Guam.



*


























>

[Miloch]

In article >, Mitchell Holman
says...
>
>Miloch > wrote in
:
>
>> https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/08/raf-bomber-command-was-ri
>> ght-to-ignore-freeman-dysons-foolish-idea
>>
>>
>> On the other hand, monthly production of the main German night
>> fighter, the Messerschmitt 110, was below the loss rate as often as
>> not, and the non-accidental losses were usually due to RAF air
>> gunners. Dyson’s modest proposal is much cited, but it was foolish,
>> and Bomber Command was right to dismiss it.
>
>
> Didn't LeMay increase the B-29 speed by
>taking out the guns?
>


from https://www.skytamer.com/Boeing_B-29.html

"With the revolutionary Central Fire Control System (CFCS), the B-29 had four
remote controlled turrets, each armed with two .50 cal M2/AN machine guns. Four
gunners were able to control these turrets with the use of four General
Electric-made analog computers, one above the Norden bombsight in the nose and
three in a pressurized compartment in the rear fuselage which incorporated clear
blown sighting blisters. The gunner manning the sight in the upper rear station
was the "Central Fire Control gunner" whose job was to allocate turrets to each
of the other three gunners, avoiding confusion in the heat of battle. The CFCS
had (at that time) a highly advanced analog computer which corrected for the
B-29s Airspeed, the target's speed, target lead, gravity, temperature, barrel
wear, and humidity. Because of this, the .50 caliber machine guns of the B-29
had a maximum effective range of 1,000 yards (910 m), double the range of the
manually-aimed machine guns of the B-17 Flying Fortress. The tail gunner could
only control his own weapons (two M2/AN Brownings plus, in early production
B-29s, a 20 mm M2 cannon) and the lower rear turret. In post World War II, the
tail guns eventually got their own APG-15 gun control radar sets.

"In early 1945, with a change of role from high altitude day bomber to low
altitude night bomber, LeMay reportedly ordered the removal of most of the
defensive armament and remote controlled sighting equipment from his B-29s so
that they could carry greater fuel and bomb loads. As a consequence of this
requirement Bell, Marietta (BM) produced a series of 311 B-29Bs which had the
turrets and sighting equipment removed, except for the tail position which
initially had the two .50 cal Browning machine guns and single M2 cannon with
the APG-15 radar fitted as standard. This armament was quickly changed to three
..50 caliber Brownings. This version also had an improved APQ-7 Eagle
bombing-through-overcast radar fitted in an airfoil shaped radome under the
fuselage. Most of these aircraft were assigned to the 315th Bomb Wing, Northwest
Field, Guam.



*