Assault on H-3- please oponions-Reply to ED RASMIUS

[Amir]

The real story:

In their frustration for a successful offensive against Iran on the
northern front between 12th and 22nd March of 1981, Iraq fired two
Frog-7 surface-to-surface Rockets against cities of Dezful and Ahwaz.
Within days after this attack, commanders of the 31st and 32nd Tactical
Fighter Wing in Shahrokhi Tactical Air Base (TAB 3, near Hamadan)
planned a counter attack. According to Iranian intelligence, the Iraqi
Air Force removed most of her valuable assets to its Al-Wallid air base
on the Baghdad-Amman highway close to Jordanian border, part of H-3
complex. There at least two squadrons equipped with ten Tu-22B and at
least six Tu-16 heavy bombers as well as two other units with MiG-23BNs
and Su-20s were hidden. Supposedly out of reach of the Iranian Air
Force. But, Iraqi's were wrong. For their operation against Al-Wallid,
31st and 32nd Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) gathered their best F-4E
Phantom crews, four F-14A Tomcats, one Boeing 747 airborne command post
and three Boeing 707 tankers. The plan was as follows, since the
interceptors of the Iraqi air defenses were usually not very active,
especially not in Northern Iraq. The only other obstacle was that
Iranian pilots had to be careful to avoid SAMs in order to reach their
target. Al-Wallid was almost 700 kilometers from Hamadan, and Phantoms
had to fly over Baghdad. To increase their chances Iranian commanders
decided to deploy their aircraft to Tabriz (TAB 2) first, and then from
there they would have a "clean" route passing by Mosul and Kirkuk
toward H-3. Since Phantoms could not reach their target without
refueling in the air, two Boeing 707-3J9C had to be sent to Turkey in
order to help the operation by meeting the attackers somewhere over
northern Iraq.
The operation began in the early hours of the April 4,1981. The
formation of eight F-4E, accompanied by two airborne reserves (whose
pilots were sad enough that they had to return as nobody had any
technical problems), started from Tabriz (TAB 2) and crossed into Iraq.
Two pairs of F-14 Tomcats stayed at low altitude over the border
waiting for their return. Sometime earlier, two Boeing 707 started from
Istanbul International Airport in Turkey (officially in order to return
to Iran) and clandestinely diverted from international commercial route
in order to fly into Iraq. Flying at very low altitude between
mountains of northwest Iraq, two tankers meet the Phantom formation and
topped their fuel tanks, before escaping without an incident back
towards Tabriz. The Phantom attackers then turned toward their prime
target. The surprise was terrible for Iraqi's, not a single Iraqi
interceptor on three bases of H-3 complex was in the air or ready to
start.
The Phantoms split their formation into two sections coming from
several different directions and attacked different parts of the base.
First they bombed both runways at Al- Wallid in order to block any
Iraqi fighters from taking off. Then further, bombs destroyed several
hardened aircraft shelters. In the meantime, cluster bombs of the
second group of Phamtons wrecked three large hangars, two radar
stations and five Iraqi bombers. Subsequently, other parked aircraft
were strafed. Iraqi's still hadn't reacted, even their anti-aircraft
fire was weak, Phantoms had enough time to make multiple attacks and
hit one enemy aircraft after another with the fire from their guns. No
less than 48 different planes were claimed as destroyed or badly
damaged at the end.
Finally, the whole Iranian formation turned back towards their base.
Not even one F-4E was damaged during the attack on Al-Wallid and
although many Iraqi interceptors were hasty scrambled toward them, none
could catch up with Phantoms.
The Iranian attack against Al-Wallid is the most successful such
operation against any air base since 1967. Never again would only eight
aircraft destroy such a large number of enemy aircrafts on the ground
in one mission.
Iraqi air defense command later claimed that Syrian interceptors were
helping Iranians during the attack, and their radar followed Phantoms
for some 67 minutes. If it was so, there are only two questions to be
asked from Iraqi air defense. First, If they were alarmed by Syrian
interceptors, why Iraqi interceptors weren't in the air already?.
Secondly, why didn't they succeeded in stopping the brave bunch from
the 31st and 32nd TFW

submitted by Military Experts and even USAF

Mr, ED RASMIUS, I have took part in many air battles and missions
during 8 years IRAN-IRAQ war, and I observed many incredible things
that happened to me in the air. I was so experienced in those days and
now all of those events have become my unforgetable memories. I have
observed and engaged in many missions even with U.S NAVY in persian
gulf...
Regards F-4 pilot ( Retired )

[Tom Cooper]

Amir,

with which units did you serve during the war with Iraq?

Thanks in advance,

Tom

[John Miller]

Amir wrote:
> Mr, ED RASMIUS, I have took part in many air battles and missions
> during 8 years IRAN-IRAQ war, and I observed many incredible things
> that happened to me in the air. I was so experienced in those days and
> now all of those events have become my unforgetable memories. I have
> observed and engaged in many missions even with U.S NAVY in persian
> gulf...
> Regards F-4 pilot ( Retired )

Amir --

Did you ever train in Pensacola?

--
John Miller
email domain: n4vu.com; username: jsm(@)

[Ed Rasimus]

On 10 Aug 2005 09:08:47 -0700, "Amir" > wrote:

> The real story:
>
>In their frustration for a successful offensive against Iran on the
>northern front between 12th and 22nd March of 1981, Iraq fired two
>Frog-7 surface-to-surface Rockets against cities of Dezful and Ahwaz.
>Within days after this attack, commanders of the 31st and 32nd Tactical
>Fighter Wing in Shahrokhi Tactical Air Base (TAB 3, near Hamadan)
>planned a counter attack. According to Iranian intelligence, the Iraqi
>Air Force removed most of her valuable assets to its Al-Wallid air base
>on the Baghdad-Amman highway close to Jordanian border, part of H-3
>complex. There at least two squadrons equipped with ten Tu-22B and at
>least six Tu-16 heavy bombers as well as two other units with MiG-23BNs
>and Su-20s were hidden. Supposedly out of reach of the Iranian Air
>Force. But, Iraqi's were wrong. For their operation against Al-Wallid,
>31st and 32nd Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) gathered their best F-4E
>Phantom crews, four F-14A Tomcats, one Boeing 747 airborne command post
>and three Boeing 707 tankers. The plan was as follows, since the
>interceptors of the Iraqi air defenses were usually not very active,
>especially not in Northern Iraq. The only other obstacle was that
>Iranian pilots had to be careful to avoid SAMs in order to reach their
>target. Al-Wallid was almost 700 kilometers from Hamadan, and Phantoms
>had to fly over Baghdad. To increase their chances Iranian commanders
>decided to deploy their aircraft to Tabriz (TAB 2) first, and then from
>there they would have a "clean" route passing by Mosul and Kirkuk
>toward H-3. Since Phantoms could not reach their target without
>refueling in the air, two Boeing 707-3J9C had to be sent to Turkey in
>order to help the operation by meeting the attackers somewhere over
>northern Iraq.
>The operation began in the early hours of the April 4,1981. The
>formation of eight F-4E, accompanied by two airborne reserves (whose
>pilots were sad enough that they had to return as nobody had any
>technical problems), started from Tabriz (TAB 2) and crossed into Iraq.
>Two pairs of F-14 Tomcats stayed at low altitude over the border
>waiting for their return. Sometime earlier, two Boeing 707 started from
>Istanbul International Airport in Turkey (officially in order to return
>to Iran) and clandestinely diverted from international commercial route
>in order to fly into Iraq. Flying at very low altitude between
>mountains of northwest Iraq, two tankers meet the Phantom formation and
>topped their fuel tanks, before escaping without an incident back
>towards Tabriz. The Phantom attackers then turned toward their prime
>target. The surprise was terrible for Iraqi's, not a single Iraqi
>interceptor on three bases of H-3 complex was in the air or ready to
>start.
>The Phantoms split their formation into two sections coming from
>several different directions and attacked different parts of the base.
>First they bombed both runways at Al- Wallid in order to block any
>Iraqi fighters from taking off. Then further, bombs destroyed several
>hardened aircraft shelters. In the meantime, cluster bombs of the
>second group of Phamtons wrecked three large hangars, two radar
>stations and five Iraqi bombers. Subsequently, other parked aircraft
>were strafed. Iraqi's still hadn't reacted, even their anti-aircraft
>fire was weak, Phantoms had enough time to make multiple attacks and
>hit one enemy aircraft after another with the fire from their guns. No
>less than 48 different planes were claimed as destroyed or badly
>damaged at the end.
>Finally, the whole Iranian formation turned back towards their base.
>Not even one F-4E was damaged during the attack on Al-Wallid and
>although many Iraqi interceptors were hasty scrambled toward them, none
>could catch up with Phantoms.
>The Iranian attack against Al-Wallid is the most successful such
>operation against any air base since 1967. Never again would only eight
>aircraft destroy such a large number of enemy aircrafts on the ground
>in one mission.
>Iraqi air defense command later claimed that Syrian interceptors were
>helping Iranians during the attack, and their radar followed Phantoms
>for some 67 minutes. If it was so, there are only two questions to be
>asked from Iraqi air defense. First, If they were alarmed by Syrian
>interceptors, why Iraqi interceptors weren't in the air already?.
>Secondly, why didn't they succeeded in stopping the brave bunch from
>the 31st and 32nd TFW
>
>submitted by Military Experts and even USAF
>
>Mr, ED RASMIUS, I have took part in many air battles and missions
>during 8 years IRAN-IRAQ war, and I observed many incredible things
>that happened to me in the air. I was so experienced in those days and
>now all of those events have become my unforgetable memories. I have
>observed and engaged in many missions even with U.S NAVY in persian
>gulf...
>Regards F-4 pilot ( Retired )


Those readers of RAM who have been following these postings as well as
Amir who has offered them might enjoy the background piece written by
Tony Cordesman on the Iran-Iraq war at:

http://www.csis.org/burke/reports/9005lessonsiraniraqII-chap13.pdf

There is a very brief discussion of the H-3 raid on page 24 of the
chapter.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Tom Cooper]

The story above was not "submitted by Military Experts and even the USAF",
however: that version was first published in the AFM's special issue about
F-4 Phantoms, in 1999, by an Iranian author. Then it was copy-pasted by the
website of the IIAF-Association, iiaf.net, where it can still be found in
this form.

Specific US documents released in accordance to FOIA procedure, reveal quite
different circumstances and results of this mission. For example, there was
a quid pro quo agreement with the Israelis: the IRIAF supplied recce photos
of Tuwaitha to IDF/AF, and the IDF/AF supplied recce photos of H-3.

IRIAF pilots who flew this mission cite different details too. For example,
a single F-4 was damaged during attack. It landed safely in Syria. An IRIAF
C-130 with repair team arrived there in the late afternoon of the same day,
and then both the Phantom and the Hercules returned to Iran - via Turkey.

[Amir]

No, I wasn't trained there

[Paul Michael Brown]

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> Those readers of RAM who have been following these postings as well as
> Amir who has offered them might enjoy the background piece written by
> Tony Cordesman on the Iran-Iraq war at:
>
> http://www.csis.org/burke/reports/9005lessonsiraniraqII-chap13.pdf

I lack Ed's extensive knowledge of military aviation, but I'm pretty good
at English composition. So I was immediately suspicious of Amir's original
post because certain parts of it featured sophisticated prose that has
been absent from his other posts. It came as no surprise when another
poster revealed Amir's effort was copied from a web site. When somebody
does this on one post, I think it raises a red flag about the accuracy of
everything else he submits.

Moreover, scanning through Coredesman's piece I found this tidbit
regarding Iranian F-14 ops:

"According to most sources, the Phoenix missile systems and/or guidance
avionics in the Iranian F-14As were sabotaged when the war began, and have
not been operational since. The Phoenix systems are reported to have been
sabotaged by Iranian Air Force personnel friendly to the U.S. shortly
after the Shah's fall, although some sources report they were sabotaged by
Iranian revolutionaries to prevent air force operations. This meant Iran
could not make optimal use of its best fighter, or use an advanced
all-weather, air-to-air missile with good shoot-down capability and a
range up to 124 miles (200 km)."

Cordesman's conclusion that sabotage precluded Iranian use of the AIM-54
stands in square conflict with other posts by Amir. Even accounting for
the passage of time, the dimming of recollection, and a substantial TINS
factor, I remain VERY leery of his stories.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Sun, 14 Aug 2005 15:48:11 -0400, (Paul Michael Brown)
wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> Those readers of RAM who have been following these postings as well as
>> Amir who has offered them might enjoy the background piece written by
>> Tony Cordesman on the Iran-Iraq war at:
>>
>> http://www.csis.org/burke/reports/9005lessonsiraniraqII-chap13.pdf
>
>I lack Ed's extensive knowledge of military aviation, but I'm pretty good
>at English composition. So I was immediately suspicious of Amir's original
>post because certain parts of it featured sophisticated prose that has
>been absent from his other posts. It came as no surprise when another
>poster revealed Amir's effort was copied from a web site. When somebody
>does this on one post, I think it raises a red flag about the accuracy of
>everything else he submits.

I posted Cordesman's chapter since most folks in the US have seen him
appear with some regularity on cable news channels as a knowledgeable
commentator on military issues. He does a good job of comparing the
status of both Iraqi and Iranian air forces over the course of the
conflict.

His recount of the H-3 attack tracks reasonably with what Amir posted,
although the results from two flights of four F-4s on a fairly large
complex seem a bit exaggerated.

The real stumbler I encountered was the tale of Iranian tankers. Now,
I had the opportunity to spend a lot of time in Turkey over the years.
In particular I was deploying regularly from '73 to '77 and
experienced the impact of the US arms embargo on US-Turkey relations
after the Cyprus incursion. By 1981, the embargo was lifted and
relations were rapidly improving both with the US and with NATO.

In '78 to '81 I was at Hq USAFE. That period, you may recall covered
the takeover of the Teheran embassy and the hostages. We had numerous
planning sessions trying to coordinate operations to deal with that
situation and tanker ops over Turkey and other nations in the region
were always difficult questions.

So, we are asked to believe that Turkey hosted a pair of Iranian
KC-137s at Istanbul--which is the far Eastern end of the nation,
nearly 800 miles from the Iraq/Turk border, at a time when Turkey was
1.) trying to make nice with the US, and 2.) at a time when Turkey was
hostile to Iran after the break-up of CENTO and the hostage-taking.

Further, we are asked to believe that Turkey (which carefully
monitored all non-national aircraft comings and goings as well as
loads) would be unaware that the KC's were preparing for a refueling
mission.

And, we are asked to accept that the tankers could leave Istanbul in a
coordinated mission with fighter from Iran, rendezvous over the enemy
territory and complete a refueling, then execute an attack and finally
have the tankers transit Iraq, Syria, Jordan and possibly some portion
of Saudi safely.

Almost anything is possible, but this one aspect is pretty hard for me
to deal with.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Amir]

Dear Paul Michael Brown,
1. Which creditable sources announced that Iranian F-14s couldn't
fire AIM-54, Can they prove their claims?
2. Who knows that Iran used AIM-54, you or me as an Iranian fighter
pilot?
I was in our air force during war, and I have seen with my own eyes
that our F-14s carried AIM-54 and used them successively. And about
your writes I must tell you that before Iran Revolution, American
Military exprerts left Iran without making change F-14'capabalities
- I was F-4 pilot at that time - and as far as I know anyone
didn't sabotage the F-14s, and for being approved my writes you can
watch images of IRIAF F-14s carring AIM-54 in flight in many websites,
so if they couldn't use them they would carry them just for joke?!!
Many of these news about Iranian F-14s are only a gossip.

[[email protected]]

During the late 1980s, most of the AIM-54s would have past out of their
useful shelf lives, although I grant you that some would certainly
remain at least marginally serviceable.

Amir, were you able to find anything further about the air combat that
I asked about? As far as the helicopter-on-helicopter engagement, I
believe it only happened once between your AF and the Iraqis, so it
should be easy to verify.

My only other brush with your AF was when a defector took over a P-3 at
gunpoint and parachuted down over Muscat, Oman. Ever hear of that
episode...?

v/r Gordon

[FatKat]

Paul Michael Brown wrote:
> Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
> > Those readers of RAM who have been following these postings as well as
> > Amir who has offered them might enjoy the background piece written by
> > Tony Cordesman on the Iran-Iraq war at:
> >
> > http://www.csis.org/burke/reports/9005lessonsiraniraqII-chap13.pdf
>
> So I was immediately suspicious of Amir's original
> post because certain parts of it featured sophisticated prose that has
> been absent from his other posts. It came as no surprise when another
> poster revealed Amir's effort was copied from a web site.

This is suspicious, but hardly proof of inaccuracy or dishonesty. That
distinction is academic, though, when the OP gives mixed signals about
his sources. He claims to be an Iranian Phantom driver - which may
imply to some that he was close to the actual events, closer to being
an eyewitness than armchair aviators like me. I have little problem
crediting accounts like the one Amir provides when I have a decent idea
of where they came from. If Amir claimed he witnessed the event
because he was there, spoke with pilots he knows who were there, read
official reports describing the event and their own sources - I could
still doubt the story, but I'd have a better idea of just what the
poster was asking me to belive. In this case, he spits out the story,
claims to be a fighter pilot and baldly claims he's read unspecified
reports.

>
> Moreover, scanning through Coredesman's piece I found this tidbit
> regarding Iranian F-14 ops:
>
> "According to most sources, the Phoenix missile systems and/or guidance
> avionics in the Iranian F-14As were sabotaged when the war began, and have
> not been operational since. The Phoenix systems are reported to have been
> sabotaged by Iranian Air Force personnel friendly to the U.S. shortly
> after the Shah's fall, although some sources report they were sabotaged by
> Iranian revolutionaries to prevent air force operations. This meant Iran
> could not make optimal use of its best fighter, or use an advanced
> all-weather, air-to-air missile with good shoot-down capability and a
> range up to 124 miles (200 km)."
>
> Cordesman's conclusion that sabotage precluded Iranian use of the AIM-54
> stands in square conflict with other posts by Amir. Even accounting for
> the passage of time, the dimming of recollection, and a substantial TINS
> factor, I remain VERY leery of his stories.

To give Amir the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Cordesman presents the above
information as the result of reports - implying a degree of controversy
rather than consensus. The copy that I saw had cites for other
interesting factoids (including one to the author's own work on the
war) but not for the above claim of sabotage. Even the nature of the
sabotage (assuming that this really happened) is up for grabs -
pro-Islamic revolutionaries, pro-American (or perhaps, as others have
said, but ommitted here Americans). I don't think it's a huge leap to
include unsuccessful sabotage or no-sabotage-at-all among the catalog
of possibilities both consistent with Amir & Cordesman.