Widower stabbed Air Traffic Controller?

[Simon and Sam]

thats true. it was the mid air collision over lak constance, where the
russian crew disobeyed TCAS and listened to the controller who was working 2
stations at the time, with multiple system outages..
poor bugger.



"vincent p. norris" > wrote in message
...
> I think I heard on radio news that a man whose wife and child were
> killed in a plane crash stabbed the controller who was blamed for the
> accident.
>
> Did I hear correctly? Can anyone post details?
>
> Thanks. vince norris

[vincent p. norris]

I think I heard on radio news that a man whose wife and child were
killed in a plane crash stabbed the controller who was blamed for the
accident.

Did I hear correctly? Can anyone post details?

Thanks. vince norris

[Stefan]

The accident was the midair of 1 July 2002 near the Swiss/German border.
You'll find the investigation report here:
http://www.bfu-web.de/berichte/02_ax001efr.pdf

The man you mentioned has lost his whole family (wife and two children)
in the accident. He searched, found and killed the controller who worked
that night a couple of months later.

The reason why you've heared this now is because the murder trial was
this week.

The tragic thing (besides the accident with many victims, of course) is,
that just about everybody made mistakes, except maybe the controller.
The controller was given a task he just couldn't accomplish. (You'll
find the details in the very detailed report, certainly worth reading.)
Another tragic thing is that probably the man wouldn't have run havoc if
Skyguide (the air control agency involved) would have publicly
apologised to the families. But the managers refused to do so, because
they feared that apologizing would imply liability.

Stefan

[Brian Whatcott]

On Thu, 27 Oct 2005 10:57:16 +0200, Stefan >
wrote:

>The accident was the midair of 1 July 2002 near the Swiss/German border.
>You'll find the investigation report here:
>http://www.bfu-web.de/berichte/02_ax001efr.pdf
///
>Another tragic thing is that probably the man wouldn't have run havoc if
>Skyguide (the air control agency involved) would have publicly
>apologised to the families. But the managers refused to do so, because
>they feared that apologizing would imply liability.
>
>Stefan

Yet another disgraceful result of the baleful influence of lawyers -
"don't apologize." In the US, a comparable habit is for politicians
and elected officials never to resign, when discovered in a disgrace.

The concept of honor is foreign to them by all accounts

Brian Whatcott

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
>
> The accident was the midair of 1 July 2002 near the Swiss/German border.
> You'll find the investigation report here:
> http://www.bfu-web.de/berichte/02_ax001efr.pdf
>
> The man you mentioned has lost his whole family (wife and two children) in
> the accident. He searched, found and killed the controller who worked that
> night a couple of months later.
>
> The reason why you've heared this now is because the murder trial was this
> week.
>
> The tragic thing (besides the accident with many victims, of course) is,
> that just about everybody made mistakes, except maybe the controller. The
> controller was given a task he just couldn't accomplish. (You'll find the
> details in the very detailed report, certainly worth reading.) Another
> tragic thing is that probably the man wouldn't have run havoc if Skyguide
> (the air control agency involved) would have publicly apologised to the
> families. But the managers refused to do so, because they feared that
> apologizing would imply liability.
>

The controller hadn't made a mistake? He failed to maintain minimum
required separation between two aircraft for which he had responsibility for
separation. How is that not a mistake?

[Gord Beaman]

"Simon and Sam" > wrote:

>thats true. it was the mid air collision over lak constance, where the
>russian crew disobeyed TCAS and listened to the controller who was working 2
>stations at the time, with multiple system outages..
>poor bugger.
>
>
>
>"vincent p. norris" > wrote in message
...
>> I think I heard on radio news that a man whose wife and child were
>> killed in a plane crash stabbed the controller who was blamed for the
>> accident.
>>
>> Did I hear correctly? Can anyone post details?
>>
>> Thanks. vince norris
>
Most interesting...certainly gives one a good understanding of
TCAS,,,very good reporting also, extensive, exhaustive, equals
any other I've seen. Read one awhile ago about a midair near
Zagreb which, while well done, wasn't nearly as detailed as this
one...thanks...
--

-Gord.
(use gordon in email)

[Stefan]

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

> The controller hadn't made a mistake? He failed to maintain minimum
> required separation between two aircraft for which he had responsibility for
> separation. How is that not a mistake?

Read the report.

Stefan

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
>
> Read the report.
>

I did. The report indicated the controller erred. You said, "just about
everybody made mistakes, except maybe the controller." Apparently you
didn't read the report.

[Stefan]

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

> I did. The report indicated the controller erred. You said, "just about
> everybody made mistakes, except maybe the controller." Apparently you
> didn't read the report.

If you read an understood the report, you know exactly what I meant. I
won't enter your game.

Stefan

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
>
> If you read an understood the report, you know exactly what I meant. I
> won't enter your game.
>

I read and understood the report. I have no idea what you meant, that's why
I asked.

[Gord Beaman]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote:

>
>"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> If you read an understood the report, you know exactly what I meant. I
>> won't enter your game.
>>
>
>I read and understood the report. I have no idea what you meant, that's why
>I asked.
>
I suspect that, although the controller made a mistake, Stefan
thinks that he wasn't to blame because he was so overloaded that
he couldn't be expected to handle the load without doing so.
--

-Gord.
(use gordon in email)

[Thomas Borchert]

Stefan,

> If you read an understood the report, you know exactly what I meant.
>

Hmm. I don't quite get it either. What DO you mean?

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[David Cartwright]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
. net...
>> If you read an understood the report, you know exactly what I meant. I
>> won't enter your game.
> I read and understood the report. I have no idea what you meant, that's
> why I asked.

I think the original poster perhaps chose the wrong words. While it can't be
denied that the controller made a mistake, this mistake was an
understandable one given the circumstances in which he found himself
(working multiple desks, with some equipment out of action, etc). It could
be said that he also made a mistake by accepting the workload when he came
on shift and had it handed to him, but I don't know enough about the
circumstances and/or the relationship between staff and management to
comment on that.

He was, however, not the only one who made a mistake. One realisation that
came from this accident, for instance, is that when TCAS and an ATC person
tell you two different things, you go with TCAS - which wasn't the case in
this incident as one pilot went with the ATC command. Similarly, it seems
that the ATC management were at fault by allowing a skeleton staff to run
such a crucial operation.

D.

[Stefan]

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

> I read and understood the report. I have no idea what you meant, that's why
> I asked.

Replace "mistake" by "is to blame" and read the posts of others who
obviously did understand what I've meant.

I've travelled a lot through countries which's languages I understood
barely or even not at all, but it was always possible to communicate if
both sides really wanted (albeit admittedly sometimes on a low level).
Of course it needed the good will of both sides, but it also does so if
both sides can speak the same language.

Stefan

[Stefan]

Thomas Borchert wrote:

> Hmm. I don't quite get it either. What DO you mean?

Sigh, ok. Replace "mistake" by "is to blame" and then you might
understand what I've meant.

If somebody is given a task which is impossible to accomplish, then who
is to blame? The one who failed or the one who gave him the task?

(Besides, the controller saw and corrected his mistake. Pretty late, but
still in time. Had there been no ACAS, then there wouldn't have been a
midair. So the controller didn't fail. And, before you ask: I don't
blame the russian pilots, either. I blame the one who is responsible
that they hadn't received adequate ACAS training.)

Stefan

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
>
> Replace "mistake" by "is to blame" and read the posts of others who
> obviously did understand what I've meant.
>
> I've travelled a lot through countries which's languages I understood
> barely or even not at all, but it was always possible to communicate if
> both sides really wanted (albeit admittedly sometimes on a low level). Of
> course it needed the good will of both sides, but it also does so if both
> sides can speak the same language.
>

If you really wanted to communicate you wouldn't have responded with "Read
the report."

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
>
> Sigh, ok. Replace "mistake" by "is to blame" and then you might understand
> what I've meant.
>
> If somebody is given a task which is impossible to accomplish, then who is
> to blame? The one who failed or the one who gave him the task?
>

The controller was not given a task that was impossible to accomplish.

[Stefan]

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

>> If somebody is given a task which is impossible to accomplish, then who is
>> to blame? The one who failed or the one who gave him the task?

> The controller was not given a task that was impossible to accomplish.

Why did you snip my next sentence?

Stefan

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
>
> Why did you snip my next sentence?
>

Because since I chose not to respond to it there was no reason to keep it.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"David Cartwright" > wrote in message
...
>
> I think the original poster perhaps chose the wrong words. While it can't
> be denied that the controller made a mistake, this mistake was an
> understandable one given the circumstances in which he found himself
> (working multiple desks, with some equipment out of action, etc). It could
> be said that he also made a mistake by accepting the workload when he came
> on shift and had it handed to him, but I don't know enough about the
> circumstances and/or the relationship between staff and management to
> comment on that.
>

Priority one in ATC is separation. He lost separation and all the equipment
needed to maintain it seems to have been working.


>
> He was, however, not the only one who made a mistake. One realisation that
> came from this accident, for instance, is that when TCAS and an ATC person
> tell you two different things, you go with TCAS - which wasn't the case in
> this incident as one pilot went with the ATC command. Similarly, it seems
> that the ATC management were at fault by allowing a skeleton staff to run
> such a crucial operation.
>

But TCAS and an ATC person weren't telling him two different things at the
time he responded to the controller's instruction to descend. The TCAS RA
came later.

[Juan Jimenez]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
> Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
>
>> I did. The report indicated the controller erred. You said, "just about
>> everybody made mistakes, except maybe the controller." Apparently you
>> didn't read the report.
>
> If you read an understood the report, you know exactly what I meant. I
> won't enter your game.
>
> Stefan

That, Stefan, is the mark of a demagogue. You obviously don't have the
slightest damn clue what you are talking about.

<plonk!>

[Juan Jimenez]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
> Thomas Borchert wrote:
>
>> Hmm. I don't quite get it either. What DO you mean?
>
> Sigh, ok. Replace "mistake" by "is to blame" and then you might understand
> what I've meant.
>
> If somebody is given a task which is impossible to accomplish, then who is
> to blame? The one who failed or the one who gave him the task?

The one who ACCEPTED the impossible task. No one forced the controller to
work under those conditions. He could have closed his station and walked
out, forcing all traffic to be either delayed or rerouted. You know that as
well as I do.

[Stefan]

Juan Jimenez wrote:

> The one who ACCEPTED the impossible task. No one forced the controller to
> work under those conditions. He could have closed his station and walked
> out, forcing all traffic to be either delayed or rerouted. You know that as
> well as I do.

I don't know this. in fact, I know quite the opposite.

I know that the whole idea of the hierarchic structure involved was that
the controller should trust that the established and approved workflow
was reasonable.

I also know that the controller was unaware of what systems didn't work
and so was't aware that the safety mechanisms he relied on were inop.

And last I know that if he refused the work he would have risked to be
fired that very evening. Not really an option with a family.

But then, why am I replying since you've plonked me anyway.

Stefan

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
>
> I also know that the controller was unaware of what systems didn't work
> and so was't aware that the safety mechanisms he relied on were inop.
>

What inoperable safety mechamisms led to this collision?

[Juan Jimenez]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
> Juan Jimenez wrote:
>
>> The one who ACCEPTED the impossible task. No one forced the controller to
>> work under those conditions. He could have closed his station and walked
>> out, forcing all traffic to be either delayed or rerouted. You know that
>> as well as I do.
>
> I don't know this. in fact, I know quite the opposite.
>
> I know that the whole idea of the hierarchic structure involved was that
> the controller should trust that the established and approved workflow was
> reasonable.
>
> I also know that the controller was unaware of what systems didn't work
> and so was't aware that the safety mechanisms he relied on were inop.
>
> And last I know that if he refused the work he would have risked to be
> fired that very evening. Not really an option with a family.
>
> But then, why am I replying since you've plonked me anyway.

Oh, so if the pilot doesn't preflight, and therefore doesn't know his
aircraft has broken systems, doesn't perform checks and just does the flight
so he won't lose his job and winds up killing everyone, it's the company's
fault. Hmm. That sure is an interesting bit of logic. You wouldn't be
related to this controller, a friend of his or perhaps a member of his labor
union? Nah, couldn't be. I'll plonk you anyway. I can see where this is
coming from...

[Stefan]

Juan Jimenez wrote:

> Oh, so if the pilot doesn't preflight, and therefore doesn't know his
> aircraft has broken systems, doesn't perform checks and just does the flight
> so he won't lose his job and winds up killing everyone, it's the company's
> fault. Hmm. That sure is an interesting bit of logic. You wouldn't be

I can see the 747 captain not believing his mechanics but instead
creeping in every hole of his aircraft, checking every nut, measuring
tolerances, measuruing hydraulic pressures, X-ray the wings for cracks,
etc.etc. before every flight...

> related to this controller, a friend of his or perhaps a member of his labor
> union? Nah, couldn't be. I'll plonk you anyway. I can see where this is
> coming from...

You've already claimed once to plonk me and haven't done so, so why
would you do it now? Do you even know how to plonk somebody?

Stefan

[Gord Beaman]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote:

>
>"David Cartwright" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> I think the original poster perhaps chose the wrong words. While it can't
>> be denied that the controller made a mistake, this mistake was an
>> understandable one given the circumstances in which he found himself
>> (working multiple desks, with some equipment out of action, etc). It could
>> be said that he also made a mistake by accepting the workload when he came
>> on shift and had it handed to him, but I don't know enough about the
>> circumstances and/or the relationship between staff and management to
>> comment on that.
>>
>
>Priority one in ATC is separation. He lost separation and all the equipment
>needed to maintain it seems to have been working.
>
>
>>
>> He was, however, not the only one who made a mistake. One realisation that
>> came from this accident, for instance, is that when TCAS and an ATC person
>> tell you two different things, you go with TCAS - which wasn't the case in
>> this incident as one pilot went with the ATC command. Similarly, it seems
>> that the ATC management were at fault by allowing a skeleton staff to run
>> such a crucial operation.
>>
>
>But TCAS and an ATC person weren't telling him two different things at the
>time he responded to the controller's instruction to descend. The TCAS RA
>came later.
>
Indeed...and he should have immediately complied with it instead
of continuing with the instruction from the ATC operator. It was
mentioned that the Russian pilot wasn't well informed about the
operation of TCAS and wasn't aware that when he was instructed by
an RA to climb that the conflict a/c would have been instructed
to descend.
--

-Gord.
(use gordon in email)

[Gord Beaman]

Gord Beaman > wrote:


> It was
>mentioned that the Russian pilot wasn't well informed about the
>operation of TCAS and wasn't aware that when he was instructed by
>an RA to climb that the conflict a/c would have been instructed
>to descend.

Correction...I should have said "The Russian PIC wasn't well
informed..."

The Russian copilot wanted to comply with the RA I gathered but
apparently the PIC over-rode him...that was my read anyway...
--

-Gord.
(use gordon in email)

[David Cartwright]

"Gord Beaman" > wrote in message
...
> Correction...I should have said "The Russian PIC wasn't well
> informed..."
> The Russian copilot wanted to comply with the RA I gathered but
> apparently the PIC over-rode him...that was my read anyway...

From the programme I saw on Channel 5 about the incident (which was, perhaps
surprisingly, well compiled and quite balanced) there was certainly a high
level of disagreement between the PIC and his colleague over whether to obey
TCAS or ATC.

D.

[David Cartwright]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>> If somebody is given a task which is impossible to accomplish, then who
>> is to blame? The one who failed or the one who gave him the task?
> The controller was not given a task that was impossible to accomplish.

Very few tasks are absolutely impossible to accomplish. Whether something is
possible for a particular person with particular skills to accomplish in a
particular situation is another thing entirely. The aviation industry goes
to great pains to take note of the human factors involved in what goes on,
and this entire incident is (very sadly) an excellent example of how a
combination of (often unrelated) human factors issues can combine to cause
loss of life.

D.

[David Cartwright]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
> I know that the whole idea of the hierarchic structure involved was that
> the controller should trust that the established and approved workflow was
> reasonable.

The person doing the job who must have the final say as to whether they feel
they can do the job satisfactorily.

In this situation, some of the equipment in the ATC facility was out of
action. Not enough, by all accounts, necessarily to make it dangerous to
work the facility, but some. It would be perfectly reasonable for someone
who was comfortable working a fully staffed facility with normal levels of
functioning equipment to say, in the event of staffing/equipment shortages:
"Sorry, I just don't feel I can provide a safe service in this set of
circumstances".

The hierarchic structure is not there to allow the guy on the ground to
trust that everything will be OK. In this case it's there to solve the
problem of someone saying: "Sorry guys, I can't operate this as I don't
think I can do so safely".

D.

[Gord Beaman]

"David Cartwright" > wrote:

>"Gord Beaman" > wrote in message
...
>> Correction...I should have said "The Russian PIC wasn't well
>> informed..."
>> The Russian copilot wanted to comply with the RA I gathered but
>> apparently the PIC over-rode him...that was my read anyway...
>
>From the programme I saw on Channel 5 about the incident (which was, perhaps
>surprisingly, well compiled and quite balanced) there was certainly a high
>level of disagreement between the PIC and his colleague over whether to obey
>TCAS or ATC.
>
>D.
>
Yes, some of the particulars of an air incident certainly don't
get well portrayed when the media or a film making endeavour is
involved do they?...did you ever see he movie made of the Air
Canada incident where a 767 ran out of fuel?...my lord that was
the most sickening flying movie that I've ever seen in my life,
(and I've seen a bunch).
--

-Gord.
(use gordon in email)

[Gord Beaman]

"David Cartwright" > wrote:

>"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>>> If somebody is given a task which is impossible to accomplish, then who
>>> is to blame? The one who failed or the one who gave him the task?
>> The controller was not given a task that was impossible to accomplish.
>
>Very few tasks are absolutely impossible to accomplish. Whether something is
>possible for a particular person with particular skills to accomplish in a
>particular situation is another thing entirely. The aviation industry goes
>to great pains to take note of the human factors involved in what goes on,
>and this entire incident is (very sadly) an excellent example of how a
>combination of (often unrelated) human factors issues can combine to cause
>loss of life.
>
>D.
>
Luckily so..and caused by a lot of study, think tanks and
training in this very very responsible occupation. I don't think
that controllers are making enough money to compensate them
properly for their responsibility.

One get's a huge shot of respect for them when one's entering a
very busy ATC section in zero zero conditions and listen to them
handling many many flights very rapidly...you sure hang onto
every word they speak and the 'tone of voice' it's given in. :)
--

-Gord.
(use gordon in email)

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Gord Beaman" > wrote in message
...
>
> I don't think that controllers are making enough money to compensate them
> properly for their responsibility.
>

You're absolutely right.

[Stefan]

David Cartwright wrote:

> The hierarchic structure is not there to allow the guy on the ground to
> trust that everything will be OK. In this case it's there to solve the
> problem of someone saying: "Sorry guys, I can't operate this as I don't
> think I can do so safely".

You're absolutely correct. But then, there's such a thing which we call
in German "corporate culture" (translated, I don't know if this is the
correct term in English). You grow up and live in a certain corporate
culture and it's very difficult if not impossible to resist. It's the
responsibility of the managers to create a safe corporate culture. In
this case, one man operations at two workstations at night were SOP.
It's asking very much to second guess the SOP.

Stefan

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
>
> You're absolutely correct. But then, there's such a thing which we call in
> German "corporate culture" (translated, I don't know if this is the
> correct term in English). You grow up and live in a certain corporate
> culture and it's very difficult if not impossible to resist. It's the
> responsibility of the managers to create a safe corporate culture. In this
> case, one man operations at two workstations at night were SOP. It's
> asking very much to second guess the SOP.
>

What's wrong with one-man operations during light traffic periods at what
would normally be two work stations? In the US you can find half a dozen
sectors combined and worked by one man during the night.

[Peter Clark]

On Sat, 29 Oct 2005 19:46:21 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
> wrote:

>
>"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> You're absolutely correct. But then, there's such a thing which we call in
>> German "corporate culture" (translated, I don't know if this is the
>> correct term in English). You grow up and live in a certain corporate
>> culture and it's very difficult if not impossible to resist. It's the
>> responsibility of the managers to create a safe corporate culture. In this
>> case, one man operations at two workstations at night were SOP. It's
>> asking very much to second guess the SOP.
>>
>
>What's wrong with one-man operations during light traffic periods at what
>would normally be two work stations? In the US you can find half a dozen
>sectors combined and worked by one man during the night.

Are they combined on the same scope, or does the controller have to
physically roll the chair up and down the stations to see all the
screens covering their sectors? If memory serves, in this incident
the screens were separate, the controller was looking at another
screen dealing with something there, and by the time he got back to
this station the aircraft were already well within the lateral
distance which would have caused the alerting system to activate, if
it wasn't INOP.

[Ginny]

I think I heard on radio news that a man whose wife and child were
killed in a plane crash stabbed the controller who was blamed for the
accident.

Did I hear correctly? Can anyone post details?

Thanks. vince norris

Yes, that's true. The man lost his wife and children in a mid-air plane collision near German/Swiss border. He killed the controller who made the mistake. And se was sentenced for 8 years. he trial was last week.

[Brian Whatcott]

On Sat, 29 Oct 2005 15:22:04 GMT, Gord Beaman >
wrote:
>/// I don't think
>that controllers are making enough money to compensate them
>properly for their responsibility.
///

Let's see, what does a center controller make currently?
A hundred grand? More?
About as much as a (US) pharmaceutical dispenser
I guess? A third as much as a physician?
A fifth as much as an anesthesiologist?

Brian Whatcott Altusa OK

[Sylvain]

Brian Whatcott wrote:
> I guess? A third as much as a physician?
> A fifth as much as an anesthesiologist?

yet, a bad physician or anesthesiologist generally
only kills one patient at a time...

--Sylvain

[Gord Beaman]

Brian Whatcott > wrote:

>On Sat, 29 Oct 2005 15:22:04 GMT, Gord Beaman >
>wrote:
>>/// I don't think
>>that controllers are making enough money to compensate them
>>properly for their responsibility.
>///
>
>Let's see, what does a center controller make currently?
>A hundred grand? More?
>About as much as a (US) pharmaceutical dispenser
>I guess? A third as much as a physician?
>A fifth as much as an anesthesiologist?
>
>Brian Whatcott Altusa OK

Hell no, it'd shake you Brian...here's a site for California.

http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/occguide/AIRCONTR.HTM

....and a snippet from that site...

WAGES, HOURS, AND FRINGE BENEFITS

Entry-level Air Traffic Controllers start at $24,734 per year at
the General Schedule-7 (GS-7). Journey-level wages for
controllers depend on the size and complexity of the facility
where they work. For example, for smaller towns in California
like Chico and Modesto, the rate at the journey-level is $33,320,
(GS-10); while, at the Sacramento airport, the journey-level pay
is $39,406 (GS-11). In busier airports, the pay can go as high
as $86,275 (GS-14). Top pay for journey-level Flight Service
Station Controllers is $61,401 (GS-12). Many controllers receive
additional pay to compensate for higher living costs in expensive
areas.

This is disgusting, when one thinks of their
responsibility...God! I make more than some of these guys and I'm
retired military...
--

-Gord.
(use gordon in email)

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Gord Beaman" > wrote in message
...
>
> Hell no, it'd shake you Brian...here's a site for California.
>
> http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/occguide/AIRCONTR.HTM
>
> ...and a snippet from that site...
>
> WAGES, HOURS, AND FRINGE BENEFITS
>
> Entry-level Air Traffic Controllers start at $24,734 per year at
> the General Schedule-7 (GS-7). Journey-level wages for
> controllers depend on the size and complexity of the facility
> where they work. For example, for smaller towns in California
> like Chico and Modesto, the rate at the journey-level is $33,320,
> (GS-10); while, at the Sacramento airport, the journey-level pay
> is $39,406 (GS-11). In busier airports, the pay can go as high
> as $86,275 (GS-14). Top pay for journey-level Flight Service
> Station Controllers is $61,401 (GS-12). Many controllers receive
> additional pay to compensate for higher living costs in expensive
> areas.
>
> This is disgusting, when one thinks of their
> responsibility...God! I make more than some of these guys and I'm
> retired military...
>

That information looks to be about ten years old.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Peter Clark" > wrote in message
...
>
> Are they combined on the same scope, or does the controller have to
> physically roll the chair up and down the stations to see all the
> screens covering their sectors? If memory serves, in this incident
> the screens were separate, the controller was looking at another
> screen dealing with something there, and by the time he got back to
> this station the aircraft were already well within the lateral
> distance which would have caused the alerting system to activate, if
> it wasn't INOP.
>

Could go either way. If the primary system was operational they'd just be
combined at one scope and you used a larger range to see all of the
airspace. If the backup system was in use you couldn't see all of the
airspace at low altitudes because it did not have multiple radar site
capability at that time. You'd have to either switch to different radar
sites at one scope or configure a nearby scope with a different site.

[Stefan]

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

> What inoperable safety mechamisms led to this collision?

If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't ask
this.

Stefan

[Stefan]

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

> Could go either way. If the primary system was operational they'd just be
> combined at one scope and you used a larger range to see all of the
....

If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't
write this. It's described in detail that the controller was working two
stations, and there is even a picture of the situation in the report.

Stefan

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
>
> If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't ask
> this.
>

If you were aware of any inoperable safety mechanisms that led to this
collision you would have answered it.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
> Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
>
>> Could go either way. If the primary system was operational they'd just
>> be combined at one scope and you used a larger range to see all of the
> ...
>
> If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't write
> this. It's described in detail that the controller was working two
> stations, and there is even a picture of the situation in the report.
>

What I wrote above has nothing to do with the collision.

[Peter Clark]

On Sun, 30 Oct 2005 23:37:49 +0100, Stefan >
wrote:

>Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
>
>> Could go either way. If the primary system was operational they'd just be
>> combined at one scope and you used a larger range to see all of the
>...
>
>If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't
>write this. It's described in detail that the controller was working two
>stations, and there is even a picture of the situation in the report.

In fairness, he was answering my question regarding whether the
combined US sectors would come up on one scope, not whether the
controller there had the capabilities to do so.

[Brian Whatcott]

On Sun, 30 Oct 2005 19:29:41 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
> wrote:

>
>"Gord Beaman" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> Hell no, it'd shake you Brian...here's a site for California.
>>
>> http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/occguide/AIRCONTR.HTM
>>
>> ...and a snippet from that site...
>>
>> WAGES, HOURS, AND FRINGE BENEFITS
>>
>> Entry-level Air Traffic Controllers start at $24,734 per year at
>> the General Schedule-7 (GS-7). Journey-level wages for
>> controllers depend on the size and complexity of the facility
>> where they work. For example, for smaller towns in California
>> like Chico and Modesto, the rate at the journey-level is $33,320,
>> (GS-10); while, at the Sacramento airport, the journey-level pay
>> is $39,406 (GS-11). In busier airports, the pay can go as high
>> as $86,275 (GS-14). Top pay for journey-level Flight Service
>> Station Controllers is $61,401 (GS-12). Many controllers receive
>> additional pay to compensate for higher living costs in expensive
>> areas.
>>
>> This is disgusting, when one thinks of their
>> responsibility...God! I make more than some of these guys and I'm
>> retired military...
>>
>
>That information looks to be about ten years old.
>

......And excludes the copious overtime and other payments.
It is true that there are other grades, better paid grades than
journeyman, for sure!

Brian Whatcott

[Brian Whatcott]

On Sun, 30 Oct 2005 22:53:06 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
> wrote:

>
>"Stefan" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't ask
>> this.
>>
>
>If you were aware of any inoperable safety mechanisms that led to this
>collision you would have answered it.
>


"****ing in the wind" is what this kind of debate is sometimes called.
By the uncouth.
Like me.

Brian Whatcott

[Gord Beaman]

Brian Whatcott > wrote:
snip
>On Sun, 30 Oct 2005 19:29:41 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
> wrote:
>
>>That information looks to be about ten years old.
>>
>
>.....And excludes the copious overtime and other payments.
>It is true that there are other grades, better paid grades than
>journeyman, for sure!
>
>Brian Whatcott

Yes it is a bit old (7 years I see now)...

Hell, it was a gov't site, I didn't think that the US Gov't would
leave such an outdated website on the net...especially an
information site like that...what can I say?...
--

-Gord.
(use gordon in email)