I want to build the most EVIL plane EVER !!!

[Eliot Coweye]

Can you tell me what parts do I need to create a truly EVIL plane from
hell???

[Stealth Pilot]

On 24 Nov 2005 19:10:04 -0800, "Eliot Coweye" >
wrote:

>Can you tell me what parts do I need to create a truly EVIL plane from
>hell???

I'm sorry you've been pipped at the post.
the most evil aircraft is being built in the hangar two down from
mine. lots of 4130 tube, sheet and a tig welder.
thousand horsepower russian radial and lots of Antonov 2 bits in
hangars around the place all for it.

a 70 foot wingspan experimental aircraft.

the bench he's building it on is bigger than my aircraft!
Stealth Pilot

[Morgans]

"Stealth Pilot" > wrote

> the most evil aircraft is being built in the hangar two down from
> mine. lots of 4130 tube, sheet and a tig welder.
> thousand horsepower russian radial and lots of Antonov 2 bits in
> hangars around the place all for it.
>
> a 70 foot wingspan experimental aircraft.
>
> the bench he's building it on is bigger than my aircraft!

Ooooh! Tell us more! Will it look like an AN-2?
--
Jim in NC

[Flyingmonk]

>Can you tell me what parts do I need to create a truly EVIL plane >from hell???

OK, first you get a mini500 and... Oh never mind.

[wright1902glider]

FOO--EL ! (2 sylibles for emphysis) Every evil genius knows that to
have a truly evil flying machine, it must be a dirigable ....with a
pipe-organ. I'd call Wick's. Organs in the white building, aircraft
parts in the yellow building... just across the street. Oh yea, they
can also hook you up with some bitchin' custom furniture for your
flyin' shag-palace of Doom!

Harry "my plane's not evil, but its hauler-trailer is" Frey
Wright Brothers Enterprises


Morgans wrote:
> "Stealth Pilot" > wrote
>
> > the most evil aircraft is being built in the hangar two down from
> > mine. lots of 4130 tube, sheet and a tig welder.
> > thousand horsepower russian radial and lots of Antonov 2 bits in
> > hangars around the place all for it.
> >
> > a 70 foot wingspan experimental aircraft.
> >
> > the bench he's building it on is bigger than my aircraft!
>
> Ooooh! Tell us more! Will it look like an AN-2?
> --
> Jim in NC

[Morgans]

"wright1902glider" > wrote

> FOO--EL ! (2 sylibles for emphysis) Every evil genius knows that to
> have a truly evil flying machine, it must be a dirigable

Wellllll, maybe so, but I was interested in a homebuilt with a 70 foot
wingspan. If that ever shows up at OSH, I may have to end up helping to
push it, and that would be worse (heavier) than the (VK-30??) Cirrus
brother's earlier airplane that I helped push a few years ago. That was in
rain softened ground, too.

We pushed it out down an isle that had so little wigtip clearance, that I
had to put my hand between the spinner of another plane, and the wing, to
keep them from scratching each other.

See, I'll glaadly sacrifice my body, even for someone else's plane! <g>
--
Jim in NC

[Darrel Toepfer]

Crosspost to: brasil.unix deleted.
Morgans wrote:

> Wellllll, maybe so, but I was interested in a homebuilt with a 70 foot
> wingspan. If that ever shows up at OSH, I may have to end up helping to
> push it, and that would be worse (heavier) than the (VK-30??) Cirrus
> brother's earlier airplane that I helped push a few years ago. That was in
> rain softened ground, too.

Theres one in Winnsboro, La. awaiting completion of a turboprop
conversion... Airstair door sure makes for ease of entry/exit...

[John Ousterhout]

Eliot Coweye wrote:
> Can you tell me what parts do I need to create a truly EVIL plane from
> hell???


See: http://www.bd5.com/

- J.O.-

[Morgans]

"Darrel Toepfer" > wrote
>
> Theres one in Winnsboro, La. (VK-30) awaiting completion of a turboprop
> conversion... Airstair door sure makes for ease of entry/exit...

Thanks for deleting that cross post. I have to admit, I forget to look for
cross posts in the replies, most of the time.

I'll bet that will be sweet. What engine, and Shaft HP?

It is a neat looking plane. I have never heard a PIREP on how it handles,
or performs. All I remember is how big and heavy it was, but that was
because I was pushing it! <g>
--
Jim in NC

[Morgans]

"Darrel Toepfer" > wrote

> Theres one in Winnsboro, La. awaiting completion of a turboprop
> conversion...

You know, I'll bet it would do well on a little pair of turbofans on a
couple of pods, a la Adam, too. I wonder how fast it would go?

***********************************
Continuation of reply, after some more digging around:

Seems that the turbo prop testing and conversion was being done on more than
one occasion. http://www.eaa1000.av.org/fltrpts/st50/st50.htm

***********************************
It looks as astronaut David Overmeyer was killed testing aft CG, and lost
control, in a spin. http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/rfovermyer.htm
NTSB report here:
< http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001208X05368&key=1>

It seems it had some nasty deep stall problems at aft loadings.

***********************************
More on Israviation's putting a PT-6A turboprop, working (at the time)
towards certification:
ST-50 1994 = 5pClwM rg; 500# P&W-Canada PT6A-135/7 pusher; span: 39'0"
length: 26'0" load: 1950# v: x/322/71 range: 1260; ff: 12/7/94 (p: Norman E
Howell) [N50ST]. Based on VK-30, Cirrus and Israviation (Israel)
collaborated on design and development.

**********************************

I don't know if the one you mentioned is related to any of the other
versions or conversions. At any rate, some interesting stuff.

Some questions I never found answers to were:

Turbo prop version's speed?

Was it pressurized, in the original, or after the conversion?

I wish the others luck on the conversions. I do hope they do some
aerodynamics work on it, to make it better. (more safe?) It seems like the
inclusion of a spin chute would be helpful, although on a pusher, that might
be tricky.

--
Jim in NC

[Darrel Toepfer]

Morgans wrote:

> I'll bet that will be sweet. What engine, and Shaft HP?
>
> It is a neat looking plane. I have never heard a PIREP on how it handles,
> or performs. All I remember is how big and heavy it was, but that was
> because I was pushing it! <g>

I dunno if it will ever fly again, its been sitting for several years
already but thats not a true measuring device...

I saw a completion that flew to Oshgosh in one of the mags many years ago...

Lanny the guy with the rights to the Turbine Legend series has it, to do
the conversion for somebody that has apparently lost interest. You can
see it in the hanger photo here:

http://www.legendaircraft.net/New%20Owner.htm

[Stealth Pilot]

On Fri, 25 Nov 2005 09:18:32 -0500, "Morgans"
> wrote:

>
>"Stealth Pilot" > wrote
>
>> the most evil aircraft is being built in the hangar two down from
>> mine. lots of 4130 tube, sheet and a tig welder.
>> thousand horsepower russian radial and lots of Antonov 2 bits in
>> hangars around the place all for it.
>>
>> a 70 foot wingspan experimental aircraft.
>>
>> the bench he's building it on is bigger than my aircraft!
>
>Ooooh! Tell us more! Will it look like an AN-2?

he'll kill me for this post :-)
a BV141

Stealth Pilot

[Morgans]

"Stealth Pilot" > wrote

> he'll kill me for this post :-)
> a BV141

*That* is ambitious!
--
Jim in NC

[Dale Alexander]

I would start with a BD-5 kit. Most parts are available, also most are
pretty rusty now...

Dale Alexander

"Eliot Coweye" > wrote in message
oups.com...
> Can you tell me what parts do I need to create a truly EVIL plane from
> hell???
>

[jmk]

Eliot Coweye wrote:
> Can you tell me what parts do I need to create a truly EVIL plane from
> hell???

Have you seen the movie "Nightwings" (or maybe just "Nightwing")? It's
a Cessna 337 painted all black on the outside, and all red inside. In
the movie the pilot was a monster or a vampire or the main character,
depending on your viewpoint. [Good author, lousy movie.]

[[email protected]]

The most evil airplane is the one that uses up all your money and
many years of your life, alienates your family, and still isn't
finished and won't fly anyway because it's too heavy or has serious
technical issues. Seen it happen. Pick something within reach.

Dan (the wary)

[Dennis Fetters]

Flyingmonk wrote:
>>Can you tell me what parts do I need to create a truly EVIL plane >from hell???
>
>
> OK, first you get a mini500 and... Oh never mind.
>

There will always be someone that has to pop-off with an open, unfounded
comment about the Mini-500 helicopter based on roomer and uninformed
newsgroup bigmouths.

If anyone really wants to know the safety record of the Mini-500, then
here it is in black and white. Anyone wanting the full document in Word,
with color charts and all, can ask and I'll email it to them.

Sincerely,


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter


************************************************** ********************
Mini-500 Accident Analysis
1995-1998

RHCI has always had a policy of not including the tail rotor gearbox
with the shipment of a Mini-500 helicopter to anyone who is not a
helicopter pilot. This policy has been strictly enforced throughout the
years in order to prevent customers who have not yet received proper
helicopter training from injuring themselves and the reputation of the
Mini-500. Unfortunately, it is impossible to enforce policies for those
few who will find a way around them. Several of the pilots involved in
a Mini-500 accident were not helicopter pilots at the time their
aircraft was shipped from the factory. They received the tail rotor
gear box because either they told RHCI they were buying the kit with
another person who was a helicopter pilot, or they were somehow able to
provide documents to RHCI showing that they were qualified to fly the
kit.

In this detailed analysis, it can be seen that all accidents are a
result of pilot error or a maintenance/assembly problem aggravated by
pilot error, and that the majority occurred to pilots with accumulated
low time in helicopters (100 hours or less).


Mini-500 Pilots’ Flight Experience
(Chart removed)

As shown in the chart above, 72% of the helicopter pilots involved in
Mini-500 accidents were either low-time helicopter pilots or did not
hold a helicopter rating at the time of the accident.

The Mini-500 has become the most popular helicopter in the world since
its introduction in 1990 and, like any other helicopter, has been
exposed to accidents. It was introduced at a time when the industry
needed an economical helicopter not only to purchase, but to operate and
maintain as well. New or low-time pilots were attracted to the Mini-500
as a way to enter the rotorcraft field or to build flight hours. The
relatively low acquisition cost allowed a new generation of pilots to
fulfill their dream of owning and flying a helicopter. High operating
costs had previously kept personal flying to a minimum. The Mini-500
created new pilots because it gave them a reason to become helicopter
certified, but this did not come without some problems.

The first few years proved to be the most difficult as the Mini-500 was
built and "field operated" by the pilots. As expected with any new
aircraft, a few mechanical problems occurred as the Mini-500 built up
flight hours. Components were re-engineered and retested before being
retrofitted to aircraft in the field. One by one these problems were
resolved.

The aircraft was introduced with the Rotax 582, a two-cylinder,
water-cooled engine, which is considered to be very reliable if properly
installed and maintained. The homebuilt industry finally had an
inexpensive helicopter that would make many people’s dreams of reliable
vertical flight come true. A "state-of-the-art" homebuilt helicopter had
achieved a record for affordability and reliability unmatched in the
homebuilt industry.

Conversations with Mini-500 pilots from other countries reveal that many
of them feel that the U.S. suffers from a severe lack of flying
discipline. There are fewer regulations in the U.S. than in most other
countries. The U.S. is still the world leader in the aviation industry,
and more regulations will not solve some of the problems. The only
solution now is "self-regulation.” Flight instructors must demonstrate
through their own actions that safety awareness must be applied to
flying helicopters. This may explain why the Mini-500 has fewer foreign
accidents than U.S. accidents.

A review of the Mini-500 NTSB accident briefs clearly demonstrates that
lack of proper training is the primary cause of accidents through
entering low rotor RPM conditions, followed by improper or inadequate
assembly and maintenance. These are by far the most preventable
accidents and require intensive training in avoidance and prevention
techniques as well as pilot judgment training. An analysis of the
Mini-500 accidents reveals that more pilot training is needed in
anticipating power changes, rotor RPM management, and keeping the dual
engine/rotor RPM tach in the VFR scan. The Power Enhancement Package
(PEP) introduced by RHCI improves the recovery of low rotor RPM, and
therefore, RHCI recommends that every Mini-500 owner install it in their
aircraft.

Most experienced flight instructors agree that low rotor RPM problems
are a result of rapid over pitching of the collective, causing an RPM
drop. This is similar to any powered helicopter rotor RPM droop, but the
throttle in the Mini-500 will respond immediately if the pilot properly
anticipates the need of increasing power before adding collective.
Pilots must obtain training in a similar helicopter without relying on
the correlator or governor before attempting to fly the Mini-500.

Mini-500 Accident Review
(NTSB Data and Unreported Accidents)
(Chart removed)


Pilot Error 24
Maintenance/Pilot Error 19
Undetermined/Pilot Error 1
TOTAL ACCIDENTS 44
Notes

1. All information was obtained from the NTSB and/or directly from the
pilots, witnesses, friends, instructors, customers’ file, etc.

2. Most of these accidents were caused by several related factors and
probable causes may tend to be misleading (i.e. a roll-over may be
caused by excessive slope or unsuitable terrain, failure to successfully
autorotate, improper maintenance and assembly, collision with ground
object, etc.).

3. Mechanical failures are often caused by improper assembly,
maintenance procedures or exceeding limitations. All of them appear to
be attributed to this. In many cases, the pilot misinterpreted or
reacted improperly to a minor problem in flight.

4. Most of the accidents were attributed to pilots entering into a low
rotor RPM condition and not recovering properly.

5. Approximately 87% of accidents due to autorotative landings appear to
be caused by not recovering properly from low rotor RPM conditions. In
some cases the pilot reported an engine failure during power recovery on
a practice autorotation, or reported a rough engine followed by failure
when power was reduced for a landing. Post-accident engine run up found
wrong jets installed or in some cases no mechanical problems.
ALL OF THESE ACCIDENTS WERE AVOIDABLE!

Types of Accident
(Chart removed)

Types of Accidents Number of Accidents

A. Maintenance/Pilot Error 19
B. Low Rotor RPM 18
C. Collision With Ground Object 3
D. Fuel Exhaustion 2
E. Power Line Strike 1
F. Undetermined/Pilot Error 1
TOTAL 44

Accident Definitions

A. Maintenance/Pilot Error
Aircraft system failure caused by improper assembly, installation,
and/or maintenance procedures (i.e. wrong jets, belt alignment, improper
installation of components, loose parts, wrong adhesive, bad fuel, etc.)
followed by pilot error (i.e. not successfully autorotating or
recovering power after an emergency).

B. Low Rotor RPM
Inadequate control of aircraft, low rotor RPM due to practicing
autorotations, pilot operating behind the "power curve,” lack of
training, failure to maintain or recover from low rotor, etc.

C. Collision with Ground Objects
Collision during ground run-up or while in hovering flight (i.e.
aircraft tie downs, skids caught in a mound of protruding grass, etc.).

D. Fuel Exhaustion
Improper pre-flight preparation, fuel exhaustion due to running out of
fuel, leaking, or fuel restriction.

E. Power Line Strike
Collision with a power line while in cruise, takeoff, landing, etc.

F. Undetermined
The NTSB or RHCI has not determined a probable cause of the accident
(information unreliable, no eye-witnesses, information not obtainable to
determine cause).


RHCI has investigated every known Mini-500 accident, but the
investigations alone will accomplish nothing if recommendations aren’t
issued and adopted to prevent recurrence. Therefore, the following
Mini-500 accident analysis will take a detailed look at how some of the
accidents happened and how a typical safety awareness program can
prevent most of these accidents:

A. Maintenance - Of the 19 accidents in this category, approximately 98%
appear to have occurred as a result of engine failure due to having the
wrong jets installed, unauthorized modifications, improper assembly and
maintenance procedures. Most reported engine failures appear to have
resulted from improper installation and adjustments of the jets. If the
proper needle jet and needle position are not installed according to
RHCI’s instructions, Airworthiness Directives (AD’s) and advisories, the
engine will seize. This would most likely happen in a decent where the
improper needle jet arrangement tends to lean the mixture the most.

One accident was caused by installing a type of adhesive on the fuel
tank that was not the recommended one, causing the fuel filter to become
plugged. In several instances, the pilot or builder forgot to tighten a
part (i.e. a jam nut that secures the tail rotor push pull cable left
loose after trailering the aircraft; a loose hose clamp caused the
engine to lose coolant, and therefore overheat; the collective friction
was not tightened and the aircraft was left unattended causing it to
take off by itself; etc.). Lack of proper assembly procedures (i.e.
drive belt not properly aligned; improper installation of the collective
control tube; failure to remove packing material from inside the tail
boom after trailering; forgetting to change the center of gravity of the
aircraft after a much heavier pilot finished flying; etc.) has caused
several of the accidents. In one instance, RHCI suspected that the
builder reused the nuts and bolts located in the control system area,
because if he would have not done so, the certified bolts and nuts would
have not come loose.

When servicing and performing maintenance work in the Mini-500, it is
important to pay attention to detail and to make sure that no extra
parts are left inside any of the components. Compliance with RHCI’s
assembly manual, pilots operating handbook, service bulletins, AD’s,
safety notices and RHCI’s newsletters will help eliminate most, if not
all, maintenance problems on the Mini-500.

B. Low Rotor RPM - This has always been one of the most common types of
helicopter accidents and is quite often listed by the NTSB as a
contributing cause of a helicopter accident. It typically occurs to an
inexperienced pilot as a result of poor training or judgment and happens
to high-time pilots as a result of overconfidence in their ability.
Sometimes it occurs as a result of operating behind the power curve,
over pitching the collective, twisting the throttle the wrong direction
or exceeding the performance limits of the aircraft (i.e. operating at
high gross weight, attempting takeoff with high density altitude, etc.).
Mini-500 pilots must be made aware of the limits of the aircraft’s
correlator system.

If the pilot over pitches the collective without anticipating throttle,
a rapid decay will occur that can not be corrected without sufficient
airspeed or altitude. Usually the helicopter will settle rapidly to the
ground before the pilot can regain control of the RPM. This will occur
when landing with a tail wind, allowing rate of descent to build on
approach (especially below 100' AGL), landing at a high density altitude
site, operating at high gross weights, etc. It can generally be avoided
by using a high-speed shallow approach at higher density altitude
airports and aborting a takeoff if the aircraft will not hover
momentarily (at least a few inches above the surface). Student pilots
must be taught procedures for safe operation when flying at other than
standard atmospheric conditions.

Autorotations should be practiced frequently, with recovery made before
touchdown, until pilots’ skills are developed. New pilots, low time
pilots, and pilots not accustomed to flying light weight reciprocating
helicopters should not be allowed to practice autorotations in the
Mini-500 until they can do so proficiently in a similar two-place
helicopter with an instructor. These same pilots should also let
experienced pilots first fly their Mini-500, and make all trimming and
balancing adjustments. This will make the Mini-500 safer for a new
pilot to fly.

Of the 18 accidents in this category, most appear to have been caused
because the pilot put himself in a situation where he was not able to
recover from low rotor RPM (i.e. operating behind the power curve,
experiencing settling with power from 20 ft. or higher, etc.). The most
serious accidents have occurred as a result of practicing autorotations
when the pilot lacked thorough and recent training and experience in
helicopters. Intensive training in low rotor RPM recovery is necessary
in a similar type helicopter to reduce this type of accident.

C. Collision With Ground Objects - Three accidents have occurred in the
Mini-500 as a result of operating in close proximity to objects on the
ground. Most of these accidents occurred when hovering too close to the
ground. One pilot was practicing slide on landings from a hover, and
the skids caught on an aircraft tie down. On another occasion, a pilot
thought he could fly his aircraft out of his garage. While attempting
to do this, the down wash pulled the door down on top of the rotors.
Another pilot while hovering the helicopter for the first time, to break
in the engine, drifted off the tarmac area onto a grassy area, causing
one skid to get caught in a mound of grass.

RHCI has found that the odds of striking an object on the ground are
much greater than a hard landing due to engine failure, because of the
Mini-500’s high inertia system. An altitude of at least 12 inches will
avoid most objects on the ground.

Landing in unknown or unfavorable sites is generally a contributing
factor in this type of accident. Quite often the pilot has not seen the
object until it is too late, thereby colliding with it or losing control
trying to avoid it. Other times the pilot will land on a severe slope,
tall grass or soft terrain and the aircraft will roll-over. Ground
instruction on the types of terrain that are unsuitable for skid-type
landing gear must be given to students by flight instructors.
Instructors must use self-control when teaching new students.
Demonstrating landings in extremely hazardous areas has little training
value when teaching pilot judgment.

D. Fuel Exhaustion - There were two reports of accidents caused by fuel
exhaustion in the Mini-500. In one instance, the pilot failed to
pre-flight the aircraft for fuel level before taking off, causing it to
run out of fuel while in flight. On another occasion, RHCI suspected
that the pilot filled his gas tank with low octane level (less than 87
octane) without knowing it, causing the engine to fail due to
pre-detonation. It was reported to RHCI that the aircraft was freshly
refueled at the airport gas pump, and based on RHCI’s past experiences,
the grade usually offered by airports in auto gas is less than 87
octane. If the gas is in the ground for a long period of time, it will
lose octane, and low octane gas will pre-detonate in the Rotax engine,
as explained in the Rotax manual. RHCI recommends that pilots always
test the fuel for octane level when obtaining fuel from an airport or
even from the local gas station.

E. Power Line Strike - Even though there was only one accident caused
directly by a Mini-500 striking a power line, two other accidents can
also be attributed to power lines. One pilot flew into a power line at
70 MPH while flight testing for forward balance. The power line
contacted the aircraft on the mast, and the pilot was able to maintain
control up until ground contact. On another two occasions, the pilots
failed to see the power lines before taking off, but were able to miss
them. In the process, they allowed the rotor RPM to droop and were
unable to recover.

Contrary to popular belief, most wire strikes occur in clear weather
conditions. This type of wire encounter is most likely to be fatal since
the aircraft is usually operating at a high rate of speed at the moment
of impact. Intensive ground training on wire strike avoidance is
required to avoid this common fatal accident. Only experienced pilots
should fly low level operations.

G. Undetermined/Pilot Error - Only 1 accident in the Mini-500 has been
undetermined during this period. The pilot did not successfully
complete an autorotation and did not have the engine disassembled to
determine the reason for failure. Therefore, engine failure is
undetermined.


The Revolution Mini-500 makes up approximately 4% of the total U.S.
civil helicopter fleet (year end 1998). There are approximately 436
Mini-500 helicopters in the U.S. compared to 10,892 other types of
helicopters. Of the 436 Mini-500’s in the U.S. fleet, 38 were involved
in accidents for the calendar years 1995-1998, or approximately .35% of
the U.S. fleet. Of the 10,892 other helicopters, 716 were involved in
accidents during this same period, or approximately 6.5% of the U.S.
fleet. This includes helicopters used for such diverse operations as
crop dusting, corporate, off-shore, personal and business, EMS, etc.

Considering the role the Mini-500 has in the worldwide personal use
market, the Mini-500 would be expected to have a proportionately higher
number of accidents each year. Enstrom had similar problems back in the
1970's when F. Lee Bailey spiffed up the F28A and targeted the
businessman market. The accident rate soared as dealers sold executives
the idea of the modern “flying carpet.” Unfortunately, despite claims
made as early as 1950, the world is still not ready for a helicopter in
everyone's garage. Even the MD-500, one of the easiest light helicopters
to fly, can be a handful to an inexperienced pilot, a phenomenon that is
not unlike the V-Tail Beech or the Cessna Citation. Considering the fact
that Mini-500 helicopters are used for some type of personal recreation
(which generally involves numerous takeoffs/landings), the accident rate
per aircraft flying becomes even more favorable.



To take this analysis a little further, let's look at the total
transportation accidents records in the U.S. as published annually by
the NTSB:

Comparison of U.S. Transportation Fatalities for 1997

Fatalities Fatalities
Passenger Cars 22,227 Pedacycles 800
Trains 746 Airplanes (G.A.) 646
Buses 15 Helicopters 78
Motorcycles 2,099 (Mini-500) 3


During 1998, total helicopter fatalities were 91, while the Mini-500
only had 4.

A detailed analysis would be necessary in order to assess risk/benefit
in any form of transportation. How often has it been said in the
helicopter industry (since Igor Sikorsky first said it) that a
helicopter is potentially one of the safest forms of transportation?
This statement may very well prove to be true someday.


Mini-500 Total Accidents
(Chart removed)


Out of 44 flight related Mini-500 accidents, there were 35 accidents
with minor or no injuries (80%), 2 serious injuries (4%), and 7 fatal
(16%). Of the nine serious and fatal accidents, five were caused by
pilot error and four by maintenance aggravated by pilot error.


Mini-500 Accident Rate vs. Total Aircraft Flying
(Chart removed)


RHCI estimates that about 400 out of 521 Mini-500 sold are flying or
capable of flight. RHCI bases this estimate on conversations and
letters received from the builders. This indicates that 44 (11%) out of
an estimated 400 flyable Mini-500s were involved in an accident.

Conclusion

The results of accident investigations or safety studies are useless
unless the information is readily available to those who need it.
Pilots are still cited as a cause or contributing factor in about 85% of
all general aviation accidents. While new technology and design have
clearly played an important role in the improved safety record, the
potential for continued improvements down the road may be diminishing
and we need to focus on the human factors affecting the safety of flight
operations: factors such as situational awareness, error chain detection
and analysis, communication skills, decision-making, stress management,
etc.

This Mini-500 Accident Analysis has been compiled in the interest of
helicopter safety and can be adapted to any type of helicopter safety
program. Flight schools and instructors are urged to review these and
other Mini-500 accident data with students to make them aware of some
common mistakes made by Mini-500 pilots. All helicopter pilots are aware
of the inherent risks involved in aviation, especially the unique risk
to helicopter operations. Any type of flying activity involves certain
risk, whether it be in an ultralight airplane or a commercial airliner,
and pilots have accepted the risk realizing full well the consequences
when something goes wrong.

Despite repeated criticism from opponents, the Mini-500 helicopter has
proven itself to be one of the safest helicopters ever manufactured. It
was certified as a homebuilt kit under the 51% category. Its primary
markets (personal training for adding on hours and personal use) have
placed it in a high risk category and not unlike the Cessna 152, it is
exposed to a higher accidents rate.

The Mini-500 and the pilots that fly it throughout the world have
achieved a remarkable record in helicopter safety. It has given many the
opportunity to finally own a helicopter, and it has helped many pilots
to increase their helicopter flight time inexpensively. It has opened
the market and allowed pilots all over the world to learn to fly
helicopters affordably. A Mini-500 as well as any other helicopter will
crash as a result of low rotor RPM or poor maintenance. These types of
accidents may very likely occur in a helicopter other than the Mini-500,
but that would probably not receive the same level of attention as a
Mini-500 accident.

Many pilots who have been flying the Mini-500 are aware of some of the
more controversial accidents in the past few years. Many of us in the
industry are aware of these accidents, but it is rare that the actual
circumstances are revealed. NTSB data tends to indicate the probability
that the accident was caused by pilot error. RHCI has acted responsibly,
as it always has in the past, to prevent future accidents. I am
comfortable knowing that with good training and supervision, people are
probably safer in the aircraft than in the car.


NOTES: All data and statistics have been obtained from NTSB and the
Helicopter Association International (HAI) sources.


Mini-500 Reported Accidents to the NTSB

The following accident summaries are abstracts from NTSB Accident
Reports and are intended to keep operators, maintenance personnel and
safety managers aware of the Mini-500 helicopter safety trends. Except
for RHCI Investigative Findings, the text of these reports is taken from
NTSB reports; no editorializing has been done.

Followng each NTSB accident report, RHCI includes its findings (RHCI
Investigative Findings) after investigating each accident and obtaining
information from the NTSB, FAA, pilots, witnesses, and RHCI’s customers’
file. It is RHCI’s intent to clarify the information and help those
seeking the real cause of the accidents to understand what could go
wrong when flying not only the Mini-500, but any helicopter. The RHCI
information is the opinion of RHCI, and should not necessarily reflect
the opinion of the NTSB, FAA or any other affiliated group or
organization.


(1) NTSB Identification: CHI95FA242
Accident occurred Jul-27-95 At Oshkosh, WI
Aircraft: Revolution Helicopter Mini-500, registration: N500ZZ
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

The amateur-built helicopter was conducting a demonstration flight
during the annual EAA convention. During the first flight after
re-jetting of the carburetor, the helicopter experienced a total loss of
engine power. During the autorotation into a crop field, the helicopter
was substantially damaged when the skid shoes caught in the terrain,
failing the left skid and fracturing the shoe on that skid. Subsequent
examination of the engine revealed that the rear piston had seized in
the cylinder. The owner of the company which produces the helicopter
stated that the re-jetting of the carburetor was made in an attempt to
achieve what were thought to be correct readings in main rotor RPM and
EGT after replacement of both gauges. The company owner attributed the
piston seizure to the re-jetting. The skid shoes were new and had been
tested only on concrete. The owner said that the design contributed to
the damage to the helicopter. Probable Cause the inadequate design of
the helicopter skid shoes. Factors related to the accident were: false
indications of rotor RPM and EGT which led to seizure of the piston.

Full Narrative
On July 27, 1995, at 0930 central daylight time, an amateur built
Revolution Helicopter Mini-500, N500ZZ, registered to Revolution
Helicopter Corp. of Excelsior Springs, Missouri, and piloted by a
commercial helicopter pilot, experienced a total loss of engine power
while in cruise flight. During an auto rotational (forced) landing,
one-half mile west of Wittman Regional Airport, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, the
helicopter sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported no injuries.
The local 14 CFR Part 91 flight was operating in visual meteorological
conditions. No flight plan was on file. The flight departed at 0920. The
accident occurred during the annual Experimental Aircraft Association's
convention. The helicopter was conducting a demonstration flight in the
vicinity of the airport at Oshkosh, Wisconsin.

Personal Information
The pilot had obtained approximately 100 hours flight time in this type
of helicopter, at the time of the accident. This was the first flight of
the day.

Aircraft Information
The helicopter had accumulated 210 hours time in service at the time of
the accident with less than one hour since inspection and maintenance to
the carburetor which included changing the jetting.

Wreckage And Impact Information
The helicopter impacted the terrain during a forced landing in an open
field approximately one-half mile west of Wittman Regional Airport,
Oshkosh, Wisconsin. There were two ground scars consistent with the size
and shape of the skids running westerly from the first visible impact
mark to the wreckage. The left skid was broken away from its mounting.
The tail boom was lying to the north of the main wreckage and exhibited
sharp fractures at the broken end. The tail rotor blades were bent. The
main rotor blades were bent and broken and one had red paint on it
similar to the color of the tail boom. Subsequent examination of the
engine found that the rear piston was seized in the cylinder. The owner
of the company producing the helicopter said that two changes to the
helicopter just prior to the flight were of concern. He stated that a
new rotor/engine RPM instrument was installed at the same time as a new
exhaust gas temperature (EGT) gauge. He said that prior to the
installation of these gauges that the helicopter was operating without
incident; however after reading the indications on these new instruments
re-jetting of the carburetor was done in an attempt to bring the
readings within gauge limits. The owner attributed the seizure to the
previous accomplished re-jetting. He said that at the same time a new
set of skid shoes were installed on the skids of the helicopter and
testing was done on concrete only. When an autorotational landing was
conducted in a crop field the new skid shoes dug in and stopped the
helicopter in a short distance, failing the left skid and fracturing the
skid shoe on that skid.

Additional Data/Information
The NTSB did not exercise its right to retain custody of the wreckage.
When the on scene investigation was complete the wreckage was removed
and retained by the owner. Party to the investigation was the Federal
Aviation Administration, Flight Standards District Office, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
As published in the September 1995 “Reaching the Customer” newsletter,
the following report was written by Brian Thomas (RHCI’s Test Pilot):

Many of you have been asking questions about the autorotation
capabilities and crashworthiness of the Mini-500. Well, I will answer
some of those questions, but this time with an actual experience...

Oshkosh was less than a week away, the composite department was still in
the learning stage and needed much supervision, and the assembly manual
was a priority. Our minds were divided onto these other projects while
we were working on preparing the aircraft for the show. As a result of
this, we made three mistakes which caused this whole incident.

First, we installed a new rotor/engine tachometer in the aircraft just
before the fly-in. We thought the gauge was calibrated correctly.
Also, we were using a new EGT gauge that was supposed to be
self-compensating for temperature. The week before Oshkosh, the
temperature at the factory was 95 to 100 degrees F. with 95% humidity.
After making these changes, the aircraft experienced a loss in
performance. Our EGT temperatures were only running about 900 to 1000
degrees F. We attributed this loss of performance to the high
temperature and humidity. Using the EGT gauge as a guide, we leaned the
mixture by installing much smaller main jets and lowering the needles.
This brought the temperature up to 1100 and 1200 degrees F., but with no
significant increase in performance. Through testing, we then learned
that the rotor/engine tachometer was calibrated too low. After
re-calibration, our performance returned. EGT’s were still reading
normally and were left as changed. I immediately conducted a short test
flight and everything seemed to be working well.

Second, we installed wear shoes on the bottom of the skids to prevent
excessive wear on concrete and rocky surfaces. Our intentions were to
make this an option later. These shoes consisted of eight pieces of
steel, four per skid, approximately five inches long, riveted with six
rivets each, evenly spaced along the skids.

Third, we did not test the skid shoes on grass or dirt to see if they
would change the run-on landing performance.

Now for what happened at Oshkosh. It was the first flight on the first
day of the show. I started the aircraft and hovered around the grass
runway for a few minutes and the aircraft was operating normally. I
then departed and entered the traffic pattern. On my first trip around
the pattern, the aircraft was performing perfectly. I was keeping an
eye on the EGT gauge to make sure that the temperatures were still good,
since it was cooler at Oshkosh than at the factory. The temperature was
still 1100 and 1200 degrees F. On my second trip around the pattern,
the engine suddenly stopped. The EGT gauge that we installed was not as
accurate as we thought and the engine hot seized. At the time the
engine quit, I was at 300 feet AGL with an airspeed of 70 MPH. I
entered autorotation and steered for a nearby clover field. The
autorotation was uneventful, as was the flair and touchdown.

As I have previously said, the Mini-500 is one of the best autorotating
helicopters I have ever flown. The problems began during the ground
slide. Immediately upon touchdown, the skid shoes caught in the clover
and soft dirt so hard that one shoe was pulled off the skid! The left
skid caught and jerked so hard that the legs buckled. The legs did not
buckle because they are not strong enough. They buckled from the
enormous force of trying to stop 730 lbs. of aircraft so quickly. The
skid shoes were the cause, not the legs. When the left skid buckled,
the aircraft started to go onto its left side. As a result, one rotor
blade contacted the tail boom. Part of the reason that the skid shoes
caught so hard is that the normal procedure for the Mini-500 is to lower
the collective all the way down after touchdown from an auto. On most
helicopters with skid shoes, the procedure is to hold the collective up
until the helicopter comes to a stop to prevent the shoes from digging
in too badly. I am very familiar with this procedure, but failed to
relate it to the Mini-500.


(2) NTSB Identification: LAX96LA150
Accident occurred Mar-31-96 at San Carlos, CA
Aircraft: Lampert Revolution M500, registration: N750GL
Injuries: 1 Minor

According to FAA airman records, the pilot did not hold a rotorcraft
category rating. FAA inspectors examined the pilot's logbook and
reported that he received a solo endorsement in helicopters about 1 1/2
years ago. The pilot was returning to the airport following a local area
flight. About 1 mile west of the airport, the pilot began to smell
something burning and said he sensed something was wrong. Shortly
thereafter, he heard a "slap" sound as the helicopter transitioned
through 50 feet and 50 knots about 1/4 mile from the runway. The pilot
stated that he "didn't do anything [with the controls] but keep it
headed for an open area between the taxi way and the runway." The pilot
said he did not flare or touch the collective, and the helicopter hit
hard in the open area and rolled on its left side. An FAA airworthiness
inspector examined the helicopter and found the engine to transmission
drive belt fragmented, with rubber transfer throughout the engine
compartment. Rubber transfer on the pulleys showed a forward movement
pattern of the belt off the pulley. The inspector reported that the
pulley was designed without a flange or other means to keep the belt
aligned.

Probable Cause
The pilot's failure to recognize a drive train disengagement and
initiate an autorotation. The inadequate engine-to-transmission drive
belt/pulley design, and the pilot's limited training and experience in
rotorcraft operations were factors in this accident.

Full Narrative
On March 31, 1996, at 1347 hours Pacific standard time, a homebuilt
experimental Lampert Revolution M500 helicopter, N750GL, collided with
the ground and rolled over during landing at San Carlos, California. The
aircraft was owned, built, and operated by the pilot. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was
filed. The helicopter sustained substantial damage. The non-rotorcraft
rated private pilot, the sole occupant, sustained minor injuries. The
flight originated at Half Moon Bay, California, on the day of the
accident at 1315 as a personal cross-country flight to San Carlos.
According to FAA airman records, the pilot does not hold a rotorcraft
category rating. FAA inspectors examined the pilot's logbook and
reported that he received a solo endorsement in helicopters about 1 1/2
years ago. The pilot reported that he flew from San Carlos to Half Moon
Bay earlier in the day and was returning to the San Carlos airport.
About 1 mile west of the airport the pilot began to smell something
burning and said he "sensed something was wrong." Shortly thereafter, he
heard a "slap" sound as the helicopter transitioned through 50 feet and
50 knots about 1/4 mile from the runway. The pilot stated that he
"didn't do anything [with the controls] but keep it headed for an open
area between the taxi way and the runway." The pilot said he did not
flare or touch the collective and the helicopter hit hard in the open
area and rolled on its left side. An FAA airworthiness inspector
examined the helicopter and found the engine to transmission drive belt
fragmented, with rubber transfer throughout the engine compartment.
Rubber transfer on the pulleys showed a forward movement pattern of the
belt off the pulley. The inspector reported that the pulley is designed
without a flange or other means to keep the belt aligned.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
RHCI was allowed to investigate the damaged aircraft with the FAA
present in an attempt to discover why the belt failure occurred. It was
explained to the FAA investigator how the belt alignment worked, and the
flanges on the sprocket were pointed out to him at that time. They were
in place and functioning. There was another Mini-500 in the same hanger
built by the same person, but not yet flown. RHCI showed the FAA
inspector that the belt on the crashed Mini-500 had not been properly
aligned, and that the same mistake was made on the other Mini-500 he
built as well. It is unknown why the inspector said the sprocket was
designed without a flange or other means to keep the belt aligned, even
when RHCI showed him the flanges and explained their operation, but RHCI
had no influence on the outcome of an NTSB or FAA investigation. With
hundreds of Mini-500 now flying, the belt alignment system has obviously
proved itself if properly installed and maintained.


(3) NTSB Identification: LAX97LA150
Accident occurred Apr-16-97 at Lihue, Kauai, HI
Aircraft: Duff Mini-500, registration: N13118
Injuries: 1 Fatal

A witness stated that the helicopter appeared to be about 500 feet AGL
and that he could hear a "tick-tick-tick" sound as the aircraft started
yawing to the left and right. The yawing motion was followed by a left
roll to an inverted attitude from which the aircraft descended nose down
to the ground and crashed. At the time that the roll began, the tail
rotor and gearbox were observed to separate from the tail boom.
Examination of the helicopter did not disclose any pre-accident engine,
fuel system, or flight control system malfunctions or abnormalities.
Black paint, the color of the tail boom, was evident on the leading edge
of both main rotor blades, and four impact dents were found on the tail
boom. Paint transfer indicated that the upper right-hand windshield had
also been impacted by the main rotor blades. Review of the student
pilot's flight records disclosed that he had obtained 12 hours of
helicopter dual instruction in 1991, with only 1 hour listed for
autorotations. No record of additional dual instruction was found
between 1991 and the date of the accident.

Probable Cause
the student pilot's improper use of the helicopter flight controls,
which resulted in rotor contact with the tail boom and loss of control.
Factors relating to the accident were: the pilot's lack of total and
recent training and experience in airborne control of helicopters.

Full Narrative
On April 16, 1997, at 1424 hours Hawaiian standard time, a single-place
Duff Mini-500 homebuilt experimental helicopter, N13118, was destroyed
when it impacted the ground in the vicinity of Lihue, Kauai, Hawaii. The
student pilot was fatally injured. The flight departed from the pilot's
Anahole residence for an unknown destination. No flight plan was filed
for the personal flight and no en route communications were received by
any Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) facility. An eyewitness, who
was approximately 1/4 mile from the crash location, stated that the
aircraft appeared to be about 500 feet AGL, and that the engine did not
sound as if it was maintaining a steady RPM. The aircraft was then
observed to start yawing to the left and right, which was followed by a
left roll to an inverted attitude, from which it descended nose down to
the ground. At the time the final roll began, the tail rotor and gear
box were observed to separate from the tail boom. The witness also
stated that he heard a "tick-tick-tick" sound emanating from the
aircraft at the time that it appeared to be in trouble. The helicopter
was examined by an FAA airworthiness inspector from the Honolulu,
Hawaii, Flight Standards District Office, with the technical assistance
of the aircraft kit manufacturer's safety investigator. According to
their report, which is appended to this report, the fuel system was
intact and without obstructions. The system was equipped with a
motorcycle fuel filter, but no debris or obstructions were found in the
filter and there was no evidence of a fuel problem. All control system
linkage breaks that were found appeared to have resulted from fracture
and not fatigue, and all rod ends that were broken had first been bent.
The engine exhaust manifold bolts and head bolts were found to be finger
tight. The internal parts of the engine were in new condition and
correctly assembled. One manufacturer's bulletin on the carburetor,
which specified a change in jets, had not been complied with; however,
the inspector stated that the engine had been running rich so the
noncompliance was not considered significant. The electronic engine
ignition system was intact and functional. The engine contained coolant
and oil, and no evidence was found that would indicate an engine
problem. The main transmission and tail rotor gear box contained
lubricant. The tail rotor gear box was severed in half but the internal
gears were in new condition. The tail rotor blades were bent and one
main rotor blade had separated from the rotor head and was found 30 feet
away from the aircraft. Black paint, the color of the tail boom, was
evident on the leading edge of both main rotor blades, and four impact
dents were found on the tail boom moving progressively towards the
cockpit. The upper right-hand windshield was separated from the airframe
with a smear of paint transfer identical to the main rotor blade color.
The FAA inspector stated that the student pilot's records indicated
that he had received 12 hours of helicopter flight instruction in 1991,
of which a total of only 1 hour was logged for both autorotation and
pattern flight. Five years later, and without any known additional
instruction, the pilot obtained and assembled a Mini-500 helicopter and
proceeded to train himself to fly it after a flight instructor
endorsement for solo flights that the FAA stated was in violation of
FAR's 61.59, 61.87, 61.189, and 61.195.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The FAA asked RHCI to join the Investigation Team in an attempt to
establish a cause for the accident. RHCI compiled information through
the local police department, eye witnesses, friends of Mr. Duff, and the
NTSB and FAA.

After RHCI’s examination, it is RHCI’s opinion that no mechanical
failures occurred during the aircraft's last flight, and if it were not
for the crash, the aircraft could be flying today. By compiling the
evidence, RHCI believes that the best scenario which led to the crash is
as follows:

Mr. Duff had received 12 hours of helicopter flight instruction back in
1991. Only one hour during this time was logged for both autorotations
and pattern flight. Five years later, and without any further
instruction, Mr. Duff assembled a Mini-500 helicopter kit and proceeded
to train himself to fly it. During his third flight, and his longest
cross country, Mr. Duff probably allowed his rotor blades to lose RPM to
the point that the low rotor warning light and the low rotor warning
horn alerted him of this situation. Without the proper experience and
training, Mr. Duff overreacted and overspun the rotor system in an
attempt to normalize his RPM. The aircraft yawed to the right, and then
again yawed to the left as he chopped power to avoid the overspin. While
the aircraft was yawing, he would have been trying to regain control of
the cyclic, collective and anti-torque pedal systems. His responsibility
was then overloaded and he failed to catch up with the controls and
decayed his rotor RPM to the point that the centrifugal force of the
blades was not great enough to hold them in their plane. The oncoming
forces of airflow and retreating blade stall caused the aircraft to roll
left and then invert. What RPM was left in the rotors then allowed them
to contact the tail boom, striking it with such force that it broke the
tail rotor gear box off of the tail boom. The rotors also folded and
contacted the cockpit. The pilot lost control, and then lost RPM and
failed to recover. The aircraft then impacted the ground at a speed
well in excess of 100 MPH. The pilot instantly died from impact. The
cause of the crash was pilot error, due to his inability to fly a
helicopter.


(4) NTSB Identification: CHI97LA222
Accident occurred Jul-19-97 at Ava, MO
Aircraft: Morgan Mini-500, registration: N500XM
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

On July 19, 1997, at 1315 central daylight time, an experimental Mini
500 helicopter, N500XM, was substantially damaged during a forced
landing near Ava, Missouri. The pilot reported that the engine lost
power during cruise. He was not injured. The 14 CFR Part 91 flight had
departed Cabool, Missouri, about 1245 with a planned destination of Ava,
Missouri. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan
was filed.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The NTSB had this Mini-500 delivered to RHCI to help in the
investigation. With the NTSB present, it was discovered that the
original airplane jetting was still installed in the carburetors. The
engine failed due to high EGTs from failure to follow instructions and
re-jet the engine upon installation for helicopter use. The helicopter
landed on the side of a 30 degree hill, and rolled over.


(5) NTSB Identification: LAX97LA269
Accident occurred Jul-31-97 at Agua Dulce, CA
Aircraft: Mitteer Mini-500, registration: N501GM
Injuries: 1 Serious

The pilot of the recently completed, kit-built helicopter, stated that
the engine stopped abruptly about 150 feet above helipad elevation as he
was on base leg for landing. A hard landing resulted from an
unsuccessful autorotation. Examination of the helicopter revealed that
the size of the metering jet installed in both carburetors by the
owner/pilot was too small, and that the fuel metering pin in both
carburetors was improperly set so as to create an excessively lean
fuel/air mixture, which resulted in loss of engine power. The pilot
reported having 50 hours total helicopter flight time and that he last
practiced autorotations 22 years prior to the accident. A revised
aircraft assembly manual, which added a discussion of fuel jets and
metering pins, was offered to holders of the earlier manual at a reduced
price; however, the owner/builder did not purchase it. An article in the
manufacture's newsletter, again discussing the importance of this
subject, was sent to the owner/builder's address of record.

Probable Cause
Failure of the owner/builder to obtain and comply with service
literature from the kit manufacturer, which resulted in improper setting
of the carburetor fuel mixture and led to loss of engine power. An
additional cause was the pilot's failure to successfully autorotate the
helicopter to an emergency landing. The pilot's lack of total experience
in the type helicopter and lack of recent experience in performing
autorotations were related factors.

Full narrative
On July 31, 1997, at 1945 hours Pacific daylight time, an experimental
(amateur built) Mitteer Mini 500 helicopter, N501GM, was substantially
damaged when it collided with terrain while on landing approach to a
private helipad at Agua Dulce, California. The commercial pilot was
seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the
personal flight. The recently completed helicopter departed from the
helipad about 1940. According to the pilot's brother, the pilot related
from his hospital bed that the engine stopped abruptly about 150 feet
above helipad level as he was on base leg for landing. Because previous
approaches had been at too steep an angle, the pilot was deliberately
flying a flatter and slower approach, which, together with his low
altitude when the engine failed and lack of a suitable landing site,
made his autorotation unsuccessful. According to inspectors from the
Van Nuys Flight Standards District Office, the aircraft impacted on a
two-lane asphalt road about 1/8 mile from the helipad in a valley about
100 feet below the helipad elevation. Terrain slopes upward about 45
degrees on one side of the road and there are power transmission lines
on the other side of the road, however, the helicopter contacted neither
prior to impacting on the roadway. The impact bent both landing skids
outward and the belly of the fuselage contacted the pavement. The
pilot's seat structure exhibited compression failure with more collapse
on the left side than the right side. The two rotor blades had minor
damage on the lower surface of the tips. After impact, the aircraft
rotated 90 degrees to the right and came to rest about 10 feet away from
the impact mark, resting on its left side. According to the inspector,
no airworthiness certificate or operating limitations had been issued to
the builder/pilot by the Federal Aviation Administration. The recording
hour meter in the aircraft indicated 8.4 total hours, however, the pilot
told his brother that he had operated the aircraft more than those
hours. The pilot's logbook indicated total operating time since new,
including ground run time, of 14.8 hours. The first entry was about a
month before the accident. The last entry in the logbook, for the
previous flight, indicates that the pilot changed the fuel metering jets
in the carburetors to "150" size. The pilot reported having 50 hours
total helicopter flight time, with 18 hours in the previous 60 days. In
a telephone conversation with the Safety Board in December, 1997, the
pilot said that he received his helicopter training in 1975 in a Bell 47
helicopter, and that was the last time he practiced an autorotation to
landing. In June, 1997, prior to first flying his Mini 500, he took 2
hours of dual instruction in a Robinson R-22, but did not perform any
autorotation practice. Representatives of the company which manufactures
the parts kit for the helicopter, examined the aircraft and determined
that the size of the metering jet installed in both carburetors by the
owner/pilot was too small, and that the fuel metering pin in both
carburetors was improperly set so as to create an excessively lean
fuel/air mixture in the engine. Examination of the aft piston of the two
cylinder engine through the exhaust port showed scoring on the sides of
the piston and evidence of "hot seizure." A manufacture's bulletin on
the subject of sizing metering jets and metering pins in the carburetor
to control exhaust gas temperature was issued on May 7, 1996, the same
day the kit was shipped to the manufacture's dealer. The dealer signed
and returned a receipt for the bulletin to the manufacturer who placed
it in the file for the aircraft serial number. The kit was sold to the
builder/pilot on January 13, 1997, and there is no record whether there
was a copy of the service bulletin with the kit. An article in the
manufacture's newsletter of March, 1997, discussed the importance of
this subject again. According to the kit manufacturer, the newsletter
was mailed to the builder/pilot's address of record, which was his
business address. A revised aircraft assembly manual which added a
discussion of fuel jets and metering pins was offered to holders of the
earlier manual at a reduced price. The owner/builder did not purchase
the revised manual.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The NTSB invited RHCI to help in the investigation. With the NTSB
present, it was discovered that the jetting was incorrectly installed in
the carburetors to the maximum lean settings, and the EGT gauge was
labeled by the pilot at a red line of 1300F. The EGT should never run
more than 1150F. The engine seized due to high EGTs from improper
jetting. The accident was caused from failure to perform successful
autorotation. In fact, the rotor blades were nearly undamaged and not
turning at the time of impact. It is believed the helicopter fell more
than 50 feet, and hit on a hard paved road.


(6) NTSB Identification: IAD97LA113
Accident occurred Aug-23-97 at New Philadelphia, OH
Aircraft: Haines Revolution Mini-500, registration: N7240E
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

On August 23, 1997, at 1045 eastern daylight time, a Haines Revolution
Mini 500, homebuilt helicopter, N7240E, was substantially damaged when
it collided with the ground during takeoff at Harry Clever Field, New
Philadelphia, Ohio. The certificated private pilot was not injured.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local, personal
flight that originated at New Philadelphia, Ohio. The flight was
conducted under 14 CFR Part 91 and a visual flight rules flight plan was
not filed. According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Safety
Inspector, the pilot was taking off, and about 50 feet above the ground,
the rotor RPM started to decay. The pilot said he applied more power,
but the engine sputtered, and shortly thereafter the engine lost power.
The pilot said he entered autorotation, but he did not have enough rotor
speed to land safely, and the helicopter struck the ground. According to
the pilot, he had flown the helicopter for an hour the day before, and
he had refueled the helicopter the day of the accident. The fuel tank,
fuel lines, fuel filter and fuel pump were examined after the accident
by the FAA Inspector. According to the Inspector, the examination did
not disclose any contaminants. The helicopter was moved to a hangar for
further examination.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
It was reported to RHCI that the pistons had holes burnt through them,
and the tongues were gone from the spark plugs. This can happen only
with the use of low octane fuel or if the cylinder head of the engine
has been modified to increase compression ratio. It was reported to
RHCI that the aircraft was freshly refueled at the airport gas pump. The
cause of engine failure was due to pre-detonation of fuel. It is
suspected by RHCI that the gas used prior to the flight was less than 87
octane, which is usually the grade offered by airports in auto gas. If
the gas is in the ground for a long period of time, it will lose octane,
and low octane gas will pre-detonate in the Rotax engine, as explained
in the Rotax manual. The cause of the accident was failure to perform a
successful autorotation.


(7) NTSB Identification: FTW97LA328
Accident occurred AUG-26-97 at Huffman, TX
Aircraft: Fingerhut Revolution Mini-500, registration: N570F
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

The student pilot experienced a disconnect of the collective control
system which resulted in the main rotor blades going to flat pitch while
in cruise flight at 800 feet MSL. When the pilot attempted to cushion
the landing by increasing collective pitch, the helicopter yawed to the
left prior to touching down and the helicopter rolled over on its side.
Examination of the wreckage revealed a disconnect of the collective
flight control system between the collective riser block (P/N 0153), and
the rod end (P/N 0600) for the collective control tube. Examination of
the threaded areas of the collective riser block and the rod end
revealed that the threads on the aluminum collective riser block were
found to be displaced or pulled out due to inadequate improper
penetration. The information supplied by the kit manufacturer was
insufficient to properly rig the flight control system.

Probable Cause
The disengagement of the helicopter's collective control tube due to
improper installation by the builder. Factors were the lack of
sufficient information provided by the kit manufacturer and the pilot's
inability to cushion the landing.

Full Narrative
On August 26, 1997, at 2000 central daylight time, a Fingerhut
Revolution Mini 500 homebuilt helicopter, N570F, was substantially
damaged during a forced landing near Huffman, Texas. The student pilot,
sole occupant of the helicopter, was not injured. The helicopter was
owned and operated by the pilot under Title 14 CFR Part 91. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight for which a
flight plan was not filed. The instructional flight originated from a
helipad at the pilot's home in Huffman, Texas at 1945. According to the
pilot, he experienced a disconnect of the collective control system
which resulted in the main rotor blades going to flat pitch while in
cruise flight at 800 feet MSL. The pilot added that he elected to
execute a running landing to a cultivated field rather that try to land
in a confined helipad. During the landing flare the helicopter yawed to
the left as the pilot applied collective to cushion the landing prior to
touching down. The pilot added that the helicopter was not properly
aligned during touch down and the helicopter rolled over on its side.
The FAA inspector confirmed that the 1997 model helicopter sustained
structural damage. He added that the student pilot was properly endorsed
for solo flight and had accumulated a total of 50 hours of flight in
helicopters, of which 28 were in the same make and model. According to
the aircraft maintenance records, the helicopter had accumulated a total
of 28 hours since it was assembled by the pilot from a kit. Flight
control continuity was confirmed by the FAA inspector to the cyclic and
anti-torque systems of the helicopter. Examination of the helicopter by
the FAA inspector revealed that a disconnect of the collective flight
control system between the collective riser block (P/N 0153), and the
rod end (P/N 0600) for the collective control rod (P/N 0002) With the
aid of 10 power magnification, the inspector examined the threaded areas
of the collective riser block and the rod end. The threads on the
aluminum collective riser block were found to be displaced or pulled
out. See enclosed drawing showing the 0.314 inch penetration on the
threaded surface of the riser block and the first 0.388 inch engagement
on the rod end. The FAA inspector also noted that the control rods
provided by the helicopter manufacturer were not provided with a
"witness hole" so either the installer or an inspector could verify the
amount of rod end penetration into the threaded control tube.
Furthermore, the assembly instructions provided by the manufacturer did
not stipulate the minimum amount of thread engagement required in any of
the rod ends in any of the flight control tubes in the helicopter, nor
did it warn the potential builder of the criticality of proper thread
engagement and security. To assist with the investigation, the FAA
inspector inspected a like helicopter to establish a comparison on the
installation of the flight control systems. The comparison between the
two installations revealed that a pronounced difference existed in the
length of exposed threaded areas between the rod ends and the control
rods. The owner/builder of the helicopter provided the FAA inspector
with the plans and instructions provided to him by the kit manufacturer
during the assembly of the helicopter.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
This Mini-500 was first owned and built by a previous person. The new
owner was the pilot at the time of the accident. After the accident,
the FAA reported to RHCI that a rod-end that operates the collective
control had pulled out of the aluminum collective riser block due to
threads stripping out of the block. The reason was improper
installation by the builder. Instead of screwing the rod into the block
until 1/4” of threads are visible after tightening the jam nut as the
manual clearly states, this builder screwed the rod into the block only
1/4” and then tightened the jam nut. That allowed only 4 threads to
enter the block and although the rod end could not turn or back out, by
design, the threads finally failed in time due to applied forces through
normal operation. “Witness holes” are not necessary because the manual
plainly states the depth necessary for installation. RHCI points the
ability of the new pilot to still maintain control of his disabled
aircraft, and the ability of the Mini-500 to still be controlled even
with loss of this vital control function.

(8) NTSB Identification: FTW97LA339
Accident occurred Sep-09-97 at Idabel, OK
Aircraft: Roddie Mini-500, registration: N42JR
Injuries: 1 Fatal

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On September 9, 1997, at 1500 central daylight time, a Roddie Mini-500,
homebuilt helicopter, N42JR, registered to and operated by the pilot,
was destroyed while maneuvering near Idabel Airport, Idabel, Oklahoma.
The airline transport rated pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally
injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan
was filed for the Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The flight
originated from Idabel Airport at 1440. A witness, who was located at
the airport, reported that the pilot performed a run-up on the ground
before departing. The witness stated that the aircraft was operating
approximately 2000 feet above ground level and about 500 feet from the
approach end of runway 35. The witness then observed the aircraft in a
nose low attitude. Then he "saw pieces" of the aircraft "fly" from the
aircraft. The main fuselage came to rest on its right side, 1300 feet
from the approach end runway 35. The instrument panel was found 157 feet
south of the main fuselage. The tail rotor, including the vertical and
horizontal stabilizers, came
to rest 400 feet south of the main fuselage. A close friend of the
pilot, who also assisted in manufacturing the kit helicopter, reported
that new rotor blades were installed on the day prior to the accident.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
A witness reported to RHCI that the low time 50+ hours helicopter pilot
was going to attempt the first autorotation in his new Mini-500. The
witness warned him not to do so because he lacked experience in
helicopters. The witness reported that the pilot radioed to the ground
as he prepared to enter autorotation. The cause of the accident was
improper entrance into autorotation due to lack of experience in a new
and unfamiliar machine.


(9) NTSB Identification: LAX97LA326
Accident occurred Sep-13-97 at San Carlos, CA
Aircraft: Lampert M500, registration: N800GL
Injuries: 1 Minor

The pilot reported that the engine lost power, while he was holding
short of a taxi way in a hover. The helicopter landed hard on its right
skid and rolled over on its right side. Witnesses reported that they
observed the helicopter at about 20 feet AGL, when they heard the engine
abruptly cease. They then reported seeing the pilot release the
collective control with his left hand and apply full aft cyclic with
both hands. The helicopter then pitched up to an approximately 45-degree
angle while simultaneously falling. The helicopter and the airframe were
examined by an FAA airframe and powerplant mechanic, and an FAA
airworthiness inspector. No discrepancies were noted. The pilot did not
hold a rotorcraft category rating and no evidence was found that he was
endorsed for solo privileges in rotorcraft within the previous 90 days.

Probable Cause
Loss of engine power for undetermined reasons, and the pilot's improper
use of the flight controls following the loss of power. The pilot's lack
of training/certification in rotorcraft operations was a factor in this
accident.

Full Narrative
On September 13, 1997, at 1516 hours Pacific daylight time, a homebuilt
experimental Lampert M500 helicopter, N800GL, crashed on the taxiway
following a loss of engine power on approach to the San Carlos,
California, airport. The aircraft sustained substantial damage, and the
pilot, the sole occupant, incurred minor injuries. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and no flight plan was
on file. The local area personal flight departed San Carlos at 1500 and
was terminating at the time of the accident. In a recorded statement to
the FAA, the pilot reported that he was inbound to the airport and was
asked to hold short of a taxi way to avoid oncoming traffic. The pilot
held the helicopter in a hover and complied with the hold short
instructions. He said that at that time, "my engine went silent, the
engine RPM dropped to zero, and the aircraft began to drop rapidly." The
aircraft landed hard on its right skid and rolled over on its right
side. The tail rotor driveshaft separated from the main transmission,
and the T-tail separated from the vertical fin. In his written report,
the pilot stated that he "could have denied a straight-in [approach]
from the shoreline and entered a left-hand pattern to runway or taxiway
30 at the traffic pattern altitude thus allowing the chance of
successfully deploying autorotation technique rather than the low flight
with slight tailwind component thus being caught in the 'Dead Man's
Curve'." The pilot also reported that on entering the autorotation he
made a "slight cyclic maneuver into the wind to gain energy in the main
rotors." He said that he was, "so low that I might have smacked my tail
rotor when executing this maneuver." Witnesses stated that they observed
the helicopter at about 20 feet AGL when they heard the engine abruptly
cease. They reported then seeing the pilot release the collective
control with his left hand and apply full aft cyclic with both hands.
The helicopter then pitched up to an approximately 45-degree angle while
simultaneously falling. Initial inspection of the aircraft at the
accident site revealed that the fuel tanks were approximately 1/2 full.
The helicopter and the powerplant were examined by a certified airframe
and powerplant mechanic and a airworthiness inspector from the San Jose
Flight Standards District Office. No discrepancies were noted during the
examination. The engine was not seized and the spark plugs fired in
order with hand rotation of the crankshaft. Fuel was found in the fuel
tank and the carburetor bowl. A review of the carburetor icing
probability chart disclosed that icing conditions were not present at
the time of the accident. According to FAA Airman Records, the pilot
does not hold a rotorcraft category rating. No evidence was found that
the pilot was endorsed for solo flight in rotorcraft within the last 90
days. Repeated attempts were made to contact the pilot to schedule
further aircraft inspection with no response. The aircraft was moved
from the hangar and the owner has declined to provide its location.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
It was later reported to RHCI that the engine had no sign of stoppage.
Also a witness reported to RHCI that he could hear the engine running
until impact with the ground. From these reports, RHCI suspects that
rotor RPM was lost, and it was not properly recovered. The pilot had low
time in helicopters, and did not have a helicopter rating.


(10) NTSB Identification: LAX98LA021
Accident occurred Oct-26-97 at Long Beach, CA
Aircraft: Revolution Mini-500, registration: N7234Y
Injuries: 1 Serious

After taking off, the helicopter had climbed about 250 to 300 feet, when
the engine abruptly lost power. The pilot attempted an autorotation, but
said he was able to maintain only 80 percent rotor RPM, which was
insufficient to prevent a hard landing. The pilot reported that the main
rotor low pitch stop had recently been changed from -1.8 degree to -0.5
degree, as recommended by a factory representative. Also, the pilot
stated that he was aware of a phenomenon called "cold-freeze" (engine
seizure without over temp) that (according to him) had occurred with
other engines of this make/model. He believed there was a possible
engine seizure and that reduced settings of the rotor low pitch stops
could have resulted in low rotor RPM. No pre-impact mechanical problem
was found that would have resulted in loss of engine power.

Probable Cause
Loss of engine power and low rotor RPM for undetermined reasons. The
factory representative's recommendation to reduce the main rotor low
pitch stop (from -1.8 degree to -0.5 degree) may have been a related
factor.

Full Narrative
On October 26, 1997, at 1233 hours Pacific standard time, a Revolution
Mini-500 experimental helicopter, N7234Y, was destroyed and the
commercial pilot seriously injured when it impacted terrain following
takeoff at Daugherty Field, Long Beach, California. The aircraft had
completed one circuit of the helicopter traffic pattern and landed on
Helo Pad 3. It was then cleared for a second circuit of the helicopter
traffic pattern. The pilot stated that on the second takeoff, the engine
quit abruptly at an altitude of 250-300 feet AGL. He then attempted an
autorotation, but could get only 80 percent rotor RPM which was
insufficient to prevent a hard touchdown. (The pilot stated in his
report that he felt this was due to a recent change in the main rotor
low pitch stop from -1.8 deg. to -0.5 deg. which had been recommended by
a factory representative.) The pilot also stated that he was aware of a
phenomenon called "cold-freeze" (engine seizure without over temp) that
had happened several times with the Rotax engine. He felt that a
possible engine seizure, combined with the change in the rotor low pitch
stop, were contributing factors to the accident rather than fuel
starvation or mechanical malfunction of the helicopter.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
Upon RHCI investigation, it was discovered that the pilot was performing
a maximum performance take off which developed low rotor RPM. It was
reported that the engine did not quit, but the pilot encountered low
rotor speed and failed to recover. It was also reported that upon
examination of the engine there was no sign of stoppage, or failure.
The pilot had very low time in helicopters. It is noted that the pilot
had -1.8 degrees adjusted into his main rotor pitch. Proper pitch
should be between -.05 and -1.0 degrees. Any more than -1.0 degree will
tend to tuck the nose of the aircraft abruptly when entering an
autorotation, and also increase the possibility of a tail boom strike.
Before this accident, an RHCI test pilot flew this helicopter, performed
successful autorotations, and reported that the aircraft performed
properly.


(11) NTSB Identification: IAD98LA014
Accident occurred Nov-27-97 at Bluefield, WV
Aircraft: Jones Mini-500, registration: N8015E
Injuries: 1 Minor

On November 27, 1997, approximately 1430 eastern standard time, a Jones
Mini 500, N8015E, sustained substantial damage when the experimental
helicopter impacted the ground while maneuvering at Mercer County
Airport, Bluefield, West Virginia. The certificated commercial
pilot/builder received minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed. No flight plan was filed for the local flight conducted under
14 CFR Part 91.

Full Narrative
On November 27, 1997, approximately 1430 eastern standard time, a Jones
Mini 500, N8015E, sustained substantial damage when the experimental
helicopter impacted the ground while maneuvering at Mercer County
Airport, Bluefield, West Virginia. The certificated commercial
pilot/builder received minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed. No flight plan was filed for the local flight conducted under
14 CFR Part 91. The pilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to
"balance and adjust the flight controls." While air taxiing, the pilot
took off down wind and climbed to 50 feet AGL. The pilot stated that
"after passing through transitional lift, the rotor began to over speed,
so I reduced the throttle to maintain the rotor in the mid green." The
pilot reported that he continued and as he approached the end of the
runway, "I slowed the helicopter down and started a left turn with the
intention of flying down runway to check the head balance." The pilot
stated that, "as I started the turn I increased the throttle to the
maximum, however, the rotor RPM had deteriorated and the throttle would
not bring it back up." The pilot reported that he did not have
sufficient altitude to unload the rotor and upon ground impact, the
helicopter's left skid collapsed, rolling the helicopter onto its side
damaging the main rotor, tail boom, tail rotor, and the cockpit. The
pilot reported to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Inspector
that he had thousands of hours in turbine powered helicopters, and
approximately 10 hours in reciprocating engine powered helicopters. The
FAA Inspector examined the wreckage. The examination confirmed flight
control continuity and no mechanical malfunction was found in the engine.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The pilot developed low rotor RPM and did not properly recover.


(12) NTSB Identification: NYC98LA049
Accident occurred Dec-19-97 at Gettysburg, OH
Aircraft: Bihn Mini-500, registration: N727EB
Injuries: 1 Fatal

On December 19, 1997, about 1450 eastern standard time, a homebuilt
helicopter, a Bihn Mini 500, N727EB, was destroyed during a forced
landing and collision with terrain near Gettysburg, Ohio. The
certificated airline transport pilot was fatally injured. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed for the personal flight that
originated at the Phillipsburg Airport, Phillipsburg, Ohio, about 1415.
No flight plan had been filed for the local flight conducted under 14
CFR Part 91. According to witnesses, the helicopter was observed in
level cruise flight, at 900 to 1,200 feet above the ground, when they
heard the engine noise of the helicopter decrease. This was followed by
the sound of two "pops," as witnesses observed the tail of the
helicopter raise up, and an object depart from the helicopter. The
helicopter then descended below tree level. According to a Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Inspector, examination of the wreckage
revealed that it came to rest in an open field, 90 degrees nose down,
with the forward ends of the skids imbedded about 1 foot into the
ground. The tailboom was observed to have a flattened area on the upper
surface. One rotor blade was separated from the main rotor hub, and was
located about 900 feet back along the helicopter's flight path. The
helicopter was equipped with a Rotax 582 engine. Initial examination of
the engine did not reveal a reason for the decrease in engine noise. The
pilot flew for a commercial airline and had logged in excess of 10,000
flight hours in airplanes. The pilot obtained his private pilot
helicopter certificate during July 1997. He had accumulated 59 hours in
helicopters, and all training had been conducted in the Robinson R-22.
His next helicopter flight was logged in November 1997, in the Mini 500
that he constructed. At the time of the accident, it was estimated that
he had logged about 10 hours of hover, and 2 hours of flight, in N727EB.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The helicopter did not have an engine failure. RHCI was told by people
involved with the low time 50+ hours helicopter pilot that the purpose
for the flight was to perform his first autorotation in his new
Mini-500. He was advised by these people not to practice these
maneuvers, because it had been four months since he had last flown and a
refresher course was needed. In the opinion of RHCI, the pilot was
performing maneuvers in a new untrimmed aircraft that should have first
been done by a more experienced pilot, and that the pilot needed
additional instruction before attempting the maneuver.


(13) NTSB Identification: SEA98LA030
Accident occurred Jan-28-98 at Newberg, OR
Aircraft: Raser Mini-500, registration: N500YY
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

The pilot reported that he had just lifted off and attained an altitude
of about 20 feet, when the engine experienced a loss of power. The pilot
initiated an autorotation near the end of the airpark. The pilot stated
that the helicopter was yawed slightly to the left on touchdown to a
plowed muddy area. The right side landing skid collapsed and the
helicopter rolled over. Inspection of the engine revealed that one of
the two cylinders would not hold compression. Further inspection found
evidence of overheating and damage to the rings on the piston. The pilot
reported that the engine had been experiencing heating problems, and
that he had also modified the carburetor.

Probable Cause a power loss resulting from overtemperature of a
cylinder. The pilot's operation with known deficiencies was a factor.

Full Narrative
On January 28, 1998, at 1550 Pacific standard time, a homebuilt Raser
Mini 500, N500YY, operated by the pilot as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal
flight, collapsed the right landing skid and rolled over after
initiating an autorotation as a result of a loss of engine power shortly
after takeoff from Sportsman Airpark, Newberg, Oregon. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was
filed. The helicopter was substantially damaged and the airline
transport pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured. During an interview
with a Federal Aviation Administration Inspector and subsequent written
statement, the pilot reported that he had just lifted off and attained
an altitude of about 20 feet, when the engine experienced a loss of
power. The pilot initiated an autorotation near the south end of the
airpark to a plowed muddy area. The pilot stated that the helicopter was
yawed slightly to the left on touchdown. The right side landing skid
collapsed and the helicopter rolled over onto its right side. Inspection
of the engine revealed that one of the two cylinders would not hold
compression. Further inspection of the cylinder found evidence of
overheating and damage to the rings on the piston. The pilot reported
that the engine had been experiencing heating problems, and that he had
also modified the carburetor.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
RHCI suspects that improper jetting of the carburetors was the reason
for engine failure, although the customer feels it was due to cold
seizure. It should be known that a cold seizure can only occurr in two
ways: One way is due to an insufficient warm up period upon starting,
and the other could be due to a sticking thermostat that would release
cold water to the engine head shortly after take off. This would be
indicated by a high water temperature reading in a hover, and then a
sudden drop in water temperature, causing shock cooling to the engine.


(14) NTSB Identification: MIA98LA137
Accident occurred Apr-20-98 at Lakeland, FL
Aircraft: Bennett M-500A, registration: N105WB
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

The pilot stated he was on base turn to final for a fly bye, when he
experienced a 1 to 1 vertical vibration. He informed the tower that he
was going to land, and started a deceleration. The helicopter veered to
the right, and the pilot applied left antitorque pedal. The nose started
to tuck down, then the helicopter collided with the ground and rolled
over on its right side. Examination of the helicopter flight control
system revealed a hex nut backed off the cyclic flight control push rod
bolt, and the bolt became disconnected from the control yoke teeter
block. This resulted in a loss of cyclic control.

Probable Cause
A hex nut on the cyclic flight control pushrod bolt had backed off for
undetermined reason(s) and allowed the bolt to become disconnected from
the control yoke teeter block, resulting in a loss of cyclic control and
subsequent roll over during an emergency landing.

Full Narrative
On April 20, 1998, at about 1230 eastern daylight time, a Bennett
M-500A, N105WB, experimental helicopter, registered to a private owner,
operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, crashed on landing at the
Lakeland-Linder Regional Airport, Lakeland, Florida. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The
helicopter sustained substantial damage. The commercial pilot reported
no injuries. The flight originated from the Lakeland-Linder Regional
Airport about 1 hour before the accident.

The pilot stated he entered the traffic pattern landing to the south at
Chopper Town. He made a base turn and continued to final for a fly by,
when he experienced a 1 to 1 vertical vibration. He informed the tower
that he was going to land, and started a deceleration at 50 feet. The
helicopter started to veer to the right and he applied left antitorque
pedal. The nose started to tuck down, estimated at about 50 degrees nose
down. The helicopter collided with the ground in a nose down attitude
and rolled over on its right side.

Examination of the helicopter revealed that a flight control pushrod
became disconnected (hex nut backed off the attaching bolt) from the
control yoke teeter block, resulting in a complete loss of cyclic and
collective control of the main rotor system. Review of aircraft logbooks
revealed no maintenance had been performed on the flight control push
rod since assembly of the helicopter 106 hours before the accident.

The manufacturer for the Mini 500 stated the registered owner sent a fax
request ordering 20 Teflon DU bushings (part #0562) and 20 Teflon
washers (part #0101) that are used in the flight control system. The
request was made and filled on March 25, 1998, on invoice #25969. The
manufacturer stated in order for the registered owner to remove the
bushings and washers that it would be necessary to remove the MS21042L4
nut (part #0470) and the NAS144 bolt (part #0434) to replace the
bushings and washers.

The registered owner stated that he ordered the parts that were listed
on invoice 25969. He ordered the nuts to comply with Revolution
Helicopter Airworthiness Directive (AD) #3101998 dated March 10, 1998.
He elected to replace the control yoke (part #0024), bushings (part
#0562, 2 each) and the Teflon washers (part #0101, 4 each). The
replacement of these parts is accomplished by removing bolts #0365, and
the control transfer plate #0023. It does not require the removal of the
suspect bolt and nut assembly. Review of the Mini-500 Aircraft Assembly
and Maintenance Manual Sub-Assemblies instructions verified the
registered owner's comments.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
It was reported to RHCI by the builder and a person assisting him that
all the Teflon DU bushings in the control system had been replaced prior
to the fly-in. Just enough DU bushings and other parts were purchased
from RHCI for this purpose. To comply with AD# 3101998 only requires
two DU bushings be replaced, while the builder purchased 20. The
failure of the control system occurred because a permanent all metal
locking-nut came loose from a non-rotating area. It is suspected that
the nut and bolt were reused or not tightened at all, because of the
fact that all parts were purchased and replaced except for the nuts and
bolts. These certified nuts and bolts simply do not come loose unless
they are reused.


(15) NTSB Identification: MIA98LA161
Accident occurred May-13-98 at Villa Rica, GA
Aircraft: Revolution Mini-500, registration: N355RM
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

On May 13, 1998, about 1630 eastern daylight time, a homebuilt
helicopter, a Revolution Mini-500, N355RM, registered to a private
individual, operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, crashed
during a precautionary landing at Stockmar Airport, Villa Rica, Georgia.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed.
The helicopter received substantial damage, and the ATP-rated pilot was
not injured. The flight originated from a private helipad at Cedartown,
Georgia, about 45 minutes before the accident.

Full Narrative
On May 13, 1998, about 1630 eastern daylight time, a homebuilt
helicopter, a Revolution Mini-500, N355RM, registered to a private
individual, operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, crashed
during a precautionary landing at Stockmar Airport, Villa Rica, Georgia.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed.
The helicopter received substantial damage, and the ATP-rated pilot was
not injured. The flight originated from a private helipad at Cedartown,
Georgia, about 45 minutes before the accident. The pilot stated that
while in cruise flight, he noticed a "high frequency vibration/buzz
sound," together with increasing coolant and exhaust gas temperatures,
and elected to land. His intention was to perform a run-on,
precautionary landing onto the single runway at Stockmar Airport, but
the runway was in use, and he used a grassy area adjacent to the runway.
The pilot further stated he chose the grassy area because it appeared to
have been newly "bush-hogged"; however, while in the landing flare, he
realized too late that the mowed level of the grass was high enough to
conceal small obstructions. The left landing skid collided with a large,
partially hidden rock and the helicopter rotated counterclockwise
abruptly about its vertical axis approximately 240 degrees. During the
ground gyration, the main rotor severed the tailboom and the tail rotor
assembly separated from the helicopter. Postcrash inspection of the
aircraft revealed that less than a full quantity of engine coolant was
contained in the reservoir. The pilot stated the cooling system is a
closed system, and he is at a loss to explain the leakage. He states,
"It should be noted that prior to flight on this date, (accident date)
the aircraft was parked inside a hangar on a concrete floor at 7GA9,
(Whitesburg, Georgia) and no visible evidence of a leak was noted on the
floor. Further, the aircraft was landed on a concrete pad at the private
residence at Cedartown, GA and no visible evidence of a water leak was
noted on the concrete pad."

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
A hose clamp was not properly tightened, and the engine lost coolant,
causing the engine to overheat. If the water level is allowed to lower
to the cylinder headcover of the engine, the engine could overheat. A
small leak may occurr while under pressure, but not leak while sitting
on the ground.


(16) NTSB Identification: FTW98LA234
Accident occurred May-20-98 at Grove, OK
Aircraft: Revolution Mini-500B, registration: N6144S
Injuries: 1 Minor

On May 20, 1998, at 0925 central daylight time, a Revolution Mini-500B
experimental helicopter, N6144S, owned and operated by the pilot as a
Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, was destroyed during a forced
landing near Grove, Oklahoma. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed, and a flight plan was not filed. The private pilot, sole
occupant of the aircraft, sustained minor injuries. The flight
originated from the Grove Municipal Airport, about 25 minutes before the
accident. According to preliminary information, the helicopter
experience a malfunction with its clutch or the clutch's drive belt. The
pilot initiated a forced landing to a high school parking lot, and
during the attempted landing, the helicopter impacted a pickup truck.
The helicopter was destroyed by a post crash fire.

Full Narrative
On May 20, 1998, at 0925 central daylight time, a Harding Revolution
Mini-500B experimental homebuilt helicopter, N6144S, owned and operated
by the pilot, was destroyed during a forced landing following the loss
of the main rotor drive near Grove, Oklahoma. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed, and a flight plan was not filed for the Title 14
CFR Part 91 personal flight. The private pilot, sole occupant of the
aircraft, sustained minor injuries. The flight originated from the Grove
Municipal Airport, about 25 minutes before the accident.

The pilot reported that he had adjusted the alignment of the main drive
belt and engine. During the ensuing personal/test flight of the
helicopter, while at a cruising altitude of 1,350 feet MSL, he felt a
"sudden hesitation and [smelled the] odor of smoke." While he was
"determining if [a] serious malfunction existed," the helicopter
experienced a loss of main rotor drive and altitude, "along with a
stronger burning odor." The pilot initiated an autorotation to a field
adjacent to a school. However, prior to reaching the intended landing
area, the helicopter struck a parked pickup truck, "flipped over, landed
in [the] field and started on fire." The helicopter was destroyed by the
postimpact fire. The pilot had accumulated a total of 59 flight hours
in helicopters, of which 14 hours were accumulated in his homebuilt
helicopter.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The helicopter did not have a clutch failure. The drive belt was not
properly aligned, causing a belt failure. Information about proper
alignment was supplied on the Service Information Letter #040196.


(17) NTSB Identification: NYC98LA154
Accident occurred Jul-26-98 at Shermans Dale, PA
Aircraft: Johnson Revolution Mini-500, registration: N805JJ
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On July 26, 1998, about 1800 Eastern Daylight Time, a homebuilt
Revolution Mini-500 helicopter, N805JJ, was substantially damaged during
a forced landing at Yost Airport (32PA), Shermans Dale, Pennsylvania.
The certificated private pilot was not injured. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. No flight plan was
filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. According
to the pilot's written statement, after about 45 minutes of flight, he
entered the traffic pattern at his destination, and descended during
both the base leg and final approach. While on the final approach, at 20
to 30 feet of altitude, the engine "stopped dead ... no sputtering, no
sign, just nothing." The helicopter landed hard, the left skid
collapsed, the main rotor struck the tail boom, and the helicopter
rolled over on its left side. According to a Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Inspector, the fuel tank was approximately 1/3
full, and there was fuel in the glass bulb along the fuel line. There
was sufficient engine oil in the oil tank and the throttle linkage was
intact.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
From RHCI’s investigation and after discussing the accident with the
pilot, the cause of engine failure was seizure due to improper jetting.
Customer was experimenting with the different sizes of jets, and at
the time of the accident, he had installed 155 main jets. If the proper
needle jet and needle position are not installed according to RHCI’s
instructions, AD’s and advisories, the engine will seize, and most
likely this would happen in a descent where the improper needle jet
arrangement will tend to lean the mixture the most.


(18) NTSB Identification: IAD98LA092
Accident occurred Aug-11-98 at Northampton, PA
Aircraft: Austin Revolution Mini-500, Registration: N2XK
Injuries: 1 Fatal

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On August 11,1998, at 1832 eastern daylight time, a homebuilt Revolution
Mini 500 helicopter, N2XK, was destroyed during collision with terrain
following an uncontrolled descent near Northhampton, Pennsylvania. The
certificated commercial pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed for the maintenance test flight that originated at
Bangor, Pennsylvania, approximately 1800. No flight plan was filed for
the flight conducted under 14 CFR
Part 91. In a telephone interview, one witness stated his attention was
drawn to the helicopter because it sounded unusual. He said the
helicopter was maneuvering approximately 200 feet in the air. The
witness said: "I saw it circle around but it didn't sound too good. I
heard it making these weird noises. It stopped in the air and then
turned towards my house. I heard it go 'pow' then another sharp 'snap'.
It sounded like a gunshot. Then I saw this piece flying. The helicopter
rotated approximately one-quarter turn, the tail came up, the nose
dropped, and then the aircraft fell out of sight." In a telephone
interview, a second witness said his attention was drawn by the sound.
He stated: "It sounded like a helicopter, but it had a funny sound, it
had a rat-a-tat-tat sound. I couldn't see it, then I saw him make a
right hand turn heading due west gaining altitude. I heard a
'poof-poof'...Just the sounds of the rotors didn't sound normal. I heard
the lighter 'pop' and then the louder 'pop'." The witness stated the
helicopter then descended behind a tree line out of view. The wreckage
was examined at the site on August 12, 1998, by a team of Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Aviation Safety Inspectors. All major
components were accounted for at the scene. According to one Inspector's
statement: "The helicopter wreckage showed a vertical impact where the
aircraft wreckage remained within a very confined area. No wreckage was
more than a few feet from the fuselage. The only part of the aircraft
not within the main fuselage was one main rotor blade which was
discovered over 400 feet from the aircraft. Upon further investigation
of the crash site, I observed that the pitch horn (a casting) was
fractured on one of the main rotor hubs and disconnected. The blade yoke
was still attached but only about twelve inches of the blade was
attached. This part matched with the blade assembly that was over 400
feet from the wreckage. The rest of the hub assembly was found intact
and all control rods and assemblies were attached. The mast showed no
signs of mast bumping or deformation. The tailboom assembly and tail
rotor assembly showed no signs of main rotor blade contact nor prior
damage before impact...the pitch change rod to the hub with the missing
main rotor blade was loose and the jam nuts to the rod and bearings were
loose and not torqued at all." On August 12, 1998, the Inspector visited
the location where the helicopter was hangared and maintained. He found
the construction manual for the helicopter opened to the section for the
rigging and balancing of the rotor system and a copy of the "Revolution
Helicopter Airworthiness Directive (AD) #09031997...New Dynamic Main
Rotor System Balancing Procedures." According to Revolution Helicopter
Corporation, Inc., the AD was "...Urgent (Must Be Complied With Before
Further Flight)." The FAA Inspector interviewed the pilot's son
regarding any work performed on the helicopter and the purpose of the
flight. According to the Inspector's report: "His son informed me that
he was assisting his father with rotor tracking by holding the tracking
flag and his father was adjusting the blade track with the pitch change
links. The son left prior to his father finishing the ground portion of
the checks and when he returned the aircraft and his father were gone."
Portions of the main rotor system were forwarded to the NTSB Materials
Laboratory in Washington, D.C. for further examination.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
RHCI was told by the NTSB that they found the pitch change rod to the
hub with the missing main rotor blade was loose and the jam nuts to the
rod-ends and bearings were loose and not torqued at all. The pilot
didn’t finish tightening the jam nuts on the pitch link change rods. The
pilot took off to make a run, and in forward flight, the rod-ends
screwed loose causing the blades to go so far out of track that the
aircraft could no longer be controlled, causing rotor failure.


(19) NTSB Identification: MIA98LA236
Accident occurred Aug-30-98 at Hattiesburg, MS
Aircraft: Hall Revolution Mini-500, registration: N9GH
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

On August 30, 1998, about 1500 central daylight time, a Hall Revolution
Mini 500 homebuilt helicopter, N9GH, registered to an individual, landed
hard at Hattiesburg, Mississippi, while on a Title 14 CFR Part 91
personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time
and no flight plan was filed. The airline transport-rated pilot was not
injured and the helicopter received substantial damage. The flight was
originating at the time of the accident.

Full Narrative
On August 30, 1998, about 1500 central daylight time, a Hall Revolution
Mini 500 homebuilt helicopter, N9GH, registered to an individual, landed
hard at Hattiesburg, Mississippi, while on a Title 14 CFR Part 91
personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time
and no flight plan was filed. The airline transport-rated pilot was not
injured and the helicopter received substantial damage. The flight was
originating at the time of the accident.

The pilot stated that as he hovered forward at a brisk walk, he heard
the low rotor RPM horn and reduced the collective control. The
helicopter descended rapidly and touched down on the "toes" of the
skids. The helicopter bounced back into the air and the cyclic control
grip separated from the cyclic control stick. The cyclic control stick
moved to the full aft position and the main rotor blades contacted the
tail boom.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The pilot allowed the aircraft to enter into a low rotor RPM condition
from which sufficient lift could not be obtained to slow the aircraft’s
forward speed and cushion the landing. According to the pilot, the
cause of damage was control grip separating from the cyclic control
stick which moved uncontrollably to the aft position, allowing the
rotorblades to contact the aircraft tail boom. If this was the case,
then damage may have been adverte if the cyclic grip had been glued in
place as called for in the assembly manual.


(20) NTSB Identification: CHI98LA334
Accident occurred Sep-08-98 at Eden Prairie, MN
Aircraft: CulverMini-500, registration: N6269R
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

On September 8, 1998, at 1900 central daylight time (cdt), a
Culver-Revolution Mini 500, N6269R, piloted by a private pilot, was
substantially damaged when it collided with the ground shortly after a
total loss of power while hovering. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed at the time of the accident. The 14 CFR Part 91 personal
flight was not operating on a flight plan. The pilot reported no
injuries. The flight departed Eden Prairie, Minnesota, at 1850 cdt.

Full Narrative
On September 8, 1998, at 1900 central daylight time (cdt), a
Culver-Revolution Mini 500, N6269R, piloted by a private pilot, was
substantially damaged when it collided with the ground shortly after a
total loss of power while hovering. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed at the time of the accident. The 14 CFR Part 91 personal
flight was not operating on a flight plan. The pilot reported no
injuries. The flight departed Eden Prairie, Minnesota, at 1850 cdt.

The pilot said he had been hover-taxiing the helicopter between the
approach end of runway 36 and the south taxiway for runway 09R. He said
he had been hover-taxiing for about 10-minutes when "...the engine
stopped unexpectedly [and it] settled to the runway and rolled over."

The on-scene investigation revealed no anomalies with the airframe,
engine or control system that would prevent flight. Examination of the
fuel system revealed a silicon-type sealant had completely blocked the
supply side of the fuel filter.

According to the pilot/builder, he had used this material as a seal
between the helicopter's fuel tank filler neck flange and fuel tank
body. The helicopter's kit manufacturers instruction states that the
builder is to "Place a 1/8-inch bead of MA300 from the adhesive kit
around [the] hole circle through the centerline of [the mounting]
holes." A copy of these instructions are appended to this report.

The kit manufacturer was contacted regarding the accident and
pilot/builders use of the silicon-type material. The manufacturer
representative was asked if there were any warnings in the construction
manual against the use of the silicon-type sealant as the builder had
done. He said there were no warnings, only instructions to use the MA300
material. He said the MA300 is an epoxy- type glue/sealant that does not
break down when contacted by gasoline. He said the silicon-type sealant
will dissolve when contacted by gasoline. The IIC suggested the company
publish a manual change or communicate the need to use only the sealant
recommended by them. The company agreed and said they would put a
notice in the next builder's newsletter. A copy of the company's
December 1998 newsletter is appended to this report.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
This report was taken by phone from Randy Culver on Thursday, September
10, 1998, by Rick Stitt, RHCI Project Engineer.

The aircraft was in translational lift with an indicated airspeed of 15
MPH. The engine lost power and the aircraft landed hard on the back of
the skids and rolled over. The pilot did not receive any injury. The
customer determined engine power loss was caused by silicone installed
on the metal flange of the fuel tank neck, that came loose and plugged
the fuel filter. The RHCI instructions (Sect. 5 page 21, Assy
Instruction #4) recommend using MA300 in a 1/8" bead around the flange
through the center line of each hole and securing with rivets and washers.


(21) NTSB Identification: CHI98FA353
Accident occurred Sep-19-98 at Cahokai, IL
Aircraft: Barklage Revolution Mini-500, registration: N611AB
Injuries: 1 Serious

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On September 19, 1998, at 1330 central daylight time (cdt), a Barklage
Revolution Mini 500, N611AB, operated by a commercial pilot, was
destroyed when on initial climb, the helicopter's engine lost power.
During the subsequent emergency landing, the helicopter impacted into a
soybean field. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of
the accident. The personal flight was being conducted under 14 CFR Part
91. There was no flight plan on final. The pilot sustained serious
injuries. The cross-country flight originated at Cahokia, Illinois, at
1323 cdt, and was en route to St. Charles, Missouri.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
It has been reported to RHCI by the NTSB and Rotax that a foreign object
was dropped into the crank case, and worked to the top of the piston and
failed both spark plug tongues causing the engine to quit. It was
reported to RHCI that upon take off the Mini-500 climbed to an altitude
of 200 feet, and when crossing over a power line complex experienced a
power lost. The pilot had not gained enough altitude to clear the wires,
and needed to extend his autorotation in order to reach a suitable
landing site on the other side. This maneuver used all available rotor
inertia, causing the rotor system to slow in RPM to a point where the
autorotation could not be continued.


(22) NTSB Identification: LAX99LA004
Accident occurred Oct-04-98 at Moorpark, CA
Aircraft: Burson Mini-500, registration: N418MB
Injuries: 1 Fatal

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On October 4, 1998, at an unknown time, a Burson Mini 500, N418MB,
crashed in hilly terrain near Moorpark, California. The aircraft was
destroyed, and the private pilot, the sole occupant, suffered fatal
injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the afternoon
of the flight and no flight plan was filed, nor were any ATC services
provided. The pilot's daughter reported that she accompanied the pilot
to the takeoff/landing site and helped reinstall the main rotor blades,
which had been removed to trailer the helicopter. She stated that her
father reported that he would fly over the park where she was playing
baseball, and would subsequently fly over the family residence, in
approximately 45 minutes. She left the site at 1417. The daughter
further recalled that the pilot reported that he would be flying for 1
1/2 to 2 hours. She never saw or heard him fly over the park, and he was
not seen over the family house. The pilot's wife reported the pilot as
missing and an ALNOT was issued at 2040. The Ventura County Sheriff
located the wreckage at 0300 on October 5, 1998.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
RHCI was told that the pilot had recently completed his helicopter
training, and at the time of the accident had flown his Mini-500 for 33
hours. His total helicopter time was less than 100 hours. It was
reported that the pilot was flying through a canyon in Southern
California during gusty conditions. Upon investigating the crash, it was
found that all controls were intact, gas and oil were in the tanks,
carburetors and engine were running and had no signs of seizure. It is
suspected that the gusty conditions blowing over the canyon walls caused
the low-time pilot to over control the aircraft, causing the accident.


(23) NTSB Identification: MIA99LA017
Accident occurred Oct-26-98 at Hickory, NC
Aircraft: Reinhold Revolution Mini-500, registration: N500GQ
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On October 26, 1998, about 1615 eastern standard time, a Reinhold
Revolution Mini 500, N500GQ, registered to an individual, made a hard
landing following loss of engine power near Hickory, North Carolina,
while on a Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed. The
helicopter received substantial damage and the airline transport-rated
pilot was not injured. The flight originated from Hickory, North
Carolina, the same day, about 1600. The pilot stated that the engine
lost power do to a seized rear cylinder. While making a forced landing
in a field, the helicopter touched down on uneven terrain and the main
rotor blades contacted the tail boom and ground.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The engine was not taken apart to determine the reason why it quit,
therefore, engine failure is undetermined. It is known that shortly
before this accident, this engine had failed earlier. It was then sent
to a Rotax overhaul facility, and found to have a hole burnt in the
pistons, due to pre-detonation from low octane fuel. It is believed
that the pilot obtained fuel from the same source as before, causing the
second engine failure.


(24) NTSB Identification: CHI99LA026
Accident occurred Nov-06-98 at Clinton, MN
Aircraft: Tomschin Mini-500, registration: N316AZ
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On November 6, 1998, at 0923 central standard time (cst), a Tomschin
Mini 500, N316AZ, piloted by a non-certificated individual, sustained
substantial damage when while in cruise flight, the helicopter struck a
power line. The helicopter subsequently impacted into a farm field, 4
miles east of Clinton, Minnesota. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed at the time of the accident. The personal flight was being
conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. No flight plan was on file. The
individual operating the helicopter at the time of the accident reported
no injuries.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
Pilot was performing flight testing for forward balance. He was flying
about 70 mph in a hazy overcast. He flew into a power line which
contacted the aircraft on the mast, between the main blades and turtle
deck. Pilot was able to stay in control until he was about 4 feet above
the ground and 500 feet from the contact point. Aircraft landed on the
skids and sustained blade and tail boom damage.


(25) NTSB Identification: IAD99FA023
Accident occurred Nov-29-98 At Midland, VA
Aircraft: Armbruster Mini-500, registration: N500GH
Injuries: 1 Fatal

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On November 29, 1998, about 1515 eastern standard time, a homebuilt Mini
500, N500GH, was destroyed during a collision with trees near Midland,
Virginia. The certificated private pilot/owner/builder was fatally
injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight
that originated from the Manassas Airport (HEF), Manassas, Virginia. No
flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR
Part 91. A family member reported the pilot missing after not returning
from his normal 40 to 45 minute flight. The pilot's vehicle remained
parked outside his hangar the next morning, and the Federal Aviation
Administration issued an Alert Notice. The Civil Air Patrol's search
discovered that tower personnel at HEF recorded the helicopter taking
off at 1400. Witnesses stated that they saw the helicopter near Leesburg
Airport, Leesburg, Virginia, about 1430, and near Nokesville, Virginia,
about 1500, on November 29th. The helicopter was located on December 2,
1998, about 1530, in a wooded area approximately 1/4 mile
north/northeast of the Warrenton-Fauquier Airport, Warrenton, Virginia.
A survey of the debris field discovered that the initial impact point
was the top of a 50-foot tall tree. Tree limbs, measuring 4 to 6 inches
in diameter, were cut horizontally and found near the base of the tree.
One of the helicopter's rotors was lying on the ground near the tree;
the other was snagged on a fracture tree limb about 30 feet above the
ground. The main wreckage was lying on its left side between two trees 5
feet apart, and about 35 feet south of the initial impact point. All
major components of the helicopter were found at the accident scene.
Examination of the flight controls revealed continuity at the time of
impact. The engine logbook indicated that in August 1998, at 200.4 hours
on the Hobbs meter, the owner replaced both pistons, rings, wrist pins,
rod bearings, thermostat, and head o-rings. The Hobbs meter in the
wreckage read 218.7 hours. Inspection of the engine revealed two
different types of spark plugs were utilized, one of each type in the
two cylinders. The spark plugs were wired such that one magneto fired
one type of spark plug. Rotation of the crank shaft revealed 4 point
scuffing on the cylinder and the Power Take-Off (PTO) piston.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The pilot had installed his Mini-500 “Power Enhancement Package” (PEP),
and against RHCI’s severe warnings, chose not to use the provided jet
package containing a 2.76 needle jet. Instead he installed a 2.78
needle jet which meant that he needed a 155 main jet to achieve the
proper EGT in hover. RHCI informed the pilot that the engine would
seize with this small main jet, when at high-power settings it could not
supply sufficient fuel to the engine, causing it to heat and seize. The
main jet should have been a 165 or 170. Also, he had erroneously set
the needle in the third position on the cylinder that seized; the other
was correct in the fourth position. He was flying over a forest when
the engine seized, and autorotated into a 50-foot tall tree. The impact
broke the mast and the aircraft fell and landed upside down on the ground.


Unreported Accidents

The following is a summary of unreported accidents and incidents not
only in the U.S., but also in foreign countries. These accidents were
reported to RHCI by the pilots, witnesses, and friends, but not to the
NTSB, FAA, or the legal authorities in each respective country.
Therefore, in order to protect the privacy of those involved, RHCI is
only providing a description of the events.

Report 1
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature 85 deg. F
Elevation 300 ft

Pilot stated that he was demonstrating the aircraft for someone. He had
been flying several traffic patterns and had come to a 10 ft. hover. He
suddenly lost tail rotor control. The aircraft hit the ground hard while
still spinning to the right. One skid collapsed and the aircraft rolled
onto its side. The aircraft sustained typical roll over damage. Pilot
received no injuries.

Pilot had reinstalled the tail rotor assembly after trailering the
aircraft from Oshkosh. He forgot to tighten the jam nut that secures the
tail rotor push pull control cable to the tail rotor gear box mounting
plate. When the jam nut finally worked its way off, tail rotor control
was lost.

Report 2
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unknown
Elevation Unknown

The designated pilot for this aircraft failed to make sure there was
enough fuel before taking off. After flying for a while, pilot realized
he was out of gas and was forced to make an emergency landing. Pilot
failed to autorotate successfully, and therefore, aircraft sustained
typical rollover damage. Pilot received no injuries.

Report 3
Conditions Day
Wind Gusting to 20-25 mph
Temperature 80-90 deg. F
Elevation 200 ft

There was a witness to the incident. The witness stated that they were
doing track and balance. The pilot was hovering the aircraft and the
witness was working the balance equipment. The witness said that the
aircraft started to oscillate from side to side a couple of times and
then rolled over. The aircraft actually sustained less than typical
damage. Probable cause of the incident is that the pilot was hovering
the aircraft in winds that exceeded his experience level. The aircraft
has now been repaired and is again flying. The pilot had accumulated 50+
helicopter hours and received no injuries.

Report 4
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unknown
Elevation Unknown

Pilot stated that he was returning to the airport and was on a long
final when he started to lose rotor RPM and could not recover. The
aircraft hit the ground short of the airport at an estimated 20-30 mph.
The aircraft rolled three times and broke into several pieces. The
aircraft received heavy damage as would be expected. Pilot received no
injuries.

Pilot tried to blame the transmission for the loss of rotor RPM. The
transmission was shipped to RHCI and no damage other than crash related
damage could be found. Further conversations with the pilot indicated
that he let his rotor RPM get low and panicked. He said that he applied
full throttle but the RPM would not recover. He could not remember ever
lowering the collective. More than likely, he saw the ground rushing up
at him and raised the collective.

Report 5
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unknown
Elevation Unknown

The details of this accident are a little sketchy. We have heard two
different stories. One, that the controls jammed, and the other that the
pilot lost rotor RPM and could not recover. We may never know the truth.
The aircraft did land hard and roll over, sustaining typical rollover
damage. The pilot was a low-time pilot and received no injuries.

Report 6
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature 85 deg. F
Elevation 200 ft

The second-hand word from a spectator is that the pilot was on take off
and let his RPM get low and could not recover. He landed hard,
collapsing a skid and the aircraft rolled onto its side. Aircraft
suffered typical rollover damage. The pilot had accumulated 59
helicopter hours and received no injuries.

Report 7
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unknown
Elevation 1000 ft

Pilot stated the aircraft had approximately five hours of flight time.
The pilot was practicing slide on landing from a hover to the grass
beside the runway. One of the skids got caught on an aircraft tie down
that was hidden in the grass. The aircraft tipped forward and the main
rotor blades contacted with the ground. The aircraft came to rest on its
left side. The aircraft sustained typical rollover damage. The pilot
received no injuries.

Report 8
Conditions Day
Wind 8 to 12 mph
Temperature 80 deg. F
Elevation 300 ft

The pilot stated that he departed from a local gas station after
refueling. He saw power lines in his departure path and decided to do a
180 degree turn. In doing so, he turned downwind and experienced
settling with power from about 20 feet and failed to recover properly.
On impact the helicopter’s right front leg bent enough for the main
blades to strike the ground. The aircraft did not roll over and no
injuries occurred.


Report 9
Conditions Day
Wind 25 to 35 mph
Temperature 75 deg F
Elevation 142 ft

The low time pilot had just hovered his helicopter onto a trailer with
no incident. As the engine and blades wound down, a gust of wind struck
the ship from the side and blew it off the trailer. The aircraft
sustained typical rollover damage. No injuries occurred.

Report 10
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unkown
Elevation Unknown

The pilot stated that while in cruise flight at about 300 feet above
rough terrain the engine suffered a "partial" power loss. (There is no
such thing as "partial" power loss in a piston engine, and therefore,
RHCI feels that the pilot allowed the rotors to lose RPM). The pilot
spent some time trying to recover power before setting up for an
autorotation. He made a 180 degree turn on the way down. He flared early
and ran out of rotor RPM at about 15 feet above the ground. The machine
landed very hard on sloping ground and then rolled over. The aircraft
sustained typical rollover damage. No injuries occurred.

Report 11
Conditions Day
Wind Light
Temperature Unknown
Elevation Unknown

The pilot had just completed his Mini-500. While he was hovering the
helicopter for the first time to break in the engine, he drifted off the
tarmac onto a grassy area. One skid caught a mound of grass that was
protruding up. The helicopter experienced dynamic rollover and sustained
typical rollover damage. No injuries occurred.

Report 12
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unknown
Elevation Unknown

While practicing autorotations, the low-time pilot inadvertently let the
rotor RPM wind down at the bottom end of the auto. There was not enough
time to regain RPM before touchdown. The aircraft impacted then rolled
over. The aircraft sustained typical rollover damage. No injuries occurred.

Report 13
Conditions Day
Wind 10 mph
Temperature 80 deg. F
Elevation -11 ft

The 50+ hours helicopter pilot stated that after fueling the aircraft,
he departed, and then immediately turned 90 degrees left into a
crosswind for a two-hour trip. Just before he reached translational lift
at a height of about four feet, he let the rotor RPM wind down to where
he was behind the power curve and starting to lose lift. He thought
about doing a slide-on landing, but decided to do a quick stop instead.
At that point he did not have enough RPM to successfully execute a quick
stop. The aircraft slammed down bending the right skids and then rolled
over. No injuries occurred.

Report 14
Conditions Day
Wind 3 to 5 mph
Temperature 80 deg. F
Elevation Unknown

On approach the low-time pilot let the rotor RPM wind down to the bottom
of the yellow. On landing, the helicopter impacted hard enough to bend
the landing gear causing the aircraft to roll over. The aircraft
sustained typical rollover damage. No injuries occurred.

Report 15
Conditions Day
Wind 20 mph
Temperature 59 deg F
Elevation 2000 ft

The low-time pilot reported he was in very slow flight down wind at
about 30 feet when he let the rotor RPM deteriorate. He lowered the
collective for an autorotation, then misjudged the time to raise the
collective. The aircraft impacted the ground hard enough to bend the
legs and then rolled over. The aircraft sustained typical rollover
damage. No injuries occurred.

Report 16
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unknown
Elevation Unknown

The pilot decided to go flying one afternoon, but misplaced his ground
wheels and could not remove the aircraft from the garage. He thought he
could fly it out, without harming anything. As the helicopter reached
the door, the down wash pulled the door down on top of the rotors. No
pilot injuries occurred, but the helicopter sustained typical garage
door damage. (There have been more than five different stories about
this accident, and therefore, RHCI feels that the truth is not
completely known.)

Other Accidents:

1) Pilot landed in a field with several other Mini-500s coming in behind
for landing. Pilot got out of his aircraft while engine was running and
blades were turning, and did not tighten the collective friction. He
was motioning to the others where to land, and much to the pilot’s
surprise, the aircraft took off by itself, and crash. It is recommended
that any aircraft never be unattended when the engine is running.

2) Builder failed to change the center of gravity of the aircraft after
a much heavier pilot finished flying. When he picked the aircraft up to
a hover, the tail rocked back and the tail rotor struck the ground.
Minor damage to one tail rotor blade.

3) Builder failed to remove the packing material from inside the tail
boom after trailering the aircraft. While in a hover, the packing
material became entangled in the tail rotor drive shaft and severed the
drive shaft. The aircraft landed hard and bent the landing gear and tail
boom supports.


Non-Flight Related
The following were incidents non-flight related, and they have only be
included to provide you with helpful information as to what to watch for
when you are on the ground and not flying your aircraft:

1) The pilot reported that while trailering his Mini-500 home one
evening, his car collided with a large deer. The deer flew over the top
of the car and impacted the front cabin section of the Mini-500, causing
extensive damage.

2) Builder claimed that he was cleaning the engine compartment with a
flammable solvent. He then claimed that he dropped a screwdriver into
the engine compartment, and then went to the house for something. He
said he then heard the electric starter of the aircraft making noise,
and then saw flames coming from the aircraft. The customer claimed that
the screwdriver made contact with a solonoid causing sparks and the
electric starter to turn, and the aircraft was destroyed by fire. It is
noted that the aircraft was fully insured, and the customer had been
advertising it for sale.

3) Pilot reported that he landed and exited the cockpit and was waiting
for a friend. At the same time, a Piper Warrior Pa 28 was parking, and
its right wing collided into the left side of the Mini-500. The Piper's
wing, weighing about 550 pounds with a fuel tank, knocked the Mini-500
four feet from where it was parked. The only damage found in the
Mini-500 was a dent above the collective side in the main cockpit
structure side wall and between the two left front door hinges. The
Piper Pa 28's right wing was a total loss.

[Daf]

This has GOT to be the stupidest thread EVER. What the hell does most evil
mean? If you want to die just go eat a shotgun blast, and leave aviation
alone.

[ower]

"Daf" > skrev i meddelandet
...
> This has GOT to be the stupidest thread EVER. What the hell does most evil
> mean? If you want to die just go eat a shotgun blast, and leave aviation
> alone.
>
>
Or buy a Mini-500 an fly it?

[Flyingmonk]

Hey Denise,

How many hours do YOU have in the mini500? Do you fly it? Are you
still flying it?

[Dennis Fetters]

Flyingmonk wrote:
> Hey Denise,
>
> How many hours do YOU have in the mini500? Do you fly it? Are you
> still flying it?


Sir,

My name is Dennis, or Mr. Fetters to you in this case.

As for what I'm doing, that is no longer anyone's business. As for your
questions, just look, read and do your own research.

But, here are some clues:

Many...... Yes...... Yes.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Gig 601XL Builder]

"Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
. net...
> Flyingmonk wrote:
>> Hey Denise,
>>
>> How many hours do YOU have in the mini500? Do you fly it? Are you
>> still flying it?
>
>
> Sir,
>
> My name is Dennis, or Mr. Fetters to you in this case.
>
> As for what I'm doing, that is no longer anyone's business. As for your
> questions, just look, read and do your own research.
>
> But, here are some clues:
>
> Many...... Yes...... Yes.
>
>
> Dennis Fetters
>
> Designer of;
> Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
> Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
> Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
> Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
> Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
> Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
> Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter




The question remains. How many hours have you logged in the Mini-500 you
designed and do you still have a Mini-500 that you fly?

[Darrel Toepfer]

Gig 601XL Builder wrote:
> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote...
>> Flyingmonk wrote:

>>> How many hours do YOU have in the mini500? Do you fly it? Are you
>>> still flying it?

>> Many...... Yes...... Yes.

> The question remains. How many hours have you logged in the Mini-500 you
> designed and do you still have a Mini-500 that you fly?

Does he realize that there is no factory support?

Crosspost to: brasil.unix removed...

[Gig 601XL Builder]

"Darrel Toepfer" > wrote in message
...
> Gig 601XL Builder wrote:
>> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote...
>>> Flyingmonk wrote:
>
>>>> How many hours do YOU have in the mini500? Do you fly it? Are you
>>>> still flying it?
>
>>> Many...... Yes...... Yes.
>
>> The question remains. How many hours have you logged in the Mini-500 you
>> designed and do you still have a Mini-500 that you fly?
>
> Does he realize that there is no factory support?
>
> Crosspost to: brasil.unix removed...

You are probably making a joke but you do realize who Dennis is don't you?

[Darrel Toepfer]

Gig 601XL Builder wrote:

>> Does he realize that there is no factory support?
>>
>> Crosspost to: brasil.unix removed...
>
> You are probably making a joke but you do realize who Dennis is don't you?

That was all he would say a couple years ago when anyone wanted to
buy/sell/fly one, when I got into it with him...

All accidents were of course pilot error...

Google should have the entire discussion, it went for quite abit...

[Gig 601XL Builder]

"Darrel Toepfer" > wrote in message
...
> Gig 601XL Builder wrote:
>
>>> Does he realize that there is no factory support?
>>>
>>> Crosspost to: brasil.unix removed...
>>
>> You are probably making a joke but you do realize who Dennis is don't
>> you?
>
> That was all he would say a couple years ago when anyone wanted to
> buy/sell/fly one, when I got into it with him...
>
> All accidents were of course pilot error...
>
> Google should have the entire discussion, it went for quite abit...

I've read through so many threads on the Mini-500 they blur together.

[Darrel Toepfer]

Gig 601XL Builder wrote:

> I've read through so many threads on the Mini-500 they blur together.

Well Dennis has a way of popping back up ever so often to test the
waters. Usually the person that brings it up, has an IP or provider that
matches his own...

[Flyingmonk]

>Sir,

>My name is Dennis, or Mr. Fetters to you in this case.

Sorry about that Ms. Fetters. My apologies.

[Flyingmonk]

Not this time.

[UltraJohn]

"Gig 601XL Builder" <wrDOTgiaconaATcox.net> wrote:


>>
>> Google should have the entire discussion, it went for quite abit...
>
> I've read through so many threads on the Mini-500 they blur together.
Yes and of course it can be shown that 99% of all accidents are, in part,
pilot error! Just read through the NTSB's for any aircraft.
Engine failure: pilot doesn't get back to field or crashes off field, pilot
error!
Unsafe design: pilot loses control, pilot error!
Same thing
John

[Dennis Fetters]

Darrel Toepfer wrote:
> Gig 601XL Builder wrote:
>
>>> Does he realize that there is no factory support?
>>>
>>> Crosspost to: brasil.unix removed...
>>
>>
>> You are probably making a joke but you do realize who Dennis is don't
>> you?
>
>
> That was all he would say a couple years ago when anyone wanted to
> buy/sell/fly one, when I got into it with him...


That is true, as I said then and as I say now.... "YOU should not fly
the Mini-500, or any aircraft for that matter, that no longer has
factory support". So, what's your point?


> All accidents were of course pilot error...
>
> Google should have the entire discussion, it went for quite abit...


Better than that, here it all is for you below. You just have to make
the effort to educate yourself and read....
The graphs will not show here, but anyone wanting a color copy is
welcome to email me and I will send them the complete Word document.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter



************************************

Mini-500 Accident Analysis 1995-1998

RHCI has always had a policy of not including the tail rotor gearbox
with the shipment of a Mini-500 helicopter to anyone who is not a
helicopter pilot. This policy has been strictly enforced throughout the
years in order to prevent customers who have not yet received proper
helicopter training from injuring themselves and the reputation of the
Mini-500. Unfortunately, it is impossible to enforce policies for those
few who will find a way around them. Several of the pilots involved in
a Mini-500 accident were not helicopter pilots at the time their
aircraft was shipped from the factory. They received the tail rotor
gear box because either they told RHCI they were buying the kit with
another person who was a helicopter pilot, or they were somehow able to
provide documents to RHCI showing that they were qualified to fly the kit.

In this detailed analysis, it can be seen that all accidents are a
result of pilot error or a maintenance/assembly problem aggravated by
pilot error, and that the majority occurred to pilots with accumulated
low time in helicopters (100 hours or less).


Mini-500 Pilots’ Flight Experience

(Chart)

As shown in the chart above, 72% of the helicopter pilots involved in
Mini-500 accidents were either low-time helicopter pilots or did not
hold a helicopter rating at the time of the accident.

The Mini-500 has become the most popular helicopter in the world since
its introduction in 1990 and, like any other helicopter, has been
exposed to accidents. It was introduced at a time when the industry
needed an economical helicopter not only to purchase, but to operate and
maintain as well. New or low-time pilots were attracted to the Mini-500
as a way to enter the rotorcraft field or to build flight hours. The
relatively low acquisition cost allowed a new generation of pilots to
fulfill their dream of owning and flying a helicopter. High operating
costs had previously kept personal flying to a minimum. The Mini-500
created new pilots because it gave them a reason to become helicopter
certified, but this did not come without some problems.

The first few years proved to be the most difficult as the Mini-500 was
built and "field operated" by the pilots. As expected with any new
aircraft, a few mechanical problems occurred as the Mini-500 built up
flight hours. Components were re-engineered and retested before being
retro-fitted to aircraft in the field. One by one these problems were
resolved.

The aircraft was introduced with the Rotax 582, a two-cylinder,
water-cooled engine, which is considered to be very reliable if properly
installed and maintained. The homebuilt industry finally had an
inexpensive helicopter that would make many people’s dreams of reliable
vertical flight come true. A "state-of-the-art" homebuilt helicopter had
achieved a record for affordability and reliability unmatched in the
homebuilt industry.

Conversations with Mini-500 pilots from other countries reveal that many
of them feel that the U.S. suffers from a severe lack of flying
discipline. There are fewer regulations in the U.S. than in most other
countries. The U.S. is still the world leader in the aviation industry,
and more regulations will not solve some of the problems. The only
solution now is "self-regulation.” Flight instructors must demonstrate
through their own actions that safety awareness must be applied to
flying helicopters. This may explain why the Mini-500 has fewer foreign
accidents than U.S. accidents.

A review of the Mini-500 NTSB accident briefs clearly demonstrates that
lack of proper training is the primary cause of accidents through
entering low rotor RPM conditions, followed by improper or inadequate
assembly and maintenance. These are by far the most preventable
accidents and require intensive training in avoidance and prevention
techniques as well as pilot judgment training. An analysis of the
Mini-500 accidents reveals that more pilot training is needed in
anticipating power changes, rotor RPM management, and keeping the dual
engine/rotor RPM tach in the VFR scan. The Power Enhancement Package
(PEP) introduced by RHCI improves the recovery of low rotor RPM, and
therefore, RHCI recommends that every Mini-500 owner install it in their
aircraft.

Most experienced flight instructors agree that low rotor RPM problems
are a result of rapid over pitching of the collective, causing an RPM
drop. This is similar to any powered helicopter rotor RPM droop, but the
throttle in the Mini-500 will respond immediately if the pilot properly
anticipates the need of increasing power before adding collective.
Pilots must obtain training in a similar helicopter without relying on
the correlator or governor before attempting to fly the Mini-500.

Mini-500 Accident Review
(NTSB Data and Unreported Accidents)

(Chart)

Pilot Error 24
Maintenance/Pilot Error 19
Undetermined/Pilot Error 1
TOTAL ACCIDENTS 44

Notes

1. All information was obtained from the NTSB and/or directly from
the pilots, witnesses, friends, instructors, customers’ file, etc.

2. Most of these accidents were caused by several related factors and
probable causes may tend to be misleading (i.e. a roll-over may be
caused by excessive slope or unsuitable terrain, failure to successfully
autorotate, improper maintenance and assembly, collision with ground
object, etc.).

3. Mechanical failures are often caused by improper assembly,
maintenance procedures or exceeding limitations. All of them appear to
be attributed to this. In many cases, the pilot misinterpreted or
reacted improperly to a minor problem in flight.

4. Most of the accidents were attributed to pilots entering into a
low rotor RPM condition and not recovering properly.

5. Approximately 87% of accidents due to autorotative landings appear
to be caused by not recovering properly from low rotor RPM conditions.
In some cases the pilot reported an engine failure during power recovery
on a practice autorotation, or reported a rough engine followed by
failure when power was reduced for a landing. Post-accident engine run
up found wrong jets installed or in some cases no mechanical problems.
ALL OF THESE ACCIDENTS WERE AVOIDABLE!

Types of Accident

(Chart)

Types of Accidents Number of Accidents

A. Maintenance/Pilot Error 19
B. Low Rotor RPM 18
C. Collision With Ground Object 3
D. Fuel Exhaustion 2
E. Power Line Strike 1
F. Undetermined/Pilot Error 1
TOTAL 44

Accident Definitions

A.Maintenance/Pilot Error
Aircraft system failure caused by improper assembly, installation,
and/or maintenance procedures (i.e. wrong jets, belt alignment, improper
installation of components, loose parts, wrong adhesive, bad fuel, etc.)
followed by pilot error (i.e. not successfully autorotating or
recovering power after an emergency).

B. Low Rotor RPM
Inadequate control of aircraft, low rotor RPM due to practicing
autorotations, pilot operating behind the "power curve,” lack of
training, failure to maintain or recover from low rotor, etc.

C. Collision with Ground Objects
Collision during ground run-up or while in hovering flight (i.e.
aircraft tie downs, skids caught in a mound of protruding grass, etc.).

D.Fuel Exhaustion
Improper pre-flight preparation, fuel exhaustion due to running out of
fuel, leaking, or fuel restriction.

E. Power Line Strike
Collision with a power line while in cruise, takeoff, landing, etc.

F.Undetermined
The NTSB or RHCI has not determined a probable cause of the accident
(information unreliable, no eye-witnesses, information not obtainable to
determine cause).


RHCI has investigated every known Mini-500 accident, but the
investigations alone will accomplish nothing if recommendations aren’t
issued and adopted to prevent recurrence. Therefore, the following
Mini-500 accident analysis will take a detailed look at how some of the
accidents happened and how a typical safety awareness program can
prevent most of these accidents:

A.Maintenance - Of the 19 accidents in this category, approximately 98%
appear to have occurred as a result of engine failure due to having the
wrong jets installed, unauthorized modifications, improper assembly and
maintenance procedures. Most reported engine failures appear to have
resulted from improper installation and adjustments of the jets. If the
proper needle jet and needle position are not installed according to
RHCI’s instructions, Airworthiness Directives (AD’s) and advisories, the
engine will seize. This would most likely happen in a decent where the
improper needle jet arrangement tends to lean the mixture the most.

One accident was caused by installing a type of adhesive on the
fuel tank that was not the recommended one, causing the fuel filter to
become plugged. In several instances, the pilot or builder forgot to
tighten a part (i.e. a jam nut that secures the tail rotor push pull
cable left loose after trailering the aircraft; a loose hose clamp
caused the engine to lose coolant, and therefore overheat; the
collective friction was not tightened and the aircraft was left
unattended causing it to take off by itself; etc.). Lack of proper
assembly procedures (i.e. drive belt not properly aligned; improper
installation of the collective control tube; failure to remove packing
material from inside the tail boom after trailering; forgetting to
change the center of gravity of the aircraft after a much heavier pilot
finished flying; etc.) has caused several of the accidents. In one
instance, RHCI suspected that the builder reused the nuts and bolts
located in the control system area, because if he would have not done
so, the certified bolts and nuts would have not come loose.

When servicing and performing maintenance work in the Mini-500, it
is important to pay attention to detail and to make sure that no extra
parts are left inside any of the components. Compliance with RHCI’s
assembly manual, pilots operating handbook, service bulletins, AD’s,
safety notices and RHCI’s newsletters will help eliminate most, if not
all, maintenance problems on the Mini-500.

B. Low Rotor RPM - This has always been one of the most common types
of helicopter accidents and is quite often listed by the NTSB as a
contributing cause of a helicopter accident. It typically occurs to an
inexperienced pilot as a result of poor training or judgment and happens
to high-time pilots as a result of overconfidence in their ability.
Sometimes it occurs as a result of operating behind the power curve,
over pitching the collective, twisting the throttle the wrong direction,
or exceeding the performance limits of the aircraft (i.e. operating at
high gross weight, attempting takeoff with high density altitude, etc.).
Mini-500 pilots must be made aware of the limits of the aircraft’s
correlator system.

If the pilot over pitches the collective without anticipating
throttle, a rapid decay will occur that can not be corrected without
sufficient airspeed or altitude. Usually the helicopter will settle
rapidly to the ground before the pilot can regain control of the RPM.
This will occur when landing with a tail wind, allowing rate of descent
to build on approach (especially below 100' AGL), landing at a high
density altitude site, operating at high gross weights, etc. It can
generally be avoided by using a high-speed shallow approach at higher
density altitude airports and aborting a takeoff if the aircraft will
not hover momentarily (at least a few inches above the surface). Student
pilots must be taught procedures for safe operation when flying at other
than standard atmospheric conditions.

Autorotations should be practiced frequently, with recovery made
before touchdown, until pilots’ skills are developed. New pilots, low
time pilots, and pilots not accustomed to flying light weight
reciprocating helicopters should not be allowed to practice
autorotations in the Mini-500 until they can do so proficiently in a
similar two-place helicopter with an instructor. These same pilots
should also let experienced pilots first fly their Mini-500, and make
all trimming and balancing adjustments. This will make the Mini-500
safer for a new pilot to fly.

Of the 18 accidents in this category, most appear to have been
caused because the pilot put himself in a situation where he was not
able to recover from low rotor RPM (i.e. operating behind the power
curve, experiencing settling with power from 20 ft. or higher, etc.).
The most serious accidents have occurred as a result of practicing
autorotations when the pilot lacked thorough and recent training and
experience in helicopters. Intensive training in low rotor RPM recovery
is necessary in a similar type helicopter to reduce this type of accident.

C. Collision With Ground Objects - Three accidents have occurred in
the Mini-500 as a result of operating in close proximity to objects on
the ground. Most of these accidents occurred when hovering too close to
the ground. One pilot was practicing slide on landings from a hover,
and the skids caught on an aircraft tie down. On another occasion, a
pilot thought he could fly his aircraft out of his garage. While
attempting to do this, the down wash pulled the door down on top of the
rotors. Another pilot while hovering the helicopter for the first time,
to break in the engine, drifted off the tarmac area onto a grassy area,
causing one skid to get caught in a mound of grass.

RHCI has found that the odds of striking an object on the ground
are much greater than a hard landing due to engine failure, because of
the Mini-500’s high inertia system. An altitude of at least 12 inches
will avoid most objects on the ground.

Landing in unknown or unfavorable sites is generally a contributing
factor in this type of accident. Quite often the pilot has not seen the
object until it is too late, thereby colliding with it or losing control
trying to avoid it. Other times the pilot will land on a severe slope,
tall grass or soft terrain and the aircraft will roll-over. Ground
instruction on the types of terrain that are unsuitable for skid-type
landing gear must be given to students by flight instructors.
Instructors must use self-control when teaching new students.
Demonstrating landings in extremely hazardous areas has little training
value when teaching pilot judgment.

D. Fuel Exhaustion - There were two reports of accidents caused by
fuel exhaustion in the Mini-500. In one instance, the pilot failed to
pre-flight the aircraft for fuel level before taking off, causing it to
run out of fuel while in flight. On another occasion, RHCI suspected
that the pilot filled his gas tank with low octane level (less than 87
octane) without knowing it, causing the engine to fail due to
pre-detonation. It was reported to RHCI that the aircraft was freshly
refueled at the airport gas pump, and based on RHCI’s past experiences,
the grade usually offered by airports in auto gas is less than 87
octane. If the gas is in the ground for a long period of time, it will
lose octane, and low octane gas will pre-detonate in the Rotax engine,
as explained in the Rotax manual. RHCI recommends that pilots always
test the fuel for octane level when obtaining fuel from an airport or
even from the local gas station.

E. Power Line Strike - Even though there was only one accident caused
directly by a Mini-500 striking a power line, two other accidents can
also be attributed to power lines. One pilot flew into a power line at
70 MPH while flight testing for forward balance. The power line
contacted the aircraft on the mast, and the pilot was able to maintain
control up until ground contact. On another two occasions, the pilots
failed to see the power lines before taking off, but were able to miss
them. In the process, they allowed the rotor RPM to droop and were
unable to recover.

Contrary to popular belief, most wire strikes occur in clear
weather conditions. This type of wire encounter is most likely to be
fatal since the aircraft is usually operating at a high rate of speed at
the moment of impact. Intensive ground training on wire strike
avoidance is required to avoid this common fatal accident. Only
experienced pilots should fly low level operations.

G. Undetermined/Pilot Error - Only 1 accident in the Mini-500 has
been undetermined during this period. The pilot did not successfully
complete an autorotation and did not have the engine disassembled to
determine the reason for failure. Therefore, engine failure is
undetermined.


The Revolution Mini-500 makes up approximately 4% of the total U.S.
civil helicopter fleet (year end 1998). There are approximately 436
Mini-500 helicopters in the U.S. compared to 10,892 other types of
helicopters. Of the 436 Mini-500’s in the U.S. fleet, 38 were involved
in accidents for the calendar years 1995-1998, or approximately .35% of
the U.S. fleet. Of the 10,892 other helicopters, 716 were involved in
accidents during this same period, or approximately 6.5% of the U.S.
fleet. This includes helicopters used for such diverse operations as
crop dusting, corporate, off-shore, personal and business, EMS, etc.

Considering the role the Mini-500 has in the worldwide personal use
market, the Mini-500 would be expected to have a proportionately higher
number of accidents each year. Enstrom had similar problems back in the
1970's when F. Lee Bailey spiffed up the F28A and targeted the
businessman market. The accident rate soared as dealers sold executives
the idea of the modern “flying carpet.” Unfortunately, despite claims
made as early as 1950, the world is still not ready for a helicopter in
everyone's garage. Even the MD-500, one of the easiest light helicopters
to fly, can be a handful to an inexperienced pilot, a phenomenon that is
not unlike the V-Tail Beech or the Cessna Citation. Considering the fact
that Mini-500 helicopters are used for some type of personal recreation
(which generally involves numerous takeoffs/landings), the accident rate
per aircraft flying becomes even more favorable.



To take this analysis a little further, let's look at the total
transportation accidents records in the U.S. as published annually by
the NTSB:

Comparison of U.S. Transportation Fatalities for 1997

Fatalities Fatalities
Passenger Cars 22,227 Pedacycles 800
Trains 746 Airplanes (G.A.) 646
Buses 15 Helicopters 78
Motorcycles 2,099 (Mini-500) 3


During 1998, total helicopter fatalities were 91, while the Mini-500
only had 4.

A detailed analysis would be necessary in order to assess risk/benefit
in any form of transportation. How often has it been said in the
helicopter industry (since Igor Sikorsky first said it) that a
helicopter is potentially one of the safest forms of transportation?
This statement may very well prove to be true someday.


Mini-500 Total Accidents
(Chart)

Out of 44 flight related Mini-500 accidents, there were 35 accidents
with minor or no injuries (80%), 2 serious injuries (4%), and 7 fatal
(16%). Of the nine serious and fatal accidents, five were caused by
pilot error and four by maintenance aggravated by pilot error.



Mini-500 Accident Rate vs. Total Aircraft Flying
(Chart)

RHCI estimates that about 400 out of 521 Mini-500 sold are flying or
capable of flight. RHCI bases this estimate on conversations and
letters received from the builders. This indicates that 44 (11%) out of
an estimated 400 flyable Mini-500s were involved in an accident.


Conclusion

The results of accident investigations or safety studies are useless
unless the information is readily available to those who need it. Pilots
are still cited as a cause or contributing factor in about 85% of all
general aviation accidents. While new technology and design have clearly
played an important role in the improved safety record, the potential
for continued improvements down the road may be diminishing and we need
to focus on the human factors affecting the safety of flight operations:
factors such as situational awareness, error chain detection and
analysis, communication skills, decision-making, stress management, etc.

This Mini-500 Accident Analysis has been compiled in the interest of
helicopter safety and can be adapted to any type of helicopter safety
program. Flight schools and instructors are urged to review these and
other Mini-500 accident data with students to make them aware of some
common mistakes made by Mini-500 pilots. All helicopter pilots are aware
of the inherent risks involved in aviation, especially the unique risk
to helicopter operations. Any type of flying activity involves certain
risk, whether it be in an ultralight airplane or a commercial airliner,
and pilots have accepted the risk realizing full well the consequences
when something goes wrong.

Despite repeated criticism from opponents, the Mini-500 helicopter has
proven itself to be one of the safest helicopters ever manufactured. It
was certified as a homebuilt kit under the 51% category. Its primary
markets (personal training for adding on hours and personal use) have
placed it in a high risk category and not unlike the Cessna 152, it is
exposed to a higher accidents rate.

The Mini-500 and the pilots that fly it throughout the world have
achieved a remarkable record in helicopter safety. It has given many the
opportunity to finally own a helicopter, and it has helped many pilots
to increase their helicopter flight time inexpensively. It has opened
the market and allowed pilots all over the world to learn to fly
helicopters affordably. A Mini-500 as well as any other helicopter will
crash as a result of low rotor RPM or poor maintenance. These types of
accidents may very likely occur in a helicopter other than the Mini-500,
but that would probably not receive the same level of attention as a
Mini-500 accident.

Many pilots who have been flying the Mini-500 are aware of some of the
more controversial accidents in the past few years. Many of us in the
industry are aware of these accidents, but it is rare that the actual
circumstances are revealed. NTSB data tends to indicate the probability
that the accident was caused by pilot error. RHCI has acted responsibly,
as it always has in the past, to prevent future accidents. I am
comfortable knowing that with good training and supervision, people are
probably safer in the aircraft than in the car.

NOTES: All data and statistics have been obtained from NTSB and the
Helicopter Association International (HAI) sources.

Mini-500 Reported Accidents to the NTSB

The following accident summaries are abstracts from NTSB Accident
Reports and are intended to keep operators, maintenance personnel and
safety managers aware of the Mini-500 helicopter safety trends. Except
for RHCI Investigative Findings, the text of these reports is taken from
NTSB reports; no editorializing has been done.

Followng each NTSB accident report, RHCI includes its findings (RHCI
Investigative Findings) after investigating each accident and obtaining
information from the NTSB, FAA, pilots, witnesses, and RHCI’s customers’
file. It is RHCI’s intent to clarify the information and help those
seeking the real cause of the accidents to understand what could go
wrong when flying not only the Mini-500, but any helicopter. The RHCI
information is the opinion of RHCI, and should not necessarily reflect
the opinion of the NTSB, FAA or any other affiliated group or organization.


(1) NTSB Identification: CHI95FA242
Accident occurred Jul-27-95 At Oshkosh, WI
Aircraft: Revolution Helicopter Mini-500, registration: N500ZZ
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

The amateur-built helicopter was conducting a demonstration flight
during the annual EAA convention. During the first flight after
re-jetting of the carburetor, the helicopter experienced a total loss of
engine power. During the autorotation into a crop field, the helicopter
was substantially damaged when the skid shoes caught in the terrain,
failing the left skid and fracturing the shoe on that skid. Subsequent
examination of the engine revealed that the rear piston had seized in
the cylinder. The owner of the company which produces the helicopter
stated that the re-jetting of the carburetor was made in an attempt to
achieve what were thought to be correct readings in main rotor RPM and
EGT after replacement of both gauges. The company owner attributed the
piston seizure to the re-jetting. The skid shoes were new and had been
tested only on concrete. The owner said that the design contributed to
the damage to the helicopter. Probable Cause the inadequate design of
the helicopter skid shoes. Factors related to the accident were: false
indications of rotor RPM and EGT which led to seizure of the piston.

Full Narrative
On July 27, 1995, at 0930 central daylight time, an amateur built
Revolution Helicopter Mini-500, N500ZZ, registered to Revolution
Helicopter Corp. of Excelsior Springs, Missouri, and piloted by a
commercial helicopter pilot, experienced a total loss of engine power
while in cruise flight. During an auto rotational (forced) landing,
one-half mile west of Wittman Regional Airport, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, the
helicopter sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported no injuries.
The local 14 CFR Part 91 flight was operating in visual meteorological
conditions. No flight plan was on file. The flight departed at 0920. The
accident occurred during the annual Experimental Aircraft Association's
convention. The helicopter was conducting a demonstration flight in the
vicinity of the airport at Oshkosh, Wisconsin.

Personal Information
The pilot had obtained approximately 100 hours flight time in this type
of helicopter, at the time of the accident. This was the first flight of
the day.

Aircraft Information
The helicopter had accumulated 210 hours time in service at the time of
the accident with less than one hour since inspection and maintenance to
the carburetor which included changing the jetting.

Wreckage And Impact Information
The helicopter impacted the terrain during a forced landing in an open
field approximately one-half mile west of Wittman Regional Airport,
Oshkosh, Wisconsin. There were two ground scars consistent with the size
and shape of the skids running westerly from the first visible impact
mark to the wreckage. The left skid was broken away from its mounting.
The tail boom was lying to the north of the main wreckage and exhibited
sharp fractures at the broken end. The tail rotor blades were bent. The
main rotor blades were bent and broken and one had red paint on it
similar to the color of the tail boom. Subsequent examination of the
engine found that the rear piston was seized in the cylinder. The owner
of the company producing the helicopter said that two changes to the
helicopter just prior to the flight were of concern. He stated that a
new rotor/engine RPM instrument was installed at the same time as a new
exhaust gas temperature (EGT) gauge. He said that prior to the
installation of these gauges that the helicopter was operating without
incident; however after reading the indications on these new instruments
re-jetting of the carburetor was done in an attempt to bring the
readings within gauge limits. The owner attributed the seizure to the
previous accomplished re-jetting. He said that at the same time a new
set of skid shoes were installed on the skids of the helicopter and
testing was done on concrete only. When an autorotational landing was
conducted in a crop field the new skid shoes dug in and stopped the
helicopter in a short distance, failing the left skid and fracturing the
skid shoe on that skid.

Additional Data/Information
The NTSB did not exercise its right to retain custody of the wreckage.
When the on scene investigation was complete the wreckage was removed
and retained by the owner. Party to the investigation was the Federal
Aviation Administration, Flight Standards District Office, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
As published in the September 1995 “Reaching the Customer” newsletter,
the following report was written by Brian Thomas (RHCI’s Test Pilot):

Many of you have been asking questions about the autorotation
capabilities and crashworthiness of the Mini-500. Well, I will answer
some of those questions, but this time with an actual experience...

Oshkosh was less than a week away, the composite department was still in
the learning stage and needed much supervision, and the assembly manual
was a priority. Our minds were divided onto these other projects while
we were working on preparing the aircraft for the show. As a result of
this, we made three mistakes which caused this whole incident.

First, we installed a new rotor/engine tachometer in the aircraft just
before the fly-in. We thought the gauge was calibrated correctly. Also,
we were using a new EGT gauge that was supposed to be self-compensating
for temperature. The week before Oshkosh, the temperature at the
factory was 95 to 100 degrees F. with 95% humidity. After making these
changes, the aircraft experienced a loss in performance. Our EGT
temperatures were only running about 900 to 1000 degrees F. We
attributed this loss of performance to the high temperature and
humidity. Using the EGT gauge as a guide, we leaned the mixture by
installing much smaller main jets and lowering the needles. This brought
the temperature up to 1100 and 1200 degrees F., but with no significant
increase in performance. Through testing, we then learned that the
rotor/engine tachometer was calibrated too low. After re-calibration,
our performance returned. EGT’s were still reading normally and were
left as changed. I immediately conducted a short test flight and
everything seemed to be working well.

Second, we installed wear shoes on the bottom of the skids to prevent
excessive wear on concrete and rocky surfaces. Our intentions were to
make this an option later. These shoes consisted of eight pieces of
steel, four per skid, approximately five inches long, riveted with six
rivets each, evenly spaced along the skids.

Third, we did not test the skid shoes on grass or dirt to see if they
would change the run-on landing performance.

Now for what happened at Oshkosh. It was the first flight on the first
day of the show. I started the aircraft and hovered around the grass
runway for a few minutes and the aircraft was operating normally. I
then departed and entered the traffic pattern. On my first trip around
the pattern, the aircraft was performing perfectly. I was keeping an
eye on the EGT gauge to make sure that the temperatures were still good,
since it was cooler at Oshkosh than at the factory. The temperature was
still 1100 and 1200 degrees F. On my second trip around the pattern,
the engine suddenly stopped. The EGT gauge that we installed was not as
accurate as we thought and the engine hot seized. At the time the
engine quit, I was at 300 feet AGL with an airspeed of 70 MPH. I
entered autorotation and steered for a nearby clover field. The
autorotation was uneventful, as was the flair and touchdown.

As I have previously said, the Mini-500 is one of the best autorotating
helicopters I have ever flown. The problems began during the ground
slide. Immediately upon touchdown, the skid shoes caught in the clover
and soft dirt so hard that one shoe was pulled off the skid! The left
skid caught and jerked so hard that the legs buckled. The legs did not
buckle because they are not strong enough. They buckled from the
enormous force of trying to stop 730 lbs. of aircraft so quickly. The
skid shoes were the cause, not the legs. When the left skid buckled,
the aircraft started to go onto its left side. As a result, one rotor
blade contacted the tail boom. Part of the reason that the skid shoes
caught so hard is that the normal procedure for the Mini-500 is to lower
the collective all the way down after touchdown from an auto. On most
helicopters with skid shoes, the procedure is to hold the collective up
until the helicopter comes to a stop to prevent the shoes from digging
in too badly. I am very familiar with this procedure, but failed to
relate it to the Mini-500.


(2) NTSB Identification: LAX96LA150
Accident occurred Mar-31-96 at San Carlos, CA
Aircraft: Lampert Revolution M500, registration: N750GL
Injuries: 1 Minor

According to FAA airman records, the pilot did not hold a rotorcraft
category rating. FAA inspectors examined the pilot's logbook and
reported that he received a solo endorsement in helicopters about 1 1/2
years ago. The pilot was returning to the airport following a local area
flight. About 1 mile west of the airport, the pilot began to smell
something burning and said he sensed something was wrong. Shortly
thereafter, he heard a "slap" sound as the helicopter transitioned
through 50 feet and 50 knots about 1/4 mile from the runway. The pilot
stated that he "didn't do anything [with the controls] but keep it
headed for an open area between the taxi way and the runway." The pilot
said he did not flare or touch the collective, and the helicopter hit
hard in the open area and rolled on its left side. An FAA airworthiness
inspector examined the helicopter and found the engine to transmission
drive belt fragmented, with rubber transfer throughout the engine
compartment. Rubber transfer on the pulleys showed a forward movement
pattern of the belt off the pulley. The inspector reported that the
pulley was designed without a flange or other means to keep the belt
aligned.

Probable Cause
The pilot's failure to recognize a drive train disengagement and
initiate an autorotation. The inadequate engine-to-transmission drive
belt/pulley design, and the pilot's limited training and experience in
rotorcraft operations were factors in this accident.

Full Narrative
On March 31, 1996, at 1347 hours Pacific standard time, a homebuilt
experimental Lampert Revolution M500 helicopter, N750GL, collided with
the ground and rolled over during landing at San Carlos, California. The
aircraft was owned, built, and operated by the pilot. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was
filed. The helicopter sustained substantial damage. The non-rotorcraft
rated private pilot, the sole occupant, sustained minor injuries. The
flight originated at Half Moon Bay, California, on the day of the
accident at 1315 as a personal cross-country flight to San Carlos.
According to FAA airman records, the pilot does not hold a rotorcraft
category rating. FAA inspectors examined the pilot's logbook and
reported that he received a solo endorsement in helicopters about 1 1/2
years ago. The pilot reported that he flew from San Carlos to Half Moon
Bay earlier in the day and was returning to the San Carlos airport.
About 1 mile west of the airport the pilot began to smell something
burning and said he "sensed something was wrong." Shortly thereafter, he
heard a "slap" sound as the helicopter transitioned through 50 feet and
50 knots about 1/4 mile from the runway. The pilot stated that he
"didn't do anything [with the controls] but keep it headed for an open
area between the taxi way and the runway." The pilot said he did not
flare or touch the collective and the helicopter hit hard in the open
area and rolled on its left side. An FAA airworthiness inspector
examined the helicopter and found the engine to transmission drive belt
fragmented, with rubber transfer throughout the engine compartment.
Rubber transfer on the pulleys showed a forward movement pattern of the
belt off the pulley. The inspector reported that the pulley is designed
without a flange or other means to keep the belt aligned.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
RHCI was allowed to investigate the damaged aircraft with the FAA
present in an attempt to discover why the belt failure occurred. It was
explained to the FAA investigator how the belt alignment worked, and the
flanges on the sprocket were pointed out to him at that time. They were
in place and functioning. There was another Mini-500 in the same hanger
built by the same person, but not yet flown. RHCI showed the FAA
inspector that the belt on the crashed Mini-500 had not been properly
aligned, and that the same mistake was made on the other Mini-500 he
built as well. It is unknown why the inspector said the sprocket was
designed without a flange or other means to keep the belt aligned, even
when RHCI showed him the flanges and explained their operation, but RHCI
had no influence on the outcome of an NTSB or FAA investigation. With
hundreds of Mini-500 now flying, the belt alignment system has obviously
proved itself if properly installed and maintained.


(3) NTSB Identification: LAX97LA150
Accident occurred Apr-16-97 at Lihue, Kauai, HI
Aircraft: Duff Mini-500, registration: N13118
Injuries: 1 Fatal

A witness stated that the helicopter appeared to be about 500 feet AGL
and that he could hear a "tick-tick-tick" sound as the aircraft started
yawing to the left and right. The yawing motion was followed by a left
roll to an inverted attitude from which the aircraft descended nose down
to the ground and crashed. At the time that the roll began, the tail
rotor and gearbox were observed to separate from the tail boom.
Examination of the helicopter did not disclose any pre-accident engine,
fuel system, or flight control system malfunctions or abnormalities.
Black paint, the color of the tail boom, was evident on the leading edge
of both main rotor blades, and four impact dents were found on the tail
boom. Paint transfer indicated that the upper right-hand windshield had
also been impacted by the main rotor blades. Review of the student
pilot's flight records disclosed that he had obtained 12 hours of
helicopter dual instruction in 1991, with only 1 hour listed for
autorotations. No record of additional dual instruction was found
between 1991 and the date of the accident.

Probable Cause
the student pilot's improper use of the helicopter flight controls,
which resulted in rotor contact with the tail boom and loss of control.
Factors relating to the accident were: the pilot's lack of total and
recent training and experience in airborne control of helicopters.

Full Narrative
On April 16, 1997, at 1424 hours Hawaiian standard time, a single-place
Duff Mini-500 homebuilt experimental helicopter, N13118, was destroyed
when it impacted the ground in the vicinity of Lihue, Kauai, Hawaii. The
student pilot was fatally injured. The flight departed from the pilot's
Anahole residence for an unknown destination. No flight plan was filed
for the personal flight and no en route communications were received by
any Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) facility. An eyewitness, who
was approximately 1/4 mile from the crash location, stated that the
aircraft appeared to be about 500 feet AGL, and that the engine did not
sound as if it was maintaining a steady RPM. The aircraft was then
observed to start yawing to the left and right, which was followed by a
left roll to an inverted attitude, from which it descended nose down to
the ground. At the time the final roll began, the tail rotor and gear
box were observed to separate from the tail boom. The witness also
stated that he heard a "tick-tick-tick" sound emanating from the
aircraft at the time that it appeared to be in trouble. The helicopter
was examined by an FAA airworthiness inspector from the Honolulu,
Hawaii, Flight Standards District Office, with the technical assistance
of the aircraft kit manufacturer's safety investigator. According to
their report, which is appended to this report, the fuel system was
intact and without obstructions. The system was equipped with a
motorcycle fuel filter, but no debris or obstructions were found in the
filter and there was no evidence of a fuel problem. All control system
linkage breaks that were found appeared to have resulted from fracture
and not fatigue, and all rod ends that were broken had first been bent.
The engine exhaust manifold bolts and head bolts were found to be finger
tight. The internal parts of the engine were in new condition and
correctly assembled. One manufacturer's bulletin on the carburetor,
which specified a change in jets, had not been complied with; however,
the inspector stated that the engine had been running rich so the
noncompliance was not considered significant. The electronic engine
ignition system was intact and functional. The engine contained coolant
and oil, and no evidence was found that would indicate an engine
problem. The main transmission and tail rotor gear box contained
lubricant. The tail rotor gear box was severed in half but the internal
gears were in new condition. The tail rotor blades were bent and one
main rotor blade had separated from the rotor head and was found 30 feet
away from the aircraft. Black paint, the color of the tail boom, was
evident on the leading edge of both main rotor blades, and four impact
dents were found on the tail boom moving progressively towards the
cockpit. The upper right-hand windshield was separated from the airframe
with a smear of paint transfer identical to the main rotor blade color.
The FAA inspector stated that the student pilot's records indicated
that he had received 12 hours of helicopter flight instruction in 1991,
of which a total of only 1 hour was logged for both autorotation and
pattern flight. Five years later, and without any known additional
instruction, the pilot obtained and assembled a Mini-500 helicopter and
proceeded to train himself to fly it after a flight instructor
endorsement for solo flights that the FAA stated was in violation of
FAR's 61.59, 61.87, 61.189, and 61.195.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The FAA asked RHCI to join the Investigation Team in an attempt to
establish a cause for the accident. RHCI compiled information through
the local police department, eye witnesses, friends of Mr. Duff, and the
NTSB and FAA.

After RHCI’s examination, it is RHCI’s opinion that no mechanical
failures occurred during the aircraft's last flight, and if it were not
for the crash, the aircraft could be flying today. By compiling the
evidence, RHCI believes that the best scenario which led to the crash is
as follows:

Mr. Duff had received 12 hours of helicopter flight instruction back in
1991. Only one hour during this time was logged for both autorotations
and pattern flight. Five years later, and without any further
instruction, Mr. Duff assembled a Mini-500 helicopter kit and proceeded
to train himself to fly it. During his third flight, and his longest
cross country, Mr. Duff probably allowed his rotor blades to lose RPM to
the point that the low rotor warning light and the low rotor warning
horn alerted him of this situation. Without the proper experience and
training, Mr. Duff overreacted and overspun the rotor system in an
attempt to normalize his RPM. The aircraft yawed to the right, and then
again yawed to the left as he chopped power to avoid the overspin. While
the aircraft was yawing, he would have been trying to regain control of
the cyclic, collective and anti-torque pedal systems. His responsibility
was then overloaded and he failed to catch up with the controls and
decayed his rotor RPM to the point that the centrifugal force of the
blades was not great enough to hold them in their plane. The oncoming
forces of airflow and retreating blade stall caused the aircraft to roll
left and then invert. What RPM was left in the rotors then allowed them
to contact the tail boom, striking it with such force that it broke the
tail rotor gear box off of the tail boom. The rotors also folded and
contacted the cockpit. The pilot lost control, and then lost RPM and
failed to recover. The aircraft then impacted the ground at a speed
well in excess of 100 MPH. The pilot instantly died from impact. The
cause of the crash was pilot error, due to his inability to fly a
helicopter.


(4) NTSB Identification: CHI97LA222
Accident occurred Jul-19-97 at Ava, MO
Aircraft: Morgan Mini-500, registration: N500XM
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

On July 19, 1997, at 1315 central daylight time, an experimental Mini
500 helicopter, N500XM, was substantially damaged during a forced
landing near Ava, Missouri. The pilot reported that the engine lost
power during cruise. He was not injured. The 14 CFR Part 91 flight had
departed Cabool, Missouri, about 1245 with a planned destination of Ava,
Missouri. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan
was filed.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The NTSB had this Mini-500 delivered to RHCI to help in the
investigation. With the NTSB present, it was discovered that the
original airplane jetting was still installed in the carburetors. The
engine failed due to high EGTs from failure to follow instructions and
re-jet the engine upon installation for helicopter use. The helicopter
landed on the side of a 30 degree hill, and rolled over.


(5) NTSB Identification: LAX97LA269
Accident occurred Jul-31-97 at Agua Dulce, CA
Aircraft: Mitteer Mini-500, registration: N501GM
Injuries: 1 Serious

The pilot of the recently completed, kit-built helicopter, stated that
the engine stopped abruptly about 150 feet above helipad elevation as he
was on base leg for landing. A hard landing resulted from an
unsuccessful autorotation. Examination of the helicopter revealed that
the size of the metering jet installed in both carburetors by the
owner/pilot was too small, and that the fuel metering pin in both
carburetors was improperly set so as to create an excessively lean
fuel/air mixture, which resulted in loss of engine power. The pilot
reported having 50 hours total helicopter flight time and that he last
practiced autorotations 22 years prior to the accident. A revised
aircraft assembly manual, which added a discussion of fuel jets and
metering pins, was offered to holders of the earlier manual at a reduced
price; however, the owner/builder did not purchase it. An article in the
manufacture's newsletter, again discussing the importance of this
subject, was sent to the owner/builder's address of record.

Probable Cause
Failure of the owner/builder to obtain and comply with service
literature from the kit manufacturer, which resulted in improper setting
of the carburetor fuel mixture and led to loss of engine power. An
additional cause was the pilot's failure to successfully autorotate the
helicopter to an emergency landing. The pilot's lack of total experience
in the type helicopter and lack of recent experience in performing
autorotations were related factors.

Full narrative
On July 31, 1997, at 1945 hours Pacific daylight time, an experimental
(amateur built) Mitteer Mini 500 helicopter, N501GM, was substantially
damaged when it collided with terrain while on landing approach to a
private helipad at Agua Dulce, California. The commercial pilot was
seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the
personal flight. The recently completed helicopter departed from the
helipad about 1940. According to the pilot's brother, the pilot related
from his hospital bed that the engine stopped abruptly about 150 feet
above helipad level as he was on base leg for landing. Because previous
approaches had been at too steep an angle, the pilot was deliberately
flying a flatter and slower approach, which, together with his low
altitude when the engine failed and lack of a suitable landing site,
made his autorotation unsuccessful. According to inspectors from the
Van Nuys Flight Standards District Office, the aircraft impacted on a
two-lane asphalt road about 1/8 mile from the helipad in a valley about
100 feet below the helipad elevation. Terrain slopes upward about 45
degrees on one side of the road and there are power transmission lines
on the other side of the road, however, the helicopter contacted neither
prior to impacting on the roadway. The impact bent both landing skids
outward and the belly of the fuselage contacted the pavement. The
pilot's seat structure exhibited compression failure with more collapse
on the left side than the right side. The two rotor blades had minor
damage on the lower surface of the tips. After impact, the aircraft
rotated 90 degrees to the right and came to rest about 10 feet away from
the impact mark, resting on its left side. According to the inspector,
no airworthiness certificate or operating limitations had been issued to
the builder/pilot by the Federal Aviation Administration. The recording
hour meter in the aircraft indicated 8.4 total hours, however, the pilot
told his brother that he had operated the aircraft more than those
hours. The pilot's logbook indicated total operating time since new,
including ground run time, of 14.8 hours. The first entry was about a
month before the accident. The last entry in the logbook, for the
previous flight, indicates that the pilot changed the fuel metering jets
in the carburetors to "150" size. The pilot reported having 50 hours
total helicopter flight time, with 18 hours in the previous 60 days. In
a telephone conversation with the Safety Board in December, 1997, the
pilot said that he received his helicopter training in 1975 in a Bell 47
helicopter, and that was the last time he practiced an autorotation to
landing. In June, 1997, prior to first flying his Mini 500, he took 2
hours of dual instruction in a Robinson R-22, but did not perform any
autorotation practice. Representatives of the company which manufactures
the parts kit for the helicopter, examined the aircraft and determined
that the size of the metering jet installed in both carburetors by the
owner/pilot was too small, and that the fuel metering pin in both
carburetors was improperly set so as to create an excessively lean
fuel/air mixture in the engine. Examination of the aft piston of the two
cylinder engine through the exhaust port showed scoring on the sides of
the piston and evidence of "hot seizure." A manufacture's bulletin on
the subject of sizing metering jets and metering pins in the carburetor
to control exhaust gas temperature was issued on May 7, 1996, the same
day the kit was shipped to the manufacture's dealer. The dealer signed
and returned a receipt for the bulletin to the manufacturer who placed
it in the file for the aircraft serial number. The kit was sold to the
builder/pilot on January 13, 1997, and there is no record whether there
was a copy of the service bulletin with the kit. An article in the
manufacture's newsletter of March, 1997, discussed the importance of
this subject again. According to the kit manufacturer, the newsletter
was mailed to the builder/pilot's address of record, which was his
business address. A revised aircraft assembly manual which added a
discussion of fuel jets and metering pins was offered to holders of the
earlier manual at a reduced price. The owner/builder did not purchase
the revised manual.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The NTSB invited RHCI to help in the investigation. With the NTSB
present, it was discovered that the jetting was incorrectly installed in
the carburetors to the maximum lean settings, and the EGT gauge was
labeled by the pilot at a red line of 1300F. The EGT should never run
more than 1150F. The engine seized due to high EGTs from improper
jetting. The accident was caused from failure to perform successful
autorotation. In fact, the rotor blades were nearly undamaged and not
turning at the time of impact. It is believed the helicopter fell more
than 50 feet, and hit on a hard paved road.


(6) NTSB Identification: IAD97LA113
Accident occurred Aug-23-97 at New Philadelphia, OH
Aircraft: Haines Revolution Mini-500, registration: N7240E
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

On August 23, 1997, at 1045 eastern daylight time, a Haines Revolution
Mini 500, homebuilt helicopter, N7240E, was substantially damaged when
it collided with the ground during takeoff at Harry Clever Field, New
Philadelphia, Ohio. The certificated private pilot was not injured.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local, personal
flight that originated at New Philadelphia, Ohio. The flight was
conducted under 14 CFR Part 91 and a visual flight rules flight plan was
not filed. According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Safety
Inspector, the pilot was taking off, and about 50 feet above the ground,
the rotor RPM started to decay. The pilot said he applied more power,
but the engine sputtered, and shortly thereafter the engine lost power.
The pilot said he entered autorotation, but he did not have enough rotor
speed to land safely, and the helicopter struck the ground. According to
the pilot, he had flown the helicopter for an hour the day before, and
he had refueled the helicopter the day of the accident. The fuel tank,
fuel lines, fuel filter and fuel pump were examined after the accident
by the FAA Inspector. According to the Inspector, the examination did
not disclose any contaminants. The helicopter was moved to a hangar for
further examination.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
It was reported to RHCI that the pistons had holes burnt through them,
and the tongues were gone from the spark plugs. This can happen only
with the use of low octane fuel or if the cylinder head of the engine
has been modified to increase compression ratio. It was reported to
RHCI that the aircraft was freshly refueled at the airport gas pump. The
cause of engine failure was due to pre-detonation of fuel. It is
suspected by RHCI that the gas used prior to the flight was less than 87
octane, which is usually the grade offered by airports in auto gas. If
the gas is in the ground for a long period of time, it will lose octane,
and low octane gas will pre-detonate in the Rotax engine, as explained
in the Rotax manual. The cause of the accident was failure to perform a
successful autorotation.


(7) NTSB Identification: FTW97LA328
Accident occurred AUG-26-97 at Huffman, TX
Aircraft: Fingerhut Revolution Mini-500, registration: N570F
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

The student pilot experienced a disconnect of the collective control
system which resulted in the main rotor blades going to flat pitch while
in cruise flight at 800 feet MSL. When the pilot attempted to cushion
the landing by increasing collective pitch, the helicopter yawed to the
left prior to touching down and the helicopter rolled over on its side.
Examination of the wreckage revealed a disconnect of the collective
flight control system between the collective riser block (P/N 0153), and
the rod end (P/N 0600) for the collective control tube. Examination of
the threaded areas of the collective riser block and the rod end
revealed that the threads on the aluminum collective riser block were
found to be displaced or pulled out due to inadequate improper
penetration. The information supplied by the kit manufacturer was
insufficient to properly rig the flight control system.

Probable Cause
The disengagement of the helicopter's collective control tube due to
improper installation by the builder. Factors were the lack of
sufficient information provided by the kit manufacturer and the pilot's
inability to cushion the landing.


Full Narrative
On August 26, 1997, at 2000 central daylight time, a Fingerhut
Revolution Mini 500 homebuilt helicopter, N570F, was substantially
damaged during a forced landing near Huffman, Texas. The student pilot,
sole occupant of the helicopter, was not injured. The helicopter was
owned and operated by the pilot under Title 14 CFR Part 91. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight for which a
flight plan was not filed. The instructional flight originated from a
helipad at the pilot's home in Huffman, Texas at 1945. According to the
pilot, he experienced a disconnect of the collective control system
which resulted in the main rotor blades going to flat pitch while in
cruise flight at 800 feet MSL. The pilot added that he elected to
execute a running landing to a cultivated field rather that try to land
in a confined helipad. During the landing flare the helicopter yawed to
the left as the pilot applied collective to cushion the landing prior to
touching down. The pilot added that the helicopter was not properly
aligned during touch down and the helicopter rolled over on its side.
The FAA inspector confirmed that the 1997 model helicopter sustained
structural damage. He added that the student pilot was properly endorsed
for solo flight and had accumulated a total of 50 hours of flight in
helicopters, of which 28 were in the same make and model. According to
the aircraft maintenance records, the helicopter had accumulated a total
of 28 hours since it was assembled by the pilot from a kit. Flight
control continuity was confirmed by the FAA inspector to the cyclic and
anti-torque systems of the helicopter. Examination of the helicopter by
the FAA inspector revealed that a disconnect of the collective flight
control system between the collective riser block (P/N 0153), and the
rod end (P/N 0600) for the collective control rod (P/N 0002) With the
aid of 10 power magnification, the inspector examined the threaded areas
of the collective riser block and the rod end. The threads on the
aluminum collective riser block were found to be displaced or pulled
out. See enclosed drawing showing the 0.314 inch penetration on the
threaded surface of the riser block and the first 0.388 inch engagement
on the rod end. The FAA inspector also noted that the control rods
provided by the helicopter manufacturer were not provided with a
"witness hole" so either the installer or an inspector could verify the
amount of rod end penetration into the threaded control tube.
Furthermore, the assembly instructions provided by the manufacturer did
not stipulate the minimum amount of thread engagement required in any of
the rod ends in any of the flight control tubes in the helicopter, nor
did it warn the potential builder of the criticality of proper thread
engagement and security. To assist with the investigation, the FAA
inspector inspected a like helicopter to establish a comparison on the
installation of the flight control systems. The comparison between the
two installations revealed that a pronounced difference existed in the
length of exposed threaded areas between the rod ends and the control
rods. The owner/builder of the helicopter provided the FAA inspector
with the plans and instructions provided to him by the kit manufacturer
during the assembly of the helicopter.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
This Mini-500 was first owned and built by a previous person. The new
owner was the pilot at the time of the accident. After the accident,
the FAA reported to RHCI that a rod-end that operates the collective
control had pulled out of the aluminum collective riser block due to
threads stripping out of the block. The reason was improper
installation by the builder. Instead of screwing the rod into the block
until 1/4” of threads are visible after tightening the jam nut as the
manual clearly states, this builder screwed the rod into the block only
1/4” and then tightened the jam nut. That allowed only 4 threads to
enter the block and although the rod end could not turn or back out, by
design, the threads finally failed in time due to applied forces through
normal operation. “Witness holes” are not necessary because the manual
plainly states the depth necessary for installation. RHCI points the
ability of the new pilot to still maintain control of his disabled
aircraft, and the ability of the Mini-500 to still be controlled even
with loss of this vital control function.


(8) NTSB Identification: FTW97LA339
Accident occurred Sep-09-97 at Idabel, OK
Aircraft: Roddie Mini-500, registration: N42JR
Injuries: 1 Fatal

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On September 9, 1997, at 1500 central daylight time, a Roddie Mini-500,
homebuilt helicopter, N42JR, registered to and operated by the pilot,
was destroyed while maneuvering near Idabel Airport, Idabel, Oklahoma.
The airline transport rated pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally
injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan
was filed for the Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The flight
originated from Idabel Airport at 1440. A witness, who was located at
the airport, reported that the pilot performed a run-up on the ground
before departing. The witness stated that the aircraft was operating
approximately 2000 feet above ground level and about 500 feet from the
approach end of runway 35. The witness then observed the aircraft in a
nose low attitude. Then he "saw pieces" of the aircraft "fly" from the
aircraft. The main fuselage came to rest on its right side, 1300 feet
from the approach end runway 35. The instrument panel was found 157 feet
south of the main fuselage. The tail rotor, including the vertical and
horizontal stabilizers, came
to rest 400 feet south of the main fuselage. A close friend of the
pilot, who also assisted in manufacturing the kit helicopter, reported
that new rotor blades were installed on the day prior to the accident.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
A witness reported to RHCI that the low time 50+ hours helicopter pilot
was going to attempt the first autorotation in his new Mini-500. The
witness warned him not to do so because he lacked experience in
helicopters. The witness reported that the pilot radioed to the ground
as he prepared to enter autorotation. The cause of the accident was
improper entrance into autorotation due to lack of experience in a new
and unfamiliar machine.


(9) NTSB Identification: LAX97LA326
Accident occurred Sep-13-97 at San Carlos, CA
Aircraft: Lampert M500, registration: N800GL
Injuries: 1 Minor

The pilot reported that the engine lost power, while he was holding
short of a taxi way in a hover. The helicopter landed hard on its right
skid and rolled over on its right side. Witnesses reported that they
observed the helicopter at about 20 feet AGL, when they heard the engine
abruptly cease. They then reported seeing the pilot release the
collective control with his left hand and apply full aft cyclic with
both hands. The helicopter then pitched up to an approximately 45-degree
angle while simultaneously falling. The helicopter and the airframe were
examined by an FAA airframe and powerplant mechanic, and an FAA
airworthiness inspector. No discrepancies were noted. The pilot did not
hold a rotorcraft category rating and no evidence was found that he was
endorsed for solo privileges in rotorcraft within the previous 90 days.

Probable Cause
Loss of engine power for undetermined reasons, and the pilot's improper
use of the flight controls following the loss of power. The pilot's lack
of training/certification in rotorcraft operations was a factor in this
accident.

Full Narrative
On September 13, 1997, at 1516 hours Pacific daylight time, a homebuilt
experimental Lampert M500 helicopter, N800GL, crashed on the taxiway
following a loss of engine power on approach to the San Carlos,
California, airport. The aircraft sustained substantial damage, and the
pilot, the sole occupant, incurred minor injuries. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and no flight plan was
on file. The local area personal flight departed San Carlos at 1500 and
was terminating at the time of the accident. In a recorded statement to
the FAA, the pilot reported that he was inbound to the airport and was
asked to hold short of a taxi way to avoid oncoming traffic. The pilot
held the helicopter in a hover and complied with the hold short
instructions. He said that at that time, "my engine went silent, the
engine RPM dropped to zero, and the aircraft began to drop rapidly." The
aircraft landed hard on its right skid and rolled over on its right
side. The tail rotor driveshaft separated from the main transmission,
and the T-tail separated from the vertical fin. In his written report,
the pilot stated that he "could have denied a straight-in [approach]
from the shoreline and entered a left-hand pattern to runway or taxiway
30 at the traffic pattern altitude thus allowing the chance of
successfully deploying autorotation technique rather than the low flight
with slight tailwind component thus being caught in the 'Dead Man's
Curve'." The pilot also reported that on entering the autorotation he
made a "slight cyclic maneuver into the wind to gain energy in the main
rotors." He said that he was, "so low that I might have smacked my tail
rotor when executing this maneuver." Witnesses stated that they observed
the helicopter at about 20 feet AGL when they heard the engine abruptly
cease. They reported then seeing the pilot release the collective
control with his left hand and apply full aft cyclic with both hands.
The helicopter then pitched up to an approximately 45-degree angle while
simultaneously falling. Initial inspection of the aircraft at the
accident site revealed that the fuel tanks were approximately 1/2 full.
The helicopter and the powerplant were examined by a certified airframe
and powerplant mechanic and a airworthiness inspector from the San Jose
Flight Standards District Office. No discrepancies were noted during the
examination. The engine was not seized and the spark plugs fired in
order with hand rotation of the crankshaft. Fuel was found in the fuel
tank and the carburetor bowl. A review of the carburetor icing
probability chart disclosed that icing conditions were not present at
the time of the accident. According to FAA Airman Records, the pilot
does not hold a rotorcraft category rating. No evidence was found that
the pilot was endorsed for solo flight in rotorcraft within the last 90
days. Repeated attempts were made to contact the pilot to schedule
further aircraft inspection with no response. The aircraft was moved
from the hangar and the owner has declined to provide its location.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
It was later reported to RHCI that the engine had no sign of stoppage.
Also a witness reported to RHCI that he could hear the engine running
until impact with the ground. From these reports, RHCI suspects that
rotor RPM was lost, and it was not properly recovered. The pilot had low
time in helicopters, and did not have a helicopter rating.


(10) NTSB Identification: LAX98LA021
Accident occurred Oct-26-97 at Long Beach, CA
Aircraft: Revolution Mini-500, registration: N7234Y
Injuries: 1 Serious

After taking off, the helicopter had climbed about 250 to 300 feet, when
the engine abruptly lost power. The pilot attempted an autorotation, but
said he was able to maintain only 80 percent rotor RPM, which was
insufficient to prevent a hard landing. The pilot reported that the main
rotor low pitch stop had recently been changed from -1.8 degree to -0.5
degree, as recommended by a factory representative. Also, the pilot
stated that he was aware of a phenomenon called "cold-freeze" (engine
seizure without over temp) that (according to him) had occurred with
other engines of this make/model. He believed there was a possible
engine seizure and that reduced settings of the rotor low pitch stops
could have resulted in low rotor RPM. No pre-impact mechanical problem
was found that would have resulted in loss of engine power.

Probable Cause
Loss of engine power and low rotor RPM for undetermined reasons. The
factory representative's recommendation to reduce the main rotor low
pitch stop (from -1.8 degree to -0.5 degree) may have been a related factor.

Full Narrative
On October 26, 1997, at 1233 hours Pacific standard time, a Revolution
Mini-500 experimental helicopter, N7234Y, was destroyed and the
commercial pilot seriously injured when it impacted terrain following
takeoff at Daugherty Field, Long Beach, California. The aircraft had
completed one circuit of the helicopter traffic pattern and landed on
Helo Pad 3. It was then cleared for a second circuit of the helicopter
traffic pattern. The pilot stated that on the second takeoff, the engine
quit abruptly at an altitude of 250-300 feet AGL. He then attempted an
autorotation, but could get only 80 percent rotor RPM which was
insufficient to prevent a hard touchdown. (The pilot stated in his
report that he felt this was due to a recent change in the main rotor
low pitch stop from -1.8 deg. to -0.5 deg. which had been recommended by
a factory representative.) The pilot also stated that he was aware of a
phenomenon called "cold-freeze" (engine seizure without over temp) that
had happened several times with the Rotax engine. He felt that a
possible engine seizure, combined with the change in the rotor low pitch
stop, were contributing factors to the accident rather than fuel
starvation or mechanical malfunction of the helicopter.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
Upon RHCI investigation, it was discovered that the pilot was performing
a maximum performance take off which developed low rotor RPM. It was
reported that the engine did not quit, but the pilot encountered low
rotor speed and failed to recover. It was also reported that upon
examination of the engine there was no sign of stoppage, or failure. The
pilot had very low time in helicopters. It is noted that the pilot had
-1.8 degrees adjusted into his main rotor pitch. Proper pitch should be
between -.05 and -1.0 degrees. Any more than -1.0 degree will tend to
tuck the nose of the aircraft abruptly when entering an autorotation,
and also increase the possibility of a tail boom strike. Before this
accident, an RHCI test pilot flew this helicopter, performed successful
autorotations, and reported that the aircraft performed properly.


(11) NTSB Identification: IAD98LA014
Accident occurred Nov-27-97 at Bluefield, WV
Aircraft: Jones Mini-500, registration: N8015E
Injuries: 1 Minor

On November 27, 1997, approximately 1430 eastern standard time, a Jones
Mini 500, N8015E, sustained substantial damage when the experimental
helicopter impacted the ground while maneuvering at Mercer County
Airport, Bluefield, West Virginia. The certificated commercial
pilot/builder received minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed. No flight plan was filed for the local flight conducted under
14 CFR Part 91.

Full Narrative
On November 27, 1997, approximately 1430 eastern standard time, a Jones
Mini 500, N8015E, sustained substantial damage when the experimental
helicopter impacted the ground while maneuvering at Mercer County
Airport, Bluefield, West Virginia. The certificated commercial
pilot/builder received minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed. No flight plan was filed for the local flight conducted under
14 CFR Part 91. The pilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to
"balance and adjust the flight controls." While air taxiing, the pilot
took off down wind and climbed to 50 feet AGL. The pilot stated that
"after passing through transitional lift, the rotor began to over speed,
so I reduced the throttle to maintain the rotor in the mid green." The
pilot reported that he continued and as he approached the end of the
runway, "I slowed the helicopter down and started a left turn with the
intention of flying down runway to check the head balance." The pilot
stated that, "as I started the turn I increased the throttle to the
maximum, however, the rotor RPM had deteriorated and the throttle would
not bring it back up." The pilot reported that he did not have
sufficient altitude to unload the rotor and upon ground impact, the
helicopter's left skid collapsed, rolling the helicopter onto its side
damaging the main rotor, tail boom, tail rotor, and the cockpit. The
pilot reported to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Inspector
that he had thousands of hours in turbine powered helicopters, and
approximately 10 hours in reciprocating engine powered helicopters. The
FAA Inspector examined the wreckage. The examination confirmed flight
control continuity and no mechanical malfunction was found in the engine.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The pilot developed low rotor RPM and did not properly recover.


(12) NTSB Identification: NYC98LA049
Accident occurred Dec-19-97 at Gettysburg, OH
Aircraft: Bihn Mini-500, registration: N727EB
Injuries: 1 Fatal

On December 19, 1997, about 1450 eastern standard time, a homebuilt
helicopter, a Bihn Mini 500, N727EB, was destroyed during a forced
landing and collision with terrain near Gettysburg, Ohio. The
certificated airline transport pilot was fatally injured. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed for the personal flight that
originated at the Phillipsburg Airport, Phillipsburg, Ohio, about 1415.
No flight plan had been filed for the local flight conducted under 14
CFR Part 91. According to witnesses, the helicopter was observed in
level cruise flight, at 900 to 1,200 feet above the ground, when they
heard the engine noise of the helicopter decrease. This was followed by
the sound of two "pops," as witnesses observed the tail of the
helicopter raise up, and an object depart from the helicopter. The
helicopter then descended below tree level. According to a Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Inspector, examination of the wreckage
revealed that it came to rest in an open field, 90 degrees nose down,
with the forward ends of the skids imbedded about 1 foot into the
ground. The tailboom was observed to have a flattened area on the upper
surface. One rotor blade was separated from the main rotor hub, and was
located about 900 feet back along the helicopter's flight path. The
helicopter was equipped with a Rotax 582 engine. Initial examination of
the engine did not reveal a reason for the decrease in engine noise. The
pilot flew for a commercial airline and had logged in excess of 10,000
flight hours in airplanes. The pilot obtained his private pilot
helicopter certificate during July 1997. He had accumulated 59 hours in
helicopters, and all training had been conducted in the Robinson R-22.
His next helicopter flight was logged in November 1997, in the Mini 500
that he constructed. At the time of the accident, it was estimated that
he had logged about 10 hours of hover, and 2 hours of flight, in N727EB.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The helicopter did not have an engine failure. RHCI was told by people
involved with the low time 50+ hours helicopter pilot that the purpose
for the flight was to perform his first autorotation in his new
Mini-500. He was advised by these people not to practice these
maneuvers, because it had been four months since he had last flown and a
refresher course was needed. In the opinion of RHCI, the pilot was
performing maneuvers in a new untrimmed aircraft that should have first
been done by a more experienced pilot, and that the pilot needed
additional instruction before attempting the maneuver.


(13) NTSB Identification: SEA98LA030
Accident occurred Jan-28-98 at Newberg, OR
Aircraft: Raser Mini-500, registration: N500YY
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

The pilot reported that he had just lifted off and attained an altitude
of about 20 feet, when the engine experienced a loss of power. The pilot
initiated an autorotation near the end of the airpark. The pilot stated
that the helicopter was yawed slightly to the left on touchdown to a
plowed muddy area. The right side landing skid collapsed and the
helicopter rolled over. Inspection of the engine revealed that one of
the two cylinders would not hold compression. Further inspection found
evidence of overheating and damage to the rings on the piston. The pilot
reported that the engine had been experiencing heating problems, and
that he had also modified the carburetor.

Probable Cause a power loss resulting from overtemperature of a
cylinder. The pilot's operation with known deficiencies was a factor.

Full Narrative
On January 28, 1998, at 1550 Pacific standard time, a homebuilt Raser
Mini 500, N500YY, operated by the pilot as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal
flight, collapsed the right landing skid and rolled over after
initiating an autorotation as a result of a loss of engine power shortly
after takeoff from Sportsman Airpark, Newberg, Oregon. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was
filed. The helicopter was substantially damaged and the airline
transport pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured. During an interview
with a Federal Aviation Administration Inspector and subsequent written
statement, the pilot reported that he had just lifted off and attained
an altitude of about 20 feet, when the engine experienced a loss of
power. The pilot initiated an autorotation near the south end of the
airpark to a plowed muddy area. The pilot stated that the helicopter was
yawed slightly to the left on touchdown. The right side landing skid
collapsed and the helicopter rolled over onto its right side. Inspection
of the engine revealed that one of the two cylinders would not hold
compression. Further inspection of the cylinder found evidence of
overheating and damage to the rings on the piston. The pilot reported
that the engine had been experiencing heating problems, and that he had
also modified the carburetor.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
RHCI suspects that improper jetting of the carburetors was the reason
for engine failure, although the customer feels it was due to cold
seizure. It should be known that a cold seizure can only occurr in two
ways: One way is due to an insufficient warm up period upon starting,
and the other could be due to a sticking thermostat that would release
cold water to the engine head shortly after take off. This would be
indicated by a high water temperature reading in a hover, and then a
sudden drop in water temperature, causing shock cooling to the engine.


(14) NTSB Identification: MIA98LA137
Accident occurred Apr-20-98 at Lakeland, FL
Aircraft: Bennett M-500A, registration: N105WB
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

The pilot stated he was on base turn to final for a fly bye, when he
experienced a 1 to 1 vertical vibration. He informed the tower that he
was going to land, and started a deceleration. The helicopter veered to
the right, and the pilot applied left antitorque pedal. The nose started
to tuck down, then the helicopter collided with the ground and rolled
over on its right side. Examination of the helicopter flight control
system revealed a hex nut backed off the cyclic flight control push rod
bolt, and the bolt became disconnected from the control yoke teeter
block. This resulted in a loss of cyclic control.

Probable Cause
A hex nut on the cyclic flight control pushrod bolt had backed off for
undetermined reason(s) and allowed the bolt to become disconnected from
the control yoke teeter block, resulting in a loss of cyclic control and
subsequent roll over during an emergency landing.

Full Narrative
On April 20, 1998, at about 1230 eastern daylight time, a Bennett
M-500A, N105WB, experimental helicopter, registered to a private owner,
operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, crashed on landing at the
Lakeland-Linder Regional Airport, Lakeland, Florida. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The
helicopter sustained substantial damage. The commercial pilot reported
no injuries. The flight originated from the Lakeland-Linder Regional
Airport about 1 hour before the accident.

The pilot stated he entered the traffic pattern landing to the south at
Chopper Town. He made a base turn and continued to final for a fly by,
when he experienced a 1 to 1 vertical vibration. He informed the tower
that he was going to land, and started a deceleration at 50 feet. The
helicopter started to veer to the right and he applied left antitorque
pedal. The nose started to tuck down, estimated at about 50 degrees nose
down. The helicopter collided with the ground in a nose down attitude
and rolled over on its right side.

Examination of the helicopter revealed that a flight control pushrod
became disconnected (hex nut backed off the attaching bolt) from the
control yoke teeter block, resulting in a complete loss of cyclic and
collective control of the main rotor system. Review of aircraft logbooks
revealed no maintenance had been performed on the flight control push
rod since assembly of the helicopter 106 hours before the accident.

The manufacturer for the Mini 500 stated the registered owner sent a fax
request ordering 20 Teflon DU bushings (part #0562) and 20 Teflon
washers (part #0101) that are used in the flight control system. The
request was made and filled on March 25, 1998, on invoice #25969. The
manufacturer stated in order for the registered owner to remove the
bushings and washers that it would be necessary to remove the MS21042L4
nut (part #0470) and the NAS144 bolt (part #0434) to replace the
bushings and washers.

The registered owner stated that he ordered the parts that were listed
on invoice 25969. He ordered the nuts to comply with Revolution
Helicopter Airworthiness Directive (AD) #3101998 dated March 10, 1998.
He elected to replace the control yoke (part #0024), bushings (part
#0562, 2 each) and the Teflon washers (part #0101, 4 each). The
replacement of these parts is accomplished by removing bolts #0365, and
the control transfer plate #0023. It does not require the removal of the
suspect bolt and nut assembly. Review of the Mini-500 Aircraft Assembly
and Maintenance Manual Sub-Assemblies instructions verified the
registered owner's comments.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
It was reported to RHCI by the builder and a person assisting him that
all the Teflon DU bushings in the control system had been replaced prior
to the fly-in. Just enough DU bushings and other parts were purchased
from RHCI for this purpose. To comply with AD# 3101998 only requires
two DU bushings be replaced, while the builder purchased 20. The
failure of the control system occurred because a permanent all metal
locking-nut came loose from a non-rotating area. It is suspected that
the nut and bolt were reused or not tightened at all, because of the
fact that all parts were purchased and replaced except for the nuts and
bolts. These certified nuts and bolts simply do not come loose unless
they are reused.


(15) NTSB Identification: MIA98LA161
Accident occurred May-13-98 at Villa Rica, GA
Aircraft: Revolution Mini-500, registration: N355RM
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

On May 13, 1998, about 1630 eastern daylight time, a homebuilt
helicopter, a Revolution Mini-500, N355RM, registered to a private
individual, operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, crashed
during a precautionary landing at Stockmar Airport, Villa Rica, Georgia.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed.
The helicopter received substantial damage, and the ATP-rated pilot was
not injured. The flight originated from a private helipad at Cedartown,
Georgia, about 45 minutes before the accident.

Full Narrative
On May 13, 1998, about 1630 eastern daylight time, a homebuilt
helicopter, a Revolution Mini-500, N355RM, registered to a private
individual, operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, crashed
during a precautionary landing at Stockmar Airport, Villa Rica, Georgia.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed.
The helicopter received substantial damage, and the ATP-rated pilot was
not injured. The flight originated from a private helipad at Cedartown,
Georgia, about 45 minutes before the accident. The pilot stated that
while in cruise flight, he noticed a "high frequency vibration/buzz
sound," together with increasing coolant and exhaust gas temperatures,
and elected to land. His intention was to perform a run-on,
precautionary landing onto the single runway at Stockmar Airport, but
the runway was in use, and he used a grassy area adjacent to the runway.
The pilot further stated he chose the grassy area because it appeared to
have been newly "bush-hogged"; however, while in the landing flare, he
realized too late that the mowed level of the grass was high enough to
conceal small obstructions. The left landing skid collided with a large,
partially hidden rock and the helicopter rotated counterclockwise
abruptly about its vertical axis approximately 240 degrees. During the
ground gyration, the main rotor severed the tailboom and the tail rotor
assembly separated from the helicopter. Postcrash inspection of the
aircraft revealed that less than a full quantity of engine coolant was
contained in the reservoir. The pilot stated the cooling system is a
closed system, and he is at a loss to explain the leakage. He states,
"It should be noted that prior to flight on this date, (accident date)
the aircraft was parked inside a hangar on a concrete floor at 7GA9,
(Whitesburg, Georgia) and no visible evidence of a leak was noted on the
floor. Further, the aircraft was landed on a concrete pad at the private
residence at Cedartown, GA and no visible evidence of a water leak was
noted on the concrete pad."

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
A hose clamp was not properly tightened, and the engine lost coolant,
causing the engine to overheat. If the water level is allowed to lower
to the cylinder headcover of the engine, the engine could overheat. A
small leak may occurr while under pressure, but not leak while sitting
on the ground.


(16) NTSB Identification: FTW98LA234
Accident occurred May-20-98 at Grove, OK
Aircraft: Revolution Mini-500B, registration: N6144S
Injuries: 1 Minor

On May 20, 1998, at 0925 central daylight time, a Revolution Mini-500B
experimental helicopter, N6144S, owned and operated by the pilot as a
Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, was destroyed during a forced
landing near Grove, Oklahoma. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed, and a flight plan was not filed. The private pilot, sole
occupant of the aircraft, sustained minor injuries. The flight
originated from the Grove Municipal Airport, about 25 minutes before the
accident. According to preliminary information, the helicopter
experience a malfunction with its clutch or the clutch's drive belt. The
pilot initiated a forced landing to a high school parking lot, and
during the attempted landing, the helicopter impacted a pickup truck.
The helicopter was destroyed by a post crash fire.

Full Narrative
On May 20, 1998, at 0925 central daylight time, a Harding Revolution
Mini-500B experimental homebuilt helicopter, N6144S, owned and operated
by the pilot, was destroyed during a forced landing following the loss
of the main rotor drive near Grove, Oklahoma. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed, and a flight plan was not filed for the Title 14
CFR Part 91 personal flight. The private pilot, sole occupant of the
aircraft, sustained minor injuries. The flight originated from the Grove
Municipal Airport, about 25 minutes before the accident.

The pilot reported that he had adjusted the alignment of the main drive
belt and engine. During the ensuing personal/test flight of the
helicopter, while at a cruising altitude of 1,350 feet MSL, he felt a
"sudden hesitation and [smelled the] odor of smoke." While he was
"determining if [a] serious malfunction existed," the helicopter
experienced a loss of main rotor drive and altitude, "along with a
stronger burning odor." The pilot initiated an autorotation to a field
adjacent to a school. However, prior to reaching the intended landing
area, the helicopter struck a parked pickup truck, "flipped over, landed
in [the] field and started on fire." The helicopter was destroyed by the
postimpact fire. The pilot had accumulated a total of 59 flight hours
in helicopters, of which 14 hours were accumulated in his homebuilt
helicopter.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The helicopter did not have a clutch failure. The drive belt was not
properly aligned, causing a belt failure. Information about proper
alignment was supplied on the Service Information Letter #040196.


(17) NTSB Identification: NYC98LA154
Accident occurred Jul-26-98 at Shermans Dale, PA
Aircraft: Johnson Revolution Mini-500, registration: N805JJ
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On July 26, 1998, about 1800 Eastern Daylight Time, a homebuilt
Revolution Mini-500 helicopter, N805JJ, was substantially damaged during
a forced landing at Yost Airport (32PA), Shermans Dale, Pennsylvania.
The certificated private pilot was not injured. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. No flight plan was
filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. According
to the pilot's written statement, after about 45 minutes of flight, he
entered the traffic pattern at his destination, and descended during
both the base leg and final approach. While on the final approach, at 20
to 30 feet of altitude, the engine "stopped dead ... no sputtering, no
sign, just nothing." The helicopter landed hard, the left skid
collapsed, the main rotor struck the tail boom, and the helicopter
rolled over on its left side. According to a Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Inspector, the fuel tank was approximately 1/3
full, and there was fuel in the glass bulb along the fuel line. There
was sufficient engine oil in the oil tank and the throttle linkage was
intact.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
From RHCI’s investigation and after discussing the accident with the
pilot, the cause of engine failure was seizure due to improper jetting.
Customer was experimenting with the different sizes of jets, and at
the time of the accident, he had installed 155 main jets. If the proper
needle jet and needle position are not installed according to RHCI’s
instructions, AD’s and advisories, the engine will seize, and most
likely this would happen in a descent where the improper needle jet
arrangement will tend to lean the mixture the most.


(18) NTSB Identification: IAD98LA092
Accident occurred Aug-11-98 at Northampton, PA
Aircraft: Austin Revolution Mini-500, Registration: N2XK
Injuries: 1 Fatal

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On August 11,1998, at 1832 eastern daylight time, a homebuilt Revolution
Mini 500 helicopter, N2XK, was destroyed during collision with terrain
following an uncontrolled descent near Northhampton, Pennsylvania. The
certificated commercial pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed for the maintenance test flight that originated at
Bangor, Pennsylvania, approximately 1800. No flight plan was filed for
the flight conducted under 14 CFR
Part 91. In a telephone interview, one witness stated his attention was
drawn to the helicopter because it sounded unusual. He said the
helicopter was maneuvering approximately 200 feet in the air. The
witness said: "I saw it circle around but it didn't sound too good. I
heard it making these weird noises. It stopped in the air and then
turned towards my house. I heard it go 'pow' then another sharp 'snap'.
It sounded like a gunshot. Then I saw this piece flying. The helicopter
rotated approximately one-quarter turn, the tail came up, the nose
dropped, and then the aircraft fell out of sight." In a telephone
interview, a second witness said his attention was drawn by the sound.
He stated: "It sounded like a helicopter, but it had a funny sound, it
had a rat-a-tat-tat sound. I couldn't see it, then I saw him make a
right hand turn heading due west gaining altitude. I heard a
'poof-poof'...Just the sounds of the rotors didn't sound normal. I heard
the lighter 'pop' and then the louder 'pop'." The witness stated the
helicopter then descended behind a tree line out of view. The wreckage
was examined at the site on August 12, 1998, by a team of Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Aviation Safety Inspectors. All major
components were accounted for at the scene. According to one Inspector's
statement: "The helicopter wreckage showed a vertical impact where the
aircraft wreckage remained within a very confined area. No wreckage was
more than a few feet from the fuselage. The only part of the aircraft
not within the main fuselage was one main rotor blade which was
discovered over 400 feet from the aircraft. Upon further investigation
of the crash site, I observed that the pitch horn (a casting) was
fractured on one of the main rotor hubs and disconnected. The blade yoke
was still attached but only about twelve inches of the blade was
attached. This part matched with the blade assembly that was over 400
feet from the wreckage. The rest of the hub assembly was found intact
and all control rods and assemblies were attached. The mast showed no
signs of mast bumping or deformation. The tailboom assembly and tail
rotor assembly showed no signs of main rotor blade contact nor prior
damage before impact...the pitch change rod to the hub with the missing
main rotor blade was loose and the jam nuts to the rod and bearings were
loose and not torqued at all." On August 12, 1998, the Inspector visited
the location where the helicopter was hangared and maintained. He found
the construction manual for the helicopter opened to the section for the
rigging and balancing of the rotor system and a copy of the "Revolution
Helicopter Airworthiness Directive (AD) #09031997...New Dynamic Main
Rotor System Balancing Procedures." According to Revolution Helicopter
Corporation, Inc., the AD was "...Urgent (Must Be Complied With Before
Further Flight)." The FAA Inspector interviewed the pilot's son
regarding any work performed on the helicopter and the purpose of the
flight. According to the Inspector's report: "His son informed me that
he was assisting his father with rotor tracking by holding the tracking
flag and his father was adjusting the blade track with the pitch change
links. The son left prior to his father finishing the ground portion of
the checks and when he returned the aircraft and his father were gone."
Portions of the main rotor system were forwarded to the NTSB Materials
Laboratory in Washington, D.C. for further examination.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
RHCI was told by the NTSB that they found the pitch change rod to the
hub with the missing main rotor blade was loose and the jam nuts to the
rod-ends and bearings were loose and not torqued at all. The pilot
didn’t finish tightening the jam nuts on the pitch link change rods. The
pilot took off to make a run, and in forward flight, the rod-ends
screwed loose causing the blades to go so far out of track that the
aircraft could no longer be controlled, causing rotor failure.


(19) NTSB Identification: MIA98LA236
Accident occurred Aug-30-98 at Hattiesburg, MS
Aircraft: Hall Revolution Mini-500, registration: N9GH
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

On August 30, 1998, about 1500 central daylight time, a Hall Revolution
Mini 500 homebuilt helicopter, N9GH, registered to an individual, landed
hard at Hattiesburg, Mississippi, while on a Title 14 CFR Part 91
personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time
and no flight plan was filed. The airline transport-rated pilot was not
injured and the helicopter received substantial damage. The flight was
originating at the time of the accident.

Full Narrative
On August 30, 1998, about 1500 central daylight time, a Hall Revolution
Mini 500 homebuilt helicopter, N9GH, registered to an individual, landed
hard at Hattiesburg, Mississippi, while on a Title 14 CFR Part 91
personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time
and no flight plan was filed. The airline transport-rated pilot was not
injured and the helicopter received substantial damage. The flight was
originating at the time of the accident.

The pilot stated that as he hovered forward at a brisk walk, he heard
the low rotor RPM horn and reduced the collective control. The
helicopter descended rapidly and touched down on the "toes" of the
skids. The helicopter bounced back into the air and the cyclic control
grip separated from the cyclic control stick. The cyclic control stick
moved to the full aft position and the main rotor blades contacted the
tail boom.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The pilot allowed the aircraft to enter into a low rotor RPM condition
from which sufficient lift could not be obtained to slow the aircraft’s
forward speed and cushion the landing. According to the pilot, the
cause of damage was control grip separating from the cyclic control
stick which moved uncontrollably to the aft position, allowing the
rotorblades to contact the aircraft tail boom. If this was the case,
then damage may have been adverte if the cyclic grip had been glued in
place as called for in the assembly manual.


(20) NTSB Identification: CHI98LA334
Accident occurred Sep-08-98 at Eden Prairie, MN
Aircraft: CulverMini-500, registration: N6269R
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

On September 8, 1998, at 1900 central daylight time (cdt), a
Culver-Revolution Mini 500, N6269R, piloted by a private pilot, was
substantially damaged when it collided with the ground shortly after a
total loss of power while hovering. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed at the time of the accident. The 14 CFR Part 91 personal
flight was not operating on a flight plan. The pilot reported no
injuries. The flight departed Eden Prairie, Minnesota, at 1850 cdt.

Full Narrative
On September 8, 1998, at 1900 central daylight time (cdt), a
Culver-Revolution Mini 500, N6269R, piloted by a private pilot, was
substantially damaged when it collided with the ground shortly after a
total loss of power while hovering. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed at the time of the accident. The 14 CFR Part 91 personal
flight was not operating on a flight plan. The pilot reported no
injuries. The flight departed Eden Prairie, Minnesota, at 1850 cdt.

The pilot said he had been hover-taxiing the helicopter between the
approach end of runway 36 and the south taxiway for runway 09R. He said
he had been hover-taxiing for about 10-minutes when "...the engine
stopped unexpectedly [and it] settled to the runway and rolled over."

The on-scene investigation revealed no anomalies with the airframe,
engine or control system that would prevent flight. Examination of the
fuel system revealed a silicon-type sealant had completely blocked the
supply side of the fuel filter.

According to the pilot/builder, he had used this material as a seal
between the helicopter's fuel tank filler neck flange and fuel tank
body. The helicopter's kit manufacturers instruction states that the
builder is to "Place a 1/8-inch bead of MA300 from the adhesive kit
around [the] hole circle through the centerline of [the mounting]
holes." A copy of these instructions are appended to this report.

The kit manufacturer was contacted regarding the accident and
pilot/builders use of the silicon-type material. The manufacturer
representative was asked if there were any warnings in the construction
manual against the use of the silicon-type sealant as the builder had
done. He said there were no warnings, only instructions to use the MA300
material. He said the MA300 is an epoxy- type glue/sealant that does not
break down when contacted by gasoline. He said the silicon-type sealant
will dissolve when contacted by gasoline. The IIC suggested the company
publish a manual change or communicate the need to use only the sealant
recommended by them. The company agreed and said they would put a
notice in the next builder's newsletter. A copy of the company's
December 1998 newsletter is appended to this report.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
This report was taken by phone from Randy Culver on Thursday, September
10, 1998, by Rick Stitt, RHCI Project Engineer.

The aircraft was in translational lift with an indicated airspeed of 15
MPH. The engine lost power and the aircraft landed hard on the back of
the skids and rolled over. The pilot did not receive any injury. The
customer determined engine power loss was caused by silicone installed
on the metal flange of the fuel tank neck, that came loose and plugged
the fuel filter. The RHCI instructions (Sect. 5 page 21, Assy
Instruction #4) recommend using MA300 in a 1/8" bead around the flange
through the center line of each hole and securing with rivets and washers.


(21) NTSB Identification: CHI98FA353
Accident occurred Sep-19-98 at Cahokai, IL
Aircraft: Barklage Revolution Mini-500, registration: N611AB
Injuries: 1 Serious

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On September 19, 1998, at 1330 central daylight time (cdt), a Barklage
Revolution Mini 500, N611AB, operated by a commercial pilot, was
destroyed when on initial climb, the helicopter's engine lost power.
During the subsequent emergency landing, the helicopter impacted into a
soybean field. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of
the accident. The personal flight was being conducted under 14 CFR Part
91. There was no flight plan on final. The pilot sustained serious
injuries. The cross-country flight originated at Cahokia, Illinois, at
1323 cdt, and was en route to St. Charles, Missouri.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
It has been reported to RHCI by the NTSB and Rotax that a foreign object
was dropped into the crank case, and worked to the top of the piston and
failed both spark plug tongues causing the engine to quit. It was
reported to RHCI that upon take off the Mini-500 climbed to an altitude
of 200 feet, and when crossing over a power line complex experienced a
power lost. The pilot had not gained enough altitude to clear the wires,
and needed to extend his autorotation in order to reach a suitable
landing site on the other side. This maneuver used all available rotor
inertia, causing the rotor system to slow in RPM to a point where the
autorotation could not be continued.


(22) NTSB Identification: LAX99LA004
Accident occurred Oct-04-98 at Moorpark, CA
Aircraft: Burson Mini-500, registration: N418MB
Injuries: 1 Fatal

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On October 4, 1998, at an unknown time, a Burson Mini 500, N418MB,
crashed in hilly terrain near Moorpark, California. The aircraft was
destroyed, and the private pilot, the sole occupant, suffered fatal
injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the afternoon
of the flight and no flight plan was filed, nor were any ATC services
provided. The pilot's daughter reported that she accompanied the pilot
to the takeoff/landing site and helped reinstall the main rotor blades,
which had been removed to trailer the helicopter. She stated that her
father reported that he would fly over the park where she was playing
baseball, and would subsequently fly over the family residence, in
approximately 45 minutes. She left the site at 1417. The daughter
further recalled that the pilot reported that he would be flying for 1
1/2 to 2 hours. She never saw or heard him fly over the park, and he was
not seen over the family house. The pilot's wife reported the pilot as
missing and an ALNOT was issued at 2040. The Ventura County Sheriff
located the wreckage at 0300 on October 5, 1998.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
RHCI was told that the pilot had recently completed his helicopter
training, and at the time of the accident had flown his Mini-500 for 33
hours. His total helicopter time was less than 100 hours. It was
reported that the pilot was flying through a canyon in Southern
California during gusty conditions. Upon investigating the crash, it was
found that all controls were intact, gas and oil were in the tanks,
carburetors and engine were running and had no signs of seizure. It is
suspected that the gusty conditions blowing over the canyon walls caused
the low-time pilot to over control the aircraft, causing the accident.


(23) NTSB Identification: MIA99LA017
Accident occurred Oct-26-98 at Hickory, NC
Aircraft: Reinhold Revolution Mini-500, registration: N500GQ
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On October 26, 1998, about 1615 eastern standard time, a Reinhold
Revolution Mini 500, N500GQ, registered to an individual, made a hard
landing following loss of engine power near Hickory, North Carolina,
while on a Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed. The
helicopter received substantial damage and the airline transport-rated
pilot was not injured. The flight originated from Hickory, North
Carolina, the same day, about 1600. The pilot stated that the engine
lost power do to a seized rear cylinder. While making a forced landing
in a field, the helicopter touched down on uneven terrain and the main
rotor blades contacted the tail boom and ground.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The engine was not taken apart to determine the reason why it quit,
therefore, engine failure is undetermined. It is known that shortly
before this accident, this engine had failed earlier. It was then sent
to a Rotax overhaul facility, and found to have a hole burnt in the
pistons, due to pre-detonation from low octane fuel. It is believed
that the pilot obtained fuel from the same source as before, causing the
second engine failure.


(24) NTSB Identification: CHI99LA026
Accident occurred Nov-06-98 at Clinton, MN
Aircraft: Tomschin Mini-500, registration: N316AZ
Injuries: 1 Uninjured

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On November 6, 1998, at 0923 central standard time (cst), a Tomschin
Mini 500, N316AZ, piloted by a non-certificated individual, sustained
substantial damage when while in cruise flight, the helicopter struck a
power line. The helicopter subsequently impacted into a farm field, 4
miles east of Clinton, Minnesota. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed at the time of the accident. The personal flight was being
conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. No flight plan was on file. The
individual operating the helicopter at the time of the accident reported
no injuries.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
Pilot was performing flight testing for forward balance. He was flying
about 70 mph in a hazy overcast. He flew into a power line which
contacted the aircraft on the mast, between the main blades and turtle
deck. Pilot was able to stay in control until he was about 4 feet above
the ground and 500 feet from the contact point. Aircraft landed on the
skids and sustained blade and tail boom damage.


(25) NTSB Identification: IAD99FA023
Accident occurred Nov-29-98 At Midland, VA
Aircraft: Armbruster Mini-500, registration: N500GH
Injuries: 1 Fatal

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On November 29, 1998, about 1515 eastern standard time, a homebuilt Mini
500, N500GH, was destroyed during a collision with trees near Midland,
Virginia. The certificated private pilot/owner/builder was fatally
injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight
that originated from the Manassas Airport (HEF), Manassas, Virginia. No
flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR
Part 91. A family member reported the pilot missing after not returning
from his normal 40 to 45 minute flight. The pilot's vehicle remained
parked outside his hangar the next morning, and the Federal Aviation
Administration issued an Alert Notice. The Civil Air Patrol's search
discovered that tower personnel at HEF recorded the helicopter taking
off at 1400. Witnesses stated that they saw the helicopter near Leesburg
Airport, Leesburg, Virginia, about 1430, and near Nokesville, Virginia,
about 1500, on November 29th. The helicopter was located on December 2,
1998, about 1530, in a wooded area approximately 1/4 mile
north/northeast of the Warrenton-Fauquier Airport, Warrenton, Virginia.
A survey of the debris field discovered that the initial impact point
was the top of a 50-foot tall tree. Tree limbs, measuring 4 to 6 inches
in diameter, were cut horizontally and found near the base of the tree.
One of the helicopter's rotors was lying on the ground near the tree;
the other was snagged on a fracture tree limb about 30 feet above the
ground. The main wreckage was lying on its left side between two trees 5
feet apart, and about 35 feet south of the initial impact point. All
major components of the helicopter were found at the accident scene.
Examination of the flight controls revealed continuity at the time of
impact. The engine logbook indicated that in August 1998, at 200.4 hours
on the Hobbs meter, the owner replaced both pistons, rings, wrist pins,
rod bearings, thermostat, and head o-rings. The Hobbs meter in the
wreckage read 218.7 hours. Inspection of the engine revealed two
different types of spark plugs were utilized, one of each type in the
two cylinders. The spark plugs were wired such that one magneto fired
one type of spark plug. Rotation of the crank shaft revealed 4 point
scuffing on the cylinder and the Power Take-Off (PTO) piston.

RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The pilot had installed his Mini-500 “Power Enhancement Package” (PEP),
and against RHCI’s severe warnings, chose not to use the provided jet
package containing a 2.76 needle jet. Instead he installed a 2.78
needle jet which meant that he needed a 155 main jet to achieve the
proper EGT in hover. RHCI informed the pilot that the engine would
seize with this small main jet, when at high-power settings it could not
supply sufficient fuel to the engine, causing it to heat and seize. The
main jet should have been a 165 or 170. Also, he had erroneously set
the needle in the third position on the cylinder that seized; the other
was correct in the fourth position. He was flying over a forest when
the engine seized, and autorotated into a 50-foot tall tree. The impact
broke the mast and the aircraft fell and landed upside down on the ground.


Unreported Accidents

The following is a summary of unreported accidents and incidents not
only in the U.S., but also in foreign countries. These accidents were
reported to RHCI by the pilots, witnesses, and friends, but not to the
NTSB, FAA, or the legal authorities in each respective country.
Therefore, in order to protect the privacy of those involved, RHCI is
only providing a description of the events.

Report 1
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature 85 deg. F
Elevation 300 ft

Pilot stated that he was demonstrating the aircraft for someone. He had
been flying several traffic patterns and had come to a 10 ft. hover. He
suddenly lost tail rotor control. The aircraft hit the ground hard while
still spinning to the right. One skid collapsed and the aircraft rolled
onto its side. The aircraft sustained typical roll over damage. Pilot
received no injuries.

Pilot had reinstalled the tail rotor assembly after trailering the
aircraft from Oshkosh. He forgot to tighten the jam nut that secures the
tail rotor push pull control cable to the tail rotor gear box mounting
plate. When the jam nut finally worked its way off, tail rotor control
was lost.

Report 2
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unknown
Elevation Unknown

The designated pilot for this aircraft failed to make sure there was
enough fuel before taking off. After flying for a while, pilot realized
he was out of gas and was forced to make an emergency landing. Pilot
failed to autorotate successfully, and therefore, aircraft sustained
typical rollover damage. Pilot received no injuries.

Report 3
Conditions Day
Wind Gusting to 20-25 mph
Temperature 80-90 deg. F
Elevation 200 ft

There was a witness to the incident. The witness stated that they were
doing track and balance. The pilot was hovering the aircraft and the
witness was working the balance equipment. The witness said that the
aircraft started to oscillate from side to side a couple of times and
then rolled over. The aircraft actually sustained less than typical
damage. Probable cause of the incident is that the pilot was hovering
the aircraft in winds that exceeded his experience level. The aircraft
has now been repaired and is again flying. The pilot had accumulated 50+
helicopter hours and received no injuries.

Report 4
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unknown
Elevation Unknown

Pilot stated that he was returning to the airport and was on a long
final when he started to lose rotor RPM and could not recover. The
aircraft hit the ground short of the airport at an estimated 20-30 mph.
The aircraft rolled three times and broke into several pieces. The
aircraft received heavy damage as would be expected. Pilot received no
injuries.

Pilot tried to blame the transmission for the loss of rotor RPM. The
transmission was shipped to RHCI and no damage other than crash related
damage could be found. Further conversations with the pilot indicated
that he let his rotor RPM get low and panicked. He said that he applied
full throttle but the RPM would not recover. He could not remember ever
lowering the collective. More than likely, he saw the ground rushing up
at him and raised the collective.

Report 5
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unknown
Elevation Unknown

The details of this accident are a little sketchy. We have heard two
different stories. One, that the controls jammed, and the other that the
pilot lost rotor RPM and could not recover. We may never know the truth.
The aircraft did land hard and roll over, sustaining typical rollover
damage. The pilot was a low-time pilot and received no injuries.

Report 6
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature 85 deg. F
Elevation 200 ft

The second-hand word from a spectator is that the pilot was on take off
and let his RPM get low and could not recover. He landed hard,
collapsing a skid and the aircraft rolled onto its side. Aircraft
suffered typical rollover damage. The pilot had accumulated 59
helicopter hours and received no injuries.

Report 7
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unknown
Elevation 1000 ft

Pilot stated the aircraft had approximately five hours of flight time.
The pilot was practicing slide on landing from a hover to the grass
beside the runway. One of the skids got caught on an aircraft tie down
that was hidden in the grass. The aircraft tipped forward and the main
rotor blades contacted with the ground. The aircraft came to rest on its
left side. The aircraft sustained typical rollover damage. The pilot
received no injuries.

Report 8
Conditions Day
Wind 8 to 12 mph
Temperature 80 deg. F
Elevation 300 ft

The pilot stated that he departed from a local gas station after
refueling. He saw power lines in his departure path and decided to do a
180 degree turn. In doing so, he turned downwind and experienced
settling with power from about 20 feet and failed to recover properly.
On impact the helicopter’s right front leg bent enough for the main
blades to strike the ground. The aircraft did not roll over and no
injuries occurred.


Report 9
Conditions Day
Wind 25 to 35 mph
Temperature 75 deg F
Elevation 142 ft

The low time pilot had just hovered his helicopter onto a trailer with
no incident. As the engine and blades wound down, a gust of wind struck
the ship from the side and blew it off the trailer. The aircraft
sustained typical rollover damage. No injuries occurred.

Report 10
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unkown
Elevation Unknown

The pilot stated that while in cruise flight at about 300 feet above
rough terrain the engine suffered a "partial" power loss. (There is no
such thing as "partial" power loss in a piston engine, and therefore,
RHCI feels that the pilot allowed the rotors to lose RPM). The pilot
spent some time trying to recover power before setting up for an
autorotation. He made a 180 degree turn on the way down. He flared early
and ran out of rotor RPM at about 15 feet above the ground. The machine
landed very hard on sloping ground and then rolled over. The aircraft
sustained typical rollover damage. No injuries occurred.

Report 11
Conditions Day
Wind Light
Temperature Unknown
Elevation Unknown

The pilot had just completed his Mini-500. While he was hovering the
helicopter for the first time to break in the engine, he drifted off the
tarmac onto a grassy area. One skid caught a mound of grass that was
protruding up. The helicopter experienced dynamic rollover and sustained
typical rollover damage. No injuries occurred.

Report 12
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unknown
Elevation Unknown

While practicing autorotations, the low-time pilot inadvertently let the
rotor RPM wind down at the bottom end of the auto. There was not enough
time to regain RPM before touchdown. The aircraft impacted then rolled
over. The aircraft sustained typical rollover damage. No injuries occurred.

Report 13
Conditions Day
Wind 10 mph
Temperature 80 deg. F
Elevation -11 ft

The 50+ hours helicopter pilot stated that after fueling the aircraft,
he departed, and then immediately turned 90 degrees left into a
crosswind for a two-hour trip. Just before he reached translational lift
at a height of about four feet, he let the rotor RPM wind down to where
he was behind the power curve and starting to lose lift. He thought
about doing a slide-on landing, but decided to do a quick stop instead.
At that point he did not have enough RPM to successfully execute a quick
stop. The aircraft slammed down bending the right skids and then rolled
over. No injuries occurred.

Report 14
Conditions Day
Wind 3 to 5 mph
Temperature 80 deg. F
Elevation Unknown

On approach the low-time pilot let the rotor RPM wind down to the bottom
of the yellow. On landing, the helicopter impacted hard enough to bend
the landing gear causing the aircraft to roll over. The aircraft
sustained typical rollover damage. No injuries occurred.

Report 15
Conditions Day
Wind 20 mph
Temperature 59 deg F
Elevation 2000 ft

The low-time pilot reported he was in very slow flight down wind at
about 30 feet when he let the rotor RPM deteriorate. He lowered the
collective for an autorotation, then misjudged the time to raise the
collective. The aircraft impacted the ground hard enough to bend the
legs and then rolled over. The aircraft sustained typical rollover
damage. No injuries occurred.

Report 16
Conditions Day
Wind Unknown
Temperature Unknown
Elevation Unknown

The pilot decided to go flying one afternoon, but misplaced his ground
wheels and could not remove the aircraft from the garage. He thought he
could fly it out, without harming anything. As the helicopter reached
the door, the down wash pulled the door down on top of the rotors. No
pilot injuries occurred, but the helicopter sustained typical garage
door damage. (There have been more than five different stories about
this accident, and therefore, RHCI feels that the truth is not
completely known.)

Other Accidents:

1) Pilot landed in a field with several other Mini-500s coming in
behind for landing. Pilot got out of his aircraft while engine was
running and blades were turning, and did not tighten the collective
friction. He was motioning to the others where to land, and much to the
pilot’s surprise, the aircraft took off by itself, and crash. It is
recommended that any aircraft never be unattended when the engine is
running.

2) Builder failed to change the center of gravity of the aircraft
after a much heavier pilot finished flying. When he picked the aircraft
up to a hover, the tail rocked back and the tail rotor struck the
ground. Minor damage to one tail rotor blade.

3) Builder failed to remove the packing material from inside the tail
boom after trailering the aircraft. While in a hover, the packing
material became entangled in the tail rotor drive shaft and severed the
drive shaft. The aircraft landed hard and bent the landing gear and tail
boom supports.



Non-Flight Related
The following were incidents non-flight related, and they have only be
included to provide you with helpful information as to what to watch for
when you are on the ground and not flying your aircraft:

1) The pilot reported that while trailering his Mini-500 home one
evening, his car collided with a large deer. The deer flew over the top
of the car and impacted the front cabin section of the Mini-500, causing
extensive damage.

2) Builder claimed that he was cleaning the engine compartment with a
flammable solvent. He then claimed that he dropped a screwdriver into
the engine compartment, and then went to the house for something. He
said he then heard the electric starter of the aircraft making noise,
and then saw flames coming from the aircraft. The customer claimed that
the screwdriver made contact with a solonoid causing sparks and the
electric starter to turn, and the aircraft was destroyed by fire. It is
noted that the aircraft was fully insured, and the customer had been
advertising it for sale.

3) Pilot reported that he landed and exited the cockpit and was
waiting for a friend. At the same time, a Piper Warrior Pa 28 was
parking, and its right wing collided into the left side of the Mini-500.
The Piper's wing, weighing about 550 pounds with a fuel tank, knocked
the Mini-500 four feet from where it was parked. The only damage found
in the Mini-500 was a dent above the collective side in the main cockpit
structure side wall and between the two left front door hinges. The
Piper Pa 28's right wing was a total loss.

[Dennis Fetters]

Darrel Toepfer wrote:
> Well Dennis has a way of popping back up ever so often to test the
> waters. Usually the person that brings it up, has an IP or provider that
> matches his own...


That is correct. I am using the ID name "Flyingmonk" to come here and
insult myself with childish remarks, name-calling and make unfounded and
untrue accusations.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Flyingmonk]

>Dennis Fetters
>Designer of;
>Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
>Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
>Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
>Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
>Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

Impresive! Any of the above still flying? Are YOU flying any of the
above? Anyone die because of the above?

[Dennis Fetters]

Gig 601XL Builder wrote:

> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
> . net...
>
>>Flyingmonk wrote:
>>
>>>Hey Denise,
>>>
>>>How many hours do YOU have in the mini500? Do you fly it? Are you
>>>still flying it?

> The question remains. How many hours have you logged in the Mini-500 you
> designed and do you still have a Mini-500 that you fly?



The question can remain until hell freezes over. I owe you no answer,
and what I do is no ones business anymore. Don't like that? Learn to
live with it, or don't for that matter, I could care less. I am only
here to correct misinformation concerning the Mini-500 when it is posted.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Flyingmonk]

>Dennis Fetters
>Designer of;
>Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
>Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
>Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
>Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
>Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

Impresive! Any of the above still flying? Are YOU flying any of the
above? Anyone die because of the above?

[Matt Whiting]

Flyingmonk wrote:
>>Dennis Fetters
>>Designer of;
>>Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
>>Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
>>Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
>>Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
>>Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter
>
>
> Impresive! Any of the above still flying? Are YOU flying any of the
> above? Anyone die because of the above?
>

Hey, Flyingmonk, your stupid switch is on. Might want to switch it off.

Matt

[Flyingmonk]

Thanks Matt. Sometimes I feel like a nut, sometimes I don't. : <)

[Morgans]

Tell us about your relationship with the Rotax company, and how they felt
about the use of their engine, at the power levels it was expected to run in
the 500. What was that percentage of maximum power, anyway?

[Dennis Fetters]

Morgans wrote:
> Tell us about your relationship with the Rotax company, and how they felt
> about the use of their engine, at the power levels it was expected to run in
> the 500. What was that percentage of maximum power, anyway?


Sure, be glad to answer. My relationship with Rotax, at the close of
Revolution Helicopter, went back over 18 years.

In fact, I was the one that opened Rotax to the gyroplane engine sales
market, being the first to accomplish flying a gyroplane with a Rotax
engine. I sold over 1,200 engines for them just in gyros alone.

They sent me the first 532 liquid cooled Rotax to see if I could make it
fly. I did, and opened their market for the larger engines.

Rotax and their customers were having over heating problems with the
532. They told everyone it was ok to run the engine at 210 F. I showed
them how to run the engine at 160 F, and how it would last longer and be
more reliable. They changed to that, and had their airplane builders
call me for advice on how to change to running cooler.

They sent me the first 582 ever built, to see how it would fly. I did,
told them what to change and they did, opening their market for that
engine as well.

I was the first to use mass amounts 582 engines in helicopters, buying
over 500 engines from them.

I had, and have a very good working relationship with Rotax. Rotax is
the best, and only engine as far as I'm concerned, in the world for lite
aviation use.

As for the power levels used on the Mini-500 and how much the Rotax 582
could handle, I already wrote and posted all that here on the newsgroups
many times. You may want to do some research.

Once such post is copied below:

"Jul 25, 4:47 pm
The 582 Rotax is a good choice for the Mini-500. It has the power
necessary to do the job, at the price people will pay. The engine was
only ran at 6600 RPM's, which is still a 100% duty cycle for the engine
at 70% power reduction. Remember, the same engine in the snowmobile
industry will produce 110 hp at 8500 rpm's. Rotax simply derated the
engine for aircraft by lowering the RPM's. If you look at the power
charts of the snowmobile, the output HP at 6500 rpm is 64HP. No Rotax in
a Mini-500 has ever failed due to overexertion, if operated properly.
Only to improper installation or improper (or lack of) maintenance. It
is the finest light-aircraft engine ever made."


The short answer to your question is; the Mini-500 cruses at 70% power
available at it's operational RPM, which is at 90% of it's total duty
cycle. That is normal for most helicopters.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Morgans]

"Dennis Fetters" > wrote
>
> The short answer to your question is; the Mini-500 cruses at 70% power
> available at it's operational RPM, which is at 90% of it's total duty
> cycle.

Hummm, you or someone else is not being truthful, about the percent power
and RPM's the engine had to run at.

Also, the factory being eager to sell engines for the 500 is not quite what
I heard.

I know who I will believe.
--
Jim in NC

[VaVoom]

Morgans wrote:
> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote
>
>>The short answer to your question is; the Mini-500 cruses at 70% power
>>available at it's operational RPM, which is at 90% of it's total duty
>>cycle.
>
>
> Hummm, you or someone else is not being truthful, about the percent power
> and RPM's the engine had to run at.

He's truthful about the duty cycle! The engine ran for 90% of the flight.

[Dennis Fetters]

Morgans wrote:
> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote
>
>>The short answer to your question is; the Mini-500 cruses at 70% power
>>available at it's operational RPM, which is at 90% of it's total duty
>>cycle.
>
>
> Hummm, you or someone else is not being truthful, about the percent power
> and RPM's the engine had to run at.


I can't speak for what others have told you, nor their honesty about the
topic or how gullible you are to believe them.

However, me as the designer and manufacturer of the aircraft is stating
to you the numbers I given here are correct. I don't care if you believe
me, no skin off my teeth.


> Also, the factory being eager to sell engines for the 500 is not quite what
> I heard.


I can't answer to what you heard, nor can I help what other people tell
you, and I can't help what you choose to believe, nor do I care.

I can only warrant that I said the above, and I stand behind what I said.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Dennis Fetters]

VaVoom wrote:

> Morgans wrote:
>
>> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote
>>
>>> The short answer to your question is; the Mini-500 cruses at 70% power
>>> available at it's operational RPM, which is at 90% of it's total duty
>>> cycle.
>>
>>
>>
>> Hummm, you or someone else is not being truthful, about the percent power
>> and RPM's the engine had to run at.
>
>
> He's truthful about the duty cycle! The engine ran for 90% of the flight.


I hope you are trying to be funny, or you need to learn what a duty
cycle consists of. Don't be ashamed, I find that many people do not know.

Also, you cut the important part off...."That is normal for most
helicopters".


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[C.D.Damron]

Hey, dumbass.

Your record of lies and deceit is a matter of public record.

Do you remember the chronology of your little helicopter project I put
together a while back? I'm sure that you would like to forget about it,
wouldn't you?

Also, how much mileage do you think you can get out of the FAA's finding of
pilot error?

[Dennis Fetters]

C.D.Damron wrote:

> Hey, dumbass.


Nice. I can see already what we're dealing with....


> Your record of lies and deceit is a matter of public record.


You are welcome to prove this statement by posting a little thing called
facts. If you don't have facts, and I know you don't, then you are just
another faceless big mouth coward using the newsgroups to spew unfounded
statements. I have always backed up anything I said with facts and
figures. Please, post what ya got.


> Do you remember the chronology of your little helicopter project I put
> together a while back? I'm sure that you would like to forget about it,
> wouldn't you?


You give yourself to much credit. I don't even remember you. But, why
don't you look it up and re-post it here again, but please also post my
responses I made, and save me the trouble of proving you wrong again. I
am quite busy these days.


> Also, how much mileage do you think you can get out of the FAA's finding of
> pilot error?


Well, sticking to the FACTS is always been best, and I have always done
that. So, I guess to answer your question, forever. Try it some time for
yourself.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[C.D.Damron]

"Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
et...
> You are welcome to prove this statement by posting a little thing called
> facts.

FACT: In your literature, you claimed 2000 hour TBO for non-engine parts
while you had never tested any parts for anything approaching 2000 hours.

[VaVoom]

"Planeman" Fetters wrote:

> VaVoom wrote:
>> Morgans wrote:
>>> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote
>>>
>>>> The short answer to your question is; the Mini-500 cruses at 70% power
>>>> available at it's operational RPM, which is at 90% of it's total duty
>>>> cycle.
>>> Hummm, you or someone else is not being truthful, about the percent
>>> power and RPM's the engine had to run at.
>> He's truthful about the duty cycle! The engine ran for 90% of the flight.
> I hope you are trying to be funny, or you need to learn what a duty
> cycle consists of. Don't be ashamed, I find that many people do not know.
>
> Also, you cut the important part off...."That is normal for most
> helicopters".

I didn't cut anything off, planeman.

[(blank)]

This must be it:
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0119784/

I gotta see that airplane!

[City Father]

On Wed, 30 Nov 2005 18:04:41 GMT, Dennis Fetters
> wrote:

>Sir,
>
>My name is Dennis, or Mr. Fetters to you in this case.
>
>As for what I'm doing, that is no longer anyone's business. As for your
>questions, just look, read and do your own research.
>
>But, here are some clues:
>
>Many...... Yes...... Yes.
>
>
>Dennis Fetters
>
>Designer of;
>Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
>Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
>Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
>Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
>Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
>Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
>Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter


Dear Sir/Mr.Fetters:

Being the astute business man that you are/were...
Do you have any future manufacturing plans for Excesior Springs?
There are many folks that would just love to see you here again.

Although we have a new McDonalds, Arbys, an Applebee's and a huge
Wal-Mart expansion underway.... Excelsior Springs never had anybody
close to your reputation, except maybe, the late great Jesse James.

City Father,
Excelsior Springs, MO 64024

[Dennis Fetters]

C.D.Damron wrote:
> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
> et...
>
>>You are welcome to prove this statement by posting a little thing called
>>facts.
>
>
> FACT: In your literature, you claimed 2000 hour TBO for non-engine parts
> while you had never tested any parts for anything approaching 2000 hours.


WRONG!! In our literature we said that we designed the components to a
2000 hour TBO. We also stated that they were not tested to a 2000 hour TBO.

Just like many commercial helicopters that also had premature failures
(and that did test 2000 hours), including the R-22 and R-44, some of our
components did not make it to the designed life. But, each and every
problem that came up with the Mini-500, we fixed, and did so for free to
the customer, or at least at our cost. Now, how many of the commercial
helicopter companies fixed "all" of their problems for free or at cost??

So you see Mr. Damron, your comment that was false and meant to be
negative was wrong, and actually gave me the opportunity to show
opposite of your intention. Thank you!


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Dennis Fetters]

City Father wrote:
> Dear Sir/Mr.Fetters:
>
> Being the astute business man that you are/were...
> Do you have any future manufacturing plans for Excesior Springs?
> There are many folks that would just love to see you here again.
>
> Although we have a new McDonalds, Arbys, an Applebee's and a huge
> Wal-Mart expansion underway.... Excelsior Springs never had anybody
> close to your reputation, except maybe, the late great Jesse James.
>
> City Father,
> Excelsior Springs, MO 64024


Dear coward that hides behind a fake name.

I, like Jesse James, don't hid behind a mask to obscure my identity, as
you do.

I, unlike that killer and cutthroat Jesse James, have the courage to
subject myself to the public and take whatever undeserved ridicule that
is dished out by losers like you and some of the others, and defend
myself with only facts and professionalism.

I, unlike those failures, back stabbers and thieves Rick Stitt and Joe
Rinke, make my own way in life and don't feed off the hard earned
efforts of others.

I have never taken a penny out of Revolution Helicopter outside of a
meager paycheck. I am not a thief as you tried to portray me.

But on the other hand, you are definitely and undeniably what you are,
and that is a nameless, shameful, cowardly character assassin.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[C.D.Damron]

"Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
. net...
> C.D.Damron wrote:
> > "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
> > et...
> >
> WRONG!! In our literature we said that we designed the components to a
> 2000 hour TBO. We also stated that they were not tested to a 2000 hour
TBO.

Would you like me to post a copy of your brochure?

[Dennis Fetters]

C.D.Damron wrote:
> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
> . net...
>
>>C.D.Damron wrote:
>>
>>>"Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
et...
>>>
>>
>>WRONG!! In our literature we said that we designed the components to a
>>2000 hour TBO. We also stated that they were not tested to a 2000 hour
>
> TBO.
>
> Would you like me to post a copy of your brochure?


Why are you even asking? We're waiting.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[C.D.Damron]

"Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
. com...
> Why are you even asking? We're waiting.

I'll round up a copy. I don't exactly have one waiting for you to come on
here and continue your lies.

You know what it said, Dennis.

[Morgans]

"C.D.Damron" > wrote

> Would you like me to post a copy of your brochure?

I would.
--
Jim in NC

[Dennis Fetters]

C.D.Damron wrote:

> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
> . com...
>
>>Why are you even asking? We're waiting.
>
>
> I'll round up a copy. I don't exactly have one waiting for you to come on
> here and continue your lies.


You are not only a internet character assassin, but an unprepared lousy
one at that!


> You know what it said, Dennis.


I should, I wrote it! But you're the one that made the false accusation
and can't back it up.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[C.D.Damron]

"Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
m...
> I should, I wrote it! But you're the one that made the false accusation
> and can't back it up.

I'll round it up.

In the meantime, do you want to tell us how many hours you had on your
prototype, not the Cicare prototype you took to Oshkosh, before you started
selling your helicopters? I know this is the kind of questions that make
you squirm, Dennis.

[Dennis Fetters]

C.D.Damron wrote:
> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
> m...
>
>>I should, I wrote it! But you're the one that made the false accusation
>>and can't back it up.
>
>
> I'll round it up.
>
> In the meantime, do you want to tell us how many hours you had on your
> prototype, not the Cicare prototype you took to Oshkosh, before you started
> selling your helicopters? I know this is the kind of questions that make
> you squirm, Dennis.


Why don't you just read for yourself sometime?

The first time I took it to Oshkosh it had 0 hours. The second time it
had 210 hours.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[C.D.Damron]

"Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
m...
> The first time I took it to Oshkosh it had 0 hours. The second time it
> had 210 hours.

Dennis, in separate posts, you have provided the info required to establish
a timeline that shows you were more concerned with marketing than testing.

In the Summer of 1992, the Mini-500 showed up at Oshkosh, but that aircraft
didn't have its 40 hours flown off yet. Whether this was the first Mini or
not, the timeline suggests that Fetters designed and tested his new design
in a year and half, or less.

Sometime in 1992, brochures were in circulation stating non-engine TBO's of
2000+ hours. By October of 1992, Revolution reported at least 150 orders
had been placed.

I'm not sure when the first Mini-500's shipped, but it is clear that the
sales effort was on before the design was completed and TBO claims were
advertised that had not been tested. By July of 1995, N500ZZ (serial
#0000) only had 200 hours and was by everybody's opinion, the aircraft with
the most time.

Dennis, when Revolution had 150 orders, how many hours did your high time
aircraft have???

[Matt Whiting]

C.D.Damron wrote:
> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
> . com...
>
>>Why are you even asking? We're waiting.
>
>
> I'll round up a copy. I don't exactly have one waiting for you to come on
> here and continue your lies.

Don't you just hate it when they call your bluff?

Matt

[C.D.Damron]

"Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
...
> C.D.Damron wrote:
> Don't you just hate it when they call your bluff?
>
> Matt

I thought I had it close at hand. We'll find it.

[Flyingmonk]

Bin Fetters wrote:
>Just like many commercial helicopters that also had premature failures
>(and that did test 2000 hours), including the R-22 and R-44, some of our
>components did not make it to the designed life.

Your designs will never ever be in the sake league as that of Frank
Robinson and NONE of your designs made it even even CLOSE to 2000 hours.

[Darrel Toepfer]

C.D.Damron wrote:
> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote...
>> The first time I took it to Oshkosh it had 0 hours. The second time it
>> had 210 hours.

Who left the master switch on?

> By July of 1995, N500ZZ (serial #0000) only had 200 hours and
> was by everybody's opinion, the aircraft with the most time.

[Helper]

Dennis Fetters wrote:
> C.D.Damron wrote:
>
>> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
>> et...
>>
>>> You are welcome to prove this statement by posting a little thing called
>>> facts.
>>
>> FACT: In your literature, you claimed 2000 hour TBO for non-engine parts
>> while you had never tested any parts for anything approaching 2000 hours.
>
> WRONG!! In our literature we said that we designed the components to a
> 2000 hour TBO.

Ah. You deliberately misled customers by using weasel words, but didn't
quite say "to", you used the word "with".
Here are some quotes from various brochures over the years:

All components, except the Rotax 582 engine, were designed with a 2,000
hour T.B.O.

All components, except the engine, are designed with a TBO of at least
2,000 hours.

High TBO: All components except the engine and lifetime composite main
blades, are designed with a TBO up to 2,000 hours.

The main transmission contains a set of ground spiral bevel ring and
pinion gears, designed and manufactured specifically for the Mini-500B
to give a 2,000 hour TBO.

> We also stated that they were not tested to a 2000 hour TBO.

You _never_ stated any such thing.

[Flyingmonk]

Bin Fetters wrote:
>Just like many commercial helicopters that also had premature failures
>(and that did test 2000 hours), including the R-22 and R-44, some of our
>components did not make it to the designed life.

Your designs will never EVER be in the same league as that of Frank
Robinson's and NONE of your designs made it even CLOSE to 2000 hours.

[ower]

"Dennis Fetters" wrote
>
> Designer of;
> Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
> Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
> Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
> Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
> Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
> Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
> Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

Are they all deathtraps or only the Mini-500?

[C.D.Damron]

"Darrel Toepfer" > wrote in message
...
> C.D.Damron wrote:
> > "Dennis Fetters" > wrote...
> >> The first time I took it to Oshkosh it had 0 hours. The second time it
> >> had 210 hours.
>
> Who left the master switch on?
>
> > By July of 1995, N500ZZ (serial #0000) only had 200 hours and
> > was by everybody's opinion, the aircraft with the most time.
>

For Fetters, the history of the Mini-500 starts with the display and demos
of Cicare CH-6 at Oshkosh. He refers to this aircraft as "the prototype",
but in his own posts states that he did not have access to the prototype
after he ended his relationship with Cicare, forcing him to design and test
a helicopter from scratch.

Based on the timeline, Fetters designed a helicopter from scratch in a year
and half after ending his relationship with Cicare, all the while taking
orders based largely on the excitement generated by the earlier CH-6. I
find it an amazing task that a helicopter could be designed, built, and
tested in this timeframe.

If you think that timeframe is a little tight, throw in a 1993 flood that
Fetters has said resulted in delays.

The high-time aircraft had about 200 hours on it by July of 1995.

I DIDN'T THINK OF IT EARLIER, BUT I WONDER WHEN THE FIRST AIRCRAFT WAS
ASSEMBLED AND TESTED USING PRODUCTION PARTS AS THEY APPEARED IN ACTUAL
PRODUCTION KITS.

This is an important question, as many of the problems associated with the
Mini-500 were quality control issues that might have been revealed had
adequate testing been performed on a kit-built aircraft, instead of a
prototype craft where every part is crafted under close scrutiny.

[Flyingmonk]

I don't think he's been able to sell anything since the 500 fiasco.

[Flyingmonk]

My observation is:
1. Denise is a good businessman, but not a good designer.
2. Cicarre is a good designer, but not a good businessman.

[marika]

Dennis Fetters wrote:

>
>
> That is true, as I said then and as I say now.... "YOU should not fly
> the Mini-500, or any aircraft for that matter, that no longer has
> factory support".

Will do!

mk5000

"And I see amazing
And I feel it too
I wish you could meet her
'Coz she comes and goes and when you see her you'll know"--Truly
Amazing (OST-Passion of the Christ), POD

[Dennis Fetters]

I don't have much time to research your "time line" for accuracy, I'm to
busy on other projects. But, assuming you are correct, and the dates you
have sounds about right to me, here are some answers:


C.D.Damron wrote:
> Dennis, in separate posts, you have provided the info required to establish
> a timeline that shows you were more concerned with marketing than testing.


You obviously have never designed, tested, manufactured and sold
aircraft, or you would know better as to the balance it takes in the
kitbuilt industry to accomplish such a goal.

Yes, the purpose of the project was to sell and deliver kitbuilt
helicopters. What a surprise, eh? We are not certified, can't charge
certified prices, and don't have funding that it takes to test to
certified levels. That's why there is "certified aircraft" and "kitbuilt
experimental aircraft".

Are you really a fool that don't understand the kitbuilt market? We
tested for as long as we financially could, and for as long as the
customers would tolerate. It was finally up to the customers when we had
to freeze the design, because it became clear they would not wait any
longer. We were at a point where we had solved all the design problems,
tested to the point where we were having no immediate foreseeable
problems, and then started manufacturing. That is what most all kitbuilt
manufacturer have to do.

Besides, let's not forget the fact that even what little problems the
Mini-500 did have in customers hands;

1. We fixed those problems for free or at cost.
2. We still had less problems than certified helicopters had at
introductions.
3. We never had a crash due to a failed part that was properly installed
and maintained.
4. We never had a crash due to poor flying characteristics, in fact we
had excellent flying characteristics.

Could we have been even better? Absolutely, if we would have had all of
our experience and knowledge in advance. But, we did very well, even
considering it was our first helicopter project, we succeeded when most
all other failed.


> In the Summer of 1992, the Mini-500 showed up at Oshkosh, but that aircraft
> didn't have its 40 hours flown off yet. Whether this was the first Mini or
> not, the timeline suggests that Fetters designed and tested his new design
> in a year and half, or less.


That seems to be right.

I started in December - January 1990.


> Sometime in 1992, brochures were in circulation stating non-engine TBO's of
> 2000+ hours. By October of 1992, Revolution reported at least 150 orders
> had been placed.


No, we started saying we were designing the components to a 2000 hour
life back in mid 1990.

Dude, I had 50 orders before I even finished the first aircraft. After I
flew it for the first time sometime in 1991, I had over 100 orders.


> I'm not sure when the first Mini-500's shipped, but it is clear that the
> sales effort was on before the design was completed and TBO claims were
> advertised that had not been tested.


You are correct. Welcome to the kitbuilt world. That is how it is done.


By July of 1995, N500ZZ (serial
> #0000) only had 200 hours and was by everybody's opinion, the aircraft with
> the most time.


Sounds correct.


> Dennis, when Revolution had 150 orders, how many hours did your high time
> aircraft have???


I can't remember without looking it up, and I don't have that much time.
But, if it were around 50 to 100 hours would not surprise me. But, by
the time we started shipping kits, we had well more than double that, as
I remember.

The point you are trying to make is that I had the audacity to actually
take orders for the Mini-500 before it was fully tested!!! OH MY GOD!!!!

Well, wake up Mr. Darmon and smell the aviation fuel! That is how the
kitbuilt market works. Don't like it? Stay away from it!


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Dennis Fetters]

Helper wrote:
>> Dennis Fetters wrote:
>> WRONG!! In our literature we said that we designed the components to a
>> 2000 hour TBO.
>
>
> Ah. You deliberately misled customers by using weasel words, but didn't
> quite say "to", you used the word "with".
> Here are some quotes from various brochures over the years:


Ah HA!! Mr. Help, you are no help. People are not as stupid as you
portray them to be. How many customers do you think purchased a Mini-500
without calling us to ask questions? How many do you think didn't
understand what we wrote, or those that didn't understand about the 2000
hours asked for clarification? How many people do you think really
thought they were purchasing a fully 2000 hour tested helicopter for
only $20,000 to $28,000.

Why do you think other people are so stupid? Or, do you judge all others
as if they were equal to you? I guess if "you" would have been someone
that purchased a Mini-500 based on your belief it had a 2000 tested
component life, then I would actually owe someone an apology for their
lacking braid capacity to understand. Lucky for me, you didn't buy one.


> All components, except the Rotax 582 engine, were designed with a 2,000
> hour T.B.O.
>
> All components, except the engine, are designed with a TBO of at least
> 2,000 hours.
>
> High TBO: All components except the engine and lifetime composite main
> blades, are designed with a TBO up to 2,000 hours.
>
> The main transmission contains a set of ground spiral bevel ring and
> pinion gears, designed and manufactured specifically for the Mini-500B
> to give a 2,000 hour TBO.


Thank you for backing up what we advertised.


>> We also stated that they were not tested to a 2000 hour TBO.
>
>
> You _never_ stated any such thing.

Yes we did.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Dennis Fetters]

Flyingmonk wrote:

> Bin Fetters wrote:
>
>>Just like many commercial helicopters that also had premature failures
>>(and that did test 2000 hours), including the R-22 and R-44, some of our
>>components did not make it to the designed life.
>
>
> Your designs will never EVER be in the same league as that of Frank
> Robinson's and NONE of your designs made it even CLOSE to 2000 hours.


Well, thank you Mr. Flyingmonk for coming out with this off the wall
comment, just out of the blue!! I would never claim to be in the same
league as Frank Robinson. He is a truly gifted helicopter designer. Man,
you need to take a chill-pill or something.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Flyingmonk]

Bin Fetters wrote:
>Just like many commercial helicopters that also had premature failures
>(and that did test 2000 hours), including the R-22 and R-44, some of our
>components did not make it to the designed life.

Your designs will never EVER be in the same league as that of Frank
Robinson's and NONE of your designs made it even CLOSE to 2000 hours.

[Dennis Fetters]

C.D.Damron wrote:

> "Darrel Toepfer" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>C.D.Damron wrote:
>>
>>>"Dennis Fetters" > wrote...
>>>
>>>>The first time I took it to Oshkosh it had 0 hours. The second time it
>>>>had 210 hours.
>>
>>Who left the master switch on?
>>
>>
>>>By July of 1995, N500ZZ (serial #0000) only had 200 hours and
>>
>> > was by everybody's opinion, the aircraft with the most time.
>>
>
>
> For Fetters, the history of the Mini-500 starts with the display and demos
> of Cicare CH-6 at Oshkosh. He refers to this aircraft as "the prototype",
> but in his own posts states that he did not have access to the prototype
> after he ended his relationship with Cicare, forcing him to design and test
> a helicopter from scratch.


Correct. Mr. Cicare, for whatever reason he had, could not live up to
his end of the deal, forcing me to take on the Mini-500 on my own and
with none of his help or experience, which would have been beneficial.


> Based on the timeline, Fetters designed a helicopter from scratch in a year
> and half after ending his relationship with Cicare, all the while taking
> orders based largely on the excitement generated by the earlier CH-6. I
> find it an amazing task that a helicopter could be designed, built, and
> tested in this timeframe.


Thank you. It was an incredible amount of work. A challenge of a
lifetime. Testing continued on many years after until we shipped the
first kit, and many years after that until we closed our doors in 2000.


> If you think that timeframe is a little tight, throw in a 1993 flood that
> Fetters has said resulted in delays.


Right. We even lost our only flying Mini-500, along with all of our
factory equipment, molds and part supplies. We had to start all over,
and move to a new location and outfit it too. Yet, in a year and a half
after, we shipped our first kit. It was a magnificent comeback and
triumph over adversity. Thank you for recognizing this.


> The high-time aircraft had about 200 hours on it by July of 1995.
>
> I DIDN'T THINK OF IT EARLIER, BUT I WONDER WHEN THE FIRST AIRCRAFT WAS
> ASSEMBLED AND TESTED USING PRODUCTION PARTS AS THEY APPEARED IN ACTUAL
> PRODUCTION KITS.


The first Mini-500 I made had 95% of the same parts in it as was in the
finalized machines. We also had a second Mini-500 before shipping, that
was helping in the testing. The design was frozen sometime in early
1995, and tested on until the day we closed.


> This is an important question, as many of the problems associated with the
> Mini-500 were quality control issues that might have been revealed had
> adequate testing been performed on a kit-built aircraft, instead of a
> prototype craft where every part is crafted under close scrutiny.


We had some quality control issues, as well as any new company with a
product. Look at the R-22 and R-44 problems, and those were certified
helicopters! We solved our problems, as they did.

If you had some real-earth experience in what you were saying, then you
would not be saying it.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Dennis Fetters]

Flyingmonk wrote:

> I don't think he's been able to sell anything since the 500 fiasco.


This shows just how ignorant you really are. Just because I learned my
lesson to not sell to the kitbuilt market, don't mean I stopped
developing, building and selling. Hell, I got customers with money I'm
selling to now. It's amazing how price separates the quality of
customers you get. Not true for everyone, I did have many really good
customers that could never afford to own a helicopter until I came out
with the Mini-500.

Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Dennis Fetters]

Flyingmonk wrote:

> My observation is:
> 1. Denise is a good businessman, but not a good designer.
> 2. Cicarre is a good designer, but not a good businessman.
>

Everyone has the right to their own opinion, no matter how uneducated it
may be.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[C.D.Damron]

"Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
. com...
> If you had some real-earth experience in what you were saying, then you
> would not be saying it.

You don't have to design and market a helicopter to understand that you
should probably design and test your product adequately before selling it.
Call me old fashioned, but that is how I think it should be done, especially
if lives are at stake.

[Helper]

Dennis Fetters wrote:
> Helper wrote:
>
>>> Dennis Fetters wrote:
>>> WRONG!! In our literature we said that we designed the components to
>>> a 2000 hour TBO.
>>
>> Ah. You deliberately misled customers by using weasel words, but
>> didn't quite say "to", you used the word "with".
>> Here are some quotes from various brochures over the years:
>
> Ah HA!! Mr. Help, you are no help. People are not as stupid as you
> portray them to be.

Well that's a switch! You marketed to entry-level customers. Then after
your collapse, you portrayed them as stupid, incapable, and the cause of
all your problems.

> How many customers do you think purchased a Mini-500
> without calling us to ask questions? How many do you think didn't
> understand what we wrote, or those that didn't understand about the 2000
> hours asked for clarification? How many people do you think really
> thought they were purchasing a fully 2000 hour tested helicopter for
> only $20,000 to $28,000.

We'll never know how many of them thought what.

> Why do you think other people are so stupid? Or, do you judge all others
> as if they were equal to you? I guess if "you" would have been someone
> that purchased a Mini-500 based on your belief it had a 2000 tested
> component life, then I would actually owe someone an apology for their
> lacking braid capacity to understand. Lucky for me, you didn't buy one.
>
>> All components, except the Rotax 582 engine, were designed with a
>> 2,000 hour T.B.O.
>>
>> All components, except the engine, are designed with a TBO of at least
>> 2,000 hours.
>>
>> High TBO: All components except the engine and lifetime composite main
>> blades, are designed with a TBO up to 2,000 hours.
>>
>> The main transmission contains a set of ground spiral bevel ring and
>> pinion gears, designed and manufactured specifically for the Mini-500B
>> to give a 2,000 hour TBO.
>
> Thank you for backing up what we advertised.

LOL! It was pure hyperbole. You never backed it up then, and nobody's
backing it up now.

>>> We also stated that they were not tested to a 2000 hour TBO.
>>
>> You _never_ stated any such thing.
>
> Yes we did.

Naw, I've got a bunch of brochures here and there's nothing of the sort,
not a hint.

You're not very popular here, ya' notice? Feeling kind of alone? Maybe
it's time for you to pop up as "planeman" again and praise yourself.

[Helper]

C.D.Damron wrote:

> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
> . com...
>
>>If you had some real-earth experience in what you were saying, then you
>>would not be saying it.
>
>
> You don't have to design and market a helicopter to understand that you
> should probably design and test your product adequately before selling it.
> Call me old fashioned, but that is how I think it should be done, especially
> if lives are at stake.

I'm sure Denise recognizes that lives are at risk. Looks like he is
marketing special bags for Mini-500 pilots.
http://tinyurl.com/8jfcv

[Flyingmonk]

C.D.Damron wrote:
>especiallyif lives are at stake.

Denise Mohammad Bin Farris Al Fetters AKA Planeman don't give a sh*t
about lives. He would have continued on if people let him. He's still
designing more if you're game enough to buy them.

[Dennis]

Dear Sir,

We represent an investment Bank in UK. We provide the following
services:-

* Arrange Project finance, Short Term Finance for profitable projects.

* Project funding with and without collateral (against Insurance
wrap).
* We arrange insurance guarantee also.

We do not charge any upfront fee. Client will be dealing directly with
bank.

For more information, please feel free to contact us.

With Regards
Dennis

[Flyingmonk]

Bin Fetters wrote:
>Just like many commercial helicopters that also had premature failures
>(and that did test 2000 hours), including the R-22 and R-44, some of our
>components did not make it to the designed life.

Your designs will never EVER be in the same league as that of Frank
Robinson's and NONE of your designs made it even CLOSE to 2000 hours.

[Flyingmonk]

Bin Fetters wrote:
>Just like many commercial helicopters that also had premature failures
>(and that did test 2000 hours), including the R-22 and R-44, some of our
>components did not make it to the designed life.

>We had some quality control issues, as well as any new company with a
>product. Look at the R-22 and R-44 problems, and those were certified
>helicopters!

Your designs will never EVER be in the same league as that of Frank
Robinson's and NONE of your designs made it even CLOSE to 2000 hours.

[Flyingmonk]

Everyone has a right to think they're designers, no matter how unsafe
their designs may be or how many has died because of it.

[Flyingmonk]

Denise wrote:
>This shows just how ignorant you really are. Just because I learned my
>lesson to not sell to the kitbuilt market, don't mean I stopped
>developing, building and selling. Hell, I got customers with money I'm
>selling to now. It's amazing how price separates the quality of
>customers you get. Not true for everyone, I did have many really good
>customers that could never afford to own a helicopter until I came out
>with the Mini-500.

Prove it! Who did you sell what to? Are they ready to die?

[Smitty Two]

In article <_jMkf.602344$_o.270005@attbi_s71>,
"C.D.Damron" > wrote:

> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
> . com...
> > If you had some real-earth experience in what you were saying, then you
> > would not be saying it.
>
> You don't have to design and market a helicopter to understand that you
> should probably design and test your product adequately before selling it.
> Call me old fashioned, but that is how I think it should be done, especially
> if lives are at stake.

Maybe you "should," but if that were the business model prevalent in the
real world today, Microsoft wouldn't be who they are. Imagine a product
or service that needs to be "patched' every three days or so being
successful in the market place. Utterly incomprehensible to Mac users
and other men of proper wit. Snake oil goes by a lot of different
monikers in different industries, but it isn't likely to be pulled off
the shelves any time soon. Caveat Emptor.

While I have the virtual floor, I'll add that I don't know anything
about Mr. Fetters or his products, but since neither he nor his
detractors seem able to discuss the issues like gentlemen, I put little
credence in anything said here on this topic. That's unfortunate,
because while I might have learned something interesting if not useful,
all I've gained is another confirmation that flared nostrils do not win
friends and influence people.

[Dennis Fetters]

C.D.Damron wrote:
> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
> . com...
>
>>If you had some real-earth experience in what you were saying, then you
>>would not be saying it.
>
>
> You don't have to design and market a helicopter to understand that you
> should probably design and test your product adequately before selling it.


No you don't... if you don't care if you succeed or not. The kitbuilt
industry tests as much as it can afford before shipping product. If it
were not for advanced sales, there would be no kitbuilt industry.
Advanced sales is what any new kitbuilt company relies on to develop and
manufacture their product. It is a fact of the industry. RHCI tested
even more than most companies tested, and we continued testing until the
day we closed.


> Call me old fashioned, but that is how I think it should be done, especially
> if lives are at stake.

You are old fashion...... So am I. I think that is the way it should be
done too. But, nothing moves without the money. If you want an
alternative to certified aviation which offers kit aircraft at low
prices, then the only solution is advanced sales, and less non-certified
test time.

C.D., think about it..... If a company that wants to setup and
manufacture a helicopter spent 2 years to design and develop the
aircraft, how much will it cost?

Well, if it has only 5 employees and a moderate sized building, they
would spend about $400,000 in wages alone, and about $60,000 on renting
and fixed overhead. Cost of equipment will be around $25,000. Material
and parts will be around $50,000, if you're lucky. If you don't crash
the first flight or make any costly mistakes, you just spent $535,000,
and now you have something that just flew today.

Take another year and a half to test and modify, while your setting up
production tooling and building parts to reach a goal of shipping 5 kits
weekly, you will spend another $300,000 in wages, $45,000 in rent and
fixed overhead, and maybe another $20,000 in modifications, if you're
lucky. You just spent another $365,000, totaling $900,000 and you
haven't shipped nothing yet.

Now you are ready to ship, but wait, what about the parts to ship? They
were not for free! To end up with only 50 aircraft sitting on the
shelves, a mire 10 weeks worth of inventory to ship, you had to spend
around $1,050,000. What, you think the vendors were going to let you pay
later? HAH!!!

One other thing. You can't put 50 aircraft worth of parts on the shelves
with only 5 people in a modest sized shop. It takes a factory of around
52 people and 24,000 sq. ft. You had to hire, train and pay these people
over the last 4 months. With an average shop wage of only $30,000 a
year, rent of around $16,000 and around $40,000 to outfit the building.
That last 4 months just cost you $576,000.

So, here we are, shipping our fist aircraft today that we sold for
$28,000!!! You have invested $2,526,000.

Wait, lets step back to when we had only 5 employees and a modest sized
shop, where you were spending only $267,500 a year. Now you want to test
for 2000 hours after you spent $535,000 just to get where you can fly
something. If you fly 5 hours a day, 5 days a week, you can log 1,300
hours in a year. So at this rate, you will take 19 months, say 2 years
because you have to disassemble and inspect every 50 hours. Lets say you
don't crash of even have to redesign anything. BANG!! You just spent
another $535,000 and got away cheep.

So, you got 2000 hours of testing under your belt at a cost of
$1,070,000. Now you're ready to sell something, or are you one of these
type of people that would start selling something before you had a
factory to produce it with??

C.D., if you don't think these numbers are real, then go out there and
do it yourself, and see.

Yes, we're old fashion, you and I. The big difference between us is,
I've done the above, and you have not.

We live in the real world, and people that have not designed and
manufactured their own helicopter could never comprehend what it takes
to do so. You may think you do, wish you did, but you don't, yet you so
easily judge.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Dennis Fetters]

No need to waste my time discussing it with you. What I said below is
correct, unchanged.

Helper wrote:

> Dennis Fetters wrote:
>
>> Helper wrote:
>>
>>>> Dennis Fetters wrote:
>>>> WRONG!! In our literature we said that we designed the components to
>>>> a 2000 hour TBO.
>
> >>
>
>>> Ah. You deliberately misled customers by using weasel words, but
>>> didn't quite say "to", you used the word "with".
>>> Here are some quotes from various brochures over the years:
>>
>>
>> Ah HA!! Mr. Help, you are no help. People are not as stupid as you
>> portray them to be.
>
>
> Well that's a switch! You marketed to entry-level customers. Then after
> your collapse, you portrayed them as stupid, incapable, and the cause of
> all your problems.
>
>> How many customers do you think purchased a Mini-500 without calling
>> us to ask questions? How many do you think didn't understand what we
>> wrote, or those that didn't understand about the 2000 hours asked for
>> clarification? How many people do you think really thought they were
>> purchasing a fully 2000 hour tested helicopter for only $20,000 to
>> $28,000.
>
>
> We'll never know how many of them thought what.
>
>> Why do you think other people are so stupid? Or, do you judge all
>> others as if they were equal to you? I guess if "you" would have been
>> someone that purchased a Mini-500 based on your belief it had a 2000
>> tested component life, then I would actually owe someone an apology
>> for their lacking braid capacity to understand. Lucky for me, you
>> didn't buy one.
>>
>>> All components, except the Rotax 582 engine, were designed with a
>>> 2,000 hour T.B.O.
>>>
>>> All components, except the engine, are designed with a TBO of at
>>> least 2,000 hours.
>>>
>>> High TBO: All components except the engine and lifetime composite
>>> main blades, are designed with a TBO up to 2,000 hours.
>>>
>>> The main transmission contains a set of ground spiral bevel ring and
>>> pinion gears, designed and manufactured specifically for the
>>> Mini-500B to give a 2,000 hour TBO.
>>
>>
>> Thank you for backing up what we advertised.
>
>
> LOL! It was pure hyperbole. You never backed it up then, and nobody's
> backing it up now.
>
>>>> We also stated that they were not tested to a 2000 hour TBO.
>
> >>
>
>>> You _never_ stated any such thing.
>>
>>
>> Yes we did.
>
>
> Naw, I've got a bunch of brochures here and there's nothing of the sort,
> not a hint.
>
> You're not very popular here, ya' notice? Feeling kind of alone? Maybe
> it's time for you to pop up as "planeman" again and praise yourself.


Believe me, I don't waste a single moment worrying about anything you think.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Dennis Fetters]

Helper wrote:

> C.D.Damron wrote:
>
>> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
>> . com...
>>
>>> If you had some real-earth experience in what you were saying, then you
>>> would not be saying it.
>>
>>
>>
>> You don't have to design and market a helicopter to understand that you
>> should probably design and test your product adequately before selling
>> it.
>> Call me old fashioned, but that is how I think it should be done,
>> especially
>> if lives are at stake.
>
>
> I'm sure Denise recognizes that lives are at risk. Looks like he is
> marketing special bags for Mini-500 pilots.
> http://tinyurl.com/8jfcv


You can not reason with someone that has a childish behavior. A bad
mannered one at that.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Dennis Fetters]

Smitty Two wrote:

> In article <_jMkf.602344$_o.270005@attbi_s71>,
> "C.D.Damron" > wrote:
>
>
>>"Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
. com...
>>
>>>If you had some real-earth experience in what you were saying, then you
>>>would not be saying it.
>>
>>You don't have to design and market a helicopter to understand that you
>>should probably design and test your product adequately before selling it.
>>Call me old fashioned, but that is how I think it should be done, especially
>>if lives are at stake.
>
>
> Maybe you "should," but if that were the business model prevalent in the
> real world today, Microsoft wouldn't be who they are. Imagine a product
> or service that needs to be "patched' every three days or so being
> successful in the market place. Utterly incomprehensible to Mac users
> and other men of proper wit. Snake oil goes by a lot of different
> monikers in different industries, but it isn't likely to be pulled off
> the shelves any time soon. Caveat Emptor.
>
> While I have the virtual floor, I'll add that I don't know anything
> about Mr. Fetters or his products, but since neither he nor his
> detractors seem able to discuss the issues like gentlemen, I put little
> credence in anything said here on this topic. That's unfortunate,
> because while I might have learned something interesting if not useful,
> all I've gained is another confirmation that flared nostrils do not win
> friends and influence people.


Dear Mr. Smitty,
Thank you for your post, I see where you're coming from. Although I try
my best to be gentlemanly, it becomes extremely difficult when you are
only dealing with childlike behavior from the detractors. I try to
answer questions and false statements as nice and well as I can, but
look at what I have to respond back to, and to only the 3 people making
the rude comments here. I never start the discussions, but only jump in
to correct false statements once they are submitted. It is a challenge
to say the least, but I do try. Any questions you have, I am more than
happy to answer.

Sincerely,

Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Darrel Toepfer]

Smitty Two wrote:

> Maybe you "should," but if that were the business model prevalent in the
> real world today, Microsoft wouldn't be who they are. Imagine a product
> or service that needs to be "patched' every three days or so being
> successful in the market place. Utterly incomprehensible to Mac users
> and other men of proper wit. Snake oil goes by a lot of different
> monikers in different industries, but it isn't likely to be pulled off
> the shelves any time soon. Caveat Emptor.

You've described *fBetters Bilt* pretty well. He apparently took
"Pirates of Silicon Valley" and applied it to rotary winged aircraft. He
took others designs and "improved" on them. All are "Caveat Emptor" as
they've proved to be fatal, least the people flying models. One for sure
was *vaporware* (Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter, people paid for them and
never got anything), maybe more:

Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter (Excalibur is an airplane)
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter
(He posted once he was "designing" a UAV)

Pirates of Silicon Valley (1999)
http://imdb.com/title/tt0168122

[Dennis Fetters]

Darrel Toepfer wrote:

> Smitty Two wrote:
>
>> Maybe you "should," but if that were the business model prevalent in
>> the real world today, Microsoft wouldn't be who they are. Imagine a
>> product or service that needs to be "patched' every three days or so
>> being successful in the market place. Utterly incomprehensible to Mac
>> users and other men of proper wit. Snake oil goes by a lot of
>> different monikers in different industries, but it isn't likely to be
>> pulled off the shelves any time soon. Caveat Emptor.
>
>
> You've described *fBetters Bilt* pretty well. He apparently took
> "Pirates of Silicon Valley" and applied it to rotary winged aircraft. He
> took others designs and "improved" on them.


As did every helicopter designer and manufacturer since Igor. I never
claimed to invent the helicopter. I don't even think I "improved" them.
I just designed and manufactured my own.

As for Fetters-Built Co., what could you possibly know about it? I don't
deal with the public, so you have no way of knowing anything to base any
comments about it.


All are "Caveat Emptor" as
> they've proved to be fatal, least the people flying models. One for sure
> was *vaporware* (Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter, people paid for them and
> never got anything),


Then we sure spent a lot of money and time for a hoax. "vaporware" is
something that never existed. We built the Voyager-500, flew it and
started manufacturing parts for it. Not making it to the marketplace is
another story, because sadly it didn't.


maybe more:

> Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
> (He posted once he was "designing" a UAV)

Send me your email address, and I'll send you a picture of one of my
UAV's. Or, just ask old Beav, I sent him some.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Richard Isakson]

Dennis,

So, you were undercapitalized and your product was underpriced. A brilliant
example of pending business failure.

My big problem with this thread is your claim of a 2000 hour TBO. You knew
from the start that a helicopter is a harsh environment for parts to live
in. Some helicopters have to be thrown away well before that. Your
advertising claim was huge. You were telling people "Look! This one will
last." Dennis, design includes testing. It's not a part until it's proven
it's a part. That was implied in your advertising claim. Now, you've
redefined "design" to mean ... Well what does it mean? If a part is
designed to last 2000 hours and it breaks at 1500 hours, there are those who
would say that's close enough. I wouldn't say that but, others might. You
had parts failing at *tens* of hours. There are only two possible
explainations: either you're a truely crappy designer or you lied and you
never even tried to design to 2000 hours. So, which is it? Are you an
incompetent or are you a liar who's word shouldn't be taken about anything.
It doesn't matter what other people do. You should have learned that when
you were twelve years old. It doesn't matter what sort of remediation you
offered. Your parts weren't properly designed.

For others that are reading this thread: take a close look at Dennis's
financial numbers. After you've had time to study them, we should reopen
the thread on why fancy LSAs cost $100,000.

Rich

[Dennis Fetters]

Richard Isakson wrote:

> Dennis,
>
> So, you were undercapitalized and your product was underpriced. A brilliant
> example of pending business failure.


Welcome to the world of kitbuilt aviation. You can only sell what people
will pay for.


> My big problem with this thread is your claim of a 2000 hour TBO. You knew
> from the start that a helicopter is a harsh environment for parts to live
> in.


I sure do.


Some helicopters have to be thrown away well before that.


They sure do.


Your
> advertising claim was huge. You were telling people "Look! This one will
> last."


No, I said if you build your kit the same way we built ours, you should
expect the same results. Our advertising claim was correct. We did use
the 2000 hour mark as our designed goal. Like "ALL" helicopters ever
built, some components needed redesigned after being exposed to the
customers. Like "ALL" helicopters, there were some things that we simply
designed inadequate, and had to redesign. And we did, each and every
problem, and for free or at our cost to the customer.

Even then, we had less problems to correct than the most popular
commercial helicopters did after they first come out. THAT SAYS
SOMETHING, and we didn't even built them, the customers did.


Dennis, design includes testing. It's not a part until it's proven
> it's a part. That was implied in your advertising claim.


We did do testing, more than most companies did too. We were as
confidant as we could be when we started shipping parts. But, unlike
you, we were not blind to the fact that we knew that someday there would
be problems. All helicopter manufacturers know that. We took the
problems as they came and fixed them. We were lucky there were so few,
compared to all other new designs.


Now, you've
> redefined "design" to mean ... Well what does it mean?


It means designed. You want it to mean designed and tested to the life
expectancy, but that is something else, that means commercial and high
prices.


If a part is
> designed to last 2000 hours and it breaks at 1500 hours, there are those who
> would say that's close enough. I wouldn't say that but, others might. You
> had parts failing at *tens* of hours.


What is Frank Robinson excuse, and was it good enough for you? You are
right dude, we had some parts fail to soon. We know it, and we corrected
them. But you have to give some credit for as few problems as we had,
and how cheep it was to fix them. It's not OK that we made mistakes, but
we fixed them and that is the best I can offer. I understand that is not
going to be exceptable for you, you don't have to be reasonable, I do.


There are only two possible
> explainations: either you're a truely crappy designer or you lied and you
> never even tried to design to 2000 hours. So, which is it?


Who are you to say anything? Who are you to say these are the only two
explanations? You are so closed minded that even if the facts slapped
you in the head you would refuse to believe them. Read what I said above
and stop talking like some uneducated idiot for a moment.


Are you an
> incompetent or are you a liar who's word shouldn't be taken about anything.
> It doesn't matter what other people do. You should have learned that when
> you were twelve years old. It doesn't matter what sort of remediation you
> offered. Your parts weren't properly designed.


I wish I was a better designer. I wish I had never made a mistake. I
hope I never will make another mistake, but I am realistic, unlike you.

But Mr. Isakson, there is one undeniable fact you can't deny, well you
could, and will. Even if I was the worst designer in the world, the fact
is that I did design a working helicopter, built the kits and sold over
500, and that puts me high above what you have done. The lower you try
and place me, the lower you place yourself. I may be a has-been in the
kitbuilt field, thank God, but better that than a never-been, or a
never-gonna-be, like you. And you judge me?


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Richard Isakson]

"Dennis Fetters" wrote ...
>The lower you try
> and place me, the lower you place yourself. I may be a has-been in the
> kitbuilt field, thank God, but better that than a never-been, or a
> never-gonna-be, like you. And you judge me?

Yes, Dennis. As an educated Aeronautical Engineer and a life long engineer,
I judge you.

Rich

[Dennis Fetters]

Richard Isakson wrote:

> "Dennis Fetters" wrote ...
>
>>The lower you try
>>and place me, the lower you place yourself. I may be a has-been in the
>>kitbuilt field, thank God, but better that than a never-been, or a
>>never-gonna-be, like you. And you judge me?
>
>
> Yes, Dennis. As an educated Aeronautical Engineer and a life long engineer,
> I judge you.
>
> Rich




Good for you! Email me some of the aircraft you have designed, built and
manufactured, let's compare.

fettersbuiltco at sbcglobal dot net


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Matt Whiting]

Richard Isakson wrote:
> "Dennis Fetters" wrote ...
>
>>The lower you try
>>and place me, the lower you place yourself. I may be a has-been in the
>>kitbuilt field, thank God, but better that than a never-been, or a
>>never-gonna-be, like you. And you judge me?
>
>
> Yes, Dennis. As an educated Aeronautical Engineer and a life long engineer,
> I judge you.
>
> Rich
>
>

Just curious, but how many products have you designed, manufactured and
sold?

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Smitty Two wrote:

> In article <_jMkf.602344$_o.270005@attbi_s71>,
> "C.D.Damron" > wrote:
>
>
>>"Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
. com...
>>
>>>If you had some real-earth experience in what you were saying, then you
>>>would not be saying it.
>>
>>You don't have to design and market a helicopter to understand that you
>>should probably design and test your product adequately before selling it.
>>Call me old fashioned, but that is how I think it should be done, especially
>>if lives are at stake.
>
>
> Maybe you "should," but if that were the business model prevalent in the
> real world today, Microsoft wouldn't be who they are. Imagine a product
> or service that needs to be "patched' every three days or so being
> successful in the market place. Utterly incomprehensible to Mac users
> and other men of proper wit. Snake oil goes by a lot of different
> monikers in different industries, but it isn't likely to be pulled off
> the shelves any time soon. Caveat Emptor.
>
> While I have the virtual floor, I'll add that I don't know anything
> about Mr. Fetters or his products, but since neither he nor his
> detractors seem able to discuss the issues like gentlemen, I put little
> credence in anything said here on this topic. That's unfortunate,
> because while I might have learned something interesting if not useful,
> all I've gained is another confirmation that flared nostrils do not win
> friends and influence people.

I'm in the same boat as you. I know little about Dennis or his
helicopter(s). I know little about his detractors here. However, just
from reading the diatribes that crop up here every two years, I
personally think that Dennis comes across at least as credible as his
detractors. Most seem to just foam at the mouth a lot and make
accusations that they can't back up when he calls their bluff. It tends
to be entertaining for about five posts and then is just stupid.


Matt

[Morgans]

"Smitty Two" > wrote

> While I have the virtual floor, I'll add that I don't know anything
> about Mr. Fetters or his products, but since neither he nor his
> detractors seem able to discuss the issues like gentlemen, I put little
> credence in anything said here on this topic.

If you have a whole bunch of time to kill, google Mini-500, with the field
of search locations being this newsgroup.

I'll try to put out some of the high points (low points) of other's
accusations against the 500. I'm sure others could add much more, but most
of them are no longer active in this group.

The engine in the mini was running at something like 130% of the
manufacturer's recommended power level. It had to be re-jetted to produce
that much power, and had a horrible TBO and mean time between failures.

It barely had enough power to get out of ground effect hover, so climbout
was so slow that if took much longer than usual to get enough altitude that
an autorotation could be successfully pulled off.

Major parts (necessary for safe flight) were not designed with enough safety
margin, with excessive slop, and failed after very short run times.

There were problems getting parts in a timely manner for some customers,
even though they had been paid for.

When the engine packed it in, it tended to tuck over very quickly, and crash
at a steep angle. IIRC, a stabilizer was added to help protect against this
trait.

Many people had close friends die in them, and contrary to what has been
said, many were highly experienced rotorcraft pilots. They were declared
pilot error, but it might be said that no pilot could have saved them in
similar situations.

Long to short, if the engine died, you died. The engines died way too
often.

Others could add more, and I'm sure Dennis will refute every single thing I
have written, but he has had much practice defending himself.
--
Jim in NC

[Dennis Fetters]

Morgans wrote:

> "Smitty Two" > wrote

> If you have a whole bunch of time to kill, google Mini-500, with the field
> of search locations being this newsgroup.


Absolutely. You will see many unfounded accusation just like what this
guy posted, and to each and every one I gave a response with the factual
information, just like I'm about to do now....


> I'll try to put out some of the high points (low points) of other's
> accusations against the 500. I'm sure others could add much more, but most
> of them are no longer active in this group.


Right, they got tired of being proved wrong.


> The engine in the mini was running at something like 130% of the
> manufacturer's recommended power level. It had to be re-jetted to produce
> that much power, and had a horrible TBO and mean time between failures.


Where on earth did you get this information? Did you make it up??
Morgans, you really have no idea of what you are spouting off about.

Do you know anything about helicopters, and how the engine works? Do you
know that in a helicopter you can fly at 70% power and still be at 100% RPM?

Did you know that by running the engine at one RPM and varying the power
setting was better than varying the RPM and power settings? Our TBO's
were higher than Rotax engines being used in airplanes. We never had a
single engine failure due to overexertion of the engine.


> It barely had enough power to get out of ground effect hover, so climbout
> was so slow that if took much longer than usual to get enough altitude that
> an autorotation could be successfully pulled off.


What? Have you ever seen a Mini-500 fly? Have you ever been to Oshkosh
or Sun & Fun and watched a Mini-500 perform and out-fly all the other
designs? Didn't you ever read the flight report that KitPlanes magazine
did, or all the other flight reviews from other magazines?

Everyone said that the Mini-500 was one of the finest helicopers they
ever flew, and it autoroted very well.


> Major parts (necessary for safe flight) were not designed with enough safety
> margin, with excessive slop, and failed after very short run times.


Not true at all. We had some parts wareout, mostly due to a customer
flying their Mini-500 40 hours without tracking and balancing the
aircraft. Yes, we also had some design problems, but we corrected them all.


> There were problems getting parts in a timely manner for some customers,
> even though they had been paid for.


Not true at all. We always had parts in stock, shipped same or next day.
As for one of the AD changes, it took time to test our repairs, and as
soon as they were appoeved, they were shipped, and not paid for until
they were ready to go.


> When the engine packed it in, it tended to tuck over very quickly, and crash
> at a steep angle. IIRC, a stabilizer was added to help protect against this
> trait.


Absolutely a bunch of crap. No Mini-500 crashed from too steep of an
autorotation. Something else you made up??

Not true again, the problem came from a few customers taking the bad
advice from another customer and set the autorotation angle of the main
blades to -1.5 degrees instead of the factory -0.5 degrees, because he
said it would inter at a lower altitude. This made the nose drop
suddenly when interring autorotations.

Also, as it said in the pilots manual. Lead with cyclic before
collective, or the nose would drop more than normal. We even came up
with a modification that took all nose drop out even if you forgot to
lead with cyclic.

"....tucked over very quickly and crashed!!!" What an uninformed idiot
you are!


> Many people had close friends die in them, and contrary to what has been
> said, many were highly experienced rotorcraft pilots. They were declared
> pilot error, but it might be said that no pilot could have saved them in
> similar situations.
>
> Long to short, if the engine died, you died. The engines died way too
> often.


Are your eyes brown? Your eyes are brown, aren't they!.... because you
are FUUUUUULLL of it!


You are talking about Allen Barklige, and I answered that some time ago.
Here, this is from a post I did on 8/15/2005 concerning Allen:

<Cut>
Dear Mr. O'Brien

Let's look at this for a moment:

The witness was on the airport, and the Mini-500 was 150 or less above
him, and still over the airport. The power lines are about 1000 feet
away from the witness. Already 150 feet high over the witness, Allen
only climbed 50 more feet over a 1000 foot distance to clear a power
line complex. It shows that he had no concern about climbing high
enough, as we are all trained to do to clear an obstacle in case of
engine failure. Pilot error.

It was 83 degrees F. The witness, standing on the opposite side on a
large hanger, heard the Mini-500 running behind the hanger complex, then
he watched it fly from around the hanger making a wide and level turn
towards him climbing to 150 feet or so, then flying away almost 900 feet
before the engine failed. The point is, between the mandatory warm-up
time, hover time, flying from around the hanger time, wide level turn
time, flying toward the witness while climbing to 150 feet time, and
flying 900 feet away while climbing an additional 50 feet time, the
Mini-500 had plenty of warm up time not to have cold seizure.

Cold seizures in a Mini-500 have only happened when the pilot starts the
engine cold, and immediately lifts into a climbing departure, and then
the engine will seize within 100 feet or so and not turn until later
after the piston cooled enough to allow it to do so. It's Pilot error.

Look at the report:
"The top of the piston showed foreign material impact strikes in the
squish-band area. Small particles of foreign metallic material were
found embedded in the piston head. Impact marks were found in the top
dome of the power-takeoff cylinder. The two power-takeoff cylinder spark
plugs' electrodes showed no gap. The bottom of both electrodes showed
impact marks." "the sound (engine sound) went quiet, followed by a pop".

Again, dose that sound like an engine that just cold seized, when the
engine can still turn to allow a "pop" from a misfire. The engine quit
because the spark plug gaps were closed from the previous contamination
pounding them shut.

Dose that sound like something was COLD? Not at all. That was an engine
failure due to disintegration of parts. Just like if you seize an
engine, and then run it again without fixing it by removing the damaged
parts and metal, and just like what I said when Allen himself called me
to tell me he seized his engine and he didn't bother to fix it right
before the crash. The engine got hot, and darn hot at that. Nothing cold
about it. In fact, a cold seizure shows only scuffing from sudden
expansion of the piston squeezing in the cylinder, because the cylinder
was not given time to expand. You will not find the metal as what was
found in Allen's engine that was large enough to de-gap the plugs.

>> Worse yet, he hugs the ground during his flight, and flies over a
power line complex without gaining altitude.
>

> Witness: "It was approximately 200 feet above the ground."
> Source:
>
https://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20001211X11011&ntsbno=CHI98FA353&akey=1



Just like I said. 200 feet high and 1000 feet away from the airport
property boundries, and only climed 50 more feet in that distance from
the airport. Pilot error.


>> The engine finally failed over the lines, and he tried to milk the
rotor rpm for more than any helicopter could have offered, and nosed
into the ground after stalling the blades.
>
>
> The witness also noted that "The helicopter did not do a nose tuck,"
which indicates some familiarity with the type, if he was expecting that.


I didn't say it did a "nose tuck". I said it nosed into ground after
stalling the blades, meaning the nose pointing the direction of travel.
As the report indicated, he still had some forward speed, just no lift
and little RPM, as the blade damage described in the report would indicate.

[Dennis Fetters]

Matt Whiting wrote:
> I'm in the same boat as you. I know little about Dennis or his
> helicopter(s). I know little about his detractors here. However, just
> from reading the diatribes that crop up here every two years, I
> personally think that Dennis comes across at least as credible as his
> detractors. Most seem to just foam at the mouth a lot and make
> accusations that they can't back up when he calls their bluff. It tends
> to be entertaining for about five posts and then is just stupid.
>
>
> Matt


Hello Matt,

Thank for taking the time to read them. Congratulations, you are now one
of my so-called aliases, as you will soon be called by one of these
yahoos here.

But, again, thanks for taking the time to read before just judging.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Jerry Springer]

Matt Whiting wrote:
> Smitty Two wrote:
>
>> In article <_jMkf.602344$_o.270005@attbi_s71>,
>> "C.D.Damron" > wrote:
>>
>>
>>> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
>>> . com...
>>>
>>>> If you had some real-earth experience in what you were saying, then you
>>>> would not be saying it.
>>>
>>>
>>> You don't have to design and market a helicopter to understand that you
>>> should probably design and test your product adequately before
>>> selling it.
>>> Call me old fashioned, but that is how I think it should be done,
>>> especially
>>> if lives are at stake.
>>
>>
>>
>> Maybe you "should," but if that were the business model prevalent in
>> the real world today, Microsoft wouldn't be who they are. Imagine a
>> product or service that needs to be "patched' every three days or so
>> being successful in the market place. Utterly incomprehensible to Mac
>> users and other men of proper wit. Snake oil goes by a lot of
>> different monikers in different industries, but it isn't likely to be
>> pulled off the shelves any time soon. Caveat Emptor.
>>
>> While I have the virtual floor, I'll add that I don't know anything
>> about Mr. Fetters or his products, but since neither he nor his
>> detractors seem able to discuss the issues like gentlemen, I put
>> little credence in anything said here on this topic. That's
>> unfortunate, because while I might have learned something interesting
>> if not useful, all I've gained is another confirmation that flared
>> nostrils do not win friends and influence people.
>
>
> I'm in the same boat as you. I know little about Dennis or his
> helicopter(s). I know little about his detractors here. However, just
> from reading the diatribes that crop up here every two years, I
> personally think that Dennis comes across at least as credible as his
> detractors. Most seem to just foam at the mouth a lot and make
> accusations that they can't back up when he calls their bluff. It tends
> to be entertaining for about five posts and then is just stupid.
>
>
> Matt

Wow to bad you can't ask the dead people what they think!!!! Do the
research on the accidents in the FAA accident data base. Read the
reports on how the engine was abused. don't expect other people to
do the research for you.

[Matt Whiting]

Jerry Springer wrote:
> Matt Whiting wrote:
>
>> Smitty Two wrote:
>>
>>> In article <_jMkf.602344$_o.270005@attbi_s71>,
>>> "C.D.Damron" > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> "Dennis Fetters" > wrote in message
>>>> . com...
>>>>
>>>>> If you had some real-earth experience in what you were saying, then
>>>>> you
>>>>> would not be saying it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You don't have to design and market a helicopter to understand that you
>>>> should probably design and test your product adequately before
>>>> selling it.
>>>> Call me old fashioned, but that is how I think it should be done,
>>>> especially
>>>> if lives are at stake.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Maybe you "should," but if that were the business model prevalent in
>>> the real world today, Microsoft wouldn't be who they are. Imagine a
>>> product or service that needs to be "patched' every three days or so
>>> being successful in the market place. Utterly incomprehensible to Mac
>>> users and other men of proper wit. Snake oil goes by a lot of
>>> different monikers in different industries, but it isn't likely to be
>>> pulled off the shelves any time soon. Caveat Emptor.
>>>
>>> While I have the virtual floor, I'll add that I don't know anything
>>> about Mr. Fetters or his products, but since neither he nor his
>>> detractors seem able to discuss the issues like gentlemen, I put
>>> little credence in anything said here on this topic. That's
>>> unfortunate, because while I might have learned something interesting
>>> if not useful, all I've gained is another confirmation that flared
>>> nostrils do not win friends and influence people.
>>
>>
>>
>> I'm in the same boat as you. I know little about Dennis or his
>> helicopter(s). I know little about his detractors here. However,
>> just from reading the diatribes that crop up here every two years, I
>> personally think that Dennis comes across at least as credible as his
>> detractors. Most seem to just foam at the mouth a lot and make
>> accusations that they can't back up when he calls their bluff. It
>> tends to be entertaining for about five posts and then is just stupid.
>>
>>
>> Matt
>
>
> Wow to bad you can't ask the dead people what they think!!!! Do the
> research on the accidents in the FAA accident data base. Read the
> reports on how the engine was abused. don't expect other people to
> do the research for you.

I have no need to as I have no interest in the mini-500. I just get
tired of the prolonged rants that occur here every year or two. Both
sides come across pretty poorly and I was simply observing that.

Matt

[Flyingmonk]

Matt, just FYI only, many of us actually lost good friends in that
machine (mini500). In my case Gil Armbruster, so for some of us it
hits close to home. I guess you wouldn't understand unless you were in
our shoes.

[Darrel Toepfer]

Matt Whiting wrote:

> I have no need to as I have no interest in the mini-500. I just get
> tired of the prolonged rants that occur here every year or two. Both
> sides come across pretty poorly and I was simply observing that.

Dennis just needs to realize that his history here will never be
forgotten...

There is no need to *test the waters* nor defend himself, unless he's
prepared to relive the past over and over again and with the same outcome...

The only thing to silence the hostile crowd, would be to expire himself
in his own creation. Just make sure theres a video camera saving it for
posterity. If he doesn't have one, several here would probably offer
theirs...

[Flyingmonk]

One more thing Matt, just count the number of people that is actually
one his side and are in here defending him and you'll get the idea of
who's right and who's wrong. One doesn't need a engineering degree to
see a bad design, the result speaks for itself i.e. One doesn't have to
be a good barber to see a bad haircut. BTW, he has invented supporters
in the past 'Planeman' being one of them, but he used the same computer
to post from and was caught right away.

[Matt Whiting]

Flyingmonk wrote:
> Matt, just FYI only, many of us actually lost good friends in that
> machine (mini500). In my case Gil Armbruster, so for some of us it
> hits close to home. I guess you wouldn't understand unless you were in
> our shoes.
>

I've lost friends also, but not in a helicopter. I understand the loss,
but what good does it do for your departed friend to keep beating a dead
horse in this ng?


Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Darrel Toepfer wrote:

> Matt Whiting wrote:
>
>> I have no need to as I have no interest in the mini-500. I just get
>> tired of the prolonged rants that occur here every year or two. Both
>> sides come across pretty poorly and I was simply observing that.
>
>
> Dennis just needs to realize that his history here will never be
> forgotten...

Every time that I can remember a thread like this starting, it was
because some yahoo in this group poked a jab at Fetters. I can't
remember a time that he initiated the "discussion."


Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Flyingmonk wrote:

> One more thing Matt, just count the number of people that is actually
> one his side and are in here defending him and you'll get the idea of
> who's right and who's wrong. One doesn't need a engineering degree to
> see a bad design, the result speaks for itself i.e. One doesn't have to
> be a good barber to see a bad haircut. BTW, he has invented supporters
> in the past 'Planeman' being one of them, but he used the same computer
> to post from and was caught right away.

Right and wrong are hardly determined by numbers. I'm basing my
assessment on the quality of the postings here. My point was that
neither side is making a credible argument or showing any data that I'd
take to the bank, so why not just let it die? What does a mini-500
basher have to taunt Fetters into an argument every year or two? What
purpose does it serve?


Matt

[Darrel Toepfer]

Matt Whiting wrote:

> Every time that I can remember a thread like this starting, it was
> because some yahoo in this group poked a jab at Fetters. I can't
> remember a time that he initiated the "discussion."

Read the post that Flyingmonk just did in regards to "Planeman" just one
of many alias used by Dennis to *test the waters*...

[Flyingmonk]

>but what good does it do for your departed friend to keep eating a dead horse in this ng?

It tells the truth, so people such as yourself who didn't know, will
know. Hopefully it will save future customers of Denise from loosing
their money and/or their health and their life.

[Flyingmonk]

>One more thing Matt, just count the number of people that is actually
>on his side and are in here defending him and you'll get the idea of
>who's right and who's wrong. One doesn't need a engineering degree to
>see a bad design, the result speaks for itself i.e. One doesn't have to
>be a good barber to see a bad haircut. BTW, he has invented supporters
>in the past 'Planeman' being one of them, but he used the same computer
>to post from and was caught right away.

Also keep in mid that many that are offended by him have given up and
just look at how many are still here. That also gives you the idea of
how bad he is/was.

[Flyingmonk]

Matt wrote:
>What does a mini-500 basher have to taunt Fetters into an argument every year or two? What purpose does it serve?

Because when we see or hear his name our blood boils. Simple as that,
it hit close to home for us.

[Helper]

Matt Whiting wrote:

> Most seem to just foam at the mouth a lot and make accusations that
> they can't back up

Haha, okay I've wiped all of the foam off of my mouth. I'll back up my
accusations with this link...

http://tinyurl.com/bub5s

You'll find two discussions in rec.aviation rotorcraft:

One started by Dennis posing as "planeman" lashing out at everyone who
replies, then Dennis' gracious reply to himself, then Dennis posting
again as "planeman" and thanking himself.

The other started by Dennis as Dennis, becoming Dennis posting as
"planeman" praising himself.

> when he calls their bluff.

Bluff?

[Morgans]

"Dennis Fetters" > wrote

Blah, blah, blah, blah. We've heard it all before.

I predicted this:

>>Others could add more, and I'm sure Dennis will refute every single thing
I
>>have written, but he has had much practice defending himself.

Did I call it, or what.

By the way, independent thinkers, anyone notice that the only one defending
the mini-500 is Dennis? You would think that if it were worth a half a
damn, at least one or two would have a positive report about the subject. I
have noted none stepping forward.
--
Jim in NC

[Morgans]

"Flyingmonk" > wrote

> One more thing Matt, just count the number of people that is actually
> one his side and are in here defending him and you'll get the idea of
> who's right and who's wrong. One doesn't need a engineering degree to
> see a bad design, the result speaks for itself i.e.

Funny, I just got done posting the same thing, before I read this post.
--
Jim in NC

[Flyingmonk]

__________________________
Path:
g2news1.google.com!postnews.google.com!f14g2000cwb .googlegroups.com!not-for-mail
From: "planeman" >
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.rotorcraft
Subject: Re: Mini-500 Accident Analysis
Date: 26 Jul 2005 11:59:38 -0700
Organization: http://groups.google.com
Lines: 13
Message-ID: om>
References: >
>
>
NNTP-Posting-Host: 69.235.147.233

__________________________
Path:
g2news1.google.com!news3.google.com!newsfeed2.dall as1.level3.net!news.level3.com!bos-service1.raytheon.com!cyclone.swbell.net!newscon02 .news.prodigy.com!prodigy.net!newsmst01b.news.prod igy.com!prodigy.com!postmaster.news.prodigy.com!ne wssvr21.news.prodigy.com.POSTED!d955721d!not-for-mail
From: Dennis Fetters >
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.2)
Gecko/20040804 Netscape/7.2 (ax)
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
MIME-Version: 1.0
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.rotorcraft
Subject: Mini-500 Accident Analysis
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Lines: 2305
Message-ID: >
NNTP-Posting-Host: 69.235.147.233
__________________________

As you can see, both:
From: "planeman" >
and
From: Dennis Fetters >
both originate from:
NNTP-Posting-Host: 69.235.147.233 , where this number '69.235.147.233'
is unigue to each user, although he used two different email addresses.

Dennis is not very bright. He's not even bright enough to know that he
could be traced. He's not even bright enough to go back and remove his
posts. He calls his critics idiots, but what an idiot he is. Too
stupid to even go back and erase evidence.

[Helper]

Morgans wrote:

> The engine in the mini was running at something like 130% of the
> manufacturer's recommended power level. It had to be re-jetted to produce
> that much power, and had a horrible TBO and mean time between failures.
>
> It barely had enough power to get out of ground effect hover, so climbout
> was so slow that if took much longer than usual to get enough altitude that
> an autorotation could be successfully pulled off.

Though the CH-7 Angel succeeded with the same engine.
http://tinypic.com/i6z390.jpg
(There's Mr. Cicare on the right)

[Flyingmonk]

Jim wrote:
>By the way, independent thinkers, anyone notice that the only one defending
>the mini-500 is Dennis?

Great minds think alike, just kidding...

He got caught many times and many years before defending himself with
his other multiple personalities, but too STUPID to use a different
computer.

[Flyingmonk]

Richard Riley wrote:
>I'll defend him to this extent...<SNIPPED>
>...resulted in it's demise.

http://tinypic.com/i6z390.jpg

Same engine, same design, better manufacture much better performance.
The mini500 is a copy of this design (Mr. Cicarre' CH7) w/ a miniature
MD500 body on it and different skids, but everything else was the same.
If you look at the above picture, you can see that the chopper is
capable with that engine.

[Flyingmonk]

I'll qualiy my earlier statements:

Richard Riley wrote:
>I'll defend him to this extent...<SNIPPED>
>...resulted in it's demise.


http://tinypic.com/i6z390.jpg

Same engine, same design, MUCH better manufacture MUCH better
performance. The mini500 is a copy of this design (Mr. Cicarre' CH7)
w/ a miniature MD500 body on it and different skids, but everything
else was the same with exception that the Mini was manufactured and
overseen BY Fetters. Where Mr. Cicarre actually knew what he was
doing. If you look at the above picture, you can see that the chopper
is capable with that engine.

[Flyingmonk]

Richard Riley wrote:
>It's also possible that engine outs in the CH7 have more often
>resulted in survivable landings, perhaps due to the different shell,
>and THAT's why we don't hear about them. Just speculating.

Mr. Cicarre and the later Ch-7 Angel's manufacturer's had better
quality manufacturing facility and personnel than Fetters did. Fetters
had problems with blades that bowed like a banana, rfames that cracked,
bearings that gave out...etc.

It is quality issue, and aviation is very unforgiving of bad quality.

[Matt Whiting]

Flyingmonk wrote:
>>but what good does it do for your departed friend to keep eating a dead horse in this ng?
>
>
> It tells the truth, so people such as yourself who didn't know, will
> know. Hopefully it will save future customers of Denise from loosing
> their money and/or their health and their life.
>

Well, it certainly hasn't convinced me of anything.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Helper wrote:

> Matt Whiting wrote:
>
>> Most seem to just foam at the mouth a lot and make accusations that
>> they can't back up
>
>
> Haha, okay I've wiped all of the foam off of my mouth. I'll back up my
> accusations with this link...
>
> http://tinyurl.com/bub5s
>
> You'll find two discussions in rec.aviation rotorcraft:
>
> One started by Dennis posing as "planeman" lashing out at everyone who
> replies, then Dennis' gracious reply to himself, then Dennis posting
> again as "planeman" and thanking himself.
>
> The other started by Dennis as Dennis, becoming Dennis posting as
> "planeman" praising himself.
>
>> when he calls their bluff.
>
>
> Bluff?

About a claim made in a brochure and then no brochure could be found.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Flyingmonk wrote:

> Richard Riley wrote:
>
>>I'll defend him to this extent...<SNIPPED>
>>...resulted in it's demise.
>
>
> http://tinypic.com/i6z390.jpg
>
> Same engine, same design, better manufacture much better performance.
> The mini500 is a copy of this design (Mr. Cicarre' CH7) w/ a miniature
> MD500 body on it and different skids, but everything else was the same.
> If you look at the above picture, you can see that the chopper is
> capable with that engine.
>

Then what is the difference between the two designs that causes the
engine to work well in one and not in the other? Is the mini-500 much
heavier?

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Flyingmonk wrote:

> I'll qualiy my earlier statements:
>
> Richard Riley wrote:
>
>>I'll defend him to this extent...<SNIPPED>
>>...resulted in it's demise.
>
>
>
> http://tinypic.com/i6z390.jpg
>
> Same engine, same design, MUCH better manufacture MUCH better
> performance. The mini500 is a copy of this design (Mr. Cicarre' CH7)
> w/ a miniature MD500 body on it and different skids, but everything
> else was the same with exception that the Mini was manufactured and
> overseen BY Fetters. Where Mr. Cicarre actually knew what he was
> doing. If you look at the above picture, you can see that the chopper
> is capable with that engine.
>

This makes no sense at all. Exactly what did the mini-500 design do to
hobble the engine? If the designs are essentially the same, then the
engine isn't going to know the difference. If the performance really
was dramatically different, then SOMETHING had to be dramatically
different between the designs. And saying that one was overseen by one
person and one by a different person, isn't a design difference.

Matt

[C.D.Damron]

"Richard Riley" > wrote in message
...
> On 5 Dec 2005 23:31:28 -0800, "Flyingmonk" > wrote:
>
>
> If the two are really the same except for the body,

Don't you think that enclosing the engine has consequences?

Beyond that, maybe the CH-7 manufacturers provide a little more guidance on
the care and feeding of your Rotax.

[C.D.Damron]

"Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
...
> About a claim made in a brochure and then no brochure could be found.

Matt, a number of us have seen the brochures in question. After ten years,
it isn't surprising that they aren't on the top of the desk anymore. I'll
try to find a copy. In the meantime, I guess you think Fetters maintains
his credibility, right? Even if I was wrong, what do you think "designed
for a 2000 TBO" was supposed to mean?. Does it mean something different
than "2000 TBO"? I've never seen anybody in the aviation community use the
verbage, "designed, but not tested, to achieve 2000 TBO".

Did you miss the rest of the conversation? The part about Cicare yanking
his prototype, his plans, and support, leaving Fetters to design, build, and
test a new helicopter in a year and half, minus lost time due to flooding.
The timeline tells the real story behind the Mini-500 if you are unwilling
to dismiss the experiences of owners and employees of the Revolution.


Fetters has stopped trying to argue that his design was well tested and now
offers a rationale for not testing his design adequately. Namely, it would
have taken too much time and money. It was a lot cheaper to make big
claims, verbally and in Revolution literature.

Given the success of the CH-6 prototype and the CH-7, I think Fetters came
pretty close to getting it right. I think that more engineering, quality
control, and testing could have yielded a much better craft.

[RKey]

Thank you, well put from some one else trying to learn something. But
find it difficult to see facts for the smoke from flared nostrils :)

[RKey]

I have been following this discussion I lost friends to Rotorways,
Cessnas, Pipers, Harleys, Hondas, Horses and a hand gun. I do not hate
the creators of any of these products and I know people that have bad
things to say about all of them. But I have never seen the attack on
an individual or product as I have seen here. I am a fixed wing pilot.
I have taken discovey flights in Robinson Helicopters and have
considered purchasing a kit rotorcraft. When I was younger my parents
told me the Scorpion was nothing but a death trap. I have done much
research on other kits and wanted to follow this thread as I am
grateful for people who take the chance to design and build products I
hope to one day afford. I only know about the Mini500 from what I read
in flying magazines and you guys must exist in different universes. I
do not have the knowledge to remark on the Mini500, but I was hoping to
get more from this than a hate fest.

[Flyingmonk]

I can't picture you going out and getting one of them minis that's for
sale in Ebay from time to time and fly them after reading all this?

[Flyingmonk]

>>This makes no sense at all. Exactly what did the mini-500 design do to
hobble the engine? If the designs are essentially the same, then the
engine isn't going to know the difference. If the performance really
was dramatically different, then SOMETHING had to be dramatically
different between the designs. And saying that one was overseen by one

person and one by a different person, isn't a design difference.
>>

See my response to Richard Riley above.

[Flyingmonk]

I believe he also had problems with gyro people on the Air Command
gyros also.

[Darrel Toepfer]

Flyingmonk wrote:
> I'll qualiy my earlier statements:
> http://tinypic.com/i6z390.jpg
>
> Same engine, same design, MUCH better manufacture MUCH better
> performance. The mini500 is a copy of this design (Mr. Cicarre' CH7)
> w/ a miniature MD500 body on it and different skids, but everything
> else was the same with exception that the Mini was manufactured and
> overseen BY Fetters. Where Mr. Cicarre actually knew what he was
> doing. If you look at the above picture, you can see that the chopper
> is capable with that engine.

http://www.mini500.com/bwb17.jpg

Most accidents involved a rollover. Notice the difference in rotor
height between the two... Lots of Mini's removed their own tails in the
accidents (snapping sound)... Looks to be a cold day in that CH7 photo,
wonder want the altitude was? The story behind the Mini link above was
that it could barely manage a hover in Las Vegas on an apparently cool
day...

[Darrel Toepfer]

Matt Whiting wrote:

> This makes no sense at all. Exactly what did the mini-500 design do to
> hobble the engine? If the designs are essentially the same, then the
> engine isn't going to know the difference. If the performance really
> was dramatically different, then SOMETHING had to be dramatically
> different between the designs. And saying that one was overseen by one
> person and one by a different person, isn't a design difference.

Gearing ratio of the transmission? Put the engine into more of a cruise
range instead of WOT...

[Darrel Toepfer]

RKey wrote:
> I have been following this discussion I lost friends to Rotorways,
> Cessnas, Pipers, Harleys, Hondas, Horses and a hand gun. I do not hate
> the creators of any of these products and I know people that have bad
> things to say about all of them. But I have never seen the attack on
> an individual or product as I have seen here. I am a fixed wing pilot.
> I have taken discovey flights in Robinson Helicopters and have
> considered purchasing a kit rotorcraft. When I was younger my parents
> told me the Scorpion was nothing but a death trap. I have done much
> research on other kits and wanted to follow this thread as I am
> grateful for people who take the chance to design and build products I
> hope to one day afford. I only know about the Mini500 from what I read
> in flying magazines and you guys must exist in different universes. I
> do not have the knowledge to remark on the Mini500, but I was hoping to
> get more from this than a hate fest.

http://www.mini500.com/oldmini/mini.html

List of problems, list of serial numbers and their history.... None of
this stuff is up to date though, but gives an idea of what the builders
experienced...

[Stealth Pilot]

On Mon, 28 Nov 2005 17:44:17 GMT, Dennis Fetters
> wrote:


>>
>> OK, first you get a mini500 and... Oh never mind.
>>

I'm amazed at all the guys who beat on Denis's head.
hasnt anyone realised that there is a sizeable market awaiting the
first person who designs a successful helicopter in this size range
and cost. half the problem in new markets is working out a niche
opportunity that will make money.
here sitting on a plate is an unanswered niche opportunity.
design a mini500 from scratch that has none of the original's faults
and a sizeable market surely exists.
ok dont design a mini500, design a mini jetranger, that should sort
out all the copyright issues.

Stealth Pilot

[RKey]

The Helicycle looks like a pretty good mini Jetranger to me.

[Darrel Toepfer]

Crosspost to brasil.unix deleted.

RKey wrote:
> The Helicycle looks like a pretty good mini Jetranger to me.

Designer crashed demoing it and then later died in another crash...

Seems like a waste as just a single seat...

[RKey]

Wasn't it the same designer as the Rotorway?

[Matt Whiting]

C.D.Damron wrote:
> "Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>About a claim made in a brochure and then no brochure could be found.
>
>
> Matt, a number of us have seen the brochures in question. After ten years,
> it isn't surprising that they aren't on the top of the desk anymore. I'll
> try to find a copy. In the meantime, I guess you think Fetters maintains
> his credibility, right? Even if I was wrong, what do you think "designed
> for a 2000 TBO" was supposed to mean?. Does it mean something different
> than "2000 TBO"? I've never seen anybody in the aviation community use the
> verbage, "designed, but not tested, to achieve 2000 TBO".

I don't think either side has much credibility in an absolute sense. I
was simply observing that neither side appears to have much.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Darrel Toepfer wrote:

> Matt Whiting wrote:
>
>> This makes no sense at all. Exactly what did the mini-500 design do
>> to hobble the engine? If the designs are essentially the same, then
>> the engine isn't going to know the difference. If the performance
>> really was dramatically different, then SOMETHING had to be
>> dramatically different between the designs. And saying that one was
>> overseen by one person and one by a different person, isn't a design
>> difference.
>
>
> Gearing ratio of the transmission? Put the engine into more of a cruise
> range instead of WOT...

Gearing doesn't materially change the power output of the engine, unless
you are geared way out of range so that the engine can't achieve a
reasonable RPM.

Matt

[Morgans]

> :Mr. Cicarre and the later Ch-7 Angel's manufacturer's had better
> :quality manufacturing facility and personnel than Fetters did. Fetters
> :had problems with blades that bowed like a banana, rfames that cracked,
> :bearings that gave out...etc.
>
> And these problems killed engines?

A vibrating rotating system takes a lot more power to achieve a RPM than the
same system without vibration.

The common thread in the saga of the mini 500, is that there were many
poorly manufactured and machined parts, and that the vibrations were nearly
impossible to eliminate.

So you take the same design without vibrations; without vibrations because
parts are machined to higher tolerances, an perhaps some key parts are
"stouter" but of the same basic design.

Now the engine does not have to run overstressed (because of the lack of
vibrations), it will continue to run reliably. Parts don't fail because
they are not shaken to failure.

Accepting this premise is contingent on accepting that a non vibrating
system will run more RPM's with the same power compared to a vibrating
system. It is true, but I don't have time to look up cites, right now.
--
Jim in NC

[Flyingmonk]

Richard wrote:
>Read any of VDubber's brilliant posts.

I always do... He is one of the best in RAH.

[Flyingmonk]

>The story behind the Mini link above was that it could barely manage a hover in Las Vegas on an apparently cool day...

Bad Water Bill is not a light weight you know?

[Flyingmonk]

>The Helicycle looks like a pretty good mini Jetranger to me.

I was just about to say the same thing.

[Flyingmonk]

>Wasn't it the same designer as the Rotorway?

Yep!

[Darrel Toepfer]

Flyingmonk wrote:
>> The story behind the Mini link above was that it could barely manage a hover in Las Vegas on an apparently cool day...
>
> Bad Water Bill is not a light weight you know?

I've met him out at NLV... I delivered a crawfish-a-too-fay stuffed
deboned chicken and a few pounds of boudin to Martin and the crew at
Aero Supercharger Solutions...

[Montblack]

("Flyingmonk" wrote)
[snip]
> Dennis is not very bright. He's not even bright enough to know that he
> could be traced. He's not even bright enough to go back and remove his
> posts. He calls his critics idiots, but what an idiot he is. Too
> stupid to even go back and erase evidence.


How does one do this ...remove old posts and erase evidence?

Curious.


Montblack

[Dennis Fetters]

Flyingmonk wrote:
> Matt, just FYI only, many of us actually lost good friends in that
> machine (mini500). In my case Gil Armbruster, so for some of us it
> hits close to home. I guess you wouldn't understand unless you were in
> our shoes.


This is what happened to Gil, show me where we were at fault;


RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The pilot had installed his Mini-500 “Power Enhancement Package” (PEP),
and against RHCI’s severe warnings, chose not to use the provided jet
package containing a 2.76 needle jet. Instead he installed a 2.78
needle jet which meant that he needed a 155 main jet to achieve the
proper EGT in hover. RHCI informed the pilot that the engine would
seize with this small main jet, when at high-power settings it could not
supply sufficient fuel to the engine, causing it to heat and seize. The
main jet should have been a 165 or 170. Also, he had erroneously set
the needle in the third position on the cylinder that seized; the other
was correct in the fourth position. He was flying over a forest when
the engine seized, and autorotated into a 50-foot tall tree. The impact
broke the mast and the aircraft fell and landed upside down on the ground.

NTSB Identification: IAD99FA023
Accident occurred Nov-29-98 At Midland, VA
Aircraft: Armbruster Mini-500, registration: N500GH
Injuries: 1 Fatal

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.

On November 29, 1998, about 1515 eastern standard time, a homebuilt Mini
500, N500GH, was destroyed during a collision with trees near Midland,
Virginia. The certificated private pilot/owner/builder was fatally
injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight
that originated from the Manassas Airport (HEF), Manassas, Virginia. No
flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR
Part 91. A family member reported the pilot missing after not returning
from his normal 40 to 45 minute flight. The pilot's vehicle remained
parked outside his hangar the next morning, and the Federal Aviation
Administration issued an Alert Notice. The Civil Air Patrol's search
discovered that tower personnel at HEF recorded the helicopter taking
off at 1400. Witnesses stated that they saw the helicopter near Leesburg
Airport, Leesburg, Virginia, about 1430, and near Nokesville, Virginia,
about 1500, on November 29th. The helicopter was located on December 2,
1998, about 1530, in a wooded area approximately 1/4 mile
north/northeast of the Warrenton-Fauquier Airport, Warrenton, Virginia.
A survey of the debris field discovered that the initial impact point
was the top of a 50-foot tall tree. Tree limbs, measuring 4 to 6 inches
in diameter, were cut horizontally and found near the base of the tree.
One of the helicopter's rotors was lying on the ground near the tree;
the other was snagged on a fracture tree limb about 30 feet above the
ground. The main wreckage was lying on its left side between two trees 5
feet apart, and about 35 feet south of the initial impact point. All
major components of the helicopter were found at the accident scene.
Examination of the flight controls revealed continuity at the time of
impact. The engine logbook indicated that in August 1998, at 200.4 hours
on the Hobbs meter, the owner replaced both pistons, rings, wrist pins,
rod bearings, thermostat, and head o-rings. The Hobbs meter in the
wreckage read 218.7 hours. Inspection of the engine revealed two
different types of spark plugs were utilized, one of each type in the
two cylinders. The spark plugs were wired such that one magneto fired
one type of spark plug. Rotation of the crank shaft revealed 4 point
scuffing on the cylinder and the Power Take-Off (PTO) piston.

[Dennis Fetters]

Matt Whiting wrote:

>> Same engine, same design, MUCH better manufacture MUCH better
>> performance. The mini500 is a copy of this design (Mr. Cicarre' CH7)
>> w/ a miniature MD500 body on it and different skids, but everything
>> else was the same with exception that the Mini was manufactured and
>> overseen BY Fetters. Where Mr. Cicarre actually knew what he was
>> doing. If you look at the above picture, you can see that the chopper
>> is capable with that engine.
>>
>
> This makes no sense at all. Exactly what did the mini-500 design do to
> hobble the engine? If the designs are essentially the same, then the
> engine isn't going to know the difference. If the performance really
> was dramatically different, then SOMETHING had to be dramatically
> different between the designs. And saying that one was overseen by one
> person and one by a different person, isn't a design difference.
>
> Matt


As you can see, it simply makes no difference how much I post, prove or
answer, these few people that keep spewing the same things over and over
again will never change their minds, no matter how compelling the facts
are, if contrary to what they want to believe. We can all see that, so
there is no need to try and change their minds. If I say it's day, they
will argue it's night somewhere in the world.

I have already answered each and every question or false allegation put
forth here, so no need to keep answering the same thing over and over, I
have work to do and these few people posting to this thread are lost
causes anyway.

But, you asked the difference between the CH7 and the Mini-500, so
please allow me to explain. Engorging the history behind the politics,
here is the main deference.

1. There has only been around 60 CH7 helicopters manufactured. There was
over 500 Mini-500 kits manufactured.

2. Almost all of the CH7 helicopters were built, test flown and made
flight worthy by the factory. Only 4 Mini-500 helicopters were built by
the factory, the rest by the customers.

3. The CH7 helicopter had problems too, but with the small amount of
customers they had, meant fewer people when there was a problem to take
care of. 30 Mini-500's could get out the door before we could hear about
a repeat problem, so it was more costly to fix and affected more people.
Not an excuse, just a fact.

4. Nearly 100% of CH7 pilots were proficient and experienced in
helicopters and maintenance. 72% of Mini-500 owners were new helicopter
pilots, with less than 50 hours flight time and having their first
experience with a helicopter.



Simply put, the CH7 greatly benefited from being assembled and flown by
the factory and was sold at a much higher price that only allowed more
hightime helicopter pilots to buy it, and properly fly and maintain it.
The Mini-500 was built by customers that in 72% of the cases were
building a helicopter and flying one for the first time, after only
minimum flight training.

You guys add it up.

Another thing, I only post under my own name.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Dennis Fetters]

Morgans wrote:

>
>>:Mr. Cicarre and the later Ch-7 Angel's manufacturer's had better
>>:quality manufacturing facility and personnel than Fetters did. Fetters
>>:had problems with blades that bowed like a banana, rfames that cracked,
>>:bearings that gave out...etc.
>>
>>And these problems killed engines?
>
>
> A vibrating rotating system takes a lot more power to achieve a RPM than the
> same system without vibration.
>
> The common thread in the saga of the mini 500, is that there were many
> poorly manufactured and machined parts, and that the vibrations were nearly
> impossible to eliminate.
>
> So you take the same design without vibrations; without vibrations because
> parts are machined to higher tolerances, an perhaps some key parts are
> "stouter" but of the same basic design.
>
> Now the engine does not have to run overstressed (because of the lack of
> vibrations), it will continue to run reliably. Parts don't fail because
> they are not shaken to failure.
>
> Accepting this premise is contingent on accepting that a non vibrating
> system will run more RPM's with the same power compared to a vibrating
> system. It is true, but I don't have time to look up cites, right now.


I guess that could be an argument, except for fact that Mini-500 owners
say that after they properly balanced it, it was one of the smoothest
helicopters they ever flown. Also backed up by Kin Armstrong of
KitPlanes magazine when he did a complete flight review at Sun & Sun air
show.


Dennis Fetters

Designer of;
Air Command 1/plcs Gyroplanes
Air Command 2/plcs Gyroplanes
Mini-500 1/Plcs Helicopter
Voyager-500 2/Plcs Helicopter
Excalibur 5/Plcs Turbine Helicopter
Star-Lite-A VTUAV Helicopter
Star-Lite-B VTUAV Helicopter

[Darrel Toepfer]

Montblack wrote:

> How does one do this ...remove old posts and erase evidence?
>
> Curious.

You could send out a *kill request* but not all servers honor it and
typically it only works on your own if you catch the message before it
propagates. Groups.Google.Com will remove your posts if requested to do
so from its archives. They won't remove the replies to your posts
however. If you don't want your posts archived put the following at the
beginning of each message: "X-No-Archive" without the quotes of course.
Keep in mind that replies to your X-NO posts will get archived
however... This is a holdover from Deja News who Google bought...

[Helper]

C.D.Damron wrote:
> "Richard Riley" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>On 5 Dec 2005 23:31:28 -0800, "Flyingmonk" > wrote:
>>
>>
>>If the two are really the same except for the body,
>
>
> Don't you think that enclosing the engine has consequences?

Also, IIRC, the CH-7 uses a pair of Fiat radiators and electric fans.

[Helper]

Darrel Toepfer wrote:

> Crosspost to brasil.unix deleted.
>
> RKey wrote:
>
>> The Helicycle looks like a pretty good mini Jetranger to me.
>
>
> Designer crashed demoing it

Flew into wires.

and then later died in another crash...

Crashed while already dying, heart attack or something.

[Flyingmonk]

Fetters wrote:
>Another thing, I only post under my own name.

__________________________
From: "planeman" >
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.rotorcraft
Subject: Re: Mini-500 Accident Analysis
Date: 26 Jul 2005 11:59:38 -0700
Organization: http://groups.google.com
Lines: 13
Message-ID: om>
References: >
>
>
NNTP-Posting-Host: 69.235.147.233
__________________________
From: Dennis Fetters >
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.2)
Gecko/20040804 Netscape/7.2 (ax)
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
MIME-Version: 1.0
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.rotorcraft
Subject: Mini-500 Accident Analysis
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Lines: 2305
Message-ID: >
NNTP-Posting-Host: 69.235.147.233
__________________________


As you can see, both:
"planeman" > and
Dennis Fetters >
both originate from:
NNTP-Posting-Host: 69.235.147.233 , where this number '69.235.147.233'
is unigue to each compunter, although he used two different email
addresses. He computer's finger print is there for all to see...

Dennis is not very bright. He's not even bright enough to know that he

could be traced. He's not even bright enough to go back and remove his

posts. He calls his critics idiots, but what an idiot he is. Too
stupid to even go back and erase evidence.

[Flyingmonk]

Montblack, If you use Google, just click on "show options" and click
remove. That's it. Idiot Fetters still claims that he didn't use
different names. That computer "finger print" is as good as DNA.

[Flyingmonk]

The CH-7's blades were better, they didn't bow like a banana. The were
bowing forward as you go farther from the root of the blades. This
changed the pivot point for the baldes, imagine taking a straight
bladed sword and rotating it, the tip and the rest of the sword stays
at the pivot point. Now imagine taking a curved sword and rotating it
the same way, you'll notice that the tip stays at the pivot point, but
the remainder of the sword will rise or fall due to the curve.

The CH-7's blades were fabricated better, they were more uniform or
should I say more consistent than what Denise was able to produce.
Being more uniform, and of the shape that they were designed, they were
easier to track and balance. This resulted in a smoother flying ship.
Denise couldn't get the blades to come out as designed. They were not
consistent they bowed where they shouldn't have and all this resulted
in problems when trying to track and balance the blades. I remember
that Gill had a hard time getting the baldes to fly smoothly.

I think this fact alone(bad blades) resulted in inefficient rotor
system, Unlike propellers, the blades of a helicopter changes pitch
continously, this resulted in "shaking" or unsmooth helicopter. The
shaking caused the frames to crack! Again, instead of addressing the
problem (bad blades), Denise added more metal to the frame in an
attempt to beef up the area prone to cracking.

Since the blades were not as efficient as the CH-7's blades, the engine
had to work much harder to get the same lift. That's where Denise came
up with the bandaid fix again, the PEP kit. Instead of tackling the
blade problem, he overworked the engine by PEPing it up. CH-7s didn't
need to be PEPed up.

That's my two cents worth.

[Matt Whiting]

Dennis Fetters wrote:
> Flyingmonk wrote:
>
>> Matt, just FYI only, many of us actually lost good friends in that
>> machine (mini500). In my case Gil Armbruster, so for some of us it
>> hits close to home. I guess you wouldn't understand unless you were in
>> our shoes.
>
>
>
> This is what happened to Gil, show me where we were at fault;

I never claimed anyone was at fault.


> RHCI INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
> The pilot had installed his Mini-500 “Power Enhancement Package” (PEP),
> and against RHCI’s severe warnings, chose not to use the provided jet
> package containing a 2.76 needle jet. Instead he installed a 2.78
> needle jet which meant that he needed a 155 main jet to achieve the
> proper EGT in hover. RHCI informed the pilot that the engine would
> seize with this small main jet, when at high-power settings it could not
> supply sufficient fuel to the engine, causing it to heat and seize. The
> main jet should have been a 165 or 170. Also, he had erroneously set
> the needle in the third position on the cylinder that seized; the other
> was correct in the fourth position. He was flying over a forest when
> the engine seized, and autorotated into a 50-foot tall tree. The impact
> broke the mast and the aircraft fell and landed upside down on the ground.

Is the above correct? Was the carburetor jetting not what was
recommended? Was one needle not in the proper position? I'm not
familiar with Rotax engines and their carbs, but the Mikuni's on the
Kawasaki's that I have owned over the years, especially the two
two-strokes I owned, were VERY sensitive to jetting. One size off of
clipping the needle valve one position off made a huge difference.


> NTSB Identification: IAD99FA023
> Accident occurred Nov-29-98 At Midland, VA
> Aircraft: Armbruster Mini-500, registration: N500GH
> Injuries: 1 Fatal
>
> This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
> errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
> report has been completed.
>
> On November 29, 1998, about 1515 eastern standard time, a homebuilt Mini
> 500, N500GH, was destroyed during a collision with trees near Midland,
> Virginia. The certificated private pilot/owner/builder was fatally
> injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight
> that originated from the Manassas Airport (HEF), Manassas, Virginia. No
> flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR
> Part 91. A family member reported the pilot missing after not returning
> from his normal 40 to 45 minute flight. The pilot's vehicle remained
> parked outside his hangar the next morning, and the Federal Aviation
> Administration issued an Alert Notice. The Civil Air Patrol's search
> discovered that tower personnel at HEF recorded the helicopter taking
> off at 1400. Witnesses stated that they saw the helicopter near Leesburg
> Airport, Leesburg, Virginia, about 1430, and near Nokesville, Virginia,
> about 1500, on November 29th. The helicopter was located on December 2,
> 1998, about 1530, in a wooded area approximately 1/4 mile
> north/northeast of the Warrenton-Fauquier Airport, Warrenton, Virginia.
> A survey of the debris field discovered that the initial impact point
> was the top of a 50-foot tall tree. Tree limbs, measuring 4 to 6 inches
> in diameter, were cut horizontally and found near the base of the tree.
> One of the helicopter's rotors was lying on the ground near the tree;
> the other was snagged on a fracture tree limb about 30 feet above the
> ground. The main wreckage was lying on its left side between two trees 5
> feet apart, and about 35 feet south of the initial impact point. All
> major components of the helicopter were found at the accident scene.
> Examination of the flight controls revealed continuity at the time of
> impact. The engine logbook indicated that in August 1998, at 200.4 hours
> on the Hobbs meter, the owner replaced both pistons, rings, wrist pins,
> rod bearings, thermostat, and head o-rings. The Hobbs meter in the
> wreckage read 218.7 hours. Inspection of the engine revealed two
> different types of spark plugs were utilized, one of each type in the
> two cylinders. The spark plugs were wired such that one magneto fired
> one type of spark plug. Rotation of the crank shaft revealed 4 point
> scuffing on the cylinder and the Power Take-Off (PTO) piston.

Was the NTSB wrong about the spark plugs? It doesn't say what the
difference in "type" of plug was. Again, the Kawasaki's I've owned were
very sensitive to having the right heat range of spark plug, especially
the two-strokes. Change from one heat range to another made a big deal
with these engines.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Flyingmonk wrote:

> Montblack, If you use Google, just click on "show options" and click
> remove. That's it. Idiot Fetters still claims that he didn't use
> different names. That computer "finger print" is as good as DNA.
>

Really? Ever hear of spoofing?

Matt

[Flyingmonk]

Fetters wrote:
>Really? Ever hear of spoofing?

Email addresses can be spoofed, names can be changed, but the computer
"finger print" is unigue to each computer and its IP. 69.235.147.233
originated from ONE IP and in particular, ONE computer connected via
ONE IP.
__________________________
From: "planeman" >
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.rotorcraft
Subject: Re: Mini-500 Accident Analysis
Date: 26 Jul 2005 11:59:38 -0700
Organization: http://groups.google.com
Lines: 13
Message-ID: om>
References: >
>
>
NNTP-Posting-Host: 69.235.147.233
__________________________
From: Dennis Fetters >
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.2)
Gecko/20040804 Netscape/7.2 (ax)
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
MIME-Version: 1.0
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.rotorcraft
Subject: Mini-500 Accident Analysis
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Lines: 2305
Message-ID: >
NNTP-Posting-Host: 69.235.147.233
__________________________

As you can see, both:
"planeman" > and
Dennis Fetters >
both originate from:
NNTP-Posting-Host: 69.235.147.233 , where this number '69.235.147.233'
is unigue to each compunter, although he used two different email
addresses. He computer's finger print is there for all to see...

Dennis is not very bright. He's not even bright enough to know that he
could be traced. He's not even bright enough to go back and remove his
posts. He calls his critics idiots, but what an idiot he is. Too
stupid to even go back and erase evidence.

[Barnyard BOb -]

On 3 Dec 2005 10:27:02 -0800, "Flyingmonk" > wrote:

>My observation is:
>1. Denise is a good businessman, but not a good designer.
>2. Cicarre is a good designer, but not a good businessman.



Does a GOOD businessman....

1. Run his business into the ground?
2. Keep deposits on undelivered goods?
3. Leave others holding the bag?
4. Open more businesses to repeat the above?


Does a GOOD SALESMAN....

1. Sell a refrigerator to an eskimo,
2. Get the money,
3. Sleep with or marry the eskimo's daughter....
4. NEVER have to deliver the refrigerator.


City Father -
Excelsior Springs, MO
Home of a failed kit helicopter company

[Barnyard BOb -]

On Fri, 02 Dec 2005 16:49:57 GMT, Dennis Fetters
> wrote:

>City Father wrote:
>> Dear Sir/Mr.Fetters:
>>
>> Being the astute business man that you are/were...
>> Do you have any future manufacturing plans for Excesior Springs?
>> There are many folks that would just love to see you here again.
>>
>> Although we have a new McDonalds, Arbys, an Applebee's and a huge
>> Wal-Mart expansion underway.... Excelsior Springs never had anybody
>> close to your reputation, except maybe, the late great Jesse James.
>>
>> City Father,
>> Excelsior Springs, MO 64024
>
>
>Dear coward that hides behind a fake name.
>Dennis Fetters

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

Fake name?
Guilty.

Me a coward?
Not guilty.

You're waaay too easy, Dennis.



Barnyard BOb - aka City Father

[[email protected]]

Fake Name, now I'm guilty --- just a test.
to see the header. Same laptop, same browser, same ip, some simple
spoofing to see how the header looks.

[[email protected]]

Posted by rkey on web from powerbook laptop
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Path:
g2news1.google.com!postnews.google.com!z14g2000cwz .googlegroups.com!not-for-mail
From: "RKey" >
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.homebuilt
Subject: Re: (Mini-500)I want to build the most EVIL plane EVER !!!
Date: 6 Dec 2005 04:55:35 -0800
Organization: http://groups.google.com
Lines: 3
Message-ID: . com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: 216.203.6.11
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
X-Trace: posting.google.com 1133873740 25338 127.0.0.1 (6 Dec 2005
12:55:40 GMT)
X-Complaints-To:
NNTP-Posting-Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2005 12:55:40 +0000 (UTC)
User-Agent: G2/0.2
X-HTTP-UserAgent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X Mach-O;
en-US; rv:1.7.12) Gecko/20050915 Firefox/1.0.7,gzip(gfe),gzip(gfe)
Complaints-To:
Injection-Info: z14g2000cwz.googlegroups.com;
posting-host=216.203.6.11;
posting-account=dsV8YQ0AAACKXf8oFSmrcSh_Rvu1LQlN

Again by rkey on web from powerbook laptop
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Path:
g2news1.google.com!postnews.google.com!g47g2000cwa .googlegroups.com!not-for-mail
From:
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.homebuilt
Subject: Re: (Mini-500)I want to build the most EVIL plane EVER !!!
Date: 7 Dec 2005 11:49:47 -0800
Organization: http://groups.google.com
Lines: 4
Message-ID: . com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: 70.162.101.116
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
X-Trace: posting.google.com 1133984993 15322 127.0.0.1 (7 Dec 2005
19:49:53 GMT)
X-Complaints-To:
NNTP-Posting-Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2005 19:49:53 +0000 (UTC)
In-Reply-To: >
User-Agent: G2/0.2
X-HTTP-UserAgent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1;
SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322),gzip(gfe),gzip(gfe)
Complaints-To:
Injection-Info: g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com;
posting-host=70.162.101.116;
posting-account=An4-4w0AAADToU769co3UbEZvnNdsQB2

Both post are still me, both post are done from OS X on Powerbook.
Accounts are differrent and NNTP-Posting-Host is different. I guess
this proves NNTP-Posting-Host may or may not be proof

Too lazy to see how to modify message ID, of course FireFox makes
browser spoofing easy :)

Since I'm using a web front end NNTP-Posting-Host means nothing as
proof of ID.

[Flyingmonk]

To get a different NNTP posting is very easy, but to get the same is
hard. I challenge you to 'spoof' MY NNTP with your name and see if you
can show that you are posting from MY NNTP. That will be the test. I
can get a new NNTP all day long, but this one is unigue to my computer.

To proove that Planeman spoofed Denise, You must spoof me with same
NNTP. IF you can't than I rest my case.

[Matt Whiting]

Flyingmonk wrote:
> Fetters wrote:
>
>>Really? Ever hear of spoofing?
>
>
> Email addresses can be spoofed, names can be changed, but the computer
> "finger print" is unigue to each computer and its IP. 69.235.147.233
> originated from ONE IP and in particular, ONE computer connected via
> ONE IP.

Well, I haven't been involved with networking since the DECnet days, but
I have no doubt that someone proficient can hack the packet header field
that contains the originating node IP address.

I'm not saying Dennis wasn't trying to impersonate someone else, but I
hardly think the evidence presented is sufficient to prove that.


Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Flyingmonk wrote:

> To get a different NNTP posting is very easy, but to get the same is
> hard. I challenge you to 'spoof' MY NNTP with your name and see if you
> can show that you are posting from MY NNTP. That will be the test. I
> can get a new NNTP all day long, but this one is unigue to my computer.
>
> To proove that Planeman spoofed Denise, You must spoof me with same
> NNTP. IF you can't than I rest my case.
>

Well, I'm not questioning is hacking ability, but saying that because
one person can't do this implies that it can't be done is just
ridiculous. I can't perform open heart surgery either, so I guess that
means to you that it can't be done, right?

I'm beginning to appreciate Dennis' frustration now.


Matt

[Flyingmonk]

Matt wrote:
>Well, I'm not questioning is hacking ability, but saying that because
>one person can't do this implies that it can't be done is just
>ridiculous. I can't perform open heart surgery either, so I guess that
>means to you that it can't be done, right?

No, not at all. My question is WHY would someone named Planeman,
posting from a DIFFERENT email address, would spoof Denise's NNTP and
post with a diferent name to support Denise's arguments? If Planeman
wanted to support Denise, he can just go right ahead and support him.
Why would he need to spoof denise's NNTP? Why would Planeman go
through the trouble of spoofing and yet posted under a different name?

>I'm beginning to appreciate Dennis' frustration now.

Sorry that I frustate you Matt, but I never meant to frustrate YOU in
particular. Normally I'm very docile, He is probably one of very VERY
few people that gets me worked up.

[Matt Whiting]

Flyingmonk wrote:
> Matt wrote:
>
>>Well, I'm not questioning is hacking ability, but saying that because
>>one person can't do this implies that it can't be done is just
>>ridiculous. I can't perform open heart surgery either, so I guess that
>>means to you that it can't be done, right?
>
>
> No, not at all. My question is WHY would someone named Planeman,
> posting from a DIFFERENT email address, would spoof Denise's NNTP and
> post with a diferent name to support Denise's arguments? If Planeman
> wanted to support Denise, he can just go right ahead and support him.
> Why would he need to spoof denise's NNTP? Why would Planeman go
> through the trouble of spoofing and yet posted under a different name?

So that someone could claim that Denise is impersonating someone else to
support his cause. That was just too easy. :-)


>>I'm beginning to appreciate Dennis' frustration now.
>
>
> Sorry that I frustate you Matt, but I never meant to frustrate YOU in
> particular. Normally I'm very docile, He is probably one of very VERY
> few people that gets me worked up.

And I wasn't suggesting that you were. I just like to see logical
arguments and your argument in this case (I'm not saying this is true in
general) simply wasn't logical.


Matt

[Flyingmonk]

Matt wrote:
>I just like to see logical arguments and your argument in this case (I'm not saying this is true in general) simply wasn't logical.

I'm just not good at arguing. Anywho, so what you are saying now is
that the one and only person that supported Denise is actually not
supporting him, but instead set him up? The one and only friend he had
in RAH was his enemy? LOL

[Helper]

Matt Whiting wrote:
> Flyingmonk wrote:
>> Matt wrote:
>>
>>> Well, I'm not questioning is hacking ability, but saying that because
>>> one person can't do this implies that it can't be done is just
>>> ridiculous. I can't perform open heart surgery either, so I guess that
>>> means to you that it can't be done, right?
>>
>> No, not at all. My question is WHY would someone named Planeman,
>> posting from a DIFFERENT email address, would spoof Denise's NNTP and
>> post with a diferent name to support Denise's arguments? If Planeman
>> wanted to support Denise, he can just go right ahead and support him.
>> Why would he need to spoof denise's NNTP? Why would Planeman go
>> through the trouble of spoofing and yet posted under a different name?
>
> So that someone could claim that Denise is impersonating someone else to
> support his cause. That was just too easy. :-)

Except that "planeman" was lashing out at everyone, for no reason, until
Dennis made his timed entrance. Planned and executed by Dennis, a
spoofer couldn't have set it up that way.

>>> I'm beginning to appreciate Dennis' frustration now.

Oh, I don't think you really are. You're rejecting the simple and
obvious, and instead coming up with ridiculously convoluted scenarios.

>> Sorry that I frustate you Matt, but I never meant to frustrate YOU in
>> particular. Normally I'm very docile, He is probably one of very VERY
>> few people that gets me worked up.
>
>
> And I wasn't suggesting that you were. I just like to see logical
> arguments and your argument in this case (I'm not saying this is true in
> general) simply wasn't logical.

It's simply the only argument that *is* logical. The spoofing argument
is absurd.
http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/Occam's%20razor

[Smitty Two]

In article . com>,
"Flyingmonk" > wrote:

> The CH-7's blades were better, they didn't bow like a banana. The were
> bowing forward as you go farther from the root of the blades. This
> changed the pivot point for the baldes, imagine taking a straight
> bladed sword and rotating it, the tip and the rest of the sword stays
> at the pivot point. Now imagine taking a curved sword and rotating it
> the same way, you'll notice that the tip stays at the pivot point, but
> the remainder of the sword will rise or fall due to the curve.
>
> The CH-7's blades were fabricated better, they were more uniform or
> should I say more consistent than what Denise was able to produce.
> Being more uniform, and of the shape that they were designed, they were
> easier to track and balance. This resulted in a smoother flying ship.
> Denise couldn't get the blades to come out as designed. They were not
> consistent they bowed where they shouldn't have and all this resulted
> in problems when trying to track and balance the blades. I remember
> that Gill had a hard time getting the baldes to fly smoothly.
>
> I think this fact alone(bad blades) resulted in inefficient rotor
> system, Unlike propellers, the blades of a helicopter changes pitch
> continously, this resulted in "shaking" or unsmooth helicopter. The
> shaking caused the frames to crack! Again, instead of addressing the
> problem (bad blades), Denise added more metal to the frame in an
> attempt to beef up the area prone to cracking.
>
> Since the blades were not as efficient as the CH-7's blades, the engine
> had to work much harder to get the same lift. That's where Denise came
> up with the bandaid fix again, the PEP kit. Instead of tackling the
> blade problem, he overworked the engine by PEPing it up. CH-7s didn't
> need to be PEPed up.
>
> That's my two cents worth.

Sir, I hope you will not feel singled out by me, but how does abusing
the man's name lend credibility to what appears to be a reasonably
scholarly hypothesis? This is only one example of what I mean when I say
I don't give much credence to either Mr. Fetters or his detractors.
Sarcasm, rudeness, disrespect, arrogance, snottiness, and all the other
exhibits of hostility that permeate both sides of this discussion - and
so many others here - may bring self-righteous snickers to the
like-minded, but do *nothing* to persuade your opponents or the neutral
lurkers.

[Flyingmonk]

Smitty Two wrote:
>Sir, I hope you will not feel singled out by me, but how does abusing
>the man's name lend credibility to what appears to be a reasonably
>scholarly hypothesis? This is only one example of what I mean when I say
>I don't give much credence to either Mr. Fetters or his detractors.
>Sarcasm, rudeness, disrespect, arrogance, snottiness, and all the other
>exhibits of hostility that permeate both sides of this discussion - and
>so many others here - may bring self-righteous snickers to the
>like-minded, but do *nothing* to persuade your opponents or the neutral
>lurkers.

Fetters is one of very very few people that makes my blood boil.
Normally I'm a very docile person. I lost a friend, Gil Armbruster, An
FAA executive with 10s of thousands of hours of flight time, in the
mini500. Gil was a metoculous builder. Fetters is blamed his accident
on pilot error. Which is correct, Gil's accident was due to pilot
error, his error was choosing the mini500.

[Flyingmonk]

The CH-7's blades were better, they didn't bow like a banana. The
Mini500's blades were bowing forward as you go from the root to tip.
This changed the pivot point for the baldes, imagine taking a straight
bladed sword and rotating it, the tip and the rest of the sword pivots
at the pivot point. Now imagine taking a curved sword and rotating it
the same way, you'll notice that the tip stays at the pivot point as
well as the root, but the remainder of the sword will rise or fall due
to the curve.

The CH-7's blades were fabricated better, they were more uniform or
should I say more consistent than what Fetters was able to produce.
Being more uniform, and of the shape that they were designed, they were
easier to track and balance. This resulted in a smoother flying ship.
Fetters couldn't get the blades to come out as designed. They were not
consistent, they bowed where they shouldn't have and this resulted in
problems when trying to track and balance the blades. I remember that
Gill had a hard time getting the baldes to fly smoothly.

I think this fact alone (bad blades) resulted in inefficient rotor
system, Unlike propellers, the blades of a helicopter changes pitch
continously, with bad blades, this resulted in "shaking" or unsmooth
helicopter. The shaking caused the frames to crack! Again, instead
of addressing the problem (bad blades), Fetters added more metal to the
frame in an attempt to beef up the area prone to cracking.

Since the blades were not as efficient as the CH-7's blades, the engine
had to work much harder to get the same lift. That's where Fetters
came up with the bandaid fix, the PEP kit. Instead of tackling the
blade problem, he overworked the engine by PEPing it up. CH-7s didn't
need to be PEPed up.

That's my two cents worth.

[Flyingmonk]

Smitty Two wrote:

>Sir, I hope you will not feel singled out by me, but how does abusing
>the man's name lend credibility to what appears to be a reasonably
>scholarly hypothesis? This is only one example of what I mean when I say
>I don't give much credence to either Mr. Fetters or his detractors.
>Sarcasm, rudeness, disrespect, arrogance, snottiness, and all the other
>exhibits of hostility that permeate both sides of this discussion - and
>so many others here - may bring self-righteous snickers to the
>like-minded, but do *nothing* to persuade your opponents or the neutral
>lurkers.

First of all, I want to thank you for pointing that out. You are
correct, I have rewritten it:

Cicarre's CH-7's blades were better, they didn't bow like a banana.
The Mini500's blades were bowing forward as you go from the root to
tip. This changed the pivot point for the baldes, imagine taking a
straight bladed sword and rotating it, the tip and the rest of the
sword pivots at the pivot point. Now imagine taking a curved sword and
rotating it the same way, you'll notice that the tip stays at the pivot
point as well as the root, but the remainder of the sword will rise or
fall due to the curve.

The CH-7's blades were fabricated better, they were more uniform or
should I say more consistent than what Fetters was able to produce.
Being more uniform, and of the shape that they were designed, they were
easier to track and balance. This resulted in a smoother flying ship.
Fetters couldn't get the blades to come out as designed. They were not
consistent, they bowed where they shouldn't have and this resulted in
problems when trying to track and balance the blades. I remember that
Gill had a hard time getting the baldes to fly smoothly.

I think this fact alone (bad blades) resulted in inefficient rotor
system, unlike propellers, the blades of a helicopter changes pitch
continously as it goes around the vertical shaft, with bad blades, this
resulted in "shaking" or unsmooth helicopter. The shaking caused the
frames to crack! Again, instead of addressing the problem (bad
blades), Fetters added more metal to the frame in an attempt to beef up
the area prone to cracking.

Since the blades were not as efficient as the CH-7's blades, the engine
had to work much harder to get the same lift. That's where Fetters
came up with the bandaid fix, the PEP kit. Instead of tackling the
blade problem, he overworked the engine by PEPing it up. CH-7s didn't
need to be PEPed up.

That's my two cents worth.

[Matt Whiting]

Flyingmonk wrote:
> Matt wrote:
>
>>I just like to see logical arguments and your argument in this case (I'm not saying this is true in general) simply wasn't logical.
>
>
> I'm just not good at arguing. Anywho, so what you are saying now is
> that the one and only person that supported Denise is actually not
> supporting him, but instead set him up? The one and only friend he had
> in RAH was his enemy? LOL

No, I didn't say that at all and putting words in people's mouths isn't
a great way to make friends and influence people. It really takes away
from your credibility.

I don't know Dennis or the history of his helicopter to comment on
whether he had one supporter, 1000, or none, and I don't have any reason
to find out.

I'm going to exit this discussion now as I've confirmed to my
satisfaction what I suspected all along.


Cheers,
Matt

[Darrel Toepfer]

Flyingmonk wrote:

> Fetters is one of very very few people that makes my blood boil.
> Normally I'm a very docile person. I lost a friend, Gil Armbruster, An
> FAA executive with 10s of thousands of hours of flight time, in the
> mini500. Gil was a metoculous builder. Fetters is blamed his accident
> on pilot error. Which is correct, Gil's accident was due to pilot
> error, his error was choosing the mini500.

Gil had around 200 hours in the Mini, which seems to be its life limit
for airframe and pilot...

[Karl Rove]

On Thu, 08 Dec 2005 11:33:06 GMT, Matt Whiting >
wrote:


>I don't know Dennis or the history of his helicopter to comment on
>whether he had one supporter, 1000, or none, and I don't have any reason
>to find out.
>
>I'm going to exit this discussion now as I've confirmed to my
>satisfaction what I suspected all along.

Any chance you're available for jury duty about a year from now?

Karl

[Flyingmonk]

Darrel Toepfer wrote:
>Gil had around 200 hours in the Mini, which seems to be its life limit
>for airframe and pilot...

Thank you for the correction Darrel. It was a typo, I meant write:

>FAA executive with 10s of thousands of hours of flight time, and almost 200 hrs in the mini500.

[Darrel Toepfer]

Flyingmonk wrote:

> Thank you for the correction Darrel. It was a typo, I meant write:
>
>> FAA executive with 10s of thousands of hours of flight time, and almost 200 hrs in the mini500.

I understood ya, just didn't want anyone else to be confused...

[Flyingmonk]

In addition, Glen Ryerson, who built and flown the CH-7 "Miss Nina" in
PA, didn't have any trouble tracking and balancing his blades.

[Flyingmonk]

> Flyingmonk wrote:
>> Richard Riley wrote:
>>>I'll defend him to this extent...<SNIPPED>
>>>...resulted in it's demise.
>> http://tinypic.com/i6z390.jpg

>> Same engine, same design, better manufacture much better performance.
>> The mini500 is a copy of this design (Mr. Cicarre' CH7) w/ a miniature
>> MD500 body on it and different skids, but everything else was the same.
>> If you look at the above picture, you can see that the chopper is
>> capable with that engine.

>Then what is the difference between the two designs that causes the
>engine to work well in one and not in the other? Is the mini-500 much
>heavier?

>Matt

Cicarre's CH-7's blades were better, they didn't bow like a banana. The
Mini500's blades were bowing forward as you go from the root to tip.
This changed the pivot point for the baldes, imagine taking a straight
bladed sword and rotating it, the tip and the rest of the sword pivots
at the pivot point. Now imagine taking a curved sword and rotating it
the same way, you'll notice that the tip stays at the pivot point as
well as the root, but the remainder of the sword will rise or fall due
to the curve.

The CH-7's blades were fabricated better, they were more uniform or
should I say more consistent than what Fetters was able to produce.
Being more uniform, and of the shape that they were designed, they were
easier to track and balance. This resulted in a smoother flying ship.
Fetters couldn't get the blades to come out as designed. They were not
consistent, they bowed where they shouldn't have and this resulted in
problems when trying to track and balance the blades. I remember that
Gill had a hard time getting the baldes to fly smoothly.

I think this fact alone (bad blades) resulted in inefficient rotor
system, unlike propellers, the blades of a helicopter changes pitch
continously as it goes around the vertical shaft, with bad blades, this
resulted in "shaking" or unsmooth helicopter. The shaking caused the
frames to crack! Again, instead of addressing the problem (bad
blades), Fetters added more metal to the frame in an attempt to beef up
the area prone to cracking.

Since the blades were not as efficient as the CH-7's blades, the engine
had to work much harder to get the same lift. That's where Fetters
came up with the bandaid fix, the PEP kit. Instead of tackling the
blade problem, he overworked the engine by PEPing it up. CH-7s didn't
need to be PEPed up.

That's my two cents worth.

[[email protected]]

On Tue, 06 Dec 2005 11:45:18 GMT, Matt Whiting >
wrote:

>Then what is the difference between the two designs that causes the
>engine to work well in one and not in the other? Is the mini-500 much
>heavier?
>
>Matt

Matt, I seem to remember that the engine was required to run at 110
percent rated power. I also remember that Rotax did not recommend
that their engine be run at such power settings.

I also remember something about having to have some kind of special
exhaust system in order to achieve the 110% rating.

Corky Scott

[Morgans]

"Smitty Two" > wrote

> Sir, I hope you will not feel singled out by me, but how does abusing
> the man's name lend credibility to what appears to be a reasonably
> scholarly hypothesis? This is only one example of what I mean when I say
> I don't give much credence to either Mr. Fetters or his detractors.
> Sarcasm, rudeness, disrespect, arrogance, snottiness, and all the other
> exhibits of hostility that permeate both sides of this discussion - and
> so many others here - may bring self-righteous snickers to the
> like-minded, but do *nothing* to persuade your opponents or the neutral
> lurkers.

You are totally missing the extreme emotions associated with this issue.
People have had friend's lives snuffed out, in their eyes, due to this man's
kit. There is no logic that can be associated in this discussion, and
nobody involved really gives a sh*t whether you or others have a warm fuzzy
feeling about the thread. Get it?
--
Jim in NC

[Darrel Toepfer]

Morgans wrote:

> <chuckle> I didn't even catch it.
>
> It would be truly remarkable if anyone had tens of thousands in a Mini.
> Supernatural, shall we say? <g>

That was the only phunnie part of this whole thing...

I'd say if we weren't here to say otherwise, bFetters would have the
numbers in Zzzzoom proportions...

[Morgans]

"Darrel Toepfer" > wrote

> I understood ya, just didn't want anyone else to be confused...

<chuckle> I didn't even catch it.

It would be truly remarkable if anyone had tens of thousands in a Mini.
Supernatural, shall we say? <g>
--
Jim in NC

[Helper]

Flyingmonk wrote:
> In addition, Glen Ryerson, who built and flown the CH-7 "Miss Nina" in
> PA, didn't have any trouble tracking and balancing his blades.

Good ol'Glen. He used to be a Mini-500 supporter too, even had a pic on
his site of Fetters sitting in Miss Nina. And then the big picture
started to emerge.

I found this comment in the Mini-500 owners list:
"I am working on further improving the airflow in the engine compartment
for cooling, this is a still a problem."

[Smitty Two]

In article >,
"Morgans" > wrote:

> "Smitty Two" > wrote
>
> > Sir, I hope you will not feel singled out by me, but how does abusing
> > the man's name lend credibility to what appears to be a reasonably
> > scholarly hypothesis? This is only one example of what I mean when I say
> > I don't give much credence to either Mr. Fetters or his detractors.
> > Sarcasm, rudeness, disrespect, arrogance, snottiness, and all the other
> > exhibits of hostility that permeate both sides of this discussion - and
> > so many others here - may bring self-righteous snickers to the
> > like-minded, but do *nothing* to persuade your opponents or the neutral
> > lurkers.
>
> You are totally missing the extreme emotions associated with this issue.
> People have had friend's lives snuffed out, in their eyes, due to this man's
> kit. There is no logic that can be associated in this discussion, and
> nobody involved really gives a sh*t whether you or others have a warm fuzzy
> feeling about the thread. Get it?

By whose authority do you speak for everyone else in the group? The
gentleman to whom I replied has already posted a thank you to me and an
edited version of his comments. I also note that he subsequently
separated his personal rage from his intellectual assessments.

As far as logic being associated with the discussion, there seem to be
quite a few here who are attempting to discuss the facts rationally and
intelligently. My point is, for those who are *genuinely attempting* to
discuss the topic logically, and convince others of the merits of their
arguments, mixing personal hostility into the discussion is
counterproductive.

On the other hand, if your sole objective is to vent rage, please go
ahead. I have no quarrel with that or with you. I am *not* missing the
extreme emotions as you suggest. I understand them and I have compassion
for those who have lost friends and family. And if my comments have
stirred your pain or anger, I'm sorry, as that is not my intention.

[Morgans]

"Smitty Two" > wrote

> By whose authority do you speak for everyone else in the group?

Whatever, smitty two. You need to take yourself and me a bit less
seriously. I do.

I have a hard time taking any nameless person seriously, anyway. Far as I
am concerned, you are just another nameless, paranoid little person with
something to hide, or some other personality issues.

Oh, by the way, on what authority do you speak for me, and the rest of the
group, with this quote?

> > Sarcasm, rudeness, disrespect, arrogance, snottiness, and all the other
> > exhibits of hostility that permeate both sides of this discussion - and
> > so many others here - may bring self-righteous snickers to the
> > like-minded, but do *nothing* to persuade your opponents or the neutral
> > lurkers.

Self-righteous snickers to the like-minded? Seems like you are speaking for
the group, here.

.....do *nothing* to persuade your opponents or the neutral lurkers? By what
right do you stipulate the state of mind and reaction, of the group?

Pot kettle black, and plonk.
--
Jim in NC

[City Father]

>You are totally missing the extreme emotions associated with this issue.
>People have had friend's lives snuffed out, in their eyes, due to this man's
>kit. There is no logic that can be associated in this discussion, and
>nobody involved really gives a sh*t whether you or others have a warm fuzzy
>feeling about the thread. Get it?

Come on, Morgans !!!

I'm ultra logical about discussing the Mini-500.
If you don't believe it, just axe me. ;-)

In fact, I have even observed one that flew over
100 hours before a bearing froze.. knocking it out of the sky.

It was just dumb luck and a measure of skill that saved the pilot
from serious injury or possible death, IMO. No B.S.

This incident took place at Grain Valley Airport
umpteen years ago. The pilot never ever again took
a Mini-500 on another cross country... or out of hover.

I'm dyin' if I'm lyin'.

- Barnyard BOb -

[Morgans]

"City Father" > wrote

> I'm ultra logical about discussing the Mini-500.
> If you don't believe it, just axe me. ;-)
>
> In fact, I have even observed one that flew over
> 100 hours before a bearing froze.. knocking it out of the sky.
>
> It was just dumb luck and a measure of skill that saved the pilot
> from serious injury or possible death, IMO. No B.S.

oH gOd! Here we go again. Dennis will surely pop up and defend his
fabulous flying machine, now!

You really need to keep up. Throw the salt on the wounds (or bearings) in a
more timely manner, almost real time, even. Now we have to hear it all
again! <g>

The only possible good that could come out of this, is that bAdWaTeR BiLL
might come out of his hole and take a couple shots. I might almost pay
money for that! ;-)

The only thing that could have saved the mini, is if it had been powered by
Corvair. It would have been a great machine, then.

Jim (is there a limit on how many hooks I can set on this line?) in NC

[anon]

> The only thing that could have saved the mini, is if it had been powered by
> Corvair. It would have been a great machine, then.


Interesting that you mention a Corvair. I used to work with an ex-Army
guy that bought a complete (-engine) Korean-era Bell helicopter in a
crates, packed for long-term storage. He wasn't a pilot, but was a
pretty good mechanic. He built the helicopter, took a lesson, put on a
football helmet, and then crashed it in the trees. He's lucky he didn't
kill himself.

[Morgans]

"anon" > wrote

> Interesting that you mention a Corvair. I used to work with an ex-Army
> guy that bought a complete (-engine) Korean-era Bell helicopter in a
> crates, packed for long-term storage.

And that relates to Corvair, how?

I didn't follow.
--
Jim in NC

[john smith]

In article >,
"Morgans" > wrote:

> "anon" > wrote
>
> > Interesting that you mention a Corvair. I used to work with an ex-Army
> > guy that bought a complete (-engine) Korean-era Bell helicopter in a
> > crates, packed for long-term storage.
>
> And that relates to Corvair, how?

I'll take a guess...
"UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED", by Ralph Nader

[anon]

Morgans wrote:
> "anon" > wrote
>
>> Interesting that you mention a Corvair. I used to work with an ex-Army
>> guy that bought a complete (-engine) Korean-era Bell helicopter in a
>> crates, packed for long-term storage.
>
> And that relates to Corvair, how?
>
> I didn't follow.

He installed a modified Corvair engine in his old warbird.

[Morgans]

"anon" > wrote in

> He installed a modified Corvair engine in his old warbird.

Ahh, that part was left out, eh?

From the sounds of it, the engine had no fault in the crash; just a stupid
pilot trick. :-(
--
Jim in NC

[Morgans]

"john smith" > wrote

> I'll take a guess...
> "UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED", by Ralph Nader

I knew that was coming.

What people do not widely know, is that he printed a retraction, saying that
the problems were fixed, '63 and later. It had to do with the fact that the
rear axles only had one U-joint, at the transaxle. After they put in two
per side, and made the wheels travel straight up and down, they were fine.

Bonus points. What rear engine air cooled engine car never put the two
extra U-joints per side in, and in some parts of the world, are still
produced that way?
--
Jim in NC

[Alan Baker]

In article >,
"Morgans" > wrote:

> "john smith" > wrote
>
> > I'll take a guess...
> > "UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED", by Ralph Nader
>
> I knew that was coming.
>
> What people do not widely know, is that he printed a retraction, saying that
> the problems were fixed, '63 and later. It had to do with the fact that the
> rear axles only had one U-joint, at the transaxle. After they put in two
> per side, and made the wheels travel straight up and down, they were fine.
>
> Bonus points. What rear engine air cooled engine car never put the two
> extra U-joints per side in, and in some parts of the world, are still
> produced that way?

The situation is more complicated than you make it sound.

--
Alan Baker
Vancouver, British Columbia
"If you raise the ceiling 4 feet, move the fireplace from that wall
to that wall, you'll still only get the full stereophonic effect
if you sit in the bottom of that cupboard."

[kd5sak]

VW?
Harold
KD5SAK


"Morgans" > wrote in message
...
>
> "john smith" > wrote
>
>> I'll take a guess...
>> "UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED", by Ralph Nader
>
> I knew that was coming.
>
> What people do not widely know, is that he printed a retraction, saying
> that the problems were fixed, '63 and later. It had to do with the fact
> that the rear axles only had one U-joint, at the transaxle. After they
> put in two per side, and made the wheels travel straight up and down, they
> were fine.
>
> Bonus points. What rear engine air cooled engine car never put the two
> extra U-joints per side in, and in some parts of the world, are still
> produced that way?
> --
> Jim in NC
>

[Rich S.]

"Morgans" > wrote in message
...
>
> What people do not widely know, is that he printed a retraction, saying
> that the problems were fixed, '63 and later. It had to do with the fact
> that the rear axles only had one U-joint, at the transaxle. After they
> put in two per side, and made the wheels travel straight up and down, they
> were fine.

Jim..........

Actually, the rear suspension change was made in 1965. See
http://www.corvair.com/user-cgi/pages.cgi?category=corvairhistory

Rich S.
1965 Corvair Monza Convertible
140 hp 4-carb PG transmission
Black with whorehouse red velvet upholstery and wyare weels.

[Morgans]

"Alan Baker" > wrote
>
> The situation is more complicated than you make it sound.

Not much. Yes, I could have talked about parallelagram suspension, and
mentioned sway bars, but the basic idea got across with the "straight up and
down" comment, I think.

Or are you talking about the fact that the owner had to be smart enough to
look at the inflation chart on the inside of the glove compartment lid, if
big print, and follow the differential air pressure for front vs. rear.

Or the fact that the pushrod tube O-rings had to be replaced once in a
while, to keep oil from leaking on the cooling fins and making carbon
monoxide. Duh? If your heater smells like burned oil, does anyone think it
would be a good idea to fix it?

There were many other cars of the period, and since then, that were far
worse machines than the Corvair. How about the rolling over Ford SUV's, or
exploding Pinto's? Nader got the consumer movement going, by abusing a
target, and sensationalizing it. Period.

Then there has been the Chevy truck gas tanks that they had to rig to catch
fire for the sake of filmed TV crash tests. Don't tell me that the consumer
movement and the media are always correct, and just. Nader was the first.

I gotta let this go. I feel my blood pressure going up, far too high! <g>
--
Jim in NC

[Morgans]

"kd5sak" > wrote in message
. com...
> VW?

Ding Ding Ding! We have a winner!!!

It wasn't a very hard question, but you got it! How come Nader didn't write
a book about them. The Corvair was three times as crashworthy as a VW Bug,
too.
--
Jim in NC

[Morgans]

"Richard RIley" > wrote
>
> Probably the VW Beetle - but the last one came off the assembly line
> in Mexico about 2 years ago.

I missed that. How about Brazil, or Argentina? They were produced there,
weren't they? Not anymore?
--
Jim in NC

[Morgans]

"Richard RIley" > wrote

> Nader is scum. No, Nader aspires to be scum
> http://nielsenhayden.com/makinglight/archives/007140.html

Wow, everyone needs to read this link. The only med that helps a big group
of people is being withdrawn, due to Nader. Thanks for nothing, Nader.
--
Jim in NC

[john smith]

In article >,
"Morgans" > wrote:

> "anon" > wrote in
>
> > He installed a modified Corvair engine in his old warbird.

> Ahh, that part was left out, eh?
> From the sounds of it, the engine had no fault in the crash; just a stupid
> pilot trick. :-(

I was thinking that.
The Corvair engine is seeing a lot of popularity in homebuilts these
days.

[Morgans]

"john smith" > wrote

> I was thinking that.
> The Corvair engine is seeing a lot of popularity in homebuilts these
> days.

That is a damn tough, and smooth running engine. I wonder how hard it was
to modify it for vertical operations?
--
Jim in NC

[Ron Wanttaja]

On Sun, 08 Jan 2006 14:10:45 -0800, Richard Riley >
wrote:

> Ralph Nader did go after VW - he got them to stop selling The Thing in
> the US after 2 years.

I don't think Nader went after the Thing...that was about ten years after his
heyday. The Thing tanked because it was a piece of crap. It had all the
drawbacks of the standard Beetle (low power, poor heater, floorboard rust-out,
fairly poor mileage) and none of the good aspects, and zero quality. And
next-to-no occupant protection.

I owned one for ~20 years, I should know....

Ron Wanttaja

[john smith]

In article >,
Richard Riley > wrote:

> German Beetle production petered out in Germany in 1978 and
> production shifted to Brazil and Mexico. The last Beetle was built in
> Puebla, Mexico, in mid-2003. Production in Brazil ended in 1988,
> restarted in 1993 and went until 1996. I don't think it was ever
> made in Argentina - VW has a plant there, but I think it was built in
> the early 80's for later models.

Aern't they still driving Ford Falcon's in Argentina? :-))

[UltraJohn]

Morgans wrote:

>
> "kd5sak" > wrote in message
> . com...
>> VW?
>
> Ding Ding Ding! We have a winner!!!
>
> It wasn't a very hard question, but you got it! How come Nader didn't
> write
> a book about them. The Corvair was three times as crashworthy as a VW
> Bug, too.
About 2 or 3 weeks ago the final VW Type 1 engined vehicle left the assembly
line in South America (Brazil I think). They still used it in the 'Bus' So
new cases were still available on the open market. That will probably end
shortly.
John

[Montblack]

("Morgans" wrote)
> I gotta let this go. I feel my blood pressure going up, far too high! <g>


Like your blood vessels are going to explode, resulting in you rolling over
....in the corner?

Is it too late to 'recall' Jim?


Montblack :-)
"It's better to burn out than it is to rust ......Hey hey, my my"

[Morgans]

"Montblack" > wrote

> Is it too late to 'recall' Jim?

*twitch*twitch* No, why do you *twitch* say that? * twitch*twitch*
--
Jim in (twitch) NC ;-)

[Anthony W]

kd5sak wrote:
> VW?
> Harold
> KD5SAK
>
>
> "Morgans" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>"john smith" > wrote
>>
>>
>>>I'll take a guess...
>>>"UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED", by Ralph Nader
>>
>>I knew that was coming.
>>
>>What people do not widely know, is that he printed a retraction, saying
>>that the problems were fixed, '63 and later. It had to do with the fact
>>that the rear axles only had one U-joint, at the transaxle. After they
>>put in two per side, and made the wheels travel straight up and down, they
>>were fine.
>>
>>Bonus points. What rear engine air cooled engine car never put the two
>>extra U-joints per side in, and in some parts of the world, are still
>>produced that way?

VW ditched swing-arm rear suspension bug in 1979 for US models. In the
rest of the world they were sold both ways. Also 2003 was the last year
for the aircooled bug, they are no more...

Also Raplh Nader is unsafe at any speed.

Tony

[Bob Chilcoat]

I had a 65 Monza convertible when GM finally canned the Corvair. I painted
a picture of Snoopy on his doghouse going down in flames shouting "Curse
you, Ralph Nader". Noticed a lot of people chuckling behind me at lights.

--
Bob (Chief Pilot, White Knuckle Airways)


"Rich S." > wrote in message
. ..
> "Morgans" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> What people do not widely know, is that he printed a retraction, saying
>> that the problems were fixed, '63 and later. It had to do with the fact
>> that the rear axles only had one U-joint, at the transaxle. After they
>> put in two per side, and made the wheels travel straight up and down,
>> they were fine.
>
> Jim..........
>
> Actually, the rear suspension change was made in 1965. See
> http://www.corvair.com/user-cgi/pages.cgi?category=corvairhistory
>
> Rich S.
> 1965 Corvair Monza Convertible
> 140 hp 4-carb PG transmission
> Black with whorehouse red velvet upholstery and wyare weels.
>

[Bob Chilcoat]

Didn't the SuperBeetle have a better (non-swing axle) rear suspension?

The two-U-joint half shafts on the 65 and later Corvair was borrowed from
the Corvette suspension of the same era. Lowered the roll center and
eliminated the jacking effect of the swing axles. Once the tuck that is
generally characteristic of most swing axles was eliminated, the early
Corvair became a very controllable car near the limit. I found (on the '62
Monza that I had before the '65) that substituting much stiffer adjustable
shocks in the back fixed most of the problem. Monroe "Adjustamatic"
(couldn't afford Konis) set to 3 (stiffest) on the back and 1 (softest) on
the front made the car completely controllable on the skid pad. Of course
you had to have the tire pressures right, and five plus turns lock-to-lock
on the steering made you really busy, but that was all that was necessary.
If only GM had been willing to accept a (slightly) harsher ride.

--
Bob (Chief Pilot, White Knuckle Airways)


"Morgans" > wrote in message
...
>
> "kd5sak" > wrote in message
> . com...
>> VW?
>
> Ding Ding Ding! We have a winner!!!
>
> It wasn't a very hard question, but you got it! How come Nader didn't
> write a book about them. The Corvair was three times as crashworthy as a
> VW Bug, too.
> --
> Jim in NC
>

[Morgans]

"Bob Chilcoat" > wrote in message
...
>I had a 65 Monza convertible when GM finally canned the Corvair. I painted
>a picture of Snoopy on his doghouse going down in flames shouting "Curse
>you, Ralph Nader". Noticed a lot of people chuckling behind me at lights.
>

I had the '68 110 with the 2 speed hydromatic. When the air pressure in the
tires was tuned perfectly, you had 100% neutral steering. I could put it
into a high speed constant radius turn, and let go of the wheel. It was a
blast!

I always wanted a Monza Spider. I got to drive one, once. I was spoiled.
--
Jim in NC

[City Father]

On Sun, 8 Jan 2006 16:30:43 -0500, "Morgans"
> wrote:


>The Corvair was three times as crashworthy as a VW Bug,
>too.

ACCORDING TO WHOM, oh wise (ass) one? <g>


- Barnyard BOb -

[City Father]

On Sun, 08 Jan 2006 16:24:22 -0800, Ron Wanttaja
> wrote:

>
>I don't think Nader went after the Thing...that was about ten years after his
>heyday. The Thing tanked because it was a piece of crap. It had all the
>drawbacks of the standard Beetle (low power, poor heater, floorboard rust-out,
>fairly poor mileage) and none of the good aspects, and zero quality. And
>next-to-no occupant protection.
>
>I owned one for ~20 years, I should know....
>
>Ron Wanttaja
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

How many USA cars have you owned for 20 years, Ron?


Barnyard - If I had an inquiring mind, I'd want to know - BOb

[City Father]

On Mon, 9 Jan 2006 21:29:40 -0500, "Morgans"
> wrote:


>I had the '68 110 with the 2 speed hydromatic.


Sheesh.
Seems I STILL gotta' 'teach' the teacher. <g>

The word is HYDRAMATIC, sweetheart.....
and it NEVER was installed in the love of your life Corvair.

I first saw a Hydr-A-matic Oldsmoblie on the street in 1948.
T'was an iron case 4 speed tranny with fluid coupling.
Surfing the net, it seems they were first available in 1946.
IIRC, much later similar designs left out 3rd gear...
making it a very sad and sick factory 3 speed performer.

More Minutia:
In the name of cost containment circa 1960?....
the rear hydraulic pump was eliminated, so one could no
longer push/pull start it with a dead battery or whatever.
This led to starting cars with dead batteries the way we do it today.
[Somewhere in time, the hand crank disappeared.]

FWIW.....
Jaguar, Rolls Royce and countless others have sported
various versions of GM hydramatic transmissions over the years....
BUT NOT CORVAIRS!!!!!


Barnyard - older than dirt - BOb

[Morgans]

>>The Corvair was three times as crashworthy as a VW Bug,
>>too.
>
> ACCORDING TO WHOM, oh wise (ass) one? <g>
>
>
> - Barnyard BOb -

Why, according to me, the group's foremost authority on the Corvair, of
course! <g>

The VW always made me edgy, just from looking down at that thin little door.
Then I pulled the interior trim panel off and looked at the structure of the
door, and got really afraid!
--
Jim in NC

[John Ousterhout]

That would have been a Chevrolet POWERGLIDE in the Corvair.

The Powerglide had only Two speeds: Low and High (direct) and a Torque
converter. Performance suffered a bit - if you didn't wind it out in
low the engine would fall off the cam when it shifted to high - but it
was durable. It worked a lot better with a big V-8 than a little six.

While I was in college my 64 Corvair Monza sported a "Ralph Nader Racing
Team" window sign.

- John (not nearly as old as Bob) Ousterhout -


City Father wrote:
> On Mon, 9 Jan 2006 21:29:40 -0500, "Morgans"
> > wrote:
>
>
>> I had the '68 110 with the 2 speed hydromatic.
>
>
> Sheesh.
> Seems I STILL gotta' 'teach' the teacher. <g>
>
> The word is HYDRAMATIC, sweetheart.....
> and it NEVER was installed in the love of your life Corvair.
>
> I first saw a Hydr-A-matic Oldsmoblie on the street in 1948.
> T'was an iron case 4 speed tranny with fluid coupling.
> Surfing the net, it seems they were first available in 1946.
> IIRC, much later similar designs left out 3rd gear...
> making it a very sad and sick factory 3 speed performer.
>
> More Minutia:
> In the name of cost containment circa 1960?....
> the rear hydraulic pump was eliminated, so one could no
> longer push/pull start it with a dead battery or whatever.
> This led to starting cars with dead batteries the way we do it today.
> [Somewhere in time, the hand crank disappeared.]
>
> FWIW.....
> Jaguar, Rolls Royce and countless others have sported
> various versions of GM hydramatic transmissions over the years....
> BUT NOT CORVAIRS!!!!!
>
>
> Barnyard - older than dirt - BOb
>
>
>
>
>

[Morgans]

"City Father" > wrote

> The word is HYDRAMATIC, sweetheart.....
> and it NEVER was installed in the love of your life Corvair.

Well, it was a two speed - I remember that much!
--
Jim in NC

[Morgans]

"John Ousterhout" > wrote in
message news:SDaGf.752118$x96.326148@attbi_s72...
> That would have been a Chevrolet POWERGLIDE in the Corvair.
>
> The Powerglide had only Two speeds: Low and High (direct) and a Torque
> converter. Performance suffered a bit - if you didn't wind it out in low
> the engine would fall off the cam when it shifted to high - but it was
> durable. It worked a lot better with a big V-8 than a little six.
>
> While I was in college my 64 Corvair Monza sported a "Ralph Nader Racing
> Team" window sign.

I love it!

In the Corvair, the "POWERGLIDE" -OK BOB?- didn't hurt performance all that
much. It was still making good HP when it shifted, and it took off, then.

It did seem to suffer when the engine ran out of rev's at 92 MPH, tho! <g>

That car was a blast. I still sometimes think about looking for another
one.
--
Jim in NC

[Ron Wanttaja]

On Tue, 07 Feb 2006 13:58:47 -0600, City Father > wrote:

>On Sun, 08 Jan 2006 16:24:22 -0800, Ron Wanttaja
> wrote:
>
>>I don't think Nader went after the Thing...that was about ten years after his
>>heyday. The Thing tanked because it was a piece of crap. It had all the
>>drawbacks of the standard Beetle (low power, poor heater, floorboard rust-out,
>>fairly poor mileage) and none of the good aspects, and zero quality. And
>>next-to-no occupant protection.
>>
>>I owned one for ~20 years, I should know....
>
>How many USA cars have you owned for 20 years, Ron?

*Owned* the "Thing" for almost 20 years, only drove it for about eight. Was a
third/fourth car for much of the time I owned it, quietly rusting away in the
garage. It was a spare car when I was single (bought in ~1978), then my wife's
daily commuter 1981-1984 until we bought her a Nissan pickup. After that, just
took it out on warm, sunny, Seattle evenings to drive around with the top down.

Had 88K miles when I sold it, basically because I was tired of it cluttering up
the garage. We've owned the pickup for the past 22 years, same thing....been
sitting nearly idle since '93. Think I've put about 4,000 miles on it in that
time. Don't object so much to it, since there are times you absolutely *need* a
pickup truck. It now sits in my hangar, so the garage isn't cluttered.

The Thing's only advantage is that you could carry a full sheet of plywood in
it. Not *totally* in it, mind, but it would sit flat.

But if I were offered the choice of being in an accident in the Thing or in my
22-year-old pickup, I'd be in that Nissan *real* fast. The Thing had big
storage pockets in the doors...pretty convenient, until you realized that the
outside of the storage pocket was the inside face of the exterior sheet metal.
Absolutely nothing to resist a side impact but flat 0.060 steel. If you slammed
the doors, the whole side of the car would shake back and forth. Didn't make
much difference to a dashing 24-year-old Lieutenant, but as you get older, that
sort of thing does give you pause.

Have driven several US-made cars for longer periods, including more miles. Have
owned two US cars older than 20 years old ('46 and '51 Willys Jeeps, back in the
'70s), still wish I had them.

Ron Wanttaja

[City Father]

On Tue, 7 Feb 2006 19:25:37 -0500, "Morgans" >
wrote:

>In the Corvair, the "POWERGLIDE" -OK BOB?- didn't hurt performance all that
>much. It was still making good HP when it shifted, and it took off, then.

Yeh, yeh.
You'd still be grasping for facts, if 'Oyster' hadn't bailed you out.

My life long friend had a Corvair with POWERSLIDE and it did OK.
It got us back and forth from the bars and beaches in our and its
heyday.

Powergilide was pretty much the mainstay thru the 50's for all
automatic Chevies and served well until the 3 speed Turbo Hydramatic
came along as a '60's option. In between was TURBOGLIDE.. a dismal
failure with the less than popular 348 c.i.d. Chevy V-8 circa 1958.

When the big block Fords came along in the 60's, I left GM....
and never went back until I bought that piece of sh*t Buick
from Steakbreath Stricker in western Kansass! I can't believe
that we are still on speaking terms after that fiasco. <g>

- Barnyard BOb -

[- Barnyard BOb -]

On Tue, 07 Feb 2006 19:07:05 -0800, Ron Wanttaja
> wrote:

>
>But if I were offered the choice of being in an accident in the Thing or in my
>22-year-old pickup, I'd be in that Nissan *real* fast. The Thing had big
>storage pockets in the doors...pretty convenient, until you realized that the
>outside of the storage pocket was the inside face of the exterior sheet metal.
>Absolutely nothing to resist a side impact but flat 0.060 steel. If you slammed
>the doors, the whole side of the car would shake back and forth. Didn't make
>much difference to a dashing 24-year-old Lieutenant, but as you get older, that
>sort of thing does give you pause.

I currently own a '97 Nissan Hardbody that was purchased new.
A sheet of plywood doesn't lie flat, however the airbag is a plus.
It's my third Nissan truck. Don't stay in 'em 20 years, tho.
Gotta' feed the economy once in a while....
Sometimes Detroit. Other times, Tennessee or Ohio.
Even made the mistake of buying a Kansas City built FORD...
Once.

- Barnyard BOb -

[Montblack]

("- Barnyard BOb -" wrote)
> Even made the mistake of buying a Kansas City built FORD...
> Once.


Try one built in St Paul - Ranger's only plant now that NJ is done.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twin_Cities_Assembly_Plant
Ford's oldest and BEST plant!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Ford_lock_and_dam.jpg

I worked there for one week in 1978 - they were changing over from cars to
trucks. I was 18 and stoopid, so I left for something less difficult and
more fun. I was on the chassis line - ugh!


Montblack
UAW baby! $12.50/hr after a probation period. I was making $8.50/hr temp
wages.

[JJS]

"Ron Wanttaja" > wrote in message ...
snip
>
> Have driven several US-made cars for longer periods, including more miles. Have
> owned two US cars older than 20 years old ('46 and '51 Willys Jeeps, back in the
> '70s), still wish I had them.
>
> Ron Wanttaja

The first 4X4 my Dad had on the farm was a Willy's Jeep. He later bought a Willy's pickup and had the local FFA
chapter repaint it. I restored a 1948 Willy's Jeep pickup back in the late 70's / early 80's. Fond memories! My
new bride loved driving it. You could go lot's of places in one... you just couldn't go there very fast!

Joe Schneider
8437R



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[Flyingmonk]

>I worked there for one week in 1978 - they were changing over from cars to
>trucks. I was 18 and stoopid, so I left for something less difficult and
>more fun. I was on the chassis line - ugh!
>Montblack
>UAW baby! $12.50/hr after a probation period. I was making $8.50/hr temp
>wages.

Was this what you were making in '78 Montblack? Wow that's good money
back then I bet.

The Monk

[Montblack]

("Flyingmonk" wrote)
>>UAW baby! $12.50/hr after a probation period. I was making $8.50/hr temp
>>wages.

> Was this what you were making in '78 Montblack? Wow that's good money
> back then I bet.


I was at $8 temp. I didn't stay long enough for the $12.50 - $14.00.
With OT it was a full-time $25-$32K job in '78.

Nice houses sold for $50K-$75K in 1978.
College at a very nice private school was $4,800. $5,050 in '79. St Olaf.
1976 new VW Karmann Ghia was under $4K.
Gas was 0.57/gal It topped $1.00 in the spring of '79.
IIRC, new Ford full size pickups were about $7K-$8K in 1978.

1978 was the first year for the Cessna 152 ....$15K Base price.
http://www.cessna150-152club.com/


Montblack

[Morgans]

"Montblack" > wrote in message
...
> ("Flyingmonk" wrote)
>>>UAW baby! $12.50/hr after a probation period. I was making $8.50/hr temp
>>>wages.
>
>> Was this what you were making in '78 Montblack? Wow that's good money
>> back then I bet.
>
>
> I was at $8 temp. I didn't stay long enough for the $12.50 - $14.00.
> With OT it was a full-time $25-$32K job in '78.
>
> Nice houses sold for $50K-$75K in 1978.
> College at a very nice private school was $4,800. $5,050 in '79. St Olaf.
> 1976 new VW Karmann Ghia was under $4K.
> Gas was 0.57/gal It topped $1.00 in the spring of '79.
> IIRC, new Ford full size pickups were about $7K-$8K in 1978.
>
> 1978 was the first year for the Cessna 152 ....$15K Base price.
> http://www.cessna150-152club.com/

Minimum wage was $3.65, I think.
--
Jim in NC

[Rich S.]

"JJS" <jschneider@remove socks cebridge.net> wrote in message
...
> The first 4X4 my Dad had on the farm was a Willy's Jeep. He later bought
> a Willy's pickup and had the local FFA chapter repaint it. I restored a
> 1948 Willy's Jeep pickup back in the late 70's / early 80's. Fond
> memories! My new bride loved driving it. You could go lot's of places in
> one... you just couldn't go there very fast!

Joe..........

Try the new Jeep with the Hemi. . . :)

Rich "My wife's got the 300C - I've got the '65 Corvair" S.

[Flyingmonk]

Wow,

That was great 4 yah. I remember that my dad was supporting us on
$3.75/hr at a Radiation Systems on the shop floor making Sat Dishes for
the military I think. Something like that.

The Monk

[Montblack]

("Morgans" wrote)
>> 1978 was the first year for the Cessna 152 ....$15K Base price.
>> http://www.cessna150-152club.com/

> Minimum wage was $3.65, I think.


$3.65 is high for 1978.

I was lifeguarding for $2.40 and $2.90 in '75 to '78. Arby's, in 1978, paid
$4.25 if you could run the back table (fill sandwiches orders for 4 cash
registers) during dinner rush - if not, you got $3.85. Arby's paid almost
$1.00/hr more than Mac's.


Montblack
1978 Yamaha 360 ...windshield/back rest/ luggage rack/roll bar/foot pegs --
$1,100
1981 Yamaha 650 Special II ....... $ ????

[JJS]

"Montblack" > wrote in message ...
> $3.65 is high for 1978.
>
> I was lifeguarding for $2.40 and $2.90 in '75 to '78. Arby's, in 1978, paid $4.25 if you could run the back table
> (fill sandwiches orders for 4 cash registers) during dinner rush - if not, you got $3.85. Arby's paid almost
> $1.00/hr more than Mac's.
>
>
> Montblack
> 1978 Yamaha 360 ...windshield/back rest/ luggage rack/roll bar/foot pegs -- $1,100
> 1981 Yamaha 650 Special II ....... $ ????

1978 Wally World Sporting Goods $3.25 IIRC. Man it pains me to admit that! Had to get through school somehow
though. Rewarded myself with a 1978 GS1100 Suzuki on Graduation. Also $1100. It's still in the barn with 46,000
miles on it. Can't bring myself to scrap it... awaiting restoration after retirement?
1982 RM465 Suzuki motocrosser... about $1800? Damn I'm getting old! But then again... "The older I get, the faster
I was! :' ).

Joe Schneider
N8437R



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[Morgans]

> > $3.65 is high for 1978.

I'll bet I was thinking $2.65 hr. I do remember the .65 part, I think! <g>
--
Jim in NC

[Jonathan Lowe]

"Morgans" > wrote in message
...
>
> "City Father" > wrote
>
> > The word is HYDRAMATIC, sweetheart.....
> > and it NEVER was installed in the love of your life Corvair.
>
> Well, it was a two speed - I remember that much!

Yeh, GO and STOP.:-)
--
..
..
Cheers,
Jonathan Lowe,
Rallye 100
EI-BFR

> --
> Jim in NC