Persian Tomcats in service

[DDAY]

There's a very interesting article in the current issue of Combat Aircraft,
Vol 7, No. 6. It's by Tom Cooper and Liam F. Devlin and titled "Iran: A
Formidable Opponent?"

The article is about Iran's current air force capabilities, specifically
focusing on the Tomcats in Iranian service (it is in keeping with the
issue's focus on the retirement of the Tomcat from USN service; several
other magazines are doing similar Tomcat farewell issues).

According to the authors, the Tomcat remains in frontline Iranian service
and in sizeable numbers. The authors claim that in late 2003 a USAF E-3
Sentry tracked 16--yes, SIXTEEN--Iranian Tomcats flying in formation. This
was the largest number spotted at one time since 1997, when nine were
tracked over the southern Persian Gulf by the US Navy.

The article is somewhat defensive in tone. The authors claim that although
Western sources report that the Tomcat is barely operable, this is untrue.
The Iranians have put a lot of effort into maintaining and even rebuilding
their Tomcats and Phantoms, and they may have as many as 65 Phantoms in
service. It said that the US has decided that the Tomcat is barely operable
because it no longer operates on the borders, but only deep inside Iran.
But they claim that this is actually because the Iranians are trying to
preserve their assets and keep their most powerful fighter farther from
potential harm.

They also make a number of other claims, including that the CIA may have
acquired or inspected a Russian MiG-31 in 1997, and that the Russians
offered 22 secondhand MiG-31 aircraft to the Iranians, who turned them down.
(The CIA reportedly sought to buy these aircraft rather than let the
Iranians get them.) The article also claims that the Russians offered
Su-27s, Su-30s, and MiG-29s to the Iranians, but the Iranians are wary of
buying Russian aircraft because the terms are bad. For instance, the
Russians do not allow license building of their jet engines. Simply put,
the Russians won't give the Iranians enough independence and the Iranians
don't want to get stuck in a position of weakness when it comes to acquiring
spare parts for their aircraft.

There's a lot of amazing stuff in the article and it would be fascinating if
true. But one objection that I've heard others make about Cooper and his
other co-writer Farzad Bishop is that it is impossible to independently
confirm their information. They might conduct a lot of interviews with
Iranian pilots and ex-pat Iranians, but we don't know how carefully they
check their information. (This article by Cooper and Devlin concedes that
fewer Iranians have left the country since the mid-1990s, so it is harder to
speak to Iranians outside the country.)

Personally, the one thing I'm dubious about is the claim that Western
intelligence agencies do not have a good understanding of just how active
the Iranian F-14s are. If they turn on their radars, then the US intel
assets in the Persian Gulf will detect them. In addition, satellite photos
should also indicate how many F-14s are operable. Sure, the Iranians must
keep a lot of them in hangars, but occasionally they will move them around
airfields and they can be counted. In fact, somebody with a credit card
could order up commercial images of Iranian airfields and check for
themselves. So I don't buy the claim that US intel officials think that
_virtually no_ F-14s or their AWG-9 radars are still operating. My
suspicion is that the authors are responding to misinformed trash talking in
the aviation press, not to what US intel actually believes about Iranian
capabilities.

All that said, the one thing that establishes credibility for Cooper and
Devlin (as well as Cooper and Bishop in their books on the Iranian F-4s and
F-14s) is the impressive array of photos that they have collected. These
include aerial refueling shots of F-4s and Su-24s, as well as formation
shots of F-5s and other aircraft, and a very cool grainy image of an F-14 at
extremely low altitude over the Gulf. That aircraft is in the current
blue/gray paint scheme. They also have a photo of an F-14 with an ATM-54A
training round alongside, photographed in April 2004. That raises an
interesting point--if the Iranians no longer can operate the AIM-54 Phoenix,
then why would they be carrying around training rounds? Clearly they retain
some kind of AIM-54 Phoenix capability.



D

[Yofuri]

Follow the money!

To begin with, the Shah bought plenty of spare parts. Two AVCAL's (each
consisting of one year's estimated usage of spare parts based on flight
hours) were required to be delivered concurrent with the first IIAF
F-14. That allowed plenty of time for copying and improvement.

Second, the USN lied to Congress that 70% of inflight malfunctions would
be repairable at the Organizational or Intermediate Maintenance levels,
without resort to the slow, highly expensive Depot or Contractor levels.

Third, Congress dictated the use of a myriad of small-business
minority-setaside contractors to provide bit-and-piece components for
production and spare parts. Many were totally inept, dishonest, or both.

For instance: A red or green lens for the nav lights cost $18,000;
Hughes used a special transistor in the AWG-9 Radar that was not
manufactured, but selected for its special characteristics from bulk
quantities of a common type of transistor used in GM auto seat belt
controllers. The yield rate for usable transistors was about 1 in 2,700
tested. Guess what happened when GM dropped that seat-belt design.

Fleet introduction was a real zoo, with the production line, the IIAF
and current fleet usage all in competition for the same non-existent
parts.

The IIAF logistics and maintenance guys, all graduates of the USAF
Palace Log training track, got a real snicker out of that one, and
contracted with French companies to provide outyear support.

To make a long story short, the guts of any nearly system-ready F-14 in
Iran's current inventory bear no resemblance to what was in them in
1975. The sons of the Frenchmen who provided logistics and engineering
to the Shah in the 1970's are providing them to Iran today, along with
the Russians. The flying pack of internal rat**** that USN maintainers
put up with for years long since went the way of the Wing Flap Glove
Vane Controller System.

By the way, another old giggle: When the first F-14 landed at Point
Mugu, the canopy warped so badly in the sunshine that it couldn't be
closed until it was taken into the hangar and cooled down. Everyone was
going nuts about what the Iranians would say when they found out (lots
of our oil dollars riding on this deal, guys). The Iranians were
totally unconcerned; their hangers were underground and a canopy would
never be opened in the sun. Point is, these airframes have been stored
and maintained in conditions superior to most museums. The original
hangar and support facilities were designed by the French, also.

OK, it's time for one of you aero types to explain the history of the
Wing Flap Glove Vanes, and where they went.

Rick




DDAY wrote:
> There's a very interesting article in the current issue of Combat Aircraft,
> Vol 7, No. 6. It's by Tom Cooper and Liam F. Devlin and titled "Iran: A
> Formidable Opponent?"
>
> The article is about Iran's current air force capabilities, specifically
> focusing on the Tomcats in Iranian service (it is in keeping with the
> issue's focus on the retirement of the Tomcat from USN service; several
> other magazines are doing similar Tomcat farewell issues).
>
> According to the authors, the Tomcat remains in frontline Iranian service
> and in sizeable numbers. The authors claim that in late 2003 a USAF E-3
> Sentry tracked 16--yes, SIXTEEN--Iranian Tomcats flying in formation. This
> was the largest number spotted at one time since 1997, when nine were
> tracked over the southern Persian Gulf by the US Navy.
>
> The article is somewhat defensive in tone. The authors claim that although
> Western sources report that the Tomcat is barely operable, this is untrue.
> The Iranians have put a lot of effort into maintaining and even rebuilding
> their Tomcats and Phantoms, and they may have as many as 65 Phantoms in
> service. It said that the US has decided that the Tomcat is barely operable
> because it no longer operates on the borders, but only deep inside Iran.
> But they claim that this is actually because the Iranians are trying to
> preserve their assets and keep their most powerful fighter farther from
> potential harm.
<snip>
*** Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com ***

[W. D. Allen]

Don't know the current status of Iranian F-14 readiness but can vouch for
Iranian pilots being a bit better than camel jockeys. I personally saw then
fly three Iranian Air Force Boeing 747s in military parade formation at a
flight demonstration for the Shah in the mid 1970s.

That said, my guess is they would fare no better against our Air Force, Navy
and Marine aviators than did the Iraqis. It's probably more a matter of
motivation than skill.

Crown prince Raza, the Shah's son, claims the young people in Iran,
including the Revolutionary Guard, are ready to revolt against the murderous
mullahs if they can get some support from us western nations. Certainly that
would be better all round than our invading yet another middle east country!

WDA

end

"DDAY" > wrote in message
k.net...
> There's a very interesting article in the current issue of Combat
> Aircraft,
> Vol 7, No. 6. It's by Tom Cooper and Liam F. Devlin and titled "Iran: A
> Formidable Opponent?"
>
> The article is about Iran's current air force capabilities, specifically
> focusing on the Tomcats in Iranian service (it is in keeping with the
> issue's focus on the retirement of the Tomcat from USN service; several
> other magazines are doing similar Tomcat farewell issues).
>
> According to the authors, the Tomcat remains in frontline Iranian service
> and in sizeable numbers. The authors claim that in late 2003 a USAF E-3
> Sentry tracked 16--yes, SIXTEEN--Iranian Tomcats flying in formation.
> This
> was the largest number spotted at one time since 1997, when nine were
> tracked over the southern Persian Gulf by the US Navy.
>
> The article is somewhat defensive in tone. The authors claim that
> although
> Western sources report that the Tomcat is barely operable, this is untrue.
> The Iranians have put a lot of effort into maintaining and even rebuilding
> their Tomcats and Phantoms, and they may have as many as 65 Phantoms in
> service. It said that the US has decided that the Tomcat is barely
> operable
> because it no longer operates on the borders, but only deep inside Iran.
> But they claim that this is actually because the Iranians are trying to
> preserve their assets and keep their most powerful fighter farther from
> potential harm.
>
> They also make a number of other claims, including that the CIA may have
> acquired or inspected a Russian MiG-31 in 1997, and that the Russians
> offered 22 secondhand MiG-31 aircraft to the Iranians, who turned them
> down.
> (The CIA reportedly sought to buy these aircraft rather than let the
> Iranians get them.) The article also claims that the Russians offered
> Su-27s, Su-30s, and MiG-29s to the Iranians, but the Iranians are wary of
> buying Russian aircraft because the terms are bad. For instance, the
> Russians do not allow license building of their jet engines. Simply put,
> the Russians won't give the Iranians enough independence and the Iranians
> don't want to get stuck in a position of weakness when it comes to
> acquiring
> spare parts for their aircraft.
>
> There's a lot of amazing stuff in the article and it would be fascinating
> if
> true. But one objection that I've heard others make about Cooper and his
> other co-writer Farzad Bishop is that it is impossible to independently
> confirm their information. They might conduct a lot of interviews with
> Iranian pilots and ex-pat Iranians, but we don't know how carefully they
> check their information. (This article by Cooper and Devlin concedes that
> fewer Iranians have left the country since the mid-1990s, so it is harder
> to
> speak to Iranians outside the country.)
>
> Personally, the one thing I'm dubious about is the claim that Western
> intelligence agencies do not have a good understanding of just how active
> the Iranian F-14s are. If they turn on their radars, then the US intel
> assets in the Persian Gulf will detect them. In addition, satellite
> photos
> should also indicate how many F-14s are operable. Sure, the Iranians must
> keep a lot of them in hangars, but occasionally they will move them around
> airfields and they can be counted. In fact, somebody with a credit card
> could order up commercial images of Iranian airfields and check for
> themselves. So I don't buy the claim that US intel officials think that
> _virtually no_ F-14s or their AWG-9 radars are still operating. My
> suspicion is that the authors are responding to misinformed trash talking
> in
> the aviation press, not to what US intel actually believes about Iranian
> capabilities.
>
> All that said, the one thing that establishes credibility for Cooper and
> Devlin (as well as Cooper and Bishop in their books on the Iranian F-4s
> and
> F-14s) is the impressive array of photos that they have collected. These
> include aerial refueling shots of F-4s and Su-24s, as well as formation
> shots of F-5s and other aircraft, and a very cool grainy image of an F-14
> at
> extremely low altitude over the Gulf. That aircraft is in the current
> blue/gray paint scheme. They also have a photo of an F-14 with an ATM-54A
> training round alongside, photographed in April 2004. That raises an
> interesting point--if the Iranians no longer can operate the AIM-54
> Phoenix,
> then why would they be carrying around training rounds? Clearly they
> retain
> some kind of AIM-54 Phoenix capability.
>
>
>
> D
>

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, "W. D. Allen"
> wrote:

> Crown prince Raza, the Shah's son, claims the young people in Iran,
> including the Revolutionary Guard, are ready to revolt against the murderous
> mullahs if they can get some support from us western nations. Certainly that
> would be better all round than our invading yet another middle east country!

Yeah, but the problem with guys who have vested interests is that they tend
to drink their own bathwater.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[[email protected]]

On Wed, 03 May 2006 14:23:20 -0700, (Harry
Andreas) wrote:

>In article >, "W. D. Allen"
> wrote:
>
>> Crown prince Raza, the Shah's son, claims the young people in Iran,
>> including the Revolutionary Guard, are ready to revolt against the murderous
>> mullahs if they can get some support from us western nations. Certainly that
>> would be better all round than our invading yet another middle east country!
>
>Yeah, but the problem with guys who have vested interests is that they tend
>to drink their own bathwater.

Isn't this the son of the same guy who never saw it coming?

Like father, like son?

I was an instructor at NAS Corpus when the Iranian revolution took
place. You could tell who was on what side becaus the Shah's guys
wore name tags that said "IIN" (Iranian Imperial Navy) and the other
guys wore tags that said "INN" (Iranian National Navy). The IIN guys
seemed to outnumber the INN guys, but not by much.

Maybe among the more Western oriented youth there is a desire to
replace the Mullahs, but I wonder how deep it runs.

Bill Kambic
Haras Lucero, Kingston, TN
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma Raça, Uma Paixão

[[email protected]]

To make the long story short, it is quite ironic that US Navy got rid
of Tomcats just in time when they could face foreign F-14s in battle
;-)))

[[email protected]]

DDAY wrote:
> There's a very interesting article in the current issue of Combat Aircraft,
> Vol 7, No. 6. It's by Tom Cooper and Liam F. Devlin and titled "Iran: A
> Formidable Opponent?"
>
> The article is about Iran's current air force capabilities, specifically
> focusing on the Tomcats in Iranian service (it is in keeping with the
> issue's focus on the retirement of the Tomcat from USN service; several
> other magazines are doing similar Tomcat farewell issues).
>
> According to the authors, the Tomcat remains in frontline Iranian service
> and in sizeable numbers. The authors claim that in late 2003 a USAF E-3
> Sentry tracked 16--yes, SIXTEEN--Iranian Tomcats flying in formation. This
> was the largest number spotted at one time since 1997, when nine were
> tracked over the southern Persian Gulf by the US Navy.
>
> The article is somewhat defensive in tone. The authors claim that although
> Western sources report that the Tomcat is barely operable, this is untrue.
> The Iranians have put a lot of effort into maintaining and even rebuilding
> their Tomcats and Phantoms, and they may have as many as 65 Phantoms in
> service. It said that the US has decided that the Tomcat is barely operable
> because it no longer operates on the borders, but only deep inside Iran.
> But they claim that this is actually because the Iranians are trying to
> preserve their assets and keep their most powerful fighter farther from
> potential harm.
>
> They also make a number of other claims, including that the CIA may have
> acquired or inspected a Russian MiG-31 in 1997, and that the Russians
> offered 22 secondhand MiG-31 aircraft to the Iranians, who turned them down.
> (The CIA reportedly sought to buy these aircraft rather than let the
> Iranians get them.) The article also claims that the Russians offered
> Su-27s, Su-30s, and MiG-29s to the Iranians, but the Iranians are wary of
> buying Russian aircraft because the terms are bad. For instance, the
> Russians do not allow license building of their jet engines. Simply put,
> the Russians won't give the Iranians enough independence and the Iranians
> don't want to get stuck in a position of weakness when it comes to acquiring
> spare parts for their aircraft.
>
> There's a lot of amazing stuff in the article and it would be fascinating if
> true. But one objection that I've heard others make about Cooper and his
> other co-writer Farzad Bishop is that it is impossible to independently
> confirm their information. They might conduct a lot of interviews with
> Iranian pilots and ex-pat Iranians, but we don't know how carefully they
> check their information. (This article by Cooper and Devlin concedes that
> fewer Iranians have left the country since the mid-1990s, so it is harder to
> speak to Iranians outside the country.)
>
> Personally, the one thing I'm dubious about is the claim that Western
> intelligence agencies do not have a good understanding of just how active
> the Iranian F-14s are. If they turn on their radars, then the US intel
> assets in the Persian Gulf will detect them. In addition, satellite photos
> should also indicate how many F-14s are operable. Sure, the Iranians must
> keep a lot of them in hangars, but occasionally they will move them around
> airfields and they can be counted. In fact, somebody with a credit card
> could order up commercial images of Iranian airfields and check for
> themselves. So I don't buy the claim that US intel officials think that
> _virtually no_ F-14s or their AWG-9 radars are still operating. My
> suspicion is that the authors are responding to misinformed trash talking in
> the aviation press, not to what US intel actually believes about Iranian
> capabilities.
>
> All that said, the one thing that establishes credibility for Cooper and
> Devlin (as well as Cooper and Bishop in their books on the Iranian F-4s and
> F-14s) is the impressive array of photos that they have collected. These
> include aerial refueling shots of F-4s and Su-24s, as well as formation
> shots of F-5s and other aircraft, and a very cool grainy image of an F-14 at
> extremely low altitude over the Gulf. That aircraft is in the current
> blue/gray paint scheme. They also have a photo of an F-14 with an ATM-54A
> training round alongside, photographed in April 2004. That raises an
> interesting point--if the Iranians no longer can operate the AIM-54 Phoenix,
> then why would they be carrying around training rounds? Clearly they retain
> some kind of AIM-54 Phoenix capability.
>
>
>
> D

Cooper, Bishop and Devlin have provided credible artiles on the status
of the IRIAF coupled with an warning that those who ignore the
capabilities will be doomed to failure against the Iranians.

The article implies that there are 44 operational Tomcats instead of 28
operational and 29 inoperational as cited by US intelligence sources.
But it was Cooper and Bishop in their 2003 book on the Iraq/Iran war
that stated the original assertion of 28/29 as of F-14's.

The Iranians are willing to invest thousands of man hours in rebuilding
their F-4's and F-14 fleets in an effort to prolong their operational
life. That is because they are not able to buy US made aircraft and
foreign aircraft with US made parts incorporated in them. That is why
they are willing tlo spend all that time and money on refurbishing an
aging aircraft ready for the junk pile to zero hour status.

For the US to attack Iranian military bases with IRIAF fighters sitting
on the tarmac, they would have to expend 300 plus cruise missiles and
then wait another 18 months for new build stocks of cruise missiles to
come from the manufacturer to replenish their supplies. There is no
guarantee that they would be able to destroy all the active Iranian
aircraft as the Iranians would commingle the active aircraft with the
inactive ones in an effort to compel the US to have to destroy all the
aircraft on the base in order to ensure that the fleet of F-4's and
F-14's were no longer a threat thereafter.

Even if we achieved air superority over the Iranians, we will still
have a slog of a battle with the ground elements as they resort to
IED's and suicide bombers against American convoys. And that would add
to the general operational strain our military is under with wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan.

To achieve air superority would require that we accept the loss of a
few aircraft, including fighter planes and a few prized bombers of B-1
and B-2 vintage. Since we have only 21 B-2's, we cannot lose afford to
lose even one or two as that would add immensely to our long term
attrition rate for that aircraft and we would not have sufficient
numbers of B-2's for a future conflict.

It was surprising that the Pentagon and Iran made a secret agreement
with each other not to allow their aircraft to attack each other's
aircraft in cross border skirmishes. THis helped reduce tension to an
extent. Being a deep reader of Early Bird as that is the first thing I
read when I come to the office, I never saw any such agreement made
with the Iranians by the Pentagon.

If the Pentagon could talk with the Iranians, then President Bush
should follow the UN Secretary General's advice to talk with the
Iranians as it would go a long way toward reducing tensions and then
create a downward spiral in the price of oil.

It was great to hear one Iranian general tell the world that the
opinion of another general who said that Iran would strike Israel in
the event of an American attack on their country was his own personal
opinion and not that of the Iranian military That went a long way
toward assuring Americans that Iran maintains a good command and
control structure over its military like we do.

So, the ball is in the President's court and we will see what he will
do. I believe that an agreable deal can be made between both countries
on the nuclear matter in exchange for the United States to promise an
non-aggression pact against Iran and for Iran will do the same to the
United States. This will go a long way toward reducing fear of
terrorism and to help shorten the long war against terrorism that we
are fighting. It would not be surprising to see both countries resume
diplomatic relations.

Onc more curious tidbit. Did the CIA get the 22 Mig-31's from the
Russians under their dummy arms buying corporation?

James K. Goodwin

[DDAY]

----------
In article . com>,
wrote:

> Cooper, Bishop and Devlin have provided credible artiles on the status
> of the IRIAF coupled with an warning that those who ignore the
> capabilities will be doomed to failure against the Iranians.

That is a useful warning. They delve into things like the training and the
political control of the pilots. Iran had a very well-trained air force in
the 1970s, but a lot of the pilots were imprisoned or controlled by the new
regime. As this article notes, the survivors from those days are now all
reaching retirement.


> The article implies that there are 44 operational Tomcats instead of 28
> operational and 29 inoperational as cited by US intelligence sources.
> But it was Cooper and Bishop in their 2003 book on the Iraq/Iran war
> that stated the original assertion of 28/29 as of F-14's.

I saw a post by Cooper last year where he said that he has better
information than he did for that book.

My only concern is that we don't get a good sense of how reliable their
information is, or how careful they are checking it.


> life. That is because they are not able to buy US made aircraft and
> foreign aircraft with US made parts incorporated in them. That is why

There must be a huge aftermarket inventory on Phantom parts. But what is
interesting in this article is that they actually provide a motive for
keeping the American aircraft--they don't like the terms that the Russians
have offered.


> For the US to attack Iranian military bases with IRIAF fighters sitting
> on the tarmac, they would have to expend 300 plus cruise missiles and
> then wait another 18 months for new build stocks of cruise missiles to
> come from the manufacturer to replenish their supplies. There is no

The US Tomahawk inventory is well over 2000 missiles, so expending 300 is
not crippling.


> To achieve air superority would require that we accept the loss of a
> few aircraft, including fighter planes and a few prized bombers of B-1
> and B-2 vintage. Since we have only 21 B-2's, we cannot lose afford to
> lose even one or two as that would add immensely to our long term
> attrition rate for that aircraft and we would not have sufficient
> numbers of B-2's for a future conflict.

I don't think that either assertion is true. There's no reason to believe
that the B-2 would be vulnerable. And we have already operated them for
over a decade without a single loss.

> So, the ball is in the President's court and we will see what he will
> do. I believe that an agreable deal can be made between both countries
> on the nuclear matter in exchange for the United States to promise an
> non-aggression pact against Iran and for Iran will do the same to the
> United States.

Iran doesn't want a bomb to protect them from the US. They want a bomb to
make them a major power, and to use on Israel.


> Onc more curious tidbit. Did the CIA get the 22 Mig-31's from the
> Russians under their dummy arms buying corporation?

The article implies that they did not, that the CIA was primarily interested
in preventing them from going to Iran, but when the Iranians lost interest,
so did the CIA.



D

[~^ beancounter ~^]

interesting artical...i think it will be good practice
for collitition (sp?) forces, to engage and practice
"their art".... remember, the f14 is over 30 yrs old...

[Thomas A. Hoffer]

I'm not an expert in naval hardware as many others are. My expertise lies in
policy, admin, and personnel issues. However, I believe we need to keep in
mind that this aircraft was built with 1960's technology.

Yea....they might have been upgraded...and the Iranians sent many guys my
age to western engineering schools (I knew quite a number in college...good
students too!!) But many a Tomcat was defeated by an aggressor squadron A-4
and F-5 flown by a well trained and seasoned pilot. How well trained are
Iranian pilots and how adept are they in fighting the aircraft?

In my mind the biggest concern would be their long range air-air missile
capability. What is it? What are our counter measures? It's easy to awe
civilians and observers. What I'm curious is what our aviators were
thinking. Was it "uh oh!" or "those poor paisons will be dead if they fly
against us"?

[Yofuri]

~^ beancounter ~^ wrote:
> interesting artical...i think it will be good practice
> for collitition (sp?) forces, to engage and practice
> "their art".... remember, the f14 is over 30 yrs old...
>
And the SA-6 and radar tracking system that took down the first F-117
"Stealth" in Yugoslavia was how old?

And the eyeball-guided AAA in 'Nam?

Never bet your ass that modern technology will trump dedicated
ingenuity, even when fighting against sticks and rocks.

Rick

*** Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com ***

[[email protected]]

wrote:
> DDAY wrote:
> > There's a very interesting article in the current issue of Combat Aircraft,
> > Vol 7, No. 6. It's by Tom Cooper and Liam F. Devlin and titled "Iran: A
> > Formidable Opponent?"
> >
> > The article is about Iran's current air force capabilities, specifically
> > focusing on the Tomcats in Iranian service (it is in keeping with the
> > issue's focus on the retirement of the Tomcat from USN service; several
> > other magazines are doing similar Tomcat farewell issues).
> >
> > According to the authors, the Tomcat remains in frontline Iranian service
> > and in sizeable numbers. The authors claim that in late 2003 a USAF E-3
> > Sentry tracked 16--yes, SIXTEEN--Iranian Tomcats flying in formation. This
> > was the largest number spotted at one time since 1997, when nine were
> > tracked over the southern Persian Gulf by the US Navy.
> >
> > The article is somewhat defensive in tone. The authors claim that although
> > Western sources report that the Tomcat is barely operable, this is untrue.
> > The Iranians have put a lot of effort into maintaining and even rebuilding
> > their Tomcats and Phantoms, and they may have as many as 65 Phantoms in
> > service. It said that the US has decided that the Tomcat is barely operable
> > because it no longer operates on the borders, but only deep inside Iran.
> > But they claim that this is actually because the Iranians are trying to
> > preserve their assets and keep their most powerful fighter farther from
> > potential harm.
> >
> > They also make a number of other claims, including that the CIA may have
> > acquired or inspected a Russian MiG-31 in 1997, and that the Russians
> > offered 22 secondhand MiG-31 aircraft to the Iranians, who turned them down.
> > (The CIA reportedly sought to buy these aircraft rather than let the
> > Iranians get them.) The article also claims that the Russians offered
> > Su-27s, Su-30s, and MiG-29s to the Iranians, but the Iranians are wary of
> > buying Russian aircraft because the terms are bad. For instance, the
> > Russians do not allow license building of their jet engines. Simply put,
> > the Russians won't give the Iranians enough independence and the Iranians
> > don't want to get stuck in a position of weakness when it comes to acquiring
> > spare parts for their aircraft.
> >
> > There's a lot of amazing stuff in the article and it would be fascinating if
> > true. But one objection that I've heard others make about Cooper and his
> > other co-writer Farzad Bishop is that it is impossible to independently
> > confirm their information. They might conduct a lot of interviews with
> > Iranian pilots and ex-pat Iranians, but we don't know how carefully they
> > check their information. (This article by Cooper and Devlin concedes that
> > fewer Iranians have left the country since the mid-1990s, so it is harder to
> > speak to Iranians outside the country.)
> >
> > Personally, the one thing I'm dubious about is the claim that Western
> > intelligence agencies do not have a good understanding of just how active
> > the Iranian F-14s are. If they turn on their radars, then the US intel
> > assets in the Persian Gulf will detect them. In addition, satellite photos
> > should also indicate how many F-14s are operable. Sure, the Iranians must
> > keep a lot of them in hangars, but occasionally they will move them around
> > airfields and they can be counted. In fact, somebody with a credit card
> > could order up commercial images of Iranian airfields and check for
> > themselves. So I don't buy the claim that US intel officials think that
> > _virtually no_ F-14s or their AWG-9 radars are still operating. My
> > suspicion is that the authors are responding to misinformed trash talking in
> > the aviation press, not to what US intel actually believes about Iranian
> > capabilities.
> >
> > All that said, the one thing that establishes credibility for Cooper and
> > Devlin (as well as Cooper and Bishop in their books on the Iranian F-4s and
> > F-14s) is the impressive array of photos that they have collected. These
> > include aerial refueling shots of F-4s and Su-24s, as well as formation
> > shots of F-5s and other aircraft, and a very cool grainy image of an F-14 at
> > extremely low altitude over the Gulf. That aircraft is in the current
> > blue/gray paint scheme. They also have a photo of an F-14 with an ATM-54A
> > training round alongside, photographed in April 2004. That raises an
> > interesting point--if the Iranians no longer can operate the AIM-54 Phoenix,
> > then why would they be carrying around training rounds? Clearly they retain
> > some kind of AIM-54 Phoenix capability.
> >
> >
> >
> > D
>
> Cooper, Bishop and Devlin have provided credible artiles on the status
> of the IRIAF coupled with an warning that those who ignore the
> capabilities will be doomed to failure against the Iranians.
>
> The article implies that there are 44 operational Tomcats instead of 28
> operational and 29 inoperational as cited by US intelligence sources.
> But it was Cooper and Bishop in their 2003 book on the Iraq/Iran war
> that stated the original assertion of 28/29 as of F-14's.
>
> The Iranians are willing to invest thousands of man hours in rebuilding
> their F-4's and F-14 fleets in an effort to prolong their operational
> life. That is because they are not able to buy US made aircraft and
> foreign aircraft with US made parts incorporated in them. That is why
> they are willing tlo spend all that time and money on refurbishing an
> aging aircraft ready for the junk pile to zero hour status.
>
> For the US to attack Iranian military bases with IRIAF fighters sitting
> on the tarmac, they would have to expend 300 plus cruise missiles and
> then wait another 18 months for new build stocks of cruise missiles to
> come from the manufacturer to replenish their supplies. There is no
> guarantee that they would be able to destroy all the active Iranian
> aircraft as the Iranians would commingle the active aircraft with the
> inactive ones in an effort to compel the US to have to destroy all the
> aircraft on the base in order to ensure that the fleet of F-4's and
> F-14's were no longer a threat thereafter.
>
> Even if we achieved air superority over the Iranians, we will still
> have a slog of a battle with the ground elements as they resort to
> IED's and suicide bombers against American convoys. And that would add
> to the general operational strain our military is under with wars in
> Iraq and Afghanistan.
>
> To achieve air superority would require that we accept the loss of a
> few aircraft, including fighter planes and a few prized bombers of B-1
> and B-2 vintage. Since we have only 21 B-2's, we cannot lose afford to
> lose even one or two as that would add immensely to our long term
> attrition rate for that aircraft and we would not have sufficient
> numbers of B-2's for a future conflict.
>
> It was surprising that the Pentagon and Iran made a secret agreement
> with each other not to allow their aircraft to attack each other's
> aircraft in cross border skirmishes. THis helped reduce tension to an
> extent. Being a deep reader of Early Bird as that is the first thing I
> read when I come to the office, I never saw any such agreement made
> with the Iranians by the Pentagon.
>
> If the Pentagon could talk with the Iranians, then President Bush
> should follow the UN Secretary General's advice to talk with the
> Iranians as it would go a long way toward reducing tensions and then
> create a downward spiral in the price of oil.
>
> It was great to hear one Iranian general tell the world that the
> opinion of another general who said that Iran would strike Israel in
> the event of an American attack on their country was his own personal
> opinion and not that of the Iranian military That went a long way
> toward assuring Americans that Iran maintains a good command and
> control structure over its military like we do.
>
> So, the ball is in the President's court and we will see what he will
> do. I believe that an agreable deal can be made between both countries
> on the nuclear matter in exchange for the United States to promise an
> non-aggression pact against Iran and for Iran will do the same to the
> United States. This will go a long way toward reducing fear of
> terrorism and to help shorten the long war against terrorism that we
> are fighting. It would not be surprising to see both countries resume
> diplomatic relations.
>
> Onc more curious tidbit. Did the CIA get the 22 Mig-31's from the
> Russians under their dummy arms buying corporation?
>
> James K. Goodwin

DDAY

In response to your mesage, I do have my qualms about Tom Cooper and
Farzad Bishop. Yes, they are historians and military analysts, but the
tone of their reporting seems to imply a bias toward the Iranians. And
they seem top have good access to unimpeachable sources inside Iran.
Were it not for their astute reporting, we would never know what was
going on inside Iran.

But, they seem to give the West a warning, lest they go into combat
with the misconception that it will be a cakewalk. We had assumed the
same in Iraq, once we invaded, the people would rejoice and start
building a new government while hailing us as their saviors. Instead,
we confronted a home grown insurgency that related on bomb making
experts from the army and an inexhausible supply of mortar shells that
were used to make IED's for use against our troop convoys.

We call them insurgents because they attack our troops, but during WW
II, we called them freedom fighters because they put limb and their
families at extreme risk while doing hit and run attacks on the Nazis.

Thanks for correcting me on our supply of curise missiles. It is nice
to have 2000 on hand and to be able to expend 300 in a day or two's
worth of attack.

About the safety of our B-2's, never say never as you never know what
may well happen. Current USAF doctrine will mandate that a hostile
area be raked over by SEAD Vipers, F-15E's dropping bombs on value
targets with cruise missiles hitting air bases to maximize confusion
and F-15C's doing air interdiction of enemy aircraft and all steps
being taken to ensure that the SAM belt is completely eliminated before
the B-2's come. You want to get them all the very first time, but you
never know what may happen. The Golden BB is the thing aircrew fear
the most.

The F-117 was hit by a SAM over Bosnia. And if that can happen, then
it can happen to any kind of aircraft, including stealth aircraft and
bombers. It is better to expect the worse before going out to combat
and to breathe a sigh of relief once arrivng safely at home and finding
out nobody else was lost than to go to combat with an cocky attitude
only to be the one hunted on the ground.

The Iranians have not only Israel in their crosshairs, but Europe, too.
They want to intimidate and create fear among their neighbors,
including our citizens in the United States. They hope antiwar
activists among the politicians, media types and ordinary people will
put immense pressure on George Bush to back off.

And we are not buying it. We may strike, or we may not strike at all.
No one wants a long war of attrition that we have now in Iraq. What
the Iranians need is a good punch to the nose, then they can run over
to Europe for plastic surgery.

Let those clowns in Tehran try to pull a fast one and let them watch
their nuclear ambitions reduced to rubble and the price of oil will
start dropping dramatically as cooperative allies who supply oil will
keep the spigots turned on full force.

Kofi Annan has nothing inside his hat to work a miracle. He is reduced
to beggin on the sidelines. Why? Because he allowed the UN to be used
as a perverted kind of a circus when the poorer nations can gang on a
wealthier nation. That is why it is difficult and almost impossible to
craft reasonable acommodations in the UN.

If those clowns in Tehran have any brains, they will quickly come to
their senses and agree on a sensible solution to their nuclear needs
which will allow them to have a nuclear energy problem as long as the
fissible material is not enriched inside Iran in quantities sufficient
to make nuclear bombs.

Or the B-2's will come screaming down the sky and Eagles and Falcons
(Vipers) will add F-4's, F-5E's and F-14's to their fuselages as kills.

And the mullahs will be reduced to living in holes in the ground just
like Saddam was after seeing his personal 25 billion dollar fortune
reduced to insolvency.


James K. Goodwin

[DDAY]

----------
In article >, "Thomas A.
Hoffer" > wrote:

> I'm not an expert in naval hardware as many others are. My expertise lies in
> policy, admin, and personnel issues. However, I believe we need to keep in
> mind that this aircraft was built with 1960's technology.
>
> Yea....they might have been upgraded...and the Iranians sent many guys my
> age to western engineering schools (I knew quite a number in college...good
> students too!!) But many a Tomcat was defeated by an aggressor squadron A-4
> and F-5 flown by a well trained and seasoned pilot. How well trained are
> Iranian pilots and how adept are they in fighting the aircraft?

Doesn't that work both ways? In other words, if the Iranian F-14s are 1960s
technology, doesn't your A-4/F-5 analogy indicate that an older aircraft can
beat a newer one?

I think that the essential point of the article was that we shouldn't
underestimate Iranian aerial capabilities. They have demonstrated an
ability to keep these planes flying for decades.



D

[Dave Kearton]

DDAY wrote:
> ----------
>
> Doesn't that work both ways? In other words, if the Iranian F-14s
> are 1960s technology, doesn't your A-4/F-5 analogy indicate that an
> older aircraft can beat a newer one?
>
> I think that the essential point of the article was that we shouldn't
> underestimate Iranian aerial capabilities. They have demonstrated an
> ability to keep these planes flying for decades.
>
>
>
> D



If I can jump in here at this point, the Iranian Tomcats are only the tip
of the spear and in many ways are irrelevant. It's been demonstrated
over the last 5 years in that region, that air to air battles aren't won in
the air, but by taking out the opposition's C3 infrastructure. Once
that's been achieved, the best way to not lose your air force is to bury it
in the desert.

While this was a straightforward process with the Iraqis (both times) one
would assume that the Iranians have learned from the failures over the
border.


If it comes to a Hornet Vs Tomcat battle, I'm guessing that somebody's
jumped too far ahead in the game plan.



--

Cheers

Dave Kearton

[Richard Lamb]

Yofuri wrote:
>
> ~^ beancounter ~^ wrote:
> > interesting artical...i think it will be good practice
> > for collitition (sp?) forces, to engage and practice
> > "their art".... remember, the f14 is over 30 yrs old...
> >
> And the SA-6 and radar tracking system that took down the first F-117
> "Stealth" in Yugoslavia was how old?
>
> And the eyeball-guided AAA in 'Nam?
>
> Never bet your ass that modern technology will trump dedicated
> ingenuity, even when fighting against sticks and rocks.
>
> Rick
>
> *** Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com ***

here here
and
hurumph

But they never listen...

[TJ]

Yofuri wrote:
> ~^ beancounter ~^ wrote:
> > interesting artical...i think it will be good practice
> > for collitition (sp?) forces, to engage and practice
> > "their art".... remember, the f14 is over 30 yrs old...
> >
> And the SA-6 and radar tracking system that took down the first F-117
> "Stealth" in Yugoslavia was how old?
>
> And the eyeball-guided AAA in 'Nam?
>
> Never bet your ass that modern technology will trump dedicated
> ingenuity, even when fighting against sticks and rocks.
>
> Rick
>
> *** Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com ***


Not an SA-6, but an SA-3. The 250th Rocket Brigade with SA-3s downed
82-806. Colonel Dani Zoltan's unit also downed F-16CG serial 88-0550
with an SA-3. There is an exhibition in the Yugoslav Aeronautical
Museum detailing the SA-3s of the 250th Rocket Brigade. Col Dani Zoltan
received an award from Milosevic himself during the conflict.

The SA-6 story gained status through the Russian Defence Minister. He
stated Kub and the system is still quoted to this day in relation to
82-806.

During 1999 Colonel Dani Zoltan appeared in a Yugoslav documentary and
revealed that the missile was the SA-3. Again in 2005 Zoltan retold his
story in greater detail.

[Yofuri]

TJ wrote:
> Yofuri wrote:
>
>>~^ beancounter ~^ wrote:
>>
>>>interesting artical...i think it will be good practice
>>>for collitition (sp?) forces, to engage and practice
>>>"their art".... remember, the f14 is over 30 yrs old...
>>>
>>
>>And the SA-6 and radar tracking system that took down the first F-117
>>"Stealth" in Yugoslavia was how old?
>>
>>And the eyeball-guided AAA in 'Nam?
>>
>>Never bet your ass that modern technology will trump dedicated
>>ingenuity, even when fighting against sticks and rocks.
>>
>>Rick
>>
>>*** Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com ***
>
>
>
> Not an SA-6, but an SA-3. The 250th Rocket Brigade with SA-3s downed
> 82-806. Colonel Dani Zoltan's unit also downed F-16CG serial 88-0550
> with an SA-3. There is an exhibition in the Yugoslav Aeronautical
> Museum detailing the SA-3s of the 250th Rocket Brigade. Col Dani Zoltan
> received an award from Milosevic himself during the conflict.
>
> The SA-6 story gained status through the Russian Defence Minister. He
> stated Kub and the system is still quoted to this day in relation to
> 82-806.
>
> During 1999 Colonel Dani Zoltan appeared in a Yugoslav documentary and
> revealed that the missile was the SA-3. Again in 2005 Zoltan retold his
> story in greater detail.
>
Thanks for the update (backdate?).

Rick

*** Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com ***

[~^ beancounter ~^]

in going through some old navy paperwork i came across this..
"the f14 requires 50 to 60 maint hrs every hour it flies, while the
super hornet needs 10 to 15 maint hrs for each flight hour...

if true, thats a hell of a difference...

[DDAY]

----------
In article . com>,
wrote:

> tone of their reporting seems to imply a bias toward the Iranians. And
> they seem top have good access to unimpeachable sources inside Iran.
> Were it not for their astute reporting, we would never know what was
> going on inside Iran.

I think this is an overstatement, or at least a misstatement. You are
implying, essentially, that they are tools of the Iranian government. But
that's clearly _not_ the case. In their F-14 book they make it quite clear
that the Iranian revolutionary government has been pretty repressive towards
the air force and the pilots. This is actually understandable, because the
Iranian pilots were trained in the 1970s by the US and naturally a
revolutionary government would be suspicious of these people.

Cooper makes clear that many of his sources are ex-pat Iranians--people who
left the country even as late as the mid-1990s. Not all of these people
would necessarily be against the current government, but a fair number of
them certainly are.

My interpretation of this is that Cooper and Bishop are essentially a couple
of guys who have a major interest in the Iranian air force and are impressed
by it, but certainly not pro-Iran. They could be characterized as "pro
Iranian air force" while "anti Iranian government." But they're more likely
simply buffs who think that the Iranian air force is interesting--and cool.
That doesn't imply sympathy toward the government, or any kind of government
sanction. I think that they've probably built up sources over time and
these sources trust them to greater or lesser extent.

My concern is less with their bias than with their analytical methods. Bias
is easily detectable, but methods are not. I don't know how careful they
are at checking their information. I'm not saying that they're bad at it,
only that I don't know how carefully they check it. For instance, if one
person tells them something do they report it, or do they only report it if
they can confirm it from another source? We don't know that. Fortunately,
some of their claims are proven by their photographs. We can tell, for
instance, that Iran was still showing off its F-14s as recently as 2004.
And although they did not put an AIM-54 missile on display, they did display
a training round, which obviously implies that they still train to fire
these missiles.


> Thanks for correcting me on our supply of curise missiles. It is nice
> to have 2000 on hand and to be able to expend 300 in a day or two's
> worth of attack.

The exact number is classified, but I believe that the last time I saw a
discussion of this in a military journal they said that the number was "over
2600."


> area be raked over by SEAD Vipers, F-15E's dropping bombs on value
> targets with cruise missiles hitting air bases to maximize confusion
> and F-15C's doing air interdiction of enemy aircraft and all steps
> being taken to ensure that the SAM belt is completely eliminated before
> the B-2's come. You want to get them all the very first time, but you
> never know what may happen. The Golden BB is the thing aircrew fear
> the most.

I don't think there is any point to playing armchair general and positing
highly speculative scenarios about how a war would be conducted.

However, the article that I refer to does make some interesting points that
the Iranians have managed to keep a lot of vintage American equipment in
service despite all odds. The one thing about the F-14 is that its Phoenix
missiles would make it a threat from long range. They could stay well
within the air defense umbrella and fire at distant American targets. If
the article is correct and at least a couple of dozen aircraft remain
operational, then they could present a problem to any American air campaign.
The threat to US aircraft is certainly greater from SAMs than aircraft, but
that has been the case for decades.




D

[Harry Andreas]

In article . com>, "~^
beancounter ~^" > wrote:

> in going through some old navy paperwork i came across this..
> "the f14 requires 50 to 60 maint hrs every hour it flies, while the
> super hornet needs 10 to 15 maint hrs for each flight hour...
>
> if true, thats a hell of a difference...

Those are more or less the numbers that I've heard.
BTW, the maint hrs/flt hr is still going down.
It's lower on the E/F than the C/D (so I've heard).

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, "DDAY"
> wrote:

> However, the article that I refer to does make some interesting points that
> the Iranians have managed to keep a lot of vintage American equipment in
> service despite all odds. The one thing about the F-14 is that its Phoenix
> missiles would make it a threat from long range. They could stay well
> within the air defense umbrella and fire at distant American targets. If
> the article is correct and at least a couple of dozen aircraft remain
> operational, then they could present a problem to any American air campaign.
> The threat to US aircraft is certainly greater from SAMs than aircraft, but
> that has been the case for decades.

1. The AIM-54's that Iran has are well past their shelf life and probably don't
even work now. Maybe they have been mod'd locally to continue working,
maybe not. Only the CIA and the USN know for sure, but
2. since the Iranians were seen trying to fit a Hawk missile to the F-14 it's
probable that the AIM-54's don't work. Otherwise, why would they?
3. Even if the AIM-54's do work, the USN has the keys to the kingdom so
to speak. They know all the ways to defeat the missile both with
electronics and manuever.

I don't think the AIM-54 is a threat anymore.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[~^ beancounter ~^]

damm...50 to 60 hrs for 1 flight hr..sheeze...
the cost of a maint hr must be around 200-500
US$, ( burdened with labor and parts, overhead
etc)...makes my cessna 172rg l@@k like a bargin

[Mike Kanze]

>However, the article that I refer to does make some interesting points that
the Iranians have managed to keep a lot of vintage American equipment in
service despite all odds.

Something none of us should discount.

Lookit the 1950s vintage American cars that still haunt Havana's streets.

--
Mike Kanze

"As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality."

- Albert Einstein


"DDAY" > wrote in message k.net...
----------
In article . com>,
wrote:

> tone of their reporting seems to imply a bias toward the Iranians. And
> they seem top have good access to unimpeachable sources inside Iran.
> Were it not for their astute reporting, we would never know what was
> going on inside Iran.

I think this is an overstatement, or at least a misstatement. You are
implying, essentially, that they are tools of the Iranian government. But
that's clearly _not_ the case. In their F-14 book they make it quite clear
that the Iranian revolutionary government has been pretty repressive towards
the air force and the pilots. This is actually understandable, because the
Iranian pilots were trained in the 1970s by the US and naturally a
revolutionary government would be suspicious of these people.

Cooper makes clear that many of his sources are ex-pat Iranians--people who
left the country even as late as the mid-1990s. Not all of these people
would necessarily be against the current government, but a fair number of
them certainly are.

My interpretation of this is that Cooper and Bishop are essentially a couple
of guys who have a major interest in the Iranian air force and are impressed
by it, but certainly not pro-Iran. They could be characterized as "pro
Iranian air force" while "anti Iranian government." But they're more likely
simply buffs who think that the Iranian air force is interesting--and cool.
That doesn't imply sympathy toward the government, or any kind of government
sanction. I think that they've probably built up sources over time and
these sources trust them to greater or lesser extent.

My concern is less with their bias than with their analytical methods. Bias
is easily detectable, but methods are not. I don't know how careful they
are at checking their information. I'm not saying that they're bad at it,
only that I don't know how carefully they check it. For instance, if one
person tells them something do they report it, or do they only report it if
they can confirm it from another source? We don't know that. Fortunately,
some of their claims are proven by their photographs. We can tell, for
instance, that Iran was still showing off its F-14s as recently as 2004.
And although they did not put an AIM-54 missile on display, they did display
a training round, which obviously implies that they still train to fire
these missiles.


> Thanks for correcting me on our supply of curise missiles. It is nice
> to have 2000 on hand and to be able to expend 300 in a day or two's
> worth of attack.

The exact number is classified, but I believe that the last time I saw a
discussion of this in a military journal they said that the number was "over
2600."


> area be raked over by SEAD Vipers, F-15E's dropping bombs on value
> targets with cruise missiles hitting air bases to maximize confusion
> and F-15C's doing air interdiction of enemy aircraft and all steps
> being taken to ensure that the SAM belt is completely eliminated before
> the B-2's come. You want to get them all the very first time, but you
> never know what may happen. The Golden BB is the thing aircrew fear
> the most.

I don't think there is any point to playing armchair general and positing
highly speculative scenarios about how a war would be conducted.

However, the article that I refer to does make some interesting points that
the Iranians have managed to keep a lot of vintage American equipment in
service despite all odds. The one thing about the F-14 is that its Phoenix
missiles would make it a threat from long range. They could stay well
within the air defense umbrella and fire at distant American targets. If
the article is correct and at least a couple of dozen aircraft remain
operational, then they could present a problem to any American air campaign.
The threat to US aircraft is certainly greater from SAMs than aircraft, but
that has been the case for decades.




D

[Diamond Jim]

"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
...
> In article . com>, "~^
> beancounter ~^" > wrote:
>
> > in going through some old navy paperwork i came across this..
> > "the f14 requires 50 to 60 maint hrs every hour it flies, while the
> > super hornet needs 10 to 15 maint hrs for each flight hour...
> >
> > if true, thats a hell of a difference...
>
> Those are more or less the numbers that I've heard.
> BTW, the maint hrs/flt hr is still going down.
> It's lower on the E/F than the C/D (so I've heard).
>
> --
> Harry Andreas
> Engineering raconteur

Having had the additional duties several times as Asst. MaintO and MaintO in
a squadron, (for earlier generations of aircraft) and spending a number of
years in DOD (mostly DARPA), I can tell you that those figures are pretty
solid. The more modern an aircraft is, the more it is "plug and play" to
borrow a computer term.the aircraft is. Just about everything is a SECREP
(secondary repairable). Organizational Maintenance will unplug and swap
boxes, board, modules etc. on the aircraft, replace with new/repaired items,
test and if passed "up the system". If it fails then another is plugged in
its place. Heck even bad wires are replaced as part of a harness assembly.

The SECREP then goes to Intermediate or Depot Maintenance for repair, and
after repair it goes back into the supply system. About the only, "old time
maintenance" that takes place on an aircraft anymore is cleaning, polishing,
fueling, ordnance, maybe a little adjustment on the gun or hard points etc.
and occasionally some body work/repair, just about everything else is
swapped. This swapping out means that an aircraft can be turned around
quickly, and doesn't have to wait until the specified hours of maintenance
have been performed. In other words it could actually be back in the air as
hours of maintenance are still being performed.

When the hours are figured (maintenance hour per hour of flight, mean time
between failure) or whatever the "bean-counters" want to know, it usually
included all the maintenance hours throughout the system organizational,
intermediate, or depot. (New manufactured items are not included in these
calculations but may be in other service wide figures. As everything is in
the computers, these figures can be easily recovered for an individual part,
aircraft, squadron, wing, ship, fleet, service, manufacturer, year, month
day, hour, what ever keeps people happy, and employed.)

And as with all figures, people can manipulate them to show just about
anything they want to show in any light. In fact many build a career on
doing just that.

[DDAY]

----------
In article >, "Diamond Jim"
> wrote:

> solid. The more modern an aircraft is, the more it is "plug and play" to
> borrow a computer term.the aircraft is. Just about everything is a SECREP
> (secondary repairable). Organizational Maintenance will unplug and swap
> boxes, board, modules etc. on the aircraft, replace with new/repaired items,
> test and if passed "up the system". If it fails then another is plugged in
> its place. Heck even bad wires are replaced as part of a harness assembly.
>
> The SECREP then goes to Intermediate or Depot Maintenance for repair, and
> after repair it goes back into the supply system. About the only, "old time
> maintenance" that takes place on an aircraft anymore is cleaning, polishing,

Certainly modern systems are more reliable than older ones. However,
correct me if I'm wrong, but it is not simply the issue of having "plug and
play" systems, but also sufficient spares to replace them. It doesn't
matter if you can pull the faulty system out of the aircraft and send it off
to maintenance if you don't have a replacement. No replacement and the
aircraft sits until the system is fixed.



D

[DDAY]

----------
In article >,
(Harry Andreas) wrote:

> 1. The AIM-54's that Iran has are well past their shelf life and probably
don't
> even work now. Maybe they have been mod'd locally to continue working,
> maybe not.

Well, read the article. They go into this. The article claims that the
Iranians manufactured replacement components to keep the missiles
operational. These included batteries. Later they developed a system that
did not require the F-14 to provide cooling. The article also claims that
the Iranians eventually reverse-engineered the missiles.

> Only the CIA and the USN know for sure, but

Well, and the Iranians.


> 2. since the Iranians were seen trying to fit a Hawk missile to the F-14 it's
> probable that the AIM-54's don't work. Otherwise, why would they?

The article goes into this. They tried that (it flopped) in order to add to
their missile inventory.


> 3. Even if the AIM-54's do work, the USN has the keys to the kingdom so
> to speak. They know all the ways to defeat the missile both with
> electronics and manuever.
>
> I don't think the AIM-54 is a threat anymore.

One could say the same about the SA-2, and the SA-3, right? But SA-2s and
SA-3s, a design dating back to the early 1960s, have downed American
aircraft.

That's not to say that this is an extreme threat. And it's not to say that
the USN has no countermeasures. It's simply saying that they apparently
still have limited stocks of this formidable missile and the potential to
use them.



D

[Andrew Venor]

Mike Kanze wrote:
> >However, the article that I refer to does make some interesting points
> that
> the Iranians have managed to keep a lot of vintage American equipment in
> service despite all odds.
>
> Something none of us should discount.
>
> Lookit the 1950s vintage American cars that still haunt Havana's streets.

Or the 1950's vintage American cars that some clever Cubans turned into
boats and tried to drive to Miami.

ALV
>
> --
> Mike Kanze
>
> "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not
> certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality."
>
> - Albert Einstein
>
>
>
> "DDAY" >>
> wrote in message
> k.net...
> ----------
> In article . com
> groups.com>>,
> > wrote:
>
> > tone of their reporting seems to imply a bias toward the
> Iranians. And
> > they seem top have good access to unimpeachable sources inside Iran.
> > Were it not for their astute reporting, we would never know what was
> > going on inside Iran.
>
> I think this is an overstatement, or at least a misstatement. You are
> implying, essentially, that they are tools of the Iranian
> government. But
> that's clearly _not_ the case. In their F-14 book they make it
> quite clear
> that the Iranian revolutionary government has been pretty repressive
> towards
> the air force and the pilots. This is actually understandable,
> because the
> Iranian pilots were trained in the 1970s by the US and naturally a
> revolutionary government would be suspicious of these people.
>
> Cooper makes clear that many of his sources are ex-pat
> Iranians--people who
> left the country even as late as the mid-1990s. Not all of these people
> would necessarily be against the current government, but a fair
> number of
> them certainly are.
>
> My interpretation of this is that Cooper and Bishop are essentially
> a couple
> of guys who have a major interest in the Iranian air force and are
> impressed
> by it, but certainly not pro-Iran. They could be characterized as "pro
> Iranian air force" while "anti Iranian government." But they're
> more likely
> simply buffs who think that the Iranian air force is
> interesting--and cool.
> That doesn't imply sympathy toward the government, or any kind of
> government
> sanction. I think that they've probably built up sources over time and
> these sources trust them to greater or lesser extent.
>
> My concern is less with their bias than with their analytical
> methods. Bias
> is easily detectable, but methods are not. I don't know how careful
> they
> are at checking their information. I'm not saying that they're bad
> at it,
> only that I don't know how carefully they check it. For instance,
> if one
> person tells them something do they report it, or do they only
> report it if
> they can confirm it from another source? We don't know that.
> Fortunately,
> some of their claims are proven by their photographs. We can tell, for
> instance, that Iran was still showing off its F-14s as recently as 2004.
> And although they did not put an AIM-54 missile on display, they did
> display
> a training round, which obviously implies that they still train to fire
> these missiles.
>
>
> > Thanks for correcting me on our supply of curise missiles. It is
> nice
> > to have 2000 on hand and to be able to expend 300 in a day or two's
> > worth of attack.
>
> The exact number is classified, but I believe that the last time I saw a
> discussion of this in a military journal they said that the number
> was "over
> 2600."
>
>
> > area be raked over by SEAD Vipers, F-15E's dropping bombs on value
> > targets with cruise missiles hitting air bases to maximize confusion
> > and F-15C's doing air interdiction of enemy aircraft and all steps
> > being taken to ensure that the SAM belt is completely eliminated
> before
> > the B-2's come. You want to get them all the very first time,
> but you
> > never know what may happen. The Golden BB is the thing aircrew fear
> > the most.
>
> I don't think there is any point to playing armchair general and
> positing
> highly speculative scenarios about how a war would be conducted.
>
> However, the article that I refer to does make some interesting
> points that
> the Iranians have managed to keep a lot of vintage American equipment in
> service despite all odds. The one thing about the F-14 is that its
> Phoenix
> missiles would make it a threat from long range. They could stay well
> within the air defense umbrella and fire at distant American
> targets. If
> the article is correct and at least a couple of dozen aircraft remain
> operational, then they could present a problem to any American air
> campaign.
> The threat to US aircraft is certainly greater from SAMs than
> aircraft, but
> that has been the case for decades.
>
>
>
>
> D

[~^ beancounter ~^]

i would put my $ on the us navy over
any irian'ian navy....time will tell, we
have controlled that area now for 15
years....i am sure our boys know their
"way around"......

[Mike Kanze]

Certainly hours are being saved where they count most - at the tip of the spear.

But what's really happening here is that some of the needed maintenance hours are transferred from the squadron level to the intermediate or depot levels. (Presumably the other hours saved have come from quality and reliability improvements: Tom generation versus Bug generation versus SuperBug generation.)

A total cost of ownership (TCO) analysis of the entire aircraft fleet and the spares inventory supporting it would show the real total maintenance hours/$. Unfortunately, I am also realistic enough to know that if you're a squadron skipper and it's not all coming out of your own pocket, you will rightly give a rat's fanny about the rest.

--
Mike Kanze

"As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality."

- Albert Einstein


"Diamond Jim" > wrote in message ...

"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
...
> In article . com>, "~^
> beancounter ~^" > wrote:
>
> > in going through some old navy paperwork i came across this..
> > "the f14 requires 50 to 60 maint hrs every hour it flies, while the
> > super hornet needs 10 to 15 maint hrs for each flight hour...
> >
> > if true, thats a hell of a difference...
>
> Those are more or less the numbers that I've heard.
> BTW, the maint hrs/flt hr is still going down.
> It's lower on the E/F than the C/D (so I've heard).
>
> --
> Harry Andreas
> Engineering raconteur

Having had the additional duties several times as Asst. MaintO and MaintO in
a squadron, (for earlier generations of aircraft) and spending a number of
years in DOD (mostly DARPA), I can tell you that those figures are pretty
solid. The more modern an aircraft is, the more it is "plug and play" to
borrow a computer term.the aircraft is. Just about everything is a SECREP
(secondary repairable). Organizational Maintenance will unplug and swap
boxes, board, modules etc. on the aircraft, replace with new/repaired items,
test and if passed "up the system". If it fails then another is plugged in
its place. Heck even bad wires are replaced as part of a harness assembly.

The SECREP then goes to Intermediate or Depot Maintenance for repair, and
after repair it goes back into the supply system. About the only, "old time
maintenance" that takes place on an aircraft anymore is cleaning, polishing,
fueling, ordnance, maybe a little adjustment on the gun or hard points etc.
and occasionally some body work/repair, just about everything else is
swapped. This swapping out means that an aircraft can be turned around
quickly, and doesn't have to wait until the specified hours of maintenance
have been performed. In other words it could actually be back in the air as
hours of maintenance are still being performed.

When the hours are figured (maintenance hour per hour of flight, mean time
between failure) or whatever the "bean-counters" want to know, it usually
included all the maintenance hours throughout the system organizational,
intermediate, or depot. (New manufactured items are not included in these
calculations but may be in other service wide figures. As everything is in
the computers, these figures can be easily recovered for an individual part,
aircraft, squadron, wing, ship, fleet, service, manufacturer, year, month
day, hour, what ever keeps people happy, and employed.)

And as with all figures, people can manipulate them to show just about
anything they want to show in any light. In fact many build a career on
doing just that.

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, "Mike Kanze"
> wrote:

> >However, the article that I refer to does make some interesting points =
> that
> the Iranians have managed to keep a lot of vintage American equipment in
> service despite all odds.
>
> Something none of us should discount.=20
>
> Lookit the 1950s vintage American cars that still haunt Havana's =
> streets.=20

I haven't located a copy of the magazine yet, but keeping a missile in service
is slightly more complex than a 50's era car.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, "Diamond Jim"
> wrote:

> "Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
> ...
> > In article . com>, "~^
> > beancounter ~^" > wrote:
> >
> > > in going through some old navy paperwork i came across this..
> > > "the f14 requires 50 to 60 maint hrs every hour it flies, while the
> > > super hornet needs 10 to 15 maint hrs for each flight hour...
> > >
> > > if true, thats a hell of a difference...
> >
> > Those are more or less the numbers that I've heard.
> > BTW, the maint hrs/flt hr is still going down.
> > It's lower on the E/F than the C/D (so I've heard).
> >
> > --
> > Harry Andreas
> > Engineering raconteur
>
> Having had the additional duties several times as Asst. MaintO and MaintO in
> a squadron, (for earlier generations of aircraft) and spending a number of
> years in DOD (mostly DARPA), I can tell you that those figures are pretty
> solid. The more modern an aircraft is, the more it is "plug and play" to
> borrow a computer term.the aircraft is. Just about everything is a SECREP
> (secondary repairable). Organizational Maintenance will unplug and swap
> boxes, board, modules etc. on the aircraft, replace with new/repaired items,
> test and if passed "up the system". If it fails then another is plugged in
> its place. Heck even bad wires are replaced as part of a harness assembly.
>
> The SECREP then goes to Intermediate or Depot Maintenance for repair, and
> after repair it goes back into the supply system. About the only, "old time
> maintenance" that takes place on an aircraft anymore is cleaning, polishing,
> fueling, ordnance, maybe a little adjustment on the gun or hard points etc.
> and occasionally some body work/repair, just about everything else is
> swapped. This swapping out means that an aircraft can be turned around
> quickly, and doesn't have to wait until the specified hours of maintenance
> have been performed. In other words it could actually be back in the air as
> hours of maintenance are still being performed.
>
> When the hours are figured (maintenance hour per hour of flight, mean time
> between failure) or whatever the "bean-counters" want to know, it usually
> included all the maintenance hours throughout the system organizational,
> intermediate, or depot. (New manufactured items are not included in these
> calculations but may be in other service wide figures. As everything is in
> the computers, these figures can be easily recovered for an individual part,
> aircraft, squadron, wing, ship, fleet, service, manufacturer, year, month
> day, hour, what ever keeps people happy, and employed.)
>
> And as with all figures, people can manipulate them to show just about
> anything they want to show in any light. In fact many build a career on
> doing just that.

Jim,
as I think I've mentioned, I've spent a lot of my career working on various
radar designs, starting with the pre-production APG-65 in the pre-prod
F/A-18A's.
The engineering community has spent a huge amount of time and money
to make these airborne electronics low maintenance and highly reliable.
In terms of reliability, current circuit card designs have reliability
lifetimes in excess of the rated airframe life. Some stuff you might never
have to take out of the aircraft.
That adds a new dimension to maintenance, because if it works out as
planned, it's no longer practical to have an "I" shop aboard ship or
land base. "O" level pulls the box and in some cases the card from the
box. It's cheaper and faster to send a broken card back to depot
and replace it from stores. And with the complexity of some of the cards, they
might not be repairable in the field anyway. Think of a .020 diameter (0.5mm)
solder joint buried under a part with 400 others...
This doesn't cover all electronic parts, of course, but certainly a lot.
At least of the ones I've been associated with lately.
Most everything than can be put on removeable cards, is, and that helps
maintenance turnaround time as you have noted.
Mean time between critical failure is way up and mean time to repair is way
down.

cheers

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Paul]

"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, "Diamond Jim"
> > wrote:
>
>> "Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> > In article . com>, "~^
>> > beancounter ~^" > wrote:
>> >
>> > > in going through some old navy paperwork i came across this..
>> > > "the f14 requires 50 to 60 maint hrs every hour it flies, while the
>> > > super hornet needs 10 to 15 maint hrs for each flight hour...
>> > >
>> > > if true, thats a hell of a difference...
>> >
>> > Those are more or less the numbers that I've heard.
>> > BTW, the maint hrs/flt hr is still going down.
>> > It's lower on the E/F than the C/D (so I've heard).
>> >
>> > --
>> > Harry Andreas
>> > Engineering raconteur
>>
>> Having had the additional duties several times as Asst. MaintO and MaintO
>> in
>> a squadron, (for earlier generations of aircraft) and spending a number
>> of
>> years in DOD (mostly DARPA), I can tell you that those figures are pretty
>> solid. The more modern an aircraft is, the more it is "plug and play" to
>> borrow a computer term.the aircraft is. Just about everything is a SECREP
>> (secondary repairable). Organizational Maintenance will unplug and swap
>> boxes, board, modules etc. on the aircraft, replace with new/repaired
>> items,
>> test and if passed "up the system". If it fails then another is plugged
>> in
>> its place. Heck even bad wires are replaced as part of a harness
>> assembly.
>>
>> The SECREP then goes to Intermediate or Depot Maintenance for repair, and
>> after repair it goes back into the supply system. About the only, "old
>> time
>> maintenance" that takes place on an aircraft anymore is cleaning,
>> polishing,
>> fueling, ordnance, maybe a little adjustment on the gun or hard points
>> etc.
>> and occasionally some body work/repair, just about everything else is
>> swapped. This swapping out means that an aircraft can be turned around
>> quickly, and doesn't have to wait until the specified hours of
>> maintenance
>> have been performed. In other words it could actually be back in the air
>> as
>> hours of maintenance are still being performed.
>>
>> When the hours are figured (maintenance hour per hour of flight, mean
>> time
>> between failure) or whatever the "bean-counters" want to know, it
>> usually
>> included all the maintenance hours throughout the system organizational,
>> intermediate, or depot. (New manufactured items are not included in these
>> calculations but may be in other service wide figures. As everything is
>> in
>> the computers, these figures can be easily recovered for an individual
>> part,
>> aircraft, squadron, wing, ship, fleet, service, manufacturer, year, month
>> day, hour, what ever keeps people happy, and employed.)
>>
>> And as with all figures, people can manipulate them to show just about
>> anything they want to show in any light. In fact many build a career on
>> doing just that.
>
> Jim,
> as I think I've mentioned, I've spent a lot of my career working on
> various
> radar designs, starting with the pre-production APG-65 in the pre-prod
> F/A-18A's.
> The engineering community has spent a huge amount of time and money
> to make these airborne electronics low maintenance and highly reliable.
> In terms of reliability, current circuit card designs have reliability
> lifetimes in excess of the rated airframe life. Some stuff you might never
> have to take out of the aircraft.
> That adds a new dimension to maintenance, because if it works out as
> planned, it's no longer practical to have an "I" shop aboard ship or
> land base. "O" level pulls the box and in some cases the card from the
> box. It's cheaper and faster to send a broken card back to depot
> and replace it from stores. And with the complexity of some of the cards,
> they
> might not be repairable in the field anyway. Think of a .020 diameter
> (0.5mm)
> solder joint buried under a part with 400 others...
> This doesn't cover all electronic parts, of course, but certainly a lot.
> At least of the ones I've been associated with lately.
> Most everything than can be put on removeable cards, is, and that helps
> maintenance turnaround time as you have noted.
> Mean time between critical failure is way up and mean time to repair is
> way
> down.
>
> cheers
>
> --
> Harry Andreas
> Engineering raconteur


Thats a similar design being used on the AH-64D Longbow Apache...

For some (But not all) electronic systems, the Support maintenance folks can
pull circuit cards and replace them right on the aircraft to repair a fault.
Verses shipping a much bigger assembly back to depot / manufacturer for
repair.

[Diamond Jims]

"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, "Diamond Jim"
> > wrote:
>
>> "Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> > In article . com>, "~^
>> > beancounter ~^" > wrote:
>> >
>> > > in going through some old navy paperwork i came across this..
>> > > "the f14 requires 50 to 60 maint hrs every hour it flies, while the
>> > > super hornet needs 10 to 15 maint hrs for each flight hour...
>> > >
>> > > if true, thats a hell of a difference...
>> >
>> > Those are more or less the numbers that I've heard.
>> > BTW, the maint hrs/flt hr is still going down.
>> > It's lower on the E/F than the C/D (so I've heard).
>> >
>> > --
>> > Harry Andreas
>> > Engineering raconteur
>>
>> Having had the additional duties several times as Asst. MaintO and MaintO
>> in
>> a squadron, (for earlier generations of aircraft) and spending a number
>> of
>> years in DOD (mostly DARPA), I can tell you that those figures are pretty
>> solid. The more modern an aircraft is, the more it is "plug and play" to
>> borrow a computer term.the aircraft is. Just about everything is a SECREP
>> (secondary repairable). Organizational Maintenance will unplug and swap
>> boxes, board, modules etc. on the aircraft, replace with new/repaired
>> items,
>> test and if passed "up the system". If it fails then another is plugged
>> in
>> its place. Heck even bad wires are replaced as part of a harness
>> assembly.
>>
>> The SECREP then goes to Intermediate or Depot Maintenance for repair, and
>> after repair it goes back into the supply system. About the only, "old
>> time
>> maintenance" that takes place on an aircraft anymore is cleaning,
>> polishing,
>> fueling, ordnance, maybe a little adjustment on the gun or hard points
>> etc.
>> and occasionally some body work/repair, just about everything else is
>> swapped. This swapping out means that an aircraft can be turned around
>> quickly, and doesn't have to wait until the specified hours of
>> maintenance
>> have been performed. In other words it could actually be back in the air
>> as
>> hours of maintenance are still being performed.
>>
>> When the hours are figured (maintenance hour per hour of flight, mean
>> time
>> between failure) or whatever the "bean-counters" want to know, it
>> usually
>> included all the maintenance hours throughout the system organizational,
>> intermediate, or depot. (New manufactured items are not included in these
>> calculations but may be in other service wide figures. As everything is
>> in
>> the computers, these figures can be easily recovered for an individual
>> part,
>> aircraft, squadron, wing, ship, fleet, service, manufacturer, year, month
>> day, hour, what ever keeps people happy, and employed.)
>>
>> And as with all figures, people can manipulate them to show just about
>> anything they want to show in any light. In fact many build a career on
>> doing just that.
>
> Jim,
> as I think I've mentioned, I've spent a lot of my career working on
> various
> radar designs, starting with the pre-production APG-65 in the pre-prod
> F/A-18A's.
> The engineering community has spent a huge amount of time and money
> to make these airborne electronics low maintenance and highly reliable.
> In terms of reliability, current circuit card designs have reliability
> lifetimes in excess of the rated airframe life. Some stuff you might never
> have to take out of the aircraft.
> That adds a new dimension to maintenance, because if it works out as
> planned, it's no longer practical to have an "I" shop aboard ship or
> land base. "O" level pulls the box and in some cases the card from the
> box. It's cheaper and faster to send a broken card back to depot
> and replace it from stores. And with the complexity of some of the cards,
> they
> might not be repairable in the field anyway. Think of a .020 diameter
> (0.5mm)
> solder joint buried under a part with 400 others...
> This doesn't cover all electronic parts, of course, but certainly a lot.
> At least of the ones I've been associated with lately.
> Most everything than can be put on removeable cards, is, and that helps
> maintenance turnaround time as you have noted.
> Mean time between critical failure is way up and mean time to repair is
> way
> down.
>
> cheers
>
> --
> Harry Andreas
> Engineering raconteur

I certainly didn't mean to give the impression that the lower maintenance
hours was due only to "pull and swap" maintenance. The improvement in
design, materials, etc. has increased reliability immensely, especially in
the electronics field. I also agree that the Intermediate Maintenance
workload has been reduced in many ways. Not only is it cheaper and quicker
in many cases to draw a spare from the supply system and send the defective
one back to depot maintenance for repair, it is also economical in many
cases to toss the defective one into the recycle bin to be sold as scrap.

Now if someone could just figure out how to do the same with hydraulics.

[~^ beancounter ~^]

"Now if someone could just figure out how to
do the same with hydraulics"...

hydraulics is a whole diff ballgame, i take it?...

[ChuckW]

Everything's ball bearings these days...

Chuck W
Sharc, NAR Section 613
www.flysharc.org

Sharc, the section where two out of three certification flights always work just fine!

[Leadfoot]

"~^ beancounter ~^" > wrote in message
oups.com...
> "Now if someone could just figure out how to
> do the same with hydraulics"...


Generally if the hydraulic actuator is bad (leaking, not working properly)
you take it off and ship it off to be overhauled. Sometimes the problem is
rigging which can be fixed on the airplane. In the case of electrical part
of the actuator the servovalve (something I've actaully worked with) you
have to ship the actuator it's attached to back to an overhaul shop where it
is removed and then shipped on to either the manufacturer or a specialty
shop. Very few stand alone specialty shops, some of the bigger airlines
have servovalve shops but in general 80-90% of your servovalves are repaired
by the manufacturer. I've been approached a couple of times about doing
Boeing servo-valves and when I point out what is involved in doing a fresh
setup the manager rapidly loses interest. There is a little "tribal
knowledge" which isn't in the manual involved in tuning a servovalve. And
if you don't get it right you will probably get the "mystery auto-pilot
disconnect" problems that are damn near impossible to diagnose.

I'll note all of my on-aircraft repair experience was electrical. My
hydaulic work was limited to overhaul shops unless I was working an
auto-pilot problem on an airplane.


>
> hydraulics is a whole diff ballgame, i take it?...
>

[DDAY]

> There's a very interesting article in the current issue of Combat Aircraft,
> Vol 7, No. 6. It's by Tom Cooper and Liam F. Devlin and titled "Iran: A
> Formidable Opponent?"

I was looking at the Cooper and Devlin article again last night and wanted
to add a little more information.

They state that they obtained a 1999 US intelligence community document
through the Freedom of Information Act that indicates that the US estimated
that the Iranians had 28 active F-14s and 29 in storage at that time.
However, they said that the Iranian government has also released photos and
videos of F-14s in operation after 1999 and that by comparing tail numbers,
the authors determined that the active number of aircraft is more like 44
instead of 28.

That doesn't seem unreasonable, although I'd love to know more about how
they did this analysis. That's an awful lot of planes to count based upon
photos and videos, and my guess is that they might have had some flightline
shots that depicted a lot of F-14s in service.

They also indicate that the Iranians probably had about 135 AIM-54 Phoenix
missiles after the Iran-Iraq war, but that by the 1990s, only about 40% of
these could be considered operational. The Iranians put a lot of effort
into upgrading the missiles to extend their shelf life, however.

Reading between the lines, the authors imply that their information on the
Iranian aircraft fleet started to dry up around 2000 or so. My guess is
that they had some good contacts with the older F-14 and other pilots, and
that some of these left the country after they retired. But by the late
1990s, this was much more rare.

Like I said, it's a really interesting article. The authors have clearly
done a lot of impressive research. My only question is about how reliable
the information is.





D