Brazil 737-Embraer Crash

[Kobra[_1_]]

Is anyone else out there wondering what in the heck happened here? For
instance, what about the TCAS systems on both these planes? Were they
working and what did they say? Were they talking to ATC and what was being
said? Were they in cruise flight or were they in the terminal area? Did
the Embraer jet hit the 737 in it's Achilles heel to bring in down nose
first while the smaller jet landed without incident or injury?

Kobra

[Matt Whiting]

Kobra wrote:

> Is anyone else out there wondering what in the heck happened here? For
> instance, what about the TCAS systems on both these planes? Were they
> working and what did they say? Were they talking to ATC and what was being
> said? Were they in cruise flight or were they in the terminal area? Did
> the Embraer jet hit the 737 in it's Achilles heel to bring in down nose
> first while the smaller jet landed without incident or injury?

Hard to say with what little data has come to light thus far. I did
read today that they are holding the American pilots hostage until they
investigate further.

If the wingtip of the small jet sliced through the cockpit of the 737,
it wouldn't be hard to bring it down.

Matt

[James Robinson]

"Kobra" > wrote:

> Is anyone else out there wondering what in the heck happened here?
> For instance, what about the TCAS systems on both these planes?

The news reports so far are very vague. Not sure if I would put much
credence in any of the so-called facts released so far.

One of the Brazilian investigators was quoted as saying the transponder on
the Legacy was turned off at some point, and that it was flying northwest
at 37,000 feet, instead of 36,000 feet that had been authorized by ATC.

Other reports say that one ATC center was handling the Boeing, and another
handling the Legacy. The area where they supposedly collided, over the
jungle, does not have good radar coverage, so they might not have even been
tracked on radar.

> Did the Embraer jet hit the 737 in it's Achilles heel
> to bring in down nose first while the smaller jet landed without
> incident or injury?

The wreckage is scattered over a wide area, suggesting a breakup.

[[email protected]]

James Robinson wrote:
> "Kobra" > wrote:
>
>
> The wreckage is scattered over a wide area, suggesting a breakup.

If that is true it may indicate that the wingtip of the embraer took
off the vertical stab of the 737 which would cause it to yaw out of
control and break up much like the Airbus A310 did in New York when it
lost its vertical stab...

Dean

[Dave S]

Matt Whiting wrote:
I did read today that they are holding the American pilots hostage
until they investigate further.

How does detaining them in the course of a criminal investigation
constitute holding them hostage?

[Emily]

Dave S wrote:
> Matt Whiting wrote:
> I did read today that they are holding the American pilots hostage
> until they investigate further.
>
> How does detaining them in the course of a criminal investigation
> constitute holding them hostage?

Because the Brazilian government has zero reason to suspect criminal
action on their part.

Let's not forget that the 737 crew could have caused the accident, but
not one's even thinking of that option.

[Stefan]

Dave S schrieb:

> How does detaining them in the course of a criminal investigation
> constitute holding them hostage?

They are not holding hostage, they are just not allowed to leave the
country. For good reason: I doubt the USA would be willing to extradite
their citicens to Brasil for a trial if asked to do so.

Stefan

[James Robinson]

Emily > wrote:

> Dave S wrote:
>>
>> How does detaining them in the course of a criminal investigation
>> constitute holding them hostage?
>
> Because the Brazilian government has zero reason to suspect criminal
> action on their part.
>
> Let's not forget that the 737 crew could have caused the accident, but
> not one's even thinking of that option.

First, they are not being detained. The government is holding their
passports so they can't leave the country. The US would probably do the
same if a foreign national was involved in an such a major incident under
suspicious circumstances.

Second, the early analysis of the recorders and ATC logs suggests that
the transponder on the Legacy stopped functioning sometime before the
collision, and started functioning again after the collision. the
investigators want to determine if it was deliberate or a technical
fault.

The Brazilians also claim that the crew on the Legacy "ignored" an ATC
request to change altitude before the collision. They were flying at an
odd altitude (37,000 ft) in a northwest direction, and had been told to
descend to 36,000. While the crew didn't respond to radio calls before
the collision, they got in contact with ATC after the collision.

The judge who ordered the passports held felt there was enough evidence
to warrant holding their passports until an investigation into possible
negligence could be completed.

I haven't seen anything yet to explain why the 737 wouldn't have been
told to change course or altitude by ATC with the Legacy not reponding.
However, the news reports are really vague and incomplete, so I'm not
sure anything reported so far about the collision can be taken as fact.

[Kevin Clarke]

The Embraer was northwest bound at FL370. The 737 southeast bound (I
think). The Embraer was supposed to be at FL360 from what I've heard.
Has anyone read a report on the ATC clearances given?

Then of course I am really scratching my head about 2 TCAS "failures" or
at least TCAS being ignored. Sad.

KC

Emily wrote:
>
>
> Let's not forget that the 737 crew could have caused the accident, but
> not one's even thinking of that option.

[James Robinson]

Kevin Clarke > wrote:

> Then of course I am really scratching my head about 2 TCAS "failures" or
> at least TCAS being ignored. Sad.

TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not working.

[Larry Dighera]

On Thu, 05 Oct 2006 09:22:08 -0500, James Robinson >
wrote in >:

>
>TCAS only works with both transponders working.

Is the operating TCAS aboard the aircraft that is receiving a
transponder signal from another aircraft in its vicinity totally
incapable of outputting ANY useful information?

[Frank Ch. Eigler]

James Robinson > writes:

> TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not working.

Are you sure? Even a TCAS-II system installed on a machine with an
inoperative transponder should still provide traffic alerting, no?

- FChE

[Larry Dighera]

(Let me try to make my question a little clearer.)

On Thu, 05 Oct 2006 09:22:08 -0500, James Robinson >
wrote in >:

>
>TCAS only works with both transponders working.

Is the operating TCAS aboard the aircraft that is receiving a
transponder signal from another aircraft in its vicinity totally
incapable of outputting ANY useful information when it's transponder
is not operating?

[karl gruber[_1_]]

YOU........don't know that!



"James Robinson" > wrote in message
. ..
> Kevin Clarke > wrote:
>
>> Then of course I am really scratching my head about 2 TCAS "failures" or
>> at least TCAS being ignored. Sad.
>
> TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not working.

[news.charter.net]

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/03/business/03road.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1

"karl gruber" > wrote in message
...
> YOU........don't know that!
>
>
>
> "James Robinson" > wrote in message
> . ..
>> Kevin Clarke > wrote:
>>
>>> Then of course I am really scratching my head about 2 TCAS "failures" or
>>> at least TCAS being ignored. Sad.
>>
>> TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not working.
>
>

[James Robinson]

(Frank Ch. Eigler) wrote:

>
> James Robinson > writes:
>
>> TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not working.
>
> Are you sure? Even a TCAS-II system installed on a machine with an
> inoperative transponder should still provide traffic alerting, no?

Not as I understand it. Here are some quotes from an ARINC description
of TCAS-II:

"A Mode S transponder is required to be
installed and operational for TCAS II to be
operational. If the Mode S transponder fails,
the TCAS Performance Monitor will detect
this failure and automatically place TCAS
into Standby."

"TCAS does not alter or diminish the pilot’s
basic authority and responsibility to ensure
safe flight. Because TCAS does not respond
to aircraft that are not transponder-equipped
or aircraft with a transponder failure, TCAS
alone does not ensure safe separation in
every case."

[James Robinson]

"karl gruber" > wrote:

> "James Robinson" > wrote:
>>
>> Kevin Clarke > wrote:
>>
>>> Then of course I am really scratching my head about 2 TCAS
>>> "failures" or at least TCAS being ignored. Sad.
>>
>> TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not working.
>
> YOU........don't know that!

Quite right. I don't personally know whether the transponder was working
or not.

I should have said that it was reported to have ceased transmitting before
the collision, and started transmitting again after the collision. This
was part of a statement from a Brazilian Air Force representative in a news
conference. The BAF is heading the investigation into the accident. It was
one of the reasons given for holding the passports of the US pilots.

[Neil Gould]

Recently, Larry Dighera > posted:

> (Let me try to make my question a little clearer.)
>
> On Thu, 05 Oct 2006 09:22:08 -0500, James Robinson >
> wrote in >:
>
>>
>> TCAS only works with both transponders working.
>
> Is the operating TCAS aboard the aircraft that is receiving a
> transponder signal from another aircraft in its vicinity totally
> incapable of outputting ANY useful information when it's transponder
> is not operating?
>
As I understand it, it is the transponder signal of other aircraft that
TCAS reports. If other aircraft in the area either don't have a
transponder or it is inoperative, there is nothing for the TCAS to lock
onto, ergo, no useful information about traffic position.

Neil

[Larry Dighera]

On Thu, 5 Oct 2006 10:28:46 -0700, "news.charter.net"
> wrote in
>:

>http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/03/business/03road.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1

Thanks for the link to the New York Times story (even if I did have to
use bugmenot.com to access it). Unfortunately it doesn't mention the
TCAS system which was the subject of the article to which you were
following up. But it did contain this nugget:

A Brazilian military inspector standing by surprised me by his
willingness to talk, although the conversation was limited by his
weak English and my nonexistent Portuguese.

He was speculating on what happened, but this is what he said:
Both planes were, inexplicably, at the same altitude in the same
space in the sky. The southeast-bound 737 pilots spotted our
Legacy 600, which was flying northwest to Manaus, and made a
frantic evasive bank. The 737 wing, swooping into the space
between our wing and the high tail, clipped us twice, and the
bigger plane then went into its death spiral.

It sounded like an impossible situation, the inspector
acknowledged. “But I think this happened,” he said. Though no one
can say for certain yet how the accident occurred, three other
Brazilian officers told me they had been informed that both planes
were at the same altitude.

[Larry Dighera]

On Thu, 05 Oct 2006 12:32:31 -0500, James Robinson >
wrote in >:

(Frank Ch. Eigler) wrote:
>
>>
>> James Robinson > writes:
>>
>>> TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not working.
>>
>> Are you sure? Even a TCAS-II system installed on a machine with an
>> inoperative transponder should still provide traffic alerting, no?
>
>Not as I understand it. Here are some quotes from an ARINC description
>of TCAS-II:
>
>"A Mode S transponder is required to be
>installed and operational for TCAS II to be
>operational. If the Mode S transponder fails,
>the TCAS Performance Monitor will detect
>this failure and automatically place TCAS
>into Standby."

The Mode S requirement is suspect, as I have had jet aircraft indicate
that they could see me on their TCAS units while the transponder
installed in the aircraft I was operating was not even squawking Mode
C, but it was squawking.

>"TCAS does not alter or diminish the pilot’s
>basic authority and responsibility to ensure
>safe flight. Because TCAS does not respond
>to aircraft that are not transponder-equipped
>or aircraft with a transponder failure, TCAS
>alone does not ensure safe separation in
>every case."

That statement does not support your assertion, that both aircraft
must have transponders operating for TCAS to provide avoidance
information.

I would guess, that if the transponder in a TCAS equipped aircraft
were turned off, the TCAS unit in that aircraft would still provide
information about other transponder equipped (and squawking) aircraft
in the area, but that wouldn't do those aircraft with operational
transponders any good unless the pilot receiving the TCAS information
took evasive action.

[karl gruber[_1_]]

I won't lower myself to read the New York Times daily Jihad.


"news.charter.net" > wrote in message
...
> http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/03/business/03road.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1
>
> "karl gruber" > wrote in message
> ...
>> YOU........don't know that!
>>
>>
>>
>> "James Robinson" > wrote in message
>> . ..
>>> Kevin Clarke > wrote:
>>>
>>>> Then of course I am really scratching my head about 2 TCAS "failures"
>>>> or
>>>> at least TCAS being ignored. Sad.
>>>
>>> TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not working.
>>
>>
>
>

[Stefan]

Larry Dighera schrieb:

> following up. But it did contain this nugget:
....
> ... three other
> Brazilian officers told me they had been informed that both planes
> were at the same altitude.

They were, obviously. I don't need three officers to know *this*.

Stefan

[Frank Ch. Eigler]

James Robinson > writes:

> >> TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not working.

> > Are you sure? Even a TCAS-II system installed on a machine with an
> > inoperative transponder should still provide traffic alerting, no?

> [...] "A Mode S transponder is required to be installed and
> operational for TCAS II to be operational. If the Mode S transponder
> fails, the TCAS Performance Monitor will detect this failure and
> automatically place TCAS into Standby." [...]

How unfortunate that it can't just downgrade to TCAS-I or even plain
traffic alerting. No wonder big planes have multiple transponders.


- FChE

[James Robinson]

Larry Dighera > wrote:

> James Robinson > wrote:
>
>> (Frank Ch. Eigler) wrote:
>>>
>>> James Robinson > writes:
>>>
>>>> TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not
>>>> working.
>>>
>>> Are you sure? Even a TCAS-II system installed on a machine with an
>>> inoperative transponder should still provide traffic alerting, no?
>>
>> Not as I understand it. Here are some quotes from an ARINC
>> description of TCAS-II:
>>
>> "A Mode S transponder is required to be
>> installed and operational for TCAS II to be
>> operational. If the Mode S transponder fails,
>> the TCAS Performance Monitor will detect
>> this failure and automatically place TCAS
>> into Standby."
>
> The Mode S requirement is suspect, as I have had jet aircraft indicate
> that they could see me on their TCAS units while the transponder
> installed in the aircraft I was operating was not even squawking Mode
> C, but it was squawking.

I think you are reading that incorrectly. The full functionality of
TCAS-II requires that both aircraft have Mode S transponders, since the
RA is worked out using the Mode S data channel. TCAS will "see" other
aircraft that are using mode C transponders, but with reduced
functionality if "Alt" isn't selected. (TA instead of RA, for example)

What the quoted paragraph is saying is that if the transponder on your
TCAS-II equipped aircraft is detected as having failed, and that can
include one of the two antennas, then the system will automatically drop
into standby, and will therefore not be able to either squawk or transmit
the necessary interrogations for system functionality.

>> "TCAS does not alter or diminish the pilot’s
>> basic authority and responsibility to ensure
>> safe flight. Because TCAS does not respond
>> to aircraft that are not transponder-equipped
>> or aircraft with a transponder failure, TCAS
>> alone does not ensure safe separation in
>> every case."
>
> That statement does not support your assertion, that both aircraft
> must have transponders operating for TCAS to provide avoidance
> information.
>
> I would guess, that if the transponder in a TCAS equipped aircraft
> were turned off, the TCAS unit in that aircraft would still provide
> information about other transponder equipped (and squawking) aircraft
> in the area, but that wouldn't do those aircraft with operational
> transponders any good unless the pilot receiving the TCAS information
> took evasive action.

You have to take the two paragraphs together. As I understand it,
"standby" means that the transponders will not be squawking. That also
means that the interrogations necessary for the functionality of the
system won't transmit either. The system does not seem to have a passive
mode that simply listens.

[Rick[_1_]]

James Robinson wrote in message ...
>Larry Dighera > wrote:
>
>> James Robinson > wrote:
>>
>>> (Frank Ch. Eigler) wrote:
>>>>
>>>> James Robinson > writes:
>>>>
>>>>> TCAS only works with both transponders working. One was not
>>>>> working.
>>>>
>>>> Are you sure? Even a TCAS-II system installed on a machine with an
>>>> inoperative transponder should still provide traffic alerting, no?
>>>
>>> Not as I understand it. Here are some quotes from an ARINC
>>> description of TCAS-II:
>>>
>>> "A Mode S transponder is required to be
>>> installed and operational for TCAS II to be
>>> operational. If the Mode S transponder fails,
>>> the TCAS Performance Monitor will detect
>>> this failure and automatically place TCAS
>>> into Standby."
>>
>> The Mode S requirement is suspect, as I have had jet aircraft indicate
>> that they could see me on their TCAS units while the transponder
>> installed in the aircraft I was operating was not even squawking Mode
>> C, but it was squawking.
>
>I think you are reading that incorrectly. The full functionality of
>TCAS-II requires that both aircraft have Mode S transponders, since the
>RA is worked out using the Mode S data channel. TCAS will "see" other
>aircraft that are using mode C transponders, but with reduced
>functionality if "Alt" isn't selected. (TA instead of RA, for example)
>
>What the quoted paragraph is saying is that if the transponder on your
>TCAS-II equipped aircraft is detected as having failed, and that can
>include one of the two antennas, then the system will automatically drop
>into standby, and will therefore not be able to either squawk or transmit
>the necessary interrogations for system functionality.
>
>>> "TCAS does not alter or diminish the pilot’s
>>> basic authority and responsibility to ensure
>>> safe flight. Because TCAS does not respond
>>> to aircraft that are not transponder-equipped
>>> or aircraft with a transponder failure, TCAS
>>> alone does not ensure safe separation in
>>> every case."
>>
>> That statement does not support your assertion, that both aircraft
>> must have transponders operating for TCAS to provide avoidance
>> information.
>>
>> I would guess, that if the transponder in a TCAS equipped aircraft
>> were turned off, the TCAS unit in that aircraft would still provide
>> information about other transponder equipped (and squawking) aircraft
>> in the area, but that wouldn't do those aircraft with operational
>> transponders any good unless the pilot receiving the TCAS information
>> took evasive action.
>
>You have to take the two paragraphs together. As I understand it,
>"standby" means that the transponders will not be squawking. That also
>means that the interrogations necessary for the functionality of the
>system won't transmit either. The system does not seem to have a passive
>mode that simply listens.

That's too bad...sounds like a G1000 that reboots with one bad input.

- Rick

[Matt Whiting]

Dave S wrote:

> Matt Whiting wrote:
> I did read today that they are holding the American pilots hostage
> until they investigate further.
>
> How does detaining them in the course of a criminal investigation
> constitute holding them hostage?

Pulling your passport without filing charges is taking one hostage in my
book.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

James Robinson wrote:

> Emily > wrote:
>
>
>>Dave S wrote:
>>
>>>How does detaining them in the course of a criminal investigation
>>>constitute holding them hostage?
>>
>>Because the Brazilian government has zero reason to suspect criminal
>>action on their part.
>>
>>Let's not forget that the 737 crew could have caused the accident, but
>>not one's even thinking of that option.
>
>
> First, they are not being detained. The government is holding their
> passports so they can't leave the country. The US would probably do the
> same if a foreign national was involved in an such a major incident under
> suspicious circumstances.

They aren't being detained, but they can't leave. Do you know what
detain means?

Matt

[James Robinson]

Matt Whiting > wrote:

> James Robinson wrote:
>
>> First, they are not being detained. The government is holding their
>> passports so they can't leave the country. The US would probably do
>> the same if a foreign national was involved in an such a major
>> incident under suspicious circumstances.
>
> They aren't being detained, but they can't leave. Do you know what
> detain means?

Slight legal distinction. Michael Jackson wasn't considered as detained
when he was awaiting trial, but he did have to surrender his passport.

In this case, the pilots aren't in the slammer in Sao Paulo, and are free
to travel around Brazil, but cannot leave the country. I consider detained
as being in the custody of the police.

[john smith]

In article >,
Larry Dighera > wrote:

> He was speculating on what happened, but this is what he said:
> Both planes were, inexplicably, at the same altitude in the same
> space in the sky. The southeast-bound 737 pilots spotted our
> Legacy 600, which was flying northwest to Manaus, and made a
> frantic evasive bank. The 737 wing, swooping into the space
> between our wing and the high tail, clipped us twice, and the
> bigger plane then went into its death spiral.

Was this byline Joe Sharkey? He was a pax on the Legacy.
Having viewed the image of the damage to the Legacy, one wonders how the
737 could have been so badly damaged as to be unflyable.

[Matt Whiting]

James Robinson wrote:

> Matt Whiting > wrote:
>
>
>>James Robinson wrote:
>>
>>
>>>First, they are not being detained. The government is holding their
>>>passports so they can't leave the country. The US would probably do
>>>the same if a foreign national was involved in an such a major
>>>incident under suspicious circumstances.
>>
>>They aren't being detained, but they can't leave. Do you know what
>>detain means?
>
>
> Slight legal distinction. Michael Jackson wasn't considered as detained
> when he was awaiting trial, but he did have to surrender his passport.
>
> In this case, the pilots aren't in the slammer in Sao Paulo, and are free
> to travel around Brazil, but cannot leave the country. I consider detained
> as being in the custody of the police.

I didn't see "custody of the police" in the dictionary definition.

Matt

[James Robinson]

Matt Whiting > wrote:

> James Robinson wrote:
>
>> Matt Whiting > wrote:
>>
>>
>>>James Robinson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>>First, they are not being detained. The government is holding their
>>>>passports so they can't leave the country. The US would probably do
>>>>the same if a foreign national was involved in an such a major
>>>>incident under suspicious circumstances.
>>>
>>>They aren't being detained, but they can't leave. Do you know what
>>>detain means?
>>
>>
>> Slight legal distinction. Michael Jackson wasn't considered as
>> detained when he was awaiting trial, but he did have to surrender his
>> passport.
>>
>> In this case, the pilots aren't in the slammer in Sao Paulo, and are
>> free to travel around Brazil, but cannot leave the country. I
>> consider detained as being in the custody of the police.
>
> I didn't see "custody of the police" in the dictionary definition.
>
> Matt
>

So you consider that Michael Jackson was detained?

[Jose[_1_]]

> Having viewed the image of the damage to the Legacy, one wonders how the
> 737 could have been so badly damaged as to be unflyable.

I haven't seen anything, but from what I've heard, if the wing managed
to sever the tail, that would send the plane vertically down. Can it be
done that way? How strong is a 737 tail?

Jose
--
"Never trust anything that can think for itself, if you can't see where
it keeps its brain." (chapter 10 of book 3 - Harry Potter).
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[**THE-RFI-EMI-GUY**]

A few questions:

Does anyone know if the transponder switch positions (on vs off) are
recorded by the FDR? Can it be proven that the transponder was switched off?

Is the Brazilian gov't making a claim that the Legacy transponder was
off based soley on lack of reception by the ATC? (possible antenna
problem on new Legacy plane, or poor reception at ATC?)

What about the claim the Legacy was cleared to FL 370 and was then
ordered to descend to 360? If this is true would not a FL of 370 have
been an ATC error to begin with, based on the NW direction of flight path?

Could the metric system have played a part in the incorrect FL? Could
the Legacy pilots have been confused about appropriate odd vs even FL
for the route they were flying in southern hemisphere?

Finally, for what possible reason (speculation) would the Legacy pilots
have wanted to switch off the transponder on the maiden flight? Would
they have been acceptance testing the plane in various modes/altitudes
that would have been "inconveniant" to schedule with ATC? I note that an
Embraer executive was supposedly aboard, perhaps keen to get a sign off
on a $25 million plane. Purely speculation on my part.

wrote:

>James Robinson wrote:
>
>
>>"Kobra" > wrote:
>>
>>
>>The wreckage is scattered over a wide area, suggesting a breakup.
>>
>>
>
>If that is true it may indicate that the wingtip of the embraer took
>off the vertical stab of the 737 which would cause it to yaw out of
>control and break up much like the Airbus A310 did in New York when it
>lost its vertical stab...
>
>Dean
>
>
>

--
Joe Leikhim K4SAT
"The RFI-EMI-GUY"©

"Treason doth never prosper: what's the reason?
For if it prosper, none dare call it treason."

"Follow The Money" ;-P

[John Gaquin]

"Matt Whiting" > wrote in message news:HNeVg.1700
>
> Pulling your passport without filing charges is taking one hostage in my
> book.

But your book is not what they're going by. The only things that matter are
the laws of the Federative Republic of Brazil, regardless of the citizenship
of the principals involved.

So far in this thread we have rank speculation over factors of an accident
the investigation of which has barely begun, and broadbrush opinions on the
legal standing of investigative procedures of a foreign sovereign nation.
The whole thread is nothing but mental masturbation.

[James Robinson]

**THE-RFI-EMI-GUY** > wrote:

> A few questions:
>
> Does anyone know if the transponder switch positions (on vs off) are
> recorded by the FDR? Can it be proven that the transponder was
> switched off?
>
> Is the Brazilian gov't making a claim that the Legacy transponder was
> off based soley on lack of reception by the ATC? (possible antenna
> problem on new Legacy plane, or poor reception at ATC?)

The investigators have reported that ATC lost contact with the aircraft,
both from the transponder and by voice radio. One report said that the
crew might have changed to the wrong frequency when handed off between
centers. The transponder supposedly started working again after the
collision.

Beyond that, anything is simply speculation.