Cirrus Death Trap?

[Jay Honeck]

The long knives are coming out now... This excerpted from an AP
article this evening:

"Hersman said that as of September, there were 545 SR20s registered in
the United States. Since 2001, the NTSB has investigated 18 accidents
involving the plane; those crashes resulted in 14 deaths."

They sure make that sound terrible, don't they? Why, in just five
years, 3.3% of the SR-20 fleet has been lost to accidents, resulting in
14 deaths!

Heck, that means that in, um, er, something like 151.5 years there will
be NO Cirrus SR-20s left flying at all! See the whole article here:

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061013/ap_on_re_us/manhattan_plane_crash

:-(
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

[Marco Leon]

Jay Honeck wrote:
> The long knives are coming out now... This excerpted from an AP
> article this evening:
>
> "Hersman said that as of September, there were 545 SR20s registered in
> the United States. Since 2001, the NTSB has investigated 18 accidents
> involving the plane; those crashes resulted in 14 deaths."
>
> They sure make that sound terrible, don't they? Why, in just five
> years, 3.3% of the SR-20 fleet has been lost to accidents, resulting in
> 14 deaths!
>
> Heck, that means that in, um, er, something like 151.5 years there will
> be NO Cirrus SR-20s left flying at all! See the whole article here:

Yeah, but the bright side is that in only 100 years, the Cirrus SR-20
fatality rate will be nil! Did you know that the Sopwith Camel was one
of the SAFEST aircraft last year? ZERO fatalities! Wow!

Statistics have sharp edges on both sides.

Marco

[Mxsmanic]

Jay Honeck writes:

> Heck, that means that in, um, er, something like 151.5 years there will
> be NO Cirrus SR-20s left flying at all!

The aircraft seem like the type that might appeal to low-time pilots
who think that special gadgets will keep them safe and/or free of
accidents (or surviving accidents). Naturally this would result in
higher accident numbers, even if the aircraft is not fundamentally
unsafe.

Also, it seems like the aircraft is actively marketed to precisely
this type of buyer, which makes things even worse. It looks like Carl
Lidle fell for it (in more ways than one).

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Jim Macklin]

Everyone who ate tomatoes before the year 1880 is dead!
Therefore tomatoes must be poisonous.



"Marco Leon" > wrote in message
oups.com...
| Jay Honeck wrote:
| > The long knives are coming out now... This excerpted
from an AP
| > article this evening:
| >
| > "Hersman said that as of September, there were 545 SR20s
registered in
| > the United States. Since 2001, the NTSB has investigated
18 accidents
| > involving the plane; those crashes resulted in 14
deaths."
| >
| > They sure make that sound terrible, don't they? Why, in
just five
| > years, 3.3% of the SR-20 fleet has been lost to
accidents, resulting in
| > 14 deaths!
| >
| > Heck, that means that in, um, er, something like 151.5
years there will
| > be NO Cirrus SR-20s left flying at all! See the whole
article here:
|
| Yeah, but the bright side is that in only 100 years, the
Cirrus SR-20
| fatality rate will be nil! Did you know that the Sopwith
Camel was one
| of the SAFEST aircraft last year? ZERO fatalities! Wow!
|
| Statistics have sharp edges on both sides.
|
| Marco
|

[Joe Feise]

Mxsmanic wrote on 10/12/06 21:27:

> Jay Honeck writes:
>
>> Heck, that means that in, um, er, something like 151.5 years there will
>> be NO Cirrus SR-20s left flying at all!
>
> The aircraft seem like the type that might appeal to low-time pilots
> who think that special gadgets will keep them safe and/or free of
> accidents (or surviving accidents). Naturally this would result in
> higher accident numbers, even if the aircraft is not fundamentally
> unsafe.
>
> Also, it seems like the aircraft is actively marketed to precisely
> this type of buyer, which makes things even worse. It looks like Carl
> Lidle fell for it (in more ways than one).
>


Bull. He did the right thing, realizing that he was a low-time pilot, and had a
flight instructor with him.

[Jim Macklin]

Thurman Munson also had a CFI with him too. A CFI who is
not experienced in the airspace, or airplane is a broken
crutch. A PIC accompanied by a CFI is not doing his command
job. Rules by the Yankee's organization to require a CFI
should require active crew resource management, planning and
dispatch by the CFI. Two pilots waiting for the other to
make a decision will have an accident sooner or later.
IMHO
http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR80-02.pdf#search=%22NTSB-AAR-80-2%22
--
James H. Macklin
ATP,CFI,A&P

"Joe Feise" > wrote in message
...
| Mxsmanic wrote on 10/12/06 21:27:
|
| > Jay Honeck writes:
| >
| >> Heck, that means that in, um, er, something like 151.5
years there will
| >> be NO Cirrus SR-20s left flying at all!
| >
| > The aircraft seem like the type that might appeal to
low-time pilots
| > who think that special gadgets will keep them safe
and/or free of
| > accidents (or surviving accidents). Naturally this
would result in
| > higher accident numbers, even if the aircraft is not
fundamentally
| > unsafe.
| >
| > Also, it seems like the aircraft is actively marketed to
precisely
| > this type of buyer, which makes things even worse. It
looks like Carl
| > Lidle fell for it (in more ways than one).
| >
|
|
| Bull. He did the right thing, realizing that he was a
low-time pilot, and had a
| flight instructor with him.
|

[Happy Dog]

"Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
...
> Jay Honeck writes:
>
>> Heck, that means that in, um, er, something like 151.5 years there will
>> be NO Cirrus SR-20s left flying at all!
>
> The aircraft seem like the type that might appeal to low-time pilots
> who think that special gadgets will keep them safe and/or free of
> accidents (or surviving accidents). Naturally this would result in
> higher accident numbers, even if the aircraft is not fundamentally
> unsafe.

The aircraft appeals to just about everyone. Note the sales figures.
>
> Also, it seems like the aircraft is actively marketed to precisely
> this type of buyer, which makes things even worse. It looks like Carl
> Lidle fell for it (in more ways than one).

Here's a guaranteed laugh:

What kind of plane do you suggest he should have been flying that would have
made this accident less likely? Your statement above begs this question.
And you don't even know what happened.

If there's any increased overall risk in flying a Cirrus, it's the false
sense of security it may give some pilots flying IFR. Now tell us how that
differs from other glass cockpit rides. And, pretty soon, they almost all
will be.

moo

[Dylan Smith]

On 2006-10-13, Mxsmanic > wrote:
> Also, it seems like the aircraft is actively marketed to precisely
> this type of buyer, which makes things even worse. It looks like Carl
> Lidle fell for it (in more ways than one).

The type of aircraft he was in was utterly irrelevant. Smashing into a
building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting a building in a
Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.

--
Yes, the Reply-To email address is valid.
Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute: http://oolite-linux.berlios.de

[Dylan Smith]

On 2006-10-13, Jay Honeck > wrote:
> They sure make that sound terrible, don't they? Why, in just five
> years, 3.3% of the SR-20 fleet has been lost to accidents, resulting in
> 14 deaths!

Compared to other aircraft types, the SR-20 seems to be having a rather
high fatal accident rate. But, at least anecdotally - it seems to be a
re-run of the 'forked tailed doctor killer' [0] reputation that the Bonanza
got - pilots who are not experienced enough/not current enough being so
far behind the aircraft that they'll never crash - because they will be
five nautical miles behind the grid location of where their plane goes
in!

The insurance companies will be the ones who correct this (presumably,
they are already setting some fairly high minimum time requirements to
get insurance on an SR20 these days). Just like you will have a hard
time finding anyone insuring a so-green-he-needs-mowing pilot in a Beech
Bonanza.

[0] When our club had an S-35 Bonanza, I used to fly it on trips quite a
lot - I really enjoyed that aircraft. I jokingly told people I was safe
in it because I wasn't a doctor :-)
--
Yes, the Reply-To email address is valid.
Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute: http://oolite-linux.berlios.de

[Gary Drescher]

"Dylan Smith" > wrote in message
...
> The type of aircraft he was in was utterly irrelevant. Smashing into a
> building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting a building in a
> Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.

But a slower plane is much less likely to make the turn too wide (which
seems to be what happened). The turning radius increases with the square of
airspeed.

--Gary

[Thomas Borchert]

Jay,

> They sure make that sound terrible, don't they?
>

Actually, with regard to the Cirrusses, we pilots do more than enough
to give it a bad image. Think of all the times something like your
subject line has been a "legitimate" posting in this very group.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Denny]

Garry, the real question is what actually happened?
Was that an intentional turn or a control failure with the pilots
desperately trying to regain control? Cirrus has a flawed record when
it comes to the control systems...
Was the turn back deliberate and due to engine failure? There are
ground witnesses <unreliable, but a datum point> who said the engine
was loud <i.e. running, even if running rough>

Yes, he was a low time pilot, but he had reached the point to start his
instrument training so he wasn't completely green, he had flown the
airplane cross country (coast to coast as I read it) at some point...
USAF pilots are turned loose in supersonic fighters with less time than
he had...

The bad part of such a devastating crash is the airplane being totally
mangled to the point that we will never be able to answer the basic
questions - i.e. control failure, fuel contamination, etc...

OTOH, it has been 51 years since the previous accidental impact of an
airplane against a tall building in NYC... By the time the next one
comes around, you and I won't care...

denny

[Thomas Borchert]

Dylan,

> Compared to other aircraft types, the SR-20 seems to be having a rather
> high fatal accident rate.
>

Care to back that statement up with numbers? For example, compare the
rate to new 182s, like Richard Collins did. You'll be surprised.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Gary Drescher]

"Denny" > wrote in message
oups.com...
> Garry, the real question is what actually happened?
> Was that an intentional turn or a control failure with the pilots
> desperately trying to regain control? Cirrus has a flawed record when
> it comes to the control systems...
> Was the turn back deliberate and due to engine failure? There are
> ground witnesses <unreliable, but a datum point> who said the engine
> was loud <i.e. running, even if running rough>

I agree. We have some plausible speculations, but we don't yet know how the
collision came about.

--Gary

[Thomas Borchert]

Denny,

> Cirrus has a flawed record when
> it comes to the control systems...
>

How so?

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Mike[_11_]]

Joe Feise wrote:
> Mxsmanic wrote on 10/12/06 21:27:
>
>> Jay Honeck writes:
>>
>>> Heck, that means that in, um, er, something like 151.5 years there will
>>> be NO Cirrus SR-20s left flying at all!
>> The aircraft seem like the type that might appeal to low-time pilots
>> who think that special gadgets will keep them safe and/or free of
>> accidents (or surviving accidents). Naturally this would result in
>> higher accident numbers, even if the aircraft is not fundamentally
>> unsafe.
>>
>> Also, it seems like the aircraft is actively marketed to precisely
>> this type of buyer, which makes things even worse. It looks like Carl
>> Lidle fell for it (in more ways than one).
>>
>
>
> Bull. He did the right thing, realizing that he was a low-time pilot, and had a
> flight instructor with him.
>

But did the flight instructor believe he was at any risk? Here's a blurb
I took from one of the many stories:
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/10/12/plane.crash/index.html

"""
In a 2004 article in the San Gabriel Valley (California) Tribune,
Stanger said that flying is very safe.

"The most dangerous part about flying is the drive to the airport," he
said. "It's a wing. It's very safe. It's the wing that flies, it's not
the engine."

"""

Seems like the instructor believed that the drive to the airport was
more dangerous. Isn't that only true for commercial flight?

--
Mike

[Mike[_11_]]

Dylan Smith wrote:
> On 2006-10-13, Mxsmanic > wrote:
>> Also, it seems like the aircraft is actively marketed to precisely
>> this type of buyer, which makes things even worse. It looks like Carl
>> Lidle fell for it (in more ways than one).
>
> The type of aircraft he was in was utterly irrelevant. Smashing into a
> building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting a building in a
> Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.
>

How do you know the aircraft is irrelevant? Please post your source.

--
Mike

[Ron Lee]

"Gary Drescher" > wrote:

>I agree. We have some plausible speculations, but we don't yet know how the
>collision came about.

It is a reasonable (and most likely correct) guess that they just
screwed up. It was time to turn around in a narrow VFR airspace and
they screwed up. Lidle should have known about the narrow VFR
corridor.

As with other Cirrus accidents, this is almost surely another case of
an inexperienced pilot killing himself...not the plane causing a
problem.

Ron Lee

[Dan Luke]

"Jay Honeck" wrote:

> They sure make that sound terrible, don't they? Why, in just five
> years, 3.3% of the SR-20 fleet has been lost to accidents, resulting in
> 14 deaths!

If automobiles suffered a similar rate over a similar period in the U. S., it
would produce nearly 2 million deaths.

(Based on production of about 12M/year
http://www.automotive.com/features/90/auto-news/17435/index.html ).


--
Dan
C-172RG at BFM

[Dylan Smith]

On 2006-10-13, Mike > wrote:
>> The type of aircraft he was in was utterly irrelevant. Smashing into a
>> building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting a building in a
>> Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.
>>
>
> How do you know the aircraft is irrelevant? Please post your source.

F=ma (force = mass x acceleration). Or in this case, deceleration.

A 100kg human in an ultralight travelling at 25 metres/sec hitting a
building and decelerating to zero in 0.5 sec (entirely plausable) will
experience a force of 100 * 50 newtons (5,000 newtons) in the initial
impact. Not to mention the bits of the building which are likely to
shatter and pierce the body. But a force of 5,000 newtons against a
human body is usually enough to kill. So it's pretty irrelevant whether
a plane is a slow one or a fast one like a Cirrus - slamming (to use
Lune's favorite word) into the side of a building is usually not going
to be survivable.

--
Yes, the Reply-To email address is valid.
Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute: http://oolite-linux.berlios.de

[Denny]

Tom, I posted that off the top of my head based on stuff I have seen in
print, not official stuff and not statistics...
Since you challenged me I just now did a partial search of the NTSB on
the 20 fatals in SR-20's, which reveals that 3 were the result of
control system failure... At that point I quit looking as I don't have
an axe to grind, and 15% at minimum is enough to support my
impressions...I didn't look at SR-22 statistics...

denny

[Peter R.]

Denny > wrote:

> Since you challenged me I just now did a partial search of the NTSB on
> the 20 fatals in SR-20's, which reveals that 3 were the result of
> control system failure.

My recollection of these accidents is that at least two of those three
were a result of a mechanic incorrectly mounting the ailerons, not inherent
control system design flaws.


--
Peter

[[email protected]]

Dylan Smith wrote:
> On 2006-10-13, Mike > wrote:
> >> The type of aircraft he was in was utterly irrelevant. Smashing into a
> >> building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting a building in a
> >> Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.
> >>
> >
> > How do you know the aircraft is irrelevant? Please post your source.
>
> F=ma (force = mass x acceleration). Or in this case, deceleration.
>
> A 100kg human in an ultralight travelling at 25 metres/sec hitting a
> building and decelerating to zero in 0.5 sec (entirely plausable) will
> experience a force of 100 * 50 newtons (5,000 newtons) in the initial
> impact. Not to mention the bits of the building which are likely to
> shatter and pierce the body. But a force of 5,000 newtons against a
> human body is usually enough to kill. So it's pretty irrelevant whether
> a plane is a slow one or a fast one like a Cirrus - slamming (to use
> Lune's favorite word) into the side of a building is usually not going
> to be survivable.
>
> --
> Yes, the Reply-To email address is valid.
> Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute: http://oolite-linux.berlios.de


You've only argued that the type of aircraft was irrelevant at the
point of impact. I think we can all agree on that! But that dismisses
the possibility that this accident might not have happened if the
aircraft had been slower - like a C150. (more time to react and less
radius to turn, etc...). I don't believe this was a case of a pilot
blindly flying into an object that was not easily visible from the
cockpit (like hitting a mountain at night or in the fog). It seems
more likely that either they were incapable of making the required
tight turn (poor planning, staying ahead of the aircraft) and hit the
building while trying to turn, or they lost control for some unknown
reason (stall, aircraft malfunction, etc) and the building simply got
in the way of the uncontroled flight/fall to earth. In either of those
scenerios, aircraft type could very well be relevant.

[Matt Barrow]

"Dan Luke" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Jay Honeck" wrote:
>
>> They sure make that sound terrible, don't they? Why, in just five
>> years, 3.3% of the SR-20 fleet has been lost to accidents, resulting in
>> 14 deaths!
>
> If automobiles suffered a similar rate over a similar period in the U. S.,
> it would produce nearly 2 million deaths.
>
> (Based on production of about 12M/year
> http://www.automotive.com/features/90/auto-news/17435/index.html ).
>
>
What are the rates for comparable aircraft, such as the Columbia 300,
Skylane...?

[Thomas Borchert]

Denny,

> which reveals that 3 were the result of
> control system failure.
>

Ah, but they don't show any pattern of any kind. One at least was
maintenance related.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Jim Macklin]

Faster airplanes can still slow down and be flown. There is
a reason to practice minimum control airspeed and slow
flight. Traffic patterns are not the only time to pull the
power back and or put some flaps down. See and avoid and
scud running are much easier at 60-80 knots than at 180.
All single-engine airplanes are required to stall below 61
knots.
23.49
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, VSO
and VS1 at maximum weight must not exceed 61 knots for-

(1) Single-engine airplanes; and

(2) Multiengine airplanes of 6,000 pounds or less maximum
weight that cannot meet the minimum rate of climb specified
in §23.67(a) (1) with the critical engine inoperative.

(d) All single-engine airplanes, and those multiengine
airplanes of 6,000 pounds or less maximum weight with a VSO
of more than 61 knots that do not meet the requirements of
§23.67(a)(1), must comply with §23.562(d).



So any single can be flown at 90 knots and have a safety
margin in a 60 degree bank.

http://selair.selkirk.bc.ca/aerodynamics1/Lift/Min_Radius.html



Remember the radius is in the middle of the river and you
need to be smaller radius than half the river's width.





> wrote in message
ups.com...
|
| Dylan Smith wrote:
| > On 2006-10-13, Mike > wrote:
| > >> The type of aircraft he was in was utterly
irrelevant. Smashing into a
| > >> building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting
a building in a
| > >> Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.
| > >>
| > >
| > > How do you know the aircraft is irrelevant? Please
post your source.
| >
| > F=ma (force = mass x acceleration). Or in this case,
deceleration.
| >
| > A 100kg human in an ultralight travelling at 25
metres/sec hitting a
| > building and decelerating to zero in 0.5 sec (entirely
plausable) will
| > experience a force of 100 * 50 newtons (5,000 newtons)
in the initial
| > impact. Not to mention the bits of the building which
are likely to
| > shatter and pierce the body. But a force of 5,000
newtons against a
| > human body is usually enough to kill. So it's pretty
irrelevant whether
| > a plane is a slow one or a fast one like a Cirrus -
slamming (to use
| > Lune's favorite word) into the side of a building is
usually not going
| > to be survivable.
| >
| > --
| > Yes, the Reply-To email address is valid.
| > Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute:
http://oolite-linux.berlios.de
|
|
| You've only argued that the type of aircraft was
irrelevant at the
| point of impact. I think we can all agree on that! But
that dismisses
| the possibility that this accident might not have happened
if the
| aircraft had been slower - like a C150. (more time to
react and less
| radius to turn, etc...). I don't believe this was a case
of a pilot
| blindly flying into an object that was not easily visible
from the
| cockpit (like hitting a mountain at night or in the fog).
It seems
| more likely that either they were incapable of making the
required
| tight turn (poor planning, staying ahead of the aircraft)
and hit the
| building while trying to turn, or they lost control for
some unknown
| reason (stall, aircraft malfunction, etc) and the building
simply got
| in the way of the uncontroled flight/fall to earth. In
either of those
| scenerios, aircraft type could very well be relevant.
|

[Mxsmanic]

Joe Feise writes:

> Bull. He did the right thing, realizing that he was a low-time pilot, and had a
> flight instructor with him.

So why are they both dead?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Mxsmanic]

Happy Dog writes:

> Here's a guaranteed laugh:
>
> What kind of plane do you suggest he should have been flying that would have
> made this accident less likely?

I don't have enough information to make a suggestion.

> If there's any increased overall risk in flying a Cirrus, it's the false
> sense of security it may give some pilots flying IFR.

More generally, it's the the false sense of security it may give some
pilots.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Mxsmanic]

Dylan Smith writes:

> The type of aircraft he was in was utterly irrelevant. Smashing into a
> building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting a building in a
> Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.

But a Cessna 150 has no parachute to give inexperienced pilots the
impression that they are less likely to die in an accident.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Happy Dog]

"Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
...
> Dylan Smith writes:
>
>> The type of aircraft he was in was utterly irrelevant. Smashing into a
>> building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting a building in a
>> Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.
>
> But a Cessna 150 has no parachute to give inexperienced pilots the
> impression that they are less likely to die in an accident.

Or experienced ones. And, it's irrelevant.

moo

[Happy Dog]

"Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
>> What kind of plane do you suggest he should have been flying that would
>> have
>> made this accident less likely?
>
> I don't have enough information to make a suggestion.

That never stopped you before.
>
>> If there's any increased overall risk in flying a Cirrus, it's the false
>> sense of security it may give some pilots flying IFR.
>
> More generally, it's the the false sense of security it may give some
> pilots.

Why is the sense of security false? Are you suggesting that glass cockpits
aren't a very good thing?

m

[Mxsmanic]

Happy Dog writes:

> Why is the sense of security false?

Because the set of situations in which the gadgets actually increase
security is much smaller than the set of situations in which they
_appear_ increase security to the unsophisticated observer.

> Are you suggesting that glass cockpits aren't a very good thing?

In theory, they are fine. In practice, I don't trust them. There are
extremely complex systems that are not adequately tested or debugged,
and they are backed by computers, which have catastrophic failure
modes that more traditional avionics systems do not share.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Happy Dog]

"Mxsmanic" > wrote in
>> Why is the sense of security false?
>
> Because the set of situations in which the gadgets actually increase
> security is much smaller than the set of situations in which they
> _appear_ increase security to the unsophisticated observer.

Examples, please.
>
>> Are you suggesting that glass cockpits aren't a very good thing?
>
> In theory, they are fine. In practice, I don't trust them. There are
> extremely complex systems that are not adequately tested or debugged,
> and they are backed by computers, which have catastrophic failure
> modes that more traditional avionics systems do not share.

And these failures have resulted in how many accidents vs. those caused by
failures in old technology avionics?

moo

[Mxsmanic]

Happy Dog writes:

> Examples, please.

Parachutes on Cirrus aircraft.

> And these failures have resulted in how many accidents vs. those caused by
> failures in old technology avionics?

They aren't widespread enough in most parts of the industry to be a
problem yet, and in any case, avionics failures are not a leading
cause of accidents, IIRC.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Andrew Gideon]

On Fri, 13 Oct 2006 16:32:45 -0400, Happy Dog wrote:

> Why is the sense of security false? Are you suggesting that glass
> cockpits aren't a very good thing?

You didn't read about NW_Pilot's Atlantic Crossing?

- Andrew

[Andrew Gideon]

On Fri, 13 Oct 2006 12:16:43 -0400, Peter R. wrote:

> My recollection of these accidents is that at least two of those three
> were a result of a mechanic incorrectly mounting the ailerons, not
> inherent control system design flaws.

I don't know anything about these incidents. However, if I noted that the
number of "mechanic installed incorrectly" was unusually high for
something, I'd look for a problem which caused this. It could be
design...or perhaps documentation, training, or something else.

- Andrew

[Andrew Gideon]

On Fri, 13 Oct 2006 09:23:46 -0700, cosmo_kramer1 wrote:

> I think we can all agree on that!

Balloon?

- Andrew

[Matt Whiting]

Dylan Smith wrote:

> On 2006-10-13, Mxsmanic > wrote:
>
>>Also, it seems like the aircraft is actively marketed to precisely
>>this type of buyer, which makes things even worse. It looks like Carl
>>Lidle fell for it (in more ways than one).
>
>
> The type of aircraft he was in was utterly irrelevant. Smashing into a
> building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting a building in a
> Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.
>

It is completely relevant. A Cessna 150 could make the turn much
tighter than could a Cirrus. They may well have missed the building
easily had they been in a slower airplane.


Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Dylan Smith wrote:

> On 2006-10-13, Mike > wrote:
>
>>>The type of aircraft he was in was utterly irrelevant. Smashing into a
>>>building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting a building in a
>>>Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.
>>>
>>
>>How do you know the aircraft is irrelevant? Please post your source.
>
>
> F=ma (force = mass x acceleration). Or in this case, deceleration.
>
> A 100kg human in an ultralight travelling at 25 metres/sec hitting a
> building and decelerating to zero in 0.5 sec (entirely plausable) will
> experience a force of 100 * 50 newtons (5,000 newtons) in the initial
> impact. Not to mention the bits of the building which are likely to
> shatter and pierce the body. But a force of 5,000 newtons against a
> human body is usually enough to kill. So it's pretty irrelevant whether
> a plane is a slow one or a fast one like a Cirrus - slamming (to use
> Lune's favorite word) into the side of a building is usually not going
> to be survivable.
>

You are making the flawed assumption that the type of airplane has no
bearing on whether the crash occurred. A slower airplane may well have
avoided the crash and thus your analysis above is irrelevant.


Matt

[Owen[_4_]]

Jim Macklin wrote:

> Thurman Munson also had a CFI with him too. A CFI who is
> not experienced in the airspace, or airplane is a broken
> crutch. A PIC accompanied by a CFI is not doing his command
> job. Rules by the Yankee's organization to require a CFI
> should require active crew resource management, planning and
> dispatch by the CFI. Two pilots waiting for the other to
> make a decision will have an accident sooner or later.
> IMHO
> http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR80-02.pdf#search=%22NTSB-AAR-80-2%22

The report you cite mentions that Munson's "instructor" was merely a passenger for the
flight. He had no flying experience in turbojet aircraft (I assume they mean as
pilot). The instructor in this accident apparently was well aquainted with the
aircraft type and provided instruction in that type. As for airspace awareness, that
may well be a factor and there is no subsitute for local experience. However the
airspace around Manhattan is not a secret and I would expect an instructor to be able
to obtain all of the information needed to safely pass through that airspace, from the
terminal chart, from talking to local pilots, and just mentally calculating the turn as
well as both pilots keeping their eyes outside the airplane.

Does anyone know at what elevation the impact took place? Were the pilots trying to
change the turn at the last minute if they suddenly saw the building, or is there
anything to suggest that they knew they were headed for the building but unable to
change course (mechanical malfunction), despite trying to do so? I'm very curious
about the time interval between when they first realized there could be a collision and
the impact.

[Happy Dog]

"Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
...
> Happy Dog writes:
>
>> Examples, please.
>
> Parachutes on Cirrus aircraft.

You said:

> Because the set of situations in which the gadgets actually increase
> security is much smaller than the set of situations in which they
> _appear_ increase security to the unsophisticated observer.

Examples of the "situations" to which you refer.
>
>> And these failures have resulted in how many accidents vs. those caused
>> by
>> failures in old technology avionics?
>
> They aren't widespread enough in most parts of the industry to be a
> problem yet, and in any case, avionics failures are not a leading
> cause of accidents, IIRC.

Sub-clinical, right? IOW, you can't back your claim with statistics.

m

[Mxsmanic]

Happy Dog writes:

> Examples of the "situations" to which you refer.

The recent crash of a Cirrus in Manhattan.

> Sub-clinical, right? IOW, you can't back your claim with statistics.

I don't need to back my claim at all. This isn't a contest.

I've worked with computers for decades. I know how poorly they are
programmed and how badly systems are designed. I know that nothing
with the apparent functionality of certain glass cockpits today can
possibly be certified safe for the price points at which they are
sold. Therefore they are almost certainly accidents waiting to
happen.

Nothing prevents you from flying with such equipment, if you choose
not to believe me (or if you enjoy taking risks). But I would suggest
that you limit your flights to VMC if you are using glass instruments,
and not fly anything that gives glass avionics control over the
aircraft unless you have a positive way of disconnecting that control.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[mike regish]

One was due to a design flaw. The gap between the ailerons and wing was too
small and in a turn, with sufficient G forces and the accompanying bend in
the wing, the aileron jammed in position. I have to admit, I forget if this
resulted in a fatal accident or not.

mike

"Peter R." > wrote in message
...
> Denny > wrote:
>
>> Since you challenged me I just now did a partial search of the NTSB on
>> the 20 fatals in SR-20's, which reveals that 3 were the result of
>> control system failure.
>
> My recollection of these accidents is that at least two of those three
> were a result of a mechanic incorrectly mounting the ailerons, not
> inherent
> control system design flaws.
>
>
> --
> Peter

[Neil Gould]

Recently, Mxsmanic > posted:
>
> Nothing prevents you from flying with such equipment, if you choose
> not to believe me (or if you enjoy taking risks). But I would suggest
> that you limit your flights to VMC if you are using glass instruments,
> and not fly anything that gives glass avionics control over the
> aircraft unless you have a positive way of disconnecting that control.
>
And, your basis for this "suggestion" is...?

Just because the computers you borrow from others are unreliable does not
impact the reliability of aviation electronics. Perhaps you should read up
on the reliability of traditional gauges before making such absurd and
ill-informed "suggestions".

Neil

[Mxsmanic]

Neil Gould writes:

> And, your basis for this "suggestion" is...?

My experience with computers.

> Just because the computers you borrow from others are unreliable does not
> impact the reliability of aviation electronics. Perhaps you should read up
> on the reliability of traditional gauges before making such absurd and
> ill-informed "suggestions".

I know a great deal about computers, but I don't tell other people
that they are absurd and ill-informed just because they know less.
Ponder on that.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Happy Dog]

"Mxsmanic" > wrote in
>> Examples of the "situations" to which you refer.
>
> The recent crash of a Cirrus in Manhattan.

You said:

> Because the set of situations in which the gadgets actually increase
> security is much smaller than the set of situations in which they
> _appear_ increase security to the unsophisticated observer.

Now you're just being obtuse.

>
>> Sub-clinical, right? IOW, you can't back your claim with statistics.
>
> I don't need to back my claim at all. This isn't a contest.

Correct. You don't even have to make a coherent response at all. But, it's
generally accepted that only trolls and morons make statements they won't
back up.
>
> I've worked with computers for decades. I know how poorly they are
> programmed and how badly systems are designed. I know that nothing
> with the apparent functionality of certain glass cockpits today can
> possibly be certified safe for the price points at which they are
> sold. Therefore they are almost certainly accidents waiting to
> happen.

In your opinion for which, as you note, you don't need to provide any
evidence.
>
> Nothing prevents you from flying with such equipment, if you choose
> not to believe me (or if you enjoy taking risks). But I would suggest
> that you limit your flights to VMC if you are using glass instruments,
> and not fly anything that gives glass avionics control over the
> aircraft unless you have a positive way of disconnecting that control.

You don't really know much about avionics. I back that statement with the
above paragraph as evidence.

m

[Happy Dog]

"Mxsmanic" >
> Neil Gould writes:
>
>> And, your basis for this "suggestion" is...?
>
> My experience with computers.
>
>> Just because the computers you borrow from others are unreliable does not
>> impact the reliability of aviation electronics. Perhaps you should read
>> up
>> on the reliability of traditional gauges before making such absurd and
>> ill-informed "suggestions".
>
> I know a great deal about computers, but I don't tell other people
> that they are absurd and ill-informed just because they know less.
> Ponder on that.

I have. So identify some "computers" that you have concluded are acceptably
trustworthy in similarly critical situations. I won't bother to ask you to
explain the reasoning behind your answer. Just want to see you hoist
yourself even further.

m

[Mxsmanic]

Happy Dog writes:

> I have. So identify some "computers" that you have concluded are acceptably
> trustworthy in similarly critical situations.

The ones NASA put in Apollo spacecraft are acceptably trustworthy, as
are some others used on certain other craft (such as some Space
Shuttle computers), based on what I've heard of their development
process. Some avionics software is trustworthy, but less and less of
it.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Dylan Smith]

On 2006-10-13, > wrote:
> You've only argued that the type of aircraft was irrelevant at the
> point of impact. I think we can all agree on that! But that dismisses
> the possibility that this accident might not have happened if the
> aircraft had been slower - like a C150.

True enough. But much of the original assertion was that the SR-20 is
the problem. If it was speed vs pilot reaction time - it's still not the
"fault" of the SR-20 or something that is disfavorable to the SR-20's
safety features. It could quite easily have been a Bonanza, a Mooney, a
Baron or a Van's RV-4.

--
Yes, the Reply-To email address is valid.
Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute: http://oolite-linux.berlios.de

[Dylan Smith]

On 2006-10-14, mike regish > wrote:
> One was due to a design flaw. The gap between the ailerons and wing was too
> small and in a turn, with sufficient G forces and the accompanying bend in
> the wing, the aileron jammed in position. I have to admit, I forget if this
> resulted in a fatal accident or not.

That did result in a fatality IIRC - and it was in the test flying phase
of the aircraft. I expect the production aircraft was modified in the
light of this - after all, test flying is supposed to shake out bugs
like this. Occasionally, test flying is fatal to the test pilot.

--
Yes, the Reply-To email address is valid.
Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute: http://oolite-linux.berlios.de

[Dylan Smith]

On 2006-10-13, Matt Barrow > wrote:
> What are the rates for comparable aircraft, such as the Columbia 300,
> Skylane...?

Not wanting to pick nits, but the Skylane is hardly comparable to the
SR-20. In terms of how the pilot needs to be ahead of the plane (i.e.
cruise speed), planes like Mooneys, Bonanzas and that kind of class are
more comparable. The Cirrus aircraft are fast and slippery and the pilot
needs to stay ahead of them to the same extent they would in a Bo.

--
Yes, the Reply-To email address is valid.
Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute: http://oolite-linux.berlios.de

[Christopher Brian Colohan]

Well, the ones from before 1880 were!

Don't believe me? Why don't you try one and see?

;-)

Chris

"Jim Macklin" > writes:
> Everyone who ate tomatoes before the year 1880 is dead!
> Therefore tomatoes must be poisonous.
>
>
>
> "Marco Leon" > wrote in message
> oups.com...
> | Jay Honeck wrote:
> | > The long knives are coming out now... This excerpted
> from an AP
> | > article this evening:
> | >
> | > "Hersman said that as of September, there were 545 SR20s
> registered in
> | > the United States. Since 2001, the NTSB has investigated
> 18 accidents
> | > involving the plane; those crashes resulted in 14
> deaths."
> | >
> | > They sure make that sound terrible, don't they? Why, in
> just five
> | > years, 3.3% of the SR-20 fleet has been lost to
> accidents, resulting in
> | > 14 deaths!
> | >
> | > Heck, that means that in, um, er, something like 151.5
> years there will
> | > be NO Cirrus SR-20s left flying at all! See the whole
> article here:
> |
> | Yeah, but the bright side is that in only 100 years, the
> Cirrus SR-20
> | fatality rate will be nil! Did you know that the Sopwith
> Camel was one
> | of the SAFEST aircraft last year? ZERO fatalities! Wow!
> |
> | Statistics have sharp edges on both sides.
> |
> | Marco
> |

[[email protected]]

Did you read the thread about NW Pilot having his G1000 Garmin go
bonkers at night over the Atlantic in IMC during a ferry flight to
Lebanon? It was caused by the fuel senders, definately a software
glitch. The darn thing kept rebooting every minute or so. He had to
rely on his handheld GPS, HF radio, and steam gyros to make it back to
Greenland.

Bud

Neil Gould wrote:
> Recently, Mxsmanic > posted:
> >
> > Nothing prevents you from flying with such equipment, if you choose
> > not to believe me (or if you enjoy taking risks). But I would suggest
> > that you limit your flights to VMC if you are using glass instruments,
> > and not fly anything that gives glass avionics control over the
> > aircraft unless you have a positive way of disconnecting that control.
> >
> And, your basis for this "suggestion" is...?
>
> Just because the computers you borrow from others are unreliable does not
> impact the reliability of aviation electronics. Perhaps you should read up
> on the reliability of traditional gauges before making such absurd and
> ill-informed "suggestions".
>
> Neil

[Neil Gould]

Recently, Mxsmanic > posted:

> Neil Gould writes:
>
>> And, your basis for this "suggestion" is...?
>
> My experience with computers.
>
>> Just because the computers you borrow from others are unreliable
>> does not impact the reliability of aviation electronics. Perhaps you
>> should read up on the reliability of traditional gauges before
>> making such absurd and ill-informed "suggestions".
>
> I know a great deal about computers, but I don't tell other people
> that they are absurd and ill-informed just because they know less.
>
And, of course, you've missed the point entirely. Things fail in aircraft.
Traditional gauges rely on mechanics that have more than one failure mode,
and at some point *will* fail. Pilots train from early in basic flying
lessons on how to recognize and deal with these failures so that they
don't become catastrophic events. Pilots train to deal with glass panel
failure, just as with traditional gauges, and there is no reason to think
that the loss of a glass panel will be any more dangerous than the loss of
electrical power or a vacuum pump in a plane with traditional gauges. If
anything, glass panel failure is likely to be *less* dangerous, because
certification of aircraft requires backups of critical functions with
traditional gauges, something not required in other aircraft. Therefore,
your "suggestion" has no valid basis, and only adds to the FUD factor that
many of your posts reflect.

Finally, you should be able to tell the difference between someone calling
you "absurd and ill-informed" and calling your suggestion "absurd and
ill-informed". In case you can't; my comment was NOT an ad-hominem attack
on you personally.

Neil

[Mxsmanic]

Neil Gould writes:

> And, of course, you've missed the point entirely. Things fail in aircraft.

That is not the point.

The point is that glass cockpits are orders of magnitude more complex
than traditional cockpits. They cannot be fully tested and still be
kept affordable. They depend on computers rather than mechanical
parts, and are thus prone to have undiscovered and catastrophic
failure modes.

> Traditional gauges rely on mechanics that have more than one failure mode,
> and at some point *will* fail.

All mechanical devices are constrained in their failure modes by the
natural physical laws affecting their components. Computerized
devices have no such constraints, and can (and do) fail
catastrophically in many cases.

It is impossible for a physical throttle control to move
instantaneously from full throttle to idle, but a digital throttle
setting in a FADEC can easily move from 99 (full throttle) to 00
(idle) with a single incrementation, by rolling over. This is a
typical type of catastrophic failure mode.

> Pilots train from early in basic flying
> lessons on how to recognize and deal with these failures so that they
> don't become catastrophic events.

Their training includes nothing at all concerning computer failure
modes. Even if it did, they would not necessarily be able to deal
with the type of catastrophic failures that computer systems can
experience.

> Pilots train to deal with glass panel
> failure, just as with traditional gauges, and there is no reason to think
> that the loss of a glass panel will be any more dangerous than the loss of
> electrical power or a vacuum pump in a plane with traditional gauges.

Anything driven by a computer is potentially more dangerous because
there is no connection between the computerized representation of the
physical world and the actual physical world. Thus, there are no
constraints on failure modes, and computers lack the tendency to fail
safe that mechanical systems have.

> If anything, glass panel failure is likely to be *less* dangerous, because
> certification of aircraft requires backups of critical functions with
> traditional gauges, something not required in other aircraft.

Glass panel failures are dangerous because pilots don't realize how
glass panels can fail, and because glass panels may be given full
authority over certain functions without any possibility of a
mechanical pilot override.

I've been interested in this domain for the past quarter-century or
so, and I've learned much about it. What I know worries me,
especially when I see wholesale adoption of untested, unverified
computer systems in life-critical applications.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Neil Gould]

Recently, Mxsmanic > posted:

> Neil Gould writes:
>
>> And, of course, you've missed the point entirely. Things fail in
>> aircraft.
>
> That is not the point.
>
> The point is that glass cockpits are orders of magnitude more complex
> than traditional cockpits. They cannot be fully tested and still be
> kept affordable.
>
The main difference between glass panels and mechanical gauges is the
method of feeding sensor information to the pilot. That doesn't require
any complex software that can't be thoroughly tested. In fact, it doesn't
require software at all; control of display information can be done in
firmware that has been thoroughly tested, and many avionics do exactly
that. Complex PFDs are an integration of mulitple subsystems into a single
display presentation, and can be just as reliable -- or unreliable,
depending on one's point of view -- as traditional cockpits.

> They depend on computers rather than mechanical
> parts, and are thus prone to have undiscovered and catastrophic
> failure modes.
>
Regardless of how many "catastrophic failure modes" might exist in a glass
panel, they will present the same level of risk to the pilot of GA
aircraft.

>> Traditional gauges rely on mechanics that have more than one failure
>> mode, and at some point *will* fail.
>
> All mechanical devices are constrained in their failure modes by the
> natural physical laws affecting their components.
>
That doesn't make one bit of difference, given that the failure modes are
numerous and can present a serious problem in and of themselves. Having
experienced a vacuum pump failure early in my training, I can tell you
that I'm glad I wasn't in IMC at the time. Yet, pilots with IFR ratings
can and do survive vacuum system failures in IMC.

> Computerized
> devices have no such constraints, and can (and do) fail
> catastrophically in many cases.
>
It really doesn't matter, but then, as you've had no training whatsoever,
you wouldn't know that.

> It is impossible for a physical throttle control to move
> instantaneously from full throttle to idle,
>
Oh? What happens if the throttle cable breaks? All mechanical functions
have their failure modes, and to think that there are none for such things
as throttles is pretty risky. It's that attitude thing I've been talking
about lately.

>> Pilots train from early in basic flying
>> lessons on how to recognize and deal with these failures so that they
>> don't become catastrophic events.
>
> Their training includes nothing at all concerning computer failure
> modes. Even if it did, they would not necessarily be able to deal
> with the type of catastrophic failures that computer systems can
> experience.
>
The most serious failure of a glass panel would be that it shuts down
completely. That should not result in a catastrophic event, given that
critical functions are duplicated by mechanical gauges. It seems like a
big problem to you because your entire perspective revolves around a
computer, but flying real airplanes involves a lot more than that, as you
have been told numerous times, now.

>> Pilots train to deal with glass panel
>> failure, just as with traditional gauges, and there is no reason to
>> think that the loss of a glass panel will be any more dangerous than
>> the loss of electrical power or a vacuum pump in a plane with
>> traditional gauges.
>
> Anything driven by a computer is potentially more dangerous because
> there is no connection between the computerized representation of the
> physical world and the actual physical world. Thus, there are no
> constraints on failure modes, and computers lack the tendency to fail
> safe that mechanical systems have.
>
What "fail safe" did you have in mind w/r/t mechanical systems?
Apparently, you are completely unaware of the possible failure modes of
traditional cockpits. The only "fail safe" that I'm aware of is the
training of the pilot and their ability to arrive at viable alternatives
when something breaks.

>> If anything, glass panel failure is likely to be *less* dangerous,
>> because certification of aircraft requires backups of critical
>> functions with traditional gauges, something not required in other
>> aircraft.
>
> Glass panel failures are dangerous because pilots don't realize how
> glass panels can fail, and because glass panels may be given full
> authority over certain functions without any possibility of a
> mechanical pilot override.
>
Once again, you've missed the point entirely. Ultimately, it doesn't
matter why the panel fails, and nobody in their right mind is going to
worry about why it failed while they're flying the plane. All that is
necessary is that the failure is recognized, which pilots are trained to
do, just as they are with mechanical gauges.

Neil

[Roger (K8RI)]

On 13 Oct 2006 04:02:59 -0700, "Denny" > wrote:

>Garry, the real question is what actually happened?
>Was that an intentional turn or a control failure with the pilots
>desperately trying to regain control? Cirrus has a flawed record when
>it comes to the control systems...
>Was the turn back deliberate and due to engine failure? There are
>ground witnesses <unreliable, but a datum point> who said the engine
>was loud <i.e. running, even if running rough>
>
>Yes, he was a low time pilot, but he had reached the point to start his
>instrument training so he wasn't completely green, he had flown the
>airplane cross country (coast to coast as I read it) at some point...
>USAF pilots are turned loose in supersonic fighters with less time than
>he had...
>
>The bad part of such a devastating crash is the airplane being totally
>mangled to the point that we will never be able to answer the basic
>questions - i.e. control failure, fuel contamination, etc...
>
>OTOH, it has been 51 years since the previous accidental impact of an

That one was a lot bigger too!
Admittedly he only had one more engine even if it was a tad larger.

>airplane against a tall building in NYC... By the time the next one
>comes around, you and I won't care...
>
>denny
Roger Halstead (K8RI & ARRL life member)
(N833R, S# CD-2 Worlds oldest Debonair)
www.rogerhalstead.com

[Mike[_11_]]

Dylan Smith wrote:
> On 2006-10-13, Mike > wrote:
>>> The type of aircraft he was in was utterly irrelevant. Smashing into a
>>> building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting a building in a
>>> Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.
>>>
>> How do you know the aircraft is irrelevant? Please post your source.
>
> F=ma (force = mass x acceleration). Or in this case, deceleration.
>
> A 100kg human in an ultralight travelling at 25 metres/sec hitting a
> building and decelerating to zero in 0.5 sec (entirely plausable) will
> experience a force of 100 * 50 newtons (5,000 newtons) in the initial
> impact. Not to mention the bits of the building which are likely to
> shatter and pierce the body. But a force of 5,000 newtons against a
> human body is usually enough to kill. So it's pretty irrelevant whether
> a plane is a slow one or a fast one like a Cirrus - slamming (to use
> Lune's favorite word) into the side of a building is usually not going
> to be survivable.
>

I was asking how the aircraft is unrelated to the accident, not how the
physics of the collision proves fatal for a particular set of conditions.

--
Mike

[girmann]

Yeech.

In the interest of educating the people reading this thread about how
embedded electronics are designed - and in doing so increase the signal
to noise ratio - I am going to spout off about how electronics like
this are designed. While I do not have specific information about how
a/c electronics are designed, I have enough designs under my belt to
speak about these systems in general.

I fully expect MX to reply to this with more "correct sounding"
misinformation - don't believe it.

While it is true that "computers" are notoriously unreliable (and I
put quotes around computers to denote commodity computer hardware that
you can buy at your local computer store) embedded hardware is designed
to be extrodinarily robust. Most embedded hardware is at least
partially redundant. (Modern aviaonics qualifies as an embedded
system)

Embedded systems that are designed when human lives are on the line
ALWAYS fail safe and almost always have completely separate redundant
systems. Embedded hardware that runs software always has multiple
forms of backups. Software has internal, low-level status monitors
verifying the software's operation. Microprocessors have internal and
external "watchdogs" to make sure that the software is performing
correctly. When a fault is detected in the processor, there can be an
analog backup to the microprocessor that gives limited but core
functionality. Multiple sensors are combined to verify that one errant
sensor will not take down the system or give incorrect information.
Novel checking techniques are used to verify the health and wiring of
the unit to the sensors.

To give a real life example, a fire alarm panel that is in charge of
evacuating a building has a microprocessor and runs software. If the
software fails, the hardware has the ability to reset the software to
get the software to work again. If this fails, there is analog
circuitry that can function without the microprocessor. (You lose some
functionality, but you still get people out of the building in case of
a fire). There are battery backups that can power all of the
annunciators in case of a power outage. The panel can detect the
health of the wiring to the detectors and annunciators and indicate
failures in both. There are even techniques where the panel will not
evacuate unless it gets confirmation of a fire from its "nearest
neighbor" detector to prevent false alarms. As a final piece, it must
be tested to ensure that the fire panel cannot cause a fire on its own.

Bottom line is this: just because "computers" are unreliable doesn't
mean electronics and other types of hardware equipment are unreliable
as well. To prove my point, if anyone has a G1000 they would be
willing to have an engineer tear down and show these types of
redundancies, I'll give you my address. ;-)

Mark

As an aside, I didn't understand how anyone could get so fired up about
MX's misinformation - until he started spouting misinformation about
stuff I do. The more I live, the more learn to try to walk in other
people's shoes...

[Gig 601XL Builder]

> wrote in message
ups.com...
> Did you read the thread about NW Pilot having his G1000 Garmin go
> bonkers at night over the Atlantic in IMC during a ferry flight to
> Lebanon? It was caused by the fuel senders, definately a software
> glitch. The darn thing kept rebooting every minute or so. He had to
> rely on his handheld GPS, HF radio, and steam gyros to make it back to
> Greenland.
>

That was one of the POSSIBLE causes. Others included the "hacked Up"
installation of the entertainment system that was in the aircraft. The truth
is we don't know and may not ever know what was wrong with that G1000
system.

[Mxsmanic]

girmann writes:

> While it is true that "computers" are notoriously unreliable (and I
> put quotes around computers to denote commodity computer hardware that
> you can buy at your local computer store) embedded hardware is designed
> to be extrodinarily robust. Most embedded hardware is at least
> partially redundant. (Modern aviaonics qualifies as an embedded
> system)

The failures in glass cockpits are most likely to be software
failures, not hardware failures.

> Embedded systems that are designed when human lives are on the line
> ALWAYS fail safe and almost always have completely separate redundant
> systems.

Not true, unfortunately. Think Therac-25.

> To give a real life example, a fire alarm panel that is in charge of
> evacuating a building has a microprocessor and runs software. If the
> software fails, the hardware has the ability to reset the software to
> get the software to work again.

If the software fails, the system is already defective.

> Bottom line is this: just because "computers" are unreliable doesn't
> mean electronics and other types of hardware equipment are unreliable
> as well.

True. Unfortunately, when the overall safety of the system depends to
any degree upon software, the reliability of the electronics and
hardware do not suffice.

> To prove my point, if anyone has a G1000 they would be
> willing to have an engineer tear down and show these types of
> redundancies, I'll give you my address. ;-)

You need to look at the code, not the hardware.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[girmann]

Bud,

Ooops. My bad.

You know what, I did read about that - so in choosing the G1000, I
chose a bad example in which to make my point. I just hope that it
wasn't lost.


wrote:
> Did you read the thread about NW Pilot having his G1000 Garmin go
> bonkers at night over the Atlantic in IMC during a ferry flight to
> Lebanon? It was caused by the fuel senders, definately a software
> glitch. The darn thing kept rebooting every minute or so. He had to
> rely on his handheld GPS, HF radio, and steam gyros to make it back to
> Greenland.
>
> Bud
>
> Neil Gould wrote:
> > Recently, Mxsmanic > posted:
> > >
> > > Nothing prevents you from flying with such equipment, if you choose
> > > not to believe me (or if you enjoy taking risks). But I would suggest
> > > that you limit your flights to VMC if you are using glass instruments,
> > > and not fly anything that gives glass avionics control over the
> > > aircraft unless you have a positive way of disconnecting that control.
> > >
> > And, your basis for this "suggestion" is...?
> >
> > Just because the computers you borrow from others are unreliable does not
> > impact the reliability of aviation electronics. Perhaps you should read up
> > on the reliability of traditional gauges before making such absurd and
> > ill-informed "suggestions".
> >
> > Neil

[Neil Gould]

Recently, girmann > posted:

> Bud,
>
> Ooops. My bad.
>
> You know what, I did read about that - so in choosing the G1000, I
> chose a bad example in which to make my point. I just hope that it
> wasn't lost.
>
Not only was it not lost, the facts of NW_Pilot's experience witht the
G1000 have not been established by anyone on this list. Given the whole
story, and that the panel was hacked into by an outfit whose other
products had definite design flaws, I suspect they are the more likely
culprit. No matter how robust a computer system is, it can be messed with
by a dolt with a drill.

Neil


> wrote:
>> Did you read the thread about NW Pilot having his G1000 Garmin go
>> bonkers at night over the Atlantic in IMC during a ferry flight to
>> Lebanon? It was caused by the fuel senders, definately a software
>> glitch. The darn thing kept rebooting every minute or so. He had to
>> rely on his handheld GPS, HF radio, and steam gyros to make it back
>> to Greenland.
>>
>> Bud
>>
>> Neil Gould wrote:
>>> Recently, Mxsmanic > posted:
>>>>
>>>> Nothing prevents you from flying with such equipment, if you choose
>>>> not to believe me (or if you enjoy taking risks). But I would
>>>> suggest that you limit your flights to VMC if you are using glass
>>>> instruments, and not fly anything that gives glass avionics
>>>> control over the aircraft unless you have a positive way of
>>>> disconnecting that control.
>>>>
>>> And, your basis for this "suggestion" is...?
>>>
>>> Just because the computers you borrow from others are unreliable
>>> does not impact the reliability of aviation electronics. Perhaps
>>> you should read up on the reliability of traditional gauges before
>>> making such absurd and ill-informed "suggestions".
>>>
>>> Neil

[Grumman-581[_4_]]

On Oct 13, 5:39 am, Dylan Smith > wrote:
> The type of aircraft he was in was utterly irrelevant. Smashing into a
> building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting a building in a
> Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.

That would depend upon how high above the ground you hit the building,
wouldn't it? With a slow enough crash and adequate personal
protection, it might be survivable if the remains of the plane didn't
have far to fall... Not that it is something that I want to try out...
One aircraft destroyed is more than enough for me...

http://grumman581.googlepages.com/gyro-02.jpg

[Grumman-581[_4_]]

On Oct 13, 6:11 pm, Matt Whiting > wrote:
> They may well have missed the building
> easily had they been in a slower airplane.

Or been a bit higher... Or started their turn a bit earlier or later...
I believe that the technical term for this is "**** HAPPENS"...

[Matt Whiting]

Grumman-581 wrote:

> On Oct 13, 6:11 pm, Matt Whiting > wrote:
>
>>They may well have missed the building
>>easily had they been in a slower airplane.
>
>
> Or been a bit higher... Or started their turn a bit earlier or later...
> I believe that the technical term for this is "**** HAPPENS"...
>

No, that is for things that are out of your control. If they really did
make too wide a turn (and I'm not convinced they did at this point),
then that is in the category of stupidity.

Matt

[Big John]

Owen

----clip----

>Does anyone know at what elevation the impact took place? Were the pilots trying to
>change the turn at the last minute if they suddenly saw the building, or is there
>anything to suggest that they knew they were headed for the building but unable to
>change course (mechanical malfunction), despite trying to do so? I'm very curious
>about the time interval between when they first realized there could be a collision and
>the impact.


The time interval you asked about is just enought to say "Oh S**t".

I'm assuming you asked a valid question and I tried to give a truthful
answer from my experience listening to 'black boxes" after accidents.

Big John

[Grumman-581[_3_]]

"Big John" > wrote in message
...
> The time interval you asked about is just enought to say "Oh S**t".
>
> I'm assuming you asked a valid question and I tried to give a truthful
> answer from my experience listening to 'black boxes" after accidents.

Having had my share of 'incidents' over the years, I can definitely attest
to that... *Maybe* if there's a bit more time, you get to think, "This is
*really* gonna hurt"...