start making the ST21, AST21, ASF-14 and A-12 Flying Dorito!

[AirRaid[_2_]]

for cripes sake, the F/A-18E Super Hornet is not good enough to be the
navy's only fighter, and neither is the future JSF / F-35.

the Pentagon, Navy and NorthropeGrumman should resurrect plans for the

Super Tomcat 21
Attack Super Tomcat 21
and ASF-14 (Advanced Strike Fighter-14)

along with the 100-200 mile range Advanced Air To Air Missile

as well as the A-12 Avenger II 'Flying Dorito' aka mini stealth bomber


relying on the Super Hornet, it's almost as if the higher-ups who hate
america want the Navy to get its ass kicked and America to go down.

the Navy no longer officially has any mach 2.0+ fighters!

the Super Hornet should've been something of mach 2.5 class that went
into service in the late 80s, with even more powerful engines,
canards, and 3D-thrust vectoring to make it a super-maneuverable
fighter that could counter the Su-37 Terminator (and its brothers), but
with exellent attack capability.

the A-12 becomes the primary bomber/strike plane with the ability to
defend itself from other fighters.

the Super Tomcat 21 or the even more advanced ASF-14 would've been an
exellent alternative to the NATF / F-22N, a 1990s and 21st Century
FLEET DEFENDER with decent maneuverability, much easier to mantain,
crew of 1, 8, AAAMs plus 2 medium range AAMs plus 2 short range
AAMs, plus 30mm cannon and perhaps even a chemical laser for knife
fights. (smaller version of the Airborne Laser on the modified 747s.


plus the Attack Super Tomcat 21 (faster than the A-12 Avenger II) for
F-15 Strike Eagle-like capability.

plus a new class of supercarrier 2x the size of Nimitz-class, that's a
half a mile long. with an airwing of 150+ aircraft, to carry lots of
these new aircraft with their increased payload and needs.

plus a new small 'fast carrier', smaller than the Nimitz class, with
60-70 aircraft that can get across the world in 1/2 to 2/3 the time it
takes a supercarrier

oh yeah im dreaming now.


this is gonna be a big thread, i can feel in my bones.

hey, at least the videogame company SEGA has the right spirit by making
a new, modern AFTERBURNER arcade game, (AfterBurner Climax) with the
classic F-14D.
it brings back memories of the late 80s when the Navy was SUPREME.
not that the Navy isnt great, but clearly the Navy isnt getting what it
should have.

ok and this ends my rant.

[Derek Lyons]

"AirRaid" > wrote:

>this is gonna be a big thread, i can feel in my bones.

Yah - ROTFLMAO takes up a lot of room it does.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

[John Gilbert]

> plus a new small 'fast carrier', smaller than the Nimitz class, with
> 60-70 aircraft that can get across the world in 1/2 to 2/3 the time it
> takes a supercarrier
>
> oh yeah im dreaming now.

In general, if you want ships to go faster for great distances, you make
them bigger, not smaller.

John Gilbert

[BlackBeard]

Derek Lyons wrote:
> "AirRaid" > wrote:
>
> >this is gonna be a big thread, i can feel in my bones.
>
> Yah - ROTFLMAO takes up a lot of room it does.
>
> D.
>
I get the impression his entire knowledge base for these matters is
based on his experience with SEGA....


BB

I guess everyone has some mountain to climb,
it's just fate whether you live in Tibet or Kansas...

[Derek Lyons]

"John Gilbert" > wrote:

>
>> plus a new small 'fast carrier', smaller than the Nimitz class, with
>> 60-70 aircraft that can get across the world in 1/2 to 2/3 the time it
>> takes a supercarrier
>>
>> oh yeah im dreaming now.
>
>In general, if you want ships to go faster for great distances, you make
>them bigger, not smaller.


John; wrestling with a pig does nothing but get you covered in pig****
and annoys the pig.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

[Derek Lyons]

"BlackBeard" > wrote:

>
>Derek Lyons wrote:
>> "AirRaid" > wrote:
>>
>> >this is gonna be a big thread, i can feel in my bones.
>>
>> Yah - ROTFLMAO takes up a lot of room it does.
>
>I get the impression his entire knowledge base for these matters is
>based on his experience with SEGA....
>

SEKA? The platinum blonde with floppy tits?

Yah, she had a navel.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

[Jeb Hoge]

AirRaid wrote:
> for cripes sake, the F/A-18E Super Hornet is not good enough to be the
> navy's only fighter, and neither is the future JSF / F-35.

By definition, if both of those planes exist, then neither one is the
Navy's only fighter.

> the Pentagon, Navy and NorthropeGrumman should resurrect plans for the
>
> Super Tomcat 21
> Attack Super Tomcat 21
> and ASF-14 (Advanced Strike Fighter-14)
>
> along with the 100-200 mile range Advanced Air To Air Missile
>
> as well as the A-12 Avenger II 'Flying Dorito' aka mini stealth bomber

Yeah, I thought those were cool when I was a kid too.

> the Super Hornet should've been something of mach 2.5 class that went
> into service in the late 80s, with even more powerful engines,
> canards, and 3D-thrust vectoring to make it a super-maneuverable
> fighter that could counter the Su-37 Terminator (and its brothers), but
> with exellent attack capability.

Here's something I don't get. This "Terminator" name...it's just a
made-up name slapped on by...who, exactly? It's not a NATO reporting
name and I'm pretty sure it's not Sukhoi's name, but yet it gets passed
around as if it's not only a name but a description.

> the A-12 becomes the primary bomber/strike plane with the ability to
> defend itself from other fighters.
>
> the Super Tomcat 21 or the even more advanced ASF-14 would've been an
> exellent alternative to the NATF / F-22N, a 1990s and 21st Century
> FLEET DEFENDER with decent maneuverability, much easier to mantain,
> crew of 1, 8, AAAMs plus 2 medium range AAMs plus 2 short range
> AAMs, plus 30mm cannon and perhaps even a chemical laser for knife
> fights. (smaller version of the Airborne Laser on the modified 747s.

And a partridge in a pear tree...who's funding this, again?

> plus the Attack Super Tomcat 21 (faster than the A-12 Avenger II) for
> F-15 Strike Eagle-like capability.

That's what the F-35 is for, plus the F-35 is designed from the start
to be stealthy.

> plus a new class of supercarrier 2x the size of Nimitz-class, that's a
> half a mile long. with an airwing of 150+ aircraft, to carry lots of
> these new aircraft with their increased payload and needs.
>
> plus a new small 'fast carrier', smaller than the Nimitz class, with
> 60-70 aircraft that can get across the world in 1/2 to 2/3 the time it
> takes a supercarrier

Or even better, more Nimitz-sized decks with improved catapults,
propulsion, radar, and combat systems. *waits...*

> oh yeah im dreaming now.
>
>
> this is gonna be a big thread, i can feel in my bones.
>
> hey, at least the videogame company SEGA has the right spirit by making
> a new, modern AFTERBURNER arcade game, (AfterBurner Climax) with the
> classic F-14D.
> it brings back memories of the late 80s when the Navy was SUPREME.
> not that the Navy isnt great, but clearly the Navy isnt getting what it
> should have.
>
> ok and this ends my rant.

Hey, I loved the Tomcat too, but maintenance costs were killing the
squadrons and the airframes weren't going to get any younger (and RCS
any smaller).

[[email protected]]

Jeb Hoge wrote:

....snip
> Hey, I loved the Tomcat too, but maintenance costs were killing the
> squadrons and the airframes weren't going to get any younger (and RCS
> any smaller).


The proposed ST21 and the Strike F14 did have reduced RCS.

[Ski]

You all seemd to me to have hit the main issues with the USN right now -
somehow the Navy has thrown away its good sense and started chasing courses
of action that will reduce its ability to deal with the world threats in
only from a defensive nature.

(1) New big carriers go fast, protect themselves better, and sustain more
everything but they can't start costing $10 billion plus each

(2) The F/A-18E/F/G has re-written the maintainability and sortie generation
books but it is no more then a more capable A-7 and not even an A-6 and
surely not an F-14 despite the maintenance nightmares.

(3) Since there is not a Naval F-22, hardly can't see the Typhoon working
sensibly, and we do not want to deal with the French for the Rafale (which
is the best Naval fighter around today) - then going back and redesigning a
super-Tomcat is not a bad idea and since now with the F-15E and F-14D we
have the right engines around - go for the digital improved all - electric
Tomcat.

(4) If we drop JSF STOVL and force only one configuration CTOL and then
slide the whole program to include a decade or so development the JSF could
absorb the UCS/UCAV and work to have manned - unmanned variants which makes
more sense and helps preserve the stealth if it works to keep the internal
weapon design (say maybe include something laser by then) - but this alone
could pay for the new Tomcat and a crash program it could be

(5) Now like it or not, the move from battle ship to carrier will have
another shift down the road and that may be sub-surface so the Navy may
really find that under-sea ops will be its big hitters and the whole surface
world may have to look again at what it is and should be.

But whatever it is - the present Navy is not it

[Paul J. Adam]

In message <CFomh.8490$tc5.2604@trnddc01>, Ski
> writes
>You all seemd to me to have hit the main issues with the USN right now -
>somehow the Navy has thrown away its good sense and started chasing courses
>of action that will reduce its ability to deal with the world threats in
>only from a defensive nature.

>(2) The F/A-18E/F/G has re-written the maintainability and sortie generation
>books but it is no more then a more capable A-7 and not even an A-6 and
>surely not an F-14 despite the maintenance nightmares.

Some issues there - the Hornet's much more survivable than the A-7 or
A-6, and certainly much more flexible (you couldn't multirole a Corsair
or Intruder airframe, let alone swing-role it - but the Hornet's been
doing that for twenty years).

The Hornet gets you flexibility and affordability, which is what the
Navy needs at the moment.

>(3) Since there is not a Naval F-22, hardly can't see the Typhoon working
>sensibly, and we do not want to deal with the French for the Rafale (which
>is the best Naval fighter around today) - then going back and redesigning a
>super-Tomcat is not a bad idea and since now with the F-15E and F-14D we
>have the right engines around - go for the digital improved all - electric
>Tomcat.

The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question,
that being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires
armed with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that
threat, there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.

>(4) If we drop JSF STOVL and force only one configuration CTOL and then
>slide the whole program to include a decade or so development

In half a sentence you lose most of the customers. The STOVL variant was
added because there was a user requirement (US-led and then others
bought in) and if you "slide a decade" then you lose your export sales,
who didn't sign up for an extra ten-year gap.

>(5) Now like it or not, the move from battle ship to carrier will have
>another shift down the road and that may be sub-surface so the Navy may
>really find that under-sea ops will be its big hitters and the whole surface
>world may have to look again at what it is and should be.

Trouble there is that submarines are great for sea denial, but hopeless
for sea control. How do you escort oil tankers through the Straits of
Hormuz, or shiploads of evacuees out of Lebanon, with a submarine?

--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
-Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)co<dot>uk

[God's Creator! (TEXT & HTML)]

Ski wrote:
> You all seemd to me to have hit the main issues with the USN right now -
> somehow the Navy has thrown away its good sense and started chasing courses
> of action that will reduce its ability to deal with the world threats in
> only from a defensive nature.
>
> (1) New big carriers go fast, protect themselves better, and sustain more
> everything but they can't start costing $10 billion plus each
>
> (2) The F/A-18E/F/G has re-written the maintainability and sortie generation
> books but it is no more then a more capable A-7 and not even an A-6 and
> surely not an F-14 despite the maintenance nightmares.
>
> (3) Since there is not a Naval F-22, hardly can't see the Typhoon working
> sensibly, and we do not want to deal with the French for the Rafale (which
> is the best Naval fighter around today) - then going back and redesigning a
> super-Tomcat is not a bad idea and since now with the F-15E and F-14D we
> have the right engines around - go for the digital improved all - electric
> Tomcat.
>
> (4) If we drop JSF STOVL and force only one configuration CTOL and then
> slide the whole program to include a decade or so development the JSF could
> absorb the UCS/UCAV and work to have manned - unmanned variants which makes
> more sense and helps preserve the stealth if it works to keep the internal
> weapon design (say maybe include something laser by then) - but this alone
> could pay for the new Tomcat and a crash program it could be
>
> (5) Now like it or not, the move from battle ship to carrier will have
> another shift down the road and that may be sub-surface so the Navy may
> really find that under-sea ops will be its big hitters and the whole surface
> world may have to look again at what it is and should be.
>
> But whatever it is - the present Navy is not it
>
>
>

Thus Spake: *G* *O* *D* *S* *C* *R* *E* *A* *T* *O* *R*



Has any these "Futuristic Flying Machines" ever been "Battle Tested",
against OTHER nations futuristic and costly Flying Machines... BS?



God's Creator!
(I am Life & Death) 8-)


--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Todays U.S. Holy Oil Wars News:
http://www.antiwar.com
http://icasualties.org/oif/

[John Dallman]

In article >,
(Paul J. Adam) wrote:
> > writes

> >(4) If we drop JSF STOVL and force only one configuration CTOL and
> >then slide the whole program to include a decade or so development
>
> In half a sentence you lose most of the customers. The STOVL variant
> was added because there was a user requirement (US-led and then
> others bought in) and if you "slide a decade" then you lose your
> export sales, who didn't sign up for an extra ten-year gap.

Just to agree some more: that route for the JSF programme also wastes a
large fraction of the money that's been spent so far, and leaves the
USMC with no Harrier replacement. Frankly, it gives BAe, Boeing and
Rolls-Royce a fine chance to produce a better Harrier, which is
perfectly possible, given enough market to pay for the engine
development - and there might be stuff to be lifted from JSF for that.

Maybe this isn't such a bad idea after all, actually... if you're
someone other than the USA.

--
John Dallman, , HTML mail is treated as probable spam.

[John Carrier]

SNIP

>>(3) Since there is not a Naval F-22, hardly can't see the Typhoon working
>>sensibly, and we do not want to deal with the French for the Rafale (which
>>is the best Naval fighter around today) - then going back and redesigning
>>a
>>super-Tomcat is not a bad idea and since now with the F-15E and F-14D we
>>have the right engines around - go for the digital improved all - electric
>>Tomcat.
>
> The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question, that
> being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires armed
> with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that threat,
> there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.

Actually pretty flexible answer to a number of problems. While its fleet
defense capability was unique, the airframe was easily adapted to the deep
(emphasis DEEP) strike roll. Had the Navy invested in the airframe's growth
capability (as the USAF did with the F-15), it would have had a most capable
(if not THE most capable) carrier strike aircraft on the planet.

The F-18 is maintainable in spades and this certainly is the most important
driver in the shipboard environment. I don't know whether the F-14 could
have ever been developed sufficiently in this regard, my educated guess is
not even close.

R / John

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, John Carrier
> writes
>> The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question, that
>> being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires armed
>> with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that threat,
>> there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.
>
>Actually pretty flexible answer to a number of problems. While its fleet
>defense capability was unique, the airframe was easily adapted to the deep
>(emphasis DEEP) strike roll.

Sure, but in the same way that the Tornado proved adaptable from an
excellent strike/interdiction platform into a decent North Sea
interceptor: a variable-geometry aircraft designed to haul tons of
air-to-air missiles out a long way, loiter a while, then either come
home or sprint to engage was a good option for a strike aircraft
required to cruise a long way with tons of PGMs before sprinting in to
deliver them.

For sure its (very effective) air-to-ground capability was a late
(desperate?) addition to the Tomcat repertoire - it might have made a
difference had there been Bombcats in 1991.

What killed the Tomcat seemed from here to be its primary mission
disappearing, and its significant strike capability arriving too late
and being too expensive to support.

--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
-Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)co<dot>uk

[qui si parla Campagnolo]

Paul J. Adam wrote:
> In message >, John Carrier
> > writes
> >> The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question, that
> >> being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires armed
> >> with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that threat,
> >> there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.
> >
> >Actually pretty flexible answer to a number of problems. While its fleet
> >defense capability was unique, the airframe was easily adapted to the deep
> >(emphasis DEEP) strike roll.
>
> Sure, but in the same way that the Tornado proved adaptable from an
> excellent strike/interdiction platform into a decent North Sea
> interceptor: a variable-geometry aircraft designed to haul tons of
> air-to-air missiles out a long way, loiter a while, then either come
> home or sprint to engage was a good option for a strike aircraft
> required to cruise a long way with tons of PGMs before sprinting in to
> deliver them.
>
> For sure its (very effective) air-to-ground capability was a late
> (desperate?) addition to the Tomcat repertoire - it might have made a
> difference had there been Bombcats in 1991.
>
> What killed the Tomcat seemed from here to be its primary mission
> disappearing, and its significant strike capability arriving too late
> and being too expensive to support.

No. When every other Cat 4 fighter was being modified, modernized, the
F-14 was not. The F-14A+, except for the enigines, was essentially
identical to the F-14 first delivered. A-6 type flight controls, tube
technology avionics. For the F-14 to survive as a viable platform(like
the F-15 has), it needed modernization early on, like in the 80-s. 1991
was too little, way to late. If the F-14 strike was made, same time
frame as the F-15E, the F-18F probably wouldn't exist.
>
> --
> The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
> warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
> by fools.
> -Thucydides
>
>
> Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)co<dot>uk

[Jim Carriere]

John Dallman wrote:
> Just to agree some more: that route for the JSF programme also wastes a
> large fraction of the money that's been spent so far,

"money that's been spent so far"

Another term for that is "sunk costs" (or writeoff), which is not a good
analytical justification for continuing with any project. Political
justification, certainly, but it is similar psychology to holding on to
a bad investment (hoping it will eventually turn around). If a project
is a dud, there really is no sense going on with it no matter how much
money has been spent or how close it is to being complete.

Please not I'm not commenting on the JSF, I'm commenting on the thinking
that can be behind budget decisions. Of course budget processes are far
too complicated to explain in two paragraphs :)

[John Carrier]

OK Paul, not one but two guys that've been there, done that.

R / John

"qui si parla Campagnolo" > wrote in message
ups.com...
>
> Paul J. Adam wrote:
>> In message >, John Carrier
>> > writes
>> >> The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question,
>> >> that
>> >> being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires
>> >> armed
>> >> with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that
>> >> threat,
>> >> there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.
>> >
>> >Actually pretty flexible answer to a number of problems. While its
>> >fleet
>> >defense capability was unique, the airframe was easily adapted to the
>> >deep
>> >(emphasis DEEP) strike roll.
>>
>> Sure, but in the same way that the Tornado proved adaptable from an
>> excellent strike/interdiction platform into a decent North Sea
>> interceptor: a variable-geometry aircraft designed to haul tons of
>> air-to-air missiles out a long way, loiter a while, then either come
>> home or sprint to engage was a good option for a strike aircraft
>> required to cruise a long way with tons of PGMs before sprinting in to
>> deliver them.
>>
>> For sure its (very effective) air-to-ground capability was a late
>> (desperate?) addition to the Tomcat repertoire - it might have made a
>> difference had there been Bombcats in 1991.
>>
>> What killed the Tomcat seemed from here to be its primary mission
>> disappearing, and its significant strike capability arriving too late
>> and being too expensive to support.
>
> No. When every other Cat 4 fighter was being modified, modernized, the
> F-14 was not. The F-14A+, except for the enigines, was essentially
> identical to the F-14 first delivered. A-6 type flight controls, tube
> technology avionics. For the F-14 to survive as a viable platform(like
> the F-15 has), it needed modernization early on, like in the 80-s. 1991
> was too little, way to late. If the F-14 strike was made, same time
> frame as the F-15E, the F-18F probably wouldn't exist.
>>
>> --
>> The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
>> warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
>> by fools.
>> -Thucydides
>>
>>
>> Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)co<dot>uk
>

[Fred J. McCall]

"John Carrier" > wrote:

:SNIP
:
:>>(3) Since there is not a Naval F-22, hardly can't see the Typhoon working
:>>sensibly, and we do not want to deal with the French for the Rafale (which
:>>is the best Naval fighter around today) - then going back and redesigning
:>>a
:>>super-Tomcat is not a bad idea and since now with the F-15E and F-14D we
:>>have the right engines around - go for the digital improved all - electric
:>>Tomcat.
:>
:> The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question, that
:> being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires armed
:> with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that threat,
:> there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.
:
:Actually pretty flexible answer to a number of problems. While its fleet
:defense capability was unique, the airframe was easily adapted to the deep
:(emphasis DEEP) strike roll. Had the Navy invested in the airframe's growth
:capability (as the USAF did with the F-15), it would have had a most capable
:(if not THE most capable) carrier strike aircraft on the planet.

The Strike Eagle was started on MDAC internal money as a technology
demonstration. No such thing was ever done with the F-14. Regardless
of that, the D and B Upgrade aircraft were converted into quite
capable deep strike platforms (4x2000lb JDAM) with better
range/payload combinations than the Super Bug.

:The F-18 is maintainable in spades and this certainly is the most important
:driver in the shipboard environment. I don't know whether the F-14 could
:have ever been developed sufficiently in this regard, my educated guess is
:not even close.

It would have been a new airplane. All the avionics would have to be
replaced and it would probably have had to be re-engined.

It sure was a pretty airplane, though...

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney

[qui si parla Campagnolo]

Fred J. McCall wrote:
> "John Carrier" > wrote:
>
> :SNIP
> :
> :>>(3) Since there is not a Naval F-22, hardly can't see the Typhoon working
> :>>sensibly, and we do not want to deal with the French for the Rafale (which
> :>>is the best Naval fighter around today) - then going back and redesigning
> :>>a
> :>>super-Tomcat is not a bad idea and since now with the F-15E and F-14D we
> :>>have the right engines around - go for the digital improved all - electric
> :>>Tomcat.
> :>
> :> The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question, that
> :> being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires armed
> :> with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that threat,
> :> there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.
> :
> :Actually pretty flexible answer to a number of problems. While its fleet
> :defense capability was unique, the airframe was easily adapted to the deep
> :(emphasis DEEP) strike roll. Had the Navy invested in the airframe's growth
> :capability (as the USAF did with the F-15), it would have had a most capable
> :(if not THE most capable) carrier strike aircraft on the planet.
>
> The Strike Eagle was started on MDAC internal money as a technology
> demonstration. No such thing was ever done with the F-14. Regardless
> of that, the D and B Upgrade aircraft were converted into quite
> capable deep strike platforms (4x2000lb JDAM) with better
> range/payload combinations than the Super Bug.
>
> :The F-18 is maintainable in spades and this certainly is the most important
> :driver in the shipboard environment. I don't know whether the F-14 could
> :have ever been developed sufficiently in this regard, my educated guess is
> :not even close.
>
> It would have been a new airplane. All the avionics would have to be
> replaced and it would probably have had to be re-engined.
>
> It sure was a pretty airplane, though...
>

Yep, just like a whizbang Phantom would have been keen as well. SELDOM
can an old, existing airframe be brought up to snuff with engines and
Avionics(can't think of one-tried in the F-20, F-8). The airframe(FUGLY
if ya ask me, and I flew for 2 squadron tours), was old, old
technology(ala A-6), the $ to make it flybywire would have been more
than a new aircraft. The 'D' model was laughable, considering the old
technology of the day that existed at the time in the genuine cat 4
fighters(think F-15/16/18). The only way the F-14 would have survived
was if the knuckeheads spending the $ on fighter modernization, would
have done it as planned, to make the 'B' model early in the 80s. Didn't
happen, the Turkey was doomed to obscurity. Gotta remember the F-14 was
not anything more than a fix to the F-111 debacle, an airframe to wrap
around the Hawg-9/Phoenix wunderweapon.

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, John Carrier
> writes
>OK Paul, not one but two guys that've been there, done that.
>
>R / John

Well, I come here to learn as well as lecture :)

--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
-Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)co<dot>uk

[DDAY]

----------
In article >, Jim Carriere
> wrote:

> Another term for that is "sunk costs" (or writeoff), which is not a good
> analytical justification for continuing with any project. Political
> justification, certainly, but it is similar psychology to holding on to
> a bad investment (hoping it will eventually turn around). If a project
> is a dud, there really is no sense going on with it no matter how much
> money has been spent or how close it is to being complete.

That's not always true. Sunk costs can be an important consideration if the
replacement is going to cost more to develop than the existing program will
cost to fix. Put it this way--suppose you've sunk $8 billion into a program
that will require $4 billion more to fix. But if you determine that any
replacement is going to cost you at least $8 billion, then you are better
off continuing with the existing program--assuming that you have a
reasonable chance of succeeding.

Sunk costs can also represent assets, because they bought _something._ Most
of that might be blown on salaries, but at least some of it bought hardware.
Starting from scratch means junking those assets.

Yeah, it's not precise, but sunk costs serve as a crude benchmark for
comparison to the costs of starting over.




D

[Jim Carriere]

DDAY wrote:
> ----------
> In article >, Jim Carriere
> > wrote:
>
>> Another term for that is "sunk costs" (or writeoff), which is not a good
>> analytical justification for continuing with any project. Political
>> justification, certainly, but it is similar psychology to holding on to
>> a bad investment (hoping it will eventually turn around). If a project
>> is a dud, there really is no sense going on with it no matter how much
>> money has been spent or how close it is to being complete.
>
> That's not always true. Sunk costs can be an important consideration if the
> replacement is going to cost more to develop than the existing program will
> cost to fix. Put it this way--suppose you've sunk $8 billion into a program
> that will require $4 billion more to fix. But if you determine that any
<snip>

Which all depends on whether the original solution is still partly valid
or no longer valid.

I think we're both expressing the same thing in different ways, and that
we agree with each other.

And OBTW my opinion is that the JSF is still a valid solution. Not for
the current conflict, but for future conflicts or (best of all) for
future conflicts that it may help deter.

[Ski]

Paul has good comments and I would just add a few remarks....



"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message ...
> In message <CFomh.8490$tc5.2604@trnddc01>, Ski
> > writes
>>You all seemd to me to have hit the main issues with the USN right now -
>>somehow the Navy has thrown away its good sense and started chasing courses
>>of action that will reduce its ability to deal with the world threats in
>>only from a defensive nature.
>
>>(2) The F/A-18E/F/G has re-written the maintainability and sortie generation
>>books but it is no more then a more capable A-7 and not even an A-6 and
>>surely not an F-14 despite the maintenance nightmares.
>
> Some issues there - the Hornet's much more survivable than the A-7 or
> A-6, and certainly much more flexible (you couldn't multirole a Corsair
> or Intruder airframe, let alone swing-role it - but the Hornet's been
> doing that for twenty years).
>
> The Hornet gets you flexibility and affordability, which is what the
> Navy needs at the moment.

In my opinion, the Hornet gets you all that and to its lasting credit - but had it been mixed with a "like" maintainable "high-far-fast" fighter the modern CVN would be at its peek in potential, without it there is nothing but adjustments. At first the so-called "outer-air battle" would shift to escort ships with many naval SAM's - then the ship numbers dropped, the enemy employed lots of ECM and the cruise missiles became lower and faster and more numerous. So now the air wing can't do the outer battle despite higher sortie generation and the support ships can't cover the real estate, so in the end ther are vulnerabilities and we have endemic "soft" ships still way too vulnerable to hits, especially from cruise missiles - so lacking the manned high-far-fast fighter at the outer air battle means that the battlegroups remain vulnerable and must stay deep and surface fast.

>
>>(3) Since there is not a Naval F-22, hardly can't see the Typhoon working
>>sensibly, and we do not want to deal with the French for the Rafale (which
>>is the best Naval fighter around today) - then going back and redesigning a
>>super-Tomcat is not a bad idea and since now with the F-15E and F-14D we
>>have the right engines around - go for the digital improved all - electric
>>Tomcat.
>
> The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question,
> that being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires
> armed with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that
> threat, there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.

Unfortunately that is not the case but it was the Navy's position when it trashed the Tomcat, and like Iraq intelligence it was a political position not facts. We still have a growing threat from all kinds of cruise missiles (sliders, high-divers, skimmers, combos, etc.) from ships, subs, tactical aircraft, UAV's, ballistic missiles and bombers - it did not suddenly stop, it only got worse. The slow demise of the Tomcat was as much forced by Navy policy as it was due to use and age - that is it also can parallel many strategies to remove the old and bring in the new (could be shared by the A-7 and A-6 also, definately the F-111 in Australia). The budget for spares was cut, the depots were diverted in effort, the Pheonix missile was pronounced "dead", little mod things here and there were stopped, and even though the Tomcat evolved to a multi-role 'Bombcat" totally outclass'ing the Hornet in range, payload and precision strike systems (F-14D) that given new engines and a digital refit could have been the right mix machine for the F/A-18E/F - but to do that would have been to hard to justify and would have added cost to the Hornet. Decisions had to be made - but were they the right ones. I contend that there was and remains an urgent need for a modern Tomcat to combat cruise missiles and platfoirms at the outer ring of the fleet and it would fill the gap in reduced numbers of support ships and the overall vulnerability of the force. Adding submarines to this outer defense ring is the necessary next step.

>>(4) If we drop JSF STOVL and force only one configuration CTOL and then
>>slide the whole program to include a decade or so development
>
> In half a sentence you lose most of the customers. The STOVL variant was
> added because there was a user requirement (US-led and then others
> bought in) and if you "slide a decade" then you lose your export sales,
> who didn't sign up for an extra ten-year gap.

The customers are leaving anyway - what is needed are some new ideas that will revigerate the JSF into something needed by everybody - it is clearly not needed now. If the JSF is slid a decade and joined by other critical technology driven add-ons the key customers will remain. The small participants simply want to share in what's there, there is no co-production potential and at best a group of coutries will buy a few aircraft and share them which is a good idea - but given how things are stretching now anyway - a decade is a breather for everyone.

>>(5) Now like it or not, the move from battle ship to carrier will have
>>another shift down the road and that may be sub-surface so the Navy may
>>really find that under-sea ops will be its big hitters and the whole surface
>>world may have to look again at what it is and should be.
>
> Trouble there is that submarines are great for sea denial, but hopeless
> for sea control. How do you escort oil tankers through the Straits of
> Hormuz, or shiploads of evacuees out of Lebanon, with a submarine?

Mahen would faint - that's showing no faith in the future. Believe me the sub-surface world will take over, the question is not will it, but just when. If you can communicate to surface ships a virtual support or escort ship then you are there are you not; the sub can be anywhere but the invisible support ship could direct weapons if attacked just as well as a real boat could. And to remove evacuees there are smaller ships and if necessary a large inflatable used by SOF may suffice or in the end surface.

We are in a time of great change in the very nature of warfare itself, the actual character of conflict - not whether one technology or thing is superior or inferior. We are dealing with a profound debate over just what war is and what it is not. The time of counting chips and comparing force structures is well gone and it is very hard to comprehend. We elude to it think about "effects based" concepts, but in the end it reduces all hierachies of power to issues of national will and values. Clauswitz is stressed at this juncture in the purpose of conflict.

> The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
> warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
> by fools.
> -Thucydides
>
>
> Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)co<dot>uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message <Z4_mh.1884$IT2.1222@trnddc06>, Ski
> writes

Happy to jump back in, but aware that some F-14 drivers are reading :)

>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message ...
>> Some issues there - the Hornet's much more survivable than the A-7 or
>> A-6, and certainly much more flexible (you couldn't multirole a Corsair
>> or Intruder airframe, let alone swing-role it - but the Hornet's been
>> doing that for twenty years).
>>
>> The Hornet gets you flexibility and affordability, which is what the
>> Navy needs at the moment.
>*
>In my opinion, the Hornet gets you all that and to its lasting credit - but
>had it been mixed with a "like" maintainable "high-far-fast" fighter the
>modern CVN would be at its peek in potential, without it there is nothing
>but adjustments.* At first the so-called "outer-air battle" would shift to
>escort ships with many naval SAM's - then the ship numbers dropped, the
>enemy employed lots of ECM and the cruise missiles became lower and
>faster and more numerous.

Add "and launched from a lot closer in". We're not fighting blue-water
warfare any more, and aren't likely to in the near future. The cruise
missile threat remains real, but it's exemplified by incidents like the
attack on HMS Glamorgan in 1982, the Gloucester shootex of 1991, or the
Hanit attack last year: ships not too far from shore getting attacked by
a late-unmasking threat, often in conditions of air superiority or even
air supremacy.

>So now the air wing can't do the outer battle
>despite higher sortie generation

Who are fighting the outer air battle against? The Bad Guys aren't going
to form up alpha strikes and come at us over a couple of hundred miles
of open ocean for us to work on: and if they do, Hornet plus AIM-120
remains an effective counter. (Arguably, since we're more likely to be
talking fighters than Backfires, more effective than Tomcat plus
Phoenix).

>> The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question,
>> that being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires
>> armed with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that
>> threat, there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.
>*
>Unfortunately that is not the case but it was the Navy's position when it
>trashed the Tomcat, and like Iraq intelligence it was a political position not
>facts.* We still have a*growing threat from all kinds of cruise missiles
>(sliders, high-divers, skimmers, combos, etc.) from ships, subs, tactical
>aircraft, UAV's, ballistic missiles and bombers - it did not suddenly stop, it
>only got worse.*

Very true, but again the danger is - and for the near future remains -
inshore and in confined or busy conditions. When you've got forty-plus
surface contacts within five miles and are within spitting distance of
Iranian territorial waters, with "IRGCN incursion!" being piped several
times a day, your priority and the primary threat is *not* the outer air
battle: current and near-future Bad Guys who make their intentions known
at 250 miles are well within the ambit of current capabilities.

Hezbollah don't have an air force or any significant over-the-horizon
targeting, but that didn't stop them putting a C802 into an Israeli
warship despite the skies being black with the Heyl Ha'Avir.

>> In half a sentence you lose most of the customers. The STOVL variant
>was
>> added because there was a user requirement (US-led and then others
>> bought in) and if you "slide a decade" then you lose your export sales,
>> who didn't sign up for an extra ten-year gap.
>*
>The customers are leaving anyway - what is needed are some new ideas
>that will revigerate the JSF into something needed by everybody - it is
>clearly not needed now. If the JSF is slid a decade and joined by other
>critical technology driven add-ons the key customers will remain.*

Okay, but the UK won't: we need the JSF to replace the Harriers and to
fly from the new carriers, and we can't wait a decade. I doubt we'd be
unique in having problems with "just keep flying what you've got for a
decade".

>> Trouble there is that submarines are great for sea denial, but hopeless
>> for sea control. How do you escort oil tankers through the Straits of
>> Hormuz, or shiploads of evacuees out of Lebanon, with a submarine?
>*
>Mahen would faint - that's showing no faith in the future.* Believe me the
>sub-surface world will take over, the question is not will it, but just when.*

That being the point - we're not ready to do this now, nor in the
immediate future.

>If
>you can communicate to surface ships a virtual support or escort ship
>then you are there are you not;

The problem being that communication, which requires the submarine to be
slow with a mast up.

>the sub can be anywhere but the invisible
>support ship could direct weapons if attacked just as well as a real boat
>could.*

You still need someone to be there with a sensor, meaning a decent-sized
hull with a radar at useful height, plus all the datalinks or whatever
black magic is getting you comms with the submarines: lose that and your
submersible forces have lost the Recognised Air Picture..

So, perhaps that unit needs weapons to protect itself, and crew to
operate them... and it's become a warship and we're back to where we
were.

>And to remove evacuees there are smaller ships and if necessary a
>large inflatable used by SOF may suffice or in the end surface.*

Which all get you back to the same vulnerabilities as surface warships,
but more so.

>We are in a time of great change in the very nature of warfare itself, the
>actual character of conflict - not whether one technology or thing is
>superior or inferior.* We are dealing with a profound debate over just what
>war is and what it is not.*

Actually, I'd say rather that we're moving away from an aberrant period
where "war" with equivalent powers could be clearly and obviously
defined, planned and prepared for; lesser conflicts were sideshows to be
managed discreetly while preparations for the Next Great Conflict were
made. Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, were all heavily influenced and
overshadowed by the ongoing Cold War.

>The time of counting chips and comparing force
>structures is well gone and it is very hard to comprehend.* We elude to it
>think about "effects based" concepts, but in the end it reduces all
>hierachies of power to issues of national will and values.* Clauswitz is
>stressed at this juncture in the purpose of conflict. ***

This assumes that your opponent is an identifiable nation, of course.

--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
-Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)co<dot>uk

[Ski]

Paul - good points but let me continue...


"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message ... In message <Z4_mh.1884$IT2.1222@trnddc06>, Ski > writes

Happy to jump back in, but aware that some F-14 drivers are reading :)

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message ... Some issues there - the Hornet's much more survivable than the A-7 or A-6, and certainly much more flexible (you couldn't multirole a Corsair or Intruder airframe, let alone swing-role it - but the Hornet's been doing that for twenty years).

The Hornet gets you flexibility and affordability, which is what the Navy needs at the moment.

Agree for the moment

In my opinion, the Hornet gets you all that and to its lasting credit - but had it been mixed with a "like" maintainable "high-far-fast" fighter the modern CVN would be at its peek in potential, without it there is nothing but adjustments. At first the so-called "outer-air battle" would shift to escort ships with many naval SAM's - then the ship numbers dropped, the enemy employed lots of ECM and the cruise missiles became lower and faster and more numerous.

Add "and launched from a lot closer in". We're not fighting blue-water warfare any more, and aren't likely to in the near future. The cruise missile threat remains real, but it's exemplified by incidents like the attack on HMS Glamorgan in 1982, the Gloucester shootex of 1991, or the Hanit attack last year: ships not too far from shore getting attacked by a late-unmasking threat, often in conditions of air superiority or even air supremacy.

"We are not fighting Blue Water any more" - that is the "wish" but not the reality - the ships are moving away from the coast lines as the threats from anti-ship cruise missiles, aircraft, ballistic missiles, small suicide craft, and bombers increases. The Naval build up now in the Persian Gulf will "show" many things but the "teeth" are gone and even with AMRAAM's and the latest F-14's theer is not enough of either to make a difference. We have one or two cycles then beat feet for open water.

So now the air wing can't do the outer battle despite higher sortie generation

Who are fighting the outer air battle against? The Bad Guys aren't going to form up alpha strikes and come at us over a couple of hundred miles of open ocean for us to work on: and if they do, Hornet plus AIM-120 remains an effective counter. (Arguably, since we're more likely to be talking fighters than Backfires, more effective than Tomcat plus Phoenix).

The "outer" air battle can form very fast and one does not need regiments to do it, just four, six or ten platforms with cruise missiles. Note that this week Malaysia takes delivery of its first Su-30's, Indonesia has them and the Chinese are converting their Air Force to them and evaluating still better versions as the Russian come out of the cold and have started to deliver new models to the Russian Air Force. The Su-34 will replace the Su-24 Fencer, a far more capable platform and as we look to the Carribean Venezuela and Mexico will have these machines - all capable of employing several families of anti-ship cruise and precision stand-off weapons. The Navy will need to move wide, deep and fast and the only things that will keep up with them will be aircraft and submarines and a small number of specialized auxiliary boats.

The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question, that being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires armed with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that threat, there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.

And hence the big "mis-information" to modernize the decks, simplify the Navy's aviation types and support trail and in the end a smaller more capable Navy to fight an enemy that has already check-mated that capability and can do so min an un-organized way of failed-states and irregular actors.

Unfortunately that is not the case but it was the Navy's position when it trashed the Tomcat, and like Iraq intelligence it was a political position not facts. We still have a growing threat from all kinds of cruise missiles
(sliders, high-divers, skimmers, combos, etc.) from ships, subs, tactical aircraft, UAV's, ballistic missiles and bombers - it did not suddenly stop, it only got worse.

Very true, but again the danger is - and for the near future remains - inshore and in confined or busy conditions. When you've got forty-plus surface contacts within five miles and are within spitting distance of Iranian territorial waters, with "IRGCN incursion!" being piped several times a day, your priority and the primary threat is *not* the outer air battle: current and near-future Bad Guys who make their intentions known at 250 miles are well within the ambit of current capabilities.

You are not wrong that the "core" threat for irregular ops remains littoral, but the present fleet can not operate there safely and the ships they have programmed for that cost 5 times too much, hence a step back may be necessary.
We need a littoral carrier but not a $3 billion LHA(R) - more LHA's and LHD's with more MV-22's and a Blitz-fighter would make the case much better. The best and most cost effective aviation littoral ship for the Marines and SOF would be a refurbished JFK (CVA-67) revamped to include two less boilers and screws, reduced cats, a trauma hospital, SOF troop quarters, a wing of Marine F/A-18E/F/G's, more CH-53E and the Blitz fighter. Now with the JFK operating close and the swarm of ships and aircraft from the amphibious expeditionary battle group it all fits better. The Kitty Hawk would round off the 2 x fleet 2 x ExBG idea

Hezbollah don't have an air force or any significant over-the-horizon targeting, but that didn't stop them putting a C802 into an Israeli warship despite the skies being black with the Heyl Ha'Avir.

Terrible proof that not much is really working with all the IT and ISR hype - we need numbers and strength. Note that I speak the same as you in the littoral context but all i did was to move the nuclear fleet out into the open ocean and brought in more of the present classes of chips that you can still procure for two or three to the new model. And the $600+ million for the JFK refurbishment that once was considered such an enormous figure is putts against the near $10 billion projected for the CVN-21 - yikes!!!

In half a sentence you lose most of the customers. The STOVL variant was added because there was a user requirement (US-led and then others bought in) and if you "slide a decade" then you lose your export sales, who didn't sign up for an extra ten-year gap.

The customers are leaving anyway - what is needed are some new ideas that will revigerate the JSF into something needed by everybody - it is clearly not needed now. If the JSF is slid a decade and joined by other critical technology driven add-ons the key customers will remain.

Okay, but the UK won't: we need the JSF to replace the Harriers and to fly from the new carriers, and we can't wait a decade. I doubt we'd be unique in having problems with "just keep flying what you've got for a decade".

Your UK will not leave but it will drag its feet and what really needs to be done is what is being done slowly - a merging of the US and UK defense industry - slowly - slowly. What the UK needs is to do what the Marines would be forced to do - give up on JSF STOVL (F-35B), drop it, the move to accept the Kitty Hawk and refurbish it to a UK-US standard, then as quid-pro-quo (as the Marines will do screaming but loving it) accelerate an enormous buy of F/A-18E/F/G's (drops the price some 20%) to fill these two carriers (actually provides the Marines and the UK with an additional fighter squadron to fill out the ship airwings). Organize the JFK and Hawk to be the aviation lead ships in two major Atlantic (NATO) Expeditionary Battle Groups (EBG) for all the warfare scenarios you describe and this frees the main six USN nuclear battlegroups to be strategic, nuclear and open ocean. The JFK would have one USN squadron and one RN squadron, the Hawk one USN squadron and one Marine Squadron. This would free up one air wing for the USN filling the shortfall.
The EBG's would join with other aviation assualt ships now loaded to the hilt with V-22's, in fact the demise of the JSF would double the space available for V-22 and that is what is needed more. The Blitz fighter would come with the V-22 because attack helicopters can not fly fast enough to escort it and the fighters from the lead ships would do that initially. The dropped necessary hospital ship will show up again organic to the JFK and Hawk as well as all the many multi-agency groups and kit for stability operations. Additional assault ships would then be abvle to fill in the EBG.

Trouble there is that submarines are great for sea denial, but hopeless for sea control. How do you escort oil tankers through the Straits of Hormuz, or shiploads of evacuees out of Lebanon, with a submarine?

Mahen would faint - that's showing no faith in the future. Believe me the sub-surface world will take over, the question is not will it, but just when.

That being the point - we're not ready to do this now, nor in the immediate future.

If you can communicate to surface ships a virtual support or escort ship then you are there are you not;

The problem being that communication, which requires the submarine to be slow with a mast up.

the sub can be anywhere but the invisible support ship could direct weapons if attacked just as well as a real boat could.

You still need someone to be there with a sensor, meaning a decent-sized hull with a radar at useful height, plus all the datalinks or whatever black magic is getting you comms with the submarines: lose that and your submersible forces have lost the Recognised Air Picture..

Agree but don't underestimate how the submarine could overcome the technical issues you present. Just as an F-22 could guide another aircraft's AMRAAM, X-Craft like high-speed cargo ships could be loaded to accompany the formations and the targeting for many weapons loaded on board could come from various other locations and much more stealthy then anything we have now on the surface

So, perhaps that unit needs weapons to protect itself, and crew to operate them... and it's become a warship and we're back to where we were.

And to remove evacuees there are smaller ships and if necessary a large inflatable used by SOF may suffice or in the end surface.

Which all get you back to the same vulnerabilities as surface warships, but more so.

We are in a time of great change in the very nature of warfare itself, the actual character of conflict - not whether one technology or thing is superior or inferior. We are dealing with a profound debate over just what war is and what it is not.

Actually, I'd say rather that we're moving away from an aberrant period where "war" with equivalent powers could be clearly and obviously defined, planned and prepared for; lesser conflicts were sideshows to be managed discreetly while preparations for the Next Great Conflict were made. Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, were all heavily influenced and overshadowed by the ongoing Cold War.

The time of counting chips and comparing force structures is well gone and it is very hard to comprehend. We elude to it think about "effects based" concepts, but in the end it reduces all hierachies of power to issues of national will and values. Clauswitz is stressed at this juncture in the purpose of conflict.

This assumes that your opponent is an identifiable nation, of course.

We are saying the same thing in different ways

--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools. -Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)co<dot>uk

This email was cleaned by emailStripper, available for free from http://www.papercut.biz/emailStripper.htm

[Mike Kanze]

Ski & Paul,

Excellent thread, and a very welcome counterpoint to much of the trash appearing in rec.aviation.military.naval recently.

Keep it coming.

--
Mike Kanze

"I would love to change the world but they won't give me the source code."

http://www.sfgate.com/blogs/tech

"Ski" > wrote in message news:dvenh.7388$kB3.6406@trnddc08...
Paul - good points but let me continue...


"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message ... In message <Z4_mh.1884$IT2.1222@trnddc06>, Ski > writes

Happy to jump back in, but aware that some F-14 drivers are reading :)

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message ... Some issues there - the Hornet's much more survivable than the A-7 or A-6, and certainly much more flexible (you couldn't multirole a Corsair or Intruder airframe, let alone swing-role it - but the Hornet's been doing that for twenty years).

The Hornet gets you flexibility and affordability, which is what the Navy needs at the moment.

Agree for the moment

In my opinion, the Hornet gets you all that and to its lasting credit - but had it been mixed with a "like" maintainable "high-far-fast" fighter the modern CVN would be at its peek in potential, without it there is nothing but adjustments. At first the so-called "outer-air battle" would shift to escort ships with many naval SAM's - then the ship numbers dropped, the enemy employed lots of ECM and the cruise missiles became lower and faster and more numerous.

Add "and launched from a lot closer in". We're not fighting blue-water warfare any more, and aren't likely to in the near future. The cruise missile threat remains real, but it's exemplified by incidents like the attack on HMS Glamorgan in 1982, the Gloucester shootex of 1991, or the Hanit attack last year: ships not too far from shore getting attacked by a late-unmasking threat, often in conditions of air superiority or even air supremacy.

"We are not fighting Blue Water any more" - that is the "wish" but not the reality - the ships are moving away from the coast lines as the threats from anti-ship cruise missiles, aircraft, ballistic missiles, small suicide craft, and bombers increases. The Naval build up now in the Persian Gulf will "show" many things but the "teeth" are gone and even with AMRAAM's and the latest F-14's theer is not enough of either to make a difference. We have one or two cycles then beat feet for open water.

So now the air wing can't do the outer battle despite higher sortie generation

Who are fighting the outer air battle against? The Bad Guys aren't going to form up alpha strikes and come at us over a couple of hundred miles of open ocean for us to work on: and if they do, Hornet plus AIM-120 remains an effective counter. (Arguably, since we're more likely to be talking fighters than Backfires, more effective than Tomcat plus Phoenix).

The "outer" air battle can form very fast and one does not need regiments to do it, just four, six or ten platforms with cruise missiles. Note that this week Malaysia takes delivery of its first Su-30's, Indonesia has them and the Chinese are converting their Air Force to them and evaluating still better versions as the Russian come out of the cold and have started to deliver new models to the Russian Air Force. The Su-34 will replace the Su-24 Fencer, a far more capable platform and as we look to the Carribean Venezuela and Mexico will have these machines - all capable of employing several families of anti-ship cruise and precision stand-off weapons. The Navy will need to move wide, deep and fast and the only things that will keep up with them will be aircraft and submarines and a small number of specialized auxiliary boats.

The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question, that being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires armed with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that threat, there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.

And hence the big "mis-information" to modernize the decks, simplify the Navy's aviation types and support trail and in the end a smaller more capable Navy to fight an enemy that has already check-mated that capability and can do so min an un-organized way of failed-states and irregular actors.

Unfortunately that is not the case but it was the Navy's position when it trashed the Tomcat, and like Iraq intelligence it was a political position not facts. We still have a growing threat from all kinds of cruise missiles
(sliders, high-divers, skimmers, combos, etc.) from ships, subs, tactical aircraft, UAV's, ballistic missiles and bombers - it did not suddenly stop, it only got worse.

Very true, but again the danger is - and for the near future remains - inshore and in confined or busy conditions. When you've got forty-plus surface contacts within five miles and are within spitting distance of Iranian territorial waters, with "IRGCN incursion!" being piped several times a day, your priority and the primary threat is *not* the outer air battle: current and near-future Bad Guys who make their intentions known at 250 miles are well within the ambit of current capabilities.

You are not wrong that the "core" threat for irregular ops remains littoral, but the present fleet can not operate there safely and the ships they have programmed for that cost 5 times too much, hence a step back may be necessary.
We need a littoral carrier but not a $3 billion LHA(R) - more LHA's and LHD's with more MV-22's and a Blitz-fighter would make the case much better. The best and most cost effective aviation littoral ship for the Marines and SOF would be a refurbished JFK (CVA-67) revamped to include two less boilers and screws, reduced cats, a trauma hospital, SOF troop quarters, a wing of Marine F/A-18E/F/G's, more CH-53E and the Blitz fighter. Now with the JFK operating close and the swarm of ships and aircraft from the amphibious expeditionary battle group it all fits better. The Kitty Hawk would round off the 2 x fleet 2 x ExBG idea

Hezbollah don't have an air force or any significant over-the-horizon targeting, but that didn't stop them putting a C802 into an Israeli warship despite the skies being black with the Heyl Ha'Avir.

Terrible proof that not much is really working with all the IT and ISR hype - we need numbers and strength. Note that I speak the same as you in the littoral context but all i did was to move the nuclear fleet out into the open ocean and brought in more of the present classes of chips that you can still procure for two or three to the new model. And the $600+ million for the JFK refurbishment that once was considered such an enormous figure is putts against the near $10 billion projected for the CVN-21 - yikes!!!

In half a sentence you lose most of the customers. The STOVL variant was added because there was a user requirement (US-led and then others bought in) and if you "slide a decade" then you lose your export sales, who didn't sign up for an extra ten-year gap.

The customers are leaving anyway - what is needed are some new ideas that will revigerate the JSF into something needed by everybody - it is clearly not needed now. If the JSF is slid a decade and joined by other critical technology driven add-ons the key customers will remain.

Okay, but the UK won't: we need the JSF to replace the Harriers and to fly from the new carriers, and we can't wait a decade. I doubt we'd be unique in having problems with "just keep flying what you've got for a decade".

Your UK will not leave but it will drag its feet and what really needs to be done is what is being done slowly - a merging of the US and UK defense industry - slowly - slowly. What the UK needs is to do what the Marines would be forced to do - give up on JSF STOVL (F-35B), drop it, the move to accept the Kitty Hawk and refurbish it to a UK-US standard, then as quid-pro-quo (as the Marines will do screaming but loving it) accelerate an enormous buy of F/A-18E/F/G's (drops the price some 20%) to fill these two carriers (actually provides the Marines and the UK with an additional fighter squadron to fill out the ship airwings). Organize the JFK and Hawk to be the aviation lead ships in two major Atlantic (NATO) Expeditionary Battle Groups (EBG) for all the warfare scenarios you describe and this frees the main six USN nuclear battlegroups to be strategic, nuclear and open ocean. The JFK would have one USN squadron and one RN squadron, the Hawk one USN squadron and one Marine Squadron. This would free up one air wing for the USN filling the shortfall.
The EBG's would join with other aviation assualt ships now loaded to the hilt with V-22's, in fact the demise of the JSF would double the space available for V-22 and that is what is needed more. The Blitz fighter would come with the V-22 because attack helicopters can not fly fast enough to escort it and the fighters from the lead ships would do that initially. The dropped necessary hospital ship will show up again organic to the JFK and Hawk as well as all the many multi-agency groups and kit for stability operations. Additional assault ships would then be abvle to fill in the EBG.

Trouble there is that submarines are great for sea denial, but hopeless for sea control. How do you escort oil tankers through the Straits of Hormuz, or shiploads of evacuees out of Lebanon, with a submarine?

Mahen would faint - that's showing no faith in the future. Believe me the sub-surface world will take over, the question is not will it, but just when.

That being the point - we're not ready to do this now, nor in the immediate future.

If you can communicate to surface ships a virtual support or escort ship then you are there are you not;

The problem being that communication, which requires the submarine to be slow with a mast up.

the sub can be anywhere but the invisible support ship could direct weapons if attacked just as well as a real boat could.

You still need someone to be there with a sensor, meaning a decent-sized hull with a radar at useful height, plus all the datalinks or whatever black magic is getting you comms with the submarines: lose that and your submersible forces have lost the Recognised Air Picture..

Agree but don't underestimate how the submarine could overcome the technical issues you present. Just as an F-22 could guide another aircraft's AMRAAM, X-Craft like high-speed cargo ships could be loaded to accompany the formations and the targeting for many weapons loaded on board could come from various other locations and much more stealthy then anything we have now on the surface

So, perhaps that unit needs weapons to protect itself, and crew to operate them... and it's become a warship and we're back to where we were.

And to remove evacuees there are smaller ships and if necessary a large inflatable used by SOF may suffice or in the end surface.

Which all get you back to the same vulnerabilities as surface warships, but more so.

We are in a time of great change in the very nature of warfare itself, the actual character of conflict - not whether one technology or thing is superior or inferior. We are dealing with a profound debate over just what war is and what it is not.

Actually, I'd say rather that we're moving away from an aberrant period where "war" with equivalent powers could be clearly and obviously defined, planned and prepared for; lesser conflicts were sideshows to be managed discreetly while preparations for the Next Great Conflict were made. Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, were all heavily influenced and overshadowed by the ongoing Cold War.

The time of counting chips and comparing force structures is well gone and it is very hard to comprehend. We elude to it think about "effects based" concepts, but in the end it reduces all hierachies of power to issues of national will and values. Clauswitz is stressed at this juncture in the purpose of conflict.

This assumes that your opponent is an identifiable nation, of course.

We are saying the same thing in different ways

--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools. -Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)co<dot>uk

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[BlackBeard]

Mike Kanze wrote:
> Ski & Paul,
>
> Excellent thread, and a very welcome counterpoint to much of the trash appearing in rec.aviation.military.naval recently.
>
> Keep it coming.
>

Agreed. With my experience working with the Hornet's various systems
(targeting, OFP's, etc.) for ten years and then the last seven years
working with survivability aspects of both the Hornet and JSF, it's
nice to see reasoned discussion regarding other aspects of these
platforms.

BB

I guess everybody has some mountain to climb,
it's just fate whether you live in Tibet or Kansas...

[Ski]

I think we must think sensibly especially since this enemy has backed us into a real bad situation. We do not need the JSF now but we do not want to loose all the good that went into it - and since we could tailor it a little better for a more complex time down the road why not put it into a generous (say $4 billion/yr) development slide and keep it getting better and staying warm for that time we need to penetrate into North Korea looking for mobile missiles or the Iranian command sites in the eastern frontier and stay around for a few hours a lot of support add-ons.

For the war on terror - we need more ships and more assault forces with many more V-22's and a replacement for the A-10 that can also replace the Apache and Cobra and escort the V-22. Then we need a air-land doctrine that explains how to use this.


"BlackBeard" > wrote in message ups.com...
>
> Mike Kanze wrote:
>> Ski & Paul,
>>
>> Excellent thread, and a very welcome counterpoint to much of the trash appearing in rec.aviation.military.naval recently.
>>
>> Keep it coming.
>>
>
> Agreed. With my experience working with the Hornet's various systems
> (targeting, OFP's, etc.) for ten years and then the last seven years
> working with survivability aspects of both the Hornet and JSF, it's
> nice to see reasoned discussion regarding other aspects of these
> platforms.
>
> BB
>
> I guess everybody has some mountain to climb,
> it's just fate whether you live in Tibet or Kansas...
>