Air buss loss at Paris Airshow?

[Danny Dot]

In about 1990 Airbus did low pass at the Paris airshow and lost the plane.
I recall it had something to do with the throttle software thinking the
pilots were in landing mode and "refused" to go to high power for the
go-around.

Anyone remember the details???

Danny Dot

[BT]

http://www.linienmc.dk/video/crashplane/2-Airplane%20Crash%20A320.mpeg

"Danny Dot" > wrote in message
...
> In about 1990 Airbus did low pass at the Paris airshow and lost the plane.
> I recall it had something to do with the throttle software thinking the
> pilots were in landing mode and "refused" to go to high power for the
> go-around.
>
> Anyone remember the details???
>
> Danny Dot
>

[BT]

May 1998

"Danny Dot" > wrote in message
...
> In about 1990 Airbus did low pass at the Paris airshow and lost the plane.
> I recall it had something to do with the throttle software thinking the
> pilots were in landing mode and "refused" to go to high power for the
> go-around.
>
> Anyone remember the details???
>
> Danny Dot
>

[Mxsmanic]

Danny Dot writes:

> In about 1990 Airbus did low pass at the Paris airshow and lost the plane.
> I recall it had something to do with the throttle software thinking the
> pilots were in landing mode and "refused" to go to high power for the
> go-around.
>
> Anyone remember the details???

Probably this one: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_296

It cast considerable doubt on the airworthiness of the Airbus and its
fly-by-wire systems, especially since the flight recorders were
spirited away and tampered with before they were officially examined.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Thomas Borchert]

Danny,

> In about 1990 Airbus did low pass at the Paris airshow and lost the plane.
> I recall it had something to do with the throttle software thinking the
> pilots were in landing mode and "refused" to go to high power for the
> go-around.
>
> Anyone remember the details???

Details? How about we get the general picture right? ;-)

It was not in Paris, it was in Mulhouse. It was in 1988. The official
accident report blamed the pilot for flying too low and too slow, basically a
classic "Hey, watch this!" accident.

If you are into conspiracies, there are other explanations (by the pilot, for
example - hardly surprising), but even they don't mention any "landing mode",
whatever that may be. You may confuse that part with the case of a Japan
Airlines flight, where the crew put the plane in TOGA mode without noticing
and fought the autopilot all the way into a stall.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Jon Woellhaf]

What's TOGA mode?

[James Robinson]

"Jon Woellhaf" > wrote:

> What's TOGA mode?

Take Off / Go Around

[Thomas Borchert]

Jon,

As James says. A one-button-push to set the plane up for go around with
max power.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Jay Honeck]

> Anyone remember the details???

The video of this crash (from a "Front Line" PBS special) really lit up
our aviation video site, with comments and conflicting opinions coming
in from pilots literally all over the world. My site's technical
advisor (a retired RAF officer) was kept busy with this one!

See it here:
http://www.alexisparkinn.com/photogallery/Videos/Airbus320_trees.mpg

Also, you can read some of the comments here:
http://www.alexisparkinn.com/autoland_crash.htm

and here:
http://www.alexisparkinn.com/autoland_crash2.htm

See all 300+ aviation videos here:
http://www.alexisparkinn.com/aviation_videos.htm
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

[Kev]

Danny Dot wrote:
> In about 1990 Airbus did low pass at the Paris airshow and lost the plane.
> I recall it had something to do with the throttle software thinking the
> pilots were in landing mode and "refused" to go to high power for the
> go-around.

There's an interesting comment on the topic of "landing mode" in the
following article about Boeing vs Airbus control philosophy. The
supposed quote from John Lauber, who was vice president of safety and
technical affairs for Airbus, specifically mentions it. The relevant
section is at the end.

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/boe202.shtml

Cheers, Kev

[Mxsmanic]

Greg Farris writes:

> Most importantly, the fly-by-wire did not "lock up" - and the plane did not
> "think" it was landing and prevent the application of TOGA power. The
> accident was classic pilot error, no fault was found with the FBW system...

Since the flight recorders were tampered with, all conclusions
concerning that flight are suspect.

Furthermore, if the FBW system were truly as reliable as Airbus
claims, the aircraft would never have crashed--the computers would
have prevented it. Airbus aircraft don't allow pilots to override the
computers, which means that this crash must have been a
computer-generated crash no matter how you look at it.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Greg Farris]

In article om>,
says...



The relevant
>section is at the end.
>


The "relevant section" is not in this article - or in much of anything
published by this Seattle-based newspaper aviation authority.

I wouldn't question his objectivity, even though he is the author of this
article :
Aggressive sales style helps Boeing soar past Airbus in new orders
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/228255_boerecovery13.html

in 1995 - the third consecutive year in which Airbus sales surpassed Boeing,
and notwithstanding the fact that a Google serach on his name reveals a litany
of strident Airbus-bashing...

And I wouldn't question his knowledge of the subject - I' sure it is simply
time and space constraints which prevent him from revealing any of the vast
technical references he surely holds which would support his claims...

Things get a little stickier though when he claims that that version of A320
had a "landing mode" which completely precluded the pilot from making a
recovery - when newspaper reporters publish demonstrably false statements it
just takes some of the shine off - for me anyway...

Planes equipped for CATIIIc approaches have a "land" mode, which when engaged
is 'expected' to terminate in an autoland prodecure. Aside the fact that this
was not the case (or anything close to it) for the Airbus in question, does
anyone here really believe that Airbus or Boeing would make a plane that
"decides" to land and "cannot" be over-ridden by pilot action?
Kev, please be clear - is this what you're asking us to believe?

In sum - the reality is clear.
The thing has NSA written all over it!
It's clear the plane was being controlled from OUTSIDE (possibly from as far
away as Washington) and was deliberately crashed to discredit Airbus. The only
failure was that the pilot was not expected to survive - since he did, they
had to get to work fast on the flight recorders so they could diecredit him
as well.

[Greg Farris]

In article >,
says...

>
>Anyone remember the details???
>

FROM AIRLINERS.NET :


The Air France A320 that was written off at Habsheim was being operated on a
public transport flight by Air France at the time of the crash. The aircraft
had been used in flight testing, but had been delivered to Air France several
days before the accident, and was involved in a promotional flight when it
crashed. The A320 was in service operating revenue flights at the time of the
accident, F-CFKC was in fact Air France's 3rd A320.

Most importantly, the fly-by-wire did not "lock up" - and the plane did not
"think" it was landing and prevent the application of TOGA power. The
accident was classic pilot error, no fault was found with the FBW system...

Some findings of the accident investigation:

• The captain had participated as Air France's technical pilot in
developmental test flying on the A320, during which manoeuvres were carried
out beyond the normal operational limitations. This could have lead to
overconfidence in the systems of the new aircraft.
• The flight had only been briefly prepared, without real consultation
between the departments (of Air France) concerned, or with the crew.
• Descent was started 5.5nm from the aerodrome. Throughout the descent, the
engines were throttled back to flight idle with the airspeed reducing.
• At 1000ft AGL the rate of descent was still ~600fpm.
• The captain levelled off at a height of ~30ft, engines at flight idle,
pitch attitude increasing. He did not have time to stabilise the angle of
attack at the maximum value he had selected.
• Full-power was rapidly applied when the angle of attack was 15° and the
airspeed 122kt.
• The response of the engines was normal, and in compliance with their
certification.

The cause:
• The accident resulted from a combination of the following;

• Flyover height lower than surrounding obstacles (Flown at 30ft against the
planned 100ft)

• Slow speed, reducing to reach maximum angle of attack

• Engines at flight idle

• Late application of go-around power

In summary the crew flew the aircraft onto the wrong side of the drag curve
in a critical situation overflying a very small grass strip with trees above
the height of the aircraft off the end of the runway, the aircraft was low,
slow and at a high angle of attack - there was no residual energy to get them
out of trouble. It's a basic lesson in flying, and the A320 was found to have
actually exceeded it's certified performance once TOGA power was selected.

The crew had been briefed to overfly the concrerte runway 02/20 at 100ft, but
unknown to them the airshow was alligned along grass strip runway 16/34. The
crew were unaware of this until descending through 200ft, 24 seconds before
the accident, at which time they had to chose to reposition the aircraft to
conduct an overflight they had not briefed for over runway 16/34 as the
height decayed to 30ft and the airspeed to 122kt...



If you want some information on some of the conflicting theories, you can
find it here : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conspiracy_theory

[Thomas Borchert]

Mxsmanic,

> Airbus aircraft don't allow pilots to override the
> computers,
>

Once again, you haven't the slightest clue what you are talking about.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Thomas Borchert]

Greg,

> It's clear the plane was being controlled from OUTSIDE
>

It must have been an early test of the 9/11 system.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Mxsmanic]

Thomas Borchert writes:

> Once again, you haven't the slightest clue what you are talking about.

I'm going by what Airbus says about their own aircraft.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Thomas Borchert]

Mxsmanic,

> I'm going by what Airbus says about their own aircraft.
>

And the quote is where in Airbus literature? Point me to it. It's the
fifth or so time I ask you to back a statement up with facts. Come on,
surprise me.


--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Kev]

Danny Dot wrote:
> In about 1990 Airbus did low pass at the Paris airshow and lost the plane.
> I recall it had something to do with the throttle software thinking the
> pilots were in landing mode and "refused" to go to high power for the
> go-around.

Yes, the computers did think the pilot was landing, but the crash was
caused by his being too low and slow. (See other posts for more info
on the latter.)

The Airbus software has modes where its flight control computer laws
are quite different. Some of those computer laws are divided into
Ground, Flight and Landing (Flare) phases.

One claim is that he was trying to demonstrate that the airplane was
unstallable. He had reportedly done this demonstration several times
before at a slightly higher altitude, and it had always worked. Why?
Because the Airbus has what's known as Alpha Protection (pitch related)
and Alpha Floor (thrust related). Too little thrust, at too high an
angle of attack (AOA), and its computers automatically kick in and
override the pilot.

The reason the automatic protection didn't work this time was because
he went below 100', so the computers switched to Landing Mode. That
doesn't mean they do an autoland. It means they think the pilot is
landing the plane and their rules change. The Alpha Floor is disabled
so that a landing is possible at all. By the time the pilot advanced
the throttles himself, it was too late.

In addition, another Landing Mode kicks in when the Bus passes below
50' going down to 30', as he did. The computer starts changing the
stick reference for landing, so that if you have the stick pulled
back', that position soon becomes the neutral spot. This is supposed
to force the pilot to pull back more for flaring.

Regards, Kev

Easy Reading Version of Airbus Flight Control Laws (for Pitch Mostly)
http://www.airbusdriver.net/airbus_fltlaws.htm

Airbus Training Details with couple of pages on Laws
http://www.chipsplace.com/helpful/Airbus/Airbus320TOC.htm#TOC

FAA Special Regs Example for Laws Feedback
http://www.washingtonwatchdog.org/documents/fr/02/jy/01/fr01jy02-3.html

Interesting incidents:

.... AOA protect problem (caused constant pitch up with resultant TCAS
alert)
http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/compendium/incidents_and_accidents/ACAS-AAIB-dft_avsafety_pdf_501275.pdf

.... AOA protect system stopped nose-up for go-around and allowed
aircraft to hit runway
.... Afterwards, the rate-of-AOA-change logic was removed from the
software
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20010207-0

[Kev]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
> Mxsmanic,
> > [Airbus software can't be overridden by pilots]
> > I'm going by what Airbus says about their own aircraft.
>
> And the quote is where in Airbus literature? Point me to it. It's the
> fifth or so time I ask you to back a statement up with facts. Come on,
> surprise me.

Woof. You both make statements but neither of you give evidence to
support your comments.

You're both right and you're both wrong. In most cases the pilot
cannot override the Airbus software. For example, a pilot is _not_
allowed to roll the aircraft, nor exceed certain AOAs (up or down).
In some cases however the pilot can hold the stick or hold down a
disconnect button and request the computers to give up some of their
authority (but never all).

See my other posting in this thread for links that you're both
obviously too lazy to find on your own. (Come on people, do a little
research before spouting off ;-)

Kev

[Thomas Borchert]

Kev,

> You both make statements but neither of you give evidence to
> support your comments.
>

Which of my statements would that be?

Come on. Your well-informed posts show that you know better. MX's
statement read: "Airbus aircraft don't allow pilots to override the
computers". That's utter BS, as your posts and the links you provide
nicely show. All I did was ask for a source where Airbus says: "Airbus
aircraft don't allow pilots to override the computers", as he claimed
there is. He couldn't provide it.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Stefan]

Greg Farris schrieb:

> accident was classic pilot error, no fault was found with the FBW system...

The computer was not only not at fault, but it even prevented a catastrophe.

The automatic wing leveller kept the wings levelled, even at full stall.
It did this so perfectly that when the airplane descended into the
trees, both wings were ripped off simultaneously, and the fuselage
"landed" straight ahead and perfectly aligned. From the 120 or so
passengers, *no* one was killed or even severely injured at the impact!
This is a plain miracle.

The three deaths of that accident were not killed at impact, but very
tragically later: There were two passengers in wheelchairs who couldn't
leave the airplane by themselves after the impact. One flight attendant
got aware of this after she had left the plane and returned back into
the plane to help the two to get out. Tragically, at that moment, the
developing fire reached the fuselage and the three were trapped and burnt.

Stefan

[Peter Dohm]

"Kev" > wrote in message
oups.com...
>
> Danny Dot wrote:
> > In about 1990 Airbus did low pass at the Paris airshow and lost the
plane.
> > I recall it had something to do with the throttle software thinking the
> > pilots were in landing mode and "refused" to go to high power for the
> > go-around.
>
> Yes, the computers did think the pilot was landing, but the crash was
> caused by his being too low and slow. (See other posts for more info
> on the latter.)
>
> The Airbus software has modes where its flight control computer laws
> are quite different. Some of those computer laws are divided into
> Ground, Flight and Landing (Flare) phases.
>
> One claim is that he was trying to demonstrate that the airplane was
> unstallable. He had reportedly done this demonstration several times
> before at a slightly higher altitude, and it had always worked. Why?
> Because the Airbus has what's known as Alpha Protection (pitch related)
> and Alpha Floor (thrust related). Too little thrust, at too high an
> angle of attack (AOA), and its computers automatically kick in and
> override the pilot.
>
> The reason the automatic protection didn't work this time was because
> he went below 100', so the computers switched to Landing Mode. That
> doesn't mean they do an autoland. It means they think the pilot is
> landing the plane and their rules change. The Alpha Floor is disabled
> so that a landing is possible at all. By the time the pilot advanced
> the throttles himself, it was too late.
>
> In addition, another Landing Mode kicks in when the Bus passes below
> 50' going down to 30', as he did. The computer starts changing the
> stick reference for landing, so that if you have the stick pulled
> back', that position soon becomes the neutral spot. This is supposed
> to force the pilot to pull back more for flaring.
>
> Regards, Kev
>
---------links snipped----------

That was not the first or last time that a flight crew got into trouble with
a new control system that they only partially understood; and I am sure that
there will be more to come.

Just as an example, Eastern Airlines lost one of the early Lockheed L-1011
aircraft in the Florida Everglades due to a chain of events which began with
a failed indicator lamp for the nose wheel. The new feature, in the
experience of the crew, was that the autopilot could be dissengaged by a
sharp pull of push on either yoke--and would remain dissengaged until either
pilot engaged it again. That was both a safety feature and a convenience
feature, since it did not require a crew member to continue to forcibly
override a rachetting capstan until the autopilot could be dissengaged. But
the crew did not fully understand the feature, or all of its implications,
at the time. Further, autopilots do operate the trim, but not perfectly,
and they happened to be trimmed very slightly nose down; with the result
that the aircraft gradually drifted down until the wheels contacted the
vegetation and water--and dug in. There were no outside visual referenced
at that place and time--and they still believed that they were on autopilot
at a constant altitude.

That's just one more relatively famous accident.

Peter

[Kingfish]

Stefan wrote:
>> From the 120 or so passengers, *no* one was killed or even severely injured at the impact!


There were pax aboard that flight? I thought it was a mfr test hop?

[Stefan]

Kingfish schrieb:

> There were pax aboard that flight? I thought it was a mfr test hop?

It was a demonstration flight on an airshow. This was the last such
flight in Europe with passengers aboard.

Stefan

[Peter Dohm]

"Stefan" > wrote in message
. ..
> Kingfish schrieb:
>
> > There were pax aboard that flight? I thought it was a mfr test hop?
>
> It was a demonstration flight on an airshow. This was the last such
> flight in Europe with passengers aboard.
>
> Stefan

It used to be fairly common for an airline with a nearby base to have one of
their aircraft make a low pass over the runway at an airshow--sometimes slow
and dirty (as this was planned to be), other times clean and fast, and
occasionally one of each. It was a way to showcase their presence, and also
provided an interesting contrast of sizes and characteristics...

Peter

[Mxsmanic]

Kev writes:

> The Airbus software has modes where its flight control computer laws
> are quite different. Some of those computer laws are divided into
> Ground, Flight and Landing (Flare) phases.
>
> One claim is that he was trying to demonstrate that the airplane was
> unstallable. He had reportedly done this demonstration several times
> before at a slightly higher altitude, and it had always worked. Why?
> Because the Airbus has what's known as Alpha Protection (pitch related)
> and Alpha Floor (thrust related). Too little thrust, at too high an
> angle of attack (AOA), and its computers automatically kick in and
> override the pilot.
>
> The reason the automatic protection didn't work this time was because
> he went below 100', so the computers switched to Landing Mode. That
> doesn't mean they do an autoland. It means they think the pilot is
> landing the plane and their rules change. The Alpha Floor is disabled
> so that a landing is possible at all. By the time the pilot advanced
> the throttles himself, it was too late.
>
> In addition, another Landing Mode kicks in when the Bus passes below
> 50' going down to 30', as he did. The computer starts changing the
> stick reference for landing, so that if you have the stick pulled
> back', that position soon becomes the neutral spot. This is supposed
> to force the pilot to pull back more for flaring.

These are all examples of poor design. It's extremely dangerous to
put such features into FBW software unless you can be certain that all
pilots will know as much about the software as the designers did, so
that they'll know all the modes and all the combinations and
permutations of possibilities.

If you aren't going to let the pilot control the plane, why have a
pilot at all? And if the computers are going to second-guess the
pilot's intentions every step of the way without the pilot knowing it,
having a pilot is worse than not having one.

This is a good example of poor human-machine interactions, created by
poor and inadequate design.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[[email protected]]

Danny Dot wrote:
> In about 1990 Airbus did low pass at the Paris airshow and lost the plane.
> I recall it had something to do with the throttle software thinking the
> pilots were in landing mode and "refused" to go to high power for the
> go-around.
>
> Anyone remember the details???
>
> Danny Dot

This really comes down to a simple difference between the way the
autothrottle operates in Boeing airplanes vs. Airbus.

In the Boeing model, if you shove the throttle handles forward, the
engines respond to the throttle setting. If autothrottle is engaged,
it will start to retard the throttles back to the commanded setting and
the pilot will see the throttles moving, realize that autothrottle is
engaged and trying to do something different than what he wants, and he
will grab the throttle handles, shove them back forward and push the
autothrottle disengage button on the side of the throttle handle. This
takes only a second or two to resolve.

In an Airbus model, if you shove the throttle handles foward, the
engines do not respond to the throttle setting (when autothrottle is
engaged), and the throttle handles will just sit there in a position
that differs from what the autothrottle is doing. In the meantime, it
can take a while for the pilot to realize what is going on and the push
the TOGA button to disengage the landing mode and get the computer to
respond to the throttle handle position. This is what happened to the
pilot involved in this accident. By the time he realized what was
going on and pushed the TOGA button, there wasn't time for the engines
to spool up enough to miss the trees.

This is why the difference between a chainsaw and an A320 is 100 trees
a minute.

Dean

[Kev]

Mxsmanic wrote:
> These are all examples of poor design. It's extremely dangerous to
> put such features into FBW software unless you can be certain that all
> pilots will know as much about the software as the designers did, so
> that they'll know all the modes and all the combinations and
> permutations of possibilities.

For once, I don't see how anyone could disagree. The FAA commissioned a
study of these issues. Check out the site map and the Find All Issues
section.

http://www.flightdeckautomation.com

> If you aren't going to let the pilot control the plane, why have a
> pilot at all?

Boeing thinks along those lines. They have soft limits vs. Airbus'
hard limits.

> And if the computers are going to second-guess the
> pilot's intentions every step of the way without the pilot knowing it,
> having a pilot is worse than not having one.

Well, not really of course. Interestingly, it seems that a lot of
pilots love the Airbus overrides. They can flick the handles and not
worry too much. Others seem to want to rely more on the usual stick
and rudder skills. You could argue both ways.

Computers aren't all bad. Consider all the traction control etc
computers in cars these days. (I actually don't like them
second-guessing me sometimes, but for the majority of drivers they're a
good thing.)

> This is a good example of poor human-machine interactions, created by
> poor and inadequate design.

I agree that letting programmers decide how things work is often a Bad
Idea.

Kev

[Mxsmanic]

Kev writes:

> Boeing thinks along those lines. They have soft limits vs. Airbus'
> hard limits.

I agree strongly with Boeing.

The whole justification for a pilot is to have a human being aboard
for unexpected emergencies. Computers are superior to human beings
for handling _foreseen_ emergencies, so pilots aren't needed in those
cases. They are also superior for controlling normal flight. The
real advantage of a human pilot in cockpit, though, is that human
beings are extremely good at dealing with completely off-the-wall
situations for which computers haven't been programmed in advance. If
an aircraft finds itself in an unusual attitude that the programmers
of the on-board computers have not foreseen, the computers will
probably make catastrophically poor decisions, or they will just fault
or reboot. A human being, on the other hand, will adapt and make
decisions that are at least moderately appropriate to the situation,
no matter how bizarre.

Given this, not allowing the pilot to override the computer makes no
sense at all. Why bother with the pilot, if all he can do in a
situation that the computer doesn't understand is watch himself and
his aircraft plummet towards the ground?

To make a pilot useful, you need a button that says "I have the
controls," and turns the computer completely off. The pilot is then
on his own, but in some situations, that may be what saves the day.

> Computers aren't all bad. Consider all the traction control etc
> computers in cars these days. (I actually don't like them
> second-guessing me sometimes, but for the majority of drivers they're a
> good thing.)

Computers aren't bad at all. Look at the widespread use of autopilots,
which are simply a type of computer. But you need to be able to
switch off the computer, just as you can disengage the autopilot,
otherwise the time may come when you'll watch helplessly as your
computer kills you and destroys your aircraft with poor decisions.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Mxsmanic]

Greg Farris writes:

> Well - we are getting much closer to a defensible response here.
> We can accept then that the plane crashed because the pilot flew too low and
> advanced the throttles too late. Contributing factors include the pilot's
> incomplete comprehension of the aircraft's systems. What the investigation had
> to determine then, was whether the pilot's poor comprehension was due to poor
> application of his training, or whether the training itself was inadequate.

There's another possibility: The designers of the FBW system had no
clue as to how real pilots react in different situations, and failed
to anticipate what a pilot would do and expect in those situations.
If they had done their job correctly, the FBW would do exactly what a
pilot would expect it to do, and there would be no "modes" for a pilot
to memorize over and above everything else that he already has to
know. Flying isn't a video game, even if some desk-bound geeks at
Airbus might like to pretend that it is.

> If a pilot, faced with an unexpected situation does something other than what
> his training suggests, and the result is positive, then nothing is said. But if
> the pilot does not act in accordance with his training and the result is
> negative, then it is fair play to attribute it to pilot error.

What happens if the aircraft is designed to do something
counterintuitive, such as having the movements of the yoke reversed,
and the pilot forgets this (or is never trained about it) and makes a
mistake that leads to an accident? Is it the pilot's fault because
the aircraft behaved like no other that he has ever flown, or the
manufacturer's fault because it designed in features that were in
direct contradiction of a pilot's normal base training?

> But then, all of the above is moot when one considers, as resident experts have
> explained to us, that Airbus aircraft are not controllable through pilot input
> ...

They are not controllable outside an envelope that is enforced by the
computers. In this case, you have to wonder just exactly why pilots
are needed at all. If all flying situations are covered by the
computers, the computers can fly the aircraft from start to finish,
and you can dispense with pilots.

This will probably actually happen one day for commercial airliners,
although that day is still quite far away. Pilots of airliners are
increasingly just skilled attendants, not people who actually fly the
plane.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Jose[_1_]]

> What the investigation had
> to determine then, was whether the pilot's poor comprehension was due to poor
> application of his training, or whether the training itself was inadequate.

.... or whether (in addition) the design invites errors of this sort.

Jose
--
"There are 3 secrets to the perfect landing. Unfortunately, nobody knows
what they are." - (mike).
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[Greg Farris]

In article >,
says...

>There's another possibility: The designers of the FBW system had no
>clue as to how real pilots react in different situations, and failed
>to anticipate what a pilot would do and expect in those situations.


How about that . . . You know I never even considered that possibility.

[Greg Farris]

In article . com>,
says...

>Yes, the computers did think the pilot was landing, but the crash was
>caused by his being too low and slow. (See other posts for more info
>on the latter.)
>
>The Airbus software has modes where its flight control computer laws
>are quite different. Some of those computer laws are divided into
>Ground, Flight and Landing (Flare) phases.
>
>One claim is that he was trying to demonstrate that the airplane was
>unstallable. He had reportedly done this demonstration several times
>before at a slightly higher altitude, and it had always worked. Why?
>Because the Airbus has what's known as Alpha Protection (pitch related)
>and Alpha Floor (thrust related). Too little thrust, at too high an
>angle of attack (AOA), and its computers automatically kick in and
>override the pilot.
>
>The reason the automatic protection didn't work this time was because
>he went below 100', so the computers switched to Landing Mode. That
>doesn't mean they do an autoland. It means they think the pilot is
>landing the plane and their rules change. The Alpha Floor is disabled
>so that a landing is possible at all. By the time the pilot advanced
>the throttles himself, it was too late.
>
>In addition, another Landing Mode kicks in when the Bus passes below
>50' going down to 30', as he did. The computer starts changing the
>stick reference for landing, so that if you have the stick pulled
>back', that position soon becomes the neutral spot. This is supposed
>to force the pilot to pull back more for flaring.
>



Well - we are getting much closer to a defensible response here.
We can accept then that the plane crashed because the pilot flew too low and
advanced the throttles too late. Contributing factors include the pilot's
incomplete comprehension of the aircraft's systems. What the investigation had
to determine then, was whether the pilot's poor comprehension was due to poor
application of his training, or whether the training itself was inadequate.

This is a key factor - I say for the benefit of some contributors who have
little or no understanding of aviation technology but who publish regularly as
resident experts - it is an established criterion of accident investigation
that pilots may be judged according to their application of specific training.
If a pilot, faced with an unexpected situation does something other than what
his training suggests, and the result is positive, then nothing is said. But if
the pilot does not act in accordance with his training and the result is
negative, then it is fair play to attribute it to pilot error. Through this
model, it is possible to evaluate the performance of the pilot, and the quality
or pertinence of the training;

As an accessory consideration, it would be expected that the aircraft's systems
would also be examined, and improvements proposed if and where appropriate.



But then, all of the above is moot when one considers, as resident experts have
explained to us, that Airbus aircraft are not controllable through pilot input
.. . .

GF

[Thomas Borchert]

> In the meantime, it
> can take a while for the pilot to realize what is going on and the push
> the TOGA button to disengage the landing mode and get the computer to
> respond to the throttle handle position.
>

Two words: type rating. That's what they are for...

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[[email protected]]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
> > In the meantime, it
> > can take a while for the pilot to realize what is going on and the push
> > the TOGA button to disengage the landing mode and get the computer to
> > respond to the throttle handle position.
> >
>
> Two words: type rating. That's what they are for...
>
> --
> Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Two more words: intelligent design. That's what is lacking at Airbus.

[[email protected]]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
> > In the meantime, it
> > can take a while for the pilot to realize what is going on and the push
> > the TOGA button to disengage the landing mode and get the computer to
> > respond to the throttle handle position.
> >
>
> Two words: type rating. That's what they are for...
>
> --
> Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

One more thing Thomas, the pilot that crashed the plane was an Airbus
test pilot with a type rating in the plane. Despite that, he still got
bit by the autothrottle design.

[Peter Dohm]

> Thomas Borchert wrote:
> > > In the meantime, it
> > > can take a while for the pilot to realize what is going on and the
push
> > > the TOGA button to disengage the landing mode and get the computer to
> > > respond to the throttle handle position.
> > >
> >
> > Two words: type rating. That's what they are for...
> >
> > --
> > Thomas Borchert (EDDH)
>
> One more thing Thomas, the pilot that crashed the plane was an Airbus
> test pilot with a type rating in the plane. Despite that, he still got
> bit by the autothrottle design.
>
Interesting point!

The fact is, I have been a Boeing Bigot for a long time, and this is only
one of many justifications.

Peter

[Thomas Borchert]

> Despite that, he still got
> bit by the autothrottle design.
>

All pilots (well, most) that crash airplanes requiring type ratings
have them. What does it prove? That humans make mistakes. What do the
conspiracy theories around the Airbuis crash prove? That humans like to
put the blame somewhere else.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Mxsmanic]

Greg Farris writes:

> Can you offer a justification that a thinking person could accept for the
> statement that "intelligent design" is lacking at Airbus?

Habsheim, and many other incidents since then.

> It really cracks me up - I mean I am really getting a laugh at these clowns
> at the zenith of their ignorance making blanket statements about a company
> like Airbus "not having a clue about real pilots" ot "lacking intelligent
> design. . ." It's really really funny!!

Is it funny when people die?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Mxsmanic]

Thomas Borchert writes:

> All pilots (well, most) that crash airplanes requiring type ratings
> have them. What does it prove? That humans make mistakes. What do the
> conspiracy theories around the Airbuis crash prove? That humans like to
> put the blame somewhere else.

And at Airbus, mistakes are transferred from pilots to the
manufacturer.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Greg Farris]

In article om>,
says...

>
>Two more words: intelligent design. That's what is lacking at Airbus.
>


Oh No!
Now we're into religion!
Let me guess - Airbus, in this scenario, represents evil Darwinism,
while Boeing, represents - you guessed it - Intelligent Design!!



Seriously though - do you know anything about Airbus? The company - their
business model - the type of engineers they hire - their training, their
engineering program - where they are located - what their logo looks like- I
mean anything at all? Do you know anything at all about Airbus aircraft?
(rhetorical question)

Can you offer a justification that a thinking person could accept for the
statement that "intelligent design" is lacking at Airbus?


It really cracks me up - I mean I am really getting a laugh at these clowns
at the zenith of their ignorance making blanket statements about a company
like Airbus "not having a clue about real pilots" ot "lacking intelligent
design. . ." It's really really funny!!

[Thomas Borchert]

Mxsmanic,

> And at Airbus, mistakes are transferred from pilots to the
> manufacturer.
>

Proof? Cites? You won't provide them, as usual. You're blathering away
cluelessly. I'd really like to know what this kind of behaviour adds to
your life.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Thomas Borchert]

Mxsmanic,

> and many other incidents since then.
>

Ok, enough. Provide us with a comparison of Airbus and Boeing accidents
since (and including) Habsheim. Prove to us with that data that FBW
Airbus types have significantly more accidents than Boeing non-FBW.
Prove that, if you can show the former (you won't be able to, but try),
that the accident types show a connection to FBW design.

If you can't provide this, you are obviously a slanderous liar.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Morgans[_2_]]

Thomas

This nut thrives, even on abuse, if that is all the attention he can get. That
is what trolls do.

Do us and yourself a favor. Ignore him.

That is what he deserves.
--
Jim in NC

[Thomas Borchert]

Greg,

> is this the cue to get into the
> Boeing runaway rudder discussion?
>

It might be a great cue. There goes MX's theory of all things
mechanical being "under total command of the pilot" out of the window.
A completely non-FBW connection between pilot and rudder - and still
the rudder deflects uncommandedly.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Mxsmanic]

Thomas Borchert writes:

> If you can't provide this, you are obviously a slanderous liar.

No, I'm simply not willing and/or able to provide it. That says
nothing about whether or not I'm telling the truth, and it is
unrelated to spoken defamation (slander).

You haven't provided anything to support your point of view, but that
does not make you a liar.

Calling someone a liar without being able to prove it is libel in some
cases, however.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Mxsmanic]

Greg Farris writes:

> Oh oh - getting serious now!

I'm already serious.

> Has your ignorance already killed people?

No.

> Are you admitting something you would be better not in public?

No.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[[email protected]]

Greg Farris wrote:
> In article om>,
> says...
>
> >
> >Two more words: intelligent design. That's what is lacking at Airbus.
> >
>
>
> Oh No!
> Now we're into religion!
> Let me guess - Airbus, in this scenario, represents evil Darwinism,
> while Boeing, represents - you guessed it - Intelligent Design!!
>
>
>
> Seriously though - do you know anything about Airbus? The company - their
> business model - the type of engineers they hire - their training, their
> engineering program - where they are located - what their logo looks like- I
> mean anything at all? Do you know anything at all about Airbus aircraft?
> (rhetorical question)
>
> Can you offer a justification that a thinking person could accept for the
> statement that "intelligent design" is lacking at Airbus?
>
>
> It really cracks me up - I mean I am really getting a laugh at these clowns
> at the zenith of their ignorance making blanket statements about a company
> like Airbus "not having a clue about real pilots" ot "lacking intelligent
> design. . ." It's really really funny!!

Lets see, I worked for Boeing for 8 years, mostly on the 777 Flight
Deck Displays (AIMS), and while there, I was privy to a lot of
competitive analysis of Airbus products.

Yep, you are right, I am just an ignoramus.

Dean

[[email protected]]

Greg Farris wrote:
> In article om>,
> says...
>
> >
> >Two more words: intelligent design. That's what is lacking at Airbus.
> >
>
>
> Oh No!
> Now we're into religion!
> Let me guess - Airbus, in this scenario, represents evil Darwinism,
> while Boeing, represents - you guessed it - Intelligent Design!!
>
>
>
> Seriously though - do you know anything about Airbus? The company - their
> business model - the type of engineers they hire - their training, their
> engineering program - where they are located - what their logo looks like- I
> mean anything at all? Do you know anything at all about Airbus aircraft?
> (rhetorical question)
>
> Can you offer a justification that a thinking person could accept for the
> statement that "intelligent design" is lacking at Airbus?
>
>
> It really cracks me up - I mean I am really getting a laugh at these clowns
> at the zenith of their ignorance making blanket statements about a company
> like Airbus "not having a clue about real pilots" ot "lacking intelligent
> design. . ." It's really really funny!!

Lets see, I worked for Boeing for 8 years, mostly on the 777 Flight
Deck Displays (AIMS), and while there, I was privy to a lot of
competitive analysis of Airbus products.

Yep, you are right, I am just an ignoramus.

Dean

[Greg Farris]

In article >,
says...

>
>> It really cracks me up - I mean I am really getting a laugh at these clowns
>> at the zenith of their ignorance making blanket statements about a company
>> like Airbus "not having a clue about real pilots" ot "lacking intelligent
>> design. . ." It's really really funny!!
>
>Is it funny when people die?
>

Oh oh - getting serious now!
Has your ignorance already killed people?
Are you admitting something you would be better not in public?

[Greg Farris]

In article . com>,
says...

>
>In the Boeing model, if you shove the throttle handles forward, the
>engines respond to the throttle setting.
>
>In an Airbus model, if you shove the throttle handles foward, the
>engines do not respond to the throttle setting

In the meantime, it
>can take a while for the pilot to realize what is going on and the push
>the TOGA button to disengage the landing mode and get the computer to
>respond to the throttle handle position. This is what happened to the
>pilot involved in this accident. By the time he realized what was
>going on and pushed the TOGA button, there wasn't time for the engines
>to spool up enough to miss the trees.
>



In Boeing planes you also use the TOGA switch to execute a go-around.
So there goes that argument. . .


To fly any plane safely, you have to know which buttons to push for each set
of circumstances. Even in a small trainer, flown low and slow, if you do not
execute the recovery properly you will go down. If you retract the flaps first
- or even at the same time - you can shove the throttle forward and you will
still go down. Nothing intuitive about it - you have to LEARN to do it, then
in a real situation, you must apply what you learned.

I do not for a second insinuate that the pilot of that plane was untrained or
unaware, but there was incontestably something incomplete in the application
of his training, and he did not execute a successful recovery from a low pass.
That's why he was held responsible for it - NOT because of some deep, dark
international conspiracy - NOT because the aircraft "has its own mind" and
cannot be controlled by the pilot.

It is surprising how willing some people are to reject plausible, rational
explanations, in favor of wild and totally unreasonable speculation.

Certainly the aircraft's systems were revisited after this incident, as is
often the case after aviation accidents (is this the cue to get into the
Boeing runaway rudder discussion?) - but even as planes are always being
improved, pilots must fly the plane they have in hand. In the crash in
question there is nothing to suggest systems failure of the aircraft, and
everything to suggest pilot error . . .

The suggestion that Airbus engineers did not consider the event of a
go-around, and made no provision for it, because they do not know enough about
airplane operations is, well simply ridiculous.

[Thomas Borchert]

Mxsmanic,

> No, I'm simply not willing and/or able to provide it.

I'm not surprised.

> You haven't provided anything to support your point of view,

I haven't provided a point of view to start with. You didn't either.
You made a factual statement. I asked you to provide the facts to back
it up. You can't. That pretty much says it all. You're a liar. I'll
keep saying it until you prove me wrong.


--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Thomas Borchert]

> Lets see, I worked for Boeing for 8 years, mostly on the 777 Flight
> Deck Displays (AIMS), and while there, I was privy to a lot of
> competitive analysis of Airbus products.
>
> Yep, you are right, I am just an ignoramus.
>

Three points for consideration:

1. "intelligent design" might be an unlucky choice of words by you.
Theses two are kind of loaded.

2. Your background makes you, well, kind of biased, wouldn't you agree?

3. Argument by authority isn't really a good way to try to convince
intelligent people.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Bob Noel]

In article om>,
wrote:

> Lets see, I worked for Boeing for 8 years, mostly on the 777 Flight
> Deck Displays (AIMS), and while there, I was privy to a lot of
> competitive analysis of Airbus products.
>
> Yep, you are right, I am just an ignoramus.

Information on Airbus products <> information regarding Airbus engineers'
knowledge and abilities.

--
Bob Noel
Looking for a sig the
lawyers will hate

[[email protected]]

Bob Noel wrote:
> In article om>,
> wrote:
>
> > Lets see, I worked for Boeing for 8 years, mostly on the 777 Flight
> > Deck Displays (AIMS), and while there, I was privy to a lot of
> > competitive analysis of Airbus products.
> >
> > Yep, you are right, I am just an ignoramus.
>
> Information on Airbus products <> information regarding Airbus engineers'
> knowledge and abilities.
>
> --
> Bob Noel
> Looking for a sig the
> lawyers will hate

So, designing an airplane that does not respond to pilot throttle
inputs reflects well on their abilities? When a pilot pushes the
throttle handles forward, he wants more power NOW. Not when some
software algorithm decides that he is allowed to have it...

[john smith]

And if it is anything like the way the side sticks work, if both pilots
frantically push on the power levers, you will eventually get twice the
thrust. :-))

wrote:

>Bob Noel wrote:
>
>
>>In article om>,
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>>Lets see, I worked for Boeing for 8 years, mostly on the 777 Flight
>>>Deck Displays (AIMS), and while there, I was privy to a lot of
>>>competitive analysis of Airbus products.
>>>
>>>Yep, you are right, I am just an ignoramus.
>>>
>>>
>>Information on Airbus products <> information regarding Airbus engineers'
>>knowledge and abilities.
>>
>>--
>>Bob Noel
>>Looking for a sig the
>>lawyers will hate
>>
>>
>
>So, designing an airplane that does not respond to pilot throttle
>inputs reflects well on their abilities? When a pilot pushes the
>throttle handles forward, he wants more power NOW. Not when some
>software algorithm decides that he is allowed to have it...
>
>
>

[Kev]

john smith wrote:
> And if it is anything like the way the side sticks work, if both pilots
> frantically push on the power levers, you will eventually get twice the
> thrust. :-))

Heh. Even Bus pilots mention that one as a major dislike. Below is
one report about an Airbus that had to go around while landing. The
captain pulled back his stick, but the copilot forgetfully had his hand
pushing slightly forward on his. The resulting input is the sum of the
sticks, but fortunately the captain pulled hard enough. The report
cites CRM and FBW design issues.

Mxsmanic once asked how pilots knew what the others' pitch input was.
Someone snidely answered that "the yokes are in front of both of them
dummy!". That's true for yokes and coupled sidesticks, but not true
for FBW sidesticks with no coupled force feedback such as the Airbus
has. It's entirely possible for one pilot to hold his stick hard
left, and the other hard right, and neither can tell what the other is
doing... except that the plane will continue to stay level.

http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/ComAndRep/SydneyA320DC10/SydneyA320DC10.html

Kev

[john smith]

Interesting that the solution is to improve CRM not fix the flight
controls so both pilots know what the control inputs are. Politics and
economics, which kills more people?

Kev wrote:

>john smith wrote:
>
>
>>And if it is anything like the way the side sticks work, if both pilots
>>frantically push on the power levers, you will eventually get twice the
>>thrust. :-))
>>
>>
>
>Heh. Even Bus pilots mention that one as a major dislike. Below is
>one report about an Airbus that had to go around while landing. The
>captain pulled back his stick, but the copilot forgetfully had his hand
>pushing slightly forward on his. The resulting input is the sum of the
>sticks, but fortunately the captain pulled hard enough. The report
>cites CRM and FBW design issues.
>
>Mxsmanic once asked how pilots knew what the others' pitch input was.
>Someone snidely answered that "the yokes are in front of both of them
>dummy!". That's true for yokes and coupled sidesticks, but not true
>for FBW sidesticks with no coupled force feedback such as the Airbus
>has. It's entirely possible for one pilot to hold his stick hard
>left, and the other hard right, and neither can tell what the other is
>doing... except that the plane will continue to stay level.
>
>http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/ComAndRep/SydneyA320DC10/SydneyA320DC10.html
>
>Kev
>
>
>

[Mxsmanic]

Kev writes:

> Mxsmanic once asked how pilots knew what the others' pitch input was.
> Someone snidely answered that "the yokes are in front of both of them
> dummy!". That's true for yokes and coupled sidesticks, but not true
> for FBW sidesticks with no coupled force feedback such as the Airbus
> has. It's entirely possible for one pilot to hold his stick hard
> left, and the other hard right, and neither can tell what the other is
> doing... except that the plane will continue to stay level.

Brilliant.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Mxsmanic]

john smith writes:

> Interesting that the solution is to improve CRM not fix the flight
> controls so both pilots know what the control inputs are. Politics and
> economics, which kills more people?

What would be wrong with just installing feedback so that each pilot
can feel what the other pilot is doing? That's the way it has worked
for the past century.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Kev]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
>> Greg wrote:
>> Certainly the aircraft's systems were revisited after this incident, as is
>> often the case after aviation accidents (is this the cue to get into the
>> Boeing runaway rudder discussion?)
>
> It might be a great cue. There goes MX's theory of all things
> mechanical being "under total command of the pilot" out of the window.
> A completely non-FBW connection between pilot and rudder - and still
> the rudder deflects uncommandedly.

Mechanical failures can happen with any aircraft, FBW or not.

Fixing an UN-intentional mechanical flaw that caused crashes, is quite
different from revisiting an intentional system design.

Kev

[Mxsmanic]

Greg Farris writes:

> Pity that in this specialized discussion group we cannot get the level of
> dialog abnove the childish, gutter-level snipes cherished by a few who would
> have every reason to know better.

You always have the option of changing.

> It could be becaus the many contributors who
> really do have something pertinent to say are no longer wasting their time on
> these discussions.

Everyone has had something pertinent to say, although sometimes a few
abstain in favor of personal attacks.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Greg Farris]

In article om>,
says...

>Lets see, I worked for Boeing for 8 years, mostly on the 777 Flight
>Deck Displays (AIMS), and while there, I was privy to a lot of
>competitive analysis of Airbus products.
>


If you did work in any significant engineering capacity at Boeing, it is all
the more disquieting that you would make disdainful (and unjustified) comments
on a worthy competitor (who has outsold Boeing every year since 2003).

The comparison between Boeing and Airbus is a very interesting industrial
subject. Two very different industrial models, in somewhat different cultural
and social context, a shared commercial strategic approach and of course a
global market resulting in two extremely comparable and highly competitive
products, with essentially equal market share.

Books can be (and have been) written about the subject - by intelligent
people, capable of making pertinent observations - and make for a lot of
insight into the high-tech sector.

Pity that in this specialized discussion group we cannot get the level of
dialog abnove the childish, gutter-level snipes cherished by a few who would
have every reason to know better. It could be becaus the many contributors who
really do have something pertinent to say are no longer wasting their time on
these discussions.

GF

[Greg Farris]

In article . com>,
says...

>
>So, designing an airplane that does not respond to pilot throttle
>inputs reflects well on their abilities? When a pilot pushes the
>throttle handles forward, he wants more power NOW. Not when some
>software algorithm decides that he is allowed to have it...
>

You make boastful claims about your knowledge and experience, yet you
continue to publish misleading information (polite word for mistakes) about
the subject.

There are several autothrottle designs in use, and a couple of general
families (those with levers that move automatically and those that do not).
The initiation of a go-around procedure will depend on what type of
autothrottle system is installed on the plane you are flying - and yes, you,
the pilot, are expected to know this and use it properly.

Both types of autothrottles have been installed on both Airbus and Boeing
aircraft, and are not specific to either. On some types, you will push the
levers forward to initiate a go-around, on others you will push the TOGA
buttons. On some, you can do either. This is not specific to Boeing or
Airbus, contrary to what deanwil continues to insist.

What happens "behind the scenes" is indeed different, and Airbus' autothrust
program is specific to their control scenario - but this is no longer a
"human factors" or ergonomics question.

GF

[[email protected]]

Greg Farris wrote:
> In article om>,
> says...
>
> >Lets see, I worked for Boeing for 8 years, mostly on the 777 Flight
> >Deck Displays (AIMS), and while there, I was privy to a lot of
> >competitive analysis of Airbus products.
> >
>
>
> If you did work in any significant engineering capacity at Boeing, it is all
> the more disquieting that you would make disdainful (and unjustified) comments
> on a worthy competitor (who has outsold Boeing every year since 2003).
>
> The comparison between Boeing and Airbus is a very interesting industrial
> subject. Two very different industrial models, in somewhat different cultural
> and social context, a shared commercial strategic approach and of course a
> global market resulting in two extremely comparable and highly competitive
> products, with essentially equal market share.
>
> Books can be (and have been) written about the subject - by intelligent
> people, capable of making pertinent observations - and make for a lot of
> insight into the high-tech sector.
>
> Pity that in this specialized discussion group we cannot get the level of
> dialog abnove the childish, gutter-level snipes cherished by a few who would
> have every reason to know better. It could be becaus the many contributors who
> really do have something pertinent to say are no longer wasting their time on
> these discussions.
>
> GF

Oh, so if my professional opinion does not agree with yours, it is
childish. That's a very high horse you are riding Greg.

The fact of the matter is that my opinion of the A320 autothrottle
design is shared by many engineers and human factors experts at Boeing.
It is a poor design. It is a dangerous design. It adds a barrier to
the pilot. Moving the throttle handles should always result in a
direct control of the engines. Pushing the autothrottle disconnect
button should not be necessary to accomplish this. The backdriven
handles on the Boeing airplanes is far safer than the A320
implementation.

So, what are your qualifications Greg?

Dean

[[email protected]]

Greg Farris wrote:
> In article . com>,
> says...
>
> >
> >So, designing an airplane that does not respond to pilot throttle
> >inputs reflects well on their abilities? When a pilot pushes the
> >throttle handles forward, he wants more power NOW. Not when some
> >software algorithm decides that he is allowed to have it...
> >
>
> You make boastful claims about your knowledge and experience, yet you
> continue to publish misleading information (polite word for mistakes) about
> the subject.
>
> There are several autothrottle designs in use, and a couple of general
> families (those with levers that move automatically and those that do not).
> The initiation of a go-around procedure will depend on what type of
> autothrottle system is installed on the plane you are flying - and yes, you,
> the pilot, are expected to know this and use it properly.
>
> Both types of autothrottles have been installed on both Airbus and Boeing
> aircraft, and are not specific to either. On some types, you will push the
> levers forward to initiate a go-around, on others you will push the TOGA
> buttons. On some, you can do either. This is not specific to Boeing or
> Airbus, contrary to what deanwil continues to insist.
>
> What happens "behind the scenes" is indeed different, and Airbus' autothrust
> program is specific to their control scenario - but this is no longer a
> "human factors" or ergonomics question.
>
> GF

Greg, it is you who is being boastful. After reading this, the limits
of your knowledge is clear. Nice try.

[[email protected]]

Greg Farris wrote:
> In article . com>,
> says...
>
> >
> >So, designing an airplane that does not respond to pilot throttle
> >inputs reflects well on their abilities? When a pilot pushes the
> >throttle handles forward, he wants more power NOW. Not when some
> >software algorithm decides that he is allowed to have it...
> >
>
> You make boastful claims about your knowledge and experience, yet you
> continue to publish misleading information (polite word for mistakes) about
> the subject.
>
> There are several autothrottle designs in use, and a couple of general
> families (those with levers that move automatically and those that do not).
> The initiation of a go-around procedure will depend on what type of
> autothrottle system is installed on the plane you are flying - and yes, you,
> the pilot, are expected to know this and use it properly.
>
> Both types of autothrottles have been installed on both Airbus and Boeing
> aircraft, and are not specific to either. On some types, you will push the
> levers forward to initiate a go-around, on others you will push the TOGA
> buttons. On some, you can do either. This is not specific to Boeing or
> Airbus, contrary to what deanwil continues to insist.
>
> What happens "behind the scenes" is indeed different, and Airbus' autothrust
> program is specific to their control scenario - but this is no longer a
> "human factors" or ergonomics question.
>
> GF

Greg, it is you who is being boastful. After reading this, the limits
of your knowledge is clear. Nice try.

[[email protected]]

Greg Farris wrote:
> In article . com>,
> says...
>
> >
> >So, designing an airplane that does not respond to pilot throttle
> >inputs reflects well on their abilities? When a pilot pushes the
> >throttle handles forward, he wants more power NOW. Not when some
> >software algorithm decides that he is allowed to have it...
> >
>
> You make boastful claims about your knowledge and experience, yet you
> continue to publish misleading information (polite word for mistakes) about
> the subject.
>
> There are several autothrottle designs in use, and a couple of general
> families (those with levers that move automatically and those that do not).
> The initiation of a go-around procedure will depend on what type of
> autothrottle system is installed on the plane you are flying - and yes, you,
> the pilot, are expected to know this and use it properly.
>
> Both types of autothrottles have been installed on both Airbus and Boeing
> aircraft, and are not specific to either. On some types, you will push the
> levers forward to initiate a go-around, on others you will push the TOGA
> buttons. On some, you can do either. This is not specific to Boeing or
> Airbus, contrary to what deanwil continues to insist.
>
> What happens "behind the scenes" is indeed different, and Airbus' autothrust
> program is specific to their control scenario - but this is no longer a
> "human factors" or ergonomics question.
>
> GF

"Both types of autothrottles have been installed on both Airbus and
Boeing
aircraft, and are not specific to either. On some types, you will push
the
levers forward to initiate a go-around, on others you will push the
TOGA
buttons. On some, you can do either. This is not specific to Boeing or

Airbus, contrary to what deanwil continues to insist."

False. On all Boeing models, moving the throttle handles controls the
engines directly. Disengaging the autothrottle is necessary to prevent
the handles from moving back to the position commanded by the
autothrottle, but the engines still respond to the handles. This is
very different than the Airbus A320 design that disengages the throttle
handles from the engines when the autothrottle is active, and has no
backdrive for the throttle handles.

I am ignoring your other remarks as the are clearly intended to incite
a flame war and I refuse to play that game.

[Mxsmanic]

writes:

> It is a poor design. It is a dangerous design. It adds a barrier to
> the pilot. Moving the throttle handles should always result in a
> direct control of the engines. Pushing the autothrottle disconnect
> button should not be necessary to accomplish this. The backdriven
> handles on the Boeing airplanes is far safer than the A320
> implementation.

I'm surprised anyone would argue otherwise. Clearly, it makes more
sense to have the handles move when the autothrottle adjusts them, so
that the pilot always knows where they are. It also makes sense that
the pilot should be able to control the throttles directly at all
times. He might sense resistance from the autothrottle actuator, but
he could still override it.

An Airbus is worse than Microsoft Flight Simulator. When I engage
autothrottle on the sim, the throttles don't move, but at least if I
grab them and move them, the sim responds. In an Airbus I could only
watch the terrain approach in the window, and I wouldn't be able to
restart the flight after the crash.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Stefan]

schrieb:

> The fact of the matter is that my opinion of the A320 autothrottle
> design is shared by many engineers and human factors experts at Boeing.

It's obviously not shared by many engineers and human factor experts at
airbus.

> It is a poor design.

Answerinig in four different posts to the same article without snipping
a single line is very poor design, too. I hope you did a better job at
Boeing.

Stefan

[Mxsmanic]

Stefan writes:

> It's obviously not shared by many engineers and human factor experts at
> airbus.

And that's the problem with Airbus.

> Answerinig in four different posts to the same article without snipping
> a single line is very poor design, too. I hope you did a better job at
> Boeing.

I hope you can come up with a more persuasive counterargument than a
personal attack.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Danny Deger]

> wrote in message
ups.com...
>
> Greg Farris wrote:
>> In article om>,
>> says...
>>

snip

> Oh, so if my professional opinion does not agree with yours, it is
> childish. That's a very high horse you are riding Greg.
>
> The fact of the matter is that my opinion of the A320 autothrottle
> design is shared by many engineers and human factors experts at Boeing.
> It is a poor design. It is a dangerous design. It adds a barrier to
> the pilot. Moving the throttle handles should always result in a
> direct control of the engines. Pushing the autothrottle disconnect
> button should not be necessary to accomplish this. The backdriven
> handles on the Boeing airplanes is far safer than the A320
> implementation.
>
> So, what are your qualifications Greg?
>
> Dean
>

I agree with you. I think Boeing has the right idea on the pilot
controlling the airplane. There are too many cases of Airbus accidents
because the airplane decided it knew what was right and the pilot had to
fight the plane for control. In my opinion the pilot is ALWAYS right.

Danny Deger

[James Robinson]

"Danny Deger" > wrote:

> There are too many cases of Airbus accidents because the airplane
> decided it knew what was right and the pilot had to fight the plane
> for control. In my opinion the pilot is ALWAYS right.

If the Airbus controls are so bad, then why isn't it reflected in the
accident rate? Overall, there really isn't much difference, as shown in
this site:

http://www.airsafe.com/events/models/rate_mod.htm

[Thomas Borchert]

Danny,

> There are too many cases of Airbus accidents
> because the airplane decided it knew what was right and the pilot had to
> fight the plane for control. In my opinion the pilot is ALWAYS right.
>

You are actually of the opinion that there are fewer cases where pilots
have made gross mistakes in aircraft accidents than cases where the
accident happened because "the pilot had to fight the plane for control"?
Wow! Care to show us with accident reports how anyone could possibly come
up with that view?

The one that comes to mind is the Nagoya (?) TOGA accident. What aircraft
was that again? And how was that not the pilots being UTTERLY WRONG and
THEN fighting the plane for control?

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Mxsmanic]

James Robinson writes:

> If the Airbus controls are so bad, then why isn't it reflected in the
> accident rate?

If the Airbus controls are so good, why aren't the accident rates for
the aircraft substantially lower?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[James Robinson]

Mxsmanic > wrote:

> James Robinson writes:
>
>> If the Airbus controls are so bad, then why isn't it reflected in the
>> accident rate?
>
> If the Airbus controls are so good, why aren't the accident rates for
> the aircraft substantially lower?

Perhaps because it doesn't make any difference, and all the argument is a
waste of time.

[Peter Dohm]

"Thomas Borchert" > wrote in message
...
> Danny,
>
> > There are too many cases of Airbus accidents
> > because the airplane decided it knew what was right and the pilot had to
> > fight the plane for control. In my opinion the pilot is ALWAYS right.
> >
>
> You are actually of the opinion that there are fewer cases where pilots
> have made gross mistakes in aircraft accidents than cases where the
> accident happened because "the pilot had to fight the plane for control"?
> Wow! Care to show us with accident reports how anyone could possibly come
> up with that view?
>
> The one that comes to mind is the Nagoya (?) TOGA accident. What aircraft
> was that again? And how was that not the pilots being UTTERLY WRONG and
> THEN fighting the plane for control?
>
> --
> Thomas Borchert (EDDH)
>
IMHO, you have now made Danny's and Dean's points better than I ever could.

See: http://sunnyday.mit.edu/accidents/nag-2.html

Peter

[Mxsmanic]

James Robinson writes:

> Perhaps because it doesn't make any difference, and all the argument is a
> waste of time.

If it doesn't make any difference, then there's no harm in giving the
pilot the final say.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Thomas Borchert]

Peter,

> IMHO, you have now made Danny's and Dean's points better than I ever could.
>

You have to explain that to me. Especially since we're talking about the
A300, a non-FBW aircraft.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)