"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"

[Mike[_7_]]

F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success

By ANGELA K. BROWN
The Associated Press
Saturday, December 16, 2006; 12:03 AM

FORT WORTH, Texas -- The new stealth fighter jet that will replace an
aging fleet of military planes experienced a largely successful first
flight Friday, with only a minor glitch, Lockheed Martin Corp.
officials said. Jon S. Beesley, chief test pilot for the Joint Strike
Fighter, also known as the F-35, said the plane handled "marvelously,"
performed flawlessly and flew better than the simulator. He flew to
15,000 feet, escorted by three jets that provided safety and took
pictures. "It was a great adventure," he said. "Today really started
the opening for me for the rest of this greatest fighter program in
history where we're going to go forward and develop this great weapons
system that will protect everybody, and that's what it's all about."
Officials initially said the test flight would last an hour; Beesley
flew for 35 minutes. One of two air data sensors was not operating
properly, he said. Although it did not pose a danger, the procedure
called for ending the flight at that time, preventing completion of the
remaining few tests, including raising the landing gear, officials
said. "Certainly to fly this first flight with the duration of almost
40 minutes and to only have this single warning appear in the pilot's
display related to this sensor is remarkable, and we're really pleased
with the quality of this first jet," said Dan Crowley, executive vice
president and general manager of the Joint Strike Fighter program.
Runway tests that began last week were completed this week. Officials
had been waiting for good weather for the maiden flight, which almost
didn't happen Friday because of fog and wind. Security was tight Friday
at Lockheed's Fort Worth facility, where the flight took place. But
hundreds of cars parked on the side of the road outside the plant near
the runway, many people holding video cameras in hopes of catching a
glimpse of the supersonic jet, as word spread of the test flight. Many
cheered as the plane took off. Lockheed employees gathered near the
runway also applauded, and some were moved to tears as the gray jet
took off, said some officials, who reported receiving phone calls from
other countries as soon as news spread of the flight. "I would call
this the flight that was heard round the world," said Tom Burbage,
executive vice president for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. and
general manager for the Joint Strike Fighter program integration.
Beesley, who was greeted with roaring cheers as he stepped out of the
cockpit after landing, later said the plane will continue test flights
next week. Brig. Gen. Charles R. Davis, the program executive officer
for the F-35 Lightning II program office in Arlington, Va., said this
jet was the first of 20 planes to be built at Lockheed's Fort Worth
plant that will have test flights there over the next 18 months. After
10 years of development, Bethesda, Md.-based Lockheed Martin is moving
to the early stages of production for what could be thousands of
fighter jets for the American military and eight countries _ and
possibly the largest defense contract ever, $275 billion over the next
two decades. The U.S. plans to use the F-35 to replace aging planes
used by the Marines, Air Force and Navy, including jets like the F-16,
the F-18 and the Harrier jet. Lockheed and its subcontractors are
making three different versions that will be used by the different
branches. The Marine version will be able to make vertical takeoffs.

[Ski]

The JSF (F-35) is clearly a nice aircraft but can any of you tell me what the JSF offers that is not available now in the aircratf it intends to replace. When considering the present wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where we seem to need more Close Air Support (CAS) kind of machines that can both strafe and engage an enemy with small blast weapons (gun, rockets, Hellfire, etc) and the occassional PGM Bomb, what does the JSF offer over just producing more F-15 / F-16 / F-18 aircraft and if anything finding a follow-on for something more like an A-10 then a high performance fighter. I suspect the F-35 may have arrived on scene a decade or two sooner then desired.



"Mike" > wrote in message ps.com...
> F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success
>
> By ANGELA K. BROWN
> The Associated Press
> Saturday, December 16, 2006; 12:03 AM
>
> FORT WORTH, Texas -- The new stealth fighter jet that will replace an
> aging fleet of military planes experienced a largely successful first
> flight Friday, with only a minor glitch, Lockheed Martin Corp.
> officials said. Jon S. Beesley, chief test pilot for the Joint Strike
> Fighter, also known as the F-35, said the plane handled "marvelously,"
> performed flawlessly and flew better than the simulator. He flew to
> 15,000 feet, escorted by three jets that provided safety and took
> pictures. "It was a great adventure," he said. "Today really started
> the opening for me for the rest of this greatest fighter program in
> history where we're going to go forward and develop this great weapons
> system that will protect everybody, and that's what it's all about."
> Officials initially said the test flight would last an hour; Beesley
> flew for 35 minutes. One of two air data sensors was not operating
> properly, he said. Although it did not pose a danger, the procedure
> called for ending the flight at that time, preventing completion of the
> remaining few tests, including raising the landing gear, officials
> said. "Certainly to fly this first flight with the duration of almost
> 40 minutes and to only have this single warning appear in the pilot's
> display related to this sensor is remarkable, and we're really pleased
> with the quality of this first jet," said Dan Crowley, executive vice
> president and general manager of the Joint Strike Fighter program.
> Runway tests that began last week were completed this week. Officials
> had been waiting for good weather for the maiden flight, which almost
> didn't happen Friday because of fog and wind. Security was tight Friday
> at Lockheed's Fort Worth facility, where the flight took place. But
> hundreds of cars parked on the side of the road outside the plant near
> the runway, many people holding video cameras in hopes of catching a
> glimpse of the supersonic jet, as word spread of the test flight. Many
> cheered as the plane took off. Lockheed employees gathered near the
> runway also applauded, and some were moved to tears as the gray jet
> took off, said some officials, who reported receiving phone calls from
> other countries as soon as news spread of the flight. "I would call
> this the flight that was heard round the world," said Tom Burbage,
> executive vice president for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. and
> general manager for the Joint Strike Fighter program integration.
> Beesley, who was greeted with roaring cheers as he stepped out of the
> cockpit after landing, later said the plane will continue test flights
> next week. Brig. Gen. Charles R. Davis, the program executive officer
> for the F-35 Lightning II program office in Arlington, Va., said this
> jet was the first of 20 planes to be built at Lockheed's Fort Worth
> plant that will have test flights there over the next 18 months. After
> 10 years of development, Bethesda, Md.-based Lockheed Martin is moving
> to the early stages of production for what could be thousands of
> fighter jets for the American military and eight countries _ and
> possibly the largest defense contract ever, $275 billion over the next
> two decades. The U.S. plans to use the F-35 to replace aging planes
> used by the Marines, Air Force and Navy, including jets like the F-16,
> the F-18 and the Harrier jet. Lockheed and its subcontractors are
> making three different versions that will be used by the different
> branches. The Marine version will be able to make vertical takeoffs.
>

[Yeff]

On Wed, 20 Dec 2006 01:25:16 GMT, Ski wrote:

> I suspect the F-35 may have arrived on scene a decade or two sooner then desired.

Without the external pylons the F-35 is rather stealthy. Using the
internal weapons bay only it's a considered a "first day of war" aircraft,
meaning it can go in and strike enemy targets before their IADS has been
suppressed/destroyed.

Marry that with its world-class sensor suite and you've got a very
dangerous aircraft indeed.

Remember, before Iraq turned into an insurgency action we had to attack an
alert Iraqi air defense system. I'd rather do that in a stealthy F-35 than
in any of the current teen-fighters.

--

-Jeff B.
zoomie at fastmail fm

[[email protected]]

Ski wrote:
> The JSF (F-35) is clearly a nice aircraft but can any of you tell me what the JSF offers that is not available now in the aircratf it intends to replace. When considering the present wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where we seem to need more Close Air Support (CAS) kind of machines that can both strafe and engage an enemy with small blast weapons (gun, rockets, Hellfire, etc) and the occassional PGM Bomb, what does the JSF offer over just producing more F-15 / F-16 / F-18 aircraft and if anything finding a follow-on for something more like an A-10 then a high performance fighter. I suspect the F-35 may have arrived on scene a decade or two sooner then desired.

Better technology at a lower(hopefully) price? F-15/16/18 tewcnology is
old, like it or not. A single seat, very manuverable, F/A-35, with
great avionics will be able to do better CAS than the Warthog.


>
>
>
> "Mike" > wrote in message ps.com...
> > F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success
> >
> > By ANGELA K. BROWN
> > The Associated Press
> > Saturday, December 16, 2006; 12:03 AM
> >
> > FORT WORTH, Texas -- The new stealth fighter jet that will replace an
> > aging fleet of military planes experienced a largely successful first
> > flight Friday, with only a minor glitch, Lockheed Martin Corp.
> > officials said. Jon S. Beesley, chief test pilot for the Joint Strike
> > Fighter, also known as the F-35, said the plane handled "marvelously,"
> > performed flawlessly and flew better than the simulator. He flew to
> > 15,000 feet, escorted by three jets that provided safety and took
> > pictures. "It was a great adventure," he said. "Today really started
> > the opening for me for the rest of this greatest fighter program in
> > history where we're going to go forward and develop this great weapons
> > system that will protect everybody, and that's what it's all about."
> > Officials initially said the test flight would last an hour; Beesley
> > flew for 35 minutes. One of two air data sensors was not operating
> > properly, he said. Although it did not pose a danger, the procedure
> > called for ending the flight at that time, preventing completion of the
> > remaining few tests, including raising the landing gear, officials
> > said. "Certainly to fly this first flight with the duration of almost
> > 40 minutes and to only have this single warning appear in the pilot's
> > display related to this sensor is remarkable, and we're really pleased
> > with the quality of this first jet," said Dan Crowley, executive vice
> > president and general manager of the Joint Strike Fighter program.
> > Runway tests that began last week were completed this week. Officials
> > had been waiting for good weather for the maiden flight, which almost
> > didn't happen Friday because of fog and wind. Security was tight Friday
> > at Lockheed's Fort Worth facility, where the flight took place. But
> > hundreds of cars parked on the side of the road outside the plant near
> > the runway, many people holding video cameras in hopes of catching a
> > glimpse of the supersonic jet, as word spread of the test flight. Many
> > cheered as the plane took off. Lockheed employees gathered near the
> > runway also applauded, and some were moved to tears as the gray jet
> > took off, said some officials, who reported receiving phone calls from
> > other countries as soon as news spread of the flight. "I would call
> > this the flight that was heard round the world," said Tom Burbage,
> > executive vice president for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. and
> > general manager for the Joint Strike Fighter program integration.
> > Beesley, who was greeted with roaring cheers as he stepped out of the
> > cockpit after landing, later said the plane will continue test flights
> > next week. Brig. Gen. Charles R. Davis, the program executive officer
> > for the F-35 Lightning II program office in Arlington, Va., said this
> > jet was the first of 20 planes to be built at Lockheed's Fort Worth
> > plant that will have test flights there over the next 18 months. After
> > 10 years of development, Bethesda, Md.-based Lockheed Martin is moving
> > to the early stages of production for what could be thousands of
> > fighter jets for the American military and eight countries _ and
> > possibly the largest defense contract ever, $275 billion over the next
> > two decades. The U.S. plans to use the F-35 to replace aging planes
> > used by the Marines, Air Force and Navy, including jets like the F-16,
> > the F-18 and the Harrier jet. Lockheed and its subcontractors are
> > making three different versions that will be used by the different
> > branches. The Marine version will be able to make vertical takeoffs.
> >
> ------=_NextPart_000_0060_01C723AB.CB4E13E0
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> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
> X-Google-AttachSize: 6051
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> <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
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> <DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><FONT face="Arial Narrow"><STRONG>The JSF
> (F-35)</STRONG></FONT> <STRONG><FONT face="Arial Narrow">is clearly a nice
> aircraft but can any of you tell me what the JSF offers that is not available
> now in the aircratf it intends to replace.&nbsp; When considering the present
> wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where we seem to need more Close Air Support
> (CAS) kind of machines that can both strafe and engage an enemy with small blast
> weapons (gun, rockets, Hellfire, etc) and the occassional PGM Bomb, what does
> the JSF offer over just producing more F-15 / F-16 / F-18 aircraft and if
> anything finding a follow-on for something more like an A-10 then a high
> performance fighter. I suspect the&nbsp;F-35 may have arrived on scene a decade
> or two sooner then desired.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</FONT></STRONG></FONT></DIV>
> <DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
> <DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
> <DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
> <DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>"Mike" &lt;</FONT><A
> "><FONT face=Arial
> </FONT></A><FONT face=Arial size=2>&gt; wrote in
> message </FONT><A
> ps.com"><FONT face=Arial
> ps.com</FONT></A><FONT
> face=Arial size=2>...</FONT></DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>&gt; F-35 Test Flight
> Deemed a Success<BR>&gt; <BR>&gt; By ANGELA K. BROWN<BR>&gt; The Associated
> Press<BR>&gt; Saturday, December 16, 2006; 12:03 AM<BR>&gt; <BR>&gt; FORT WORTH,
> Texas -- The new stealth fighter jet that will replace an<BR>&gt; aging fleet of
> military planes experienced a largely successful first<BR>&gt; flight Friday,
> with only a minor glitch, Lockheed Martin Corp.<BR>&gt; officials said. Jon S.
> Beesley, chief test pilot for the Joint Strike<BR>&gt; Fighter, also known as
> the F-35, said the plane handled "marvelously,"<BR>&gt; performed flawlessly and
> flew better than the simulator. He flew to<BR>&gt; 15,000 feet, escorted by
> three jets that provided safety and took<BR>&gt; pictures. "It was a great
> adventure," he said. "Today really started<BR>&gt; the opening for me for the
> rest of this greatest fighter program in<BR>&gt; history where we're going to go
> forward and develop this great weapons<BR>&gt; system that will protect
> everybody, and that's what it's all about."<BR>&gt; Officials initially said the
> test flight would last an hour; Beesley<BR>&gt; flew for 35 minutes. One of two
> air data sensors was not operating<BR>&gt; properly, he said. Although it did
> not pose a danger, the procedure<BR>&gt; called for ending the flight at that
> time, preventing completion of the<BR>&gt; remaining few tests, including
> raising the landing gear, officials<BR>&gt; said. "Certainly to fly this first
> flight with the duration of almost<BR>&gt; 40 minutes and to only have this
> single warning appear in the pilot's<BR>&gt; display related to this sensor is
> remarkable, and we're really pleased<BR>&gt; with the quality of this first
> jet," said Dan Crowley, executive vice<BR>&gt; president and general manager of
> the Joint Strike Fighter program.<BR>&gt; Runway tests that began last week were
> completed this week. Officials<BR>&gt; had been waiting for good weather for the
> maiden flight, which almost<BR>&gt; didn't happen Friday because of fog and
> wind. Security was tight Friday<BR>&gt; at Lockheed's Fort Worth facility, where
> the flight took place. But<BR>&gt; hundreds of cars parked on the side of the
> road outside the plant near<BR>&gt; the runway, many people holding video
> cameras in hopes of catching a<BR>&gt; glimpse of the supersonic jet, as word
> spread of the test flight. Many<BR>&gt; cheered as the plane took off. Lockheed
> employees gathered near the<BR>&gt; runway also applauded, and some were moved
> to tears as the gray jet<BR>&gt; took off, said some officials, who reported
> receiving phone calls from<BR>&gt; other countries as soon as news spread of the
> flight. "I would call<BR>&gt; this the flight that was heard round the world,"
> said Tom Burbage,<BR>&gt; executive vice president for Lockheed Martin
> Aeronautics Co. and<BR>&gt; general manager for the Joint Strike Fighter program
> integration.<BR>&gt; Beesley, who was greeted with roaring cheers as he stepped
> out of the<BR>&gt; cockpit after landing, later said the plane will continue
> test flights<BR>&gt; next week. Brig. Gen. Charles R. Davis, the program
> executive officer<BR>&gt; for the F-35 Lightning II program office in Arlington,
> Va., said this<BR>&gt; jet was the first of 20 planes to be built at Lockheed's
> Fort Worth<BR>&gt; plant that will have test flights there over the next 18
> months. After<BR>&gt; 10 years of development, Bethesda, Md.-based Lockheed
> Martin is moving<BR>&gt; to the early stages of production for what could be
> thousands of<BR>&gt; fighter jets for the American military and eight countries
> _ and<BR>&gt; possibly the largest defense contract ever, $275 billion over the
> next<BR>&gt; two decades. The U.S. plans to use the F-35 to replace aging
> planes<BR>&gt; used by the Marines, Air Force and Navy, including jets like the
> F-16,<BR>&gt; the F-18 and the Harrier jet. Lockheed and its subcontractors
> are<BR>&gt; making three different versions that will be used by the
> different<BR>&gt; branches. The Marine version will be able to make vertical
> takeoffs.<BR>&gt;</FONT></BODY></HTML>
>
> ------=_NextPart_000_0060_01C723AB.CB4E13E0--

[Ski]

OK, couple of good comments in the replys

- stealth needed for the high threat IADS
- better technology always assumed since in fact it is newer

First day war needs stealth but this I think is the role being laid for the F-22 that will not require tanks or racks to keep its stealth value, whereas the JSF still would have to have a load with it and in the end it would compromise its stealth requiring "suppression", stand off or escort or onboard "jamming", diversion tactics, etc, in the way the F-117's had to play.

So I still wonder what we are really buying. "Old" F-15's and F-16's and F-18's can be made new and for sure the F/A-18E/F may be in the JSF class as to internal systems and OBOGS and modernized self-support features - but - all of this is retrofitable to the fleet of these lets say legacy aircraft including the AESA radar features which already is underway. Now the internal FLIR and night attack features of the JSF for the current wars and near future are matched well by the family of advanced targeting pods (LITENING, SNIPER, FLIR AT, ATLAS, etc) so in effect all of the aircraft share around the same range - payload - performance - night capability with the Strike Eagle edging out on top with the brute force cpabilities and the JSF holding still to a more refined cockpit and stealth when you button it up. The mission planning and off board stuff could all trickle down to all the platforms.

What we can't do well in all of these machines is strafe: the F-18 and F-15 have canted guns that makes it dicey, the F-16 has a boresight system but a small ammo load and the JSF is a no can do - for Iraq and Afghanistan that is a tough call. And even the A-10 with the 30 mm is wished now to have a smaller gun to make less collateral damage.

Well what about the Rapiers and handheld IR SAM's - every one of these jets are too hot, too contrast prone for low altitude and all the too noisy - so they use countermeasures, tactics, and agility which is sometimes not enough. But for sure the Apache has been ruled out and the Cobra given real trouble.

If the JSF did not cost three times an F-16 or twice a F-15E then you might say lets press with the F-35 and let the maturity build up fix all this, but with the F-35 is dragging dozens of billions of dollars in investment that goes into its employment - money i think we can not afford now.

Just for grins think of an extended development JSF leveraging all the good things now realized but add a real laser weapon to rid it totally of racks, weapons, and pylons - then merge in the UCAS/UCAV ideas of creating both manned and un-manned versions, then to balance out dropping the STOVL (most costly investment) move to a vectored thrust system that would really help the unmanned version and be a safety factor to the manned. All this 10 or 15 years down the road when knocking on Iran's or North Korea's front door would be very realistic and this done at around $4 billion a year, something of a 80% savings to invest in infrastructure and this COIN Air Component idea.


> wrote in message ups.com...
>
> Ski wrote:
>> The JSF (F-35) is clearly a nice aircraft but can any of you tell me what the JSF offers that is not available now in the aircratf it intends to replace. When considering the present wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where we seem to need more Close Air Support (CAS) kind of machines that can both strafe and engage an enemy with small blast weapons (gun, rockets, Hellfire, etc) and the occassional PGM Bomb, what does the JSF offer over just producing more F-15 / F-16 / F-18 aircraft and if anything finding a follow-on for something more like an A-10 then a high performance fighter. I suspect the F-35 may have arrived on scene a decade or two sooner then desired.
>
> Better technology at a lower(hopefully) price? F-15/16/18 tewcnology is
> old, like it or not. A single seat, very manuverable, F/A-35, with
> great avionics will be able to do better CAS than the Warthog.
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> "Mike" > wrote in message ps.com...
>> > F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success
>> >
>> > By ANGELA K. BROWN
>> > The Associated Press
>> > Saturday, December 16, 2006; 12:03 AM
>> >
>> > FORT WORTH, Texas -- The new stealth fighter jet that will replace an
>> > aging fleet of military planes experienced a largely successful first
>> > flight Friday, with only a minor glitch, Lockheed Martin Corp.
>> > officials said. Jon S. Beesley, chief test pilot for the Joint Strike
>> > Fighter, also known as the F-35, said the plane handled "marvelously,"
>> > performed flawlessly and flew better than the simulator. He flew to
>> > 15,000 feet, escorted by three jets that provided safety and took
>> > pictures. "It was a great adventure," he said. "Today really started
>> > the opening for me for the rest of this greatest fighter program in
>> > history where we're going to go forward and develop this great weapons
>> > system that will protect everybody, and that's what it's all about."
>> > Officials initially said the test flight would last an hour; Beesley
>> > flew for 35 minutes. One of two air data sensors was not operating
>> > properly, he said. Although it did not pose a danger, the procedure
>> > called for ending the flight at that time, preventing completion of the
>> > remaining few tests, including raising the landing gear, officials
>> > said. "Certainly to fly this first flight with the duration of almost
>> > 40 minutes and to only have this single warning appear in the pilot's
>> > display related to this sensor is remarkable, and we're really pleased
>> > with the quality of this first jet," said Dan Crowley, executive vice
>> > president and general manager of the Joint Strike Fighter program.
>> > Runway tests that began last week were completed this week. Officials
>> > had been waiting for good weather for the maiden flight, which almost
>> > didn't happen Friday because of fog and wind. Security was tight Friday
>> > at Lockheed's Fort Worth facility, where the flight took place. But
>> > hundreds of cars parked on the side of the road outside the plant near
>> > the runway, many people holding video cameras in hopes of catching a
>> > glimpse of the supersonic jet, as word spread of the test flight. Many
>> > cheered as the plane took off. Lockheed employees gathered near the
>> > runway also applauded, and some were moved to tears as the gray jet
>> > took off, said some officials, who reported receiving phone calls from
>> > other countries as soon as news spread of the flight. "I would call
>> > this the flight that was heard round the world," said Tom Burbage,
>> > executive vice president for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. and
>> > general manager for the Joint Strike Fighter program integration.
>> > Beesley, who was greeted with roaring cheers as he stepped out of the
>> > cockpit after landing, later said the plane will continue test flights
>> > next week. Brig. Gen. Charles R. Davis, the program executive officer
>> > for the F-35 Lightning II program office in Arlington, Va., said this
>> > jet was the first of 20 planes to be built at Lockheed's Fort Worth
>> > plant that will have test flights there over the next 18 months. After
>> > 10 years of development, Bethesda, Md.-based Lockheed Martin is moving
>> > to the early stages of production for what could be thousands of
>> > fighter jets for the American military and eight countries _ and
>> > possibly the largest defense contract ever, $275 billion over the next
>> > two decades. The U.S. plans to use the F-35 to replace aging planes
>> > used by the Marines, Air Force and Navy, including jets like the F-16,
>> > the F-18 and the Harrier jet. Lockheed and its subcontractors are
>> > making three different versions that will be used by the different
>> > branches. The Marine version will be able to make vertical takeoffs.
>> >
>> ------=_NextPart_000_0060_01C723AB.CB4E13E0
>> Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
>> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>> X-Google-AttachSize: 6051
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>> <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
>> <HTML><HEAD>
>> <META http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
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>> <STYLE></STYLE>
>> </HEAD>
>> <BODY>
>> <DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><FONT face="Arial Narrow"><STRONG>The JSF
>> (F-35)</STRONG></FONT> <STRONG><FONT face="Arial Narrow">is clearly a nice
>> aircraft but can any of you tell me what the JSF offers that is not available
>> now in the aircratf it intends to replace.&nbsp; When considering the present
>> wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where we seem to need more Close Air Support
>> (CAS) kind of machines that can both strafe and engage an enemy with small blast
>> weapons (gun, rockets, Hellfire, etc) and the occassional PGM Bomb, what does
>> the JSF offer over just producing more F-15 / F-16 / F-18 aircraft and if
>> anything finding a follow-on for something more like an A-10 then a high
>> performance fighter. I suspect the&nbsp;F-35 may have arrived on scene a decade
>> or two sooner then desired.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</FONT></STRONG></FONT></DIV>
>> <DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
>> <DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
>> <DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
>> <DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>"Mike" &lt;</FONT><A
>> "><FONT face=Arial
>> </FONT></A><FONT face=Arial size=2>&gt; wrote in
>> message </FONT><A
>> ps.com"><FONT face=Arial
>> ps.com</FONT></A><FONT
>> face=Arial size=2>...</FONT></DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>&gt; F-35 Test Flight
>> Deemed a Success<BR>&gt; <BR>&gt; By ANGELA K. BROWN<BR>&gt; The Associated
>> Press<BR>&gt; Saturday, December 16, 2006; 12:03 AM<BR>&gt; <BR>&gt; FORT WORTH,
>> Texas -- The new stealth fighter jet that will replace an<BR>&gt; aging fleet of
>> military planes experienced a largely successful first<BR>&gt; flight Friday,
>> with only a minor glitch, Lockheed Martin Corp.<BR>&gt; officials said. Jon S.
>> Beesley, chief test pilot for the Joint Strike<BR>&gt; Fighter, also known as
>> the F-35, said the plane handled "marvelously,"<BR>&gt; performed flawlessly and
>> flew better than the simulator. He flew to<BR>&gt; 15,000 feet, escorted by
>> three jets that provided safety and took<BR>&gt; pictures. "It was a great
>> adventure," he said. "Today really started<BR>&gt; the opening for me for the
>> rest of this greatest fighter program in<BR>&gt; history where we're going to go
>> forward and develop this great weapons<BR>&gt; system that will protect
>> everybody, and that's what it's all about."<BR>&gt; Officials initially said the
>> test flight would last an hour; Beesley<BR>&gt; flew for 35 minutes. One of two
>> air data sensors was not operating<BR>&gt; properly, he said. Although it did
>> not pose a danger, the procedure<BR>&gt; called for ending the flight at that
>> time, preventing completion of the<BR>&gt; remaining few tests, including
>> raising the landing gear, officials<BR>&gt; said. "Certainly to fly this first
>> flight with the duration of almost<BR>&gt; 40 minutes and to only have this
>> single warning appear in the pilot's<BR>&gt; display related to this sensor is
>> remarkable, and we're really pleased<BR>&gt; with the quality of this first
>> jet," said Dan Crowley, executive vice<BR>&gt; president and general manager of
>> the Joint Strike Fighter program.<BR>&gt; Runway tests that began last week were
>> completed this week. Officials<BR>&gt; had been waiting for good weather for the
>> maiden flight, which almost<BR>&gt; didn't happen Friday because of fog and
>> wind. Security was tight Friday<BR>&gt; at Lockheed's Fort Worth facility, where
>> the flight took place. But<BR>&gt; hundreds of cars parked on the side of the
>> road outside the plant near<BR>&gt; the runway, many people holding video
>> cameras in hopes of catching a<BR>&gt; glimpse of the supersonic jet, as word
>> spread of the test flight. Many<BR>&gt; cheered as the plane took off. Lockheed
>> employees gathered near the<BR>&gt; runway also applauded, and some were moved
>> to tears as the gray jet<BR>&gt; took off, said some officials, who reported
>> receiving phone calls from<BR>&gt; other countries as soon as news spread of the
>> flight. "I would call<BR>&gt; this the flight that was heard round the world,"
>> said Tom Burbage,<BR>&gt; executive vice president for Lockheed Martin
>> Aeronautics Co. and<BR>&gt; general manager for the Joint Strike Fighter program
>> integration.<BR>&gt; Beesley, who was greeted with roaring cheers as he stepped
>> out of the<BR>&gt; cockpit after landing, later said the plane will continue
>> test flights<BR>&gt; next week. Brig. Gen. Charles R. Davis, the program
>> executive officer<BR>&gt; for the F-35 Lightning II program office in Arlington,
>> Va., said this<BR>&gt; jet was the first of 20 planes to be built at Lockheed's
>> Fort Worth<BR>&gt; plant that will have test flights there over the next 18
>> months. After<BR>&gt; 10 years of development, Bethesda, Md.-based Lockheed
>> Martin is moving<BR>&gt; to the early stages of production for what could be
>> thousands of<BR>&gt; fighter jets for the American military and eight countries
>> _ and<BR>&gt; possibly the largest defense contract ever, $275 billion over the
>> next<BR>&gt; two decades. The U.S. plans to use the F-35 to replace aging
>> planes<BR>&gt; used by the Marines, Air Force and Navy, including jets like the
>> F-16,<BR>&gt; the F-18 and the Harrier jet. Lockheed and its subcontractors
>> are<BR>&gt; making three different versions that will be used by the
>> different<BR>&gt; branches. The Marine version will be able to make vertical
>> takeoffs.<BR>&gt;</FONT></BODY></HTML>
>>
>> ------=_NextPart_000_0060_01C723AB.CB4E13E0--
>

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On Wed, 20 Dec 2006 03:25:22 GMT, "Ski"
> wrote:

>OK, couple of good comments in the replys
>
>- stealth needed for the high threat IADS
>- better technology always assumed since in fact it is newer
>
>First day war needs stealth but this I think is the role being laid for the F-22 that will not require tanks or racks to keep its stealth value, whereas the JSF still would have to have a load with it and in the end it would compromise its stealth requiring "suppression", stand off or escort or onboard "jamming", diversion tactics, etc, in the way the F-117's had to play.

Remember that F-22 is primarily an air dominance fighter. It will have
A/G capability, but that is augmentation of the basic mission rather
than predominant. Raptors will insure that the US record of
controlling the sky over the battle area remains as it has for the
last 55 years.

F-35 is very stealthy, but you can parallel the 22/35 synergy to 15/16
roles. There is limited mission cross-over for both pairs, but the
basic mission relationship applies.

>
>So I still wonder what we are really buying. "Old" F-15's and F-16's and F-18's can be made new and for sure the F/A-18E/F may be in the JSF class as to internal systems and OBOGS and modernized self-support features - but - all of this is retrofitable to the fleet of these lets say legacy aircraft including the AESA radar features which already is underway. Now the internal FLIR and night attack features of the JSF for the current wars and near future are matched well by the family of advanced targeting pods (LITENING, SNIPER, FLIR AT, ATLAS, etc) so in effect all of the aircraft share around the same range - payload - performance - night capability with the Strike Eagle edging out on top with the brute force cpabilities and the JSF holding still to a more refined cockpit and stealth when you button it up. The mission planning and off board stuff could all trickle down to all the platforms.

The major differences in the new generation are stealth and data
fusion. Stealth adds immeasurably to the survivability of the system
and as an add-on benefit it requires the internalization of those
systems which you list as bolt-ons. The bolt-ons were technology of a
time that didn't worry about observability issues and did need fairly
large processors and hard-coded software. Current technology allows
built-ins with much smaller space requirements and much more flexible
updating.

The real quantum leap forward of the new aircraft is in the
transparent merging of data from multiple sources and sensors. Where
the 15/16 aircraft had fixed, forward looking radar as the primary
sensor, the new aircraft provide full spherical coverage and
presentation of prioritized data in a way that is much more
manageable.

And, don't even begin to bring in off-the-wall cost figures for
comparison. Upgrading a pair of 30-40 year old airframes for new
production with state-of-the-art technology would not be cheap and
would still leave you with a comprised system that would be woefully
out of date in another decade. In other words a very short-term
solution which simply defers the high-cost investment.
>
>What we can't do well in all of these machines is strafe: the F-18 and F-15 have canted guns that makes it dicey, the F-16 has a boresight system but a small ammo load and the JSF is a no can do - for Iraq and Afghanistan that is a tough call. And even the A-10 with the 30 mm is wished now to have a smaller gun to make less collateral damage.

Repeat after me: "STRAFING IS STUPID!"

There are RARE occasions when strafe is a necessary alternative. But
they are very much the exception. In general the cost-benefit
discussion of strafe effectiveness is that it is very difficult to
balance the risk to a $100M airframe against the damage to the enemy.
Gotta kill a lot of $10K trucks to balance one loss.

CAS is continuing to morph into a stand-off delivery game. The
troops-in-contact provide accurate coordinates or laser-designation
and the stand-off platform dumps iron on the cross-hairs. It isn't as
glamorous as snake-n-nape at 50 feet, but it is much more accurate and
effective.
>
>Well what about the Rapiers and handheld IR SAM's - every one of these jets are too hot, too contrast prone for low altitude and all the too noisy - so they use countermeasures, tactics, and agility which is sometimes not enough. But for sure the Apache has been ruled out and the Cobra given real trouble.

Stand-off, stand-off, stand-off. The new jets aren't that hot or
noisy, but there isn't that much requirement for low altitude work.
MANPADS have always been the threat to rotary wing systems and
slow-movers, but seldom of great concern to fast-movers.
>
>If the JSF did not cost three times an F-16 or twice a F-15E then you might say lets press with the F-35 and let the maturity build up fix all this, but with the F-35 is dragging dozens of billions of dollars in investment that goes into its employment - money i think we can not afford now.

Have you heard of the concept of "sunk costs"?

The front-end costs are expended and the product is nearing
production. What we can't afford is to suddenly decide that the
decisions of the last fifteen years of the program were all wrong and
we need to regress to 1970 technology.
>
>Just for grins think of an extended development JSF leveraging all the good things now realized but add a real laser weapon to rid it totally of racks, weapons, and pylons - then merge in the UCAS/UCAV ideas of creating both manned and un-manned versions, then to balance out dropping the STOVL (most costly investment) move to a vectored thrust system that would really help the unmanned version and be a safety factor to the manned. All this 10 or 15 years down the road when knocking on Iran's or North Korea's front door would be very realistic and this done at around $4 billion a year, something of a 80% savings to invest in infrastructure and this COIN Air Component idea.

What a collection of garbled concepts. Of course there will be
extended development and weaponry upgrades. That is always the case.

First generation laser weapons are more likely to be large platform
than tactical aircraft. Think satellite or AC(B)-2 Spirit.

You don't need unmanned versions of manned aircraft--you sacrifice too
much weight and support systems to make it practical. Build a
dedicated unmanned platform.

Drop STOVL but build a "vectored thrust system"? Do it but don't?

Iran and N. Korea aren't 10-15 years down the road.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[[email protected]]

Listen to Ed, Ski, he has been there and done that. Read his books, and
you will understand why.
Ed Rasimus wrote:
> On Wed, 20 Dec 2006 03:25:22 GMT, "Ski"
> > wrote:
>
> >OK, couple of good comments in the replys
> >
> >- stealth needed for the high threat IADS
> >- better technology always assumed since in fact it is newer
> >
> >First day war needs stealth but this I think is the role being laid for the F-22 that will not require tanks or racks to keep its stealth value, whereas the JSF still would have to have a load with it and in the end it would compromise its stealth requiring "suppression", stand off or escort or onboard "jamming", diversion tactics, etc, in the way the F-117's had to play.
>
> Remember that F-22 is primarily an air dominance fighter. It will have
> A/G capability, but that is augmentation of the basic mission rather
> than predominant. Raptors will insure that the US record of
> controlling the sky over the battle area remains as it has for the
> last 55 years.
>
> F-35 is very stealthy, but you can parallel the 22/35 synergy to 15/16
> roles. There is limited mission cross-over for both pairs, but the
> basic mission relationship applies.
>
> >
> >So I still wonder what we are really buying. "Old" F-15's and F-16's and F-18's can be made new and for sure the F/A-18E/F may be in the JSF class as to internal systems and OBOGS and modernized self-support features - but - all of this is retrofitable to the fleet of these lets say legacy aircraft including the AESA radar features which already is underway. Now the internal FLIR and night attack features of the JSF for the current wars and near future are matched well by the family of advanced targeting pods (LITENING, SNIPER, FLIR AT, ATLAS, etc) so in effect all of the aircraft share around the same range - payload - performance - night capability with the Strike Eagle edging out on top with the brute force cpabilities and the JSF holding still to a more refined cockpit and stealth when you button it up. The mission planning and off board stuff could all trickle down to all the platforms.
>
> The major differences in the new generation are stealth and data
> fusion. Stealth adds immeasurably to the survivability of the system
> and as an add-on benefit it requires the internalization of those
> systems which you list as bolt-ons. The bolt-ons were technology of a
> time that didn't worry about observability issues and did need fairly
> large processors and hard-coded software. Current technology allows
> built-ins with much smaller space requirements and much more flexible
> updating.
>
> The real quantum leap forward of the new aircraft is in the
> transparent merging of data from multiple sources and sensors. Where
> the 15/16 aircraft had fixed, forward looking radar as the primary
> sensor, the new aircraft provide full spherical coverage and
> presentation of prioritized data in a way that is much more
> manageable.
>
> And, don't even begin to bring in off-the-wall cost figures for
> comparison. Upgrading a pair of 30-40 year old airframes for new
> production with state-of-the-art technology would not be cheap and
> would still leave you with a comprised system that would be woefully
> out of date in another decade. In other words a very short-term
> solution which simply defers the high-cost investment.
> >
> >What we can't do well in all of these machines is strafe: the F-18 and F-15 have canted guns that makes it dicey, the F-16 has a boresight system but a small ammo load and the JSF is a no can do - for Iraq and Afghanistan that is a tough call. And even the A-10 with the 30 mm is wished now to have a smaller gun to make less collateral damage.
>
> Repeat after me: "STRAFING IS STUPID!"
>
> There are RARE occasions when strafe is a necessary alternative. But
> they are very much the exception. In general the cost-benefit
> discussion of strafe effectiveness is that it is very difficult to
> balance the risk to a $100M airframe against the damage to the enemy.
> Gotta kill a lot of $10K trucks to balance one loss.
>
> CAS is continuing to morph into a stand-off delivery game. The
> troops-in-contact provide accurate coordinates or laser-designation
> and the stand-off platform dumps iron on the cross-hairs. It isn't as
> glamorous as snake-n-nape at 50 feet, but it is much more accurate and
> effective.
> >
> >Well what about the Rapiers and handheld IR SAM's - every one of these jets are too hot, too contrast prone for low altitude and all the too noisy - so they use countermeasures, tactics, and agility which is sometimes not enough. But for sure the Apache has been ruled out and the Cobra given real trouble.
>
> Stand-off, stand-off, stand-off. The new jets aren't that hot or
> noisy, but there isn't that much requirement for low altitude work.
> MANPADS have always been the threat to rotary wing systems and
> slow-movers, but seldom of great concern to fast-movers.
> >
> >If the JSF did not cost three times an F-16 or twice a F-15E then you might say lets press with the F-35 and let the maturity build up fix all this, but with the F-35 is dragging dozens of billions of dollars in investment that goes into its employment - money i think we can not afford now.
>
> Have you heard of the concept of "sunk costs"?
>
> The front-end costs are expended and the product is nearing
> production. What we can't afford is to suddenly decide that the
> decisions of the last fifteen years of the program were all wrong and
> we need to regress to 1970 technology.
> >
> >Just for grins think of an extended development JSF leveraging all the good things now realized but add a real laser weapon to rid it totally of racks, weapons, and pylons - then merge in the UCAS/UCAV ideas of creating both manned and un-manned versions, then to balance out dropping the STOVL (most costly investment) move to a vectored thrust system that would really help the unmanned version and be a safety factor to the manned. All this 10 or 15 years down the road when knocking on Iran's or North Korea's front door would be very realistic and this done at around $4 billion a year, something of a 80% savings to invest in infrastructure and this COIN Air Component idea.
>
> What a collection of garbled concepts. Of course there will be
> extended development and weaponry upgrades. That is always the case.
>
> First generation laser weapons are more likely to be large platform
> than tactical aircraft. Think satellite or AC(B)-2 Spirit.
>
> You don't need unmanned versions of manned aircraft--you sacrifice too
> much weight and support systems to make it practical. Build a
> dedicated unmanned platform.
>
> Drop STOVL but build a "vectored thrust system"? Do it but don't?
>
> Iran and N. Korea aren't 10-15 years down the road.
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[TV]

> Listen to Ed, Ski, he has been there and done that. Read his books, and
> you will understand why.

Ed makes valid points, but I think there's one point that cuts to the heart
of this. Are you willing to trade money for lives? Better planes will save
lives. You could win against any current, or future (10-20 year) opponent
with end of Gulf War technology (AMRAAM being critical). Absolutely no dire
need for F-22 or -35, no matter who says it. Period. Ain't no one in a
place to challenge the US military on conventional grounds. Not even close.
Not even a distant second. Not even China + Iran + North Korea (the latter
is a joke now). If the US took off its "kids gloves" and waged full
conventional warfare, perhaps only China, Russia, and India could stand for
more than a week. And each would most certainly fall. Versus all three at
once, maybe. Without counting specifics, you get the point.

So why keep building new planes? Well, I think the incredibly low casualty
figures for the USAF and USN in the last 15 years speak the reason. No,
those new jets aren't needed to get the job done. But yes, the extra money
will make improvements that save lives. And given the current political
climate, humanitarian reasons (and pilot preference!) aside, that seems to
make a lot of military sense. You can't win wars that the public doesn't
let you fight, so keep casualties down, improve accuracy to reduce
collatoral damage, and you get to do a lot more damage, with a lot less
"unwanted" death. That's the biggest reason I can think of for building
those planes.

TV

[[email protected]]

TV wrote:
> > Listen to Ed, Ski, he has been there and done that. Read his books, and
> > you will understand why.
>
> Ed makes valid points, but I think there's one point that cuts to the heart
> of this. Are you willing to trade money for lives? Better planes will save
> lives. You could win against any current, or future (10-20 year) opponent
> with end of Gulf War technology (AMRAAM being critical). Absolutely no dire
> need for F-22 or -35, no matter who says it. Period.

Don't agree...and you even mentioned China. It doesn't have to be a
WWlll type scenario to 'need' stealthy A/C..How about when(not if)
China decides it wants Taiwan back? China has NOT sat still as they
design and buy Russian and Euro technology. Altho a sliver of the tech,
Euro-fighter, Rafale, Flanker/Fulcrum follow-ons are not to be sneared
at.


Ain't no one in a
> place to challenge the US military on conventional grounds. Not even close.

Balderdash...4 years into an ill concieved 'war' with no end in sight.
Your thinking of large, massed armies going toe to toe is not
realistic.

> Not even a distant second. Not even China + Iran + North Korea (the latter
> is a joke now). If the US took off its "kids gloves" and waged full
> conventional warfare, perhaps only China, Russia, and India could stand for
> more than a week. And each would most certainly fall. Versus all three at
> once, maybe. Without counting specifics, you get the point.
>
> So why keep building new planes? Well, I think the incredibly low casualty
> figures for the USAF and USN in the last 15 years speak the reason. No,
> those new jets aren't needed to get the job done. But yes, the extra money
> will make improvements that save lives. And given the current political
> climate, humanitarian reasons (and pilot preference!) aside, that seems to
> make a lot of military sense. You can't win wars that the public doesn't
> let you fight, so keep casualties down, improve accuracy to reduce
> collatoral damage, and you get to do a lot more damage, with a lot less
> "unwanted" death. That's the biggest reason I can think of for building
> those planes.
>
> TV

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On 21 Dec 2006 05:52:03 -0800, wrote:

>
>TV wrote:
>> > Listen to Ed, Ski, he has been there and done that. Read his books, and
>> > you will understand why.
>>
>> Ed makes valid points, but I think there's one point that cuts to the heart
>> of this. Are you willing to trade money for lives? Better planes will save
>> lives. You could win against any current, or future (10-20 year) opponent
>> with end of Gulf War technology (AMRAAM being critical). Absolutely no dire
>> need for F-22 or -35, no matter who says it. Period.
>
>Don't agree...and you even mentioned China. It doesn't have to be a
>WWlll type scenario to 'need' stealthy A/C..How about when(not if)
>China decides it wants Taiwan back? China has NOT sat still as they
>design and buy Russian and Euro technology. Altho a sliver of the tech,
>Euro-fighter, Rafale, Flanker/Fulcrum follow-ons are not to be sneared
>at.

You selectively edited TV's comment to imply the opposite of what he
said. He points out the dollar versus lives value of advanced
technology and the difference between long and short term planning. He
further notes that the value placed on warrior lives is both immediate
for the warrior and political for the government decision-makers. The
total argument concludes (as do you here) that while you could vote
short term retro-fit of teen-fighters, the better choice for beyond
current scenarios is the high-tech investment.
>
>
>Ain't no one in a
>> place to challenge the US military on conventional grounds. Not even close.
>
>Balderdash...4 years into an ill concieved 'war' with no end in sight.
>Your thinking of large, massed armies going toe to toe is not
>realistic.

The "war" was over when Baghdad fell. The reconstruction and
democratization which is being attempted is a considerably different
issue. We are not well served by the continued failure by the media to
ignore the distinction between the war and the current efforts at
establishing security against the sectarian violence.

Buying fighters based on what is going on in Iraq is a non-sequitur.
>
>> Not even a distant second. Not even China + Iran + North Korea (the latter
>> is a joke now). If the US took off its "kids gloves" and waged full
>> conventional warfare, perhaps only China, Russia, and India could stand for
>> more than a week. And each would most certainly fall. Versus all three at
>> once, maybe. Without counting specifics, you get the point.
>>
>> So why keep building new planes? Well, I think the incredibly low casualty
>> figures for the USAF and USN in the last 15 years speak the reason. No,
>> those new jets aren't needed to get the job done. But yes, the extra money
>> will make improvements that save lives. And given the current political
>> climate, humanitarian reasons (and pilot preference!) aside, that seems to
>> make a lot of military sense. You can't win wars that the public doesn't
>> let you fight, so keep casualties down, improve accuracy to reduce
>> collatoral damage, and you get to do a lot more damage, with a lot less
>> "unwanted" death. That's the biggest reason I can think of for building
>> those planes.

While I could make a good, albeit emotional, argument regarding the
preference of tactical crewmembers for aircraft that are survivable,
you note very properly the reluctance of American's namby-pamby
generations to see combat through to a decisive conclusion when the
body-bags start appearing.

I watched Patton again last night and was really struck by the opening
speech in front of the giant flag--it was so true in the '40s and so
regretably gone today.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Starshiy Nemo]

Extorsion of money from a lot of "co-operant", more exactly co-slaved
countries !!!

[Mike[_7_]]

Since when are new aircraft's flying time lasting 40 minutes when the
norm is an hour-long first flight?

Mike

[Jack]

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> Repeat after me: "STRAFING IS STUPID!"
>
> There are RARE occasions when strafe is a necessary alternative. But
> they are very much the exception.


"A fighter without a gun...is like an airplane without a wing."
--Brigadier General Robin Olds, USAF.


Jack

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On Sat, 23 Dec 2006 10:04:24 GMT, Jack > wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> Repeat after me: "STRAFING IS STUPID!"
>>
>> There are RARE occasions when strafe is a necessary alternative. But
>> they are very much the exception.
>
>
>"A fighter without a gun...is like an airplane without a wing."
> --Brigadier General Robin Olds, USAF.
>
>
>Jack

Very good, Jack. But please note that strafing is NOT using a gun in
air-to-air.

And, one should also note that when Robin went to war in SEA, he chose
to go in the F-4, which at that time was sans gun. He did OK and if
you talk to him about it, he'll tell you that the "God-damned AIM-4"
was a lot more of an issue than his lack of a gun.

We've got no disagreement about putting a gun in every fighter that
has any possibility of being engaged air-to-air.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Starshiy Nemo]

>
That's the new. This aircraft will fly 40 min where the others were
flying one hour ... to save fuel

LOL

[[email protected]]

Ed Rasimus wrote:
> On Sat, 23 Dec 2006 10:04:24 GMT, Jack > wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >
> >> Repeat after me: "STRAFING IS STUPID!"
> >>
> >> There are RARE occasions when strafe is a necessary alternative. But
> >> they are very much the exception.
> >
> >
> >"A fighter without a gun...is like an airplane without a wing."
> > --Brigadier General Robin Olds, USAF.
> >
> >
> >Jack
>
> Very good, Jack. But please note that strafing is NOT using a gun in
> air-to-air.
>
> And, one should also note that when Robin went to war in SEA, he chose
> to go in the F-4, which at that time was sans gun. He did OK and if
> you talk to him about it, he'll tell you that the "God-damned AIM-4"
> was a lot more of an issue than his lack of a gun.
>
> We've got no disagreement about putting a gun in every fighter that
> has any possibility of being engaged air-to-air.


>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Cheap, reliable, last ditch weapon...a must in almost every military
tactical A/C..maybe even the V-22

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On 23 Dec 2006 09:24:11 -0800, wrote:

>> We've got no disagreement about putting a gun in every fighter that
>> has any possibility of being engaged air-to-air.
>
>>
>> Ed Rasimus

>
>Cheap, reliable, last ditch weapon...a must in almost every military
>tactical A/C..maybe even the V-22

ROTFLMAO. The real question would be which way to point it on
installation.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Jack]

Ed Rasimus wrote:


> We've got no disagreement about putting a gun in every fighter that
> has any possibility of being engaged air-to-air.

Careful wording, that. What matter the medium in which your target
operates, to a true fighter pilot? We wouldn't want to give the
impression of air-to-air arrogance. Would we?


"CAS is continuing to morph into a stand-off delivery game.
The troops-in-contact provide accurate coordinates or laser-
designation and the stand-off platform dumps iron on the
cross-hairs. It isn't as glamorous as snake-n-nape at 50 feet,
but it is much more accurate and effective." -- E. Rasimus

Oh sure, very glamorous indeed, but not much use when bad guys are not
only in the wire, but on your side of the wire. And that brings up the
question of whether 30mm might not be a little too heavy for this
particular scenario?

Strafing as a mission may suck today, but it always did -- even when it
was just too much damn fun to ignore. But as a capability and a skill,
it must be respected and won't go away. You can do things with a gun you
can't do without it, I'm sure you'll agree. And those are very important
jobs -- CAS jobs -- the kind that keep our people fighting or bring them
home when they can't.

T-I-C and SAR assets won't always have laser-designators and GPS. If
they had all that stuff working they might not be in so much trouble in
the first place.


Jack

[John Carrier]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On 23 Dec 2006 09:24:11 -0800, wrote:
>
>>> We've got no disagreement about putting a gun in every fighter that
>>> has any possibility of being engaged air-to-air.
>>
>>>
>>> Ed Rasimus
>
>>
>>Cheap, reliable, last ditch weapon...a must in almost every military
>>tactical A/C..maybe even the V-22
>
> ROTFLMAO. The real question would be which way to point it on
> installation.

We used to rag our A-7 buddies that they needed to install the AIM-9
pointing rearward to be most effective.

Ditto on the gun.

My old boat school roommate was passing through yesterday enroute to
Christmas with his mom in FL. He's a project engineer at Fort Worth for
F-35C. Slow (despite 40K thrust), weight issues, maintenance/logistics
issues (the engine is so big it won't fit into the ship's jet shop!?, is too
big to fly a spare aboard?!?). OTOH, the cockpit is PERFECT for the
Nintendo-savvy next generation aviator.

R / John

[[email protected]]

John Carrier wrote:
> "Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> ...
> > On 23 Dec 2006 09:24:11 -0800, wrote:
> >
> >>> We've got no disagreement about putting a gun in every fighter that
> >>> has any possibility of being engaged air-to-air.
> >>
> >>>
> >>> Ed Rasimus
> >
> >>
> >>Cheap, reliable, last ditch weapon...a must in almost every military
> >>tactical A/C..maybe even the V-22
> >
> > ROTFLMAO. The real question would be which way to point it on
> > installation.
>
> We used to rag our A-7 buddies that they needed to install the AIM-9
> pointing rearward to be most effective.
>
> Ditto on the gun.
>
> My old boat school roommate was passing through yesterday enroute to
> Christmas with his mom in FL. He's a project engineer at Fort Worth for
> F-35C. Slow (despite 40K thrust), weight issues, maintenance/logistics
> issues (the engine is so big it won't fit into the ship's jet shop!?, is too
> big to fly a spare aboard?!?). OTOH, the cockpit is PERFECT for the
> Nintendo-savvy next generation aviator.
>
> R / John

Sounds like the 'Bug' in the late 80s.

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On Sat, 23 Dec 2006 16:01:33 -0600, Jack > wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>
>> We've got no disagreement about putting a gun in every fighter that
>> has any possibility of being engaged air-to-air.
>
>Careful wording, that. What matter the medium in which your target
>operates, to a true fighter pilot? We wouldn't want to give the
>impression of air-to-air arrogance. Would we?

I'm hardly from the age of air-to-air arrogance. I was more in the
Jack-of-too-many-trades era. As a true Neanderthal I vociferously
protested against the idea of specialization--one in which the
aircraft has more capabilities than the operator. Yet, that's the way
we've gone and I'll freely admit that it has turned out to be a better
AF.

My contention has always been that air-to-air is something a fighter
pilot does on the way to and from the target.
>
>
>"CAS is continuing to morph into a stand-off delivery game.
> The troops-in-contact provide accurate coordinates or laser-
> designation and the stand-off platform dumps iron on the
> cross-hairs. It isn't as glamorous as snake-n-nape at 50 feet,
> but it is much more accurate and effective." -- E. Rasimus
>
>Oh sure, very glamorous indeed, but not much use when bad guys are not
>only in the wire, but on your side of the wire. And that brings up the
>question of whether 30mm might not be a little too heavy for this
>particular scenario?

Agreed, in principle, but rare in practice. We don't see fixed
position fighting very much these days with the concomitant
requirement for "danger close" employment. It might recur or might
not. And, the gun will be available although not the first choice.
>
>Strafing as a mission may suck today, but it always did -- even when it
>was just too much damn fun to ignore. But as a capability and a skill,
>it must be respected and won't go away. You can do things with a gun you
>can't do without it, I'm sure you'll agree. And those are very important
>jobs -- CAS jobs -- the kind that keep our people fighting or bring them
>home when they can't.

I'm not sure I agree if we are talking ground attack that there are
things that can be done with a gun that can't be done better with
another weapon--except for maybe writing your name in the snow.

The new generation of small bombs are going to be very nice tools for
killing Abdullah in the bedroom next door.
>
>T-I-C and SAR assets won't always have laser-designators and GPS. If
>they had all that stuff working they might not be in so much trouble in
>the first place.

It will be a very rare detachment that doesn't have GPS or laser
capability. When you can buy a Garmin to fit in your shirt pocket from
Cabela's, there's no reason not to have one in the infantryman's kit.
And, they do.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Ski]

Good discussion and I respect what Ed says immensely however gentlemen there
are some very critical differences being experienced in counter-insurgency
warfare now underway in Iraq and Iran and for the moment I want you to stop
looking around the world and realize that we must now bring an end to these
hostilities and it will take a good measure of air power to return the third
dimension to the fight simply because the Army failed to do that when its
"boots on the ground efforts" recognized that the armed helicopter (mostly
Apache and Kiawa) were now unrealiable against a ground sprinkled with armed
insurgents shooting wildly at them from all directions (Cobra II Chapter 14
and Fiasco Chapter 6). The war, which again remmebr is costing billions
every month and is taking nearly one hundred lives every month with many
more wounded has gone on now for five years. So at the moment we are not
looking at a conventional war with China or an invasion of North Korea, we
are focused on Iraq and Afghanistan for this next budget cycle and for the
next few years. We can not afford the new technology breakers that cannot
be applied to these conflicts in good measure and something has to give. We
no longer can deal with "nice to have" and starfing "may be stupid" in most
fighter pilots eyes but our of necessity in this war because of the caveats
of collateral damage and the vulnerability of the attack helicopters fighter
aircart are being asked to come in and strafe - and they do. And note that
just recently an F-16 killed itself either out of ground fixation or ground
fire, but in essence it was close to the ground and firing on the enemy.

A new F-15E or F-16C or F/A-18E coming off the production line is in no way
an "old" aircraft when considering whether it can do a job or not. These
machines have been continually maturing and continually improve to the point
that now they are more capable in just about every category of fighter
comparisons that you can think of except the materials and shapes that lend
itself to so called stealth features. To say that the JSF has a mystical
integrative advantage over the F-15E is simply a case of displays, antennas,
and circuit boards because the ever changing software tapes are deliberately
held up as different beasts in different models because we have long past
the day when you could distinguish the difference between an F-16 or F-18 or
F-15 or B-2 or JSF radar - it is just boards, components and software - all
of which is grossly overpriced and enornmously over-paced to drag out the
whole process as if we really were designing and developing something so
critically different.

Gentlemen - these wars are about reliable platforms that can duke it with a
lightly armed but numerous ground threats that simply overwhelm the space
around which our outnumbered and not-so mobile troops are forced to operate
in environments that are not tactically smart yet forced because the mission
implies a presence (boots on the ground), small units, and unfortulately for
all the failures of the great technologists and IT'ists, and band width
masters we find that in reality almost every one of the small unit patrols
and convoys that venture out beyond their safe zone go without a direct
linked eye-in-the-sky to support them for the duration of their mission. The
technologists promised them this and it fell through and now we have to fill
in gaps with everything we can use because we do not have a survivable Blitz
fighter (cross between A-10 and AH-64) that can support the troops. We could
argue this five years ago, but its 2 billion a week, 3000 lives, and still
operations without a clear strategy and time is wasting - the JSF has to go
and we will use the billions it is sucking up to flood into the war zones
enough air power to do the job. I think it would be wise to extend the
development of the JSF so that down the road it may merge with things that
could better use its qualities - lasers, unmanned, etc., but to say it is
the maneuveruing wonderdog of the next generation fighter force is like
saying the the P-40 should replace the P-51's - no guys, we have all got to
get out collective heads out of our asses and look to what is happening in
COIN warfare and realize a step back for the moment may really be the case
needed yet there are small diamonds of technoklogy that still need to be
used - it is in that integration we can overcome the air needs of urban-COIN
warfare.

So as much as we like Ed and his writes, Ed also has to think about what is
going on and come to grips with the mess that the air-ground efforts are in.
Something went so wrong after Gulf War I and now the fixes I am saying may
not again reflect the needs for a North Korea, but for OIF and OEF they
certainly make a point. The direct manned ISR, the "shooter" with you, the
"eye-in-the-sky" attached to every unit, the forcing of the enemy tyo
recognize that day or night there are small aircraft and UAV's overhead
watching and ready to shoot something and ground units that have a renewed
offensiveness in capability to do their presence mission better.

For the overall umbrella and border areas, the President then gets his
"hammer" to change the course of any incursion any challenge from outside

[Ski]

Ed - for OIF and OEF the "morf" is back to close direct fire. Small calibre
guns and rockets without warheads may have more merit. Concrete bombs were
considered but they skip and bounce sending a high speed hockey puck down
streets. For another war it will go back to standoff and precision but we
need to re-figure all this



"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 23 Dec 2006 16:01:33 -0600, Jack > wrote:
>
>>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>>
>>
>>> We've got no disagreement about putting a gun in every fighter that
>>> has any possibility of being engaged air-to-air.
>>
>>Careful wording, that. What matter the medium in which your target
>>operates, to a true fighter pilot? We wouldn't want to give the
>>impression of air-to-air arrogance. Would we?
>
> I'm hardly from the age of air-to-air arrogance. I was more in the
> Jack-of-too-many-trades era. As a true Neanderthal I vociferously
> protested against the idea of specialization--one in which the
> aircraft has more capabilities than the operator. Yet, that's the way
> we've gone and I'll freely admit that it has turned out to be a better
> AF.
>
> My contention has always been that air-to-air is something a fighter
> pilot does on the way to and from the target.
>>
>>
>>"CAS is continuing to morph into a stand-off delivery game.
>> The troops-in-contact provide accurate coordinates or laser-
>> designation and the stand-off platform dumps iron on the
>> cross-hairs. It isn't as glamorous as snake-n-nape at 50 feet,
>> but it is much more accurate and effective." -- E. Rasimus
>>
>>Oh sure, very glamorous indeed, but not much use when bad guys are not
>>only in the wire, but on your side of the wire. And that brings up the
>>question of whether 30mm might not be a little too heavy for this
>>particular scenario?
>
> Agreed, in principle, but rare in practice. We don't see fixed
> position fighting very much these days with the concomitant
> requirement for "danger close" employment. It might recur or might
> not. And, the gun will be available although not the first choice.
>>
>>Strafing as a mission may suck today, but it always did -- even when it
>>was just too much damn fun to ignore. But as a capability and a skill,
>>it must be respected and won't go away. You can do things with a gun you
>>can't do without it, I'm sure you'll agree. And those are very important
>>jobs -- CAS jobs -- the kind that keep our people fighting or bring them
>>home when they can't.
>
> I'm not sure I agree if we are talking ground attack that there are
> things that can be done with a gun that can't be done better with
> another weapon--except for maybe writing your name in the snow.
>
> The new generation of small bombs are going to be very nice tools for
> killing Abdullah in the bedroom next door.
>>
>>T-I-C and SAR assets won't always have laser-designators and GPS. If
>>they had all that stuff working they might not be in so much trouble in
>>the first place.
>
> It will be a very rare detachment that doesn't have GPS or laser
> capability. When you can buy a Garmin to fit in your shirt pocket from
> Cabela's, there's no reason not to have one in the infantryman's kit.
> And, they do.
>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 03:00:47 GMT, "Ski"
> wrote:

>Ed - for OIF and OEF the "morf" is back to close direct fire. Small calibre
>guns and rockets without warheads may have more merit. Concrete bombs were
>considered but they skip and bounce sending a high speed hockey puck down
>streets. For another war it will go back to standoff and precision but we
>need to re-figure all this
>

It's always good to get input from first-hand observers. The way
things have evolved in the current unpleasantness there is a lot of
unstructured urban close-quarters battle going on. That doesn't lend
itself to CAS but does indeed respond to direct fire. And,
particularly with organic rather than on-call assets. Having the
weapon on the Hummer, Bradley or Abrams is what's going to be used.

Only if the situation allows for a fall back do you get the
opportunity to use the various indirect fire options.

But, there's always the need to plan for the future engagement rather
than the last and in the process to include sufficient adaptability to
be responsive to changing requirements. (That's staff talk for having
high tech, brute force, sophisticated and crude, large and small,
precision and volume ordnance included in large enough numbers to be
available at a small enough price tag to fit in the budget.)

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Ski]

Hit it right on the head Ed - the situation is unique and it got that way
because we went in blind on the wishes of the politicals and not with a good
plan - hence we are backed into a wall and bleeding for it. You caught on
also that there is no doctrine for this, hardly any proper terms and as CAS
was evolving to use the UAV's and the links the real situation on the ground
just up and ran over the thinking and then again the split between the USAF
and Army has not helped.

How would you tackle this - seriously with all respect - how would you put
this fire out or in the least what role would you see air power



"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 03:00:47 GMT, "Ski"
> > wrote:
>
>>Ed - for OIF and OEF the "morf" is back to close direct fire. Small
>>calibre
>>guns and rockets without warheads may have more merit. Concrete bombs were
>>considered but they skip and bounce sending a high speed hockey puck down
>>streets. For another war it will go back to standoff and precision but we
>>need to re-figure all this
>>
>
> It's always good to get input from first-hand observers. The way
> things have evolved in the current unpleasantness there is a lot of
> unstructured urban close-quarters battle going on. That doesn't lend
> itself to CAS but does indeed respond to direct fire. And,
> particularly with organic rather than on-call assets. Having the
> weapon on the Hummer, Bradley or Abrams is what's going to be used.
>
> Only if the situation allows for a fall back do you get the
> opportunity to use the various indirect fire options.
>
> But, there's always the need to plan for the future engagement rather
> than the last and in the process to include sufficient adaptability to
> be responsive to changing requirements. (That's staff talk for having
> high tech, brute force, sophisticated and crude, large and small,
> precision and volume ordnance included in large enough numbers to be
> available at a small enough price tag to fit in the budget.)
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 21:07:03 GMT, "Ski"
> wrote:

>Hit it right on the head Ed - the situation is unique and it got that way
>because we went in blind on the wishes of the politicals and not with a good
>plan - hence we are backed into a wall and bleeding for it. You caught on
>also that there is no doctrine for this, hardly any proper terms and as CAS
>was evolving to use the UAV's and the links the real situation on the ground
>just up and ran over the thinking and then again the split between the USAF
>and Army has not helped.
>
>How would you tackle this - seriously with all respect - how would you put
>this fire out or in the least what role would you see air power

First, recognize that asking a fighter pilot for an opinion is always
dangerous. Second, if the fighter pilot also teaches political science
and international relations, you're going to get nuance (i.e.
gobbledegook) and bias (i.e. bias.)

I'm a long distance outside of the area of operations and my picture
is provided by the left-stream media. I get some very positive
feedback through back-channel links to folks still in the business to
gain a bit of balance.

Let's start by stating my impression that the current hostilities are
predominantly sectarian between Shia and Sunni, with the US getting
nailed in the cross-fire and offering a convenient scapegoat for each
side to point at as the cause. Not a good situation.

Essential to the discussion is recognition of the need to acknowledge
majority rule--that means mostly Shia, unfortunately. Balance and
stability don't come without some compromise that guarantees input
from the Kurds and Sunni, but they want sovereignty in their
regions,not just a voice. Won't come easy, if at all.

Our role is to get security forces trained (to whatever minimum
standard is achievable) and then get out of the way. The underlying
principle is that eventually the population will tire of the fighting
and determine that their self-interest is better served by stability.
Don't know if that is possible given the Arab mentality.

For US operations model, I'd look to the Israeli. Build a strong intel
system, both national tech (i.e. hardware) and HUMINT (i.e. wetware).
Then stand off and apply the intel when required at points of
decision. That allows selective application of firepower without
getting your troops into indefensible and high vulnerability
situations like house-to-house urban fighting.

I'd get out of the patrolling business as much as possible and get
into the conflict response mode. Wait for a 911 call from the local
authorities before intervening. When major scale operations are
required, do it with precision and supported by a well-managed PR
campaign that clearly spells out that folks who allow insurgents to
live next door, hide in the basement or shoot from their roofs will be
subject to instant response. "We will not lie, cheat or steal--or
support jihadists, or TOLERATE AMONG US those who do..."

The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any
war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass. The current
"mission" is untraditional to say the least. If it fails, it isn't
because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a
nation-building job. Yet, it is very much in our national interest to
try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of
government in the region.

See what you get when you ask?

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Ski]

Ed , very well said - straight shooting and from the heart - thanks
I am working these issues and will carry these words with me - thanks again

Ski




"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 21:07:03 GMT, "Ski"
> > wrote:
>
>>Hit it right on the head Ed - the situation is unique and it got that way
>>because we went in blind on the wishes of the politicals and not with a
>>good
>>plan - hence we are backed into a wall and bleeding for it. You caught on
>>also that there is no doctrine for this, hardly any proper terms and as
>>CAS
>>was evolving to use the UAV's and the links the real situation on the
>>ground
>>just up and ran over the thinking and then again the split between the
>>USAF
>>and Army has not helped.
>>
>>How would you tackle this - seriously with all respect - how would you put
>>this fire out or in the least what role would you see air power
>
> First, recognize that asking a fighter pilot for an opinion is always
> dangerous. Second, if the fighter pilot also teaches political science
> and international relations, you're going to get nuance (i.e.
> gobbledegook) and bias (i.e. bias.)
>
> I'm a long distance outside of the area of operations and my picture
> is provided by the left-stream media. I get some very positive
> feedback through back-channel links to folks still in the business to
> gain a bit of balance.
>
> Let's start by stating my impression that the current hostilities are
> predominantly sectarian between Shia and Sunni, with the US getting
> nailed in the cross-fire and offering a convenient scapegoat for each
> side to point at as the cause. Not a good situation.
>
> Essential to the discussion is recognition of the need to acknowledge
> majority rule--that means mostly Shia, unfortunately. Balance and
> stability don't come without some compromise that guarantees input
> from the Kurds and Sunni, but they want sovereignty in their
> regions,not just a voice. Won't come easy, if at all.
>
> Our role is to get security forces trained (to whatever minimum
> standard is achievable) and then get out of the way. The underlying
> principle is that eventually the population will tire of the fighting
> and determine that their self-interest is better served by stability.
> Don't know if that is possible given the Arab mentality.
>
> For US operations model, I'd look to the Israeli. Build a strong intel
> system, both national tech (i.e. hardware) and HUMINT (i.e. wetware).
> Then stand off and apply the intel when required at points of
> decision. That allows selective application of firepower without
> getting your troops into indefensible and high vulnerability
> situations like house-to-house urban fighting.
>
> I'd get out of the patrolling business as much as possible and get
> into the conflict response mode. Wait for a 911 call from the local
> authorities before intervening. When major scale operations are
> required, do it with precision and supported by a well-managed PR
> campaign that clearly spells out that folks who allow insurgents to
> live next door, hide in the basement or shoot from their roofs will be
> subject to instant response. "We will not lie, cheat or steal--or
> support jihadists, or TOLERATE AMONG US those who do..."
>
> The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any
> war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass. The current
> "mission" is untraditional to say the least. If it fails, it isn't
> because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a
> nation-building job. Yet, it is very much in our national interest to
> try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of
> government in the region.
>
> See what you get when you ask?
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Ski]

You are right, the whole cost issue is a big bag of swirling numbers and I
used license to steal,
yet the USAF pays much less for its Block 50 F-16's then FMS customers pay
but that difference is not desired to be spread all around however it is
significant and your new F-16 at a good production rate (say 10 / month)
would be around $30 million each and the JSF started at a fixed $28 million
a decade ago projected. The F-15E would also be around $50 million to the
USAF with a production rate (say 8 / month) going (that's important). For
instance the UAE paid over $4 billion to develop the AESA radar, Israel and
Greece paid over $2 billion for the same work - not bad a deal for the USA,
but if the USAF or another customer buys or sells the Block 60 it must pay
the UAE a hefty royalty - that's why you are not seeing the Block 60 in the
Guard or Reserves or anywhere and why the newer Block 50/52's are so
advanced.

The JSF gets the shaft (as all new aircraft do) because the loaded
development costs start off the price tag so if a two billion program nets
one aircraft it is a 2 billion machine - not fair of course, but the cost
projections for a production set would drop things radicaly - however the
problems with the JSF in weight and strength are causing design changes and
that's millions in man hours and millions in delay of schedule. So the unit
cost rises and if the production numbers shrink the numbers go out of sight.
It seems past $80 million each now and we have to complete the aircraft and
finish testing. But it still comes down to "what does it do better" - not
much and what it should do better is not proven yet.

I am saying give it a breather - pursue the development longer, but drop the
STOVL and focus on a CTOL that has more meat down stream. Air Force
Magazine (AFA) has an article this month "UAV's with a Bite" - a look at the
X-47 concept that is looking to far - to me merge that with JSF and start
with a set of manned and unmanned platforms so we can see how unmanned earns
its way into the force structure and mission sets.

It is possible to say to Lockheed for instance - how many F-16's would I
need to produce to get a $25 million aircraft off the production line and
there would be an answer - probably around 1000 at 50 / month, but it would
be possible. This is the benefit of having a "line" and "tooling" and
"venders" and "work force" etc... as the production lines dry up these small
essentials fade away and hurt. Many of the original F-16's were produced
with parts that are non-existent today, hence the great upgrade program for
the F-16A that brought C model avionics and more to the European A and B
models essentially died a natural death as the guts of the aircarft ran out
of spares. On the other had, the A/B market "used" has continued so
strongly (Portugal, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand and C users
for training machines etc.) commercial suppliers have stepped up and filled
again the needs of the components - so you never know.

Building 2000 F-35's would again bring the $28 million figure back to it -
but still - what would it do better in the present wars at this time and
down road for bigger nastier enemies, it does not have the performance or
legs which brings on the F-22 growth













"eponymous cowherd" > wrote in message
...
> In article <C22ih.954$Eo.367@trnddc08>,
> "Ski" > wrote:
>
>> f the JSF did not cost three times an F-16 or twice a F-15E then you
>> might
>> say lets press with the F-35 and let the maturity build up fix all this,
>> but
>> with the F-35 is dragging dozens of billions of dollars in investment
>> that
>> goes into its employment - money i think we can not afford now.
>
> Where are you getting these numbers? The -35 will likely cost less than
> either
> the -16 or the -15.
>
> Anti-military types in the press and government like to quote the costs of
> the
> -16 and the -15 based on the last time the USA bought one. The price keeps
> going
> up since then. I think the last time the USA bought a -15 the cost was $50
> million each, when Korea bought them in 01 the cost was $81 million each.
> A
> quick googling shows that the -16s bought by the UAE will cost an
> estimated $80
> million each. If you use the cost of recent purchases of the -16 and
> the -15 you
> will see that the -35 will be competitive on cost alone. Since the -15 has
> two
> engines the chances of it being cheaper than any single engine plane are
> extremely low.
>
>
> http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/facts-figures/weapon-costs.php

[The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion]

On Tue, 02 Jan 2007 15:52:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:

[snip detailed & responsible analysis from Ed]

Jumping in unbidden to pick on a couple of points just to expose my
poor manners...

>The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any
>war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass.

True, but only in so far as the first stage of operations. The war
continues. The failure of the US forces (and British) to suppress the
insurgency and sectarian conflict, despite all the cultural and
operational factors outside their control, remains a failure. I think
it's explicable, and understandable, but still a failure to adapt to
changing operational conditions.

>The current
>"mission" is untraditional to say the least.

On the contrary, I'd say it's similar to several historical examples,
from the Philippines to numerous Latin American interventions, and
that's simply from within the context of US military history. The
supremacy of the US force's operational and technological capacity
doesn't mean that every situation can be resolved by the blind
application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy.

>If it fails, it isn't
>because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a
>nation-building job.

Ah, but the wrong tool (the DoD) was used for the nation-building job.
An ideological aversion to the term "nation-building" doesn't excuse
the DoD and military for failing to engage with the neccessity for
doing just that in order to win the war. At least to start with.

>Yet, it is very much in our national interest to
>try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of
>government in the region.
>
>See what you get when you ask?

Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
uphold.

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 15:59:23 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
> wrote:

>On Tue, 02 Jan 2007 15:52:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:
>
>[snip detailed & responsible analysis from Ed]
>
>Jumping in unbidden to pick on a couple of points just to expose my
>poor manners...
>
>>The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any
>>war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass.
>
>True, but only in so far as the first stage of operations. The war
>continues. The failure of the US forces (and British) to suppress the
>insurgency and sectarian conflict, despite all the cultural and
>operational factors outside their control, remains a failure. I think
>it's explicable, and understandable, but still a failure to adapt to
>changing operational conditions.

If you are only happy by ascribing "failure" to the military
operation, far be it from me to disabuse you of the notion. We aren't
dealing here with changing operational conditions. This isn't fluidity
of a front or unforeseen maneuvering of enemy forces. It isn't
resistance efforts by an occupied nation to an imperialist force--it
is cultural, tribal and ethnic dissonance very similar to the Balkans.
Absent a unifying (and often oppressive) leader like Tito or even
Sadaam, the underlying animosity resurfaces and the national construct
fractures.

If there is a failure involved, it is very similar to the failure of
Vietnam for American foreign policy. That is, it is the failure to
recognize the culture and the historic background of the regional
strife. It is a tendency to ascribe Eurocentric values to Asian or
Middle-eastern people. Fundamentalist Muslims may never accept the
concept of Hobbesian rule by "consent of the governed" just as
Southeast Asians may never subjugate family and relationship to the
land to the dictates of the majority as expressed through an arguably
corrupt government.
>
>>The current
>>"mission" is untraditional to say the least.
>
>On the contrary, I'd say it's similar to several historical examples,
>from the Philippines to numerous Latin American interventions, and
>that's simply from within the context of US military history. The
>supremacy of the US force's operational and technological capacity
>doesn't mean that every situation can be resolved by the blind
>application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy.

Without applying a shotgun historical approach to your "examples" let
me simply suggest that neither the Philippines nor any recallable
Latin American involvements had the overlay of: 1.) three divergent
religious sects; 2.) an imposed national identity from British
colonial rule; 3.) thirty years of minority control under a
totalitarian, brutal dictatorship; 4) a distinct separatist movement
seeking national identity in a third of the nation; 5.) a dozen or
more competing warlords seeking ascendency to fill a perceived power
vacuum and 6.) a recent history of application of weapons of mass
destruction against national enemies and their own people.

I'd also be hard pressed to label the flexibility demonstrated by the
US military in approaches evolving from the collapse of the Soviet
Union into Desert Storm into Afghanistan into Iraqi Freedom into the
current referee for civil war and scapegoat role as "blind application
of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy"--whatever that
means.
>
>>If it fails, it isn't
>>because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a
>>nation-building job.
>
>Ah, but the wrong tool (the DoD) was used for the nation-building job.
>An ideological aversion to the term "nation-building" doesn't excuse
>the DoD and military for failing to engage with the neccessity for
>doing just that in order to win the war. At least to start with.

It isn't a case of ideological aversion. It is recognition of the fact
that the essential function of a military is to kill people and break
things--quicker and more efficiently than the opposition. Period.
"Everything else is rubbish"...B. M. vR
>
>>Yet, it is very much in our national interest to
>>try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of
>>government in the region.
>>
>>See what you get when you ask?
>
>Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
>rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
>commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
>uphold.

Thanks...I needed that! ;-)



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion]

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 16:36:44 GMT, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:

>>True, but only in so far as the first stage of operations. The war
>>continues. The failure of the US forces (and British) to suppress the
>>insurgency and sectarian conflict, despite all the cultural and
>>operational factors outside their control, remains a failure. I think
>>it's explicable, and understandable, but still a failure to adapt to
>>changing operational conditions.
>
>If you are only happy by ascribing "failure" to the military
>operation, far be it from me to disabuse you of the notion. We aren't
>dealing here with changing operational conditions.

I'm afraid we are. The major watershed was the change from
conventional resistance to the US invasion to an insurgency against
"occupation". Subsequent changes have included the evolution of a
multi-agency insurgency (al Queda, Sunni nationalists, then Shia
militias), and then the speculation about training/supporting the
local forces to take the lead.

>This isn't fluidity
>of a front or unforeseen maneuvering of enemy forces.

If the maneuvering of insurgent forces could be foreseen at a minute
tactical level, the US would be able to defeat them. Until the next
crop of recruits continued the conflict days, weeks or months later.

The enemy has an operational and tactical advantage attained by
abusing the status of civilians and hiding amongst them both to
protect their heroic skins from US military action and to
hypocritically garner support when that action causes civilian
casualties.

> It isn't
>resistance efforts by an occupied nation to an imperialist force

Who said it was? Don't make the mistake of assuming that I accept the
axiomatic assumptions of "imperialist intervention" which pass for
understanding of the issue in some quarters.

>--it
>is cultural, tribal and ethnic dissonance very similar to the Balkans.

There is also a real, albeit fundamentally distorted perception of
fighting foreign occupiers, however. That this is rampantly
overstated by Arab prejudice and indoctrinated anti-Americanism
doesn't alter the fact that many insurgents and their supporters
sincerely believe it.

>Absent a unifying (and often oppressive) leader like Tito or even
>Sadaam, the underlying animosity resurfaces and the national construct
>fractures.

Tito was a lot cleverer about masking Serb supremacy with some
pretensions at multi-ethnic window dressing, though. Saddam's
Tikriti-Sunni ascendency was a lot less subtle.

>If there is a failure involved, it is very similar to the failure of
>Vietnam for American foreign policy. That is, it is the failure to
>recognize the culture and the historic background of the regional
>strife.

I'd agree with that. It's not as if there are American commentators,
analysts and even some politicians who understand and understood this,
which is where I think there is some grounds for legitimate criticism
of the neo-con ideological approach to the issue. Dissenting views on
tactics were available, and not just from clueless goons in the media,
or unthinking and reflexive anti-war narcissists.

>It is a tendency to ascribe Eurocentric values to Asian or
>Middle-eastern people. Fundamentalist Muslims may never accept the
>concept of Hobbesian rule by "consent of the governed" just as
>Southeast Asians may never subjugate family and relationship to the
>land to the dictates of the majority as expressed through an arguably
>corrupt government.

All true, nonetheless ideological allies (Vietnamese who genuinely
opposed communism/Iraqis who genuinely desire democracy) do exist
amongst the murkier sectarian, ethnic and class divisions. And the
issue isn't about the existance of these other competing loyalties,
but the extent of them and how to 'shape the battlefield' to minimise
the conflicts between 'tribalism' and 'progressive democracy'.

>>On the contrary, I'd say it's similar to several historical examples,
>>from the Philippines to numerous Latin American interventions, and
>>that's simply from within the context of US military history. The
>>supremacy of the US force's operational and technological capacity
>>doesn't mean that every situation can be resolved by the blind
>>application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy.
>
>Without applying a shotgun historical approach to your "examples" let
>me simply suggest that neither the Philippines nor any recallable
>Latin American involvements had the overlay of: 1.) three divergent
>religious sects;

Only two of which are fundamentally relevant, and which have numerous
fractures within the sects concerned. SCIRI, for example, are not
identical with Sadr's militia. The larger Sunni/Shia split parallels
the catholic/islamic split in the Philippines.

>2.) an imposed national identity from British
>colonial rule

Instead they got if from Spanish and American colonial rule. Sorry,
but I don't see this as a critical difference.

>; 3.) thirty years of minority control under a
>totalitarian, brutal dictatorship;

Yet the divisions in place now reflect the situation in the 1920's
Iraqi revolt, absent maybe the socialist pretensions of the rump
B'aathists. I'd certainly accept that thirty years of B'aathism and
Saddam made things much worse and with more potential for conflict.

>4) a distinct separatist movement
>seeking national identity in a third of the nation;

There have certainly been seperatists in the Philippines, most notably
the Moros.

> 5.) a dozen or
>more competing warlords seeking ascendency to fill a perceived power
>vacuum

This has been de rigeur everywhere historically, but particularly over
much of Asia in the post-colonial era.

>and 6.) a recent history of application of weapons of mass
>destruction against national enemies and their own people.

That's certainly unique to Iraq, but even then hasn't been of much
relevance to the situation now. The Kurds would still hate Saddam and
distrust Sunni rule without Hallabjah. The Iranians don't need the
victims of chemical attacks to produce casualties suffered by Iraqi
aggresson under Saddam by the same token.

>I'd also be hard pressed to label the flexibility demonstrated by the
>US military in approaches evolving from the collapse of the Soviet
>Union into Desert Storm into Afghanistan into Iraqi Freedom into the
>current referee for civil war and scapegoat role as "blind application
>of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy"--whatever that
>means.

It means winning against a uniformed enemy without comprehending that
this does not conclude the conflict. The US has plenty of experience
in dealing with insurgencies, and plenty of innovative, thinking
leaders with excellent practical and educational experience. Some
(but not all) of the problems the US forces have faced in Iraq have
been due to the use of counter-productive and innappropriate tactics.
Most of these stem from the early stage of the insurgency, where some
commanders, and certainly the DoD, were reluctant to admit that they
were even facing such a beast, let alone embrace the concept of
modifying tactics and operational strategy to beat it.

>>Ah, but the wrong tool (the DoD) was used for the nation-building job.
>>An ideological aversion to the term "nation-building" doesn't excuse
>>the DoD and military for failing to engage with the neccessity for
>>doing just that in order to win the war. At least to start with.
>
>It isn't a case of ideological aversion.

It certainly was under Rumsfeld and the "we don't do occupations"-era
Pentagon.

>It is recognition of the fact
>that the essential function of a military is to kill people and break
>things--quicker and more efficiently than the opposition. Period.
>"Everything else is rubbish"...B. M. vR

The problem with this is when this approach conflicts with winning the
war. Either you change approach or admit that inflexible operational
doctrine trumps the achievement of strategic aims. Building a
military machine that could destroy the NVA or VC in almost any battle
it chose did not win the Vietnam war.

>>Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
>>rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
>>commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
>>uphold.
>
>Thanks...I needed that! ;-)

I note the lack of personal abuse in this followup. Have you no
shame?

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, eponymous cowherd
> wrote:

> In article <0i0ih.948$Eo.624@trnddc08>,
> "Ski" > wrote:
>
> > When considering the present wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where we seem
> > to need more Close Air Support (CAS) kind of machines that can both strafe
>
> You complain that we need more CAS, and then say we don't need the -35, which
> was designed for CAS. The -15,-16, and -18 were not originally designed
for CAS,
> if you count the -17 as the start of the -18 program. The more CAS we
need, the
> more -35s we need.

With all due respect, the-18 was designed with CAS as a mission from the outset.

> > and the occassional PGM Bomb, what does the JSF offer over just producing
> > more F-15 / F-16 / F-18 aircraft and if anything finding a follow-on for
>
> It's cheaper than these aircraft and better suited to CAS.

Cost is open to question as the beast has not gone into production yet, so
any discussion of cost comparison is bogus: comparing >projected< cost
against an established serial production cost will not illuminate the issue.
There's too much BS involved to make it in any way a useful comparison.

> It has stealth. It
> uses the same engine as the -22 which will cut down on maintenance
costs. Using
> the same plane cut down on maintenance. It is just as good a fighter as
the -16,
> -18.

As above, it remains to be seen. F-35 is not in production yet.
When a production F-35 flies against a -15, -16, or -18 then a
judgement can be made. Before that is just idle hot air.

> It has stealth. The Turd World seems to have given up on ever matching
> Western air forces and are placing their faith in Russian SAMs. This makes
> stealth even more important.
>
> > something more like an A-10 then a high performance fighter.
>
> 90% of the tank kills recorded by the A-10 during GW1 were made using the
> Maverick missile. The value of the A-10s gun is overestimated due to
> misinterpreting the number of tank kills credited to it during GW1.

Cogent comparisons are important.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:19:49 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
> wrote:

>On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 16:36:44 GMT, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:
>

>
>>>Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
>>>rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
>>>commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
>>>uphold.
>>
>>Thanks...I needed that! ;-)
>
>I note the lack of personal abuse in this followup. Have you no
>shame?
>
>Gavin Bailey

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, eponymous cowherd
> wrote:

> In article <C22ih.954$Eo.367@trnddc08>,
> "Ski" > wrote:
>
> > f the JSF did not cost three times an F-16 or twice a F-15E then you might
> > say lets press with the F-35 and let the maturity build up fix all
this, but
> > with the F-35 is dragging dozens of billions of dollars in investment that
> > goes into its employment - money i think we can not afford now.
>
> Where are you getting these numbers? The -35 will likely cost less than
either
> the -16 or the -15.
>
> Anti-military types in the press and government like to quote the costs
of the
> -16 and the -15 based on the last time the USA bought one. The price
keeps going
> up since then. I think the last time the USA bought a -15 the cost was $50
> million each, when Korea bought them in 01 the cost was $81 million each. A
> quick googling shows that the -16s bought by the UAE will cost an
estimated $80
> million each. If you use the cost of recent purchases of the -16 and the
-15 you
> will see that the -35 will be competitive on cost alone. Since the -15
has two
> engines the chances of it being cheaper than any single engine plane are
> extremely low.

Don;t disagree in principle, but your comparison is inapt.
UAE bought Block 60s which are much more expensive than the
Block 50s that USAF buys.
Cost comparisons are bogus when just looking at airframe costs
without regard to capability. Any jet with an AESA is far more capable
than one without, but an AESA initial purchase price is higher than
older mechanically scanned radars. You get far more capability
but at higher cost.
System capability must be factored in.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Harry Andreas]

In article <8%0nh.2291$Fs2.1617@trnddc05>, "Ski"
> wrote:

> It is possible to say to Lockheed for instance - how many F-16's would I
> need to produce to get a $25 million aircraft off the production line and
> there would be an answer - probably around 1000 at 50 / month, but it would
> be possible. This is the benefit of having a "line" and "tooling" and
> "venders" and "work force" etc... as the production lines dry up these small
> essentials fade away and hurt. Many of the original F-16's were produced
> with parts that are non-existent today, hence the great upgrade program for
> the F-16A that brought C model avionics and more to the European A and B
> models essentially died a natural death as the guts of the aircarft ran out
> of spares. On the other had, the A/B market "used" has continued so
> strongly (Portugal, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand and C users
> for training machines etc.) commercial suppliers have stepped up and filled
> again the needs of the components - so you never know.

One of the major reasons for the A -> C upgrade was AMRAAM.
The APG-66 radar was not AMRAAM capable, nor was the F-16's
weapons system. AAMAF it was reported at the time that the
AMRAAMs internal radar had a longer acquisition range than
the APG-66.

Large capability change drives airframe cost and complexity

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion]

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:

>I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.

I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
to the normal level of usenet discourse.

Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.

Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
weaponry which is sometimes required. I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
deliver them for some time to come.

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

[Ski]

In a insurgency where the enemy is running generally inside your ability to
react (OODA Loop) - could be seconds instead of minutes - I think there
should be a general rule or baseline for conduct of operations. That is
that no unit, small or large, that goes outside of their safe-zone, goes
without a suitable "eye-in-the-sky" that can provide both day and night
early warning, persistent surveillance, and near instant ability to either
call in or provide weapons on target. If we simply had that - and after
billions spent needlessly it is not a big order - many lives could be saved
and many IED and ambush type situations would be thwarted and many escaping
bad guys would be dealt with. Only by having a "hammer" to react to being
fired upon first (unfortunate general situation for the friendlies in an
insurgency) can the friendlies retain anything like an offensive advantage



"The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion" >
wrote in message ...
> On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
> > wrote:
>
>>I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.
>
> I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
> to the normal level of usenet discourse.
>
> Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
> patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
> ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
> dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
> overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.
>
> Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
> checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
> level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
> weaponry which is sometimes required. I'm strongly in favour of
> 'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
> have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
> alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
> always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.
>
> It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
> required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
> delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
> for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
> deliver them for some time to come.
>
> Gavin Bailey
>
> --
> Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
> Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
> than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

[Ski]

Generally anything done increases cost - for sure, the AMRAAM came to the F-16 faster then expected because the F-15 had flutter problems with AMRAAM carriage and the F-16 had a problem with asymmetric loads carrying Sparrows, although the Taiwan Block 25 and Air Defense versions adapted the AIM-7. The real issue with AMRAAM was "fratricide" in that the missile once active was on its own and the AIM-7 you could at least shut off the CW. The pit-bull AMRAAM (active missile radar locked on fired without hand off) was always there, but the data link and other hardware adapting the full AMRAAM kit made little differences here and there. The first AMRAAM kills were F-16.

The multi-shot capability is what causes the real problems, if you just looked at a narrow search pattern where all the power out is dedicated to a small area then the early F-16 radars could find targets at the ranges consistent with using an AMRAAM at it full capability, but if you opened up the scan to include multiple targets the range of using the AMRAAM compressed greatly but all multi-shot missile have that problem.

Think of it this way, project a 60 degree cone in front of you as a searching radar, and realize that targets rightdown the boresight are in your view longer then those that pop up on the edges of the cone, they slip through and the effective field of regard for the missile requires that you narrow up your search pattern until you get to around 20 degrees on either side so the targets would be seen by the radar long enough to talk to the AMRAAM on a max range shot - hence track while scan modes generally have / use narrow scans unless you are in an F-14.

To open up your envelope you have to keep the target in the cone longer so you slow down, then when you are slower you need a bigger missile with a bigger motor to intercept and maneuver against a fighter that has a greater speed advantage. Eventually you become a C-130 at 80 knots firing a Patriot missile, and now you can see why F-14's targeting cruise missile using ship fired or submarine fired missiles that are updated by the F-14's is a much better idea then many F-18's with AMRAAM, but then again AMRAM's could be shared also.

The problem is bigger then you think and it is not only the radar and its trons - point is how do you work it. Taking off out of Kirovskye in the Crimea with a vanilla Su-27 and the radar in standby carrying two long-burn AA-10's on taxi you get a 220 km target (out on the range waiting for you) placed on your scope by the Russian ground based air defense system, by the time you are gear up the system is plotting missile solutions and you have not turned the radar on yet - the radar is asked to be turned on just to provide CW for the missile at around 80 km and the scan and target hand off is automatic. The MiG-31 networks a flock of fighters and multiple sensors within a flight package and adds the external inputs just for fun and confirmation. Each family of systems has there own way to do things, and not any one sensor or thing counts all the points.


"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message ...
> In article <8%0nh.2291$Fs2.1617@trnddc05>, "Ski"
> > wrote:
>
>> It is possible to say to Lockheed for instance - how many F-16's would I
>> need to produce to get a $25 million aircraft off the production line and
>> there would be an answer - probably around 1000 at 50 / month, but it would
>> be possible. This is the benefit of having a "line" and "tooling" and
>> "venders" and "work force" etc... as the production lines dry up these small
>> essentials fade away and hurt. Many of the original F-16's were produced
>> with parts that are non-existent today, hence the great upgrade program for
>> the F-16A that brought C model avionics and more to the European A and B
>> models essentially died a natural death as the guts of the aircarft ran out
>> of spares. On the other had, the A/B market "used" has continued so
>> strongly (Portugal, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand and C users
>> for training machines etc.) commercial suppliers have stepped up and filled
>> again the needs of the components - so you never know.
>
> One of the major reasons for the A -> C upgrade was AMRAAM.
> The APG-66 radar was not AMRAAM capable, nor was the F-16's
> weapons system. AAMAF it was reported at the time that the
> AMRAAMs internal radar had a longer acquisition range than
> the APG-66.
>
> Large capability change drives airframe cost and complexity
>
> --
> Harry Andreas
> Engineering raconteur

[Ski]

I think that you will find that the UAE pays a different price for their F-16's then the USAF in many ways.
You assume that each "type" with its component systems is being designed to operate at its maximum capability. The UAE F-16's have the advantage of AESA scanning and processing but they see targets essentially at the same ranges the USAF Block 50/52's to, subtle modes vary but the capability is fairly even despite the fact that it might have been made much better. Also, the internal IRST is no more and perhaps less capable then the SNIPER or LITNING II - so it all depends.

Costs depend upon how many you want, what you have to spend to get ready to build, and how many man hours required to produce what you want. The long poles are lead items and labor, after that it is all cranking.



"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message ...
> In article >, eponymous cowherd
> > wrote:
>
>> In article <C22ih.954$Eo.367@trnddc08>,
>> "Ski" > wrote:
>>
>> > f the JSF did not cost three times an F-16 or twice a F-15E then you might
>> > say lets press with the F-35 and let the maturity build up fix all
> this, but
>> > with the F-35 is dragging dozens of billions of dollars in investment that
>> > goes into its employment - money i think we can not afford now.
>>
>> Where are you getting these numbers? The -35 will likely cost less than
> either
>> the -16 or the -15.
>>
>> Anti-military types in the press and government like to quote the costs
> of the
>> -16 and the -15 based on the last time the USA bought one. The price
> keeps going
>> up since then. I think the last time the USA bought a -15 the cost was $50
>> million each, when Korea bought them in 01 the cost was $81 million each. A
>> quick googling shows that the -16s bought by the UAE will cost an
> estimated $80
>> million each. If you use the cost of recent purchases of the -16 and the
> -15 you
>> will see that the -35 will be competitive on cost alone. Since the -15
> has two
>> engines the chances of it being cheaper than any single engine plane are
>> extremely low.
>
> Don;t disagree in principle, but your comparison is inapt.
> UAE bought Block 60s which are much more expensive than the
> Block 50s that USAF buys.
> Cost comparisons are bogus when just looking at airframe costs
> without regard to capability. Any jet with an AESA is far more capable
> than one without, but an AESA initial purchase price is higher than
> older mechanically scanned radars. You get far more capability
> but at higher cost.
> System capability must be factored in.
>
> --
> Harry Andreas
> Engineering raconteur

[The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion]

On Fri, 05 Jan 2007 04:44:44 GMT, "Ski"
> wrote:

>In a insurgency where the enemy is running generally inside your ability to
>react (OODA Loop) - could be seconds instead of minutes - I think there
>should be a general rule or baseline for conduct of operations. That is
>that no unit, small or large, that goes outside of their safe-zone, goes
>without a suitable "eye-in-the-sky" that can provide both day and night
>early warning, persistent surveillance, and near instant ability to either
>call in or provide weapons on target. If we simply had that - and after
>billions spent needlessly it is not a big order - many lives could be saved
>and many IED and ambush type situations would be thwarted and many escaping
>bad guys would be dealt with. Only by having a "hammer" to react to being
>fired upon first (unfortunate general situation for the friendlies in an
>insurgency) can the friendlies retain anything like an offensive advantage

Having aerial recce makes a difference, and having efficient CAS
within reach can be a life-saver. However, the insurgents are
incorporated in the local population, and will be feeding off accounts
of US activity when the helicopters can be heard, and even observing
aircraft movements in some cases.

One of the primary tactics in this sort of situation is to be prepared
to use small infantry patrols, planned, routed and operated with
skill, to provide observation without the insurgents and locals
knowing that they are around. This is exceptionally difficult in some
areas in Iraq, but not all of them. Paradoxically, the more
technological resources you deploy to secure them (AFVs, aircraft,
etc), the harder it is to make that kind of basic operation
successful.

I suppose it all comes down to using the appropriate tactic in the
appropriate context; doctrinaire responses to the situation - of all
kinds, including "no CAS" or "no artillery", as well as "maximal
forece protection" - will tend to prove inefficient. My view is that
anything beyond a specific and discriminate use of air power risks
counter-productive results, while aerial recce complements
ground-based observation and visa versa.

Gavin Bailey


--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 23:09:40 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
> wrote:

>On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:
>
>>I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.
>
>I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
>to the normal level of usenet discourse.

It's a curse, I know.
>
>Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
>patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
>ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
>dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
>overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.
>
>Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
>checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
>level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
>weaponry which is sometimes required.

I agree with your premise, but the model I'd go with would eliminate
US unit patrolling. As I suggested, the unit-level involvement
scenario would be on-call response to Iraqi security forces or intel.

The idea would be the classic Special Forces model. "Advisors"
embedded in national units. They keep the local force honest
(hopefully), correct errors in training, gain insight into community
relations/intel, and provide feedback to HHQ on progress. It reduces
external force visibility and hence the opportunity to use the
"occupier" propaganda against us.

> I'm strongly in favour of
>'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
>have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
>alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
>always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

No doubt about it.
>
>It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
>required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
>delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
>for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
>deliver them for some time to come.

Good point. But the essence of the tactic is that the front end,
visible security force is national not foreign. Where the indirect
fire support comes from is not readily apparent. (You could even mount
a disinformation campaign to deflect responsibility to newly
reconstituted Iraqi units....)
>
>Gavin Bailey

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On Fri, 05 Jan 2007 10:24:01 GMT, eponymous cowherd >
wrote:

>In article >,
> (Harry Andreas) wrote:
>
>> > You complain that we need more CAS, and then say we don't need the -35,
>> > which
>> > was designed for CAS. The -15,-16, and -18 were not originally designed
>> for CAS,
>> > if you count the -17 as the start of the -18 program. The more CAS we
>> need, the
>> > more -35s we need.
>>
>> With all due respect, the-18 was designed with CAS as a mission from the
>> outset.
>
>I wrote that the -18 was not designed for CAS if "you count the -17 as the start
>of the program". I think that's a fair statement, the YF-17 was offered as a
>lightweight fighter.

My impression was always that the YF-16/17 flyoff was for a high
volume replacement for the F-4 in ground attack roles while the F-15A
was solely air superiority. Both aircraft were going to be capable of
all of the A/G missions of the F-4 although both reflected de-emphasis
of the tactical nuke mission and neither was viewed at the time as a
potential Wild Weasel. CAS was part of the retained capability--this
despite the A-10.

In 1986, while ALO with the 4th ID (Mech) deployed to Ft. Irwin, I
watched F-16As from Nellis doing tosses of BDU-33s in live fire over
the heads of the FLOT and achieving direct hits (through the plywood)
on enemy tank targets. It should be noted that exercise referees
refused to give kill credit because "the fighters failed to over-fly
the target"--they didn't acknowledge the hits and applied criteria for
scoring that related to a previous generation of CAS aircraft.

We've still got a lot of that thinking with regard to CAS today.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[The Amaurotean Capitalist]

On Fri, 05 Jan 2007 15:38:12 GMT, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:

>The idea would be the classic Special Forces model. "Advisors"
>embedded in national units. They keep the local force honest
>(hopefully), correct errors in training, gain insight into community
>relations/intel, and provide feedback to HHQ on progress. It reduces
>external force visibility and hence the opportunity to use the
>"occupier" propaganda against us.

I'd argue for both - the major effort being special forces intermixed
with Iraqi units as advisors (and even leaders, given the customary
standard of Arab military leadership) with those Iraqi units as the
most visible end of the force. However, I still think there's a
powerful case for US units to be partnered up with the best Iraqi ones
to provide a localised presence in certain areas and under certain
conditions, mostly because I don't think there's enough Special Forces
available to do the job required, and the Iraqis aren't at the point
where they can handle substantial stand-up combat outside their base
areas yet.

>> I'm strongly in favour of
>>'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
>>have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
>>alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
>>always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.
>
>No doubt about it.

The only proviso as far as I can see - and it's a big one - is having
the level of intelligence required, which should be really
substantive. Short of that, risking people on the ground means risking
people on the ground, but if handled properly it can pay off with
better interactions with the locals leading to incrementally better
intelligence.

>Good point. But the essence of the tactic is that the front end,
>visible security force is national not foreign.

As far as possible, yes. But if any action is taken against groups
such as Sadrs militia it will require a substantive and sustained
operation by sizeable US ground forces, even if this is disguised
behind token (or hopefully increasingly less token) Iraqi forces. In
short, I think US forces are still required to operationally influence
the situation to the point where Iraqi forces can cope, even as they
are also required to increase Iraqi capacity via training at the same
time.

>Where the indirect
>fire support comes from is not readily apparent. (You could even mount
>a disinformation campaign to deflect responsibility to newly
>reconstituted Iraqi units....)

CAS (as opposed to selective airstrikes beyond the immediate area of
US force presence on the ground) has an advantage in larger operations
as the US/Iraqi/British forces can control the ground after the fact,
and the customary Arab hyperbole about innocent children being
murdered by the Yanqui imperialist warmongers becomes a little more
difficult to sustain when the bodies of the Mehdi army militiamen and
their AK 47s are visibly being pulled out of the rubble besides the
bodies of any collateral casualties.

On the disinformation side, this is where some accurate air strikes
and artillery can pay dividends - hitting a known mortar firing point
with observed air/artillery fire as the latest gang of "fire and flee"
militia men turn up and then attributing their demise to another
agency (no obvious sign of US forces on the spot in the morning when
their cousins and friends tentatively approach the body-strewn scene,
even if anything of intelligence value has already been lifted...)
always appealed to me, probably because I was never allowed to try it.

Gavin Bailey

--
Solution elegant. Yes. Minor problem, use 25000 CPU cycle for 1
instruction, this why all need overclock Pentium. Dumbass.
- Bart Kwan En

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, eponymous cowherd
> wrote:

> In article >,
> (Harry Andreas) wrote:
>
> > > You complain that we need more CAS, and then say we don't need the -35,
> > > which
> > > was designed for CAS. The -15,-16, and -18 were not originally designed
> > for CAS,
> > > if you count the -17 as the start of the -18 program. The more CAS we
> > need, the
> > > more -35s we need.
> >
> > With all due respect, the-18 was designed with CAS as a mission from the
> > outset.
>
> I wrote that the -18 was not designed for CAS if "you count the -17 as
the start
> of the program". I think that's a fair statement, the YF-17 was offered as a
> lightweight fighter.

Subtle difference. I understand now.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Harry Andreas]

In article <7ilnh.34460$Ap5.8738@trnddc04>, "Ski"
> wrote:

> I think that you will find that the UAE pays a different price for their =
> F-16's then the USAF in many ways.
> You assume that each "type" with its component systems is being designed =
> to operate at its maximum capability.

Actually in my job I assume nothing of the kind.

> The UAE F-16's have the advantage =
> of AESA scanning and processing but they see targets essentially at the =
> same ranges the USAF Block 50/52's to, subtle modes vary but the =
> capability is fairly even despite the fact that it might have been made =
> much better.

I understand the limitations of technology, export laws etc. I deal with it
every day. The Block 60 AESA is still much better than the APG-68.
More than that I can't comment.

> Also, the internal IRST is no more and perhaps less =
> capable then the SNIPER or LITNING II - so it all depends.
>
> Costs depend upon how many you want, what you have to spend to get ready =
> to build, and how many man hours required to produce what you want. =
> The long poles are lead items and labor, after that it is all cranking.=20
>
Build rate is also supremely important. Building 2 a year will cost a lot more
than 2 a month, regardless of the final quantity.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Ski]

Stand with you on all points and the reason we have to continue patrolling is because the Iraqi's just are not up to it yet and when left to themselves the militia police units overwhelm them and they "turn" into sympathizers of the local warlord. So it will take time and more casualties and without each little unit having back up and "high cover" they all go out and are limited to what they can see.

Also many things drive me crazy - there are optical scanners, laser scanners, audio scanners and other things that will pick up rifle fire, spot video camera lenses and sniper scope lenses and in a sense help provide a 2 second to 10 second warning that a sniper is about to shoot at something - none of this has been implemented in the field yet and the billions spent can not account for any serious effort to go after this hard and heavy. We put billions into robots, sensible but not practical for a moving force, so you try to spot an IED and then move around it, that becomes a shell game because there are now multiple plants predicting where you will "go around" the first one. Stuff like that could have simply been dealt with using many small manned aircraft with night systems. Would there be dull moments - absolutely - dull for everyone but the patrols and convoy personnel. The Army says that the local gomers stop moving around after 02:00 am, and most traffic stops but they are still moving and you would think for a minute that those moving around then would constitute folks doing something other then normal. Until only recently in the Baghdad crisis was there a systematic use of road blocks and curfews - I found this unbelievable but no **** the following existed right up until today:

(1) If you plotted where all the US casualties were made what would it look like - it would be clusters of dots collected along the main highway routes south to north through Baghdad branching off to Mosul and Tirkit. Well then the roads and the casualties overlap perhaps in more then 75% of the time.

(2) with that consistent for four years it would seem obvious that they enemy is coming after us since most of the time we are found in long convoys and patrolling along the main routes that connect the population centers - kind of challenges the notion of irregular and asymmetric warfare when things are so determined by bad habits and not corrected - starts to sound like repetitive guerilla warfare, but the enemy has made the war a business in that the skills and wares of the various cells can be scheduled and purchased to set IED's, provide ambush cover, set mortar harassment fires, etc. As long as we keep coming along the roads without controlling the roads and accesses regardless of how much we armor the vehicles or counter the IED triggers with jammers, or have robots to clear known IED finds - well as long as this continues we will be attacked because the enemy has no reason to change his habits

(3) Now knowing that one would aks - well how many units in the US and coalition forces are dedicated to road security an road access - answer NONE, nada, the road security mission is an add-on to those units that are assigned certain AO's that include the highways and the EOD teams (after the fact) are assigned to them but efforts to thwart and clear the highways are taken only with normal patrolling not with dedicated efforts except in special circumstances when helicopters were put up in groups for periods of hours but nothing could be sustained because under every rock and on every roof is an enemy with a rifle or RPG and they have a field day shooting at the helos that are heard for 20 plus miles away and can't turn fast enough to counter shots from a blind side.

(4) How many Iraqi units are dedicated to road security - very few and those involved are tainted by the militias. Note that if we allowed and encouraged the various towns and villages to set up toll sections the earned income would translate to a cash cow and there would be a firm interst in keeping the roads safe for our convoys. Well they would steal us blind - SO WHAT - at $2 billion a week that is nothing and it could provide jobs because we could demand that the roads be repaired and cleaned etc. Also alternative roads could be built for Iraqi normal traffic thus isolating the main roads for the convoys totally and many more jobs. Iraq has railroads, but they do not work - yet railroads have "rightaways"and rightaways mean you could build simple elevated rails on contrete pylons with steel tracks using sleds run by rubber-tires and electric motors (see http://www.megarail.com/CargoRail_Heavy_Cargo/) and low and behold the roads nurished by tolls that have rail rightaways running paralle could produce elevated rails capable of being manufactured in Iraq and on those elevated "T" concrete pylons you could then add pvc water lines, fibre lines, electric power lines, communications in the fibre etc and the same militias and local police collecting tolls and protecting the roads would have to protect the elevated rail segments that would rebuild the infrastructure piece by piece. Remember that over 1200 convoys a day, some miles long are required in Iraq. There are at least six major depot and garrison points - each one has over 8 to 10,000 people, so with 130,000 troops there you have around half in garrison every day - who the hell is fighting the war - a hand full of units going on patrol after patrol after patrol with no air cover and no real support. The generals see everything and in short can do very little because the sytem id set up to feed them not just keep them informed.



"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message ...
> On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 23:09:40 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
> > wrote:
>
>>On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:
>>
>>>I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.
>>
>>I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
>>to the normal level of usenet discourse.
>
> It's a curse, I know.
>>
>>Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
>>patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
>>ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
>>dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
>>overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.
>>
>>Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
>>checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
>>level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
>>weaponry which is sometimes required.
>
> I agree with your premise, but the model I'd go with would eliminate
> US unit patrolling. As I suggested, the unit-level involvement
> scenario would be on-call response to Iraqi security forces or intel.
>
> The idea would be the classic Special Forces model. "Advisors"
> embedded in national units. They keep the local force honest
> (hopefully), correct errors in training, gain insight into community
> relations/intel, and provide feedback to HHQ on progress. It reduces
> external force visibility and hence the opportunity to use the
> "occupier" propaganda against us.
>
>> I'm strongly in favour of
>>'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
>>have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
>>alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
>>always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.
>
> No doubt about it.
>>
>>It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
>>required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
>>delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
>>for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
>>deliver them for some time to come.
>
> Good point. But the essence of the tactic is that the front end,
> visible security force is national not foreign. Where the indirect
> fire support comes from is not readily apparent. (You could even mount
> a disinformation campaign to deflect responsibility to newly
> reconstituted Iraqi units....)
>>
>>Gavin Bailey
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Ski]

Ed you are soooo right and one would think that the USAF and Army are closer
but NOT, they are miles apart and going for distance


"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 05 Jan 2007 10:24:01 GMT, eponymous cowherd >
> wrote:
>
>>In article >,
>> (Harry Andreas) wrote:
>>
>>> > You complain that we need more CAS, and then say we don't need
>>> > the -35,
>>> > which
>>> > was designed for CAS. The -15,-16, and -18 were not originally
>>> > designed
>>> for CAS,
>>> > if you count the -17 as the start of the -18 program. The more CAS we
>>> need, the
>>> > more -35s we need.
>>>
>>> With all due respect, the-18 was designed with CAS as a mission from the
>>> outset.
>>
>>I wrote that the -18 was not designed for CAS if "you count the -17 as the
>>start
>>of the program". I think that's a fair statement, the YF-17 was offered as
>>a
>>lightweight fighter.
>
> My impression was always that the YF-16/17 flyoff was for a high
> volume replacement for the F-4 in ground attack roles while the F-15A
> was solely air superiority. Both aircraft were going to be capable of
> all of the A/G missions of the F-4 although both reflected de-emphasis
> of the tactical nuke mission and neither was viewed at the time as a
> potential Wild Weasel. CAS was part of the retained capability--this
> despite the A-10.
>
> In 1986, while ALO with the 4th ID (Mech) deployed to Ft. Irwin, I
> watched F-16As from Nellis doing tosses of BDU-33s in live fire over
> the heads of the FLOT and achieving direct hits (through the plywood)
> on enemy tank targets. It should be noted that exercise referees
> refused to give kill credit because "the fighters failed to over-fly
> the target"--they didn't acknowledge the hits and applied criteria for
> scoring that related to a previous generation of CAS aircraft.
>
> We've still got a lot of that thinking with regard to CAS today.
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Ski]

yes - good discussion


"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
...
> In article <7ilnh.34460$Ap5.8738@trnddc04>, "Ski"
> > wrote:
>
>> I think that you will find that the UAE pays a different price for their
>> =
>> F-16's then the USAF in many ways.
>> You assume that each "type" with its component systems is being designed
>> =
>> to operate at its maximum capability.
>
> Actually in my job I assume nothing of the kind.
>
>> The UAE F-16's have the advantage =
>> of AESA scanning and processing but they see targets essentially at the =
>> same ranges the USAF Block 50/52's to, subtle modes vary but the =
>> capability is fairly even despite the fact that it might have been made =
>> much better.
>
> I understand the limitations of technology, export laws etc. I deal with
> it
> every day. The Block 60 AESA is still much better than the APG-68.
> More than that I can't comment.
>
>> Also, the internal IRST is no more and perhaps less =
>> capable then the SNIPER or LITNING II - so it all depends.
>>
>> Costs depend upon how many you want, what you have to spend to get ready
>> =
>> to build, and how many man hours required to produce what you want. =
>> The long poles are lead items and labor, after that it is all
>> cranking.=20
>>
> Build rate is also supremely important. Building 2 a year will cost a lot
> more
> than 2 a month, regardless of the final quantity.
>
> --
> Harry Andreas
> Engineering raconteur

[Ski]

You make good comments - but in this insurgency just having something that
is flying above your head and talking to you is better then what is there
now. If it shoots something - better yet. If it can hit something -
vunderbar!!

In the beginning of the war and just out of Afghanistan the CAS concepts
were classical, the TACP team the radio's and the long discussion about
where everybody is and the "nine-line" descriptor and target coordinates all
passed verbally even though people were using GPS because the link between
the systems was moving to the Rover and not the simple IDM that operated off
the radios and could only pass data and a picture. So CAS was focused on
putting a precision bomb on a known target properly identified amongst
friendly positions. The targeting pods because a big helper for the
fighters, one generation after LANTRIN or more. Then the bomb's collateral
damage made it only usable when the house or target was a bit distanced from
friendlies but the enemy still collected a crowd to protect themselves, so
strafing came back and then even the 30 mm round became too big. This is
becoming a real tough job now - hence the Blitz fighter idea



"eponymous cowherd" > wrote in message
...
> In article <RM_lh.8389$tc5.6241@trnddc01>,
> "Ski" > wrote:
>
>> e Army failed to do that when its
>> "boots on the ground efforts" recognized that the armed helicopter
>> (mostly
>> Apache and Kiawa) were now unrealiable against a ground sprinkled with
>> armed
>> insurgents shooting wildly at them from all directions (Cobra II Chapter
>> 14
>> and Fiasco Chapter 6).
>
> I hope you are not referring to that single maneuver element fiasco during
> the
> initial invasion.
>
>
>
>>The war, which again remmebr is costing billions
>> every month and is taking nearly one hundred lives every month with many
>> more wounded has gone on now for five years.
>
> Then declare defeat and leave. Let them fight each other down to the last
> man
> and let the last man be kicked to death by a donkey.
>
>
>>
>> A new F-15E or F-16C or F/A-18E coming off the production line is in no
>> way
>> an "old" aircraft when considering whether it can do a job or not.
>
> They are old. The wing loading on the -15E is too high for low level
> attack such
> as CAS. The -15 and -18 don't make use of relaxed stability. The -16
> and -15
> don't make use of vertexs created by LERX to reduce stall speed. That's
> just the
> stuff I know and can remember off hand. A lot of **** has been learned
> since the
> 1970s. Aerodynamic research did not come to an end when NACA became NASA.
>
>
>
>> machines have been continually maturing and continually improve to the
>> point
>> that now they are more capable in just about every category of fighter
>> comparisons that you can think of except the materials and shapes that
>> lend
>> itself to so called stealth features. To say that the JSF has a mystical
>> integrative advantage over the F-15E is simply a case of displays,
>> antennas,
>> and circuit boards because the ever changing software tapes are
>> deliberately
>> held up as different beasts in different models because we have long past
>> the day when you could distinguish the difference between an F-16 or F-18
>> or
>> F-15 or B-2 or JSF radar - it is just boards, components and software -
>> all
>> of which is grossly overpriced and enornmously over-paced to drag out the
>
>
> There is no way older aircraft can mix IR and radar info without
> completely
> redoing the cockpit and all electronics. A software upgrade will not do
> it,
> because on planes previous to the -22 and -35 the IR and radar systems are
> seperate, they're ain't no stinking wires between them.
>
> Integrating sensor data from other planes with your own is possible with
> an
> upgrade, but the value is questionable. In the older systems the displays
> are
> all committed, they show one thing all the time. In the new systems all
> displays
> are controlled by a single brain and can show whatever the programmers are
> capable of coming up with. It takes a while to explain, maybe you should
> just do
> the work yourself.

[Ski]

all so true - but if the manpads is not just IR guided, say a digital beam
rider flying a laser, radar, or optical beam or with a sophisticated heads
so that it can shoot head on, then it gets tougher which is why surprise
helps and low noise does a lot there

Flying low and fast, that is nape of the earth and near sonic the JSF going
from A to B will do very well and in that case unless something warns the
ground defenses. The world is now a place where the second you taxi or
leave the ship the gomers are on their cell phones calling in the launch -
again this brings up how the Israeli's dealt with the IADS put up in the
Bekaa and how they tried to convince the US Navy not to go low in the
strikes conducted around Beirut in 1983. The idea being if you suppress the
radar SAMS (SA-2/3/6/8 etc.) then you kind of carve out the area above
15,000 feet and the AAA or manpads can not effectively shoot you there even
though they could reach the height kinematically. This goes on and on...
so going low or going high depends upon surprise, if it can be obtained, and
what you are trying to do. One thing for sure however, once you target the
SAM operators their attitude changes.

In the 90's the new Defense Minister of Lithuania was a missile officer who
served a tour with the Russians as an advisor in Hanoi during the Vietnam
war and was at the site off of Haiphong that would pick off so many of our
jets egressing. I had to take the son of a bitch to lunch as a favor to a
NATO person and got to like him, he introduced himself with "I think we met
before" - a good ice breaker. Since we are on war stories - the following
year I was dropped off at the Polish AF academy (Deblin) to help in the
transition and decided in all my good vision to convince the Chief of Staff
to allow us to commandeer his YAK and take the high grades in the senior
class to the Farnborough Air Show with an actual agenda to do some learning.
Well after a lot of hassle he agreed as long as he could go and then I
couldn't get any budget from the US but BAe became a great helper - nice
guys. Long story short in the process BAe insisted that the Polish pilots
get the Queen's tour of Warton and the Hawk & Eurofighter so we all tramp
over their shuttle plane for the flight to Warton and the class conspired
with the Brits to sit me next to the commander of the Vietnamese Air Force -
Gen Dong something - a guy with nine kills and looked and talked like a
fighter pilot in anybody's first rate air force. Never trust Lieutenants.
I felt about as big as you know what but he was entertaining knowing every
detail about his missions and kills - "what did you do in the war ole ski"
blurted his interpreter, well let's see, I bombed a lot of trees, damaged a
couple of jets, got blown out of a helicopter and basically was a miserable
noload for too long. Ahso and the fast talking interpreter was laughing up
a storm so I said - "well at least I got to kill a lot of folks like this
guy" Interpreter shuts up abruptly - General looks at me, smiles and in
perfect English says "me too". We drank all the way to Warton and talked
about the F-16 - I hope he gets his F-16's thinks the Su-27 is a pig - so
much for the enemy.


"eponymous cowherd" > wrote in message
...
> In article <C22ih.954$Eo.367@trnddc08>,
> "Ski" > wrote:
>
>> Well what about the Rapiers and handheld IR SAM's - every one of these
>> jets
>> are too hot, too contrast prone for low altitude and all the too noisy -
>> so
>> they use countermeasures, tactics, and agility which is sometimes not
>> enough.
>> But for sure the Apache has been ruled out and the Cobra given real
>> trouble.
>>
>
> Speed helps a lot against MANPADs. They have a 3 mile range and you have
> to push
> a button to cool the seeker before firing. If a plane is moving through
> that
> range quickly it is a tough target for a MANPAD, though numbers can make
> up for
> that. Still, moving through the threat zone quickly helps a lot and the
> F-35 has
> tons of engine power.
>
>
>
>> Just for grins think of an extended development JSF leveraging all the
>> good
>> things now realized but add a real laser weapon to rid it totally of
>> racks,
>> weapons, and pylons - then merge in the UCAS/
>
> I think the best lasers can currently do at converting electricity to
> laser
> light is 50% with the rest becoming heat. Until the efficiency goes up I
> don't
> think lasers will be a practical weapon. At 50% it means that if the laser
> is
> strong enough to melt a tank it is producing enough heat itself to melt a
> tank.

[Ski]

Ed is spot-on with this - the new SAM's are a factor that we have to deal
with and I see putting our energy into the F-22 first then the JSF (just my
point of view because of the present war). The stealth that we have now
still ain't enough - and it will take a whole lot of new stuff to deal. But
like everything else and as I said before, if you start targeting the SAM
operators and their mothers they get a quick change in attitude fast so we
could asymmetrically, as they say, add some diddles to the equation. It is
perhaps then a "full spectrum" fight (stealing from the Army)

Also look at it this way - the treasury we are dumping down the whole with
this war is preventing us from building the kit to deal with all this
super-stuff coming down the pike - and the dilemma is that we show ourselves
that the "new stuff" really can't be effectively used in this war - so it is
choices again







"eponymous cowherd" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, "TV" >
> wrote:
>
>> . Absolutely no dire
>> need for F-22 or -35, no matter who says it. Period. Ain't no one in a
>> place to challenge the US military on conventional grounds.
>
> I disagree. The new Russian SAMs are very good and are being sold to
> everyone.
> This makes it very hard for non-stealthed aircraft to survive. We need to
> fly
> over Turd World countries to destroy their current or future ability to
> nuke us.
>
> I think the -22 and the -35 are two of the most pressing needs for america
> in
> today's world. The most pressing would be space based boost-phase missile
> defense, but the voters won't go for it.

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On Fri, 05 Jan 2007 23:44:15 GMT, eponymous cowherd >
wrote:

>In article >,
> Ed Rasimus > wrote:
>
>> If you are only happy by ascribing "failure" to the military
>> operation, far be it from me to disabuse you of the notion. We aren't
>> dealing here with changing operational conditions. This isn't fluidity
>> of a front or unforeseen maneuvering of enemy forces. It isn't
>> resistance efforts by an occupied nation to an imperialist force--it
>> is cultural, tribal and ethnic dissonance very similar to the Balkans.
>> Absent a unifying (and often oppressive) leader like Tito or even
>> Sadaam, the underlying animosity resurfaces and the national construct
>> fractures.
>
>That's all true, but you are leaving out Gen. Abizaid giving Bush the big speech
>about how he understand Arabs cuz he's one and he knows its all going to work
>because their is no civil war. It's not the DOD's fault that bringing Western
>political systems to the muslims is a waste of time, but the Abizaid types at
>the top who refuse to call a spade a spade in front of the big man have blood on
>their hands.

I think you're doing a bit of lib-media sound-biting on this.

Abizaid is fluent in Arabic. That gives him a big leg up on
understanding what is going on in theater. He can interact with local
leadership and not suffer the mis-understandings inherent in
interpreters. That's a good thing.

Whether or not the activity in Iraq is called "civil war" is
irrelevant. What it is called isn't important. You like insurgency,
revolution, civil war, rebellion, internecine strife, resistance to
occupation or whatever terminology, go for it.

The fact is that the US military has been given a mission. It is one
that is non-traditional and one for which they are not optimized.
Police training, security, infrastructure restoration, civil affairs,
etc. are all things which the military CAN do, but also things which
are only tangential to the primary role. If one really wants to open a
bucket of worms, consider that the roles required to stabilize Iraq
are, at least nominally, the charter described roles of the UN. (But,
we all know that isn't a starter.)


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On Sat, 06 Jan 2007 00:07:23 GMT, "Ski"
> wrote:

>all so true - but if the manpads is not just IR guided, say a digital beam
>rider flying a laser, radar, or optical beam or with a sophisticated heads
>so that it can shoot head on, then it gets tougher which is why surprise
>helps and low noise does a lot there
>
>Flying low and fast, that is nape of the earth and near sonic the JSF going
>from A to B will do very well and in that case unless something warns the
>ground defenses. The world is now a place where the second you taxi or
>leave the ship the gomers are on their cell phones calling in the launch -
>again this brings up how the Israeli's dealt with the IADS put up in the
>Bekaa and how they tried to convince the US Navy not to go low in the
>strikes conducted around Beirut in 1983. The idea being if you suppress the
>radar SAMS (SA-2/3/6/8 etc.) then you kind of carve out the area above
>15,000 feet and the AAA or manpads can not effectively shoot you there even
>though they could reach the height kinematically. This goes on and on...
>so going low or going high depends upon surprise, if it can be obtained, and
>what you are trying to do. One thing for sure however, once you target the
>SAM operators their attitude changes.

The very essence of Weaseling!

>
>In the 90's the new Defense Minister of Lithuania was a missile officer who
>served a tour with the Russians as an advisor in Hanoi during the Vietnam
>war and was at the site off of Haiphong that would pick off so many of our
>jets egressing. I had to take the son of a bitch to lunch as a favor to a
>NATO person and got to like him, he introduced himself with "I think we met
>before" - a good ice breaker. Since we are on war stories - the following
>year I was dropped off at the Polish AF academy (Deblin) to help in the
>transition and decided in all my good vision to convince the Chief of Staff
>to allow us to commandeer his YAK and take the high grades in the senior
>class to the Farnborough Air Show with an actual agenda to do some learning.
>Well after a lot of hassle he agreed as long as he could go and then I
>couldn't get any budget from the US but BAe became a great helper - nice
>guys. Long story short in the process BAe insisted that the Polish pilots
>get the Queen's tour of Warton and the Hawk & Eurofighter so we all tramp
>over their shuttle plane for the flight to Warton and the class conspired
>with the Brits to sit me next to the commander of the Vietnamese Air Force -
>Gen Dong something - a guy with nine kills and looked and talked like a
>fighter pilot in anybody's first rate air force. Never trust Lieutenants.
>I felt about as big as you know what but he was entertaining knowing every
>detail about his missions and kills - "what did you do in the war ole ski"
>blurted his interpreter, well let's see, I bombed a lot of trees, damaged a
>couple of jets, got blown out of a helicopter and basically was a miserable
>noload for too long. Ahso and the fast talking interpreter was laughing up
>a storm so I said - "well at least I got to kill a lot of folks like this
>guy" Interpreter shuts up abruptly - General looks at me, smiles and in
>perfect English says "me too". We drank all the way to Warton and talked
>about the F-16 - I hope he gets his F-16's thinks the Su-27 is a pig - so
>much for the enemy.

I love it! Absolutely love it!

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[TV]

> The stealth that we have now still ain't enough - and it will take a whole
> lot of new stuff to deal. But like everything else and as I said before,
> if you start targeting the SAM operators and their mothers they get a
> quick change in attitude fast so we could asymmetrically, as they say, add
> some diddles to the equation. It is perhaps then a "full spectrum" fight
> (stealing from the Army)

The B-2, F-117, and F-22 already give a tremendous first day stealth
capability, especially with precision stand-off munitions. Enough to take
out any 3rd world and their SAMs. Especially given Weasel countermeasures.
As far as I know, SAMs are still highly allergic to anti-radiation missiles!
In my fictitious China/Russia scenario, there would be many more elements
besides airplanes targeting SAMs! UAVs, cruise missiles, special ops, etc.
Finally, Russian SAMs might be very good (who knows until they're used in
battle?), but I'm betting most of their for-sale operators aren't.

At the bigger picture, anyone using those weapons and seriously hurting the
US with them is going to prompt a US-Russia talk like the Britain-France
talk during the Falklands. Russia isn't going to want to trash US relations
over Kurzikstan or Somalia, so there goes their effectiveness (assuming that
US Intel doesn't already know about their capabilities and potential
counters). As Ed commented on my comments, I think the emphasis really
needs to be on winning the war of the media just as much (if not more so)
than the actual war. I believe that the US is on another generation of
operational capability compared to any other army in the world. I'd bet good
money that the US could sit idle for the next 30 years and still be on par
with anything coming out of Russia or China with the current arsenal. But
they don't want to be on par, or just win wars, they want (i.e., the public)
to win wars faster, cleaner, and easier than ever! It's the media, and
public perception, that are (and have been since the end of WW2, and
especially the end of the Cold War) the limiting factors on US military
success. So the trick becomes how to best prosecute a war that pleases the
public? Make it as humane, bloodless, and fast as possible. That, IMO, is
the biggest strategic reason for pushing technology forward. Not enemy
weapon/defense developments. Even if all other countries ceased developing
weapons, and went back to using spears and rocks, this reason alone would
still drive US weapons development just as much as it is being driven now
IMO.

[Peter Skelton]

On Sun, 7 Jan 2007 10:54:53 -0500, "TV" > wrote:

>> The stealth that we have now still ain't enough - and it will take a whole
>> lot of new stuff to deal. But like everything else and as I said before,
>> if you start targeting the SAM operators and their mothers they get a
>> quick change in attitude fast so we could asymmetrically, as they say, add
>> some diddles to the equation. It is perhaps then a "full spectrum" fight
>> (stealing from the Army)
>
>The B-2, F-117, and F-22 already give a tremendous first day stealth
>capability, especially with precision stand-off munitions. Enough to take
>out any 3rd world and their SAMs. Especially given Weasel countermeasures.
>As far as I know, SAMs are still highly allergic to anti-radiation missiles!
>In my fictitious China/Russia scenario, there would be many more elements
>besides airplanes targeting SAMs! UAVs, cruise missiles, special ops, etc.
>Finally, Russian SAMs might be very good (who knows until they're used in
>battle?), but I'm betting most of their for-sale operators aren't.
>
>At the bigger picture, anyone using those weapons and seriously hurting the
>US with them is going to prompt a US-Russia talk like the Britain-France
>talk during the Falklands. Russia isn't going to want to trash US relations
>over Kurzikstan or Somalia, so there goes their effectiveness (assuming that
>US Intel doesn't already know about their capabilities and potential
>counters). As Ed commented on my comments, I think the emphasis really
>needs to be on winning the war of the media just as much (if not more so)
>than the actual war. I believe that the US is on another generation of
>operational capability compared to any other army in the world. I'd bet good
>money that the US could sit idle for the next 30 years and still be on par
>with anything coming out of Russia or China with the current arsenal. But
>they don't want to be on par, or just win wars, they want (i.e., the public)
>to win wars faster, cleaner, and easier than ever! It's the media, and
>public perception, that are (and have been since the end of WW2, and
>especially the end of the Cold War) the limiting factors on US military
>success. So the trick becomes how to best prosecute a war that pleases the
>public? Make it as humane, bloodless, and fast as possible. That, IMO, is
>the biggest strategic reason for pushing technology forward. Not enemy
>weapon/defense developments. Even if all other countries ceased developing
>weapons, and went back to using spears and rocks, this reason alone would
>still drive US weapons development just as much as it is being driven now

That's a not bad at all expression of the cost side, and the cost
side is important but the US has never been limited by the cost
side. USains are as brave as anybody else, and as willing to
accept neccessary pain.

The US won its last war (GWI, this one isn't over so it doesn't
count yet) because the public understood the need, and accepted
the cost. Their leader expressed attainable goals to meet ral and
worthwhile needs, got the necessary suppport (hell he even got
someone else to foot the bill) achieved his goals, and got out,
or as out as one can in the real world. In his youth, he fought
bravely in a war where the president of the day had an eye on the
same factors.

It lost the war before that (Nam), not because of the cost, but
because the reasons for fighting couldn't stand the light of day.
There was no democracy to support, South East Asia was not going
to collapse like a pile of dominos etc. When the public figured
that out, the leadership tried the we've invested so much and
it's almost won bit. That turned out to be sending good money
after bad, which the public figured out too. Embarassing.

I'd cheerfully bet that the Shrub would be some kind of great
hero today if some of his "let's pretend" had turned out to be
true. What would we think of him now if it had cost 30,000 troops
to take out Iraq, but they'd found 50 hydrogen bombs and tons of
CBW weapons with credible delivery plans? and documentation
enabling you to roll up AQ like a filthy rug? and the folks in
the area were grateful? (if you found that, I suspect Iran,
Jordan, Syria and Turkey might have a passing twinge of
gratitude., governments, population and clerics included)

People forget the price pretty fast if quality goods are
delivered.


Peter Skelton

[Jack]

Peter Skelton wrote:

> ...South East Asia was not going
> to collapse like a pile of dominos....

You knew that then, I suppose?

And how do you know even now that it wouldn't have?

SEA didn't collapse because of what we did there -- though I'll agree we
could have gotten better results with less investment through different
means.

Isn't hindsight wonderful?


Jack

[Peter Skelton]

On Sun, 07 Jan 2007 22:37:42 GMT, Jack >
wrote:

>Peter Skelton wrote:
>
>> ...South East Asia was not going
>> to collapse like a pile of dominos....
>
>You knew that then, I suppose?
>
SE Asia did not collapse when China fell, the dictatorships we
supported were not democracies. The Viet Nam war came from the
1956 decision not to hold elections because Uncle Ho would have
won.

The argument was spurious.


Peter Skelton

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On Mon, 08 Jan 2007 14:49:27 -0500, Peter Skelton >
wrote:

>On Sun, 07 Jan 2007 22:37:42 GMT, Jack >
>wrote:
>
>>Peter Skelton wrote:
>>
>>> ...South East Asia was not going
>>> to collapse like a pile of dominos....
>>
>>You knew that then, I suppose?
>>
>SE Asia did not collapse when China fell, the dictatorships we
>supported were not democracies. The Viet Nam war came from the
>1956 decision not to hold elections because Uncle Ho would have
>won.

It should go without saying that condensing forty or fifty years of
history dealing with complex international relationships, not just
between one or two countries but between forty or fifty into a single
short paragraph will inevitably be WRONG.

SE Asia did not collapse when China fell. But that wasn't what Kennan
was talking about when he recommended to Truman that he establish a
series of alliances globally to contain (not confront) the spread of
Communism. And, it doesn't relate to Dulles' pronouncement of the
Domino metaphor.

The war came from the recruitment and training in the Comintern of Ho
Chi Minh. His resistance of the French colonials led to partition by
the Geneva Accords of 1954. Support of insurgents in the South by Ho's
movement led to instability which reasonably led to the conclusion
that holding elections might not be very workable or result in a
government that would meet US policy goals.

Let's be sure to note that from 1954 until late in the '60s there were
several rounds of elections held in SVN. (And to be fair, lets also
note that culturally the SVN people were about as ready for
Jeffersonian democracy as the Shia' and Sunnis.)
>
>The argument was spurious.

I think you mean specious. Of course it does appear to be
extemporaneous and thence somewhat spurious. It's definitely
suspicious, but not too precocious.
>
>Peter Skelton

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

[Ski]

"TV" > wrote in message ...
>> The stealth that we have now still ain't enough - and it will take a whole
>> lot of new stuff to deal. But like everything else and as I said before,
>> if you start targeting the SAM operators and their mothers they get a
>> quick change in attitude fast so we could asymmetrically, as they say, add
>> some diddles to the equation. It is perhaps then a "full spectrum" fight
>> (stealing from the Army)
>
> The B-2, F-117, and F-22 already give a tremendous first day stealth
> capability, especially with precision stand-off munitions. Enough to take
> out any 3rd world and their SAMs. Especially given Weasel countermeasures.
> As far as I know, SAMs are still highly allergic to anti-radiation missiles!
> In my fictitious China/Russia scenario, there would be many more elements
> besides airplanes targeting SAMs! UAVs, cruise missiles, special ops, etc.
> Finally, Russian SAMs might be very good (who knows until they're used in
> battle?), but I'm betting most of their for-sale operators aren't.

Not sure what 1st day stealth means any more, but for sure the standoff weapons play a big role but on the other side of the coin if the enemy invests in a proper IADS there should be enough overlap that soner or later numbers come up and bite you again - so knocking down your air force and Navy from 30 to 40 wings to less then half that number implies that you are getting down to the fine line. UAV's are likewise nice but stealth UAV's are big projects (my like of moving JSF to manned and unmanned options) and on and on. Price tag is enormous - we need to spend it - but think about all the choices and schedules that must be made to accurately define where we want to go on this. But as you suggest it must be done and I agree.

> At the bigger picture, anyone using those weapons and seriously hurting the
> US with them is going to prompt a US-Russia talk like the Britain-France
> talk during the Falklands. Russia isn't going to want to trash US relations
> over Kurzikstan or Somalia, so there goes their effectiveness (assuming that
> US Intel doesn't already know about their capabilities and potential
> counters). As Ed commented on my comments, I think the emphasis really
> needs to be on winning the war of the media just as much (if not more so)
> than the actual war. I believe that the US is on another generation of
> operational capability compared to any other army in the world. I'd bet good
> money that the US could sit idle for the next 30 years and still be on par
> with anything coming out of Russia or China with the current arsenal. But
> they don't want to be on par, or just win wars, they want (i.e., the public)
> to win wars faster, cleaner, and easier than ever! It's the media, and
> public perception, that are (and have been since the end of WW2, and
> especially the end of the Cold War) the limiting factors on US military
> success. So the trick becomes how to best prosecute a war that pleases the
> public? Make it as humane, bloodless, and fast as possible. That, IMO, is
> the biggest strategic reason for pushing technology forward. Not enemy
> weapon/defense developments. Even if all other countries ceased developing
> weapons, and went back to using spears and rocks, this reason alone would
> still drive US weapons development just as much as it is being driven now
> IMO.
>
The psychological side of war - our will or their determination - is much of the fight as we are finding out in this war - the enemy reads our population's and government's ability to cope and last....

[Andrew Chaplin]

"Ski" > wrote message
news:ViDoh.1065$Cn3.204@trnddc02...

.... in HTML.

Ski, would you please post in plain text rather than HTML?
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)

[Ed Rasimus[_1_]]

On Tue, 09 Jan 2007 02:43:01 GMT, "Ski"
> wrote:

>
>"TV" > wrote in message ...
>>> The stealth that we have now still ain't enough - and it will take a whole
>>> lot of new stuff to deal. But like everything else and as I said before,
>>> if you start targeting the SAM operators and their mothers they get a
>>> quick change in attitude fast so we could asymmetrically, as they say, add
>>> some diddles to the equation. It is perhaps then a "full spectrum" fight
>>> (stealing from the Army)
>>
>> The B-2, F-117, and F-22 already give a tremendous first day stealth
>> capability, especially with precision stand-off munitions. Enough to take
>> out any 3rd world and their SAMs. Especially given Weasel countermeasures.
>> As far as I know, SAMs are still highly allergic to anti-radiation missiles!
>> In my fictitious China/Russia scenario, there would be many more elements
>> besides airplanes targeting SAMs! UAVs, cruise missiles, special ops, etc.
>> Finally, Russian SAMs might be very good (who knows until they're used in
>> battle?), but I'm betting most of their for-sale operators aren't.
>
>Not sure what 1st day stealth means any more, but for sure the standoff weapons play a big role but on the other side of the coin if the enemy invests in a proper IADS there should be enough overlap that soner or later numbers come up and bite you again - so knocking down your air force and Navy from 30 to 40 wings to less then half that number implies that you are getting down to the fine line. UAV's are likewise nice but stealth UAV's are big projects (my like of moving JSF to manned and unmanned options) and on and on. Price tag is enormous - we need to spend it - but think about all the choices and schedules that must be made to accurately define where we want to go on this. But as you suggest it must be done and I agree.

First day stealth becomes critical especially when dealing with a
"proper IADS". That's when they are most firmly "integrated" and with
the most efficient command/control. If you can penetrate in those
conditions, then it gets easier every time after that. (BTDT)

After day one, you've got pretty updated intel on site locations.
You've got improved order-of-battle data with system types and numbers
validated. You've got better ELINT with freqs, systems,
counter-measures data. You've also degraded comm links, significantly
raised the fear quotient of the operators and hopefully, destroyed a
lot of the rolling stock.

Reduction in force in terms of total operational wings is significant,
but must be evaluated in terms of form of threat (non-traditional
Jihadists take a whole different structure than the Soviet hordes
did.)

Use of UAVs in decoy, ECM, recce, and surveillance roles is a huge
force multiplier, even if you don't get to things like an unmanned
full-scale system that could deliver heavy iron.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com