CNN News Alert Comair Transcript

[Gig 601XL Builder]

There isn't an entire story on it posted yet but according to the CNN
website...

"Seconds before a Comair commuter plane crashed after going down the wrong
runway, the co-pilot noted it was "weird" that the Lexington, Kentucky,
strip had no lights, according to a transcript released today."

[Mxsmanic]

Gig 601XL Builder writes:

> There isn't an entire story on it posted yet but according to the CNN
> website...
>
> "Seconds before a Comair commuter plane crashed after going down the wrong
> runway, the co-pilot noted it was "weird" that the Lexington, Kentucky,
> strip had no lights, according to a transcript released today."

That's like saying that it's weird that there's an aircraft-shaped
shadow with red and green highlights that seems to be right on the
runway.

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[Kev]

Mxsmanic wrote:
> Gig 601XL Builder writes:
> > "Seconds before a Comair commuter plane crashed after going down the wrong
> > runway, the co-pilot noted it was "weird" that the Lexington, Kentucky,
> > strip had no lights, according to a transcript released today."
>
> That's like saying that it's weird that there's an aircraft-shaped
> shadow with red and green highlights that seems to be right on the
> runway.

Nope, not the same at all. Control towers can control runway lights
and brightness. Therefore a pilot could easily think "Weird, they
don't have the lights on", but just say "Weird".

Kev

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Mxsmanic wrote:
> Gig 601XL Builder writes:
>
>> There isn't an entire story on it posted yet but according to the CNN
>> website...
>>
>> "Seconds before a Comair commuter plane crashed after going down the
>> wrong runway, the co-pilot noted it was "weird" that the Lexington,
>> Kentucky, strip had no lights, according to a transcript released
>> today."
>
> That's like saying that it's weird that there's an aircraft-shaped
> shadow with red and green highlights that seems to be right on the
> runway.

Not really, but it does show where CRM possibly should have kicked in and an
accident might have been avoided. That is assuming that he noted that
something was "weird" early enough in the procedure.

What I'll be interested to see in the transcripts is what the pilot's
reaction to the copilot's comment.

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Gig 601XL Builder wrote:

>
> What I'll be interested to see in the transcripts is what the pilot's
> reaction to the copilot's comment.

I hate to respond to my own post but...

http://dwb.newsobserver.com/24hour/nation/story/3475302p-12709318c.html

Excerpts of Comair cockpit recording

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Excerpts from a transcript released Wednesday showing recorded
communications between the pilots of Comair Flight 5191, which crashed Aug.
27, 2006, after taking off from the wrong runway at Blue Grass Airport in
Lexington, Ky.:
First officer James Polehinke was at the controls after Capt. Jeffrey Clay
had taxied the plane to the runway. The jet was supposed to take off from
the 7,000-foot main runway, called runway 22, but instead used 3,500-foot
runway 26, which is meant only for smaller planes. Time of day is in
parentheses.


Polehinke: (5:52:22) I'll take us to Atlanta.

Jeffrey Clay: (5:52:24) Sure.

---

Polehinke: (5:56:34) Right seat flex takeoff procedures off of um ... he
said what runway? One of 'em. Two four.

Clay: (05:56:43) It's two two.

---

Polehinke: (6:06:07) Set thrust, please.

Clay: (6:06:11) Thrust set.

Polehinke: (6:06:13) That is weird with no lights.

Clay: (6:06:18) Yeah. One-hundred knots.

Polehinke: (6:06:25) Checks.

Clay: (6:06:31) V-one rotate. Whoa.

(6:06:33) Sound of impact, unintelligible exclamation.

[Capt.Doug]

>"Gig 601XL Builder" wrote in message
> Not really, but it does show where CRM possibly should have kicked in and
an
> accident might have been avoided. That is assuming that he noted that
> something was "weird" early enough in the procedure.

I agree. Training for CRM and actually implementing it can be very
different. Many captains cooperate to graduate during recurrent CRM
training. Then they go back to being domineering autocrats as soon as they
reach the cockpit.

One of my proteges called me recently for advice. He is a new FO on an
EMB-145 regional jet. He had just flown with a 10 year captain who he had
serious reservations about. The captain didn't call for any checklists,
didn't want any questions, flew unstabilized approaches requiring flap
setting changes at the last instance when new approach speeds couldn't be
looked up, and screamed when his professionalism was questioned by my former
charter pilot. My friend had spoken to his union's professional standards
officer who replied that many FOs have complained about this captain. The
captain repeatedly blew off the pro standards officer when approached . I
asked if this captain had the experience and talent to consistently pull off
such stunts, then realized that a competent pilot wouldn't have to do such
things consistently. He is an accident waitimg to happen and I advised my
friend to take it to the next level in the chain of command. Unlike most
new-hire FOs, my friend isn't intimidated by such idiots.

> What I'll be interested to see in the transcripts is what the pilot's
> reaction to the copilot's comment.

It may tell us volumes.

D.

[Mxsmanic]

Gig 601XL Builder writes:

> Polehinke: (5:56:34) Right seat flex takeoff procedures off of um ... he
> said what runway? One of 'em. Two four.
>
> Clay: (05:56:43) It's two two.

This already sounds bad.

> Polehinke: (6:06:07) Set thrust, please.
>
> Clay: (6:06:11) Thrust set.
>
> Polehinke: (6:06:13) That is weird with no lights.
>
> Clay: (6:06:18) Yeah. One-hundred knots.
>
> Polehinke: (6:06:25) Checks.
>
> Clay: (6:06:31) V-one rotate. Whoa.
>
> (6:06:33) Sound of impact, unintelligible exclamation.

The exclamation was probably the standard "oh ****" that ends the
lives of most pilots in transcripts. In his next incarnation, perhaps
he'll have a morbid fear of dark runways.

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[Mxsmanic]

Capt.Doug writes:

> He is an accident waitimg to happen and I advised my
> friend to take it to the next level in the chain of command. Unlike most
> new-hire FOs, my friend isn't intimidated by such idiots.

Maybe he'll live, then.

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[Bucky]

There's also more details at this article:
http://www.houmatoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070117/APF/701170661

"In the minutes before the crash of a commuter jet that took off from
the wrong runway in Lexington, Ky., the pilots discussed their families
and job opportunities, violating a rule against extraneous cockpit
conversation, the airline said Wednesday."

"As the pilots went through preflight procedures, Capt. Jeffrey Clay
talked about his young children having colds, and co-pilot James
Polehinke discussed his four dogs. The two men also discussed pay and
working conditions, even as the controller occasionally interrupted to
provide instructions.

"How old are they?" Polehinke asked six minutes before the crash.
"Three months and two years old," Clay answered.

"That's a nice range, age range," Polehinke said.

[tom418]

I had a captain many years ago who refused to wear his shoulder harnesses (5
point belt on a B727). I was an F/E back then, and when after I reminded him
during the descent/in range checklist about the harnesses, he would scream
"ON" even though they weren't.
"Capt.Doug" > wrote in message
...
> >"Gig 601XL Builder" wrote in message
> > Not really, but it does show where CRM possibly should have kicked in
and
> an
> > accident might have been avoided. That is assuming that he noted that
> > something was "weird" early enough in the procedure.
>
> I agree. Training for CRM and actually implementing it can be very
> different. Many captains cooperate to graduate during recurrent CRM
> training. Then they go back to being domineering autocrats as soon as
they
> reach the cockpit.
>
> One of my proteges called me recently for advice. He is a new FO on an
> EMB-145 regional jet. He had just flown with a 10 year captain who he had
> serious reservations about. The captain didn't call for any checklists,
> didn't want any questions, flew unstabilized approaches requiring flap
> setting changes at the last instance when new approach speeds couldn't be
> looked up, and screamed when his professionalism was questioned by my
former
> charter pilot. My friend had spoken to his union's professional standards
> officer who replied that many FOs have complained about this captain. The
> captain repeatedly blew off the pro standards officer when approached . I
> asked if this captain had the experience and talent to consistently pull
off
> such stunts, then realized that a competent pilot wouldn't have to do such
> things consistently. He is an accident waitimg to happen and I advised my
> friend to take it to the next level in the chain of command. Unlike most
> new-hire FOs, my friend isn't intimidated by such idiots.
>
> > What I'll be interested to see in the transcripts is what the pilot's
> > reaction to the copilot's comment.
>
> It may tell us volumes.
>
> D.
>
>

[Mxsmanic]

tom418 writes:

> I had a captain many years ago who refused to wear his shoulder harnesses (5
> point belt on a B727). I was an F/E back then, and when after I reminded him
> during the descent/in range checklist about the harnesses, he would scream
> "ON" even though they weren't.

So what did you do about it?

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[tom418]

Nothing. I was still on probation (1 yr) at that time. If he said "on" that
was good enough for me. It's like jumpseat riding. Once the captain
approves you for the jumpseat, and then says "there's plenty of room in the
back", it's a polite way of saying "get outa here"!

"Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
...
> tom418 writes:
>
> > I had a captain many years ago who refused to wear his shoulder
harnesses (5
> > point belt on a B727). I was an F/E back then, and when after I reminded
him
> > during the descent/in range checklist about the harnesses, he would
scream
> > "ON" even though they weren't.
>
> So what did you do about it?
>
> --
> Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

[Ron Lee]

>
>Polehinke: (5:56:34) Right seat flex takeoff procedures off of um ... he
>said what runway? One of 'em. Two four.
>
>Clay: (05:56:43) It's two two.

Note that the FO did not know which runway was appropriate. Only one
was suitable so only one runway (22) should have even been considered
as the one to depart from.

Ron Lee