The Corps - no to the Super Hornet

[Mike[_1_]]

The Corps vs. the Super Hornet

Aircraft's reputation for problems simply not true, Navy officials say
Marine Corps Times
June 25, 2007

NAVAL AIR STATION PATUXENT RIVER, Md. - Inside Naval Air Systems
Command headquarters at this southern Maryland base, Navy program
officials for the F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighter program have
heard the stories circulating in the Pentagon.

Their aircraft, the stories go, can't carry certain weapons, can't fly
high enough, can't go fast enough. Design problems such as wing
flutter plague the plane and - perhaps worst of all - parts that will
wear out fast enough to severely shorten the plane's life-span are not
being replaced.

There's just one problem with the stories, say the Navy officials:
None of them is true.

"We're really scratching our heads, thinking, 'What's going on?'"
Super Hornet program manager Navy Capt. Don Gaddis said.

So who's spreading these stories about the Super Hornet?

The answer, which surprised some program officials: the Marine Corps -
which isn't even part of the Super Hornet program.

The Corps plans to replace its aging Hornets and AV-8B Harrier jump
jets with the F-35B short-takeoff-or-vertical-landing version of the
Joint Strike Fighter.

So why do the Marines even care about the Super Hornet?

"The Marines seem to be trying to discredit the Super Hornet as a way
of heading off efforts to cut their purchase of the STOVL JSF," said
Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute think tank in Washington.

"If JSF is delayed," said naval analyst Norman Polmar, "the Marines
will be forced to buy Super Hornet, which will leave them with nothing
to operate off amphibious ships."

The STOVL JSF for the Marines isn't set to enter service until 2012 at
the earliest. The Corps, unlike the Navy, is strongly committed to the
new strike fighter and is eagerly anticipating an all-STOVL aviation
strike force.

But the JSF program has suffered several delays, and in contrast to
the Marines, neither the Pentagon - the Navy and Air Force also will
fly the plane - nor Congress seem to have a sense of urgency about
keeping the program on schedule and getting the aircraft into service.

The Marines are afraid that if their plane is struck by further
delays, they won't be able to buy new JSFs fast enough to replace
their aging strike aircraft, and they might need something else to
bridge the gap between new planes and old. Into that gap, the Marines
fear, could fly the Super Hornet. And for each new F/A-18 the Marines
get, that's likely one less STOVL JSF.

"We've had this vision for a long time to be an all-STOVL force," said
Marine Brig. Gen. Robert Walsh, deputy assistant commandant for
aviation.

"We're a swing force, where we can go expeditionary, land on a big
runway at a major operating base," Walsh said June 7 in his Pentagon
office. "We can go smaller runway, [conduct] dispersed, distributed
operations. We can go on amphibious shipping, we can go on large
aircraft carrier decks. We can pretty much go everywhere with the
flexibility the JSF STOVL brings."

The aircraft the Marines are most worried about replacing sooner
rather than later are the Harriers and the two-seat F/A-18D Hornets,
Walsh said.

"Our F/A-18A+ and F/A-18C Hornets aren't in that bad shape," he said.
"But we're watching them very closely because we've got hour and
fatigue limits on those aircraft."

The high operations tempo for all aircraft in recent years "has caused
some stress between us and the Navy," Walsh said. "There's pressure
there in how you reduce the strike-fighter shortfall."

F/A-18 Super Hornets already are flying with the Navy - the single-
seat F/A-18E replaced older Hornet aircraft and the two-seat F/A-18F
replaced the fleet's F-14 Tomcats. A new two-seat EA-18G electronics
countermeasure version of the aircraft is due to begin operational
evaluation next year.

Three versions of the F-35 JSF are being developed - F-35A for the Air
Force, F-35B STOVL for the Marines and the British Royal Navy, and the
F-35C carrier version for the Navy. But the $276 billion program - the
largest single program in the defense budget - also is a fat target
for budget cutters, and worries persist that the program will continue
to suffer delays.

Hence, the Marines are worried about being sucked into the Super
Hornet program, to the detriment of their JSFs.

Problems spark 'd?j? vu'
Several unofficial briefings and papers listing alleged defects in
Super Hornets have circulated for at least a year inside the Pentagon.
Some have been leaked to the media, including Military Times.

The Marines officially disavow the materials.

"Unofficial, unendorsed, and old briefs are nothing more than opinions
which may have been used to make decisions on which direction Marine
aviation was headed long ago. They do not represent the one position
that matters: the Marine Corps' official position which is: the F-35B
represents the centerpiece of Marine Corps' aviation, and this is
supported by the program of record," said Maj. Eric Dent, a Marine
spokesman.

Still, the allegations continue to make the rounds. A recent story in
the Boston Globe about one of the alleged problems sent program
officials hurrying to Capitol Hill to reassure Congress there were no
serious issues with the aircraft.

"This is d?j? vu," Gaddis said from NavAir. "Some of those things
they're digging up are literally 12 to 15 years old."

Gaddis and his team actually have a game plan for each time the issues
reappear.

"Every so often, about every two or three years, these questions come
up. We can answer pretty much anything you want answered," he said.

Widespread enthusiasm for the Super Hornet throughout the naval
aviation community belies the alleged problems with the aircraft. The
Boeing-built twin-engine jet, a development of the original McDonnell
Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, deployed in 2002. Originally intended as a stop-
gap measure between the demise of the old A-6 Intruder and failed A-12
replacement and the JSF, the Super Hornet has legions of admirers
despite some shortcomings. With the APG-79 Active Electronically
Scanned Array radar installed in new aircraft, the Navy is even more
enthusiastic.

"By any measure - reliability, availability, flexibility, bombs
dropped, accuracy - we exceeded the F/A-18Cs in expectations across
the board," said Capt. Jeffrey Penfield, head of air-to-air missile
systems for NAVAIR.

Penfield, who commanded Strike Fighter Squadron 115 during the 2003
invasion of Iraq and wrote the operational evaluation for the Super
Hornet, is adamant in his support for the aircraft.

"It went beyond expectation," he declared. "It knocked the ball out of
the park."

Debunking the claims
Gaddis, Penfield and the Super Hornet team at NavAir addressed
numerous alleged issues with the aircraft.

·Claim: There is still "manageable wing flutter" with the aircraft and
the "wing drop" problem persists.

Rebuttal: "We do not have a flutter problem with this airplane and
have never had a flutter problem," declared Gaddis. "The only thing we
can think of is they are getting it confused with the old wing drop
problem. That was solved."

NAVAIR engineers noted that wing drop and wing flutter are different
phenomena. Flutter, explained engineer Mike Masse, "is a self-excited
oscillation" - basically, vibrations that cause aircraft instability.
"There are no stability problems or restrictions on F/A-18 E/F," he
said.

The well-publicized wing drop problem discovered during flight tests
in 1997 was entirely different, Super Hornet chief engineer Ed
Hovanesian said.

"It's a momentary loss [of lift] on one wing," he said, causing a
quick roll-off in a specific portion of the flight envelope.

Although a slight vibration - dubbed "residual lateral activity" -
remains, a series of fixes essentially solved the problem by 1999, he
said.

Now, "as you pull the airplane, you get a little bit of lateral
oscillation that is only there from 7.8 to 8.1 degrees [angle of
attack]," he said. "You can pull a little bit harder and it's gone.
You can pull a little bit less and it's gone."

Many pilots notice no effect at all, he said.

"The most important thing about it," Hovanesian added, "is it did not
cause any task abandonment at all."

·Claim: The wing drop led to the weapons pylons being canted outboard
six degrees, causing increased wear on weapons and severely cutting
their ability to acquire a target before launch.

Rebuttal: Canting the pylons is "totally different," Gaddis said.
"It's not related [to wing drop] in any form."

"That's been a myth for about 12 to 14 years," he said.

"We never flew the aircraft with straight pylons," Hovanesian said.

Rather, they pointed out, the cant was developed to ensure proper
weapons separation as bombs and missiles are launched from the
aircraft. Super Hornets have three weapons stations under each wing,
compared with two on the older Hornets, and a four-degree outboard
cant was developed to increase the distance between weapons.

One by one, the team debunked the other allegations. Missiles are not
showing excessive wear due to the cant, they said. There are no
unusual weight, speed or altitude limitations with a combat-loaded
aircraft. "The [F/A-18C] with a full load has the same limitations" in
altitude and speed, Penfield said, while the Super Hornet has no
problems carrying its top-rated full load of 66,000 pounds.

"The airplane launches at 66,000 all the time," he said.

A claim that weight restriction problems extend to the new EA-18G
Growler also was brushed aside. Test aircraft have flown with five
ALQ-99 electronic warfare pods weighing about 1,000 pounds each,
Gaddis said.

There are no restrictions for carrying certain weapons, the team said,
other than weapons that have not yet gone through a certification
process.

Another claim says the aircraft cannot go supersonic while carrying a
full weapons load.

True enough, Penfield said - the aircraft "wasn't designed for that."

Critics also claim delivery of weapons pylons is two years behind
schedule and not enough pylons are available, limiting training for
the Super Hornets.

"The idea about being two years late on pylon delivery is just not
true," Gaddis said.

Early aircraft were delivered with no pylons due to a previous $440
million budget cut, he said, but the issue was resolved a few years
ago with more funding.

"We were in catch-up mode," he said, until supply caught up with
demand "about two years ago."

Gaddis and Hovanesian scoffed at claims that not enough pylons are
available for training.

"Why carry six bombs when you can just carry one for training?"
Hovanesian said. "It's just cost."

The Boston Globe article reported that failure of some parts could
cause the aircraft's planned 6,000-flight-hour life to be limited to
3,000 hours. "That was probably one of the most egregious statements"
in the article, he said.

The problem referred to in the article would have shortened the
planes' lives, but it has been solved, Gaddis said.

"We found it early on" and a redesigned part already is being
installed on new aircraft, he said, with a retrofit planned for
earlier aircraft long before they reach any flight-hour limitations.

Back in Washington, no one knows whether the Marines will be forced to
buy Super Hornets.

Rear Adm. Bruce Clingan, director of the Navy's Air Warfare Division
in the Pentagon, said June 4 there are no plans to integrate the
aircraft into Marine Corps aviation.

Walsh noted that even if the Marines' F/A-18Cs and A+ models wear out
before they can be replaced with F-35Bs, Navy F/A-18Cs replaced by
Super Hornets could be used by the Marines until more STOVLs are
available.

"We can't have a big huge beast," Walsh said about the need for STOVL
JSF. "We need a small footprint."

[[email protected]]

At least the Corps policy is clear;-) They rather suck all redundant
Navy F/A-18A+/C than let themselves to be sucked into F/A-18E/F&EA-18G
programme. However, at some point that could mean the whole All-
Weather Fighter Attack (F/A-18D) community going single-seaters, and
vanishing of their recce/FAC(A) function.

Best regards,
Jacek



On 22 Cze, 20:38, Mike > wrote:
>
> Walsh noted that even if the Marines' F/A-18Cs and A+ models wear out
> before they can be replaced with F-35Bs, Navy F/A-18Cs replaced by
> Super Hornets could be used by the Marines until more STOVLs are
> available.
>
> "We can't have a big huge beast," Walsh said about the need for STOVL
> JSF. "We need a small footprint."

[Flashnews]

this is why converting the JFK or the Kitty Hawk to an aviation assault
ship would benefit both Navy and Marines



"Mike" > wrote in message
oups.com...
The Corps vs. the Super Hornet

Aircraft's reputation for problems simply not true, Navy officials say
Marine Corps Times
June 25, 2007

NAVAL AIR STATION PATUXENT RIVER, Md. - Inside Naval Air Systems
Command headquarters at this southern Maryland base, Navy program
officials for the F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighter program have
heard the stories circulating in the Pentagon.

Their aircraft, the stories go, can't carry certain weapons, can't fly
high enough, can't go fast enough. Design problems such as wing
flutter plague the plane and - perhaps worst of all - parts that will
wear out fast enough to severely shorten the plane's life-span are not
being replaced.

There's just one problem with the stories, say the Navy officials:
None of them is true.

"We're really scratching our heads, thinking, 'What's going on?'"
Super Hornet program manager Navy Capt. Don Gaddis said.

So who's spreading these stories about the Super Hornet?

The answer, which surprised some program officials: the Marine Corps -
which isn't even part of the Super Hornet program.

The Corps plans to replace its aging Hornets and AV-8B Harrier jump
jets with the F-35B short-takeoff-or-vertical-landing version of the
Joint Strike Fighter.

So why do the Marines even care about the Super Hornet?

"The Marines seem to be trying to discredit the Super Hornet as a way
of heading off efforts to cut their purchase of the STOVL JSF," said
Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute think tank in Washington.

"If JSF is delayed," said naval analyst Norman Polmar, "the Marines
will be forced to buy Super Hornet, which will leave them with nothing
to operate off amphibious ships."

The STOVL JSF for the Marines isn't set to enter service until 2012 at
the earliest. The Corps, unlike the Navy, is strongly committed to the
new strike fighter and is eagerly anticipating an all-STOVL aviation
strike force.

But the JSF program has suffered several delays, and in contrast to
the Marines, neither the Pentagon - the Navy and Air Force also will
fly the plane - nor Congress seem to have a sense of urgency about
keeping the program on schedule and getting the aircraft into service.

The Marines are afraid that if their plane is struck by further
delays, they won't be able to buy new JSFs fast enough to replace
their aging strike aircraft, and they might need something else to
bridge the gap between new planes and old. Into that gap, the Marines
fear, could fly the Super Hornet. And for each new F/A-18 the Marines
get, that's likely one less STOVL JSF.

"We've had this vision for a long time to be an all-STOVL force," said
Marine Brig. Gen. Robert Walsh, deputy assistant commandant for
aviation.

"We're a swing force, where we can go expeditionary, land on a big
runway at a major operating base," Walsh said June 7 in his Pentagon
office. "We can go smaller runway, [conduct] dispersed, distributed
operations. We can go on amphibious shipping, we can go on large
aircraft carrier decks. We can pretty much go everywhere with the
flexibility the JSF STOVL brings."

The aircraft the Marines are most worried about replacing sooner
rather than later are the Harriers and the two-seat F/A-18D Hornets,
Walsh said.

"Our F/A-18A+ and F/A-18C Hornets aren't in that bad shape," he said.
"But we're watching them very closely because we've got hour and
fatigue limits on those aircraft."

The high operations tempo for all aircraft in recent years "has caused
some stress between us and the Navy," Walsh said. "There's pressure
there in how you reduce the strike-fighter shortfall."

F/A-18 Super Hornets already are flying with the Navy - the single-
seat F/A-18E replaced older Hornet aircraft and the two-seat F/A-18F
replaced the fleet's F-14 Tomcats. A new two-seat EA-18G electronics
countermeasure version of the aircraft is due to begin operational
evaluation next year.

Three versions of the F-35 JSF are being developed - F-35A for the Air
Force, F-35B STOVL for the Marines and the British Royal Navy, and the
F-35C carrier version for the Navy. But the $276 billion program - the
largest single program in the defense budget - also is a fat target
for budget cutters, and worries persist that the program will continue
to suffer delays.

Hence, the Marines are worried about being sucked into the Super
Hornet program, to the detriment of their JSFs.

Problems spark 'd?j? vu'
Several unofficial briefings and papers listing alleged defects in
Super Hornets have circulated for at least a year inside the Pentagon.
Some have been leaked to the media, including Military Times.

The Marines officially disavow the materials.

"Unofficial, unendorsed, and old briefs are nothing more than opinions
which may have been used to make decisions on which direction Marine
aviation was headed long ago. They do not represent the one position
that matters: the Marine Corps' official position which is: the F-35B
represents the centerpiece of Marine Corps' aviation, and this is
supported by the program of record," said Maj. Eric Dent, a Marine
spokesman.

Still, the allegations continue to make the rounds. A recent story in
the Boston Globe about one of the alleged problems sent program
officials hurrying to Capitol Hill to reassure Congress there were no
serious issues with the aircraft.

"This is d?j? vu," Gaddis said from NavAir. "Some of those things
they're digging up are literally 12 to 15 years old."

Gaddis and his team actually have a game plan for each time the issues
reappear.

"Every so often, about every two or three years, these questions come
up. We can answer pretty much anything you want answered," he said.

Widespread enthusiasm for the Super Hornet throughout the naval
aviation community belies the alleged problems with the aircraft. The
Boeing-built twin-engine jet, a development of the original McDonnell
Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, deployed in 2002. Originally intended as a stop-
gap measure between the demise of the old A-6 Intruder and failed A-12
replacement and the JSF, the Super Hornet has legions of admirers
despite some shortcomings. With the APG-79 Active Electronically
Scanned Array radar installed in new aircraft, the Navy is even more
enthusiastic.

"By any measure - reliability, availability, flexibility, bombs
dropped, accuracy - we exceeded the F/A-18Cs in expectations across
the board," said Capt. Jeffrey Penfield, head of air-to-air missile
systems for NAVAIR.

Penfield, who commanded Strike Fighter Squadron 115 during the 2003
invasion of Iraq and wrote the operational evaluation for the Super
Hornet, is adamant in his support for the aircraft.

"It went beyond expectation," he declared. "It knocked the ball out of
the park."

Debunking the claims
Gaddis, Penfield and the Super Hornet team at NavAir addressed
numerous alleged issues with the aircraft.

·Claim: There is still "manageable wing flutter" with the aircraft and
the "wing drop" problem persists.

Rebuttal: "We do not have a flutter problem with this airplane and
have never had a flutter problem," declared Gaddis. "The only thing we
can think of is they are getting it confused with the old wing drop
problem. That was solved."

NAVAIR engineers noted that wing drop and wing flutter are different
phenomena. Flutter, explained engineer Mike Masse, "is a self-excited
oscillation" - basically, vibrations that cause aircraft instability.
"There are no stability problems or restrictions on F/A-18 E/F," he
said.

The well-publicized wing drop problem discovered during flight tests
in 1997 was entirely different, Super Hornet chief engineer Ed
Hovanesian said.

"It's a momentary loss [of lift] on one wing," he said, causing a
quick roll-off in a specific portion of the flight envelope.

Although a slight vibration - dubbed "residual lateral activity" -
remains, a series of fixes essentially solved the problem by 1999, he
said.

Now, "as you pull the airplane, you get a little bit of lateral
oscillation that is only there from 7.8 to 8.1 degrees [angle of
attack]," he said. "You can pull a little bit harder and it's gone.
You can pull a little bit less and it's gone."

Many pilots notice no effect at all, he said.

"The most important thing about it," Hovanesian added, "is it did not
cause any task abandonment at all."

·Claim: The wing drop led to the weapons pylons being canted outboard
six degrees, causing increased wear on weapons and severely cutting
their ability to acquire a target before launch.

Rebuttal: Canting the pylons is "totally different," Gaddis said.
"It's not related [to wing drop] in any form."

"That's been a myth for about 12 to 14 years," he said.

"We never flew the aircraft with straight pylons," Hovanesian said.

Rather, they pointed out, the cant was developed to ensure proper
weapons separation as bombs and missiles are launched from the
aircraft. Super Hornets have three weapons stations under each wing,
compared with two on the older Hornets, and a four-degree outboard
cant was developed to increase the distance between weapons.

One by one, the team debunked the other allegations. Missiles are not
showing excessive wear due to the cant, they said. There are no
unusual weight, speed or altitude limitations with a combat-loaded
aircraft. "The [F/A-18C] with a full load has the same limitations" in
altitude and speed, Penfield said, while the Super Hornet has no
problems carrying its top-rated full load of 66,000 pounds.

"The airplane launches at 66,000 all the time," he said.

A claim that weight restriction problems extend to the new EA-18G
Growler also was brushed aside. Test aircraft have flown with five
ALQ-99 electronic warfare pods weighing about 1,000 pounds each,
Gaddis said.

There are no restrictions for carrying certain weapons, the team said,
other than weapons that have not yet gone through a certification
process.

Another claim says the aircraft cannot go supersonic while carrying a
full weapons load.

True enough, Penfield said - the aircraft "wasn't designed for that."

Critics also claim delivery of weapons pylons is two years behind
schedule and not enough pylons are available, limiting training for
the Super Hornets.

"The idea about being two years late on pylon delivery is just not
true," Gaddis said.

Early aircraft were delivered with no pylons due to a previous $440
million budget cut, he said, but the issue was resolved a few years
ago with more funding.

"We were in catch-up mode," he said, until supply caught up with
demand "about two years ago."

Gaddis and Hovanesian scoffed at claims that not enough pylons are
available for training.

"Why carry six bombs when you can just carry one for training?"
Hovanesian said. "It's just cost."

The Boston Globe article reported that failure of some parts could
cause the aircraft's planned 6,000-flight-hour life to be limited to
3,000 hours. "That was probably one of the most egregious statements"
in the article, he said.

The problem referred to in the article would have shortened the
planes' lives, but it has been solved, Gaddis said.

"We found it early on" and a redesigned part already is being
installed on new aircraft, he said, with a retrofit planned for
earlier aircraft long before they reach any flight-hour limitations.

Back in Washington, no one knows whether the Marines will be forced to
buy Super Hornets.

Rear Adm. Bruce Clingan, director of the Navy's Air Warfare Division
in the Pentagon, said June 4 there are no plans to integrate the
aircraft into Marine Corps aviation.

Walsh noted that even if the Marines' F/A-18Cs and A+ models wear out
before they can be replaced with F-35Bs, Navy F/A-18Cs replaced by
Super Hornets could be used by the Marines until more STOVLs are
available.

"We can't have a big huge beast," Walsh said about the need for STOVL
JSF. "We need a small footprint."

[Flashnews]

Note that the Marine Corps is retiring one fighter squadron per year
now - the last one was an F-18 unit, one per year until extinction




> wrote in message
ups.com...
> At least the Corps policy is clear;-) They rather suck all redundant
> Navy F/A-18A+/C than let themselves to be sucked into F/A-18E/F&EA-18G
> programme. However, at some point that could mean the whole All-
> Weather Fighter Attack (F/A-18D) community going single-seaters, and
> vanishing of their recce/FAC(A) function.
>
> Best regards,
> Jacek
>
>
>
> On 22 Cze, 20:38, Mike > wrote:
>>
>> Walsh noted that even if the Marines' F/A-18Cs and A+ models wear out
>> before they can be replaced with F-35Bs, Navy F/A-18Cs replaced by
>> Super Hornets could be used by the Marines until more STOVLs are
>> available.
>>
>> "We can't have a big huge beast," Walsh said about the need for STOVL
>> JSF. "We need a small footprint."
>
>

[[email protected]]

On Jun 22, 5:35 pm, wrote:
> At least the Corps policy is clear;-) They rather suck all redundant
> Navy F/A-18A+/C than let themselves to be sucked into F/A-18E/F&EA-18G
> programme. However, at some point that could mean the whole All-
> Weather Fighter Attack (F/A-18D) community going single-seaters, and
> vanishing of their recce/FAC(A) function.

Yeah, but when push comes to shove, the Marines take what they're
given.

>
> Best regards,
> Jacek
>
> On 22 Cze, 20:38, Mike > wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Walsh noted that even if the Marines' F/A-18Cs and A+ models wear out
> > before they can be replaced with F-35Bs, Navy F/A-18Cs replaced by
> > Super Hornets could be used by the Marines until more STOVLs are
> > available.
>
> > "We can't have a big huge beast," Walsh said about the need for STOVL
> > JSF. "We need a small footprint."- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

[Arved Sandstrom]

Problem being, any form of F-18 is going to be an unreliable strike
aircraft. That's why the Marines are worried. Most of the time those planes
will not be supporting ground Marines. That's a given fact. They won't be
flying off gators, which means they won't be supporting Marines on the
beach. I have only ever called CAS with F-18's twice, and that was pro
forma...in fact in real war Marines would never see F-18's. Not for quick
reliable response they wouldn't.

AHS

[Bill Shatzer]

wrote:

> At least the Corps policy is clear;-) They rather suck all redundant
> Navy F/A-18A+/C than let themselves to be sucked into F/A-18E/F&EA-18G
> programme. However, at some point that could mean the whole All-
> Weather Fighter Attack (F/A-18D) community going single-seaters, and
> vanishing of their recce/FAC(A) function.

Isn't it assumed that the future of the recce/FAC function is in UAVs?

Cheers,

[Flashnews]

look the whole thing is who "owns the ship" and the dilema that if you
have a AV-8B or F-35B on an assault ship you do not have enough
helicopters or V-22's. Just givin up F-35B's will then provide more
helocopters and V-22's but you will loose your fighters, enabling the
JFK (full deck - conventional) to replace the LHA(R) gives you first a
bigger deck for the fixed wing on a boat that could add many other
things that the Marine Expeditionary Brigade's have lost - such as a
hospital - and much more room for other much needed assets. The assault
ships are returned to maximize their helicopter and MV-22 load outs, and
the JFK could switch to the F/A-18E/F/G with more bang for you buck then
the F-35B and it would help the Navy. Now this carrier is a "Marine
ship" and paid for out of the excessive funds now required for the
LHA(R) - in fact the whole air wing of F-18's and the refurbishment of
the JFK all are paid for but scrapping the LHA(R) and the F-35B. Put
the F-35 on a decade of development to get it to where it would serve as
the attack craft of choice for a war with China or Iran and let the
F/A-18's fill in the void with a full deck assault carrier.

That is how it all fits in - the JFK would not be refurbish to try to
keep up with a new nuclear boat - it would be an assault aviation ship
plus more



"Arved Sandstrom" > wrote in message
news:_C0fi.7332$xk5.5525@edtnps82...
> Problem being, any form of F-18 is going to be an unreliable strike
> aircraft. That's why the Marines are worried. Most of the time those
> planes will not be supporting ground Marines. That's a given fact.
> They won't be flying off gators, which means they won't be supporting
> Marines on the beach. I have only ever called CAS with F-18's twice,
> and that was pro forma...in fact in real war Marines would never see
> F-18's. Not for quick reliable response they wouldn't.
>
> AHS
>

[[email protected]]

The "big deck" assault ship idea is all right, but it seems you forget
about one of the most important things: DEPLOYMENT CYCLES...

Having only one such a ship would not make much sense, because that
would be usauble through only 6-to-9-month period within every 27
months (plus extensive overhauls required for such a weary vessel).

Sure, that would be a great tool for showing off (I can see the
headlines: "The situation in Bla-Bla Gulf is so tense, that the
President decided to send there a special assault ship, USS Kitty
Hawk, with over 50 Marine strike aircraft on board..." But it could
mean much more deterrence if the carrier was stationed at Guam, or
Japan...

P.S. To correct the squadron info: this fiscal year Marine Corps is
deactivating not one, but two deployable F/A-18 units, namely
VMFA(AW)-332 and VMFA-212.

[Flashnews]

Right now the Navy has two remaining conventional carriers with others
in storage
JFK and Kitty Hawk

Now the refurbishment is not for open ocean drag-races, but for littoral
hang-arounds so the black oil burning makes sense
also, these ships could or should be home ported in theater - say the UK
and Japan and would also "command" each of the Marine Expeditionary
Battle Groups that they serve as a "Command Aviation Assault Ship" - the
funny thing is - and I worked the number in the last Congress, the
savings from the JSF (canx the "B" and extend the development 10 years
at $4 bill a year), killing the LHA(R) and adding back one LHA a year,
and fully refurbishing the JFK to include two less screws, two less
boilers, two less catapults and a crew reduction of 2500 with a one
Marine Battalion add back with another SOF --- you actually double (time
2) the total aviation resources in the MEBG - twice the fighters
(F/A-18E/F/G), twice the MV-22's and twice the remaining helicopter mix
which is really what the Marines want and need - more assault, while
owning their own deck means that they are not providing squadrons to
just beef-up naval airwings -
\
In fact with this arrangement the USN comes out with one excess air
wing - so the fighter (VF) squadron on the JFK could be a NAVY squadron
with all the Marines being VMFA types - it is a win-win-win and the Navy
gets high production F-18's at lower costs and the allies get F-18's in
the same big bag of about two years of 25 per month

So you save in home porting the big deck assault ships with the battle
group, and rotating the people



> wrote in message
ups.com...
> The "big deck" assault ship idea is all right, but it seems you forget
> about one of the most important things: DEPLOYMENT CYCLES...
>
> Having only one such a ship would not make much sense, because that
> would be usauble through only 6-to-9-month period within every 27
> months (plus extensive overhauls required for such a weary vessel).
>
> Sure, that would be a great tool for showing off (I can see the
> headlines: "The situation in Bla-Bla Gulf is so tense, that the
> President decided to send there a special assault ship, USS Kitty
> Hawk, with over 50 Marine strike aircraft on board..." But it could
> mean much more deterrence if the carrier was stationed at Guam, or
> Japan...
>
> P.S. To correct the squadron info: this fiscal year Marine Corps is
> deactivating not one, but two deployable F/A-18 units, namely
> VMFA(AW)-332 and VMFA-212.
>

[[email protected]]

Two more ideas for the "no F/A-18s supporting Marine riflemen on the
beach" discussion:

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine
A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a
bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops
days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Second: No massive assault on the beach was seen recently (there is no
beach in Afghanistan at all;-))), but I cannot resist the impression
that new gizmos like ROVER, low-collateral-damage and small-diameter
bombs, land-based detachments of carrier-based units (so-called
"Cactus Air Force", once involving VFA-15 and VFA-87's F/A-18s) are
just for improving CAS capablities...

No matter if that were carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18s flying over
Iraq, or Navy's VFA-94 and VFA-97 rotating at Iwakuni, now CAS looks
to be too important to be forgotten. Through the definition now
switched from "assault on the beach CAS" to "urban CAS".

Just some of my observations, no first-hand experience with CAS, or no-
CAS...

Best regards,
Jacek

[Flashnews]

you are right and that is why there is a need for a COIN Air Component
right now a full spread of platforms just for insurgency and that would
come with the assault ships





> wrote in message
oups.com...
> Two more ideas for the "no F/A-18s supporting Marine riflemen on the
> beach" discussion:
>
> First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine
> A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a
> bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
> experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops
> days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!
>
> Second: No massive assault on the beach was seen recently (there is no
> beach in Afghanistan at all;-))), but I cannot resist the impression
> that new gizmos like ROVER, low-collateral-damage and small-diameter
> bombs, land-based detachments of carrier-based units (so-called
> "Cactus Air Force", once involving VFA-15 and VFA-87's F/A-18s) are
> just for improving CAS capablities...
>
> No matter if that were carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18s flying over
> Iraq, or Navy's VFA-94 and VFA-97 rotating at Iwakuni, now CAS looks
> to be too important to be forgotten. Through the definition now
> switched from "assault on the beach CAS" to "urban CAS".
>
> Just some of my observations, no first-hand experience with CAS, or
> no-
> CAS...
>
> Best regards,
> Jacek
>

[Arved Sandstrom]

> wrote in message
ups.com...
> The "big deck" assault ship idea is all right, but it seems you forget
> about one of the most important things: DEPLOYMENT CYCLES...
>
> Having only one such a ship would not make much sense, because that
> would be usauble through only 6-to-9-month period within every 27
> months (plus extensive overhauls required for such a weary vessel).
>
> Sure, that would be a great tool for showing off (I can see the
> headlines: "The situation in Bla-Bla Gulf is so tense, that the
> President decided to send there a special assault ship, USS Kitty
> Hawk, with over 50 Marine strike aircraft on board..." But it could
> mean much more deterrence if the carrier was stationed at Guam, or
> Japan...
>
> P.S. To correct the squadron info: this fiscal year Marine Corps is
> deactivating not one, but two deployable F/A-18 units, namely
> VMFA(AW)-332 and VMFA-212.

For decades we have had a mismatch in who owns what. To be honest, and this
is just my humble opinion, the Marine Corps should own the ships that they
need to use their primary aircraft. In fact, they should own every gator,
and it wouldn't hurt if the NGF situation got a little more resolved either
by having truly dedicated USMC gunships.

As it is, right now the USN "loans" out assets to support their amphibious
force. It's always been a struggle to get the Navy to provide that support -
gators aren't as sexy as the other ships are. The hell of it is, a deployed
Marine unit is probably one of the best and most flexible assets that NCA
has.

As far as ships go, that can support F/A-18's, my point remains. If flown by
Marines, they will *try* to support Marines. But as long as their floating
airfield is Navy, the planes will frequently be tasked for things that do
not support Marines. I myself totally support short-deck planes, because
they tend to be available for moving mud. So as much as I think the Hornet
is a nice plane, it's not what the Corps needs all that badly.

AHS

[Arved Sandstrom]

> wrote in message
oups.com...
> Two more ideas for the "no F/A-18s supporting Marine riflemen on the
> beach" discussion:
>
> First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine
> A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a
> bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
> experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops
> days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!
>
> Second: No massive assault on the beach was seen recently (there is no
> beach in Afghanistan at all;-))), but I cannot resist the impression
> that new gizmos like ROVER, low-collateral-damage and small-diameter
> bombs, land-based detachments of carrier-based units (so-called
> "Cactus Air Force", once involving VFA-15 and VFA-87's F/A-18s) are
> just for improving CAS capablities...
>
> No matter if that were carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18s flying over
> Iraq, or Navy's VFA-94 and VFA-97 rotating at Iwakuni, now CAS looks
> to be too important to be forgotten. Through the definition now
> switched from "assault on the beach CAS" to "urban CAS".
>
> Just some of my observations, no first-hand experience with CAS, or no-
> CAS...
>
> Best regards,
> Jacek

The Navy has noticed - so has the Marine Corps - that if you want very short
response times for CAS, going into places like Iraq and Afghanistan, you
aren't going to ship-base anyway. When we handled AV-8's in Camp Lejeune,
they routinely touched down on a main road aboard base, after they got there
from Cherry Point...little bit of training doing that, then back up in the
air to attack G-10 impact.

During GW1 Harriers and Cobras did most of the CAS and CIFS for Marines.
Close to 70 Harriers actually operated from airbases on land, and they were
closer to Iraq than any carrier air. Only 20 Harriers were at sea. The
average turnaround for the land-based planes was about 25 minutes.

Considering that I was in one of the first planned assault waves for more
than one Kuwait landing, I got a warm fuzzy from seeing a mean AH-1 perched
on the deck. We usually had a few on USS RALEIGH.

The problem with an area like the Gulf and the North Arabian Sea is shallow
water and Iran. You just are not going to want to get that close. As fast as
planes fly, CAS is no good if it takes an hour to get there. You need it in
10 minutes.

AHS

[Henry J Cobb]

Arved Sandstrom wrote:
> For decades we have had a mismatch in who owns what. To be honest, and this
> is just my humble opinion, the Marine Corps should own the ships that they
> need to use their primary aircraft. In fact, they should own every gator,
> and it wouldn't hurt if the NGF situation got a little more resolved either
> by having truly dedicated USMC gunships.

No.

There is no place in the USMC for a program to train marines to operate
and maintain large ships.

The Marines need to stay focused on the riflemen and those that directly
support the riflemen.

-HJC

[Flashnews]

We are all talking around the wheel and not realizing that the world is
now "JOINT" - so there can be labor management but the mechanisms today
allow the Army to own a lot of ships and a lot of flying vehicles.

But you are right in the pinning down of "ownership" - and I think what
we are suggesting is that an aviation assault ship, even a full deck
carrier refurbished to be one, will still have a Naval Officer as
Captain but the mission commander will be an officer reporting to the
Amphibious Expeditionary Force Commander and this guy could be an Air
Force three star but probably would not - it would be a Marine. What
would happen is that the physical ship itself would take a drastic
make-over as it switched from a naval aviation ship to a command assault
aviation ship. The mixture of aircraft. MV-22's, and helicopters would
all form a Marine Corps Air Group not a Naval Air Wing but they may
still call it a CAG - stuff like that


"Henry J Cobb" > wrote in message
...
> Arved Sandstrom wrote:
>> For decades we have had a mismatch in who owns what. To be honest,
>> and this is just my humble opinion, the Marine Corps should own the
>> ships that they need to use their primary aircraft. In fact, they
>> should own every gator, and it wouldn't hurt if the NGF situation got
>> a little more resolved either by having truly dedicated USMC
>> gunships.
>
> No.
>
> There is no place in the USMC for a program to train marines to
> operate and maintain large ships.
>
> The Marines need to stay focused on the riflemen and those that
> directly support the riflemen.
>
> -HJC

[Mike Kanze]

Jacek,

>First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Some words about Coonts' comment in The Intruders...

Remember that The Intruders is a work of fiction. Having said that, Coonts' account - like nearly everything in his "Intruder" books - has a factual basis, and this account is one about which I have some personal knowledge.

Coonts appears to be referring to the deployment by the VMA(AW)-224 "Bengals" during 1971-1972 with CVW-15/USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43). Those interested in the details can find enough on pp. 105-107 of Morgan & Morgan's Intruder: The Operational History of Grumman's A-6 to underscore Coonts' general theme.

There were factors unique to 224's situation, some of which Morgan & Morgan do not mention or only hint at. Until 224's deployment, no USMC A-6 squadron had ever deployed afloat so the "corporate knowledge" within Marine Corps aviation of A-6 boat ops was nonexistent. For that reason, Phil Bloomer, "Buck" Belcher, Phil Schuyler, and Daryl Kerr - all experienced USN A-6 folks - were seconded to 224 for this deployment. Also, there was essentially no recent afloat flying experience in any aircraft among any of the Bengal crews, most of whom had not seen a rounddown since the training command.

So, it may not be flattering to view USMC afloat capabilities as Coonts did, but it was a view based on a sad fact of those times. In today's environment, especially with the emphasis on "jointness," I would expect the likelihood of repeating the Bengals' "goon show" to be very low.

Two codas to the above:

* 224 shaped up very nicely after CAG Sheets sent the errant 224 skipper to the beach. The Bengals ended the cruise with a fine reputation within the air wing.

* Phil Bloomer went from 224 to a department head billet in the VA-95 "Green Lizards," which replaced 224 in the CVW-15 lineup for its 1973 deployment. As 95 was then a newly-reestablished squadron, and like 224 with very little A-6 "corporate knowledge" of its own, Phil found himself reprising his role in a back-to-back deployment, albeit now among folks like himself who did not sport funny haircuts due to institutional imperative. (Yours Truly was one of the many Lizard nuggets that Phil whipped into shape.)

Owl sends

--
Mike Kanze

"It's easy to delegate once you've learned to let a toddler spend 23 minutes buttering toast without an overwhelming urge to intervene."

- Jared Sandberg, Wall Street Journal, 5/29/2007

> wrote in message oups.com...
Two more ideas for the "no F/A-18s supporting Marine riflemen on the
beach" discussion:

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine
A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a
bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops
days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Second: No massive assault on the beach was seen recently (there is no
beach in Afghanistan at all;-))), but I cannot resist the impression
that new gizmos like ROVER, low-collateral-damage and small-diameter
bombs, land-based detachments of carrier-based units (so-called
"Cactus Air Force", once involving VFA-15 and VFA-87's F/A-18s) are
just for improving CAS capablities...

No matter if that were carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18s flying over
Iraq, or Navy's VFA-94 and VFA-97 rotating at Iwakuni, now CAS looks
to be too important to be forgotten. Through the definition now
switched from "assault on the beach CAS" to "urban CAS".

Just some of my observations, no first-hand experience with CAS, or no-
CAS...

Best regards,
Jacek

[[email protected]]

Thank you for putting some light on the facts behind the story
depicted in Coonts' book. As far as I remember squadrons like
VMA(AW)-224 or VMA(AW)-533, who happened to deploy aboard USN aircraft
carriers, also did not have their own KA-6Ds, so they had to borrow
some (from VA-42 or VA-128 at least in one of these cases, IIRC?)...

Best regards,
Jacek Zemlo


On 24 Cze, 00:34, "Mike Kanze" > wrote:
> Jacek,
>
> Some words about Coonts' comment in The Intruders...
>
> Remember that The Intruders is a work of fiction. Having said that, Coonts' account - like nearly everything in his "Intruder" books - has a factual basis, and this account is one about which I have some personal knowledge.
>
> Coonts appears to be referring to the deployment by the VMA(AW)-224 "Bengals" during 1971-1972 with CVW-15/USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43). Those interested in the details can find enough on pp. 105-107 of Morgan & Morgan's Intruder: The Operational History of Grumman's A-6 to underscore Coonts' general theme.
>
> There were factors unique to 224's situation, some of which Morgan & Morgan do not mention or only hint at. Until 224's deployment, no USMC A-6 squadron had ever deployed afloat so the "corporate knowledge" within Marine Corps aviation of A-6 boat ops was nonexistent. For that reason, Phil Bloomer, "Buck" Belcher, Phil Schuyler, and Daryl Kerr - all experienced USN A-6 folks - were seconded to 224 for this deployment. Also, there was essentially no recent afloat flying experience in any aircraft among any of the Bengal crews, most of whom had not seen a rounddown since the training command.
>
> So, it may not be flattering to view USMC afloat capabilities as Coonts did, but it was a view based on a sad fact of those times. In today's environment, especially with the emphasis on "jointness," I would expect the likelihood of repeating the Bengals' "goon show" to be very low.
>
> Two codas to the above:
>
> * 224 shaped up very nicely after CAG Sheets sent the errant 224 skipper to the beach. The Bengals ended the cruise with a fine reputation within the air wing.
>
> * Phil Bloomer went from 224 to a department head billet in the VA-95 "Green Lizards," which replaced 224 in the CVW-15 lineup for its 1973 deployment. As 95 was then a newly-reestablished squadron, and like 224 with very little A-6 "corporate knowledge" of its own, Phil found himself reprising his role in a back-to-back deployment, albeit now among folks like himself who did not sport funny haircuts due to institutional imperative. (Yours Truly was one of the many Lizard nuggets that Phil whipped into shape.)
>
> Owl sends
>
> --
> Mike Kanze

[[email protected]]

If so, I would not be much astonished to see the Corps saying goodbye
to their F/A-18s earlier than doing the same with Harriers they're in
a better control of...

Sad to hear that... Now planes from the carrier flying five-plus-hours
XCAS missions, with not fewer than three refuelings and some (I
believe not much) loiter time "in the box", and it is all for
nothing?...

On the other hand, an aircraft carrier is a nice tool to deliver some
Marine TACAIR to a base ashore (if available) when something happens
in the region given, especially when Marine units are better suited/
trained to fulfill the task. I have heard such a practice (of having
several birds rotating at not-fully-equipped land airfield and fully
maintained on the Boat) was positively tested recent years.

Best regards,
Jacek


On 23 Cze, 17:08, "Arved Sandstrom" > wrote:
> The Navy has noticed - so has the Marine Corps - that if you want very short
> response times for CAS, going into places like Iraq and Afghanistan, you
> aren't going to ship-base anyway. When we handled AV-8's in Camp Lejeune,
> they routinely touched down on a main road aboard base, after they got there
> from Cherry Point...little bit of training doing that, then back up in the
> air to attack G-10 impact.
>
> During GW1 Harriers and Cobras did most of the CAS and CIFS for Marines.
> Close to 70 Harriers actually operated from airbases on land, and they were
> closer to Iraq than any carrier air. Only 20 Harriers were at sea. The
> average turnaround for the land-based planes was about 25 minutes.
>
> Considering that I was in one of the first planned assault waves for more
> than one Kuwait landing, I got a warm fuzzy from seeing a mean AH-1 perched
> on the deck. We usually had a few on USS RALEIGH.
>
> The problem with an area like the Gulf and the North Arabian Sea is shallow
> water and Iran. You just are not going to want to get that close. As fast as
> planes fly, CAS is no good if it takes an hour to get there. You need it in
> 10 minutes.
>
> AHS

[Mike Kanze]

Jacek,

Late in the Vietnam conflict, all carrier-based A-6 squadrons - including 224 during its CVW-15 deployment - had A-6Bs and KA-6Ds. In 224's case they likely received them from whichever USN A-6 squadron had just returned from deployment at the time they started their workups, likely one of the NAS Oceana-based squadrons since they were working up at MCAS Cherry Point.

533's carrier deployments all came after the Vietnam War, and only during one of these (1984, aboard SARATOGA) did they have Ks. By that time all of the Bs and Cs were gone, with the remaining usable airframes converted to Es.

I can't speak for VA-42, but VA-128 had few or no Ks during my tenure with VA-95. Again, with a war ongoing, the limited number of Ks were promptly cross-decked between returning and deploying outfits, with some Ks never going any closer to the U.S. than NAS Cubi Point. The Bs and Cs were even fewer, and never found in the FRS. This of course doesn't include those birds that were cycled into depot-level maintenance at NARF Alameda when required.

--
Mike Kanze

"It's easy to delegate once you've learned to let a toddler spend 23 minutes buttering toast without an overwhelming urge to intervene."

- Jared Sandberg, Wall Street Journal, 5/29/2007

> wrote in message ps.com...
Thank you for putting some light on the facts behind the story
depicted in Coonts' book. As far as I remember squadrons like
VMA(AW)-224 or VMA(AW)-533, who happened to deploy aboard USN aircraft
carriers, also did not have their own KA-6Ds, so they had to borrow
some (from VA-42 or VA-128 at least in one of these cases, IIRC?)...

Best regards,
Jacek Zemlo


On 24 Cze, 00:34, "Mike Kanze" > wrote:
> Jacek,
>
> Some words about Coonts' comment in The Intruders...
>
> Remember that The Intruders is a work of fiction. Having said that, Coonts' account - like nearly everything in his "Intruder" books - has a factual basis, and this account is one about which I have some personal knowledge.
>
> Coonts appears to be referring to the deployment by the VMA(AW)-224 "Bengals" during 1971-1972 with CVW-15/USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43). Those interested in the details can find enough on pp. 105-107 of Morgan & Morgan's Intruder: The Operational History of Grumman's A-6 to underscore Coonts' general theme.
>
> There were factors unique to 224's situation, some of which Morgan & Morgan do not mention or only hint at. Until 224's deployment, no USMC A-6 squadron had ever deployed afloat so the "corporate knowledge" within Marine Corps aviation of A-6 boat ops was nonexistent. For that reason, Phil Bloomer, "Buck" Belcher, Phil Schuyler, and Daryl Kerr - all experienced USN A-6 folks - were seconded to 224 for this deployment. Also, there was essentially no recent afloat flying experience in any aircraft among any of the Bengal crews, most of whom had not seen a rounddown since the training command.
>
> So, it may not be flattering to view USMC afloat capabilities as Coonts did, but it was a view based on a sad fact of those times. In today's environment, especially with the emphasis on "jointness," I would expect the likelihood of repeating the Bengals' "goon show" to be very low.
>
> Two codas to the above:
>
> * 224 shaped up very nicely after CAG Sheets sent the errant 224 skipper to the beach. The Bengals ended the cruise with a fine reputation within the air wing.
>
> * Phil Bloomer went from 224 to a department head billet in the VA-95 "Green Lizards," which replaced 224 in the CVW-15 lineup for its 1973 deployment. As 95 was then a newly-reestablished squadron, and like 224 with very little A-6 "corporate knowledge" of its own, Phil found himself reprising his role in a back-to-back deployment, albeit now among folks like himself who did not sport funny haircuts due to institutional imperative. (Yours Truly was one of the many Lizard nuggets that Phil whipped into shape.)
>
> Owl sends
>
> --
> Mike Kanze

[Arved Sandstrom]

"Flashnews" > wrote in message
. net...
> We are all talking around the wheel and not realizing that the world is
> now "JOINT" - so there can be labor management but the mechanisms today
> allow the Army to own a lot of ships and a lot of flying vehicles.
>
> But you are right in the pinning down of "ownership" - and I think what we
> are suggesting is that an aviation assault ship, even a full deck carrier
> refurbished to be one, will still have a Naval Officer as Captain but the
> mission commander will be an officer reporting to the Amphibious
> Expeditionary Force Commander and this guy could be an Air Force three
> star but probably would not - it would be a Marine. What would happen is
> that the physical ship itself would take a drastic make-over as it
> switched from a naval aviation ship to a command assault aviation ship.
> The mixture of aircraft. MV-22's, and helicopters would all form a Marine
> Corps Air Group not a Naval Air Wing but they may still call it a CAG -
> stuff like that

I buy that idea - that's pretty much what I meant. After all, all of the
amphibs already have Marine-only air, and they are designated as Marine
air - composite squadrons and MAWs. My point was, I don't really see why
Marines need to fly F/A-18's off supercarriers, if it's not dedicated to
supporting Marines? Let the Navy worry about CAP and deep strike and all
that good stuff; it's just not something the Marines need to be doing.

AHS

[Henry J Cobb]

Arved Sandstrom wrote:
> I buy that idea - that's pretty much what I meant. After all, all of the
> amphibs already have Marine-only air, and they are designated as Marine
> air - composite squadrons and MAWs. My point was, I don't really see why
> Marines need to fly F/A-18's off supercarriers, if it's not dedicated to
> supporting Marines? Let the Navy worry about CAP and deep strike and all
> that good stuff; it's just not something the Marines need to be doing.

The reason is that the price tag on the F-35 keeps exploding and so the
Department of the Navy is shuffling the deck chairs around like mad
while their budget sinks.

Just look at it as the Navy delivering mostly empty carriers for
whatever aircraft the Marines happen to have left.

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2003/Jan/As_details_of.htm
“As the Navy continues to buy the F/A-18E/F and as the Navy and Marine
Corps start buying the JSF ... it seems that the Navy will not have the
money to continue to round out carrier battle groups with the right
number of squadrons and airplanes,” said Marine Corps Capt. Sean B.
Garick, the assistant operations officer for VFMA-224 at Marine Corps
Air Station in Beaufort, S.C.

-HJC

[[email protected]]

I remember reading an article a few years back that stated the
military didn't
have the budget for the F/A-18E/F, the F-22 *and* the JSF, and that
one of
the 3 should be cut.

The hard choice wasn't made back then, and we're seeing the results of
that (in)decision now.

[[email protected]]

By saying that "The Marine Corps is slated to replace all F-4, RF-4, F/
A-18, A-6E, OA-4, A-4M and AV-8B aircraft with the F-35 in 2008" the
Author appears to be not very up-to-date - as we know some of the
birds mentined here in 2003 had been replaced for a decade or more.
Those procurement numbers and schedules were also changed several
times...

I understand the general idea: There would be no real need (apart from
putting them on the right shore if a need arises) to embark Marine
Hornet or Prowler squadrons on a carrier. Also, I believe Navy F/A-18C
or EA-6B units are not essential for Marine Air Groups. All this is a
result of both shortage of Navy squadrons and shortage of Marine
squadrons, resulting from overzealous budget cuts, ill-aimed
economizing, transitions pending, and tense deployment cycles.

However, there has always been a gap where a squadron of one of the
services was needed in the other, no matter if that was West Coast
Marine VMFA-314 and VMFA-323's presence in Navy's East Coast CVW-13,
or VA-15, VA-192 and VFA-132 deployments to Iwakuni in 1980s. Looks
like not a G.W. Bush era invention, it was quite widespread already in
the flamboyant Reagan administration times...

Best regards,
Jacek


On 24 Cze, 10:08, Henry J Cobb > wrote:
>
> The reason is that the price tag on the F-35 keeps exploding and so the
> Department of the Navy is shuffling the deck chairs around like mad
> while their budget sinks.
>
> Just look at it as the Navy delivering mostly empty carriers for
> whatever aircraft the Marines happen to have left.
>
> http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2003/Jan/As_details_of.htm
> "As the Navy continues to buy the F/A-18E/F and as the Navy and Marine
> Corps start buying the JSF ... it seems that the Navy will not have the
> money to continue to round out carrier battle groups with the right
> number of squadrons and airplanes," said Marine Corps Capt. Sean B.
> Garick, the assistant operations officer for VFMA-224 at Marine Corps
> Air Station in Beaufort, S.C.
>
> -HJC

[Flashnews]

You have to realize how important the "shipbuilding" issues are and how
they in fact run romped over the ability to plan for and procure the
aviation assets - and then also there is the politics.

The Pentagon lies when it wants to hold steady on a point -
unfortunately there is not any real better way to put that. They
Pentagon speaks in "selected truths" and it is in fact an art-form, so
how can the Congress really know what is going on (over-sight mind you)
before it actually becomes too late and things are a mess. I stumbled on
the Military Liaison office (in the Congress) practicing how to provide
a power point briefing so selective points could be made and no real
"trail" could be made to the "who said" or "source" that would enable
further or more detailed questions. The idea was if the question is not
asked nothing is volunteered and no clarifications are made if you can
at all get away with it. So with this Admiral Mike Mullen could simply
mandate that the JFK was not a good choice to be refurbished. Well that
is fine but he did not look at a refurbishment that would not compete
with the nuclear CVN-21 but one that would actually compete with the
LHA(R) to provide a bigger-better assault aviation ship for the Marine
Corps Expeditionary Force. He was so determined to get rid of a
conventional carrier trying to focus on his vision of a nuclear CVN Navy
he totally lost track of the rest of the naval force defense needs.

The first lie was to inflate and exaggerate the refurbishment costs of
the JFK - it became around $600 million - oh my God was the call, and of
course to make it a 30 knot deck that could keep up with the new CVN's
was next to impossible - and in that nobody really gave a hoot - but for
the budget they would be on the same shipbuilding line - to do it right
was way too hard. Then as most things with defense the contractors saw
the golden cow in the CVN's and every cost possible was hammered into
the new CVN-21 concept so the already amazing $3 billion carrier slipped
to $5 bill and now out to $7.5. Holy **** was the new cry and all of a
sudden the $600 million for the JFKL started to look like a real bargain
and yikes - it was inflated to boot anyway. Now we will get nuclear
carriers and the fleet will convert - but what are the real naval issues
now:

(1) how do we build up the Marines Expeditionary Force of
independent Battle Groups lead by a capable aviation assault command
ship to fight COIN and Littoral war

(2) Determine that in the full strategic sense - do we even need
surface ships as the lead nuclear and counter-nuclear combatants - has
the time come to start really stretching out the surface navy and
building up the submarine navy to transform where there is still proven
stealth (under the sea) and stop fooling around with trying to re-invent
mother nature. It does not take much to understand that an internetted
Wolf - Pack of 4 x Virginia Class nuke-boats operating autononomously
will do more to keep the Chinese up at night then all the carriers we
could send to the Pacific. The carrier strength is so determined by the
strength of its air wing even these CVN's are limited by the F/A-18E/F
which is a step-back from the A-16 / F-14 wings and sadly the JSF will
still remain inferior to both configurations. So the carriers are just
big vulnerable target sets that in a full nuclear war will have marginal
value and the CVN Battle Groups are many times in-efficient to deal with
littoral operations to counter insurgency situations. It is interesting
to note that refurbishing the JFK abd the Kitty Hawk for the Marine
Expeditionary Battle Groups builds upon the Navy's credibility to deal
with COIN littoral war and it continues to free the CVN's to focus on
broad area open ocean concepts as the transition to strategic
sub-surface gains strength. The CVN BG's can come in and support the
Marine BG's to lend help but then move on and remain high speed, open
ocean, secure and ready.

(3) Take a hard look at what is needed in naval aviation - that
is - surge produce the F/A-18E/F/G to fill all Marine, Allied, FMS and
Navy units in such a way as to keep the force young and capable for the
next 15 years. Fill the CVN's and fill the CVA for the Marines - in
this we actually return over 200 new F/A-18's to the front line ready
units. Marine Air Wings move afloat and the two Battle Groups are
forward deployed joining with allied Battle Groups who are building in
the same fashion, primary to that would be the UK Navy that should be
offered a third retired US conventional carrier for them to refurbish
and in turn buy a wing of F/A-18's and the French may jump in with a mix
of Rafale's in the fray. The Rafale may be the best Naval Fighter in
inventory in the west today - but that is another story.

(4) Since the world is joint and since the Marine BG's will pick
up the world wide war on terror, the Expeditionary BG's will have to
move in that direction so the BG will need to be filled with more
assault ships - many times more aviation ships for helicopters, COIN
aircraft and MV-22's - and in this we should see SOF, Naval Riverine,
USAF and Allied SOF as well as US Agency and NATO special units all
becoming amphibious and moving under the ability to deal out of one
headquarters afloat - with CENTCOM and PACOM married to the whole
effort. The key to these Naval BG's is that they bring with themselves
their own suborbital IT network so things will be agile and work -
dirigibles, high alt UAV's and whatever.

(5) You pay for it by canceling the JSF and moving one variant
(the CTOL) into a decade long development merging it with the
laser-canon, vectored thrust engine, manned/unmanned variant, UCAV/UCAS
and all other programs that will evolve it into something more advanced
then just a better F-16 or F-18 - it will become the penetrating
platform of choice for war against advanced states such as North Korea,
the PRC, Iran etc.... and that decade of development will bring in the
international community that joined the JSF and togeher they move on
with all prior investment credited to buys of legacy platforms (F-16,
F-15, F-18, etc) .... This frees up over 40 billion over that decade and
re-invests 10 of it in legacy aircraft and pays for the conventional
carrier conversions and additional (50% more) MV-22's. The cancel of
the JSF kills the LHA(R) and in this two more LHA's can be obtained as
well as more helicopters. Killing the failed DD(X) will also free up
wasted billions and enable DDG's to be retrofitted with features that
were developed with the DD(X) - like armored weapons magazines. And -
each BG will get a refurbished Battle Ship for the specific reason to
provide fire support - the refurbishment will not rebuild a battleship,
it will bring afloat a fire support resource for forward deployment to
the Gulf and South Pacific.

The thinking goes on and on because you kill the flood of expensive
useless stuff and bring back the necessary and better build what you
need down the road....



"Arved Sandstrom" > wrote in message
news:Gfnfi.9242$xk5.1743@edtnps82...
> "Flashnews" > wrote in message
> . net...
>> We are all talking around the wheel and not realizing that the world
>> is now "JOINT" - so there can be labor management but the mechanisms
>> today allow the Army to own a lot of ships and a lot of flying
>> vehicles.
>>
>> But you are right in the pinning down of "ownership" - and I think
>> what we are suggesting is that an aviation assault ship, even a full
>> deck carrier refurbished to be one, will still have a Naval Officer
>> as Captain but the mission commander will be an officer reporting to
>> the Amphibious Expeditionary Force Commander and this guy could be an
>> Air Force three star but probably would not - it would be a Marine.
>> What would happen is that the physical ship itself would take a
>> drastic make-over as it switched from a naval aviation ship to a
>> command assault aviation ship. The mixture of aircraft. MV-22's, and
>> helicopters would all form a Marine Corps Air Group not a Naval Air
>> Wing but they may still call it a CAG - stuff like that
>
> I buy that idea - that's pretty much what I meant. After all, all of
> the amphibs already have Marine-only air, and they are designated as
> Marine air - composite squadrons and MAWs. My point was, I don't
> really see why Marines need to fly F/A-18's off supercarriers, if it's
> not dedicated to supporting Marines? Let the Navy worry about CAP and
> deep strike and all that good stuff; it's just not something the
> Marines need to be doing.
>
> AHS
>

[Dann]

On 22 Jun 2007, said the following in news:1182548129.916430.91700
@x35g2000prf.googlegroups.com.

> At least the Corps policy is clear;-) They rather suck all redundant
> Navy F/A-18A+/C than let themselves to be sucked into F/A-18E/F&EA-18G
> programme. However, at some point that could mean the whole All-
> Weather Fighter Attack (F/A-18D) community going single-seaters, and
> vanishing of their recce/FAC(A) function.

Proper recce/FAC was abandoned when the Corp jettisoned the OV-10D.

Regards,
Dann

[[email protected]]

For me the Marine attack aircraft carrier has one fault... Where they
are going to take the squadrons from? Now it is too few of them to
equip full 10 CVWs and 2 land-based rotations...

[[email protected]]

Oh yes, a plane like Bronco is certainly what is missing today...

For me the Marine attack aircraft carrier concept described here has
one basic fault... Where they are going to take the aircraft/squadrons
from? Now it is not enough of them to equip full 10 CVWs (one of them,
CVW-17, existing mostly on paper) and 2 land-based rotations, taking 4
more squadrons at a time...

Best regards,
Jacek

On 24 Cze, 18:12, Dann > wrote:
> On 22 Jun 2007, said the following in news:1182548129.916430.91700
> @x35g2000prf.googlegroups.com.
>
> > At least the Corps policy is clear;-) They rather suck all redundant
> > Navy F/A-18A+/C than let themselves to be sucked into F/A-18E/F&EA-18G
> > programme. However, at some point that could mean the whole All-
> > Weather Fighter Attack (F/A-18D) community going single-seaters, and
> > vanishing of their recce/FAC(A) function.
>
> Proper recce/FAC was abandoned when the Corp jettisoned the OV-10D.
>
> Regards,
> Dann

[[email protected]]

On Jun 24, 9:12 am, Dann > wrote:
> On 22 Jun 2007, said the following in news:1182548129.916430.91700
> @x35g2000prf.googlegroups.com.
>
> > At least the Corps policy is clear;-) They rather suck all redundant
> > Navy F/A-18A+/C than let themselves to be sucked into F/A-18E/F&EA-18G
> > programme. However, at some point that could mean the whole All-
> > Weather Fighter Attack (F/A-18D) community going single-seaters, and
> > vanishing of their recce/FAC(A) function.
>
> Proper recce/FAC was abandoned when the Corp jettisoned the OV-10D.
>
> Regards,
> Dann

There's actually been some talk in the USMC about reviving the OV-10
Bronco. See:

http://www.popasmoke.com/notam2/showthread.php?p=18129