Cirrus Lands via Parachute in Nantucket

[Owen Rogers[_2_]]

Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.

Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.

The two aboard had minor injuries but will be ok. Nobody was injured on
the ground.

Here is a news link:
http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070818/NEWS/708180319/-1/NEWS

Other reports said that it was a Cirrus, although the make/model hasn't
been confirmed yet.

[Judah]

Owen Rogers > wrote in
:

> Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>
> Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
> ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
> common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
> parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.

Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?

[Matt Whiting]

Judah wrote:
> Owen Rogers > wrote in
> :
>
>> Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>>
>> Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
>> ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
>> common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
>> parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>
> Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?

That's what I was thinking. There is either much more to this story or
this was one dumb pilot. I'm hoping it is the former.

Matt

[Owen Rogers[_2_]]

Judah wrote:

> Owen Rogers > wrote in
> :
>
> > Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
> >
> > Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
> > ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
> > common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
> > parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>
> Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?

Don't know, or what the options were. I do know that weather had generally
been good yesterday and got drastically worse around the accident time. The
accident time was around 8:45 PM, aka 180045. They might have been in the
soup for a short while before they pulled the handle. Check out how fast the
low vis and low ceiling appeared after a beautiful cloudless day:

KACK 180100Z 20007KT 3SM BR SCT001 BKN007 BKN015 20/19 A2981 RMK AO2 RAE0054
KACK 180053Z 21006KT 2 1/2SM -RA BR BKN001 OVC015 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2 RAB17
SLP098 P0001 T02000189
KACK 180050Z 21006KT 2 1/2SM -RA BR OVC001 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2 RAB17 P0001
KACK 180045Z 21008KT 1 3/4SM -RA BR OVC001 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2 RAB17 P0000
****
KACK 180025Z 22008KT 1/2SM -RA FG VV001 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2 RAB17 P0000
KACK 180018Z 22008KT 1SM -RA BR VV001 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2 RAB17 P0000
KACK 180014Z 21008KT 2 1/2SM BR SCT001 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2
KACK 172353Z 22007KT 6SM HZ CLR 20/17 A2982 RMK AO2 SLP097 T02000172 10256
20194 58003
KACK 172253Z 25008KT 10SM CLR 21/13 A2983 RMK AO2 SLP103 T02110133

[Judah]

Owen Rogers > wrote in
:

> Don't know, or what the options were. I do know that weather had
> generally been good yesterday and got drastically worse around the
> accident time. The accident time was around 8:45 PM, aka 180045. They
> might have been in the soup for a short while before they pulled the
> handle. Check out how fast the low vis and low ceiling appeared after a
> beautiful cloudless day:

[...]
> P0001 KACK 180045Z 21008KT 1 3/4SM -RA BR OVC001 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2
> RAB17 P0000 ****
[...]
> KACK 180014Z 21008KT 2 1/2SM BR SCT001 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2

I'm not trying to be judgemental, but the weather was below VFR minimums for
at least 1/2 hour by then.

Do you know where they started?

[Aluckyguess]

"Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
...
> Judah wrote:
>> Owen Rogers > wrote in
>> :
>>> Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>>>
>>> Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
>>> ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
>>> common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
>>> parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>>
>> Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?
>
> That's what I was thinking. There is either much more to this story or
> this was one dumb pilot. I'm hoping it is the former.

He is alive so he's not to dumb. He has money so who cares about the plane.
>
> Matt

[Thomas Borchert]

Judah,

> >
> > Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
> > ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
> > common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
> > parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>
> Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?
>

Ah, the Monday morning quarterback ;-)

The NTSB records are full of pilots who thought "I can save this by keeping
on flying..." The chute is meant to avoid exactly this kind of situation.

How the pilot got into it is a completely different question. BUt he got
out alive.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[James]

Aluckyguess wrote:

> "Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>Judah wrote:
>>
>>>Owen Rogers > wrote in
:
>>>
>>>>Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>>>>
>>>>Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
>>>>ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
>>>>common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
>>>>parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>>>
>>>Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?
>>
>>That's what I was thinking. There is either much more to this story or
>>this was one dumb pilot. I'm hoping it is the former.
>
>
> He is alive so he's not to dumb. He has money so who cares about the plane.
More money than brains? Most pilots have heard of diversion to another
airport in case of bad weather or other person. The Pilot Examiner would
have made sure that he had considered alternates for the cross country
part of the check ride. He might have an interesting time explaining to
his insurance company also. They might not want to write him another
policy again (if this story is as stated)!



>
>>Matt
>
>
>

[[email protected]]

On Aug 19, 4:53 am, Thomas Borchert >
wrote:
> > > Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
> > > ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
> > > common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
> > > parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>
> > Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?
>
> Ah, the Monday morning quarterback ;-)
>
> The NTSB records are full of pilots who thought "I can save this by keeping
> on flying..." The chute is meant to avoid exactly this kind of situation.

The Cirrus chute is meant to recover from situations that competent
piloting cannot reliably recover from (e.g. spins). It's not meant to
substitute for knowing how to fly.

> How the pilot got into it is a completely different question. BUt he got
> out alive.

Luckily, the pilot and passenger were not fatally injuried. But the
uncontolled parachute descent of an aircraft is dangerous to the
occupants and to people on the ground. It could have been a lot worse.

Cruise flight in simple instrument conditions is something that all
private pilots are required to be capable of. A pilot whose
proficiency has lapsed should not be flying without an instructor--
especially not to ACK at night, a place that's notorious for poor
visibility (ACK is next to MVY, where JFK Jr. crashed after losing
sight of the horizon). And that's not even considering that ACK was
reported IMC for half an hour prior to the parachute deployment (so
even a proficient pilot should not have been flying there VFR).

Still, you're right that if the pilot was not competent to fly the
aircraft, pulling the chute was probably the best choice at that
point. The fault lies not with that decision, but with all the
decisions leading up to it, starting with the choice to get in the
plane.

[Matt Whiting]

Aluckyguess wrote:
> "Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
> ...
>> Judah wrote:
>>> Owen Rogers > wrote in
>>> :
>>>> Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>>>>
>>>> Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
>>>> ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
>>>> common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
>>>> parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>>> Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?
>> That's what I was thinking. There is either much more to this story or
>> this was one dumb pilot. I'm hoping it is the former.
>
> He is alive so he's not to dumb. He has money so who cares about the plane.

Sorry, being alive is hardly a measure of dumb or lack thereof. I know
a lot of dumb people who are alive and well.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
> Judah,
>
>>> Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
>>> ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
>>> common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
>>> parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>> Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?
>>
>
> Ah, the Monday morning quarterback ;-)
>
> The NTSB records are full of pilots who thought "I can save this by keeping
> on flying..." The chute is meant to avoid exactly this kind of situation.
>
> How the pilot got into it is a completely different question. BUt he got
> out alive.

Getting out alive doesn't mean he got out smart.

Matt

[Viperdoc[_4_]]

Does anyone know the N number or if it was a VFR or IFR flight? What was the
TAF for the time interval? What about the VFR and IFR requirements for fuel
reserves?

The whole thing doesn't make sense- it seems like there might have been a
lot of other options prior to pulling the chute.

[Kyle Boatright]

"James" > wrote in message
...
>
>
> Aluckyguess wrote:
>
>> "Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
>> ...
>>
>>>Judah wrote:
>>>
>>>>Owen Rogers > wrote in
:
>>>>
>>>>>Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>>>>>
>>>>>Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
>>>>>ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
>>>>>common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
>>>>>parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>>>>
>>>>Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?
>>>
>>>That's what I was thinking. There is either much more to this story or
>>>this was one dumb pilot. I'm hoping it is the former.
>>
>>
>> He is alive so he's not to dumb. He has money so who cares about the
>> plane.
> More money than brains? Most pilots have heard of diversion to another
> airport in case of bad weather or other person. The Pilot Examiner would
> have made sure that he had considered alternates for the cross country
> part of the check ride. He might have an interesting time explaining to
> his insurance company also. They might not want to write him another
> policy again (if this story is as stated)!
>

I find it very hard to speculate about this particular episode until we know
the airplane's fuel state, the weather at reachable fields, the conditions
in which the aircraft was flying, or the training level of the pilot.

For example, if the pilot wasn't IFR trained, he might have been in a
situation where he wasn't confident of keeping the airplane right side up.
In that situation, popping the chute too early is much better than popping
it too late.

Another example is that the weather may have gone down, leaving him trapped
on top without sufficient fuel to reach an airport in better conditions.

Every time someone uses the chute on a Cirrus, we get people second guessing
the decision. There is only one person in the world qualified to make the
decision, and that's the guy or gal in the left seat when the decision is
made.

KB

[Larry Dighera]

On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 09:17:52 -0500, "Viperdoc"
> wrote in
>:

>Does anyone know the N number

http://www.ack.net/Crash081707.html
The plane is registered to Jackson Thomas of 6 Prospect St.,
Nantucket, but Baker would not confirm whether he was the pilot.



http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/nnumsql.asp?NNumbertxt=869CD

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA Registry
N-Number Inquiry Results

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

N869CD is Assigned

Aircraft Description

Serial Number 1421
Type Registration Individual
Manufacturer Name CIRRUS DESIGN CORP
Certificate Issue Date 10/12/2004
Model SR20 Status Valid
Type Aircraft Fixed Wing Single-Engine
Type Engine Reciprocating
Pending Number Change None Dealer No
Date Change Authorized None Mode S Code 52770174
MFR Year 2004 Fractional Owner NO

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Registered Owner

Name JACKSON THOMAS
Street 6 PROSPECT ST
City NANTUCKET State MASSACHUSETTS Zip Code 02554-2704
County NANTUCKET
Country UNITED STATES

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airworthiness
Engine Manufacturer CONT MOTOR Classification Standard
Engine Model IO-360 SER Category Normal

A/W Date 02/18/2004

[Thomas Borchert]

> The Cirrus chute is meant to recover from situations that competent
> piloting cannot reliably recover from (e.g. spins). It's not meant to
> substitute for knowing how to fly.
>

And how exactly would your competent pilot above get into that spin?

If "competent" pilots weren't doing dumb things quite regularly, 90
percent or so of all GA accidents wouldn't happen. So, in theory, your
remark sounds nice, but either the current training rules allow a
majority of incompetent pilots to get through, or competent pilots are
way more fallible than you seem to think. Heck, even a Scott Crossfield
can die in a thunderstorm. If that guy wasn't competent, most of us
have to stop flying at all.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Thomas Borchert]

Kyle,

> There is only one person in the world qualified to make the
> decision, and that's the guy or gal in the left seat when the decision is
> made.
>

Exactly.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[[email protected]]

On Aug 19, 10:53 am, "Kyle Boatright" > wrote:
> I find it very hard to speculate about this particular episode until we know
> the airplane's fuel state, the weather at reachable fields, the conditions
> in which the aircraft was flying, or the training level of the pilot.

The relevant information is easy to look up.

> For example, if the pilot wasn't IFR trained, he might have been in a
> situation where he wasn't confident of keeping the airplane right side up.

That's true, but only if the pilot was incompetent. Simple cruise
flight by instruments is a required ability for private pilots,
instrument rated or not. A pilot who lacks basic required proficiency
should not be flying as PIC. That's especially true for pilots who
head to ACK at night, and especially when the destination is reporting
IMC.

> Another example is that the weather may have gone down, leaving him trapped
> on top without sufficient fuel to reach an airport in better conditions.

Nope. Wx archives are easy to look up (e.g. uswx.com/us/stn). There
was plenty of clear weather within 15 miles.

Besides, even if the pilot had gotten stuck on top, and even if no
clear weather was forecast within fuel range, it would have been
grossly premature to deploy the chute, if the pilot had known how to
keep flying the plane. Instead, the pilot should have contacted ATC
and gotten vectored to a safe location with emergency vehicles
standing by. And even then, the pilot could have circled until low on
fuel in case conditions improved in the meantime.

[Viperdoc]

It looks like on Flightaware that it was an IFR flight, based on the
altitude. Duration was less than 1.5 h, so if he had full fuel, the reserves
shouldn't have been an issue.

So, assuming the forecast was below minimums, and knowing the weather was
bad, why pull the chute as opposed to going to an alternate? It still seems
like there should have been other options than destroying your plane and
landing in the ocean.


"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 09:17:52 -0500, "Viperdoc"
> > wrote in
> >:
>
>>Does anyone know the N number
>
> http://www.ack.net/Crash081707.html
> The plane is registered to Jackson Thomas of 6 Prospect St.,
> Nantucket, but Baker would not confirm whether he was the pilot.
>
>
>
> http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/nnumsql.asp?NNumbertxt=869CD
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> FAA Registry
> N-Number Inquiry Results
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> N869CD is Assigned
>
> Aircraft Description
>
> Serial Number 1421
> Type Registration Individual
> Manufacturer Name CIRRUS DESIGN CORP
> Certificate Issue Date 10/12/2004
> Model SR20 Status Valid
> Type Aircraft Fixed Wing Single-Engine
> Type Engine Reciprocating
> Pending Number Change None Dealer No
> Date Change Authorized None Mode S Code 52770174
> MFR Year 2004 Fractional Owner NO
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Registered Owner
>
> Name JACKSON THOMAS
> Street 6 PROSPECT ST
> City NANTUCKET State MASSACHUSETTS Zip Code 02554-2704
> County NANTUCKET
> Country UNITED STATES
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Airworthiness
> Engine Manufacturer CONT MOTOR Classification Standard
> Engine Model IO-360 SER Category Normal
>
> A/W Date 02/18/2004
>
>

[Judah]

"Kyle Boatright" > wrote in
:

> Every time someone uses the chute on a Cirrus, we get people second
> guessing the decision. There is only one person in the world qualified
> to make the decision, and that's the guy or gal in the left seat when
> the decision is made.

The decision about pulling the chute may have been the best decision at the
time under the conditions that arose.

But in this case, it would seem that the pilot may have made several bad
decisions leading up to that final one. It's not my goal to criticize the
pilot, only to analyze the decision process to help prevent myself (and
perhaps others) from making similar bad decisions... This particular
accident is particularly interesting to me because it's in a plane with
similar performance characteristics to the Bonanzas that I usually fly, and
its in an area that I fly to and am familiar with (although it's been over
a year since I flew up that way).

Using your minimum fuel example elucidates my point.

The pilot was flying to an airport on an island where the nearest alternate
is 26 miles away. For the Cirrus, which I believe cruises at about 180
knots (3 miles per minute) a 26 mile flight is just under 10 minutes,
presumably burning around 2 gallons of fuel. If the weather started
deteriorating at least 30 minutes earlier as reported by the OP, the pilot
could have checked the weather long before passing out of reach of numerous
alternate airports.

If it turns out that this pilot was landing at ACK with minimum fuel, it
seems to me that there were opportunities for this pilot to have avoided
putting himself in a situation where the best out was pulling his chute.

[Kyle Boatright]

> wrote in message
oups.com...
> On Aug 19, 10:53 am, "Kyle Boatright" > wrote:
>> I find it very hard to speculate about this particular episode until we
>> know
>> the airplane's fuel state, the weather at reachable fields, the
>> conditions
>> in which the aircraft was flying, or the training level of the pilot.
>
> The relevant information is easy to look up.

Excellent! I'll wait for your follow up post containing said information.

>
>> For example, if the pilot wasn't IFR trained, he might have been in a
>> situation where he wasn't confident of keeping the airplane right side
>> up.
>
> That's true, but only if the pilot was incompetent.

Many competent IFR and VFR pilots have died due to loss of control in IMC.
There are a thousand factors at work, and if the PIC in this situation
decided that the chute was his/her best option, so be it.

[Larry Dighera]

On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 10:58:40 -0500, "Viperdoc"
> wrote in
>:

>It looks like on Flightaware that it was an IFR flight

http://flightaware.com/live/flight/N869CD

[[email protected]]

On Aug 19, 12:06 pm, "Kyle Boatright" > wrote:
> > wrote in message
>
> oups.com...
>
> > On Aug 19, 10:53 am, "Kyle Boatright" > wrote:
> >> I find it very hard to speculate about this particular episode until we
> >> know
> >> the airplane's fuel state, the weather at reachable fields, the
> >> conditions
> >> in which the aircraft was flying, or the training level of the pilot.
>
> > The relevant information is easy to look up.
>
> Excellent! I'll wait for your follow up post containing said information.

I posted a link to the wx info (by the way, there was a typo: I wrote
15 miles instead of 25). The pilot's training level isn't relevant,
since basic instrument cruise flight is a required skill for all
private pilots.

> >> For example, if the pilot wasn't IFR trained, he might have been in a
> >> situation where he wasn't confident of keeping the airplane right side
> >> up.
>
> > That's true, but only if the pilot was incompetent.
>
> Many competent IFR and VFR pilots have died due to loss of control in IMC.

That's probably true, but we need to be more specific. Unexpected VFR
into IMC is often disorienting; pilots may crash because they cling to
fleeting visual cues, not realizing they're in IMC. Obviously, though,
that's not the case if a pilot pulled the chute because he realized he
was unable to fly by instruments.

Loss of control in IMC may also result from especially challenging
circumstances (convection, icing, complicated approach, etc.). But
that also wasn't the case here.

> There are a thousand factors at work, and if the PIC in this situation
> decided that the chute was his/her best option, so be it.

If a pilot pulls the chute because he judges an uncontrolled parachute
descent to be less risky than trying to keep the plane upright for a
few minutes in simple instrument cruise flight, then he has judged
himself to have less than the minimum required competence for a
private pilot. (As I said earlier, it's not THAT judgment that I'm
disputing; he may well have made the right choice at that point.)

Anyway, I'm glad they're ok.

[Bob Noel]

In article >,
"Kyle Boatright" > wrote:

> Every time someone uses the chute on a Cirrus, we get people second guessing
> the decision.

Every decision everyone makes is a candidate for being second guessed.
I hope no one is saying pilot decisions are not open for discussion or debate.

> There is only one person in the world qualified to make the
> decision, and that's the guy or gal in the left seat when the decision is
> made.

There are many people who are qualified to make that decision. The PIC
is responsible for it, but many people are qualified.

--
Bob Noel
(goodness, please trim replies!!!)

[Judah]

wrote in
oups.com:

>> For example, if the pilot wasn't IFR trained, he might have been in a
>> situation where he wasn't confident of keeping the airplane right side
>> up.
>
> That's true, but only if the pilot was incompetent. Simple cruise

I disagree with that statement. Most VFR pilots get a grand total of 3 hours
of hood training sitting next to their instructor. Unless they go on to get
their instrument ticket, they never put a hood on again.

I can certainly believe that a VFR-only pilot who got deep into real IFR soup
with nothing but 3 hours hood time would panic and pull his chute.

The question is that if he was not qualified to fly IFR, what conditions led
him to get into the soup so deep that his best perceived option was to pull
the chute?

And if he was qualified to fly IFR, what condition in the plane led him to
believe that he would be better of swimming in the fog than flying in it?

[Ron Natalie]

Judah wrote:
> Owen Rogers > wrote in
> :
>
>> Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>>
>> Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
>> ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
>> common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
>> parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>
> Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?

Fog setting in is often an area phenomenon. It's not
like flying into a puffy cumulous on a summer day.

[[email protected]]

On Aug 19, 12:39 pm, Judah > wrote:
> wrote groups.com:
>
> >> For example, if the pilot wasn't IFR trained, he might have been in a
> >> situation where he wasn't confident of keeping the airplane right side
> >> up.
>
> > That's true, but only if the pilot was incompetent. Simple cruise
>
> I disagree with that statement. Most VFR pilots get a grand total of 3 hours
> of hood training sitting next to their instructor. Unless they go on to get
> their instrument ticket, they never put a hood on again.

But isn't it a pilot's responsibility to be sure she or he is
proficient before taking off as PIC? If a private pilot doesn't
occasionally use a hood or a simulator (or night VFR over water, etc.)
to practice instrument flying, isn't that pilot shirking a basic
responsibility to maintain required competence?

[Thomas Borchert]

> A pilot who lacks basic required proficiency
> should not be flying as PIC.
>

No offense, but you seem to have a lot of pride. The kind that cometh
before the fall.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Thomas Borchert]

> If a pilot pulls the chute because he judges an uncontrolled parachute
> descent to be less risky than trying to keep the plane upright for a
> few minutes in simple instrument cruise flight, then he has judged
> himself to have less than the minimum required competence for a
> private pilot.
>

That's BS, plain and simple. The instrument flying requirement is
required for the test, barely. There is no requirement at all to keep it
current. Otherwise, all certified pilots would be instrument pilots.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Thomas Borchert]

> But isn't it a pilot's responsibility to be sure she or he is
> proficient before taking off as PIC? If a private pilot doesn't
> occasionally use a hood or a simulator (or night VFR over water, etc.)
> to practice instrument flying, isn't that pilot shirking a basic
> responsibility to maintain required competence?
>

MX? That you?

Seriously, though: Are you a pilot?

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Matt Whiting]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
>> If a pilot pulls the chute because he judges an uncontrolled parachute
>> descent to be less risky than trying to keep the plane upright for a
>> few minutes in simple instrument cruise flight, then he has judged
>> himself to have less than the minimum required competence for a
>> private pilot.
>>
>
> That's BS, plain and simple. The instrument flying requirement is
> required for the test, barely. There is no requirement at all to keep it
> current. Otherwise, all certified pilots would be instrument pilots.
>

That's BS, at least in the US. I can't speak for other parts of the
world. That is why we have biennial flight reviews, to see if currency
is being maintained. A private pilot should be capable of doing
anything required of their certificate. Flying straight and level on
instruments is a far cry from being instrument rated.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
>> A pilot who lacks basic required proficiency
>> should not be flying as PIC.
>>
>
> No offense, but you seem to have a lot of pride. The kind that cometh
> before the fall.
>

That isn't pride, that is a simple truth. You should not commence any
operation for which you aren't proficient.

Matt

[[email protected]]

On Aug 19, 11:23 am, Thomas Borchert >
wrote:
> > The Cirrus chute is meant to recover from situations that competent
> > piloting cannot reliably recover from (e.g. spins). It's not meant to
> > substitute for knowing how to fly.
>
> And how exactly would your competent pilot above get into that spin?

That's a reasonable question. The answer is that "competent" doesn't
mean perfect. A competent pilot may make a mistake resulting in a
spin, or airframe icing, or the like. At that point, there may be no
safe way to recover without pulling the chute.

But a competent pilot doesn't pull the chute simply because he doesn't
know how to fly the plane in conditions he's supposed to be trained
for!

[Matt Whiting]

Viperdoc wrote:
> It looks like on Flightaware that it was an IFR flight, based on the
> altitude. Duration was less than 1.5 h, so if he had full fuel, the reserves
> shouldn't have been an issue.
>
> So, assuming the forecast was below minimums, and knowing the weather was
> bad, why pull the chute as opposed to going to an alternate? It still seems
> like there should have been other options than destroying your plane and
> landing in the ocean.

Yes, that is why I stated that I'm suspecting there is more to this
story than meets the eye.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Ron Natalie wrote:
> Judah wrote:
>> Owen Rogers > wrote in
>> :
>>> Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>>>
>>> Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
>>> ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
>>> common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
>>> parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>>
>> Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?
>
> Fog setting in is often an area phenomenon. It's not
> like flying into a puffy cumulous on a summer day.

True, but it hardly ever covers an area as large as the range of a Cirrus.

Matt

[[email protected]]

On Aug 19, 12:55 pm, Thomas Borchert >
wrote:
> > If a pilot pulls the chute because he judges an uncontrolled parachute
> > descent to be less risky than trying to keep the plane upright for a
> > few minutes in simple instrument cruise flight, then he has judged
> > himself to have less than the minimum required competence for a
> > private pilot.
>
> That's BS, plain and simple. The instrument flying requirement is
> required for the test, barely. There is no requirement at all to keep it
> current.

I respectfully but emphatically disagree. "I only need to know this
for the test" is a shockingly dangerous attitude for a pilot to
exhibit with regard to an obviously important safety skill.

The PTS sets forth the practical abilities that a pilot is supposed to
have when acting as PIC.

> Otherwise, all certified pilots would be instrument pilots.

Hardly! Simple instrument cruise flight is a small, easy subset of
what's covered by the instrument rating. IFR instruction moves past
that almost immediately.

[Aluckyguess]

"James" > wrote in message
...
>
>
> Aluckyguess wrote:
>
>> "Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
>> ...
>>
>>>Judah wrote:
>>>
>>>>Owen Rogers > wrote in
:
>>>>
>>>>>Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>>>>>
>>>>>Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
>>>>>ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
>>>>>common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
>>>>>parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>>>>
>>>>Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?
>>>
>>>That's what I was thinking. There is either much more to this story or
>>>this was one dumb pilot. I'm hoping it is the former.
>>
>>
>> He is alive so he's not to dumb. He has money so who cares about the
>> plane.
> More money than brains? Most pilots have heard of diversion to another
> airport in case of bad weather or other person. The Pilot Examiner would
> have made sure that he had considered alternates for the cross country
> part of the check ride. He might have an interesting time explaining to
> his insurance company also. They might not want to write him another
> policy again (if this story is as stated)!

You dont get it, he is alive who cares about the insurance company or
anything else. For all we know he had a panic attack and panicked, my point
because of the chute he is alive not dead.
>
>
>
>>
>>>Matt
>>
>>

[Luke Skywalker]

On Aug 19, 11:34 am, wrote:

>
> If a pilot pulls the chute because he judges an uncontrolled parachute
> descent to be less risky than trying to keep the plane upright for a
> few minutes in simple instrument cruise flight, then he has judged
> himself to have less than the minimum required competence for a
> private pilot. (As I said earlier, it's not THAT judgment that I'm
> disputing; he may well have made the right choice at that point.)
>
> Anyway, I'm glad they're ok.


In my view that is not a valid statement. People who leave training
with a private pilots license have at best the most primitive and
perishable of instrument skills.

Three hours is insufficient to develop and ingrain even a rudimentary
"scan" and it certianly does not teach deriving a "picture" of what
the airplane is doing based on the instruments.

I dont know what the experience level of the pilot was, but my "BFR"
experience back home is that most private pilots without an instrument
rating are essentially non functional under IMC by the two year mark
of the BFR. IE they have no instrument skills whatsoever.

Robert

[Aluckyguess]

"Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
...
> Aluckyguess wrote:
>> "Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
>> ...
>>> Judah wrote:
>>>> Owen Rogers > wrote in
>>>> :
>>>>> Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>>>>>
>>>>> Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when
>>>>> they
>>>>> ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island
>>>>> are
>>>>> common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
>>>>> parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>>>> Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?
>>> That's what I was thinking. There is either much more to this story or
>>> this was one dumb pilot. I'm hoping it is the former.
>>
>> He is alive so he's not to dumb. He has money so who cares about the
>> plane.
>
> Sorry, being alive is hardly a measure of dumb or lack thereof. I know a
> lot of dumb people who are alive and well.
>
There are a lot of smart pilots who are dead. So who is the smart one the
one alive or the dead one. You decide.

> Matt

[Ron Wanttaja]

On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 17:05:47 GMT, Matt Whiting > wrote:

>Thomas Borchert wrote:
>>> If a pilot pulls the chute because he judges an uncontrolled parachute
>>> descent to be less risky than trying to keep the plane upright for a
>>> few minutes in simple instrument cruise flight, then he has judged
>>> himself to have less than the minimum required competence for a
>>> private pilot.
>>
>> That's BS, plain and simple. The instrument flying requirement is
>> required for the test, barely. There is no requirement at all to keep it
>> current. Otherwise, all certified pilots would be instrument pilots.
>
>That's BS, at least in the US. I can't speak for other parts of the
>world. That is why we have biennial flight reviews, to see if currency
>is being maintained. A private pilot should be capable of doing
>anything required of their certificate. Flying straight and level on
>instruments is a far cry from being instrument rated.

I've been taking BFRs since they were instituted, and don't believe I've been
put under the hood more than once or twice since my original Private flight
test. And *that* was ~35 years ago.

Every time Cirrus BRS deployments come up, I'm reminded of the anti-parachute
arguments during WWI.

Ron Wanttaja

[[email protected]]

On Aug 19, 1:28 pm, Luke Skywalker > wrote:
> Three hours is insufficient to develop and ingrain even a rudimentary
> "scan" and it certianly does not teach deriving a "picture" of what
> the airplane is doing based on the instruments.

But three hours of instrument instruction isn't the only requirement.
The requirement is to have as much instruction as it takes to acquire
the competence! It must be at least three hours, but can be much more
if necessary (just as most pilots need much more than the specified 40
hours of dual before getting a private-pilot certificate).

Once the skill is acquired and the pilot is certificated, it's the
pilot's responsibility--as with ALL basic required skills--to do
whatever is needed to remain proficient before acting as PIC.

[Kyle Boatright]

> wrote in message
ups.com...
> On Aug 19, 1:28 pm, Luke Skywalker > wrote:
>> Three hours is insufficient to develop and ingrain even a rudimentary
>> "scan" and it certianly does not teach deriving a "picture" of what
>> the airplane is doing based on the instruments.
>
> But three hours of instrument instruction isn't the only requirement.
> The requirement is to have as much instruction as it takes to acquire
> the competence! It must be at least three hours, but can be much more
> if necessary (just as most pilots need much more than the specified 40
> hours of dual before getting a private-pilot certificate).
>
> Once the skill is acquired and the pilot is certificated, it's the
> pilot's responsibility--as with ALL basic required skills--to do
> whatever is needed to remain proficient before acting as PIC.

Lets say the engine suffered a mechanical failure, and the pilot and
passengers survived after using the 'chute. Would you argue that forced
landings are part of the PTS, and therefore the pilot is incompetent because
s/he chose to pull the magic handle instead of attempting a forced landing?

KB

[[email protected]]

On Aug 19, 1:54 pm, "Kyle Boatright" > wrote:
> > wrote in message
> > But three hours of instrument instruction isn't the only requirement.
> > The requirement is to have as much instruction as it takes to acquire
> > the competence! It must be at least three hours, but can be much more
> > if necessary (just as most pilots need much more than the specified 40
> > hours of dual before getting a private-pilot certificate).
>
> > Once the skill is acquired and the pilot is certificated, it's the
> > pilot's responsibility--as with ALL basic required skills--to do
> > whatever is needed to remain proficient before acting as PIC.
>
> Lets say the engine suffered a mechanical failure, and the pilot and
> passengers survived after using the 'chute. Would you argue that forced
> landings are part of the PTS, and therefore the pilot is incompetent because
> s/he chose to pull the magic handle instead of attempting a forced landing?

That's a good analogy. The answer depends on the details. If the plane
is surrounded by large open fields, but the pilot thinks a basic power-
off soft-field landing would be more dangerous for him than
parachuting the plane, then yes, I think using the chute would show
incompetence in that case. But with trickier terrain, the chute might
well be the best option even for a proficient pilot.

Analogously, I can readily imaging specific instrument conditions that
would motivate a proficient pilot to use the chute (severe icing,
being surrounded by embedded TS, etc.). But what's been under
discussion here (at least as an instructive hypothetical example,
whatever the eventually revealed details of the ACK crash turn out to
be) is whether a competent private pilot could need to deploy the
chute just because of an inability to fly a few minutes in even the
easiest instrument conditions. I don't think so (though I'm glad the
option was available, and used, if it was needed).

[Morgans[_2_]]

"Kyle Boatright" > wrote

> I find it very hard to speculate about this particular episode until we
> know the airplane's fuel state, the weather at reachable fields, the
> conditions in which the aircraft was flying, or the training level of the
> pilot.
>
> For example, if the pilot wasn't IFR trained, he might have been in a
> situation where he wasn't confident of keeping the airplane right side up.
> In that situation, popping the chute too early is much better than popping
> it too late.

Yep, for all we know now, he may have already gotten himself upside down,
running out of ideas, skill, airspeed and altitude, all at the same time.

Yep, wait for the details before calling him a "Dumb Dan."
--
Jim in NC

[Larry Dighera]

On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 11:16:37 -0700, wrote in
om>:

>Analogously, I can readily imaging specific instrument conditions that
>would motivate a proficient pilot to use the chute (severe icing,
>being surrounded by embedded TS, etc.).

Deploying a parachute in the vicinity of stratospheric updrafts can
lead to hypoxia:


Here's a little story on that topic (Search for 'updraft' for the
pertinent part.):


A Frightening Parachute Ride

by Jim Bates

The U.S. Air Force song says, in part, "Off we go, into the wild
blue yonder,..."

Despite that "wild" warning in the beginning of a spirited
exaltation to the joys of flight, confident pilots often become
forgetful that it might be nice weather when a flight starts but it's
quite possible for aviators to experience first-hand how wild that
blue yonder can easily and quickly become.

Here's the tale-of a naval pilot who discovered the extent of
that wildness.

In May 1960, while flying in formation with another pilot, our
discoverer bailed out of a powerless F8U at 47,000 feet while on a VFR
(visual flight rules) journey from Massachusetts to North Carolina.
His unanticipated problems started while the two planes were passing
over a thunderstorm and his plane's engine made odd noises and a fire
warning light came on.

He took hurried corrective actions, but nothing worked. Abruptly
he was without power controls and the stick was locked in neutral
position. He hastily decided to eject rather than stay with the plane
that had started an uncontrollable plunge toward the raging storm
below.

Later reports estimated the thunderstorm to be some hundred miles
in diameter. His indicated airspeed at ejection was 210 knots (241.5
miles per hour).

The "wild blue yonder" gave him a frightening experience of a
nine-mile descent, lasting more than thirty minutes - an ordeal that
he fortunately survived - during which his parachute equipment did not
fail, though it had been subjected to extraordinary stresses. Parts of
his incredible adventure are given here in his words, garnered from
statements in an official U.S. Navy investigation.


* * *

"My first sensation was one of severe cold and extreme expansion,
as if I were about to explode. The cold rapidly changed to a burning,
tingling sensation. I felt as if millions of pins were sticking in me.
I sensed that I was tumbling and spinning like a cartwheel. My arms
and legs were out and I could not get them in.

"In a matter of seconds I realized I had retained my helmet and
mask but no longer had my visor although I had been flying with it
down because of the bright sunlight and reflection from the top of the
clouds. I believe it was torn away on ejection.

"I opened my eyes and saw I was entering wispy clouds. I was
going into the tops of the fleecy overcast that I had flown through
just a few minutes before. I seem to remember saying to myself, 'Well,
you're entering it and it's about 44,000 feet.' About this time I
managed to get my arms into my body.

"I looked down and noticed that I was absolutely forcing my torso
harness. It looked like it was going to burst. My stomach popped out
under my life vest as though I were pregnant.

"I had the feeling that I fell and fell and fell and fell for an
eternity. My oxygen mask was beating against my face. I held my mask
with my right hand. I put my left hand on my helmet which was pulling
on the chin strap as if it was going to go off. My left hand was very
cold and numb - it felt like somebody else's hand, not mine.

"Some time during the free fall, my right glove got in my way. It
inflated like a balloon so I let it go - just jettisoned it. I
remember seeing it go off and I thought 'Why did I throw the glove
away?'

"During the free fall I had the feeling of not being able to
exhale; in fact, I seemed to have to work very hard to be able to
exhale, but all I had to do was open my mouth and in-rushing air just
seemed to fill my lungs. At this time it was getting a bit darker in
the cloud.

"I had an urge to open the parachute but I told myself I was
still far too high and if I did I would either freeze to death or die
from lack of oxygen. I still had this tingling sensation but I sort of
had the feeling that I was slowing down and falling into denser
atmosphere and I seemed to be getting a little warmer.

"I was still in the free fall and thinking about opening the
chute. It was quite dark but I don't recall any great moisture or any
great violence. It seems like while I was thinking about opening the
chute, all of a sudden there was a terrific jolt and I knew the chute
had opened. I looked up but by this time I was in such a dense, dark
cloud that I couldn't even see my canopy. I reached up and got hold of
the risers and gave them tugs on both sides; it felt like I had a good
chute.

"From here on, my memory of what happened seems much better. I
now clearly recall running out of oxygen, having the mask collapse
against my face, and I believe I disconnected it from the right side
as I always do. At about this time I thought I definitely had it made
and was going to survive. However, I noticed I was still bleeding from
the nose, my right hand was cut, and my left hand was frozen numb, but
the pressure was going and I was much more comfortable. Then the
turbulence started and I realized I was entering the thunderstorm.

"As the turbulence started, I was pelted all over by hail. Then I
fell a little bit more and I seemed to be caught in a violent updraft.
I had the feeling that I was being tossed around - that I was actually
going around in a loop and I was looping over my canopy like being on
the end of a centrifuge. I got sick in the turbulence and heaved.

"Sometimes I could see the canopy and sometimes I couldn't. The
tossing and the turbulence was so violent it is difficult to describe.
I went up and down - I was buffeted about in all directions - at times
it felt like I was going sideways. One time I hit a very rough blast
of air - I went soaring back up and got in a very severe hailstorm. I
remember the hail beating down on my helmet. I had the feeling it
would tear my canopy up. The next thing I knew I was in rain so heavy
I felt like I was standing under a waterfall. I had my mask loose and
the water was so great that when I tried to inhale I got water with
the air like I was swimming. It seems to me that some time in the
storm I noticed my watch and was surprised that it had stayed with me.
I'm not sure but I think I was able to tell the time by the luminous
dial - I believe it was around 1815.

"At one time during an up or down draft, the parachute canopy
collapsed and came down over me like a big sheet. I could see my legs
in the shroud lines. This gave me some concern - I thought maybe the
chute wouldn't blossom again properly and since the hail seemed to be
larger now I was afraid it might damage the canopy and put holes in
it. I fell and the canopy blossomed again. I felt the risers and
everything seemed all right.

"At this time I looked down and saw what appeared to be a big
black elevator shaft. Then I felt like I had been hit by a blast of
compressed air and I went soaring back up again - up and down -
sideways. How much of this soaring went on I don't know. I had the
feeling that if it went on much longer I was not going to maintain
consciousness. I was being tossed around and beaten around and I
wasn't quite sure how much more I could take.

"The violence was so great that I thought that if it doesn't stop
soon, my gear will come apart - and my straps will break - I will come
apart. Stretching - twisting - slamming - the turbulence of this
thunderstorm was so violent I have nothing to compare it with. I
became quite airsick and I had considerable vertigo. Again I had the
feeling that I couldn't take much more of this but if I could only
hold out a little while longer, I would be falling out of the roughest
part of the storm.

"The lightning was so severe that I kept my eyes closed most of
the time. Even with my eyelids closed, there was a blinding
reddish-white light when the lightning flashed. I felt rather than
heard the thunder; it just about burst my eardrums. As I recall,
I had the feeling that I was in the upper part of the storm because
the lightning seemed to be just flashes. As I descended, I seemed to
see big red streaks heading towards the earth. All of a sudden I
realized it was getting a little calmer and I was probably descending
below the storm. The turbulence grew less, then ceased and I realized
I was below the storm. The rain continued, the air was smooth, and I
started thinking about my landing.

"By now my shoulders and legs hurt pretty badly. I checked myself
over again and thought I was O.K. I kept looking down and said to
myself 'Under the storm you probably won't have more than three
hundred feet.' It was just like breaking out when you're making a GCA
[ground controlled approach]. The first thing I saw was green and then
I was able to see trees and then I knew I was very close to the deck.

"I remember seeing a field off in the distance and I thought
there must be people nearby. As I got close to the trees I suddenly
realized there was a surface wind and I was being carried horizontally
over the ground quite rapidly - maybe 25 knots. I oscillated about
three times, then went into the trees. It seemed that my chute fouled
in two pine trees and I continued in a horizontal position with the
wind, then swung back to the left. I came crashing back through the
trees like a pendulum and hit a large tree with my left side. My head,
face, and shoulder took most of the blow. My helmet was knocked
crooked but I think it did a great deal to save me here. The blow was
so violent that it twisted my helmet back on the right side and pulled
the chin strap so tight over my Adam's apple under my chin that I had
to loosen it when I got on the ground. Anyway, I came down with a
crash. I slid down and landed on my side. I was cold and stunned but
still conscious. At first I thought I had broken something and was
paralyzed. Pretty soon, however, I was able to move my head and then
my arms. I checked the time; it was between 1840 and 1845."

The pilot's report went on to detail that he wasn't yet out of
trouble. It was still daylight but dimming quickly, and raining
heavily. The physically battered and stunned pilot struggled out
of the tangle of canopy, suspension lines, and harness webbing. He
wanted desperately to get out of the woods before dark, but he was
confused about what direction to go. Momentary panic worsened the
confusion but he forced himself to think rationally.

He then quickly recalled training in making square search
patterns. In the rainy darkness he saw a freshly cut tree stump, then
another, and another, then several more. He figured that a logging
operation of this size meant there would a logging road also. That
road would be the objective of his square search pattern.

On the third leg of the square pattern he found the road. In the
increasing darkness and steady rain he followed the dirt road until he
came to a farm field and across the field he saw automobile headlights
of several cars moving along a road. He wearily plodded through the
muddy field until he reached a paved two-lane secondary road.
Bedraggled, he stood on the edge of the road and tried to flag down a
passing car. He got annoyed, then angry, that by his count fifteen
cars went by without stopping to help.

His statement went on to read: "I must have looked like something
real unusual - all wet and bleeding and standing out there in my
flight suit in the dark and the rain. I guess they figured I was
drunk.

But suddenly he got a break: "Then after all these other cars had
kept on going, a car came by and I thought I heard a boy say, 'There's
a pilot, daddy."'

The car kept going into the rainy darkness, but then slowed,
turned around, and came back to the exhausted, hurt roadside figure.
The aviator's ordeal was done. He recovered from his injuries flew
again for many years.

The U.S. Navy's Approach magazine, produced for naval and marine
corps flight crew members, included the pilot's amazing flight
experience in an issue published soon after the official investigation
had been completed.

The "wild blue yonder" had been bested and another flyer's life
was saved with a parachute.


The author can be contacted via e-mail:
Copyright (c) 1995 Aero.com. All rights reserved.
http://aero.com/publications/parachutes/9610/pc1096.htm

[Morgans[_2_]]

> wrote

> If a pilot pulls the chute because he judges an uncontrolled parachute
> descent to be less risky than trying to keep the plane upright for a
> few minutes in simple instrument cruise flight, then he has judged
> himself to have less than the minimum required competence for a
> private pilot. (As I said earlier, it's not THAT judgment that I'm
> disputing; he may well have made the right choice at that point.)

It seems like about everyone will agree that the Private Pilot ticket is
somewhat minimal on the ability to fly on the gauges, alone.

I personally think that there should be more emphasis on teaching and
testing ability to control the plane for more extended periods of time, and
making sure that several turns, climbs and descents are combined, all while
on the gauges. Perhaps a bit of IMC upset training could be included, also.

It would be nice if these things could be demonstrated in real, and hard,
IMC. Of course, for some people in some areas, it might be "overly
difficult" to find conditions like that - in a timely matter.

I know, many of you will say - more money, more time, not needed, over
regulation, ..... and many other reasons why not to change the way it is at
the present time.

I do wonder if the requirements were as I suggested, if we would lose less
people due to loss of control accidents, though.
--
Jim in NC

[Vaughn Simon]

"Ron Natalie" > wrote in message
m...

> Fog setting in is often an area phenomenon. It's not
> like flying into a puffy cumulous on a summer day.

And it can happen fast...damn fast...when temperature and dew point merge
for any reason.

I will never forget the time it happened to me. It took less than five
minutes to happen, a sudden ground fog that seemed to obscure the entire area.
I was a solo student...in a glider.

Had there been a whole plane parachute there is little doubt that I would
have considered using it. As it was, I received some help to find a hole in the
stuff and all turned out well.

Vaughn

[Ron Natalie]

Matt Whiting wrote:
>>
>> Fog setting in is often an area phenomenon. It's not
>> like flying into a puffy cumulous on a summer day.
>
> True, but it hardly ever covers an area as large as the range of a Cirrus.
>

The Cirrus range isn't going to help much with a non-instrument trained
pilot blundering around in the muck. The issue is the conditions
changed faster than the Cirrus can fly.

[[email protected]]

> than the specified 40 hours of dual

Oops, that should say 40 hours of total time, of course.

[B A R R Y]

On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 10:53:11 -0400, "Kyle Boatright"
> wrote:

>
>For example, if the pilot wasn't IFR trained, he might have been in a
>situation where he wasn't confident of keeping the airplane right side up.
>In that situation, popping the chute too early is much better than popping
>it too late.

I thought the same.

How many times do non-instrument rated pilots who inadvertently
venture into IMC and don't have a chute end up dead?

I did the required 3 hours of foggle time as a student pilot, and
continued to practice with the foggles after my checkride, with my
co-owner as a safety pilot. My PP DE and instructors often
complimented my hood flying. I always felt I'd be prepared if I
accidentally ended up in IMC.

The first time I went into actual as an instrument student, and
actually maneuvered the aircraft, I was blown away with how different
IMC was vs. foggles. I had been in IMC before, but as a right seat
pax, not as a pilot. Popping in and out of clouds is even more
difficult without experience and proper training.

I'll leave the second guessing to the NTSB and insurance companies.
For once, it's nice to hear everyone is OK! New airplanes are born
every day, and aren't hard to replace. <G>

[Roy Smith]

Judah > wrote:
> But in this case, it would seem that the pilot may have made several bad
> decisions leading up to that final one.

If you look at accident reports, that's almost always the case. A series
of small things go wrong, each one reducing the number of options you have.
The idea is to break the chain early.

When you take off, you've got a certain range of how far you can fly with
the fuel you have left. Every airport within a circle of that radius from
you is a possible landing point. Every minute you're in the air, that
circle gets smaller and smaller. Which means your options for dealing with
deteriorating weather, minor mechanical issues, etc, keep getting reduced.

Imagine you're planning a business trip. You've picked a small airport
right near your hotel and arranged with the FBO that they'll run you over
there when you land. You were in a hurry to take off so you didn't bother
to top off the tanks. You were only down to the tab on one side and
calculated you had a 90 minute reserve with what was left and that should
be more than enough.

The airport has a 2000 foot runway. Normally, that would be no problem,
but you get there and find there's moderate turbulence and a stiff
crosswind. You also got a little lost along the way and by the time you
find your destination it's getting dark. On top of that, you took off with
a burned out landing light, which makes it hard to judge when to flare.

None of those should be fatal, but the combination of them adds up to the
landing being beyond your skill level. Fortunately, you're smart enough to
recognize that your approach is messed up and go around. You make a few
attempts at landing, but eventually figure out that this is not working and
you need to divert.

You wasted 15 minutes getting lost, and then another 15 minutes making a
few attempts to land. You've still got an hour of fuel left and your
alternate is a Class C that's only 20 minutes away. There is another
airport with a 3000 foot runway better aligned with the wind that's closer,
but you won't be able to rent a car there like you will at the bigger
field, and you need to make your meeting.

Normally, this should not be a problem, bu're still a bit stressed out from
getting lost and those four go-arounds, so you forget to lean the mixture.
Instead of burning 15 GPH, you're burning closer to 25. Those 60 minutes
of fuel become 40 minutes. Divided between two tanks. You're just about
to call up approach when the engine begins to sputter. Your good training
kicks in; you immediately switch tanks and the engine roars back to life.

That's when you realize your mistake, lean the mixture, and for good
measure throttle back to best range speed. You get the fuel burn down to
10 GPH with only a small loss of speed. You should be fine.

You call approach, but nobody answers. You're coming up on the edge of the
class charlie. You're worried about busting their airspace and are still
thinking this is not an emergency so you circle a few times trying to raise
them. Finally, you hear a scratchy reply, "Aircraft calling XXX,
unreadable, try another radio".

That's when you notice the cabin lighting is getting dim. You remember
that pilots have been squawking the alternator on this plane as failing
intermittently for several months, but it still hasn't been fixed. You
look at the voltmeter, and sure enough it's down to 11 volts. You try
resetting the alternator switch, but that doesn't do any good.

At this point, you realize you're in deep kimchee and decide to screw
talking on the radio. You can already see the airport beacon so you just
head right straight for it. You're going to get it on the ground and
explain things later. A bit closer in, ATC finally responds to one of your
calls; "Aircraft declaring low fuel, you are still barely readable, cleared
to land any runway, advise intentions and souls on board when able".

You enter the pattern, and put the gear lever down. The gear starts down,
then the cabin lights go completely dark and that's it. You pull out a
flashlight, peer at the barber pole indicator, and discover the gear is
halfway down. You peer at the gas gauge and see it's closer to E than
you've ever seen it before. You know a gear-up landing will be survivable,
but you've read that landing with partially extended gear can be much
worse. It's eons since you've practiced manually cranking down the gear
the rest of the way and aren't sure how long it will take. Not to mention
no autopilot to hold the plane steady in all that turbulence while you
fight with the stupid crank.

Just then, your instructor taps you on shoulder, and says, "OK, let's reset
the sim and talk about what went wrong".

So, what did go wrong? Lots of things. Bad maintenance. Your decision to
take off despite these issues. Getting lost. There was more wind and
turbulence at your destination than you expected. Your short-field landing
skills were a bit rusty. You forgot to lean.

None of these were fatal by themselves. Probably you could have handled
any two or three in combination. The real problem is that each one reduced
your available options until finally, at the end of the chain, you had no
choice but to hit the reset button.

You had plenty of chances to break the chain. In hindsight, any of the
following probably would have saved the day:

* Better maintenance.

* Refusing to take off knowing there were maintenance problems.

* Topping off the fuel before you left.

* Once you got lost, recognizing that you had eaten into your fuel and
daylight reserves and stopping to refuel.

* Deciding to divert after just one or two failed landing attempts.

* Using your checklists so you wouldn't forget to lean.

* Using the closer alternate.

* Heading straight for your chosen alternate instead of wasting time trying
to raise ATC on the radio.

* And more generally, not recognizing when you were really in trouble and
being proactive about breaking the chain while you still had options.

[Viperdoc[_4_]]

The flight listed in Flightaware.com was IFR.

[[email protected]]

On Aug 19, 3:40 pm, B A R R Y > wrote:
> On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 10:53:11 -0400, "Kyle Boatright"
> I did the required 3 hours of foggle time as a student pilot, and
> continued to practice with the foggles after my checkride, with my
> co-owner as a safety pilot. My PP DE and instructors often
> complimented my hood flying. I always felt I'd be prepared if I
> accidentally ended up in IMC.
>
> The first time I went into actual as an instrument student, and
> actually maneuvered the aircraft, I was blown away with how different
> IMC was vs. foggles.

That's a good point. In some ways, a PC simulator provides better
instrument practice than foggles (with foggles, peripheral lighting
changes when the plane maneuvers, giving you unconscious clues about
the plane's attitude). But there's no substitute for actual IMC.

Even though IMC was much different, I bet you could've handled
"stabilize the plane, turn to the north, and fly straight and level
for a few minutes" even if you'd been on your own.

> I'll leave the second guessing to the NTSB and insurance companies.

I think the second guessing is less important than the lessons to
draw. One important point that's emerged from this discussion is that
(in contrast with your own history) many non-instrument pilots
apparently do little or nothing to maintain their basic instrument
proficiency, and that's not good.

> For once, it's nice to hear everyone is OK! New airplanes are born
> every day, and aren't hard to replace. <G>

Agreed!

[Marty Shapiro]

"Viperdoc" > wrote in
:

> The flight listed in Flightaware.com was IFR.
>
>
>

And is was on August 10th going from Nantucket to White Plains.

--
Marty Shapiro
Silicon Rallye Inc.

(remove SPAMNOT to email me)

[ManhattanMan]

Ron Wanttaja wrote:
>
> Every time Cirrus BRS deployments come up, I'm reminded of the
> anti-parachute arguments during WWI.
>


OMG - you were in WWI? Tell us about it......... :)

[B A R R Y]

On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 13:26:28 -0700, wrote:

>
>Even though IMC was much different, I bet you could've handled
>"stabilize the plane, turn to the north, and fly straight and level
>for a few minutes" even if you'd been on your own.

I think so, too. However, I give more credit to this to my continuing
practice than the minimal check ride prep.

>I think the second guessing is less important than the lessons to
>draw. One important point that's emerged from this discussion is that
>(in contrast with your own history) many non-instrument pilots
>apparently do little or nothing to maintain their basic instrument
>proficiency, and that's not good.

Right on...

[Viperdoc]

Yes, it was IFR on that flight, which would suggest that if the same person
flew the same plane back, they probably still had the same rating. This
would also imply that it was not a VFR pilot stumbling into IMC scenario.

[B A R R Y]

On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 17:29:24 -0500, "Viperdoc"
> wrote:

>Yes, it was IFR on that flight, which would suggest that if the same person
>flew the same plane back, they probably still had the same rating. This
>would also imply that it was not a VFR pilot stumbling into IMC scenario.


How do we know it's not a rental or fractional ownership? Both are
not uncommon for Cirrus aircraft here in the Northeast.

[Viperdoc[_4_]]

Yes, you could be right. However, one of the previous posters listed an
individual, not a corporation as the owner. This also suggests it was not a
fractional or rental.

[Jim Logajan]

Owen Rogers > wrote:
> Other reports said that it was a Cirrus, although the make/model
> hasn't been confirmed yet.

"A representative with Cirrus Design confirmed the aircraft involved was
an Entegra-equipped SR20." From:

http://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?ContentBlockID=f3d69ba3-1538-488f-9018-fa2c93c17741

Here's an opinion piece already published on this that is similar to my
own opinion on the subject:

http://jamesfallows.theatlantic.com/archives/2007/08/would_this_have_saved_jfk_jr.php

[B A R R Y]

On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 18:24:29 -0500, "Viperdoc"
> wrote:

>Yes, you could be right. However, one of the previous posters listed an
>individual, not a corporation as the owner. This also suggests it was not a
>fractional or rental.

I missed the earlier post, as I was on vacation. I agree, if the
owner is listed as an individual.

An interesting sidebar is that I was vacationing on Cape Cod
(Provincetown), and I saw no mention of the accident in the local
paper.

[Montblack]

("Ron Wanttaja" wrote)
> Every time Cirrus BRS deployments come up, I'm reminded of the
> anti-parachute arguments during WWI.


John O says the funniest post (of all time!) was the "bailing out" of a Link
Trainer, which was on fire and in an uncontrolled spin, story.

Was that your adventure?

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/k05000/k05796.jpg

http://www.starksravings.com/linktrainer/linktrainer.htm


Paul-Mont

[Judah]

wrote in
ups.com:

> But isn't it a pilot's responsibility to be sure she or he is
> proficient before taking off as PIC? If a private pilot doesn't
> occasionally use a hood or a simulator (or night VFR over water, etc.)
> to practice instrument flying, isn't that pilot shirking a basic
> responsibility to maintain required competence?

I am not aware of any regulation in the FARs that indicates that it is a VFR
pilot's responsibility to be proficient at flying in instrument conditions
before taking off as PIC.

[Matt Barrow[_4_]]

"Bob Noel" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> "Kyle Boatright" > wrote:
>
>> Every time someone uses the chute on a Cirrus, we get people second
>> guessing
>> the decision.
>
> Every decision everyone makes is a candidate for being second guessed.

Instead of "second guessed", I'd rather use the word "analyzed". Such is how
we refine our learning.

> I hope no one is saying pilot decisions are not open for discussion or
> debate.

And for criticism or even derision if so warranted, or praise if so
warranted.

Having a chute is not an excuse for careless or reckless bahavior, just as
seatbelts and airbags are not an excuse for using brickwalls to stop in lieu
of keeping your brakes maintained.

[Matt Barrow[_4_]]

"Vaughn Simon" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Ron Natalie" > wrote in message
> m...
>
>> Fog setting in is often an area phenomenon. It's not
>> like flying into a puffy cumulous on a summer day.
>
> And it can happen fast...damn fast...when temperature and dew point
> merge for any reason.
>
> I will never forget the time it happened to me. It took less than
> five minutes to happen, a sudden ground fog that seemed to obscure the
> entire area. I was a solo student...in a glider.

A previous post indicates that the airport (reportedly) went IFR half an
hour earlier.

[Bob Noel]

In article >,
Ron Wanttaja > wrote:

> I've been taking BFRs since they were instituted, and don't believe I've been
> put under the hood more than once or twice since my original Private flight
> test. And *that* was ~35 years ago.

ah HA. A downside of having the instrument rating. I've been put under the
hood each and every time I've had a BFR since I got my rating in 1990.

--
Bob Noel
(goodness, please trim replies!!!)

[Judah]

Ron Natalie > wrote in news:46c87147$0$23480
:

> Fog setting in is often an area phenomenon. It's not
> like flying into a puffy cumulous on a summer day.

Does fog simply appear around a plane out of nowhere, and the pilot would not
have seen it coming before he flew into it?

I have never experienced that phenomenon...

[Ron Wanttaja]

On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 19:13:32 -0500, "Montblack"
> wrote:

>("Ron Wanttaja" wrote)
>> Every time Cirrus BRS deployments come up, I'm reminded of the
>> anti-parachute arguments during WWI.
>
>John O says the funniest post (of all time!) was the "bailing out" of a Link
>Trainer, which was on fire and in an uncontrolled spin, story.
>
>Was that your adventure?

Yup. Back when I was a CAP cadet, we resurrected an old Link C-3 from the scrap
heap and got it going again. I was working on it alone late one night, getting
the rudder pedals rigged properly. I "took it up" and decided to put it into a
right spin.

Then, I started smelling smoke. I lifted the canopy slightly, cracked the door,
and looked out. As the cabin spun around the base, I saw smoke gushing from the
main electrical control panel in the base of the Link. I stomped on the left
rudder pedal to stop the spin...and the nail I'd used to connect the pedal to
the linkage popped out.

So there I was, spinning down...well, SPINNING at least...to my flaming doom.

I did what any self-respecting aviator would do. I threw open the canopy,
pushed open the door, stood on the step, waited until the Link spun to face a
relatively clear space of floor, and bailed out.

A quick PLF, then I cut the power and starting hosing the thing down with a CO2
fire extinguisher.

The old WWII model link trainers were absolute marvels. They were analog
computers in vacuum rather than electronics. There was a sealed tank up forward
that got air sucked out as the plane climbed, and the aircraft altimeter was
merely plumbed into. One manifold "stored" the airspeed, which depended upon a
valve set by a throttle, another controlled by the pitch attitude, etc.

Ron Wanttaja

[Judah]

wrote in news:1187543218.589116.298870@
57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com:

>
> That's a reasonable question. The answer is that "competent" doesn't
> mean perfect. A competent pilot may make a mistake resulting in a
> spin, or airframe icing, or the like. At that point, there may be no
> safe way to recover without pulling the chute.

So it's acceptable for a competent pilot to get in over his head with respect
to spinning or icing, but not with respect to flying into IMC.

Hmmmmm........

[Bob Noel]

In article >,
"Matt Barrow" > wrote:

> >> Every time someone uses the chute on a Cirrus, we get people second
> >> guessing
> >> the decision.
> >
> > Every decision everyone makes is a candidate for being second guessed.
>
> Instead of "second guessed", I'd rather use the word "analyzed". Such is how
> we refine our learning.

yes. good point.

--
Bob Noel
(goodness, please trim replies!!!)

[Matt Barrow[_4_]]

"Judah" > wrote in message
. ..
> wrote in
> ups.com:
>
>> But isn't it a pilot's responsibility to be sure she or he is
>> proficient before taking off as PIC? If a private pilot doesn't
>> occasionally use a hood or a simulator (or night VFR over water, etc.)
>> to practice instrument flying, isn't that pilot shirking a basic
>> responsibility to maintain required competence?
>
> I am not aware of any regulation in the FARs that indicates that it is a
> VFR
> pilot's responsibility to be proficient at flying in instrument conditions
> before taking off as PIC.

He didn't refer to legalities.

Recall the old adage, "What is legal is not necessarily safe (and vice
versa)".

[[email protected]]

On Aug 19, 8:46 pm, Judah > wrote:
> wrote roups.com:
>
> > But isn't it a pilot's responsibility to be sure she or he is
> > proficient before taking off as PIC? If a private pilot doesn't
> > occasionally use a hood or a simulator (or night VFR over water, etc.)
> > to practice instrument flying, isn't that pilot shirking a basic
> > responsibility to maintain required competence?
>
> I am not aware of any regulation in the FARs that indicates that it is a VFR
> pilot's responsibility to be proficient at flying in instrument conditions
> before taking off as PIC.

Just to be clear, we're not talking about full IFR proficiency--just
the ability to do what the private-pilot PTS requires with regard to
instrument flight.

If you're due for a flight review, and the instructor conducting the
review discovers that you can't perform instrument flight to PTS
standards (or can't perform any other important task to PTS
standards), then you won't be allowed to fly as PIC until you can show
that your deficiency has been remedied. Doesn't that constitue a
requirement to have that proficiency? Or do you maintain that the
FAA's intent is only to require a pilot to be proficient for a few
minutes every couple of years, with arbitrary deterioration of skills
being acceptable in between (even if the pilot continues to act as
PIC)?

Even if such deterioration were legally acceptable, it would violate
the most basic tenant of PIC responsibility.

[[email protected]]

On Aug 19, 8:52 pm, Judah > wrote:
> wrote in news:1187543218.589116.298870@
> 57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com:
>
>
>
> > That's a reasonable question. The answer is that "competent" doesn't
> > mean perfect. A competent pilot may make a mistake resulting in a
> > spin, or airframe icing, or the like. At that point, there may be no
> > safe way to recover without pulling the chute.
>
> So it's acceptable for a competent pilot to get in over his head with respect
> to spinning or icing, but not with respect to flying into IMC.

Nope, that's not what I'm saying. A competent pilot is not completely
immune to the possibility of making a mistake, including the mistake
of accidentally flying into IMC.

But if flying in uncomplicated instrument conditions is something that
a private pilot simply doesn't know how to do, then the pilot is
missing an important skill that's required for the pilot's initial and
recurring certification. Lacking an entire area of expected competence
is not the same as just making a mistake.

[[email protected]]

On Aug 19, 9:11 pm, wrote:
> the most basic tenant of PIC responsibility.

Er, make that "basic tenent".

[Luke Skywalker]

On Aug 19, 12:49 pm, wrote:
> On Aug 19, 1:28 pm, Luke Skywalker > wrote:
>
> > Three hours is insufficient to develop and ingrain even a rudimentary
> > "scan" and it certianly does not teach deriving a "picture" of what
> > the airplane is doing based on the instruments.
>
> But three hours of instrument instruction isn't the only requirement.
> The requirement is to have as much instruction as it takes to acquire
> the competence! It must be at least three hours, but can be much more
> if necessary (just as most pilots need much more than the specified 40
> hours of dual before getting a private-pilot certificate).
>
> Once the skill is acquired and the pilot is certificated, it's the
> pilot's responsibility--as with ALL basic required skills--to do
> whatever is needed to remain proficient before acting as PIC.

Hello:

Instrument competency to pass a private pilot check ride is one thing,
training it to a sufficient level to remain competent in it for long
periods of time is quite another.

In addition I would imagine and my experience is that the instrument
portion of the checkride for a Private pilot license is about the last
thing that private pilots stay current and competent in.

Robert

[Kyle Boatright]

"Judah" > wrote in message
. ..
> Ron Natalie > wrote in news:46c87147$0$23480
> :
>
>> Fog setting in is often an area phenomenon. It's not
>> like flying into a puffy cumulous on a summer day.
>
> Does fog simply appear around a plane out of nowhere, and the pilot would
> not
> have seen it coming before he flew into it?
>
> I have never experienced that phenomenon...

One thing to consider is that the airplane doesn't have to be in the clouds
to have problems due to instrument conditions. You can fly for hours above
fog, but when it covers your destination (or all the airports within range),
penetrating a 100' layer of ground level fog can be an insurmountable
problem.

Weather can change across a very large area quite rapidly. I have seen
ground fog form over an area roughly 200,000 square miles in about 10
minutes. Surprised the heck out of me that on a very cold morning,
radiation fog would form so extensively and so quickly. Every airport East
of the Appalachian mountains was fogged in from North of DC to well South of
Atlanta.

This happened to me on a VFR flight right across up the Appalachians. Fog as
far as the eye could see to the East, and clear blue skies to the West of
the mountains.

At night, I imagine the rapid formation of fog or IMC could come as an even
bigger surprise.

KB

[Bob Fry]

>>>>> "NS" == NonSense == AirplaneSense > opined:

NS> The Cirrus chute is meant to recover from situations that
NS> competent piloting cannot reliably recover from
NS> (e.g. spins). It's not meant to substitute for knowing how to
NS> fly.

Really, did you tell Cirrus management that? Getting into a spin is
something that a competent pilot first of all shouldn't get into at
all, and secondly should be able to get out of. If I had a BRS and
got over my skills for whatever reason, damn right I'd use the chute.

NS> Luckily, the pilot and passenger were not fatally
NS> injuried. But the uncontolled parachute descent of an aircraft
NS> is dangerous to the occupants and to people on the ground. It
NS> could have been a lot worse.

A parachute descent is not entirely uncontrolled; the rate of descent
is very controlled, unlike a true uncontrolled descent by a
disoriented pilot. Yes, it could have been a *lot* worse if the pilot
hadn't used the chute.

NS> Cruise flight in simple instrument conditions is something
NS> that all private pilots are required to be capable of.

No. They're required to have received instruction under *simulated*
instrument conditions and be able to demonstrate a modest level of
proficiency in *simulated* conditions of instrument-only flight on
their checkride and BFRs. *Actual* instrument flight--especially at
night when you blunder into it unexpectedly and don't have an
instructor to hand the controls to--is utterly and entirely
different. I think the FARs should require some actual IMC time before
granting the IFR ticket and maybe the PP license, but for now they
don't. The pilot was probably as competent to *fly* the plane as most
VFR pilots, but also probably exhibited poor *judgement* to get into
that situation.

--
If you were a poor Indian with no weapons, and a bunch of
conquistadors came up to you and asked where the gold was, I
don't think it would be a good idea to say, "I swallowed it. So
sue me."
- Jack Handey

[Marty Shapiro]

"Viperdoc" > wrote in
:

> Yes, it was IFR on that flight, which would suggest that if the same
> person flew the same plane back, they probably still had the same
> rating. This would also imply that it was not a VFR pilot stumbling
> into IMC scenario.
>
>

The pilot may have been IFR rated & current, but at every Wings safety
seminar I've attended where the subject of inadvertent IMC encountered
while VFR comes up, it is stressed that this is a big killer of ALL pilots,
regardless of whether or not they are IFR rated and/or IFR current.

--
Marty Shapiro
Silicon Rallye Inc.

(remove SPAMNOT to email me)

[Ron Wanttaja]

On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 18:11:45 -0700, wrote:


>If you're due for a flight review, and the instructor conducting the
>review discovers that you can't perform instrument flight to PTS
>standards (or can't perform any other important task to PTS
>standards), then you won't be allowed to fly as PIC until you can show
>that your deficiency has been remedied. Doesn't that constitue a
>requirement to have that proficiency?

Not according to the FAA.

FAR 91.56 Flight Review

"...the review must include:
"1) A review of the current general operating and flight rules of Part 91 of
this chapter; and
"2) A review of those maneuvers and procedures that, at the discretion of the
person giving the review, are necessary for the pilot the safe exercise of the
privileges of the pilot certificate."

"At the discretion of the person giving the review" certainly means the FAA does
not consider it vital to have a VFR pilot demonstrate ANY particular ability,
including the ability to fly on instruments. AC 61-98A certainly leaves all
leeway to the instructor. Nor does it specify that the applicant must meet all
the all the original standards of their rating.

The FAA encourages pilots to take the BFR in aircraft they most often fly. If
that plane isn't IFR equipped...how, pray tell, is the CFI supposed to test them
on their ability to fly instruments? Here's the panel of my airplane...

http://www.wanttaja.com/hhrad2.JPG

....I haven't got room for a cat and a duck, must less anything resembling an IFR
panel. Up until a few years ago, I could have taken my BFR in this single-seat
airplane. How do you suppose the CFI was supposed to check my hood work while
he sat in a lawn chair with a radio?

Finally, don't loose sight of the fact that it is a REVIEW, not a test. There
are no pass/fail standards. An instructor is free, if they wish, to require
that applicants meet PTS standards in all areas. I've never encountered one who
did; most would just comment about my need to brush up on so-and-so and sign me
off for another two years.

Ron Wanttaja

[Judah]

Roy Smith > wrote in
:

> Judah > wrote:
>> But in this case, it would seem that the pilot may have made several
>> bad decisions leading up to that final one.
>
> If you look at accident reports, that's almost always the case. A
> series of small things go wrong, each one reducing the number of options
> you have. The idea is to break the chain early.

I appreciate the advice.

I had a bad experience once (as you may remember me mention in the past).
It was caused by a series of bad decisions that started before I even got
in the plane, not the least of which is the same "get-there-itis" that you
refer to in your simulation.

Fortunately, I walked away. More fortunately, I learned shortcuts and
carelessness don't mesh well with piloting.

I hope to never get into the situation that you described. I can't say
unequivocably that I won't, but I can't say unequivocably that I won't get
killed while crossing the street either..

Fortunately, the club that I belong to seems to be getting better about
maintenance. We've had our moments, but maintenance has made it to the top
of the priority list.

You should check it out...

;)

[Judah]

wrote in
ups.com:

> Nope, that's not what I'm saying. A competent pilot is not completely
> immune to the possibility of making a mistake, including the mistake
> of accidentally flying into IMC.
>
> But if flying in uncomplicated instrument conditions is something that
> a private pilot simply doesn't know how to do, then the pilot is
> missing an important skill that's required for the pilot's initial and
> recurring certification. Lacking an entire area of expected competence
> is not the same as just making a mistake.

I think your parallel between IMC and spins is incredibly accurate.
Recoveries from both are typically taught in the basic pilot training PTS,
but use only simulation. So why do you believe that recovery from one is
beyond a normal pilot's responsibility and the other is not?

[Aluckyguess]

"Judah" > wrote in message
. ..
> Ron Natalie > wrote in news:46c87147$0$23480
> :
>
>> Fog setting in is often an area phenomenon. It's not
>> like flying into a puffy cumulous on a summer day.
>
> Does fog simply appear around a plane out of nowhere, and the pilot would
> not
> have seen it coming before he flew into it?
>
> I have never experienced that phenomenon...

I have at night. All of a sudden your in a cloud.

[Jim Logajan]

wrote:
> If you're due for a flight review, and the instructor conducting the
> review discovers that you can't perform instrument flight to PTS
> standards (or can't perform any other important task to PTS
> standards), then you won't be allowed to fly as PIC until you can show
> that your deficiency has been remedied.

Say what? If, for example, a pilot had been signed off on a flight review
and 20 months later doesn't do well enough on another flight review then he
or she can still fly another 4 months. At least that is what I understand.

I humbly submit you don't make a lot of sense, Mr. AirplaneSense. :-)

[Jay Beckman[_2_]]

On Aug 19, 6:11 pm, wrote:
> On Aug 19, 8:46 pm, Judah > wrote:
>
> > wrote roups.com:
>
> > > But isn't it a pilot's responsibility to be sure she or he is
> > > proficient before taking off as PIC? If a private pilot doesn't
> > > occasionally use a hood or a simulator (or night VFR over water, etc.)
> > > to practice instrument flying, isn't that pilot shirking a basic
> > > responsibility to maintain required competence?
>
> > I am not aware of any regulation in the FARs that indicates that it is a VFR
> > pilot's responsibility to be proficient at flying in instrument conditions
> > before taking off as PIC.
>
> Just to be clear, we're not talking about full IFR proficiency--just
> the ability to do what the private-pilot PTS requires with regard to
> instrument flight.
>
> If you're due for a flight review, and the instructor conducting the
> review discovers that you can't perform instrument flight to PTS
> standards (or can't perform any other important task to PTS
> standards), then you won't be allowed to fly as PIC until you can show
> that your deficiency has been remedied. Doesn't that constitue a
> requirement to have that proficiency? Or do you maintain that the
> FAA's intent is only to require a pilot to be proficient for a few
> minutes every couple of years, with arbitrary deterioration of skills
> being acceptable in between (even if the pilot continues to act as
> PIC)?
>
> Even if such deterioration were legally acceptable, it would violate
> the most basic tenant of PIC responsibility.

This is not correct as a flight review is not a test that you can pass
or fail.

The worst thing that can happen is that the CFI declines to sign off
but this does not immediately disqualify you to be PIC until you reach
the end of the last day of the 24th calender month.

Jay Beckman
PP-ASEL
Chandler, AZ

[Ron Lee[_2_]]

"Kyle Boatright" > wrote:

>Every time someone uses the chute on a Cirrus, we get people second guessing
>the decision. There is only one person in the world qualified to make the
>decision, and that's the guy or gal in the left seat when the decision is
>made.

The problem is that the BRS seems to be a last resort for poor
decision making.

Ron Lee

[Thomas Borchert]

Ron,

> The problem is that the BRS seems to be a last resort for poor
> decision making.
>

And death would be a better option? I simply don't get the attitude
behind all the statements in this vain.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Thomas Borchert]

> But if flying in uncomplicated instrument conditions is something that
> a private pilot simply doesn't know how to do, then the pilot is
> missing an important skill that's required for the pilot's initial and
> recurring certification
>

You're wrong. A VFR pilot is not at all required to be able to fly in
"uncomplicated instrument conditions". Point me to the regs to prove me
wrong.

Again, I'd really like to know if you are a pilot.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Peter Clark]

On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 14:49:32 -0400, "Morgans"
> wrote:

>
>"Kyle Boatright" > wrote
>
>> I find it very hard to speculate about this particular episode until we
>> know the airplane's fuel state, the weather at reachable fields, the
>> conditions in which the aircraft was flying, or the training level of the
>> pilot.
>>
>> For example, if the pilot wasn't IFR trained, he might have been in a
>> situation where he wasn't confident of keeping the airplane right side up.
>> In that situation, popping the chute too early is much better than popping
>> it too late.
>
>Yep, for all we know now, he may have already gotten himself upside down,
>running out of ideas, skill, airspeed and altitude, all at the same time.
>
>Yep, wait for the details before calling him a "Dumb Dan."

And for all we know in a TAA like the Cirrus he was on the autopilot
the whole time.

[[email protected]]

On Aug 20, 12:57 am, Jay Beckman > wrote:
> On Aug 19, 6:11 pm, wrote:
> > If you're due for a flight review, and the instructor conducting the
> > review discovers that you can't perform instrument flight to PTS
> > standards (or can't perform any other important task to PTS
> > standards), then you won't be allowed to fly as PIC until you can show
> > that your deficiency has been remedied.
>
> This is not correct as a flight review is not a test that
> you can pass or fail.
>
> The worst thing that can happen is that the CFI declines to sign off
> but this does not immediately disqualify you to be PIC until you reach
> the end of the last day of the 24th calender month.

Right, but that's not inconsistent with my post. You and Jim missed
the clause at the beginning: "If you're due for a flight review". The
date you mention is when you're due for a flight review. And as I
correctly stated, if a flight review reveals a deficiency on or after
that date--for example, if it reveals that you can't fly by reference
to instruments in accordance with the private-pilot PTS--then you
can't fly as PIC until that deficiency is corrected.

Ron points out that a flight review instructor might not even test
your instrument flying (or any other particular component of the PTS).
That's true, of course. But that doesn't mean it's not a required
skill; it just means you MIGHT not get tested on it. That's hardly a
reason to be complacent if you lack that potentially life-saving
required safety skill. That's the point I'm trying to make, and I'm
surprised to find that it's at all controversial.

[Stefan]

Matt Barrow schrieb:

>> Every decision everyone makes is a candidate for being second guessed.

> Instead of "second guessed", I'd rather use the word "analyzed". Such is how
> we refine our learning.

I wonder how you think you can "analyse" this case with knowing exactly
*nothing* about the exact circumstances. Obviously, the word analyze has
a different meaning to you than to me.

As to the circumstances: Maybe he was trapped over a forming layer of
ground fog? A 100 ft thick layer of ground fog can form pretty quickly
and is an unsurmountable obstacle for even the best trained and
perfectly current IFR pilot, unless the airport and the plane are both
cat III equipped. The accident reports are full of cases where a class I
IFR pilot attemped to make a class III approach. But I'm just second
guessing, too.

Of course the interesting question is how he managed to get into that
situation in the first place, but we'll never know this without knowing
the exact details of the flight.

Stefan

[Stefan]

Judah schrieb:

> Does fog simply appear around a plane out of nowhere,

Yes, it can. Around the plane, and, more often, below it.

> and the pilot would not have seen it coming before he flew
> into it?

If it forms, then it isn't "coming".

> I have never experienced that phenomenon...

I'm sure there are still more things you haven't experienced yet.

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Owen Rogers wrote:
> Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>
> Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when
> they ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the
> island are common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery
> System parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>
> The two aboard had minor injuries but will be ok. Nobody was injured
> on the ground.
>
> Here is a news link:
> http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070818/NEWS/708180319/-1/NEWS
>
> Other reports said that it was a Cirrus, although the make/model
> hasn't been confirmed yet.

It's well known that countinued VFR into IMC is a leading cause of accidents
but I didn't realize that with the Cirrus an accident was required.

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Aluckyguess wrote:
> He is alive so he's not to dumb. He has money so who cares about the
> plane.


So do those flying Cirrus have the required hood time waived and an aren't
taught to do a 180 in IMC?

Obviously a climbing 180 would have been in order.

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
>> If a pilot pulls the chute because he judges an uncontrolled
>> parachute descent to be less risky than trying to keep the plane
>> upright for a few minutes in simple instrument cruise flight, then
>> he has judged himself to have less than the minimum required
>> competence for a private pilot.
>>
>
> That's BS, plain and simple. The instrument flying requirement is
> required for the test, barely. There is no requirement at all to keep
> it current. Otherwise, all certified pilots would be instrument
> pilots.

I've never had a BFR where the CFI didn't put me back under the hood.

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Matt Barrow wrote:
> "Bob Noel" > wrote in message
> ...
>> In article >,
>> "Kyle Boatright" > wrote:
>>
>>> Every time someone uses the chute on a Cirrus, we get people second
>>> guessing
>>> the decision.
>>
>> Every decision everyone makes is a candidate for being second
>> guessed.
>
> Instead of "second guessed", I'd rather use the word "analyzed". Such
> is how we refine our learning.
>
>> I hope no one is saying pilot decisions are not open for discussion
>> or debate.
>
> And for criticism or even derision if so warranted, or praise if so
> warranted.
>
> Having a chute is not an excuse for careless or reckless bahavior,
> just as seatbelts and airbags are not an excuse for using brickwalls
> to stop in lieu of keeping your brakes maintained.

It seems that pulling chutes on these planes is becoming the norm for any
out of the ordinary, potentially dangerous situation. If this keeps up it is
going to put Cirrus out of business because the cost of insurance will be
equal to the cost of the airplane.

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
> Ron,
>
>> The problem is that the BRS seems to be a last resort for poor
>> decision making.
>>
>
> And death would be a better option? I simply don't get the attitude
> behind all the statements in this vain.

No the option is make better decisions in the first place. The BRS is doing
what many here thought it would do. Remove some of the reason NOT to make
bad decisions.

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Judah wrote:
> wrote in
> ups.com:
>
>> Nope, that's not what I'm saying. A competent pilot is not completely
>> immune to the possibility of making a mistake, including the mistake
>> of accidentally flying into IMC.
>>
>> But if flying in uncomplicated instrument conditions is something
>> that a private pilot simply doesn't know how to do, then the pilot is
>> missing an important skill that's required for the pilot's initial
>> and recurring certification. Lacking an entire area of expected
>> competence is not the same as just making a mistake.
>
> I think your parallel between IMC and spins is incredibly accurate.
> Recoveries from both are typically taught in the basic pilot training
> PTS, but use only simulation. So why do you believe that recovery
> from one is beyond a normal pilot's responsibility and the other is
> not?

The Cirrus POH states that the PROPER and ONLY way to recover from a spin is
pull the chute.

[Ron Wanttaja]

On Mon, 20 Aug 2007 09:06:56 -0500, "Gig 601XL Builder"
<wrDOTgiaconaATsuddenlink.net> wrote:

>It seems that pulling chutes on these planes is becoming the norm for any
>out of the ordinary, potentially dangerous situation. If this keeps up it is
>going to put Cirrus out of business because the cost of insurance will be
>equal to the cost of the airplane.

I'm not sure what the break-even point would be. Let's assume the average net
loss is about $300,000 for every chute deployment (depreciated cost of aircraft
minus salvage value).

What's the average pay-out per *fatal* Cirrus accident? Remember, the typical
occupants aren't going to be convenience store clerks. They're going to be
people who can afford half-million-dollar airplanes. Let's say the total payout
is $5 million.

This means that if only one out of 15 chute deployments prevents a
wrongful-death lawsuit, the insurance companies come out on top.

Note that almost all CAPS deployments, so far, have prevented any serious injury
as well. So that $300K cost for each deployment is also offset by the reduced
need to pay medical bills and/or settle lawsuits in non-fatal accidents as well.

Sounds like a good bet to me.

Ron Wanttaja

[Aluckyguess]

"Gig 601XL Builder" <wrDOTgiaconaATsuddenlink.net> wrote in message
...
> Aluckyguess wrote:
>> He is alive so he's not to dumb. He has money so who cares about the
>> plane.
>
>
> So do those flying Cirrus have the required hood time waived and an aren't
> taught to do a 180 in IMC?
>
> Obviously a climbing 180 would have been in order.

Maybe to you, I wasn't in the plane. You have no idea what happened. Maybe
he was having chest pains from the stress of the flight. Maybe the g1000 (if
equipped) just went blue screen.
What we are trying to point out is we were not there the PIC made the
decision and he is still alive so who can question that.
>
>

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Ron Wanttaja wrote:
> On Mon, 20 Aug 2007 09:06:56 -0500, "Gig 601XL Builder"
> <wrDOTgiaconaATsuddenlink.net> wrote:
>
>> It seems that pulling chutes on these planes is becoming the norm
>> for any out of the ordinary, potentially dangerous situation. If
>> this keeps up it is going to put Cirrus out of business because the
>> cost of insurance will be equal to the cost of the airplane.
>
> I'm not sure what the break-even point would be. Let's assume the
> average net loss is about $300,000 for every chute deployment
> (depreciated cost of aircraft minus salvage value).
>
> What's the average pay-out per *fatal* Cirrus accident? Remember,
> the typical occupants aren't going to be convenience store clerks.
> They're going to be people who can afford half-million-dollar
> airplanes. Let's say the total payout is $5 million.
>
> This means that if only one out of 15 chute deployments prevents a
> wrongful-death lawsuit, the insurance companies come out on top.
>
> Note that almost all CAPS deployments, so far, have prevented any
> serious injury as well. So that $300K cost for each deployment is
> also offset by the reduced need to pay medical bills and/or settle
> lawsuits in non-fatal accidents as well.
>
> Sounds like a good bet to me.
>
> Ron Wanttaja

I was talking about the pilot/owners hull insurance not the manufacture's
liability. Since we are talking about a four place plane normally flown by
the owner of the plane with his family and or friends the liability is going
to be much less a factor.

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Aluckyguess wrote:
> "Gig 601XL Builder" <wrDOTgiaconaATsuddenlink.net> wrote in message
> ...
>> Aluckyguess wrote:
>>> He is alive so he's not to dumb. He has money so who cares about the
>>> plane.
>>
>>
>> So do those flying Cirrus have the required hood time waived and an
>> aren't taught to do a 180 in IMC?
>>
>> Obviously a climbing 180 would have been in order.
>
> Maybe to you, I wasn't in the plane. You have no idea what happened.
> Maybe he was having chest pains from the stress of the flight. Maybe
> the g1000 (if equipped) just went blue screen.
> What we are trying to point out is we were not there the PIC made the
> decision and he is still alive so who can question that.

With all those maybes let's add another maybe he didn't pull the chute and
it just shot out by itself.

I think the point of this and all other topics like it is to discuss what we
do know and try to learn from it. If we limit the discussion to only things
we are 100% certain of this is going to be a very quiet newsgroup. For there
to be any meaningful dialogue here we have to assume that the information we
do have is correct. When we find that it isn't or are given new information
we can adjust our comments accordingly.

[RST Engineering]

Anybody here good at limericks?

I'll start you off ...

There was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...


{;-)


Jim

--
"If you think you can, or think you can't, you're right."
--Henry Ford

[Gig 601XL Builder]

RST Engineering wrote:
> Anybody here good at limericks?
>
> I'll start you off ...
>
> There was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...
>
And the pilot panicked and said ...

[Thomas Borchert]

Gig,

> No the option is make better decisions in the first place. The BRS is doing
> what many here thought it would do. Remove some of the reason NOT to make
> bad decisions.
>

How would you possibly arrive at that statement with the data present?

As for "the option is make better decisions in the first place", that's been
tried in any number of ways. Accident rates caused by stupid pilot decisions
are still way up.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Larry Dighera]

On Mon, 20 Aug 2007 08:08:31 -0700, "RST Engineering"
> wrote in
>:

>Anybody here good at limericks?
>
>I'll start you off ...
>
>There [once] was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...
>

Whose pilot was so panicked, he wished he were home in Pawtucket.

He said with a grin,
I know this is to recover from a spin,

But aw f*ck it.

[Tina]

So, to do it by the book, if one finds herself in conditions requiring
more skills than are on board the airplane, if the airplane is a
Cirrius, one should kick it into a spin then pull the handle for the
parachute?

How long will it take the NTSB to publish its report? There was an
accident in Lakeway TX about 3 years ago and the final findings are
still not posted.


On a related note re fog, I would expect many here have begun a
landing at an uncotrolled airport at night, only to discover there's a
layer of fog 10 feet deep and when you descend into it your own
landing light washes out the runway lights.

Tina



On Aug 18, 1:52 pm, Owen Rogers > wrote:
> Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>
> Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
> ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
> common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
> parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>
> The two aboard had minor injuries but will be ok. Nobody was injured on
> the ground.
>
> Here is a news link:http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070818/NEWS...
>
> Other reports said that it was a Cirrus, although the make/model hasn't
> been confirmed yet.

[Morgans[_2_]]

"Gig 601XL Builder" <> wrote >> Anybody here good at limericks?
>>
>> I'll start you off ...
>>
>> There was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...
>>
> And the pilot panicked and said ...

He pulled on the chute, and out it flew...

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Morgans wrote:
> "Gig 601XL Builder" <> wrote >> Anybody here good at limericks?
>>>
>>> I'll start you off ...
>>>
>>> There was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...
>>>
>> And the pilot panicked and said ...
>
> He pulled on the chute, and out it flew...

After the plane landed he went to the lew.

He might as well burned 300K in a bucket.





Sorry the last line game to me and I just had to do it out of turn.

[Morgans[_2_]]

"Stefan" > wrote ...
>
> I'm sure there are still more things you haven't experienced yet.

I have not been in a plane to experience the instant fog phenomena, but I
too have seen it from the ground, and interestingly, in an East /Coast
environment.

I was at the Gator Bowl game, many years ago. It went from severe clear, to
the TV coverage not being able to use the press box cameras, (because the
fog was so dense, that they could not see the distance from the press box to
the sideline) and had to use sideline cameras for all of the game action.

It was the thickest fog I have ever seen, and it came on in about 15
minutes. Very strange.
--
Jim in NC

[Matt Whiting]

Ron Wanttaja wrote:
> On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 17:05:47 GMT, Matt Whiting > wrote:
>
>> Thomas Borchert wrote:
>>>> If a pilot pulls the chute because he judges an uncontrolled parachute
>>>> descent to be less risky than trying to keep the plane upright for a
>>>> few minutes in simple instrument cruise flight, then he has judged
>>>> himself to have less than the minimum required competence for a
>>>> private pilot.
>>> That's BS, plain and simple. The instrument flying requirement is
>>> required for the test, barely. There is no requirement at all to keep it
>>> current. Otherwise, all certified pilots would be instrument pilots.
>> That's BS, at least in the US. I can't speak for other parts of the
>> world. That is why we have biennial flight reviews, to see if currency
>> is being maintained. A private pilot should be capable of doing
>> anything required of their certificate. Flying straight and level on
>> instruments is a far cry from being instrument rated.
>
> I've been taking BFRs since they were instituted, and don't believe I've been
> put under the hood more than once or twice since my original Private flight
> test. And *that* was ~35 years ago.

As have I. I haven't had every instructor require hood time during a
BFR, but then since I got my instrument rating it hasn't been necessary.
It sounds like you need to find more competent CFIs for your BFRs.


> Every time Cirrus BRS deployments come up, I'm reminded of the anti-parachute
> arguments during WWI.

I didn't realize you were that old. :-)

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Kyle Boatright wrote:
> > wrote in message
> ups.com...
>> On Aug 19, 1:28 pm, Luke Skywalker > wrote:
>>> Three hours is insufficient to develop and ingrain even a rudimentary
>>> "scan" and it certianly does not teach deriving a "picture" of what
>>> the airplane is doing based on the instruments.
>> But three hours of instrument instruction isn't the only requirement.
>> The requirement is to have as much instruction as it takes to acquire
>> the competence! It must be at least three hours, but can be much more
>> if necessary (just as most pilots need much more than the specified 40
>> hours of dual before getting a private-pilot certificate).
>>
>> Once the skill is acquired and the pilot is certificated, it's the
>> pilot's responsibility--as with ALL basic required skills--to do
>> whatever is needed to remain proficient before acting as PIC.
>
> Lets say the engine suffered a mechanical failure, and the pilot and
> passengers survived after using the 'chute. Would you argue that forced
> landings are part of the PTS, and therefore the pilot is incompetent because
> s/he chose to pull the magic handle instead of attempting a forced landing?

Yes, if an airport or suitable landing site was available. No, if there
was no such site available or if the flight was at night or IMC.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
>> But if flying in uncomplicated instrument conditions is something that
>> a private pilot simply doesn't know how to do, then the pilot is
>> missing an important skill that's required for the pilot's initial and
>> recurring certification
>>
>
> You're wrong. A VFR pilot is not at all required to be able to fly in
> "uncomplicated instrument conditions". Point me to the regs to prove me
> wrong.

You are wrong. Check section IX of the Private Pilot PTS. Here is a
link to make it easy for you.

http://www.faa.gov/education_research/testing/airmen/test_standards/pilot/

One can argue that the PTS isn't a "reg", but the intent of the FAA is
quite clear. A non-instrument rated Private Pilot in the USA must
demonstrate a fair bit of instrument flying proficiency in order to be
issued a certificate.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Ron Natalie wrote:
> Matt Whiting wrote:
>>>
>>> Fog setting in is often an area phenomenon. It's not
>>> like flying into a puffy cumulous on a summer day.
>>
>> True, but it hardly ever covers an area as large as the range of a
>> Cirrus.
>>
>
> The Cirrus range isn't going to help much with a non-instrument trained
> pilot blundering around in the muck. The issue is the conditions
> changed faster than the Cirrus can fly.

If the pilot executes a timely 180 and can fly straight and level on
instruments, as they should be able to according to the requirements to
earn their certificate, then there is no reason that fog or IMC should
require chute deployment.

Matt

[Roy Smith]

In article >,
"RST Engineering" > wrote:

> Anybody here good at limericks?
>
> I'll start you off ...
>
> There was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...


Ugh, the meter is all wrong. You want something more like:

A man flew his plane to Nantucket,

[Aluckyguess]

"RST Engineering" > wrote in message
...
> Anybody here good at limericks?
>
> I'll start you off ...
>
> There was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...
I not going to make another payment on this bucket,
looked up and saw a chute,
pulled the cord and told the insurance agent it was a fluke.


>
>
> {;-)
>
>
> Jim
>
> --
> "If you think you can, or think you can't, you're right."
> --Henry Ford
>
>

[Jim Logajan]

Matt Whiting > wrote:
> If the pilot executes a timely 180 and can fly straight and level on
> instruments, as they should be able to according to the requirements to
> earn their certificate, then there is no reason that fog or IMC should
> require chute deployment.

That reasoning, and the policy one can draw from it, has been tried for
decades and yet people still keep dying. And it will continue to fail
because it is founded on a fallacy: that humans are perfectable.

Compare the outcome of this IMC encounter with Scott Crossfield's last IMC
encounter. Which pilot was more experienced? Which one is now dead and
which is now alive? Which had a backup to pilot failure and which didn't?

[Matt Whiting]

Aluckyguess wrote:
> "RST Engineering" > wrote in message
> ...
>> Anybody here good at limericks?
>>
>> I'll start you off ...
>>
>> There was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...
> I not going to make another payment on this bucket,
> looked up and saw a chute,
> pulled the cord and told the insurance agent it was a fluke.

First, you need to look up limerick. :-)

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Jim Logajan wrote:
> Matt Whiting > wrote:
>> If the pilot executes a timely 180 and can fly straight and level on
>> instruments, as they should be able to according to the requirements to
>> earn their certificate, then there is no reason that fog or IMC should
>> require chute deployment.
>
> That reasoning, and the policy one can draw from it, has been tried for
> decades and yet people still keep dying. And it will continue to fail
> because it is founded on a fallacy: that humans are perfectable.
>
> Compare the outcome of this IMC encounter with Scott Crossfield's last IMC
> encounter. Which pilot was more experienced? Which one is now dead and
> which is now alive? Which had a backup to pilot failure and which didn't?

Experience isn't the issue. Proficiency is the issue. Would you say
the same if the Cirrus descended into a school, burst into flame and
killed 10 kids?

A Cirrus under chute is unguided and uncontrollable and a definite
hazard to those on the ground. It hasn't happened yet, but some day a
Cirrus under chute will kill someone on the ground. The lawyers will
have a field day.


Matt

[Kyle Boatright]

"Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
...
> Jim Logajan wrote:
>> Matt Whiting > wrote:
>>> If the pilot executes a timely 180 and can fly straight and level on
>>> instruments, as they should be able to according to the requirements to
>>> earn their certificate, then there is no reason that fog or IMC should
>>> require chute deployment.
>>
>> That reasoning, and the policy one can draw from it, has been tried for
>> decades and yet people still keep dying. And it will continue to fail
>> because it is founded on a fallacy: that humans are perfectable.
>>
>> Compare the outcome of this IMC encounter with Scott Crossfield's last
>> IMC encounter. Which pilot was more experienced? Which one is now dead
>> and which is now alive? Which had a backup to pilot failure and which
>> didn't?
>
> Experience isn't the issue. Proficiency is the issue. Would you say the
> same if the Cirrus descended into a school, burst into flame and killed 10
> kids?
>
> A Cirrus under chute is unguided and uncontrollable and a definite hazard
> to those on the ground. It hasn't happened yet, but some day a Cirrus
> under chute will kill someone on the ground. The lawyers will have a
> field day.

While the lawyers may or may not have a field day, a Cirrus descending under
canopy is far less of a threat than a Cirrus in an out of control vertical
dive at 200 mph like in the Kennedy crash.

>
>
> Matt

[Roy Smith]

In article >,
Matt Whiting > wrote:

> Aluckyguess wrote:
> > "RST Engineering" > wrote in message
> > ...
> >> Anybody here good at limericks?
> >>
> >> I'll start you off ...
> >>
> >> There was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...
> > I not going to make another payment on this bucket,
> > looked up and saw a chute,
> > pulled the cord and told the insurance agent it was a fluke.
>
> First, you need to look up limerick. :-)
>
> Matt

Nantucket Cirrus
Chute unfolds like a flower
The day has gone bad

[Ron Wanttaja]

On Mon, 20 Aug 2007 23:21:18 GMT, Matt Whiting > wrote:

>Ron Wanttaja wrote:
>>
>> I've been taking BFRs since they were instituted, and don't believe I've been
>> put under the hood more than once or twice since my original Private flight
>> test. And *that* was ~35 years ago.
>
>As have I. I haven't had every instructor require hood time during a
>BFR, but then since I got my instrument rating it hasn't been necessary.
> It sounds like you need to find more competent CFIs for your BFRs.

No, I think the CFIs are just using the discretion that the AC 61-98A allows
them. The first question they ask is generally, "What kind of flying do you
do." Since I take my BFRs at the FBO on the base I'm based at, they all know
the Fly Baby. I think they figure out that fifteen minutes under the hood won't
do me a durn bit of good.

Ironically, I took my Private training and checkride in a Citabria with a turn
and bank as the only instrument beyond the basic VFR set. No artificial
horizon, no gyro compass. Memorized the compass lead/lag characteristics, etc.
Figure I could still hold wings-level if I had to, though I'd have to sneak up
on my headings, now....

>> Every time Cirrus BRS deployments come up, I'm reminded of the anti-parachute
>> arguments during WWI.

>I didn't realize you were that old. :-)

I've been around since Pontius became a Pilate. :-)

Ron Wanttaja

[Montblack]

("Kyle Boatright" wrote)
> While the lawyers may or may not have a field day, a Cirrus descending
> under canopy is far less of a threat than a Cirrus in an out of control
> vertical dive at 200 mph like in the Kennedy crash.


....which crashed into a "school" of fish.


Paul-Mont

[Ron Wanttaja]

On Mon, 20 Aug 2007 09:55:33 -0500, "Gig 601XL Builder"
<wrDOTgiaconaATsuddenlink.net> wrote:

>I was talking about the pilot/owners hull insurance not the manufacture's
>liability. Since we are talking about a four place plane normally flown by
>the owner of the plane with his family and or friends the liability is going
>to be much less a factor.

Somewhat less of a factor, yes, but there's usually injury/death benefits to be
paid, in any case, and quite likely survivors to try to get more.

I guess it all boils down to the average payout per occupant in serious/fatal
accidents. I don't know what the answer is, but I suspect it's in the six
figures.

If insurance companies start suffering excessive losses due to what they
consider unjustified CAPS deployment, they have a simple solution: They can
write policies that limit/exclude damages resulting from CAPS. I don't think
they will, because hardware damage is a lot cheaper/easier for insurance
companies to handle, not to mention easier to predict, than what's involved when
serious injuries or death are involved.

As of January 2007, there were about 2700 Cirrus aircraft in the US Registry.
In 2006, there were 22 accidents Cirrus accidents in the US, according to the
NSTB database. Out of those 22, let's look at the ones where CAPS was used:

N751CD: "...the plane into a stall, then into a spin that I could not recover
from. At that moment the parachute was engaged and we floated safely to the
ground."

Exactly the situation the CAPS was designed for.

N87HK: "...The airplane stalled, entered a spin back into instrument flight
conditions. The pilot deployed the ballistic parachute system...."

Ditto.

These were the only two Cirrus CAPS deployments I found in 2006. There were
several fatal accidents where it probably SHOULD have been deployed. One can
undoubtedly argue whether the two pilots in the above cases should have pulled
the handle, but it's an incontrovertible fact that they are *alive*.

In 2005, there were 15 accidents but only one featured a CAPS deployment. In
this case, the pilot had suffered a seizure...again, exactly the kind of
situation the CAPS was designed for.

Even if half of CAPS deployments are unjustified, the effective increase in the
plane's accident rate is very low. I suspect the insurance companies are
probably OK with it.

Ron Wanttaja

[James Sleeman]

I'm amazed at the serious negativity that the group has been giving
towards this (though I look atthe posts and there isn't that many
distinct posters really, just a vocal few).

A pilot got himself in a situation he didn't think he could handle.
We can learn from what he may have done wrong to do that, but it's not
going to change the fact that everybody make mistakes once in a while,
some of them quite bad.

He then got himself out of the situation by using a tool that he had,
and survived. He used a tool and it worked as intended.

If a pilot gets lost, and uses a GPS to find his way home, do we
admonish him for using it, sure he shouldn't have got lost in the
first place, sure he could have used traditional navigational
techniques to find his way home, but the GPS is there, it works, why
not use it.

You might not want to have a BRS (or GPS) that's fine, but why rag on
somebody who does have these things and sucessfully chooses to use
them to stop a bad situation from getting worse.

Use the tools at your disposal I always say, if you've got a nail gun
handy then you might as well try that before you pick up the hammer to
build your house.

This discussion makes me think of some anti-seat-belt people ("it just
encourages people to drive worse because they think the seatbelt will
save them").

[Jay Beckman[_2_]]

On Aug 20, 9:12 pm, Ron Wanttaja > wrote:
> On Mon, 20 Aug 2007 23:21:18 GMT, Matt Whiting > wrote:
> >Ron Wanttaja wrote:
>
> >> I've been taking BFRs since they were instituted, and don't believe I've been
> >> put under the hood more than once or twice since my original Private flight
> >> test. And *that* was ~35 years ago.
>
> >As have I. I haven't had every instructor require hood time during a
> >BFR, but then since I got my instrument rating it hasn't been necessary.
> > It sounds like you need to find more competent CFIs for your BFRs.
>
> No, I think the CFIs are just using the discretion that the AC 61-98A allows
> them. The first question they ask is generally, "What kind of flying do you
> do." Since I take my BFRs at the FBO on the base I'm based at, they all know
> the Fly Baby. I think they figure out that fifteen minutes under the hood won't
> do me a durn bit of good.
>
> Ironically, I took my Private training and checkride in a Citabria with a turn
> and bank as the only instrument beyond the basic VFR set. No artificial
> horizon, no gyro compass. Memorized the compass lead/lag characteristics, etc.
> Figure I could still hold wings-level if I had to, though I'd have to sneak up
> on my headings, now....
>
> >> Every time Cirrus BRS deployments come up, I'm reminded of the anti-parachute
> >> arguments during WWI.
> >I didn't realize you were that old. :-)
>
> I've been around since Pontius became a Pilate. :-)
>
> Ron Wanttaja

That's it...

I'm washing my hands of you...

;O)

[Jay Beckman[_2_]]

On Aug 20, 9:16 pm, "Montblack" <Y4_NOT!...
> wrote:
> ("Kyle Boatright" wrote)
>
> > While the lawyers may or may not have a field day, a Cirrus descending
> > under canopy is far less of a threat than a Cirrus in an out of control
> > vertical dive at 200 mph like in the Kennedy crash.
>
> ...which crashed into a "school" of fish.
>
> Paul-Mont

Took them weeks to notify the "next of fin."

<g d r>

Jay Beckman
PP-ASEL
Chandler, AZ
www.pbase.com/flyingphotog

[Thomas Borchert]

James,

> This discussion makes me think of some anti-seat-belt people
>

And Anti-"anti-lock-brakes". And, as someone has pointed out already,
anti-parachute in WW1. And anti-"plastic"-airplanes. And anti-diesel.
See a pattern yet? I do.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Ron Wanttaja wrote:
>
> Even if half of CAPS deployments are unjustified, the effective
> increase in the plane's accident rate is very low. I suspect the
> insurance companies are probably OK with it.
>

If half of the CAPS deployments are unjustified then the effective increase
in the plane's accident rate is some number approaching double of what it
should be.

[Thomas Borchert]

Gig,

> If half of the CAPS deployments are unjustified then the effective increase
> in the plane's accident rate is some number approaching double of what it
> should be.
>

Only if every accident involved a CAPS deployment. Clearly, they don't.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Matt Whiting]

Ron Wanttaja wrote:
> On Mon, 20 Aug 2007 23:21:18 GMT, Matt Whiting > wrote:
>
>> Ron Wanttaja wrote:
>>> I've been taking BFRs since they were instituted, and don't believe I've been
>>> put under the hood more than once or twice since my original Private flight
>>> test. And *that* was ~35 years ago.
>> As have I. I haven't had every instructor require hood time during a
>> BFR, but then since I got my instrument rating it hasn't been necessary.
>> It sounds like you need to find more competent CFIs for your BFRs.
>
> No, I think the CFIs are just using the discretion that the AC 61-98A allows
> them. The first question they ask is generally, "What kind of flying do you
> do." Since I take my BFRs at the FBO on the base I'm based at, they all know
> the Fly Baby. I think they figure out that fifteen minutes under the hood won't
> do me a durn bit of good.

That is true, but you must admit that your brand of flying is a pretty
small segment of the overall private pilot segment. I personally
believe that I'm obligated to maintain proficiency in all operations
required in the Private and Instrument PTS documents. I have a similar
obligation to maintain proficiency with respect to my PE license. The
requirement is codified in case of the PE and not, as best I know, with
respect to my pilot certificate. However, even if no FAR requires me to
maintain proficiency relative to what was required to obtain my
certificate, it simply is common sense to me to do so.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Gig 601XL Builder wrote:
> Ron Wanttaja wrote:
>> Even if half of CAPS deployments are unjustified, the effective
>> increase in the plane's accident rate is very low. I suspect the
>> insurance companies are probably OK with it.
>>
>
> If half of the CAPS deployments are unjustified then the effective increase
> in the plane's accident rate is some number approaching double of what it
> should be.

And the data appears to be bearing this out. I believe the accident
rate for the Cirrus family is comparable to Cessna and other brands. If
you believe that the parachute is a safety advantage (and I do, BTW,
even though I'm critical of its use in this case based on the data
available thus far), the something is offsetting this advantage. I
suspect it is because unnecessary deployments are offsetting the
advantage gained from necessary deployments.

The chute is just another tool in the pilot's arsenal. It requires
judgment just as with most other aspects of flying. I'm more than a
little disappointed in the number of pilots who seem to argue that the
fact that a pilot deployed the chute is prima facie evidence that a
deployment was necessary. I believe many deployments have been
completely unnecessary and thus damaged an airframe and endangered those
in the airplane and on the ground unnecessarily.


Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Kyle Boatright wrote:
> "Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
> ...
>> Jim Logajan wrote:
>>> Matt Whiting > wrote:
>>>> If the pilot executes a timely 180 and can fly straight and level on
>>>> instruments, as they should be able to according to the requirements to
>>>> earn their certificate, then there is no reason that fog or IMC should
>>>> require chute deployment.
>>> That reasoning, and the policy one can draw from it, has been tried for
>>> decades and yet people still keep dying. And it will continue to fail
>>> because it is founded on a fallacy: that humans are perfectable.
>>>
>>> Compare the outcome of this IMC encounter with Scott Crossfield's last
>>> IMC encounter. Which pilot was more experienced? Which one is now dead
>>> and which is now alive? Which had a backup to pilot failure and which
>>> didn't?
>> Experience isn't the issue. Proficiency is the issue. Would you say the
>> same if the Cirrus descended into a school, burst into flame and killed 10
>> kids?
>>
>> A Cirrus under chute is unguided and uncontrollable and a definite hazard
>> to those on the ground. It hasn't happened yet, but some day a Cirrus
>> under chute will kill someone on the ground. The lawyers will have a
>> field day.
>
> While the lawyers may or may not have a field day, a Cirrus descending under
> canopy is far less of a threat than a Cirrus in an out of control vertical
> dive at 200 mph like in the Kennedy crash.

No question. However, a Cirrus under chute is much more dangerous than
a Cirrus being flown straight and level in the clouds by a proficient
private pilot seeking VFR weather.

That is the crux of the discussion here.


Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Montblack wrote:
> ("Kyle Boatright" wrote)
>> While the lawyers may or may not have a field day, a Cirrus descending
>> under canopy is far less of a threat than a Cirrus in an out of control
>> vertical dive at 200 mph like in the Kennedy crash.
>
>
> ...which crashed into a "school" of fish.
>
>
> Paul-Mont
>
>

Montblack, we can always count on you!

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
> James,
>
>> This discussion makes me think of some anti-seat-belt people
>>
>
> And Anti-"anti-lock-brakes". And, as someone has pointed out already,
> anti-parachute in WW1. And anti-"plastic"-airplanes. And anti-diesel.
> See a pattern yet? I do.
>

Yes, I see a pattern. You are one of those people who try to label
someone as holding an absolute position when they simply disagree with a
given instance.

I'm not anti BRS at all. I am against using the BRS as a crutch in lieu
of proficiency and using it when other better alternatives are available
or at least should be available.

Matt

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
> Gig,
>
>> If half of the CAPS deployments are unjustified then the effective
>> increase in the plane's accident rate is some number approaching
>> double of what it should be.
>>
>
> Only if every accident involved a CAPS deployment. Clearly, they
> don't.

Feel free to insert "CAPS deployed" between 'plane's' and 'accident' as that
is what I meant. You have to agree though that since the accident rate for
the Cirrus aircraft seems a little high and there is something causing that.
One possible reason for it is pilots popping the CAP when other options are
out there and would have been used if there hadn't have been a CAPS in the
aircraft.

In the accident at hand it seems that one of two things happened.

A. The pilot flew into the soup and got so disoriented that he couldn't get
out and popped the shoot.
B. The pilot flew into the soup and panicked and popped the shoot.

In both situations the pilot failed to be able to do what is required of a
newly minted PP-SEL. The accident statistics show CONTINUED VMC flight into
IMC conditions cause accidents. Not VMC flight into IMC conditions. The
reason for this is that even a new pilot is supposed to know how to reverse
course and get out of IMC.

[Aluckyguess]

"Kyle Boatright" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> "James" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>>
>> Aluckyguess wrote:
>>
>>> "Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
>>> ...
>>>
>>>>Judah wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>Owen Rogers > wrote in
:
>>>>>
>>>>>>Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when
>>>>>>they
>>>>>>ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island
>>>>>>are
>>>>>>common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
>>>>>>parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>>>>>
>>>>>Wouldn't it have been easier to just turn around?
>>>>
>>>>That's what I was thinking. There is either much more to this story or
>>>>this was one dumb pilot. I'm hoping it is the former.
>>>
>>>
>>> He is alive so he's not to dumb. He has money so who cares about the
>>> plane.
>> More money than brains? Most pilots have heard of diversion to another
>> airport in case of bad weather or other person. The Pilot Examiner would
>> have made sure that he had considered alternates for the cross country
>> part of the check ride. He might have an interesting time explaining to
>> his insurance company also. They might not want to write him another
>> policy again (if this story is as stated)!
>>
>
> I find it very hard to speculate about this particular episode until we
> know the airplane's fuel state, the weather at reachable fields, the
> conditions in which the aircraft was flying, or the training level of the
> pilot.
>
> For example, if the pilot wasn't IFR trained, he might have been in a
> situation where he wasn't confident of keeping the airplane right side up.
> In that situation, popping the chute too early is much better than popping
> it too late.
>
> Another example is that the weather may have gone down, leaving him
> trapped on top without sufficient fuel to reach an airport in better
> conditions.
>
> Every time someone uses the chute on a Cirrus, we get people second
> guessing the decision. There is only one person in the world qualified to
> make the decision, and that's the guy or gal in the left seat when the
> decision is made.
>
> KB
>
I agree.

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Aluckyguess wrote:
> "Kyle Boatright" > wrote in message
>>
>> Every time someone uses the chute on a Cirrus, we get people second
>> guessing the decision. There is only one person in the world
>> qualified to make the decision, and that's the guy or gal in the
>> left seat when the decision is made.
>>
>> KB
>>
> I agree.

This is a piloting newsgroup. One of the reasons I read it is to learn from
others mistakes. The groups works for this because we take a known set of
data (admittedly it is not all the data) and discuss what might have gone
right and wrong and what may have been right are wrong with the pilot's
decision. This is exactly what the FAA and NTSB try to do post accident. And
with them like in this newsgroup all the information is not always
available. Take the accident in question. There is a very good chance that
should it be a case where the pilot just plain panicked he may or may not
admit that to the FAA/NTSB and he certainly isn't here to give his side of
the story.

To say things like only the guy or gal in the cockpit does nothing to
further the discussion or add to the learning potential of the newsgroup.

[Thomas Borchert]

Matt,

> That is the crux of the discussion here.
>

The crux is that some still believe there is such a thing as an
infallible, perfect pilot. Other have gotten beyond that.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Thomas Borchert]

Gig,

> since the accident rate for
> the Cirrus aircraft seems a little high

It is? Richard Collins once calculated it in "Flying" and didn't come to that
conclusion.

> One possible reason for it is pilots popping the CAP when other options are
> out there

Well, the NTSB stats quoted don't seem to indicate that. Which was exactly
Ron's point: There are precious few deployments among the accidents with
Cirrii.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
> Matt,
>
>> That is the crux of the discussion here.
>>
>
> The crux is that some still believe there is such a thing as an
> infallible, perfect pilot. Other have gotten beyond that.

No one here thinks there is such a thing though we should all strive to be
one. One way to do that is to look at the mistakes of others and learn from
them.

[Matt Whiting]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
> Matt,
>
>> That is the crux of the discussion here.
>>
>
> The crux is that some still believe there is such a thing as an
> infallible, perfect pilot. Other have gotten beyond that.
>

That isn't even close to the essence of the topic. Nobody has made any
statement even close to that ... other than you above.

Matt

[Doug Semler]

"Roy Smith" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> Matt Whiting > wrote:
>
>> Aluckyguess wrote:
>> > "RST Engineering" > wrote in message
>> > ...
>> >> Anybody here good at limericks?
>> >>
>> >> I'll start you off ...
>> >>
>> >> There was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...
>> > I not going to make another payment on this bucket,
>> > looked up and saw a chute,
>> > pulled the cord and told the insurance agent it was a fluke.
>>
>> First, you need to look up limerick. :-)
>>
>> Matt
>
> Nantucket Cirrus
> Chute unfolds like a flower
> The day has gone bad


Wait....Isn't that haiku?

--
Doug Semler
a.a. #705, BAAWA. EAC Guardian of the Horn of the IPU (pbuhh).
The answer is 42; DNRC o-
Gur Hfrarg unf orpbzr fb shyy bs penc gurfr qnlf, abbar rira
erpbtavmrf fvzcyr guvatf yvxr ebg13 nalzber. Fnq, vfa'g vg?

[An Aviator]

There was a young man from Nantucket
Whose instrument skills were quite sucky.
He pulled the red handle
The plane went from flying to hanging,
And the R.A.P. people cried buckets.


"RST Engineering" > wrote in message
...
> Anybody here good at limericks?
>
> I'll start you off ...
>
> There was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...
>
>
> {;-)
>
>
> Jim
>
> --
> "If you think you can, or think you can't, you're right."
> --Henry Ford
>
>

[Roy Smith]

In article >,
"Doug Semler" > wrote:

> "Roy Smith" > wrote in message
> ...
> > In article >,
> > Matt Whiting > wrote:
> >
> >> Aluckyguess wrote:
> >> > "RST Engineering" > wrote in message
> >> > ...
> >> >> Anybody here good at limericks?
> >> >>
> >> >> I'll start you off ...
> >> >>
> >> >> There was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...
> >> > I not going to make another payment on this bucket,
> >> > looked up and saw a chute,
> >> > pulled the cord and told the insurance agent it was a fluke.
> >>
> >> First, you need to look up limerick. :-)
> >>
> >> Matt
> >
> > Nantucket Cirrus
> > Chute unfolds like a flower
> > The day has gone bad
>
>
> Wait....Isn't that haiku?

A limerick or a hauku,
It makes litle difference to you.
The meter's the thing,
A smile it will bring,
If the rhyming scheme doesn't renew.

[Matt Whiting]

Roy Smith wrote:
> In article >,
> "Doug Semler" > wrote:
>
>> "Roy Smith" > wrote in message
>> ...
>>> In article >,
>>> Matt Whiting > wrote:
>>>
>>>> Aluckyguess wrote:
>>>>> "RST Engineering" > wrote in message
>>>>> ...
>>>>>> Anybody here good at limericks?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'll start you off ...
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...
>>>>> I not going to make another payment on this bucket,
>>>>> looked up and saw a chute,
>>>>> pulled the cord and told the insurance agent it was a fluke.
>>>> First, you need to look up limerick. :-)
>>>>
>>>> Matt
>>> Nantucket Cirrus
>>> Chute unfolds like a flower
>>> The day has gone bad
>>
>> Wait....Isn't that haiku?
>
> A limerick or a hauku,
> It makes litle difference to you.
> The meter's the thing,
> A smile it will bring,
> If the rhyming scheme doesn't renew.

Limerick's are cool. Haiku is just dull...

Matt

[Doug Semler]

"RST Engineering" > wrote in message
...
> Anybody here good at limericks?
>
> I'll start you off ...
>
> There was a Cirrus flying over Nantucket...
>


A pilot was flyin' o'er Nantucket
In his shiny'n'spensive bolt bucket
He popped it's chute
For whatever the root
And all we should say is "aw, **** it"

How's that?
<g>

--
Doug Semler, MCPD
a.a. #705, BAAWA. EAC Guardian of the Horn of the IPU (pbuhh).
The answer is 42; DNRC o-
Gur Hfrarg unf orpbzr fb shyy bs penc gurfr qnlf, abbar rira
erpbtavmrf fvzcyr guvatf yvxr ebg13 nalzber. Fnq, vfa'g vg?

[Ron Wanttaja]

On Tue, 21 Aug 2007 14:00:07 GMT, Matt Whiting > wrote:

>Ron Wanttaja wrote:
>
>> No, I think the CFIs are just using the discretion that the AC 61-98A allows
>> them. The first question they ask is generally, "What kind of flying do you
>> do." Since I take my BFRs at the FBO on the base I'm based at, they all know
>> the Fly Baby. I think they figure out that fifteen minutes under the hood won't
>> do me a durn bit of good.
>
>That is true, but you must admit that your brand of flying is a pretty
>small segment of the overall private pilot segment. I personally
>believe that I'm obligated to maintain proficiency in all operations
>required in the Private and Instrument PTS documents. I have a similar
>obligation to maintain proficiency with respect to my PE license. The
>requirement is codified in case of the PE and not, as best I know, with
>respect to my pilot certificate. However, even if no FAR requires me to
>maintain proficiency relative to what was required to obtain my
>certificate, it simply is common sense to me to do so.

Certainly; I think we're more agreeing than disagreeing. My comments were aimed
at the party (not you) who was claiming that any level of IFR expertise less
than that required for the Private check ride was unacceptable. Flying solo all
the time DOES lead to bad habits, and I use the BFR to get them swatted down a
bit. The fact that my BFRs never include hood work is an indication that the
local CFIs agree that it's not necessary, for the flying I do.

Ron Wanttaja

[Ron Wanttaja]

On Tue, 21 Aug 2007 14:05:28 GMT, Matt Whiting > wrote:

>Gig 601XL Builder wrote:
>> Ron Wanttaja wrote:
>>> Even if half of CAPS deployments are unjustified, the effective
>>> increase in the plane's accident rate is very low. I suspect the
>>> insurance companies are probably OK with it.
>>>
>>
>> If half of the CAPS deployments are unjustified then the effective increase
>> in the plane's accident rate is some number approaching double of what it
>> should be.

But with ~2700 airplanes and ~22 accidents in 2006, the rough Cirrus rate is
about 0.81% of all Cirruses had an accident. If we assume that one out of the
two CAPS deployments that year was unnecessary, that rate would drop to 0.77%.

Whether one considers this a "major decrease" depends, probably, on one's
going-in stance on this argument. :-)

However, consider: If we assume that 50% of the CAPS deployments in 2006 were
unnecessary, the corollary is that half of them *were*. That's between one and
four people who would have been dead or seriously injured, otherwise. Is that
worth the loss of ~2000 pounds of inanimate hardware in the "unjust" deployment
side? I think so.

>
>And the data appears to be bearing this out. I believe the accident
>rate for the Cirrus family is comparable to Cessna and other brands. If
>you believe that the parachute is a safety advantage (and I do, BTW,
>even though I'm critical of its use in this case based on the data
>available thus far), the something is offsetting this advantage. I
>suspect it is because unnecessary deployments are offsetting the
>advantage gained from necessary deployments.
>
>The chute is just another tool in the pilot's arsenal. It requires
>judgment just as with most other aspects of flying. I'm more than a
>little disappointed in the number of pilots who seem to argue that the
>fact that a pilot deployed the chute is prima facie evidence that a
>deployment was necessary. I believe many deployments have been
>completely unnecessary and thus damaged an airframe and endangered those
>in the airplane and on the ground unnecessarily.

Well stated, Matt. My cursory examination of the Cirrus accidents would make me
replace the "many deployments" in your last sentence to "some deployments," but
I think you're stating reasonable settlements.

What got me when looking at the Cirrus accidents were the cases where I *would*
have pulled the chute. One airplane exhibited what I would interpret as
structural failures in the wings, yet the pilot just throttled back and landed
without further damage or any injuries.

But one always has to worry about the fatalities, since there's usually no one
to query about why the decision to deploy was not made. I'm concerned people
are not pulling the chute because they don't want to admit a situation is beyond
their ability to recover. They're afraid of "looking bad"; they hope to recover
the aircraft and land normally so no one knows how badly they screwed up.

You're always going to have some folks wait too long, just like you're going to
have some folks to jump the gun and pull the handle early.

I don't like to second-guess the guys in the pilot seat. Sitting reading a
computer screen is not the same as sitting clenched in a sweaty cockpit, with
your inner ear tumbling, clouds swirling, engine stumbling, and passengers
climbing over you in panic. We all train for unusual situations and engine
failures, but it's just not...the...same.

I've had one gen-u-wine emergency in my flying life, an engine failure in my 150
about 23 years ago. I certainly can remember the way my throat clenched, and
how I was sucking up the seat covers by the time I got on short final. I made
one radio call, to inform all and sundry that I was going to land downwind
"...'cause I'm havin' a little problem with the engine," as I tried to explain
in my best Chuck Yeager imitation as I stared at the stopped prop. While dogs's
ears in a five-mile radius were perking up as they heard a very high-pitched
voice from the airplane....

Any pilot with an airplane on the edge of disaster who avoids getting himself
and his passengers killed gets *my* seal of approval. Whether he save the day
by superior flying skill, a petition to higher beings, or a tug on an emergency
parachute.

Ron Wanttaja

[Thomas Borchert]

Matt,

> Nobody has made any
> statement even close to that .

May I quote you:
"a Cirrus being flown straight and level in the clouds by a proficient
private pilot seeking VFR weather."

A VFR-only pilot flying straight and level in the clouds not during
training, with a CFI next to him, but in anger, after having somehow
gotten into this weather, with all the stresses around him, comes at
least close to being "perfect and infallible". In my book, at least.
But I simply may be way less perfect, infallible and "proficient" than
y'all seem to be. Or more humble in judging my (and others) abilities.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Matt Whiting]

Ron Wanttaja wrote:
> On Tue, 21 Aug 2007 14:00:07 GMT, Matt Whiting > wrote:
>
>> Ron Wanttaja wrote:
>>
>>> No, I think the CFIs are just using the discretion that the AC 61-98A allows
>>> them. The first question they ask is generally, "What kind of flying do you
>>> do." Since I take my BFRs at the FBO on the base I'm based at, they all know
>>> the Fly Baby. I think they figure out that fifteen minutes under the hood won't
>>> do me a durn bit of good.
>> That is true, but you must admit that your brand of flying is a pretty
>> small segment of the overall private pilot segment. I personally
>> believe that I'm obligated to maintain proficiency in all operations
>> required in the Private and Instrument PTS documents. I have a similar
>> obligation to maintain proficiency with respect to my PE license. The
>> requirement is codified in case of the PE and not, as best I know, with
>> respect to my pilot certificate. However, even if no FAR requires me to
>> maintain proficiency relative to what was required to obtain my
>> certificate, it simply is common sense to me to do so.
>
> Certainly; I think we're more agreeing than disagreeing. My comments were aimed
> at the party (not you) who was claiming that any level of IFR expertise less
> than that required for the Private check ride was unacceptable. Flying solo all
> the time DOES lead to bad habits, and I use the BFR to get them swatted down a
> bit. The fact that my BFRs never include hood work is an indication that the
> local CFIs agree that it's not necessary, for the flying I do.

Yes, but a Cirrus pilot absolutely should be checked for basic
instrument competency (180 turn, S&L, and 500 fpm climbs and descents).

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
> Matt,
>
>> Nobody has made any
>> statement even close to that .
>
> May I quote you:
> "a Cirrus being flown straight and level in the clouds by a proficient
> private pilot seeking VFR weather."
>
> A VFR-only pilot flying straight and level in the clouds not during
> training, with a CFI next to him, but in anger, after having somehow
> gotten into this weather, with all the stresses around him, comes at
> least close to being "perfect and infallible". In my book, at least.
> But I simply may be way less perfect, infallible and "proficient" than
> y'all seem to be. Or more humble in judging my (and others) abilities.
>

Ha, ha, ha....

If flying in a manner that just meets the MINIMUM standard to achieve a
pilot certificate in the US is what you consider "perfect and
infallible", then I guess you are right in that I was assuming
"perfection and infallibility."

I guess the standards of the FAA are much higher then I ever imagined.
Since I passed both my private and instrument rides on the first try
against these perfect FAA standards, I must be REALLY good! :-)

Then again, it may just mean that you have VERY low standards...

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Matt Whiting wrote:
> Ron Wanttaja wrote:
>> On Tue, 21 Aug 2007 14:00:07 GMT, Matt Whiting > wrote:
>>
>>> Ron Wanttaja wrote:
>>>
>>>> No, I think the CFIs are just using the discretion that the AC
>>>> 61-98A allows
>>>> them. The first question they ask is generally, "What kind of
>>>> flying do you
>>>> do." Since I take my BFRs at the FBO on the base I'm based at, they
>>>> all know
>>>> the Fly Baby. I think they figure out that fifteen minutes under
>>>> the hood won't
>>>> do me a durn bit of good.
>>> That is true, but you must admit that your brand of flying is a
>>> pretty small segment of the overall private pilot segment. I
>>> personally believe that I'm obligated to maintain proficiency in all
>>> operations required in the Private and Instrument PTS documents. I
>>> have a similar obligation to maintain proficiency with respect to my
>>> PE license. The requirement is codified in case of the PE and not,
>>> as best I know, with respect to my pilot certificate. However, even
>>> if no FAR requires me to maintain proficiency relative to what was
>>> required to obtain my certificate, it simply is common sense to me to
>>> do so.
>>
>> Certainly; I think we're more agreeing than disagreeing. My comments
>> were aimed
>> at the party (not you) who was claiming that any level of IFR
>> expertise less
>> than that required for the Private check ride was unacceptable.
>> Flying solo all
>> the time DOES lead to bad habits, and I use the BFR to get them
>> swatted down a
>> bit. The fact that my BFRs never include hood work is an indication
>> that the
>> local CFIs agree that it's not necessary, for the flying I do.
>
> Yes, but a Cirrus pilot absolutely should be checked for basic
> instrument competency (180 turn, S&L, and 500 fpm climbs and descents).

I should elaborate that I'm not just picking on Cirrus here. I would
say the above for any high performance GA airplane.

Matt

[[email protected]]

On Aug 22, 1:05 am, Ron Wanttaja > wrote:
> Certainly; I think we're more agreeing than disagreeing. My comments were aimed
> at the party (not you) who was claiming that any level of IFR expertise less
> than that required for the Private check ride was unacceptable.

Actually, I agree with you that there are unusual exceptions to the
general rule that I stated. There's an exception in cases where
there's no possibility that emergency instument-flight skill could be
useful.

For most pilots, though--and certainly for the particular flight
that's been under discussion here--it would be irresponsible to act as
PIC without having maintained private-pilot proficiency at basic
instrument flying. What I find especially distrubing is that some
pilots have been arguing that it's ok for the typical pilot to fly for
months or years with no effort to practice instrument flying, merely
because the FAA does not spell out how much practice is required to
stay proficient.

[Thomas Borchert]

Matt,

> If flying in a manner that just meets the MINIMUM standard to achieve a
> pilot certificate in the US is what you consider "perfect and
> infallible",

Ok, one more try, then I'll give up: Im my experience (and I passed the
same rides on the first try), there's a VAST difference between doing
basic instrument flight as required for VFR pilots under the hood or with
a CFI present, and flying in the clouds with no one but yourself present,
fully knowing you have gotten yourself into a situation that a) you
shouldn't be, b) you aren't legal to be in and c) has a very high
potential to kill you.

If you have the nerves of steel not to see a difference there, I can't
help it, but my view is supported by the accident statistics with
overwhelming clarity. VFR flight into IMC is a leading accident cause. Ask
yourself why that might be. Then try to pull another "Ha, ha, ha" on me.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Thomas Borchert]

> For most pilots, though--and certainly for the particular flight
> that's been under discussion here--it would be irresponsible to act as
> PIC without having maintained private-pilot proficiency at basic
> instrument flying.
>

Care to explain why VFR into IMC is one of the leading accident causes?
How do you explain the very obvious disconnect between what you
postulate a regular, average pilot's abilities to be - and reality?

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[[email protected]]

On Aug 22, 9:23 am, Thomas Borchert >
wrote:
> > For most pilots, though--and certainly for the particular flight
> > that's been under discussion here--it would be irresponsible to act as
> > PIC without having maintained private-pilot proficiency at basic
> > instrument flying.
>
> Care to explain why VFR into IMC is one of the leading accident causes?
> How do you explain the very obvious disconnect between what you
> postulate a regular, average pilot's abilities to be - and reality?

Yes, I'm glad to explain. You're confusing competence with perfection.
Private-pilot competence at instrument flying means this: if a pilot
with that competence accidentally enters IMC, and she realizes she's
in IMC and tries to fly by instruments, and the conditions aren't
complicated (that is, there's no icing, TS, proximity to challenging
terrain, etc.), then the pilot can fly the plane with only a small
chance of making a fatal mistake. But given many such occurrences,
that small chance will sometimes manifest itself, so there will still
be some crashes.

In addition, many (perhaps the large majority) of the VFR-into-IMC
crashes result because the pilot did NOT maintain basic instrument
competence, or because the accidentally-encountered instrument
conditions were NOT uncomplicated.

So there's no disconnect at all between my statement above and the
occurrence of some VFR-into-IMC accidents. My statement in no way
implies that such accidents can never occur, even for competent pilots.

[Thomas Borchert]

> then the pilot can fly the plane with only a small
> chance of making a fatal mistake. But given many such occurrences,
> that small chance will sometimes manifest itself, so there will still
> be some crashes.

"Many such occurences"??? What do you base that statement on? Pilots
(competent ones, at that) regularly fly into clouds while VFR?

> In addition, many (perhaps the large majority) of the VFR-into-IMC
> crashes result because the pilot did NOT maintain basic instrument
> competence, or because the accidentally-encountered instrument
> conditions were NOT uncomplicated.

So the majority of pilots is not competent? Hmm.

As far as can see, the disconnect is still there. And I also think it's
at the heart of this discussion.


--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[[email protected]]

On Aug 22, 9:19 am, Thomas Borchert >
wrote:
> Matt,
>
> > If flying in a manner that just meets the MINIMUM standard to achieve a
> > pilot certificate in the US is what you consider "perfect and
> > infallible",
>
> Ok, one more try, then I'll give up: Im my experience (and I passed the
> same rides on the first try), there's a VAST difference between doing
> basic instrument flight as required for VFR pilots under the hood or with
> a CFI present, and flying in the clouds with no one but yourself present,
> fully knowing you have gotten yourself into a situation that a) you
> shouldn't be, b) you aren't legal to be in and c) has a very high
> potential to kill you.

I completely agree. There is indeed a vast difference. IMC is indeed
harder.

But no one has been saying that because you can fly with foggles to
PTS standards, you can therefore fly in IMC to PTS standards. Rather,
the claim is just that if you can fly with foggles to PTS standards,
then you can very probably manage to keep the plane upright for a few
minutes in roughly straight and roughly level flight in uncomplicated
IMC. Flying to PTS standards is much HARDER than what you have to do
to turn around and head vaguely north (say) in order to get back to
nearby VMC.

> my view is supported by the accident statistics with overwhelming clarity.

Not even close. Look at the 2006 Nall Report. There were a total of 49
fatal weather accidents. The report says that "most" were VMC into
IMC--let's say about 30. Now, how many of those involved a PTS-
proficient pilot in uncomplicated IMC? We don't know, but if half of
those crashes involved challenging IMC, and if (independently) half
involved non-proficient pilots (say, ones who never practice
instrument flying after getting their certificate), then we're down to
7 or 8 accidents involving a proficient pilot in uncomplicated IMC.

Of course, that's just a guess. The actual number could be lower (to a
minimum of zero) or higher (to a maximum of 49). But unless you have
some additional data, there is no "overwhelming clarity"--indeed, no
evidence at all--that more than a handful of accidents occur when a
PTS-proficient pilot inadvertantly enters uncomplicated IMC. Instead,
the statistics are consistent with the claim that a PTS-proficient
pilot can very probably manage to fly out of simple IMC. Of course,
there's no guarantee. Competence does not imply perfection, and even a
competent pilot has a small chance of making a fatal mistake in ANY
phase of flight.

[Ron Wanttaja]

On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 15:23:22 +0200, Thomas Borchert
> wrote:

>> For most pilots, though--and certainly for the particular flight
>> that's been under discussion here--it would be irresponsible to act as
>> PIC without having maintained private-pilot proficiency at basic
>> instrument flying.
>
>Care to explain why VFR into IMC is one of the leading accident causes?
>How do you explain the very obvious disconnect between what you
>postulate a regular, average pilot's abilities to be - and reality?

Actually, VFR into VMC *is* a leading accident cause, but the rate is lower than
the leading cause by nearly an order of magnitude. Though it depends on how you
lump together causes, really.

As many of you now, I've done an in-depth analysis of homebuilt accidents in the
1998-2004 timeframe. As a Control Group, I did a similar analysis of Cessna
172/Cessna 210 accidents.

Here's how my results came out:

Cause Percent
General Pilot Error 52.5%
Fuel Exhaustion/Starvation 8.9%
VFR to IFR 5.2%
Undetermined Loss of Power 4.7%
Maintenance Error 4.6%
Other Mechanical 4.2%
Engine Mechanical 3.7%
Buzzing 2.7%
Inadequate Preflight 1.6%
Carb Ice 1.2%
Fuel System 0.9%
Fuel Contamination 0.5%
Manufacturer Error 0.3%
Other 6.8% (lumps in 12 less-common events like
midairs, pilot incapacitation, etc.)

"General Pilot Error" in my analysis includes any accident that stemmed from the
pilot's improper use of stick-and-rudder skills, including the judgement aspects
(undershoots, overshoots, etc.).

So about 5% of the 172/210 accidents were due to an attempt to continue VFR
flight into IFR conditions.

I don't know how much different the Cirrus would be than my control group, but
my cursory look over a couple of years seems to show it's similar. Cases where
the CAPS was used...or where the CAPS could/should have been used... are still
outnumbered by the instances of overshoots/undershoots, loss of control on
rollout, brake fires, etc.

Ron Wanttaja

[[email protected]]

On Aug 22, 10:30 am, Thomas Borchert >
wrote:
> > In addition, many (perhaps the large majority) of the VFR-into-IMC
> > crashes result because the pilot did NOT maintain basic instrument
> > competence, or because the accidentally-encountered instrument
> > conditions were NOT uncomplicated.
>
> So the majority of pilots is not competent? Hmm.

No, that doesn't follow at all! Surely the nonproficient pilots would
be OVERREPRESENTED in the sample consisting of fatal crashes! So your
extrapolation to the general pilot population is completely spurious.

[Neil Gould]

Recently, > posted:

> On Aug 22, 9:23 am, Thomas Borchert >
> wrote:
>>> For most pilots, though--and certainly for the particular flight
>>> that's been under discussion here--it would be irresponsible to act
>>> as PIC without having maintained private-pilot proficiency at basic
>>> instrument flying.
>>
>> Care to explain why VFR into IMC is one of the leading accident
>> causes? How do you explain the very obvious disconnect between what
>> you postulate a regular, average pilot's abilities to be - and
>> reality?
>
> Yes, I'm glad to explain. You're confusing competence with perfection.
> Private-pilot competence at instrument flying means this: if a pilot
> with that competence accidentally enters IMC, and she realizes she's
> in IMC and tries to fly by instruments, and the conditions aren't
> complicated (that is, there's no icing, TS, proximity to challenging
> terrain, etc.), then the pilot can fly the plane with only a small
> chance of making a fatal mistake. But given many such occurrences,
> that small chance will sometimes manifest itself, so there will still
> be some crashes.
>
> In addition, many (perhaps the large majority) of the VFR-into-IMC
> crashes result because the pilot did NOT maintain basic instrument
> competence, or because the accidentally-encountered instrument
> conditions were NOT uncomplicated.
>
Are you implying that VFR-only pilots regularly fly into IMC, and as a
result the odds are that they will eventually crash? If so, please support
that notion with some data. If you are implying that there are "many"
occurances of competent VFR-only pilots flying into IMC and that the
"small chance" that applies to the group-at-large affects the likelihood
that there will be "some crashes", please supply a reference to some
supporting data.

I am unaware of any data that documents the number of occurances of pilots
inadvertently venturing into IMC, and without that number, it would seem
difficult to support any notions of probability bases solely on the number
of crashes. OTOH, the data on the survivability of non-IFR pilots in IMC
has been presented numerous times in this ng, and it appears to refute
either of your notions of probability, so if you have information to the
contrary, I, for one, would like to see it.

Neil

[Aluckyguess]

You know in reality it took a lot of balls to pull that chute. Something in
the pilots mind was really wrong. Imagine yourself looking over to the
passenger after minutes that seemed like hours and saying, dude hold on im
going to pull the chute. the passenger replies what, what's the problem. The
problem even with all this cool **** in front of me I have no idea where I'm
at. Or maybe he said we just lost the alternator and the backup isn't enough
juice for me to fly in imc. As they are floating down into the abyss the
pilot looks over and says I hope this thing floats.
I really cant imagine how scary this ordeal was.

[[email protected]]

On Aug 22, 10:53 am, "Neil Gould" > wrote:
> Are you implying that VFR-only pilots regularly fly into IMC, and as a
> result the odds are that they will eventually crash? If so, please support
> that notion with some data. If you are implying that there are "many"
> occurances of competent VFR-only pilots flying into IMC and that the
> "small chance" that applies to the group-at-large affects the likelihood
> that there will be "some crashes", please supply a reference to some
> supporting data.
>
> I am unaware of any data that documents the number of occurances of pilots
> inadvertently venturing into IMC, and without that number, it would seem
> difficult to support any notions of probability bases solely on the number
> of crashes. OTOH, the data on the survivability of non-IFR pilots in IMC
> has been presented numerous times in this ng, and it appears to refute
> either of your notions of probability, so if you have information to the
> contrary, I, for one, would like to see it.

Which data about non-IFR pilots in IMC are you referring to? If it's
the ancient "158 seconds" study (or whatever the number was), that
involved pilots who did not have (present-day) PTS proficiency at
instrument flight, so it doesn't address my claim. If you mean the
Nall Report, then (see my post about that a few minutes ago) the data
there don't tell us whether there are more than a few (or even more
than zero) crashes each year when a PTS-proficient pilot inadvertently
enters simple IMC.

You're right that we also don't know the baseline number of VFR-into-
IMC occurrences that DON"T result in a crash. So my claim is NOT that
the available data show us that the probability is large that a PTS-
competent pilot can safely return from simple IMC. Rather, my claim is
that the available data (as far as anyone has shown here) do not
(contrary to Thomas's claim) REFUTE the assertion that a PTS-competent
pilot can (very probably) safely return from simple IMC.

[Thomas Borchert]

> Rather, my claim is
> that the available data (as far as anyone has shown here) do not
> (contrary to Thomas's claim) REFUTE the assertion that a PTS-competent
> pilot can (very probably) safely return from simple IMC.
>

Well, maybe, but wouldn't one of the first things that the
oh-so-"competent" pilot of your scenario would do is adhere to the
rules? And that would certainly preclude him from flying VFR into IMC,
wouldn't it, let alone having to get out of it?

I maintain my opinion that your theory just doesn't have any basis in
reality. A "competent" pilot as you describe him wouldn't get into a
VFR-into-IMC situation. He would never see "simple IMC", whatever that
is, let alone the question whether most VFR-into-IMC accidents happen in
"simple IMC", which I doubt. Thus, he would never have to fly out of it,
let alone the question whether that is possible (e.g. when fog forms all
around you).

It may be a nice concept in theory, but the reality is that pilots,
regardless of competence as measured by flight time, regularly get
killed in VFR-into-IMC accidents, and that the requirement for 3 hours
of basic instrument instruction for the certificate didn't change that
much, AFAIK. So the concept in practice simply doesn't seem to work.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Thomas Borchert]

> Look at the 2006 Nall Report. There were a total of 49
> fatal weather accidents.
>

Ok, here's your way to prove your theory: How did the VFR-into-IMC
accident number change with the introduction of the
3-hour-instrument-instruction requirement?

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Dylan Smith]

On 2007-08-22, Ron Wanttaja > wrote:
> I've had one gen-u-wine emergency in my flying life, an engine failure in my 150
> about 23 years ago.

Hmm. Were you the Ron Wanttaja who wrote the ILAFFT about that incident?
Something to do with fuel contamination, if I remember right.

--
Yes, the Reply-To email address is valid.
Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute: http://oolite-linux.berlios.de

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Aluckyguess wrote:
> You know in reality it took a lot of balls to pull that chute.
> Something in the pilots mind was really wrong. Imagine yourself
> looking over to the passenger after minutes that seemed like hours
> and saying, dude hold on im going to pull the chute. the passenger
> replies what, what's the problem. The problem even with all this cool
> **** in front of me I have no idea where I'm at. Or maybe he said we
> just lost the alternator and the backup isn't enough juice for me to
> fly in imc. As they are floating down into the abyss the pilot looks
> over and says I hope this thing floats. I really cant imagine how
> scary this ordeal was.

Weren't you one of the guys that was bitching because we didn't have enough
information to discuss the issue? Now you are adding in alternator failures
and even the conversation that went on in the cockpit.

[[email protected]]

On Aug 22, 11:30 am, Thomas Borchert >
wrote:
> > Rather, my claim is
> > that the available data (as far as anyone has shown here) do not
> > (contrary to Thomas's claim) REFUTE the assertion that a PTS-competent
> > pilot can (very probably) safely return from simple IMC.
>
> Well, maybe, but wouldn't one of the first things that the
> oh-so-"competent" pilot of your scenario would do is adhere to the
> rules? And that would certainly preclude him from flying VFR into IMC,
> wouldn't it, let alone having to get out of it?

No. Once again, you're confusing competence with perfection. A
competent pilot will seldom if ever enter IMC inadvertently, but it's
not IMPOSSIBLE for him to so.

But you bring up an interesting point: lack of proficiency at one
required skill is likely correlated with lack of proficiency at other
such skills. Although it's POSSIBLE for a competent pilot to
accidentally enter IMC, it's more likely to happen to a pilot who's
lax about weather knowledge or about preflight weather briefings. And
such a pilot is more likely to be lax about other things too--such as
practicing hood flying enough to stay proficient.

But that just reinforces my position, because that correlation makes
it even MORE likely that VFR-into-IMC crashes involve pilots who don't
maintain their proficiency.

[Jim Stewart]

wrote:
> On Aug 22, 11:30 am, Thomas Borchert >
> wrote:
>
>>>Rather, my claim is
>>>that the available data (as far as anyone has shown here) do not
>>>(contrary to Thomas's claim) REFUTE the assertion that a PTS-competent
>>>pilot can (very probably) safely return from simple IMC.
>>
>>Well, maybe, but wouldn't one of the first things that the
>>oh-so-"competent" pilot of your scenario would do is adhere to the
>>rules? And that would certainly preclude him from flying VFR into IMC,
>>wouldn't it, let alone having to get out of it?
>
>
> No. Once again, you're confusing competence with perfection. A
> competent pilot will seldom if ever enter IMC inadvertently, but it's
> not IMPOSSIBLE for him to so.

It's worth noting that Lindberg baled twice
in his career as a mail pilot, both times
because he flew into weather and couldn't
find his way out.

[[email protected]]

On Aug 22, 11:30 am, Thomas Borchert >
wrote:
> Ok, here's your way to prove your theory: How did the VFR-into-IMC
> accident number change with the introduction of the
> 3-hour-instrument-instruction requirement?

I don't know. I'd appreciate seeing those numbers if you have them.

But I disagree that those numbers would straightforwardly answer the
question at hand. Suppose the VFR-into-IMC accident rate remained
unchanged after the requirement was introduced. Perhaps that's because
private-pilot PTS proficiency at hood flying doesn't help. Or perhaps
it's partly because pilots let their proficiency lapse; basic
instrument flying is not a skill that persists for long if it's not
practiced. Or perhaps there's the well-know risk-compensation effect:
pilots with hood training might take greater chances of encountering
IMC.

The only way to answer the question statistically would be to compare
the VFR-into-simple-IMC fatality rate between pilots who were, or were
not, PTS-proficient at hood flying at the time of that inadvertent
encounter. Those numbers aren't available, as far as I know.

[[email protected]]

On Aug 22, 10:53 am, "Neil Gould" > wrote:
> I am unaware of any data that documents the number of occurances of pilots
> inadvertently venturing into IMC,

Come to think of it, we can make a reasonable estimate about this.

Suppose the average pilot wanders accidentally into IMC about once
every ten years. There are about 600,000 active pilots in the US. So
that would mean about 60,000 VFR-into-IMC events each year.

As I argued earlier today, a plausible guess for the number of VFR-
into-IMC crashes in 2006 is 7 or 8 (with a possible range from 0 to
49).

So unless the ten-years estimate is low by ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE, we
find that there is a very low fatality rate for VFR-into-IMC events.

[[email protected]]

> As I argued earlier today, a plausible guess for the number of VFR-
> into-IMC crashes in 2006 is 7 or 8 (with a possible range from 0 to
> 49).

Oops, small correction: 7 or 8 was the guess for PTS-proficient VFR-
into-simple-IMC crashes. The guess for ALL VFR-into-IMC crashes was
30, with a possible range from 25 to 49.

[Ron Rosenfeld]

On Sat, 18 Aug 2007 16:52:04 -0400, Owen Rogers >
wrote:

>Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>
>Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
>ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
>common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
>parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>
>The two aboard had minor injuries but will be ok. Nobody was injured on
>the ground.
>
>Here is a news link:
>http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070818/NEWS/708180319/-1/NEWS
>
>Other reports said that it was a Cirrus, although the make/model hasn't
>been confirmed yet.
>
>

And finally, the NTSB preliminary report:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20070821X01216&key=1

If the report is accurate, we have a non-instrument rated pilot who, when
ACK suddenly "went IFR", "informed the controller that he was capable of
executing the ILS approach". Five minutes later, Cape Approach informed
the tower controller that the pilot had deployed the parachute.

--ron

[Doug Semler]

On Aug 22, 12:38 pm, wrote:
> On Aug 22, 10:53 am, "Neil Gould" > wrote:
>
> > I am unaware of any data that documents the number of occurances of pilots
> > inadvertently venturing into IMC,
>
> Come to think of it, we can make a reasonable estimate about this.
>
> Suppose the average pilot wanders accidentally into IMC about once
> every ten years. There are about 600,000 active pilots in the US. So
> that would mean about 60,000 VFR-into-IMC events each year.
>
> As I argued earlier today, a plausible guess for the number of VFR-
> into-IMC crashes in 2006 is 7 or 8 (with a possible range from 0 to
> 49).
>
> So unless the ten-years estimate is low by ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE, we
> find that there is a very low fatality rate for VFR-into-IMC events.

Not stating anything for or against your argument, because I think it
is slightly flawed. You are assuming that all flights by all pilots
are initiated in VMC or under VFR.

I think a more correct estimate would be to take only the non
instrument rated pilots. Unless someone has done any study about
instrument rated pilots flying VFR and wandering into IMC. That would
significantly decrease the numbers of incursions per anum.

Well, come to think of it, I don't know. Now I'm thinking "what about
currency?"

The whole problem is that we don't know the number of:
total number of VFR into IMC (by non rated pilots)
total number of VFR into IMC (by rated pilots)
successful CONTINUED VFR in IMC (by non rated pilots)
successful CONTINUED VFR into IMC (by rated pilots).

All we have are total failed VFR into IMC (by rated/non-rated) pilots.

[[email protected]]

On Aug 22, 2:12 pm, Doug Semler > wrote:
> Not stating anything for or against your argument, because I think it
> is slightly flawed. You are assuming that all flights by all pilots
> are initiated in VMC or under VFR.

No, I'm making no such assumption. I'm just assuming what I stated:
that an average pilot accidentally flies VFR into IMC at least once
every ten years or so. I think that's a pretty conservative guess.

> I think a more correct estimate would be to take only the non
> instrument rated pilots.

IFR pilots accidentally fly VFR into IMC too, and sometimes get killed
doing it. But even if we exclude instrument-rated pilots from the
analysis I gave, that could at most double the fatality rate I
calculated--which would still be very small.

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Ron Rosenfeld wrote:

>
> And finally, the NTSB preliminary report:
>
> http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20070821X01216&key=1
>
> If the report is accurate, we have a non-instrument rated pilot who,
> when ACK suddenly "went IFR", "informed the controller that he was
> capable of executing the ILS approach". Five minutes later, Cape
> Approach informed the tower controller that the pilot had deployed
> the parachute.
>
>

That sort of revives the stupid pilot theory.

[[email protected]]

On Aug 22, 10:30 am, Thomas Borchert >
wrote:
> > In addition, many (perhaps the large majority) of the VFR-into-IMC
> > crashes result because the pilot did NOT maintain basic instrument
> > competence, or because the accidentally-encountered instrument
> > conditions were NOT uncomplicated.
>
> So the majority of pilots is not competent? Hmm.

No, that doesn't follow at all! Surely nonproficient pilots will be
OVERREPRESENTED in the sample that consists of fatal crashes! So your
extrapolation to the general pilot population is completely spurious.



[Sorry if this post is a duplicate; something got lost.]

[Neil Gould]

Recently, > posted:

> On Aug 22, 10:53 am, "Neil Gould" > wrote:
>> Are you implying that VFR-only pilots regularly fly into IMC, and as
>> a result the odds are that they will eventually crash? If so, please
>> support that notion with some data. If you are implying that there
>> are "many" occurances of competent VFR-only pilots flying into IMC
>> and that the "small chance" that applies to the group-at-large
>> affects the likelihood that there will be "some crashes", please
>> supply a reference to some supporting data.
>>
>> I am unaware of any data that documents the number of occurances of
>> pilots inadvertently venturing into IMC, and without that number, it
>> would seem difficult to support any notions of probability bases
>> solely on the number of crashes. OTOH, the data on the survivability
>> of non-IFR pilots in IMC has been presented numerous times in this
>> ng, and it appears to refute either of your notions of probability,
>> so if you have information to the contrary, I, for one, would like
>> to see it.
>
> Which data about non-IFR pilots in IMC are you referring to? If it's
> the ancient "158 seconds" study (or whatever the number was), that
> involved pilots who did not have (present-day) PTS proficiency at
> instrument flight, so it doesn't address my claim. If you mean the
> Nall Report, then (see my post about that a few minutes ago) the data
> there don't tell us whether there are more than a few (or even more
> than zero) crashes each year when a PTS-proficient pilot inadvertently
> enters simple IMC.
>
> You're right that we also don't know the baseline number of VFR-into-
> IMC occurrences that DON"T result in a crash. So my claim is NOT that
> the available data show us that the probability is large that a PTS-
> competent pilot can safely return from simple IMC. Rather, my claim is
> that the available data (as far as anyone has shown here) do not
> (contrary to Thomas's claim) REFUTE the assertion that a PTS-competent
> pilot can (very probably) safely return from simple IMC.
>
What I'm having difficulty with is the notion that *any* predictions of
the probability of crashes involving the VFR pilot into IMC can be made
based on the available data. It would be just as possible that the crashes
represent a small fraction of such excursions as it representing the vast
majority of them. The only information that I've seen (ancient or
otherwise) suggests that the probability of surviving such an occurance is
fairly low, and that practice didn't have much of an impact on the
result -- the difference was measured in seconds, not success. However,
the missing baseline information makes it impossible to use this as more
than a caution, albeit rather compelling.

Also, I did read your post on the Nall report, but I saw nothing that
excludes the possibility that *all* of the pilots involved in those fatal
accidents were "proficient" (which may be a reason they felt confident
enough to proceed). While I understand the face validity of your notion
that practice improves one's chances of survival, I just don't see the
supporting data to back it up. IMO, one risk of proceding into unkown IMC
is the lack of an answer to "...and then what?" Bottom line, I agree with
Tom's perspective that the truly proficient pilots won't find themselves
in that situation to begin with.

Neil

[Neil Gould]

Recently, > posted:

> On Aug 22, 10:53 am, "Neil Gould" > wrote:
>> I am unaware of any data that documents the number of occurances of
>> pilots inadvertently venturing into IMC,
>
> Come to think of it, we can make a reasonable estimate about this.
>
> Suppose the average pilot wanders accidentally into IMC about once
> every ten years.
>
Based on...?

I'm not so sure that VFR into IMC is unintentional. "...and then what?"

Neil

[[email protected]]

On Aug 22, 4:51 pm, "Neil Gould" > wrote:
> Recently, > posted:
>
> > On Aug 22, 10:53 am, "Neil Gould" > wrote:
> >> I am unaware of any data that documents the number of occurances of
> >> pilots inadvertently venturing into IMC,
>
> > Come to think of it, we can make a reasonable estimate about this.
>
> > Suppose the average pilot wanders accidentally into IMC about once
> > every ten years.
>
> Based on...?

Based on anecdotal evidence. Ask several pilots you know about their
own experience. The point of my analysis is that the guess doesn't
have to be very accurate. Suppose (implausibly) that the average time
between VFR-into-IMC events is 100 years (rather than ten) for the
average pilot. EVEN THEN, the analysis I gave shows that well over 99%
of VFR-into-IMC events are survived. (If the time is ten years, or
less, then the survival rate is well over 99.9%, by the analysis I
gave.)

It's reasonable to use anecdotal evidence if it only needs to be
accurate to within an order of magnitude or two to support a
particular conclusion, as is the case here.

>Also, I did read your post on the Nall report, but I saw nothing that
>excludes the possibility that *all* of the pilots involved in those fatal
>accidents were "proficient"

Correct. But even if (implausibly) it's only the proficient pilots who
crash, that still gives a survival rate of well nover 99% for VFR-into-
IMC events.

>Bottom line, I agree with
>Tom's perspective that the truly proficient pilots won't find themselves
>in that situation to begin with.

But if THAT were true, then all of the VFR-into-IMC crashes would
involve NONproficient pilots! Therefore, the +99% survival rate for
VFR-into-IMC events would be the rate for NONproficient pilots in that
situation. Proficient pilots presumably would be able to fare even
better in IMC than nonproficient pilots do.

[Matt Whiting]

Jim Stewart wrote:
> wrote:
>> On Aug 22, 11:30 am, Thomas Borchert >
>> wrote:
>>
>>>> Rather, my claim is
>>>> that the available data (as far as anyone has shown here) do not
>>>> (contrary to Thomas's claim) REFUTE the assertion that a PTS-competent
>>>> pilot can (very probably) safely return from simple IMC.
>>>
>>> Well, maybe, but wouldn't one of the first things that the
>>> oh-so-"competent" pilot of your scenario would do is adhere to the
>>> rules? And that would certainly preclude him from flying VFR into IMC,
>>> wouldn't it, let alone having to get out of it?
>>
>>
>> No. Once again, you're confusing competence with perfection. A
>> competent pilot will seldom if ever enter IMC inadvertently, but it's
>> not IMPOSSIBLE for him to so.
>
> It's worth noting that Lindberg baled twice
> in his career as a mail pilot, both times
> because he flew into weather and couldn't
> find his way out.

And what instruments did he have in the panel of his airplane?

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Ron Wanttaja wrote:
> On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 15:23:22 +0200, Thomas Borchert
> > wrote:
>
>>> For most pilots, though--and certainly for the particular flight
>>> that's been under discussion here--it would be irresponsible to act as
>>> PIC without having maintained private-pilot proficiency at basic
>>> instrument flying.
>> Care to explain why VFR into IMC is one of the leading accident causes?
>> How do you explain the very obvious disconnect between what you
>> postulate a regular, average pilot's abilities to be - and reality?
>
> Actually, VFR into VMC *is* a leading accident cause, but the rate is lower than
> the leading cause by nearly an order of magnitude. Though it depends on how you
> lump together causes, really.
>
> As many of you now, I've done an in-depth analysis of homebuilt accidents in the
> 1998-2004 timeframe. As a Control Group, I did a similar analysis of Cessna
> 172/Cessna 210 accidents.
>
> Here's how my results came out:
>
> Cause Percent
> General Pilot Error 52.5%
> Fuel Exhaustion/Starvation 8.9%
> VFR to IFR 5.2%
> Undetermined Loss of Power 4.7%
> Maintenance Error 4.6%
> Other Mechanical 4.2%
> Engine Mechanical 3.7%
> Buzzing 2.7%
> Inadequate Preflight 1.6%
> Carb Ice 1.2%
> Fuel System 0.9%
> Fuel Contamination 0.5%
> Manufacturer Error 0.3%
> Other 6.8% (lumps in 12 less-common events like
> midairs, pilot incapacitation, etc.)
>
> "General Pilot Error" in my analysis includes any accident that stemmed from the
> pilot's improper use of stick-and-rudder skills, including the judgement aspects
> (undershoots, overshoots, etc.).
>
> So about 5% of the 172/210 accidents were due to an attempt to continue VFR
> flight into IFR conditions.
>
> I don't know how much different the Cirrus would be than my control group, but
> my cursory look over a couple of years seems to show it's similar. Cases where
> the CAPS was used...or where the CAPS could/should have been used... are still
> outnumbered by the instances of overshoots/undershoots, loss of control on
> rollout, brake fires, etc.
>
> Ron Wanttaja
>

Ron, what is VFR into IFR and IFR conditions. Is this anything like VFR
into IMC? :-)

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Thomas Borchert wrote:
> Matt,
>
>> If flying in a manner that just meets the MINIMUM standard to achieve a
>> pilot certificate in the US is what you consider "perfect and
>> infallible",
>
> Ok, one more try, then I'll give up: Im my experience (and I passed the
> same rides on the first try), there's a VAST difference between doing
> basic instrument flight as required for VFR pilots under the hood or with
> a CFI present, and flying in the clouds with no one but yourself present,
> fully knowing you have gotten yourself into a situation that a) you
> shouldn't be, b) you aren't legal to be in and c) has a very high
> potential to kill you.
>
> If you have the nerves of steel not to see a difference there, I can't
> help it, but my view is supported by the accident statistics with
> overwhelming clarity. VFR flight into IMC is a leading accident cause. Ask
> yourself why that might be. Then try to pull another "Ha, ha, ha" on me.

That is why this should be regularly practiced and checked during every
BFR. I once accidentally flew into IMC prior to getting my instrument
rating. I did as I was trained and transitioned to instruments, made a
180 and within a couple of minutes was out of the snow storm and back
into VMC. It was a shock at first, but then the training kicked in and
I executed as taught. It wasn't a big deal. Then again, I had a crusty
old instructor who really taught you how to fly and every BFR checked
the stuff that people didn't practice often such as flying on
instruments. I'm always amazed when I hear of BFRs that cover takeoffs
and landings and stuff you do every flight and completely ignore the
stuff like simulated emergency landings, fire in the cockpit, electrical
failure, inadvertent flight into IMC, etc., that you almost never
encounter during normal flight.

The accident statistics support that many pilots are not competent. No
disagreement from me on that point. However, this has nothing to do
with "perfect and infallible" and everything to do with basic competence
of instruction and maintaining proficiency on your own between BFRs.

Matt

[Matt Whiting]

Ron Rosenfeld wrote:
> On Sat, 18 Aug 2007 16:52:04 -0400, Owen Rogers >
> wrote:
>
>> Looks like another save for BRS and Cirrus.
>>
>> Apparently a Cirrus was attempting to land ACK VFR last night when they
>> ran into weather (fog and low visibility after sunset on the island are
>> common in the summer). They pulled the Ballistic Recovery System
>> parachute about 5 miles northeast of ACK.
>>
>> The two aboard had minor injuries but will be ok. Nobody was injured on
>> the ground.
>>
>> Here is a news link:
>> http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070818/NEWS/708180319/-1/NEWS
>>
>> Other reports said that it was a Cirrus, although the make/model hasn't
>> been confirmed yet.
>>
>>
>
> And finally, the NTSB preliminary report:
>
> http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20070821X01216&key=1
>
> If the report is accurate, we have a non-instrument rated pilot who, when
> ACK suddenly "went IFR", "informed the controller that he was capable of
> executing the ILS approach". Five minutes later, Cape Approach informed
> the tower controller that the pilot had deployed the parachute.

If the report is accurate, the pilot is not only incompetent but a liar
as well. It will be curious to see the full report...

Matt

[Roger (K8RI)]

On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 10:45:41 -0700, Ron Wanttaja
> wrote:

>On Sun, 19 Aug 2007 17:05:47 GMT, Matt Whiting > wrote:
>
>>Thomas Borchert wrote:
>>>> If a pilot pulls the chute because he judges an uncontrolled parachute
>>>> descent to be less risky than trying to keep the plane upright for a
>>>> few minutes in simple instrument cruise flight, then he has judged
>>>> himself to have less than the minimum required competence for a
>>>> private pilot.
>>>
>>> That's BS, plain and simple. The instrument flying requirement is
>>> required for the test, barely. There is no requirement at all to keep it
>>> current. Otherwise, all certified pilots would be instrument pilots.
>>
>>That's BS, at least in the US. I can't speak for other parts of the
>>world. That is why we have biennial flight reviews, to see if currency
>>is being maintained. A private pilot should be capable of doing
>>anything required of their certificate. Flying straight and level on
>>instruments is a far cry from being instrument rated.
>
>I've been taking BFRs since they were instituted, and don't believe I've been
>put under the hood more than once or twice since my original Private flight
>test. And *that* was ~35 years ago.

My experience has been the opposite. I don't remember having had a BFR
without going under the hood. OTOH I always eat the same thing for
breakfast just in case some one asks I'll get it right.

>
>Every time Cirrus BRS deployments come up, I'm reminded of the anti-parachute
>arguments during WWI.
>
>Ron Wanttaja

[Doug Semler]

"Matt Whiting" > wrote in message
...

>
> Ron, what is VFR into IFR and IFR conditions. Is this anything like VFR
> into IMC? :-)


Matt.. VFR into IFR conditions is when you slew that Cessna 172 above FL180
<grin>

--
Doug Semler, MCPD
a.a. #705, BAAWA. EAC Guardian of the Horn of the IPU (pbuhh).
The answer is 42; DNRC o-
Gur Hfrarg unf orpbzr fb shyy bs penc gurfr qnlf, abbar rira
erpbtavmrf fvzcyr guvatf yvxr ebg13 nalzber. Fnq, vfa'g vg?

[Aluckyguess]

"Gig 601XL Builder" <wrDOTgiaconaATsuddenlink.net> wrote in message
...
> Aluckyguess wrote:
>> You know in reality it took a lot of balls to pull that chute.
>> Something in the pilots mind was really wrong. Imagine yourself
>> looking over to the passenger after minutes that seemed like hours
>> and saying, dude hold on im going to pull the chute. the passenger
>> replies what, what's the problem. The problem even with all this cool
>> **** in front of me I have no idea where I'm at. Or maybe he said we
>> just lost the alternator and the backup isn't enough juice for me to
>> fly in imc. As they are floating down into the abyss the pilot looks
>> over and says I hope this thing floats. I really cant imagine how
>> scary this ordeal was.
>
> Weren't you one of the guys that was bitching because we didn't have
> enough information to discuss the issue? Now you are adding in alternator
> failures and even the conversation that went on in the cockpit.

I am just making something up, a scenario out of the blue. I have no idea
what happened. I do know the pilot and passenger are still alive and to me
that is all that matters.
>
>

[Ron Wanttaja]

On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 22:18:36 GMT, Matt Whiting > wrote:


>Ron, what is VFR into IFR and IFR conditions. Is this anything like VFR
>into IMC? :-)

Whatever you guys with the flickery-humming things in your instrument panel call
it when the forward view looks like the inside of a cow. :-)

Ron Wanttaja

[Ron Wanttaja]

On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 15:34:35 +0000 (UTC), Dylan Smith >
wrote:

>On 2007-08-22, Ron Wanttaja > wrote:
>> I've had one gen-u-wine emergency in my flying life, an engine failure in my 150
>> about 23 years ago.
>
>Hmm. Were you the Ron Wanttaja who wrote the ILAFFT about that incident?
>Something to do with fuel contamination, if I remember right.

No, that was my evil twin, Ron "Skippy" Wanttaja.

Yep, t'was me. May 1987, reprinted in ILAFFT #3.

Strange, the Usenet posting that I did after the event is *almost* on Google.
When I search for it, I find a couple of responses, but not the original
article. Just a follow-up by sometime who wanted to tell their own story, and a
smart-a** response from Ron Natalie.

Funny how things never change. :-)

Ron Wanttaja

[Ron Lee[_2_]]

wrote:

>On Aug 22, 2:12 pm, Doug Semler > wrote:
>> Not stating anything for or against your argument, because I think it
>> is slightly flawed. You are assuming that all flights by all pilots
>> are initiated in VMC or under VFR.
>
>No, I'm making no such assumption. I'm just assuming what I stated:
>that an average pilot accidentally flies VFR into IMC at least once
>every ten years or so. I think that's a pretty conservative guess.

Been flying for 30+ years and ZERO VFR to IMC incursions.

Plus of the 600,000 pilots (maybe only 450,000), many seldom fly.

I suspect that the odds are very high that if a VFR pilots gets into
IMC he is a goner.

Ron Lee

[Ron Lee[_2_]]

>> And finally, the NTSB preliminary report:
>>
>> http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20070821X01216&key=1
>>
>> If the report is accurate, we have a non-instrument rated pilot who,
>> when ACK suddenly "went IFR", "informed the controller that he was
>> capable of executing the ILS approach". Five minutes later, Cape
>> Approach informed the tower controller that the pilot had deployed
>> the parachute.
>>
>>
>
>That sort of revives the stupid pilot theory.
>
>
Actually that is a good initial guess for most GA crashes.

Ron Lee

[Doug Semler]

"Ron Lee" > wrote in message
...
> wrote:
>
>>On Aug 22, 2:12 pm, Doug Semler > wrote:
>>> Not stating anything for or against your argument, because I think it
>>> is slightly flawed. You are assuming that all flights by all pilots
>>> are initiated in VMC or under VFR.
>>
>>No, I'm making no such assumption. I'm just assuming what I stated:
>>that an average pilot accidentally flies VFR into IMC at least once
>>every ten years or so. I think that's a pretty conservative guess.
>
> Been flying for 30+ years and ZERO VFR to IMC incursions.
>
> Plus of the 600,000 pilots (maybe only 450,000), many seldom fly.
>
> I suspect that the odds are very high that if a VFR pilots gets into
> IMC he is a goner.
>

That was my point. What was snipped was the most relevant to the
discussion:
total number of VFR into IMC (by non rated pilots)
total number of VFR into IMC (by rated pilots)
successful CONTINUED VFR in IMC (by non rated pilots)
successful CONTINUED VFR into IMC (by rated pilots).

All we have are total failed VFR into IMC (by rated/non-rated) pilots.

There are some flawed assumptions in his model. <shrug> I would think that
60,000 VFR flights into IMC is awfly high. Hell, does anyone know how many
part 91 flights under VFR per year?


--
Doug Semler, MCPD
a.a. #705, BAAWA. EAC Guardian of the Horn of the IPU (pbuhh).
The answer is 42; DNRC o-
Gur Hfrarg unf orpbzr fb shyy bs penc gurfr qnlf, abbar rira
erpbtavmrf fvzcyr guvatf yvxr ebg13 nalzber. Fnq, vfa'g vg?

[Thomas Borchert]

> Suppose the average pilot wanders accidentally into IMC about once
> every ten years
>

How would you possibly arrive at such an estimate? That's ridiculous.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

[Neil Gould]

Recently, > posted:

> On Aug 22, 4:51 pm, "Neil Gould" > wrote:
>> Recently, > posted:
>>
>>> On Aug 22, 10:53 am, "Neil Gould" > wrote:
>>>> I am unaware of any data that documents the number of occurances of
>>>> pilots inadvertently venturing into IMC,
>>
>>> Come to think of it, we can make a reasonable estimate about this.
>>
>>> Suppose the average pilot wanders accidentally into IMC about once
>>> every ten years.
>>
>> Based on...?
>
> Based on anecdotal evidence. Ask several pilots you know about their
> own experience. The point of my analysis is that the guess doesn't
> have to be very accurate. Suppose (implausibly) that the average time
> between VFR-into-IMC events is 100 years (rather than ten) for the
> average pilot. EVEN THEN, the analysis I gave shows that well over 99%
> of VFR-into-IMC events are survived. (If the time is ten years, or
> less, then the survival rate is well over 99.9%, by the analysis I
> gave.)
>
And, how does your analysis change if the average pilot "wanders" into IMC
once every 10 days?

> It's reasonable to use anecdotal evidence if it only needs to be
> accurate to within an order of magnitude or two to support a
> particular conclusion, as is the case here.
>
I disagree. Given that the practice in question is against the rules, what
is reasonable is to expect that it will be significantly under-reported in
anecdotal reports. Anecdotal information is useful for establishing
parameters to test, but not much beyond that.

>> Also, I did read your post on the Nall report, but I saw nothing that
>> excludes the possibility that *all* of the pilots involved in those
>> fatal accidents were "proficient"
>
> Correct. But even if (implausibly) it's only the proficient pilots who
> crash, that still gives a survival rate of well nover 99% for
> VFR-into- IMC events.
>
My point is that there is no basis to establish a "survival rate" at any
level.

>> Bottom line, I agree with
>> Tom's perspective that the truly proficient pilots won't find
>> themselves in that situation to begin with.
>
> But if THAT were true, then all of the VFR-into-IMC crashes would
> involve NONproficient pilots!
>
Well, this does beg the question of what proficiency means? IMO, the
"proficient pilots" are not unaware of their surroundings or atmospheric
conditions affecting their flight path, and will not "wander" into
anything. Thus they will enter IMC or not, based on their evaluation of
the circumstances. If they're right, things *may* turn out well, and if
not...

As I see it, this is not as much a stick-and-rudder issue as one of
judgement, and to some degree luck. The pilots that "wander" around
unaware of their situation may be good stick-and-rudder folks, but they
are demonstrating bad judgement, and IMC is just one of many ways that
they can get nailed.

Neil

[Matt Whiting]

Ron Wanttaja wrote:
> On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 22:18:36 GMT, Matt Whiting > wrote:
>
>
>> Ron, what is VFR into IFR and IFR conditions. Is this anything like VFR
>> into IMC? :-)
>
> Whatever you guys with the flickery-humming things in your instrument panel call
> it when the forward view looks like the inside of a cow. :-)

Well, never having seen the inside of a cow, I can only guess. :-)

IFR is when I have to talk to controllers and fly certain courses and
altitudes.

IMC is when I have the inside the cow view.

I can be IFR and not in IMC. I can be IFR and in IMC. And I can be in
IMC and no IFR, although this is legal in very few areas.


Matt

[Larry Dighera]

On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 19:16:56 -0700, "Aluckyguess" > wrote in
>:

>I do know the pilot and passenger are still alive and to me
>that is all that matters.

The non-instrument rated pilot received serious injuries as a result
of his telling ATC he was able to fly the Rnwy 25 ILS approach. Why
he chose to do that, rather than divert to another destination, is
anybody's guess at this point.

[Larry Dighera]

On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 23:55:39 -0400, "Doug Semler"
> wrote in
>:

>Ghe Usenet has become so full of crap these days, noone even
>recognizes simple things like rot13 anymore. Sad, isn't it?

That's not because Usenet is FOC. It's because MS's news reader
doesn't require that readers first visit news.announce.newusers before
they can participate as was the case of pre-Windows, Unix based news
clients.

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Larry Dighera wrote:
> On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 23:55:39 -0400, "Doug Semler"
> > wrote in
> >:
>
>> Ghe Usenet has become so full of crap these days, noone even
>> recognizes simple things like rot13 anymore. Sad, isn't it?
>
> That's not because Usenet is FOC. It's because MS's news reader
> doesn't require that readers first visit news.announce.newusers before
> they can participate as was the case of pre-Windows, Unix based news
> clients.

You can't blame MS for that. I was never forced to visit
news.announce.newusers when I first accessed USNET via a telnet connection
back in the 80's and a Mac didn't require it when I first accessed one in
the early 90's.

The downfall of USNET happened during "The September That Never Ended" when
AOL was unleashed on to USENET.

[Larry Dighera]

On Thu, 23 Aug 2007 09:53:12 -0500, "Gig 601XL Builder"
<wrDOTgiaconaATsuddenlink.net> wrote in
>:

>Larry Dighera wrote:
>> On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 23:55:39 -0400, "Doug Semler"
>> > wrote in
>> >:
>>
>>> Ghe Usenet has become so full of crap these days, noone even
>>> recognizes simple things like rot13 anymore. Sad, isn't it?
>>
>> That's not because Usenet is FOC. It's because MS's news reader
>> doesn't require that readers first visit news.announce.newusers before
>> they can participate as was the case of pre-Windows, Unix based news
>> clients.
>
>You can't blame MS for that. I was never forced to visit
>news.announce.newusers when I first accessed USNET via a telnet connection
>back in the 80's and a Mac didn't require it when I first accessed one in
>the early 90's.

What news client software did you use via telnet?

Usenet was created under the Unix operating system. Have you ever
used rn or trn?* They forced a visit to news.announce.newusers when
initially run.

>The downfall of USNET happened during "The September That Never Ended" when
>AOL was unleashed on to USENET.

That was about the time MS released Windows also.

There's no question that AOL's impact on the web and Usenet caused it
to be inundated with naïve users. That's both good and bad.

* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rn_(newsreader)

[Gig 601XL Builder]

Larry Dighera wrote:
> What news client software did you use via telnet?


I really don't remember.

[James Robinson]

Thomas Borchert > wrote:

>> For most pilots, though--and certainly for the particular flight
>> that's been under discussion here--it would be irresponsible to act as
>> PIC without having maintained private-pilot proficiency at basic
>> instrument flying.
>>
>
> Care to explain why VFR into IMC is one of the leading accident causes?
> How do you explain the very obvious disconnect between what you
> postulate a regular, average pilot's abilities to be - and reality?

Just a coincidence, but there was another Cirrus accident near Edmonton,
Alberta, about a week ago, resulting in fatalities.

http://www.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/story.html?id=b5978e56-c577-
4b68-8a17-50016d7bb7b4&k=19839

http://tinyurl.com/2s3flh

The wreckage was found on the top of a high hill, about 500 feet from a
350 foot tall communications tower supported with guy wires. The
parachute had been deployed. The pilot had six years experience, and had
purchased the aircraft about a month before.

The ceiling was reported at a nearby airport as being close to even with
the top of the hill.

In other articles, the investigator from the Safety Board suggested that
the parachute likely deployed on impact. The brother of the pilot, who
is also a pilot, speculated that the route he was taking would see the
hills come up quickly, and he was likely squeezed between the ground and
the clouds.

[Doug Semler]

On Aug 23, 12:35 pm, Larry Dighera > wrote:
> On Thu, 23 Aug 2007 09:53:12 -0500, "Gig 601XL Builder"
> <wrDOTgiaconaATsuddenlink.net> wrote in
> >:
>
>
>
>
>
> >Larry Dighera wrote:
> >> On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 23:55:39 -0400, "Doug Semler"
> >> > wrote in
> >> >:
>
> >>> Ghe Usenet has become so full of crap these days, noone even
> >>> recognizes simple things like rot13 anymore. Sad, isn't it?
>
> >> That's not because Usenet is FOC. It's because MS's news reader
> >> doesn't require that readers first visit news.announce.newusers before
> >> they can participate as was the case of pre-Windows, Unix based news
> >> clients.
>
> >You can't blame MS for that. I was never forced to visit
> >news.announce.newusers when I first accessed USNET via a telnet connection
> >back in the 80's and a Mac didn't require it when I first accessed one in
> >the early 90's.
>
> What news client software did you use via telnet?
>
> Usenet was created under the Unix operating system. Have you ever
> used rn or trn?* They forced a visit to news.announce.newusers when
> initially run.
>

IIRC xrn (what I started out with) also forced you to go to it...

[Larry Dighera]

On Thu, 23 Aug 2007 12:08:15 -0700, Doug Semler >
wrote in . com>:

>
>IIRC xrn (what I started out with) also forced you to go to it...

I'm not familiar with xrn. Was that also a Larry Wall creation?

[Doug Semler]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Thu, 23 Aug 2007 12:08:15 -0700, Doug Semler >
> wrote in . com>:
>
>>
>>IIRC xrn (what I started out with) also forced you to go to it...
>
> I'm not familiar with xrn. Was that also a Larry Wall creation?
>


xrn is an X11 front end to rn (using the Athena widget set). I can't
remember offhand whether it compiled in rn's nntp code or if it acted as a
front end to the rn and sent the results to its widgets.

--
Doug Semler, MCPD
a.a. #705, BAAWA. EAC Guardian of the Horn of the IPU (pbuhh).
The answer is 42; DNRC o-
Gur Hfrarg unf orpbzr fb shyy bs penc gurfr qnlf, abbar rira
erpbtavmrf fvzcyr guvatf yvxr ebg13 nalzber. Fnq, vfa'g vg?

[Doug Semler]

"Doug Semler" > wrote in message
news:_4CdndoC6K71oFPbnZ2dnUVZ_tijnZ2d@wideopenwest .com...

>
>
> xrn is an X11 front end to rn (using the Athena widget set). I can't
> remember offhand whether it compiled in rn's nntp code or if it acted as a
> front end to the rn and sent the results to its widgets.


(I hate to reply to my own messages, but come to think of it, xrn was a
front end to trn (*threaded* readnews), not rn).

--
Doug Semler, MCPD
a.a. #705, BAAWA. EAC Guardian of the Horn of the IPU (pbuhh).
The answer is 42; DNRC o-
Gur Hfrarg unf orpbzr fb shyy bs penc gurfr qnlf, abbar rira
erpbtavmrf fvzcyr guvatf yvxr ebg13 nalzber. Fnq, vfa'g vg?

[Roger (K8RI)]

On Thu, 23 Aug 2007 13:27:25 GMT, Larry Dighera >
wrote:

>On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 19:16:56 -0700, "Aluckyguess" > wrote in
>:
>
>>I do know the pilot and passenger are still alive and to me
>>that is all that matters.
>
>The non-instrument rated pilot received serious injuries as a result
>of his telling ATC he was able to fly the Rnwy 25 ILS approach. Why
>he chose to do that, rather than divert to another destination, is
>anybody's guess at this point.

Hey! I got a parachute on this thing, if anything goes wrong we just
pull the red handel.