Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation

[ned]

Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007

Flying in a jetliner is extraordinarily safe: There has been only one
fatal crash in the United States in the past five years, an astounding
record considering that more than 30,000 flights take off every day. How
did flying get so reliable? In part, because of accidents that triggered
crucial safety improvements. Here are eight crashes and two emergency
landings whose influence is felt -- for the good -- each time you step
on a plane.

1956 | GRAND CANYON | TWA FLIGHT 2 & UNITED FLIGHT 718
Upgrade: Improvements of air traffic control system; creation of FAA
The TWA Super Constellation and the United DC-7 had taken off from Los
Angeles only 3 minutes apart, both headed east. Ninety minutes later,
out of contact with ground controllers and flying under see-and-avoid
visual flight rules, the two aircraft were apparently maneuvering
separately to give their passengers views of the Grand Canyon when the
DC-7's left wing and propellers ripped into the Connie's tail. Both
aircraft crashed into the canyon, killing all 128 people aboard both
planes. The accident spurred a $250 million upgrade of the air traffic
control (ATC) system -- serious money in those days. (It worked: There
hasn't been a collision between two airliners in the United States in 47
years.) The crash also triggered the creation in 1958 of the Federal
Aviation Agency (now Administration) to oversee air safety.

1978 | PORTLAND | UNITED FLIGHT 173
Upgrade: Cockpit teamwork
United Flight 173, a DC-8 approaching Portland, Ore., with 181
passengers, circled near the airport for an hour as the crew tried in
vain to sort out a landing gear problem. Although gently warned of the
rapidly diminishing fuel supply by the flight engineer on board, the
captain -- later described by one investigator as "an arrogant S.O.B."
-- waited too long to begin his final approach. The DC-8 ran out of fuel
and crashed in a suburb, killing 10. In response, United revamped its
cockpit training procedures around the then-new concept of Cockpit
Resource Management (CRM). Abandoning the traditional "the captain is
god" airline hierarchy, CRM emphasized teamwork and communication among
the crew, and has since become the industry standard. "It's really paid
off," says United captain Al Haynes, who in 1989 remarkably managed to
crash-land a crippled DC-10 at Sioux City, Iowa, by varying engine
thrust. "Without [CRM training], it's a cinch we wouldn't have made it."

1983 | CINCINNATTI | AIR CANADA FLIGHT 797
Upgrade: Lav smoke sensors
The first signs of trouble on Air Canada 797, a DC-9 flying at 33,000
ft. en route from Dallas to Toronto, were the wisps of smoke wafting out
of the rear lavatory. Soon, thick black smoke started to fill the cabin,
and the plane began an emergency descent. Barely able to see the
instrument panel because of the smoke, the pilot landed the plane at
Cincinnati. But shortly after the doors and emergency exits were opened,
the cabin erupted in a flash fire before everyone could get out. Of the
46 people aboard, 23 died. The FAA subsequently mandated that aircraft
lavatories be equipped with smoke detectors and automatic fire
extinguishers. Within five years, all jetliners were retrofitted with
fire-blocking layers on seat cushions and floor lighting to lead
passengers to exits in dense smoke. Planes built after 1988 have more
flame-resistant interior materials.

1985 | DALLAS/FORT WORTH | DELTA FLIGHT 191
Upgrade: Downdraft detection
As Delta Flight 191, a Lockheed L-1011, approached for landing at
Dallas/Fort Worth airport, a thunderstorm lurked near the runway.
Lightning flashed around the plane at 800 ft., and the jetliner
encountered a microburst wind shear -- a strong downdraft and abrupt
shift in the wind that caused the plane to lose 54 knots of airspeed in
a few seconds. Sinking rapidly, the L-1011 hit the ground about a mile
short of the runway and bounced across a highway, crushing a vehicle and
killing the driver. The plane then veered left and crashed into two huge
airport water tanks. On board, 134 of 163 people were killed. The crash
triggered a seven-year NASA/FAA research effort, which led directly to
the on-board forward-looking radar wind-shear detectors that became
standard equipment on airliners in the mid-1990s. Only one
wind-shear-related accident has occurred since.

1986 | LOS ANGELES | AEROMEXICO FLIGHT 498
Upgrade: Collision avoidance
Although the post-Grand Canyon ATC system did a good job of separating
airliners, it failed to account for small private planes like the
four-seat Piper Archer that wandered into the Los Angeles terminal
control area on Aug. 31, 1986. Undetected by ground controllers, the
Piper blundered into the path of an Aeromexico DC-9 approaching to land
at LAX, knocking off the DC-9's left horizontal stabilizer. Both planes
plummeted into a residential neighborhood 20 miles east of the airport,
killing 82 people, including 15 on the ground.

The FAA subsequently required small aircraft entering control areas to
use transponders --electronic devices that broadcast position and
altitude to controllers. Additionally, airliners were required to have
TCAS II collision-avoidance systems, which detect potential collisions
with other transponder-equipped aircraft and advise pilots to climb or
dive in response. Since then, no small plane has collided with an
airliner in flight in the United States.

1988 | MAUI | ALOHA FLIGHT 243
Upgrade: Retiring tin
As Aloha Flight 243, a weary, 19-year-old Boeing 737 on a short hop from
Hilo, Hawaii, to Honolulu, leveled off at 24,000 ft., a large section of
its fuselage blew off, leaving dozens of passengers riding in the
open-air breeze. Miraculously, the rest of the plane held together long
enough for the pilots to land safely. Only one person, a flight
attendant who was swept out of the plane, was killed.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) blamed a combination of
corrosion and widespread fatigue damage, the result of repeated
pressurization cycles during the plane's 89,000-plus flights. In
response, the FAA began the National Aging Aircraft Research Program in
1991, which tightened inspection and maintenance requirements for
high-use and high-cycle aircraft. Post-Aloha, there has been only one
American fatigue-related jet accident -- the Sioux City DC-10.

1994 | PITTSBURGH | USAIR FLIGHT 427
Upgrade: Rudder Rx
When USAir Flight 427 began its approach to land at Pittsburgh, the
Boeing 737 suddenly rolled to the left and plunged 5000 ft. to the
ground, killing all 132 on board. The plane’s black box revealed that
the rudder had abruptly moved to the full-left position, triggering the
roll. But why? USAir blamed the plane. Boeing blamed the crew. It took
nearly five years for the NTSB to conclude that a jammed valve in the
rudder-control system had caused the rudder to reverse: As the pilots
frantically pressed on the right rudder pedal, the rudder went left. As
a result, Boeing spent $500 million to retrofit all 2800 of the world's
most popular jetliner. And, in response to conflicts between the airline
and the victims' families, Congress passed the Aviation Disaster Family
Assistance Act, which transferred survivor services to the NTSB.

1996 | MIAMI | VALUJET FLIGHT 592
Upgrade: Fire prevention in the hold
Although the FAA took anti-cabin-fire measures after the 1983 Air Canada
accident, it did nothing to protect passenger jet cargo compartments --
despite NTSB warnings after a 1988 cargo fire in which the plane managed
to land safely. It took the horrific crash of ValuJet 592 into the
Everglades near Miami to finally spur the agency to action. The fire in
the DC-9 was caused by chemical oxygen generators that had been
illegally packaged by SabreTech, the airline's maintenance contractor. A
bump apparently set one off, and the resulting heat started a fire,
which was fed by the oxygen being given off. The pilots were unable to
land the burning plane in time, and 110 people died. The FAA responded
by mandating smoke detectors and automatic fire extinguishers in the
cargo holds of all commercial airliners. It also bolstered rules against
carrying hazardous cargo on aircraft.

1996 | LONG ISLAND | TWA FLIGHT 800
Upgrade: electrical spark elimination
It was everybody's nightmare: a plane that blew up in midair for no
apparent reason. The explosion of TWA Flight 800, a Boeing 747 that had
just taken off from JFK bound for Paris, killed all 230 people aboard
and stirred great controversy. After painstakingly reassembling the
wreckage, the NTSB dismissed the possibility of a terrorist bomb or
missile attack and concluded that fumes in the plane's nearly empty
center-wing fuel tank had ignited, most likely after a short circuit in
a wire bundle led to a spark in the fuel gauge sensor. The FAA has since
mandated changes to reduce sparks from faulty wiring and other sources.
Boeing, meanwhile, has developed a fuel-inerting system that injects
nitrogen gas into fuel tanks to reduce the chance of explosions. It will
install the system in all its newly built planes, starting in 2008.
Retrofit kits for in-service Boeings will also be available.

1998 | NOVA SCOTIA | SWISSAIR FLIGHT 111
Upgrade: Insulation swap-out
About an hour after takeoff, the pilots of Swissair's Flight 111 from
New York to Geneva -- a McDonnell Douglas MD-11 -- smelled smoke in the
cockpit. Four minutes later, they began an immediate descent toward
Halifax, Nova Scotia, about 65 miles away. But with the fire spreading
and cockpit lights and instruments failing, the plane crashed into the
Atlantic about 5 miles off the Nova Scotia coast. All 229 people aboard
were killed.

Investigators traced the fire to the plane's in-flight entertainment
network, whose installation led to arcing in vulnerable Kapton wires
above the cockpit. The resulting fire spread rapidly along flammable
Mylar fuselage insulation. The FAA ordered the Mylar insulation replaced
with fire-resistant materials in about 700 McDonnell Douglas jets.

[Sylvia Else]

Wolfgang Schwanke wrote:
> Ned > wrote in :
>
>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>
> The list doesn't mention one single crash that happened outside of
> North America. Is that a reflex of the worldview of American media? I
> would have thought that the Tenerife disaster made an impact.

Tenerife was in part a failure to apply CRM - an arrogant captain
overruled the doubts of his first officer about whether the runway was
clear, when the obvious thing would have been to check.

Other than "don't do that," and the utility of ground radar was anything
learned?

Sylvia.

[John Ewing]

"Wolfgang Schwanke" > wrote in message
...
> Ned > wrote in :
>
>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>
> The list doesn't mention one single crash that happened outside of
> North America. Is that a reflex of the worldview of American media?

Yes - it is a perfect example of US myopia.

> I would have thought that the Tenerife disaster made an impact.

Indeed it did. But most US citizens would not have a clue where Tenerife
is.

John

[ned]

John Ewing wrote:
> "Wolfgang Schwanke" > wrote in message
> ...
>> Ned > wrote in :
>>
>>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>> The list doesn't mention one single crash that happened outside of
>> North America. Is that a reflex of the worldview of American media?
>
> Yes - it is a perfect example of US myopia.
>
>> I would have thought that the Tenerife disaster made an impact.
>
> Indeed it did. But most US citizens would not have a clue where Tenerife
> is.
>
Quite unfair John.

Last I heard Bush was planning to bomb the Canary Islands to
halt the spread of bird flu.

[ned]

Sylvia Else wrote:
> Wolfgang Schwanke wrote:
>> Ned > wrote in :
>>
>>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>>
>> The list doesn't mention one single crash that happened outside of
>> North America. Is that a reflex of the worldview of American media? I
>> would have thought that the Tenerife disaster made an impact.
>
> Tenerife was in part a failure to apply CRM - an arrogant captain
> overruled the doubts of his first officer about whether the runway was
> clear, when the obvious thing would have been to check.
>
> Other than "don't do that," and the utility of ground radar was anything
> learned?
>
"The primary safety message drawn from the accident was the
urgent need to improve communication between aircraft and
Tower. Such communications lagged far behind the fail-safe
principle applied to other aspects of aviation. Radio
communication, as it existed at Los Rodeos Airport on the
day of the accident, was not fail-safe.

Operational measures recommended for immediate adoption as a
short term improvement included:

* The use of concise and unambiguous terminology.

* Avoiding the expression "takeoff' in airways clearances.

* Allowing a distinct time interval between the
transmission of an airways clearance and a takeoff clearance.

These recommendations were referred to the Air Navigation
Commission of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) for study."

Air Disaster Vol 1 Mac Job ISBN 1 875671 11 0

[Larry Dighera]

Those among the readership of rec.aviation.piloting should be aware
that the original author of this thread has directed follow up
responses to this thread to:

aus.aviation,rec.travel.air,rec.aviation.piloting


On Thu, 01 Nov 2007 15:00:30 +1000, Ned > wrote in
>:

>Followup-To: aus.aviation,rec.travel.air,rec.aviation.piloting

[Morgans[_2_]]

> Yes - it is a perfect example of US myopia.
>
>> I would have thought that the Tenerife disaster made an impact.
>
> Indeed it did. But most US citizens would not have a clue where Tenerife
> is.

You don't need to know where Tenerife is, as long as you know what happened
there, and why it was significant...

I would think you could at least double the list, and still be missing some
very important disasters/near disasters that have had large effect on
aviation.
--
Jim in NC

[Hatunen]

On Thu, 1 Nov 2007 23:02:33 +1000, "John Ewing" <none@needed>
wrote:

>
>"Wolfgang Schwanke" > wrote in message
...
>> Ned > wrote in :
>>
>>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>>
>> The list doesn't mention one single crash that happened outside of
>> North America. Is that a reflex of the worldview of American media?
>
>Yes - it is a perfect example of US myopia.
>
>> I would have thought that the Tenerife disaster made an impact.
>
>Indeed it did. But most US citizens would not have a clue where Tenerife
>is.

We did at the time. It was in all the papers.

--
************* DAVE HATUNEN ) *************
* Tucson Arizona, out where the cacti grow *
* My typos & mispellings are intentional copyright traps *

[Justin Case]

"John Ewing" <none@needed> wrote in
u:

> Indeed it did. But most US citizens would not have a clue where
> Tenerife is.

You're as arrogant as the KLM Captain who caused that mess.

--

[Bob Gardner]

Doesn't anyone believe in copyright protection anymore? Who gave you
permission to republish this copyrighted material?

Bob Gardner

"Ned" > wrote in message ...
> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>
> Flying in a jetliner is extraordinarily safe: There has been only one
> fatal crash in the United States in the past five years, an astounding
> record considering that more than 30,000 flights take off every day. How
> did flying get so reliable? In part, because of accidents that triggered
> crucial safety improvements. Here are eight crashes and two emergency
> landings whose influence is felt -- for the good -- each time you step on
> a plane.
>
> 1956 | GRAND CANYON | TWA FLIGHT 2 & UNITED FLIGHT 718
> Upgrade: Improvements of air traffic control system; creation of FAA
> The TWA Super Constellation and the United DC-7 had taken off from Los
> Angeles only 3 minutes apart, both headed east. Ninety minutes later, out
> of contact with ground controllers and flying under see-and-avoid visual
> flight rules, the two aircraft were apparently maneuvering separately to
> give their passengers views of the Grand Canyon when the DC-7's left wing
> and propellers ripped into the Connie's tail. Both aircraft crashed into
> the canyon, killing all 128 people aboard both planes. The accident
> spurred a $250 million upgrade of the air traffic control (ATC) system --
> serious money in those days. (It worked: There hasn't been a collision
> between two airliners in the United States in 47 years.) The crash also
> triggered the creation in 1958 of the Federal Aviation Agency (now
> Administration) to oversee air safety.
>
> 1978 | PORTLAND | UNITED FLIGHT 173
> Upgrade: Cockpit teamwork
> United Flight 173, a DC-8 approaching Portland, Ore., with 181 passengers,
> circled near the airport for an hour as the crew tried in vain to sort out
> a landing gear problem. Although gently warned of the rapidly diminishing
> fuel supply by the flight engineer on board, the captain -- later
> described by one investigator as "an arrogant S.O.B." -- waited too long
> to begin his final approach. The DC-8 ran out of fuel and crashed in a
> suburb, killing 10. In response, United revamped its cockpit training
> procedures around the then-new concept of Cockpit Resource Management
> (CRM). Abandoning the traditional "the captain is god" airline hierarchy,
> CRM emphasized teamwork and communication among the crew, and has since
> become the industry standard. "It's really paid off," says United captain
> Al Haynes, who in 1989 remarkably managed to crash-land a crippled DC-10
> at Sioux City, Iowa, by varying engine thrust. "Without [CRM training],
> it's a cinch we wouldn't have made it."
>
> 1983 | CINCINNATTI | AIR CANADA FLIGHT 797
> Upgrade: Lav smoke sensors
> The first signs of trouble on Air Canada 797, a DC-9 flying at 33,000 ft.
> en route from Dallas to Toronto, were the wisps of smoke wafting out of
> the rear lavatory. Soon, thick black smoke started to fill the cabin, and
> the plane began an emergency descent. Barely able to see the instrument
> panel because of the smoke, the pilot landed the plane at Cincinnati. But
> shortly after the doors and emergency exits were opened, the cabin erupted
> in a flash fire before everyone could get out. Of the 46 people aboard, 23
> died. The FAA subsequently mandated that aircraft lavatories be equipped
> with smoke detectors and automatic fire extinguishers. Within five years,
> all jetliners were retrofitted with fire-blocking layers on seat cushions
> and floor lighting to lead passengers to exits in dense smoke. Planes
> built after 1988 have more flame-resistant interior materials.
>
> 1985 | DALLAS/FORT WORTH | DELTA FLIGHT 191
> Upgrade: Downdraft detection
> As Delta Flight 191, a Lockheed L-1011, approached for landing at
> Dallas/Fort Worth airport, a thunderstorm lurked near the runway.
> Lightning flashed around the plane at 800 ft., and the jetliner
> encountered a microburst wind shear -- a strong downdraft and abrupt shift
> in the wind that caused the plane to lose 54 knots of airspeed in a few
> seconds. Sinking rapidly, the L-1011 hit the ground about a mile short of
> the runway and bounced across a highway, crushing a vehicle and killing
> the driver. The plane then veered left and crashed into two huge airport
> water tanks. On board, 134 of 163 people were killed. The crash triggered
> a seven-year NASA/FAA research effort, which led directly to the on-board
> forward-looking radar wind-shear detectors that became standard equipment
> on airliners in the mid-1990s. Only one wind-shear-related accident has
> occurred since.
>
> 1986 | LOS ANGELES | AEROMEXICO FLIGHT 498
> Upgrade: Collision avoidance
> Although the post-Grand Canyon ATC system did a good job of separating
> airliners, it failed to account for small private planes like the
> four-seat Piper Archer that wandered into the Los Angeles terminal control
> area on Aug. 31, 1986. Undetected by ground controllers, the Piper
> blundered into the path of an Aeromexico DC-9 approaching to land at LAX,
> knocking off the DC-9's left horizontal stabilizer. Both planes plummeted
> into a residential neighborhood 20 miles east of the airport, killing 82
> people, including 15 on the ground.
>
> The FAA subsequently required small aircraft entering control areas to use
> transponders --electronic devices that broadcast position and altitude to
> controllers. Additionally, airliners were required to have TCAS II
> collision-avoidance systems, which detect potential collisions with other
> transponder-equipped aircraft and advise pilots to climb or dive in
> response. Since then, no small plane has collided with an airliner in
> flight in the United States.
>
> 1988 | MAUI | ALOHA FLIGHT 243
> Upgrade: Retiring tin
> As Aloha Flight 243, a weary, 19-year-old Boeing 737 on a short hop from
> Hilo, Hawaii, to Honolulu, leveled off at 24,000 ft., a large section of
> its fuselage blew off, leaving dozens of passengers riding in the open-air
> breeze. Miraculously, the rest of the plane held together long enough for
> the pilots to land safely. Only one person, a flight attendant who was
> swept out of the plane, was killed.
>
> The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) blamed a combination of
> corrosion and widespread fatigue damage, the result of repeated
> pressurization cycles during the plane's 89,000-plus flights. In response,
> the FAA began the National Aging Aircraft Research Program in 1991, which
> tightened inspection and maintenance requirements for high-use and
> high-cycle aircraft. Post-Aloha, there has been only one American
> fatigue-related jet accident -- the Sioux City DC-10.
>
> 1994 | PITTSBURGH | USAIR FLIGHT 427
> Upgrade: Rudder Rx
> When USAir Flight 427 began its approach to land at Pittsburgh, the Boeing
> 737 suddenly rolled to the left and plunged 5000 ft. to the ground,
> killing all 132 on board. The plane’s black box revealed that the rudder
> had abruptly moved to the full-left position, triggering the roll. But
> why? USAir blamed the plane. Boeing blamed the crew. It took nearly five
> years for the NTSB to conclude that a jammed valve in the rudder-control
> system had caused the rudder to reverse: As the pilots frantically pressed
> on the right rudder pedal, the rudder went left. As a result, Boeing spent
> $500 million to retrofit all 2800 of the world's most popular jetliner.
> And, in response to conflicts between the airline and the victims'
> families, Congress passed the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act,
> which transferred survivor services to the NTSB.
>
> 1996 | MIAMI | VALUJET FLIGHT 592
> Upgrade: Fire prevention in the hold
> Although the FAA took anti-cabin-fire measures after the 1983 Air Canada
> accident, it did nothing to protect passenger jet cargo compartments --
> despite NTSB warnings after a 1988 cargo fire in which the plane managed
> to land safely. It took the horrific crash of ValuJet 592 into the
> Everglades near Miami to finally spur the agency to action. The fire in
> the DC-9 was caused by chemical oxygen generators that had been illegally
> packaged by SabreTech, the airline's maintenance contractor. A bump
> apparently set one off, and the resulting heat started a fire, which was
> fed by the oxygen being given off. The pilots were unable to land the
> burning plane in time, and 110 people died. The FAA responded by mandating
> smoke detectors and automatic fire extinguishers in the cargo holds of all
> commercial airliners. It also bolstered rules against carrying hazardous
> cargo on aircraft.
>
> 1996 | LONG ISLAND | TWA FLIGHT 800
> Upgrade: electrical spark elimination
> It was everybody's nightmare: a plane that blew up in midair for no
> apparent reason. The explosion of TWA Flight 800, a Boeing 747 that had
> just taken off from JFK bound for Paris, killed all 230 people aboard and
> stirred great controversy. After painstakingly reassembling the wreckage,
> the NTSB dismissed the possibility of a terrorist bomb or missile attack
> and concluded that fumes in the plane's nearly empty center-wing fuel tank
> had ignited, most likely after a short circuit in a wire bundle led to a
> spark in the fuel gauge sensor. The FAA has since mandated changes to
> reduce sparks from faulty wiring and other sources. Boeing, meanwhile, has
> developed a fuel-inerting system that injects nitrogen gas into fuel tanks
> to reduce the chance of explosions. It will install the system in all its
> newly built planes, starting in 2008. Retrofit kits for in-service Boeings
> will also be available.
>
> 1998 | NOVA SCOTIA | SWISSAIR FLIGHT 111
> Upgrade: Insulation swap-out
> About an hour after takeoff, the pilots of Swissair's Flight 111 from New
> York to Geneva -- a McDonnell Douglas MD-11 -- smelled smoke in the
> cockpit. Four minutes later, they began an immediate descent toward
> Halifax, Nova Scotia, about 65 miles away. But with the fire spreading and
> cockpit lights and instruments failing, the plane crashed into the
> Atlantic about 5 miles off the Nova Scotia coast. All 229 people aboard
> were killed.
>
> Investigators traced the fire to the plane's in-flight entertainment
> network, whose installation led to arcing in vulnerable Kapton wires above
> the cockpit. The resulting fire spread rapidly along flammable Mylar
> fuselage insulation. The FAA ordered the Mylar insulation replaced with
> fire-resistant materials in about 700 McDonnell Douglas jets.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Wolfgang Schwanke" > wrote in message
...
>
> The list doesn't mention one single crash that happened outside of
> North America. Is that a reflex of the worldview of American media? I
> would have thought that the Tenerife disaster made an impact.
>

Tenerife didn't change aviation. It was already known that departing from
an occupied runway at a controlled field without a takeoff clearance was a
bad idea.

[Jim Stewart]

Sylvia Else wrote:
> Wolfgang Schwanke wrote:
>> Ned > wrote in :
>>
>>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>>
>> The list doesn't mention one single crash that happened outside of
>> North America. Is that a reflex of the worldview of American media? I
>> would have thought that the Tenerife disaster made an impact.
>
> Tenerife was in part a failure to apply CRM - an arrogant captain
> overruled the doubts of his first officer about whether the runway was
> clear, when the obvious thing would have been to check.
>
> Other than "don't do that," and the utility of ground radar was anything
> learned?

That the tower crew shouldn't be listening
to a soccer playoff while working?

[JD[_3_]]

Wolfgang Schwanke wrote:

> Ned > wrote in :
>
>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>
> The list doesn't mention one single crash that happened outside of
> North America. Is that a reflex of the worldview of American media? I
> would have thought that the Tenerife disaster made an impact.
>
> Regards
>

It also does not mention a single crash before the 1950s. Almost every
standard in civil aviation is the result of an accident investigation - and
the really basic lessons were learned as early as the 20s and 30s. Some
local examples include Southern Cloud (radio communications) and Kyeema
(radio navigation), both in the thirties, and I am sure there are similar
ones in North America even if you restrict your crashes to there. And these
lessons are even more basic than anything post war.

JD

[Capt. Geoffrey Thorpe]

"Wolfgang Schwanke" > wrote in message
...
> Ned > wrote in :
>
>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>
> The list doesn't mention one single crash that happened outside of
> North America. Is that a reflex of the worldview of American media? I
> would have thought that the Tenerife disaster made an impact.


This is from "Popular Mechanics" - the magazine that, every few years,
predicts that Moller's "sky car" is going to revolutionize air travel.

Every couple years they break the news about the new revolutionary
automobile engine that is going to replace the conventional internal
combustion engine.

etc. etc. etc.

What do you expect? This time they would get something right? Eh?

--
Geoff
The Sea Hawk at Wow Way d0t Com
remove spaces and make the obvious substitutions to reply by mail
When immigration is outlawed, only outlaws will immigrate.

[Blueskies]

"Wolfgang Schwanke" > wrote in message ...
> Ned > wrote in :
>
>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>
> The list doesn't mention one single crash that happened outside of
> North America. Is that a reflex of the worldview of American media? I
> would have thought that the Tenerife disaster made an impact.
>
> Regards
>

Yes, it should take the place of #2...

[Blueskies]

"Morgans" > wrote in message ...
> I would think you could at least double the list, and still be missing some very important disasters/near disasters
> that have had large effect on aviation.
> --
> Jim in NC
>

You do have to consider the source. PM is a fairly good magazine, but it is a little enquirer-like...

[DaveM]

On Thu, 1 Nov 2007 10:58:04 -0700, "Bob Gardner" > wrote:

>Doesn't anyone believe in copyright protection anymore? Who gave you
>permission to republish this copyrighted material?

<snip complete quotation of the copyrighted article>

Wonderful, truly wonderful.

DaveM

[Bush]

We built the engine, and XOM quickly purchased the plans for it which
is why we are going to buying $150/barrel oil and $6.00/gallon for
unleaded. Save this thread.

Bush

On Thu, 1 Nov 2007 16:36:48 -0400, "Capt. Geoffrey Thorpe" <The Sea
Hawk at wow way d0t com> wrote:

>"Wolfgang Schwanke" > wrote in message
...
>> Ned > wrote in :
>>
>>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>>
>> The list doesn't mention one single crash that happened outside of
>> North America. Is that a reflex of the worldview of American media? I
>> would have thought that the Tenerife disaster made an impact.
>
>
>This is from "Popular Mechanics" - the magazine that, every few years,
>predicts that Moller's "sky car" is going to revolutionize air travel.
>
>Every couple years they break the news about the new revolutionary
>automobile engine that is going to replace the conventional internal
>combustion engine.
>
>etc. etc. etc.
>
>What do you expect? This time they would get something right? Eh?

[Bush]

Who gave you permission to dispatch pilots into the Northeast Corridor
without proper ice training?

Have a great one!

Bush

On Thu, 1 Nov 2007 10:58:04 -0700, "Bob Gardner" >
wrote:

>Doesn't anyone believe in copyright protection anymore? Who gave you
>permission to republish this copyrighted material?
>
>Bob Gardner
>
>"Ned" > wrote in message ...
>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>>
>> Flying in a jetliner is extraordinarily safe: There has been only one
>> fatal crash in the United States in the past five years, an astounding
>> record considering that more than 30,000 flights take off every day. How
>> did flying get so reliable? In part, because of accidents that triggered
>> crucial safety improvements. Here are eight crashes and two emergency
>> landings whose influence is felt -- for the good -- each time you step on
>> a plane.
>>
>> 1956 | GRAND CANYON | TWA FLIGHT 2 & UNITED FLIGHT 718
>> Upgrade: Improvements of air traffic control system; creation of FAA
>> The TWA Super Constellation and the United DC-7 had taken off from Los
>> Angeles only 3 minutes apart, both headed east. Ninety minutes later, out
>> of contact with ground controllers and flying under see-and-avoid visual
>> flight rules, the two aircraft were apparently maneuvering separately to
>> give their passengers views of the Grand Canyon when the DC-7's left wing
>> and propellers ripped into the Connie's tail. Both aircraft crashed into
>> the canyon, killing all 128 people aboard both planes. The accident
>> spurred a $250 million upgrade of the air traffic control (ATC) system --
>> serious money in those days. (It worked: There hasn't been a collision
>> between two airliners in the United States in 47 years.) The crash also
>> triggered the creation in 1958 of the Federal Aviation Agency (now
>> Administration) to oversee air safety.
>>
>> 1978 | PORTLAND | UNITED FLIGHT 173
>> Upgrade: Cockpit teamwork
>> United Flight 173, a DC-8 approaching Portland, Ore., with 181 passengers,
>> circled near the airport for an hour as the crew tried in vain to sort out
>> a landing gear problem. Although gently warned of the rapidly diminishing
>> fuel supply by the flight engineer on board, the captain -- later
>> described by one investigator as "an arrogant S.O.B." -- waited too long
>> to begin his final approach. The DC-8 ran out of fuel and crashed in a
>> suburb, killing 10. In response, United revamped its cockpit training
>> procedures around the then-new concept of Cockpit Resource Management
>> (CRM). Abandoning the traditional "the captain is god" airline hierarchy,
>> CRM emphasized teamwork and communication among the crew, and has since
>> become the industry standard. "It's really paid off," says United captain
>> Al Haynes, who in 1989 remarkably managed to crash-land a crippled DC-10
>> at Sioux City, Iowa, by varying engine thrust. "Without [CRM training],
>> it's a cinch we wouldn't have made it."
>>
>> 1983 | CINCINNATTI | AIR CANADA FLIGHT 797
>> Upgrade: Lav smoke sensors
>> The first signs of trouble on Air Canada 797, a DC-9 flying at 33,000 ft.
>> en route from Dallas to Toronto, were the wisps of smoke wafting out of
>> the rear lavatory. Soon, thick black smoke started to fill the cabin, and
>> the plane began an emergency descent. Barely able to see the instrument
>> panel because of the smoke, the pilot landed the plane at Cincinnati. But
>> shortly after the doors and emergency exits were opened, the cabin erupted
>> in a flash fire before everyone could get out. Of the 46 people aboard, 23
>> died. The FAA subsequently mandated that aircraft lavatories be equipped
>> with smoke detectors and automatic fire extinguishers. Within five years,
>> all jetliners were retrofitted with fire-blocking layers on seat cushions
>> and floor lighting to lead passengers to exits in dense smoke. Planes
>> built after 1988 have more flame-resistant interior materials.
>>
>> 1985 | DALLAS/FORT WORTH | DELTA FLIGHT 191
>> Upgrade: Downdraft detection
>> As Delta Flight 191, a Lockheed L-1011, approached for landing at
>> Dallas/Fort Worth airport, a thunderstorm lurked near the runway.
>> Lightning flashed around the plane at 800 ft., and the jetliner
>> encountered a microburst wind shear -- a strong downdraft and abrupt shift
>> in the wind that caused the plane to lose 54 knots of airspeed in a few
>> seconds. Sinking rapidly, the L-1011 hit the ground about a mile short of
>> the runway and bounced across a highway, crushing a vehicle and killing
>> the driver. The plane then veered left and crashed into two huge airport
>> water tanks. On board, 134 of 163 people were killed. The crash triggered
>> a seven-year NASA/FAA research effort, which led directly to the on-board
>> forward-looking radar wind-shear detectors that became standard equipment
>> on airliners in the mid-1990s. Only one wind-shear-related accident has
>> occurred since.
>>
>> 1986 | LOS ANGELES | AEROMEXICO FLIGHT 498
>> Upgrade: Collision avoidance
>> Although the post-Grand Canyon ATC system did a good job of separating
>> airliners, it failed to account for small private planes like the
>> four-seat Piper Archer that wandered into the Los Angeles terminal control
>> area on Aug. 31, 1986. Undetected by ground controllers, the Piper
>> blundered into the path of an Aeromexico DC-9 approaching to land at LAX,
>> knocking off the DC-9's left horizontal stabilizer. Both planes plummeted
>> into a residential neighborhood 20 miles east of the airport, killing 82
>> people, including 15 on the ground.
>>
>> The FAA subsequently required small aircraft entering control areas to use
>> transponders --electronic devices that broadcast position and altitude to
>> controllers. Additionally, airliners were required to have TCAS II
>> collision-avoidance systems, which detect potential collisions with other
>> transponder-equipped aircraft and advise pilots to climb or dive in
>> response. Since then, no small plane has collided with an airliner in
>> flight in the United States.
>>
>> 1988 | MAUI | ALOHA FLIGHT 243
>> Upgrade: Retiring tin
>> As Aloha Flight 243, a weary, 19-year-old Boeing 737 on a short hop from
>> Hilo, Hawaii, to Honolulu, leveled off at 24,000 ft., a large section of
>> its fuselage blew off, leaving dozens of passengers riding in the open-air
>> breeze. Miraculously, the rest of the plane held together long enough for
>> the pilots to land safely. Only one person, a flight attendant who was
>> swept out of the plane, was killed.
>>
>> The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) blamed a combination of
>> corrosion and widespread fatigue damage, the result of repeated
>> pressurization cycles during the plane's 89,000-plus flights. In response,
>> the FAA began the National Aging Aircraft Research Program in 1991, which
>> tightened inspection and maintenance requirements for high-use and
>> high-cycle aircraft. Post-Aloha, there has been only one American
>> fatigue-related jet accident -- the Sioux City DC-10.
>>
>> 1994 | PITTSBURGH | USAIR FLIGHT 427
>> Upgrade: Rudder Rx
>> When USAir Flight 427 began its approach to land at Pittsburgh, the Boeing
>> 737 suddenly rolled to the left and plunged 5000 ft. to the ground,
>> killing all 132 on board. The plane’s black box revealed that the rudder
>> had abruptly moved to the full-left position, triggering the roll. But
>> why? USAir blamed the plane. Boeing blamed the crew. It took nearly five
>> years for the NTSB to conclude that a jammed valve in the rudder-control
>> system had caused the rudder to reverse: As the pilots frantically pressed
>> on the right rudder pedal, the rudder went left. As a result, Boeing spent
>> $500 million to retrofit all 2800 of the world's most popular jetliner.
>> And, in response to conflicts between the airline and the victims'
>> families, Congress passed the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act,
>> which transferred survivor services to the NTSB.
>>
>> 1996 | MIAMI | VALUJET FLIGHT 592
>> Upgrade: Fire prevention in the hold
>> Although the FAA took anti-cabin-fire measures after the 1983 Air Canada
>> accident, it did nothing to protect passenger jet cargo compartments --
>> despite NTSB warnings after a 1988 cargo fire in which the plane managed
>> to land safely. It took the horrific crash of ValuJet 592 into the
>> Everglades near Miami to finally spur the agency to action. The fire in
>> the DC-9 was caused by chemical oxygen generators that had been illegally
>> packaged by SabreTech, the airline's maintenance contractor. A bump
>> apparently set one off, and the resulting heat started a fire, which was
>> fed by the oxygen being given off. The pilots were unable to land the
>> burning plane in time, and 110 people died. The FAA responded by mandating
>> smoke detectors and automatic fire extinguishers in the cargo holds of all
>> commercial airliners. It also bolstered rules against carrying hazardous
>> cargo on aircraft.
>>
>> 1996 | LONG ISLAND | TWA FLIGHT 800
>> Upgrade: electrical spark elimination
>> It was everybody's nightmare: a plane that blew up in midair for no
>> apparent reason. The explosion of TWA Flight 800, a Boeing 747 that had
>> just taken off from JFK bound for Paris, killed all 230 people aboard and
>> stirred great controversy. After painstakingly reassembling the wreckage,
>> the NTSB dismissed the possibility of a terrorist bomb or missile attack
>> and concluded that fumes in the plane's nearly empty center-wing fuel tank
>> had ignited, most likely after a short circuit in a wire bundle led to a
>> spark in the fuel gauge sensor. The FAA has since mandated changes to
>> reduce sparks from faulty wiring and other sources. Boeing, meanwhile, has
>> developed a fuel-inerting system that injects nitrogen gas into fuel tanks
>> to reduce the chance of explosions. It will install the system in all its
>> newly built planes, starting in 2008. Retrofit kits for in-service Boeings
>> will also be available.
>>
>> 1998 | NOVA SCOTIA | SWISSAIR FLIGHT 111
>> Upgrade: Insulation swap-out
>> About an hour after takeoff, the pilots of Swissair's Flight 111 from New
>> York to Geneva -- a McDonnell Douglas MD-11 -- smelled smoke in the
>> cockpit. Four minutes later, they began an immediate descent toward
>> Halifax, Nova Scotia, about 65 miles away. But with the fire spreading and
>> cockpit lights and instruments failing, the plane crashed into the
>> Atlantic about 5 miles off the Nova Scotia coast. All 229 people aboard
>> were killed.
>>
>> Investigators traced the fire to the plane's in-flight entertainment
>> network, whose installation led to arcing in vulnerable Kapton wires above
>> the cockpit. The resulting fire spread rapidly along flammable Mylar
>> fuselage insulation. The FAA ordered the Mylar insulation replaced with
>> fire-resistant materials in about 700 McDonnell Douglas jets.

[Morgans[_2_]]

"Blueskies" > wrote
>
> You do have to consider the source. PM is a fairly good magazine, but it
> is a little enquirer-like...

I buy it once in a while, so I can get a good laugh. At it, and there are
no joke pages, unless you consider all of the articles. <g>
--
Jim in NC

[Mike Isaksen]

"Ned" > wrote in message ...
> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>

I would include the Avianca (ran out of gas) crash in Long Island, NY in the
list. Seems like there was a major rework to the ARTCC traffic desks, and an
explosion of procedural "gate holds", to prevent extended enroute holds.
That's my walkaway from that event.

[Sylvia Else]

Mike Isaksen wrote:
> "Ned" > wrote in message ...
>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>>
>
> I would include the Avianca (ran out of gas) crash in Long Island, NY in the
> list. Seems like there was a major rework to the ARTCC traffic desks, and an
> explosion of procedural "gate holds", to prevent extended enroute holds.
> That's my walkaway from that event.
>
>

Mine would be "don't assume that your minimum fuel status is known by
each new controller you talk to."

Sylvia.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Sylvia Else" > wrote in message
u...
> Mike Isaksen wrote:
>> "Ned" > wrote in message ...
>>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>>>
>>
>> I would include the Avianca (ran out of gas) crash in Long Island, NY in
>> the list. Seems like there was a major rework to the ARTCC traffic desks,
>> and an explosion of procedural "gate holds", to prevent extended enroute
>> holds. That's my walkaway from that event.
>
> Mine would be "don't assume that your minimum fuel status is known by each
> new controller you talk to."
>

Mine would be "don't miss an approach when you don't have enough fuel to fly
another one."

[Aluckyguess]

"Ned" > wrote in message ...
> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>
> Flying in a jetliner is extraordinarily safe: There has been only one
> fatal crash in the United States in the past five years, an astounding
> record considering that more than 30,000 flights take off every day. How
> did flying get so reliable? In part, because of accidents that triggered
> crucial safety improvements. Here are eight crashes and two emergency
> landings whose influence is felt -- for the good -- each time you step on
> a plane.
Its is weird yo posted this I was looking for something today and this came
up and I read it and now I see it again the same day. Wierd
>
> 1956 | GRAND CANYON | TWA FLIGHT 2 & UNITED FLIGHT 718
> Upgrade: Improvements of air traffic control system; creation of FAA
> The TWA Super Constellation and the United DC-7 had taken off from Los
> Angeles only 3 minutes apart, both headed east. Ninety minutes later, out
> of contact with ground controllers and flying under see-and-avoid visual
> flight rules, the two aircraft were apparently maneuvering separately to
> give their passengers views of the Grand Canyon when the DC-7's left wing
> and propellers ripped into the Connie's tail. Both aircraft crashed into
> the canyon, killing all 128 people aboard both planes. The accident
> spurred a $250 million upgrade of the air traffic control (ATC) system --
> serious money in those days. (It worked: There hasn't been a collision
> between two airliners in the United States in 47 years.) The crash also
> triggered the creation in 1958 of the Federal Aviation Agency (now
> Administration) to oversee air safety.
>
> 1978 | PORTLAND | UNITED FLIGHT 173
> Upgrade: Cockpit teamwork
> United Flight 173, a DC-8 approaching Portland, Ore., with 181 passengers,
> circled near the airport for an hour as the crew tried in vain to sort out
> a landing gear problem. Although gently warned of the rapidly diminishing
> fuel supply by the flight engineer on board, the captain -- later
> described by one investigator as "an arrogant S.O.B." -- waited too long
> to begin his final approach. The DC-8 ran out of fuel and crashed in a
> suburb, killing 10. In response, United revamped its cockpit training
> procedures around the then-new concept of Cockpit Resource Management
> (CRM). Abandoning the traditional "the captain is god" airline hierarchy,
> CRM emphasized teamwork and communication among the crew, and has since
> become the industry standard. "It's really paid off," says United captain
> Al Haynes, who in 1989 remarkably managed to crash-land a crippled DC-10
> at Sioux City, Iowa, by varying engine thrust. "Without [CRM training],
> it's a cinch we wouldn't have made it."
>
> 1983 | CINCINNATTI | AIR CANADA FLIGHT 797
> Upgrade: Lav smoke sensors
> The first signs of trouble on Air Canada 797, a DC-9 flying at 33,000 ft.
> en route from Dallas to Toronto, were the wisps of smoke wafting out of
> the rear lavatory. Soon, thick black smoke started to fill the cabin, and
> the plane began an emergency descent. Barely able to see the instrument
> panel because of the smoke, the pilot landed the plane at Cincinnati. But
> shortly after the doors and emergency exits were opened, the cabin erupted
> in a flash fire before everyone could get out. Of the 46 people aboard, 23
> died. The FAA subsequently mandated that aircraft lavatories be equipped
> with smoke detectors and automatic fire extinguishers. Within five years,
> all jetliners were retrofitted with fire-blocking layers on seat cushions
> and floor lighting to lead passengers to exits in dense smoke. Planes
> built after 1988 have more flame-resistant interior materials.
>
> 1985 | DALLAS/FORT WORTH | DELTA FLIGHT 191
> Upgrade: Downdraft detection
> As Delta Flight 191, a Lockheed L-1011, approached for landing at
> Dallas/Fort Worth airport, a thunderstorm lurked near the runway.
> Lightning flashed around the plane at 800 ft., and the jetliner
> encountered a microburst wind shear -- a strong downdraft and abrupt shift
> in the wind that caused the plane to lose 54 knots of airspeed in a few
> seconds. Sinking rapidly, the L-1011 hit the ground about a mile short of
> the runway and bounced across a highway, crushing a vehicle and killing
> the driver. The plane then veered left and crashed into two huge airport
> water tanks. On board, 134 of 163 people were killed. The crash triggered
> a seven-year NASA/FAA research effort, which led directly to the on-board
> forward-looking radar wind-shear detectors that became standard equipment
> on airliners in the mid-1990s. Only one wind-shear-related accident has
> occurred since.
>
> 1986 | LOS ANGELES | AEROMEXICO FLIGHT 498
> Upgrade: Collision avoidance
> Although the post-Grand Canyon ATC system did a good job of separating
> airliners, it failed to account for small private planes like the
> four-seat Piper Archer that wandered into the Los Angeles terminal control
> area on Aug. 31, 1986. Undetected by ground controllers, the Piper
> blundered into the path of an Aeromexico DC-9 approaching to land at LAX,
> knocking off the DC-9's left horizontal stabilizer. Both planes plummeted
> into a residential neighborhood 20 miles east of the airport, killing 82
> people, including 15 on the ground.
>
> The FAA subsequently required small aircraft entering control areas to use
> transponders --electronic devices that broadcast position and altitude to
> controllers. Additionally, airliners were required to have TCAS II
> collision-avoidance systems, which detect potential collisions with other
> transponder-equipped aircraft and advise pilots to climb or dive in
> response. Since then, no small plane has collided with an airliner in
> flight in the United States.
>
> 1988 | MAUI | ALOHA FLIGHT 243
> Upgrade: Retiring tin
> As Aloha Flight 243, a weary, 19-year-old Boeing 737 on a short hop from
> Hilo, Hawaii, to Honolulu, leveled off at 24,000 ft., a large section of
> its fuselage blew off, leaving dozens of passengers riding in the open-air
> breeze. Miraculously, the rest of the plane held together long enough for
> the pilots to land safely. Only one person, a flight attendant who was
> swept out of the plane, was killed.
>
> The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) blamed a combination of
> corrosion and widespread fatigue damage, the result of repeated
> pressurization cycles during the plane's 89,000-plus flights. In response,
> the FAA began the National Aging Aircraft Research Program in 1991, which
> tightened inspection and maintenance requirements for high-use and
> high-cycle aircraft. Post-Aloha, there has been only one American
> fatigue-related jet accident -- the Sioux City DC-10.
>
> 1994 | PITTSBURGH | USAIR FLIGHT 427
> Upgrade: Rudder Rx
> When USAir Flight 427 began its approach to land at Pittsburgh, the Boeing
> 737 suddenly rolled to the left and plunged 5000 ft. to the ground,
> killing all 132 on board. The plane’s black box revealed that the rudder
> had abruptly moved to the full-left position, triggering the roll. But
> why? USAir blamed the plane. Boeing blamed the crew. It took nearly five
> years for the NTSB to conclude that a jammed valve in the rudder-control
> system had caused the rudder to reverse: As the pilots frantically pressed
> on the right rudder pedal, the rudder went left. As a result, Boeing spent
> $500 million to retrofit all 2800 of the world's most popular jetliner.
> And, in response to conflicts between the airline and the victims'
> families, Congress passed the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act,
> which transferred survivor services to the NTSB.
>
> 1996 | MIAMI | VALUJET FLIGHT 592
> Upgrade: Fire prevention in the hold
> Although the FAA took anti-cabin-fire measures after the 1983 Air Canada
> accident, it did nothing to protect passenger jet cargo compartments --
> despite NTSB warnings after a 1988 cargo fire in which the plane managed
> to land safely. It took the horrific crash of ValuJet 592 into the
> Everglades near Miami to finally spur the agency to action. The fire in
> the DC-9 was caused by chemical oxygen generators that had been illegally
> packaged by SabreTech, the airline's maintenance contractor. A bump
> apparently set one off, and the resulting heat started a fire, which was
> fed by the oxygen being given off. The pilots were unable to land the
> burning plane in time, and 110 people died. The FAA responded by mandating
> smoke detectors and automatic fire extinguishers in the cargo holds of all
> commercial airliners. It also bolstered rules against carrying hazardous
> cargo on aircraft.
>
> 1996 | LONG ISLAND | TWA FLIGHT 800
> Upgrade: electrical spark elimination
> It was everybody's nightmare: a plane that blew up in midair for no
> apparent reason. The explosion of TWA Flight 800, a Boeing 747 that had
> just taken off from JFK bound for Paris, killed all 230 people aboard and
> stirred great controversy. After painstakingly reassembling the wreckage,
> the NTSB dismissed the possibility of a terrorist bomb or missile attack
> and concluded that fumes in the plane's nearly empty center-wing fuel tank
> had ignited, most likely after a short circuit in a wire bundle led to a
> spark in the fuel gauge sensor. The FAA has since mandated changes to
> reduce sparks from faulty wiring and other sources. Boeing, meanwhile, has
> developed a fuel-inerting system that injects nitrogen gas into fuel tanks
> to reduce the chance of explosions. It will install the system in all its
> newly built planes, starting in 2008. Retrofit kits for in-service Boeings
> will also be available.
>
> 1998 | NOVA SCOTIA | SWISSAIR FLIGHT 111
> Upgrade: Insulation swap-out
> About an hour after takeoff, the pilots of Swissair's Flight 111 from New
> York to Geneva -- a McDonnell Douglas MD-11 -- smelled smoke in the
> cockpit. Four minutes later, they began an immediate descent toward
> Halifax, Nova Scotia, about 65 miles away. But with the fire spreading and
> cockpit lights and instruments failing, the plane crashed into the
> Atlantic about 5 miles off the Nova Scotia coast. All 229 people aboard
> were killed.
>
> Investigators traced the fire to the plane's in-flight entertainment
> network, whose installation led to arcing in vulnerable Kapton wires above
> the cockpit. The resulting fire spread rapidly along flammable Mylar
> fuselage insulation. The FAA ordered the Mylar insulation replaced with
> fire-resistant materials in about 700 McDonnell Douglas jets.

[Kwyjibo]

"Craig Welch" > wrote in message
...
> "Morgans" > said:
>
>>> Indeed it did. But most US citizens would not have a clue where
>>> Tenerife
>>> is.
>>
>>You don't need to know where Tenerife is, as long as you know what
>>happened
>>there, and why it was significant...
>
> Huh? I find it hard to understand someone who, when faced with a
> place the location of which was unknown to them, would not look it
> up in an atlas.
>
> Possibly the same kinds of people who don't refer to a dictionary
> when faced with an unknown word.

Huh? What does 'dictionary' mean?

--
Kwyj.

[A Guy Called Tyketto]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

In rec.aviation.piloting Steven P. McNicoll > wrote:
>>
>
> Mine would be "don't miss an approach when you don't have enough fuel to fly
> another one."

This reminds me, and perhaps Newps could pitch in on this as
well, seeing that you've been controlling for the past 15 - 20something
years.

When did the Wake Turbulence advisory become standard in the
..65? From what I've read (I got into aviation in 2000), it happened
shortly after the King Air crash at KSNA that killed the founder of
In-N-Out Burger. It was concluded that the King Air had been caught in
the UAL B757's wake, rolled into a steep descent and crashed.

I don't have any versions of the .65 from back at that time
(according to Wikipedia, it was 1993). Do you have any versions of it
from that time, and did it address the Wake Turbulence advisory?

BL.
- --
Brad Littlejohn | Email:
Unix Systems Administrator, |
Web + NewsMaster, BOFH.. Smeghead! :) | http://www.wizard.com/~tyketto
PGP: 1024D/E319F0BF 6980 AAD6 7329 E9E6 D569 F620 C819 199A E319 F0BF

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[RT]

"Hatunen" > wrote in message
...
> On Thu, 1 Nov 2007 23:02:33 +1000, "John Ewing" <none@needed>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>"Wolfgang Schwanke" > wrote in message
...
>>> Ned > wrote in :
>>>
>>>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>>>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>>>
>>> The list doesn't mention one single crash that happened outside of
>>> North America. Is that a reflex of the worldview of American media?
>>
>>Yes - it is a perfect example of US myopia.
>>
>>> I would have thought that the Tenerife disaster made an impact.
>>
>>Indeed it did. But most US citizens would not have a clue where Tenerife
>>is.
>
> We did at the time. It was in all the papers.

PM is a US popular mag. Do you think an article *of the same title* in
the Oz Post or similar would have other than Oz crashes?

Don't be so precious.

> --
> ************* DAVE HATUNEN ) *************
> * Tucson Arizona, out where the cacti grow *
> * My typos & mispellings are intentional copyright traps *

(Stuff the cactii - what about the Barretts and the belt-fed stuff? :-)

[James Robinson]

A Guy Called Tyketto > wrote:

> When did the Wake Turbulence advisory become standard in the
> .65? From what I've read (I got into aviation in 2000), it happened
> shortly after the King Air crash at KSNA that killed the founder of
> In-N-Out Burger. It was concluded that the King Air had been caught in
> the UAL B757's wake, rolled into a steep descent and crashed.

I don't know when it started, but might be able to narrow it a bit.

There were extensive tests done by NASA in the 1950s into the subject, and
various Advisory Circulars were issued warning pilots of the danger. One I
found that dates from early 1965 mentions that controllers might use the
expression "Caution, wake turbulence". It therefore goes back at least
that far.

[James Robinson]

James Robinson > wrote:

> A Guy Called Tyketto > wrote:
>
>> When did the Wake Turbulence advisory become standard in the
>> .65? From what I've read (I got into aviation in 2000), it happened
>> shortly after the King Air crash at KSNA that killed the founder of
>> In-N-Out Burger. It was concluded that the King Air had been caught
>> in the UAL B757's wake, rolled into a steep descent and crashed.
>
> I don't know when it started, but might be able to narrow it a bit.
>
> There were extensive tests done by NASA in the 1950s into the subject,
> and various Advisory Circulars were issued warning pilots of the
> danger. One I found that dates from early 1965 mentions that
> controllers might use the expression "Caution, wake turbulence". It
> therefore goes back at least that far.

(That should have been NACA, which was NASA's predecessor.)

In looking a bit more, it seems that 7110.65 evolved in the 1970s from
simply a cautionary warning to establishing separations based on aircraft
type and size. There is an historic discussion in the following link:

http://www.flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_mar-apr02.pdf

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"A Guy Called Tyketto" > wrote in message
...
>
> This reminds me, and perhaps Newps could pitch in on this as
> well, seeing that you've been controlling for the past 15 - 20something
> years.
>
> When did the Wake Turbulence advisory become standard in the
> .65? From what I've read (I got into aviation in 2000), it happened
> shortly after the King Air crash at KSNA that killed the founder of
> In-N-Out Burger. It was concluded that the King Air had been caught in
> the UAL B757's wake, rolled into a steep descent and crashed.
>
> I don't have any versions of the .65 from back at that time
> (according to Wikipedia, it was 1993). Do you have any versions of it
> from that time, and did it address the Wake Turbulence advisory?
>

I don't know when the language was added to FAAO 7110.65, but I know wake
turbulence advisories were issued long before 1993.

[Newps]

I started in 1988 and it was in there then. Nobody knew how bad the 757
was at that time, the crashes were just starting to pile up. They
changed the 757 to basically a heavy in the 90's.

A Guy Called Tyketto wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> In rec.aviation.piloting Steven P. McNicoll > wrote:
>
>>Mine would be "don't miss an approach when you don't have enough fuel to fly
>>another one."
>
>
> This reminds me, and perhaps Newps could pitch in on this as
> well, seeing that you've been controlling for the past 15 - 20something
> years.
>
> When did the Wake Turbulence advisory become standard in the
> .65? From what I've read (I got into aviation in 2000), it happened
> shortly after the King Air crash at KSNA that killed the founder of
> In-N-Out Burger. It was concluded that the King Air had been caught in
> the UAL B757's wake, rolled into a steep descent and crashed.
>
> I don't have any versions of the .65 from back at that time
> (according to Wikipedia, it was 1993). Do you have any versions of it
> from that time, and did it address the Wake Turbulence advisory?
>
>

[Morgans[_2_]]

"Newps" > wrote in message
. ..
>I started in 1988 and it was in there then. Nobody knew how bad the 757
>was at that time, the crashes were just starting to pile up. They changed
>the 757 to basically a heavy in the 90's.

What planes, or how heavy does a plane need to be to get the heavy
designation?

What do they call the ones just below that, and do they issue wake warnings
behind them?

Thanks.
--
Jim in NC

[Newps]

Morgans wrote:

> "Newps" > wrote in message
> . ..
>
>>I started in 1988 and it was in there then. Nobody knew how bad the 757
>>was at that time, the crashes were just starting to pile up. They changed
>>the 757 to basically a heavy in the 90's.
>
>
> What planes, or how heavy does a plane need to be to get the heavy
> designation?

Generally speaking a heavy is a plane that has the ability to fly at
weights above 255,000 pounds, whether or not they actually are. It used
to be 300,000 but they lowered it so it would include the 757 which is
now for all intents and purposes now a heavy.


>
> What do they call the ones just below that, and do they issue wake warnings
> behind them?


Large. You would issue a warning to all aircraft in the small or small
plus weight class.

[Aluckyguess]

"Craig Welch" > wrote in message
...
> "aluckyguess" > said:
>
>
>>Its is weird yo posted this I was looking for something today and this
>>came
>>up and I read it and now I see it again the same day. Wierd
>
> What is really wierd [sic.] is that someone with your lack of
> word-skill can get access to a computer when no-one's looking.
>
Get a life. Looser. Go back to reading youre dictionary. Who really cares.
> --
> Craig http://www.wazu.jp/
> 1,239 Unicode fonts for 82 written language groups:
> Price your own web plan: http://www.wazu.jp/hosting/

[Kwyjibo]

"aluckyguess" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Craig Welch" > wrote in message
> ...
>> "aluckyguess" > said:
>>
>>
>>>Its is weird yo posted this I was looking for something today and this
>>>came
>>>up and I read it and now I see it again the same day. Wierd
>>
>> What is really wierd [sic.] is that someone with your lack of
>> word-skill can get access to a computer when no-one's looking.
>>
> Get a life. Looser. Go back to reading youre dictionary. Who really cares.

Hmmmm.

--
Kwyj

[Aluckyguess]

"Craig Welch" > wrote in message
...
> "aluckyguess" > said:
>
>>
>>"Craig Welch" > wrote in message
...
>>> "aluckyguess" > said:
>>>
>>>
>>>>Its is weird yo posted this I was looking for something today and this
>>>>came
>>>>up and I read it and now I see it again the same day. Wierd
>>>
>>> What is really wierd [sic.] is that someone with your lack of
>>> word-skill can get access to a computer when no-one's looking.
>>>
>>Get a life. Looser. Go back to reading youre dictionary. Who really cares.
>
> Heh. The irony of a newsgroup poster telling another newsgroup
> poster to get a life.
>
> Communication is one of life's most important skills. You're
> deficient. Fix it.
Ok here it goes, you ready. PLONK thats all the communication I need with
you.

>
> Craig http://www.wazu.jp/
> 1,239 Unicode fonts for 82 written language groups:
> Price your own web plan: http://www.wazu.jp/hosting/

[Kwyjibo]

"aluckyguess" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Craig Welch" > wrote in message
> ...
>> "aluckyguess" > said:
>>
>>>
>>>"Craig Welch" > wrote in message
...
>>>> "aluckyguess" > said:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>Its is weird yo posted this I was looking for something today and this
>>>>>came
>>>>>up and I read it and now I see it again the same day. Wierd
>>>>
>>>> What is really wierd [sic.] is that someone with your lack of
>>>> word-skill can get access to a computer when no-one's looking.
>>>>
>>>Get a life. Looser. Go back to reading youre dictionary. Who really
>>>cares.
>>
>> Heh. The irony of a newsgroup poster telling another newsgroup
>> poster to get a life.
>>
>> Communication is one of life's most important skills. You're
>> deficient. Fix it.
> Ok here it goes, you ready. PLONK thats all the communication I need with
> you.

Hmmm.
Punctuation's not a strong point either, I see.

--
Kwyj.

[Matt Whiting]

Craig Welch wrote:
> "aluckyguess" > said:
>
>> "Craig Welch" > wrote in message
>> ...
>>> "aluckyguess" > said:
>>>
>>>
>>>> Its is weird yo posted this I was looking for something today and this
>>>> came
>>>> up and I read it and now I see it again the same day. Wierd
>>> What is really wierd [sic.] is that someone with your lack of
>>> word-skill can get access to a computer when no-one's looking.
>>>
>> Get a life. Looser. Go back to reading youre dictionary. Who really cares.
>
> Heh. The irony of a newsgroup poster telling another newsgroup
> poster to get a life.
>
> Communication is one of life's most important skills. You're
> deficient. Fix it.
>

And double the irony when you suggest someone read a dictionary and then
misspell loser. :-)

Matt

[mrtravel]

Justin Case wrote:

> "John Ewing" <none@needed> wrote in
> u:
>
>
>>Indeed it did. But most US citizens would not have a clue where
>>Tenerife is.
>
>
> You're as arrogant as the KLM Captain who caused that mess.
>

That may be true, but it doesn't change the facts.
I would guess the most Australians couldn't tell you where Tenerife is
either.

[Jeff[_7_]]

"mrtravel" > wrote in message
. ..
> Justin Case wrote:
>
>> "John Ewing" <none@needed> wrote in
>> u:
>>>Indeed it did. But most US citizens would not have a clue where
>>>Tenerife is.
>>
>>
>> You're as arrogant as the KLM Captain who caused that mess.
>>
>
> That may be true, but it doesn't change the facts.
> I would guess the most Australians couldn't tell you where Tenerife is
> either.

Simply put, the U.S. has had a larger number of commercial flights over the
past 100 years, so it has had a larger number of crashes.

You could argue about the ten that changed the world, but I think the
following definitely should be included:

1. The British Comet crashes (particularly "Yoke Peter") out of Rome, and
the next one, also out of Rome - BOAC;
2. The Lockheed L-188 Electra problems in the U.S. on Braniff (Buffalo,
Texas) and Northwest (Tell City, Indiana) (propeller "whirl" issues)
3. Tenerife (because of the shear number of victims and the influence on
Cockpit Resource Management) (KLM and PanAm)
4. Several of the Korean Air and China Air crashes including Guam, Hong
Kong, Taipei (also because of Cockpit Resource Management issues)
5. Aloha Airlines decompression and issue between Hilo and Maui, where the
top sheared off (because of metal fatigue issues - just like the Comets);
6. Pan Am Stratocruiser over the Pacific ocean in 1958 (because they were
able to ditch the airplane in the ocean and all passengers survived).

[Bush]

We would have to say that this particular accident was a breakdown in
communications in three ways-

First there was a storm coming up from the Southwest similar to Noel
hitting the Northeast over this past weekend. JFK was landing on the
22's . We were a PAA flight approaching from the Southwest
with a BOS alternate . This was a Sunday night if memory serves and we
held over ACY for a one 1 hour plus on our 10 mile legs. Avianca began
making comments about fuel, fuel. , no response from New York. This
was the second breakdown, non-standard communication about their fuel
situation, ATC needed to hear "Crit fuel, or fuel emergency" in order
to get a response sometimes, we were stacked right above them . We
attempted to communicate that an aircraft holding above us might have
a possible fuel problem however that notion was acknowledged and we
were facing a fuel problem of our own, or how long can we hold here
before screwing to BOS we asked the dispatcher? (We had worked this
out previuosly since the Bornman software at the time could not).

Finally getting routed for the ILS 22 at JFK the ceiling had dropped
and the wind picked up, Avianca missed the approach
right in front of us so we were like "Jeez" how low can you go with a
****ty ride like this since, an ordinary approach in 100 and 1/2
usually gives a fairly calm wind condition and a decent. At any rate
we landed no worries however 002 crashed behind us. Avianca's
off-airport landing closed JFK for an hour or so, we did however get
to Boston.

There is a fourth part to this: Do not crash in John McEnroe's
driveway.




n Fri, 02 Nov 2007 02:56:33 GMT, "Mike Isaksen" >
wrote:

>
>"Ned" > wrote in message ...
>> Ten Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation
>> Popular Mechanics David Noland October 13, 2007
>>
>
>I would include the Avianca (ran out of gas) crash in Long Island, NY in the
>list. Seems like there was a major rework to the ARTCC traffic desks, and an
>explosion of procedural "gate holds", to prevent extended enroute holds.
>That's my walkaway from that event.
>

[webmouse]

Of all the flights listed Air Canada 797 in 1983 was the only one where I felt a deep personal loss with the death of folk singer Stan Rogers. My interest did not end there.

Back in the early 1980s I provided childcare for a man who worked for the Airline Pilots Association. I was there when he came home the day after the fire aboard Air Canada 797 on 2 June, 1983. He was saying even then that the fire was a major event in recent aviation, and that it proved things that the pilots had been saying all along.

One issue at the time was that airlines wanted to remove "redundant equipment" in favor of the latest automation. Then the Air Canada pilot was left with a compass, a level and a radio -- all primitive devices that proved essential to getting the plane on the ground.

Another issue was the matter of Reagan firing all the air traffic controllers who had gone on strike a year or so before. The man who talked Air Canada 797 out of the sky was one of the few who had not gone on strike and had not been fired. The pilots said that Reagan's "fit of peak" was leaving the flying public endangered. This one accident proved their point to the tragic loss of 23 lives.

Later on the issues of that fire would force airlines to refit planes with less combustible less toxic materials, as well as to fit planes with smoke detectors in the lavvie, better trained staff, and contributed to the end of smoking on aircraft.