Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear Weapons

[Hellman]

What could soaring possibly have in common with nuclear weapons? To
find out, read my new article "Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear
Weapons" at

http://www.nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php

If nuclear weapons are too much of a turn off, take a look at the
related lecture on flying safety which I gave last November at PASCO's
Soaring Safety Seminar. Entitled, "Complacency: What Me Worry?" that
one is at

http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/soaring/PASCO_2007_talk.html

Martin

PS I have more soaring safety articles at

http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/soaring/safety.html

and links to soaring photo pages at

http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/soaring/photos.html

[SoaringXCellence]

On Oct 20, 6:14*pm, Hellman > wrote:
> What could soaring possibly have in common with nuclear weapons? To
> find out, read my new article "Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear
> Weapons" at
>
> http://www.nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php
>
> If nuclear weapons are too much of a turn off, take a look at the
> related lecture on flying safety which I gave last November at PASCO's
> Soaring Safety Seminar. Entitled, "Complacency: What Me Worry?" that
> one is at
>
> http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/soaring/PASCO_2007_talk.html
>
> Martin
>
> PS I have more soaring safety articles at
>
> http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/soaring/safety.html
>
> and links to soaring photo pages at
>
> http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/soaring/photos.html

Martin,

Outstanding articles!! I'll be sharing these with everyone at the
flight school where I work.

Mike

[Frank Whiteley]

On Oct 20, 7:14*pm, Hellman > wrote:
> What could soaring possibly have in common with nuclear weapons? To
> find out, read my new article "Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear
> Weapons" at
>
> http://www.nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php
>
> If nuclear weapons are too much of a turn off, take a look at the
> related lecture on flying safety which I gave last November at PASCO's
> Soaring Safety Seminar. Entitled, "Complacency: What Me Worry?" that
> one is at
>
> http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/soaring/PASCO_2007_talk.html
>
> Martin
>
> PS I have more soaring safety articles at
>
> http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/soaring/safety.html
>
> and links to soaring photo pages at
>
> http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/soaring/photos.html

coverage
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article6901.html

[TXBill]

"Hellman" > wrote

> What could soaring possibly have in common with nuclear weapons?

Great articles, Martin. Thanks for sharing them.

- Bill



--
Posted via NewsDemon.com - Premium Uncensored Newsgroup Service
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[Ari]

On Mon, 20 Oct 2008 18:14:35 -0700 (PDT), Hellman wrote:

> What could soaring possibly have in common with nuclear weapons? To
> find out, read my new article "Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear
> Weapons" at
>
> http://www.nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php

"On an annual basis, that makes relying on nuclear weapons a 99% safe
maneuver. As with 99.9% safe maneuvers in soaring, that is not as safe
as it sounds and is no cause for complacency. If we continue to rely on
a strategy with a one percent failure rate per year, that adds up to
about 10% in a decade and almost certain destruction within my
grandchildren's lifetimes."

Your math is off, risk is not cumulative.
--
Meet Ari!
http://preview.tinyurl.com/3wh3hh

[Eric Greenwell]

Ari wrote:

>
> "On an annual basis, that makes relying on nuclear weapons a 99% safe
> maneuver. As with 99.9% safe maneuvers in soaring, that is not as safe
> as it sounds and is no cause for complacency. If we continue to rely on
> a strategy with a one percent failure rate per year, that adds up to
> about 10% in a decade and almost certain destruction within my
> grandchildren's lifetimes."
>
> Your math is off, risk is not cumulative.

Absolutely right! But here's the deal: 0.99 to the 10th power is .904
(90% safe, 10% unsafe).

--
Eric Greenwell - Washington State, USA
* Change "netto" to "net" to email me directly

* Updated! "Transponders in Sailplanes" http://tinyurl.com/y739x4
* New Jan '08 - sections on Mode S, TPAS, ADS-B, Flarm, more

* "A Guide to Self-launching Sailplane Operation" at www.motorglider.org

[Jim Logajan]

Ari > wrote:
> On Mon, 20 Oct 2008 18:14:35 -0700 (PDT), Hellman wrote:
>
>> What could soaring possibly have in common with nuclear weapons? To
>> find out, read my new article "Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear
>> Weapons" at
>>
>> http://www.nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php
>
> "On an annual basis, that makes relying on nuclear weapons a 99% safe
> maneuver. As with 99.9% safe maneuvers in soaring, that is not as safe
> as it sounds and is no cause for complacency. If we continue to rely on
> a strategy with a one percent failure rate per year, that adds up to
> about 10% in a decade and almost certain destruction within my
> grandchildren's lifetimes."
>
> Your math is off, risk is not cumulative.

I don't think he meant "adds up" literally - if he did he wouldn't have
added the "about" qualifier. The multiplicative value of the safe maneuver
ensemble (0.99**10) happens to yield a risk of about 10%. The examples
elsewhere in his article indicates he understands the proper math. It's not
like he doesn't have the education. ;-)

The issue isn't, IMHO, the math, but rather several other points:

0) The redundant identification of a risk already known while speaking
little of a viable solution. Or even whether a solution can be found
because the underlying problem(s) disallow and viable solution.

1) Invention of arbitrary risk percentages over arbitrarily selected
periods.

2) The attempt to apply an objective measure (statistics) to singular
subjective human actions. In this realm, statistics appears about as
relevant a tool as a hammer is to painting.

[Ari]

On Wed, 22 Oct 2008 02:32:02 GMT, Eric Greenwell wrote:

> Ari wrote:
>
>>
>> "On an annual basis, that makes relying on nuclear weapons a 99% safe
>> maneuver. As with 99.9% safe maneuvers in soaring, that is not as safe
>> as it sounds and is no cause for complacency. If we continue to rely on
>> a strategy with a one percent failure rate per year, that adds up to
>> about 10% in a decade and almost certain destruction within my
>> grandchildren's lifetimes."
>>
>> Your math is off, risk is not cumulative.
>
> Absolutely right! But here's the deal: 0.99 to the 10th power is .904
> (90% safe, 10% unsafe).

So what you are saying is that the power is equal to the number of years
(decade)?
--
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJVydzNJrno

[Ari]

On Tue, 21 Oct 2008 22:04:55 -0500, Jim Logajan wrote:

> Ari > wrote:
>> On Mon, 20 Oct 2008 18:14:35 -0700 (PDT), Hellman wrote:
>>
>>> What could soaring possibly have in common with nuclear weapons? To
>>> find out, read my new article "Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear
>>> Weapons" at
>>>
>>> http://www.nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php
>>
>> "On an annual basis, that makes relying on nuclear weapons a 99% safe
>> maneuver. As with 99.9% safe maneuvers in soaring, that is not as safe
>> as it sounds and is no cause for complacency. If we continue to rely on
>> a strategy with a one percent failure rate per year, that adds up to
>> about 10% in a decade and almost certain destruction within my
>> grandchildren's lifetimes."
>>
>> Your math is off, risk is not cumulative.
>
> I don't think he meant "adds up" literally - if he did he wouldn't have
> added the "about" qualifier. The multiplicative value of the safe maneuver
> ensemble (0.99**10) happens to yield a risk of about 10%. The examples
> elsewhere in his article indicates he understands the proper math. It's not
> like he doesn't have the education. ;-)

Got that right, I am a big Hellman crypto fan, his credential outweigh
mine the flea to the elephant.
--
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJVydzNJrno

[Ari]

On Tue, 21 Oct 2008 22:04:55 -0500, Jim Logajan wrote:

> The issue isn't, IMHO, the math, but rather several other points:
>
> 0) The redundant identification of a risk already known while speaking
> little of a viable solution. Or even whether a solution can be found
> because the underlying problem(s) disallow and viable solution.
>
> 1) Invention of arbitrary risk percentages over arbitrarily selected
> periods.
>
> 2) The attempt to apply an objective measure (statistics) to singular
> subjective human actions. In this realm, statistics appears about as
> relevant a tool as a hammer is to painting.

The last is what threw me as well. I don't see real life, war time,
complexities being identified with statistical data. If that
extrapolation is permissible, we can have long discussions about coin
flipping and guessing the dates of the next 9/11.
--
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJVydzNJrno

[a[_3_]]

Bayesian statistics and the insurance industry apply statistics to
singular events all of the time -- and consider the 'end of the world'
statistics associated with the Hayden device at CERN, or the explosion
at Trinity.

The threat analysis has to change as conditions change. Consider now
the threat from mid east groups, which didn't exist in their present
form 30 years ago. The parameters have changed, the threat has
increased. It's one thing for a country like the USSR was to risk
mutually assured destruction with someone with enough money who lives
in a cave and may not care about dying.

I don't know how to assign probabilities to this -- gaming doesn't
work well because we have no good models for terrorist behavior,
except we do know many are willing to die in exchange for a few other
lives. Imagine, then, if a portable device, or a biological, was
available? It would be instructive to do classical strategic planning
from their point of view, looking at strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats.




On Oct 21, 11:04*pm, Jim Logajan > wrote:
> Ari > wrote:
> > On Mon, 20 Oct 2008 18:14:35 -0700 (PDT), Hellman wrote:
>
> >> What could soaring possibly have in common with nuclear weapons? To
> >> find out, read my new article "Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear
> >> Weapons" at
>
> >>http://www.nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php
>
> > "On an annual basis, that makes relying on nuclear weapons a 99% safe
> > maneuver. As with 99.9% safe maneuvers in soaring, that is not as safe
> > as it sounds and is no cause for complacency. If we continue to rely on
> > a strategy with a one percent failure rate per year, that adds up to
> > about 10% in a decade and almost certain destruction within my
> > grandchildren's lifetimes."
>
> > Your math is off, risk is not cumulative.
>
> I don't think he meant "adds up" literally - if he did he wouldn't have
> added the "about" qualifier. The multiplicative value of the safe maneuver
> ensemble (0.99**10) happens to yield a risk of about 10%. The examples
> elsewhere in his article indicates he understands the proper math. It's not
> like he doesn't have the education. ;-)
>
> The issue isn't, IMHO, the math, but rather several other points:
>
> 0) The redundant identification of a risk already known while speaking
> little of a viable solution. Or even whether a solution can be found
> because the underlying problem(s) disallow and viable solution.
>
> 1) Invention of arbitrary risk percentages over arbitrarily selected
> periods.
>
> 2) The attempt to apply an objective measure (statistics) to singular
> subjective human actions. In this realm, statistics appears about as
> relevant a tool as a hammer is to painting.

[Ralph Jones[_2_]]

On Tue, 21 Oct 2008 21:05:23 -0400, Ari
> wrote:

>On Mon, 20 Oct 2008 18:14:35 -0700 (PDT), Hellman wrote:
>
>> What could soaring possibly have in common with nuclear weapons? To
>> find out, read my new article "Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear
>> Weapons" at
>>
>> http://www.nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php
>
>"On an annual basis, that makes relying on nuclear weapons a 99% safe
>maneuver. As with 99.9% safe maneuvers in soaring, that is not as safe
>as it sounds and is no cause for complacency. If we continue to rely on
>a strategy with a one percent failure rate per year, that adds up to
>about 10% in a decade and almost certain destruction within my
>grandchildren's lifetimes."
>
>Your math is off, risk is not cumulative.

His math is quite precise for a one-decade interval: the probability
of getting through 10 years with a 99% success rate per year is
0.99^10 = 0.904 or slightly less than a 10% likelihood of disaster.

If his children have a life expectancy of 9o years, the probability of
their encountering failure is 0.99^90 = 0.405, so substitute "60%
likely" for "almost certain".

rj

[Ralph Jones[_2_]]

On Wed, 22 Oct 2008 09:43:47 -0600, Ralph Jones >
wrote:

>On Tue, 21 Oct 2008 21:05:23 -0400, Ari
> wrote:
>
>>On Mon, 20 Oct 2008 18:14:35 -0700 (PDT), Hellman wrote:
>>
>>> What could soaring possibly have in common with nuclear weapons? To
>>> find out, read my new article "Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear
>>> Weapons" at
>>>
>>> http://www.nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php
>>
>>"On an annual basis, that makes relying on nuclear weapons a 99% safe
>>maneuver. As with 99.9% safe maneuvers in soaring, that is not as safe
>>as it sounds and is no cause for complacency. If we continue to rely on
>>a strategy with a one percent failure rate per year, that adds up to
>>about 10% in a decade and almost certain destruction within my
>>grandchildren's lifetimes."
>>
>>Your math is off, risk is not cumulative.
>
>His math is quite precise for a one-decade interval: the probability
>of getting through 10 years with a 99% success rate per year is
>0.99^10 = 0.904 or slightly less than a 10% likelihood of disaster.
>
>If his children have a life expectancy of 9o years, the probability of
>their encountering failure is 0.99^90 = 0.405, so substitute "60%
>likely" for "almost certain".
>
>rj

Sorry, typo, that should read "not encountering failure".

rj

[JJ Sinclair]

I expected this discussion to center around the continued use of the
finish gate in US competition, not the math involved. I believe the 50
foot finish line was made unnecessary with the incorporation of the
GPS finish cylinder. I also believe the continued use of the finish
line exposes the SSA to potential liability involved in using a system
that clearly violates FAR's in that the contestant is flying within
500 feet of people, vehicles and structures while not in the act of
landing. Comments from the rules committee?
JJ

Hellman wrote:
> What could soaring possibly have in common with nuclear weapons? To
> find out, read my new article "Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear
> Weapons" at
>
> http://www.nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php
>
> If nuclear weapons are too much of a turn off, take a look at the
> related lecture on flying safety which I gave last November at PASCO's
> Soaring Safety Seminar. Entitled, "Complacency: What Me Worry?" that
> one is at
>
> http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/soaring/PASCO_2007_talk.html
>
> Martin
>
> PS I have more soaring safety articles at
>
> http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/soaring/safety.html
>
> and links to soaring photo pages at
>
> http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/soaring/photos.html

[Jack[_12_]]

Ari wrote:


> ...risk is not cumulative.


For a statistician there is no risk, therefor no accumulation.

I doubt those who live with risk on a continuing basis would agree
with you.


Jack

[CindyASK]

On Oct 22, 10:21*am, JJ Sinclair > wrote:
> I expected this discussion to center around the continued use of the
> finish gate in US competition, not the math involved. I believe the 50
> foot finish line was made unnecessary with the incorporation of the
> GPS finish cylinder. I also believe the continued use of the finish
> line exposes the SSA to potential liability involved in using a system
> that clearly violates FAR's in that the contestant is flying within
> 500 feet of people, vehicles and structures while not in the act of
> landing. Comments from the rules committee?
> JJ


JJ -

I have not read Martin's articles, yet.
This one took a hard course correction away from the thread name.

I am not/have never been on the Rules Committee, but ran contests at
sites where low finishes were allowed. Our local interpretation,
based on premises and traffic, were that a no-floor then low-floor
finish line was oriented in a location that DID comply with FARs.
Other locations had different premises and administration.

There was plenty of opportunity to race AND comply with FARs at my
events.

And pilots who chose to not cooperate with those restrictions got
handed significant point penalties, including a demotion from first
place to also-ran.

I don’t think the low-finish to cylinder change had much to do with a
perception of SSA liability exposure. I think it had more to do with
trying to legislate “common sense”, ‘equitable’ competition, and
flight safety for perceived mid-air risks. But you should ask the
other John . . . I think he was front row in the discussion then.

Cindy B
www.caracolesoaring.com

[JJ Sinclair]

Cindy wrote.......
> I have not read Martin's articles, yet.

Cindy, Take a minute and read the article. It's not very long and
points out the unnecessary risk involved in making a low pass /
contest finish. You might also read the AIM about the altitudes, speed
and position one is required to follow when landing at a busy airport.
Yes, when 50 aircraft finish at about the same time, it would be
considered a busy airport. Don't get me wrong, I love to make low
passes, but I have seen too many accidents involved with low finishes
(you had one at Cal City, Remember SL?..............GPS has provided
us with a much safer alternative, why do we still have an unsafe,
unnecessary and illegal procedure in our rules? Would you like to
answer any of the above questions in court?
JJ