RTFM

[Steven P. McNicoll[_2_]]

Private wrote:
>
> RTFM
>
> http://www.rense.com/general85/Airbus340.pdf
>

Funny, but not quite true.

http://www.snopes.com/photos/airplane/etihad.asp

[Private]

RTFM

http://www.rense.com/general85/Airbus340.pdf

[Dudley Henriques[_2_]]

On Apr 28, 7:41*pm, "Steven P. McNicoll" >
wrote:
> Private wrote:
>
> > RTFM
>
> >http://www.rense.com/general85/Airbus340.pdf
>
> Funny, but not quite true.
>
> http://www.snopes.com/photos/airplane/etihad.asp

Actually it's pretty close to the truth. The SOP for the engine tests
as far as I can determine, called for the tail to be tied down which
it wasn't. I'm not absolutely certain about this, but I believe the
brakes including the parking brake won't restrain this aircraft at
full thrust anyway; hence the tail tie down requirement.
Just as a comparison, I can't hold a T38 after a line check with
brakes at full max thrust, and even a P51 will jump the chocks at 40
inches :-)
At the very least, these guys were an accident waiting to happen and
the wait ran out.

Dudley Henriques

[Mike Ash]

In article
>,
Dudley Henriques > wrote:

> On Apr 28, 7:41*pm, "Steven P. McNicoll" >
> wrote:
> > Private wrote:
> >
> > > RTFM
> >
> > >http://www.rense.com/general85/Airbus340.pdf
> >
> > Funny, but not quite true.
> >
> > http://www.snopes.com/photos/airplane/etihad.asp
>
> Actually it's pretty close to the truth. The SOP for the engine tests
> as far as I can determine, called for the tail to be tied down which
> it wasn't. I'm not absolutely certain about this, but I believe the
> brakes including the parking brake won't restrain this aircraft at
> full thrust anyway; hence the tail tie down requirement.
> Just as a comparison, I can't hold a T38 after a line check with
> brakes at full max thrust, and even a P51 will jump the chocks at 40
> inches :-)
> At the very least, these guys were an accident waiting to happen and
> the wait ran out.

It's not all that close to the truth. The overall story is more or less
true. The details are somewhat off. The anti-Arab sentiment is
completely wrong.

This made the rounds on my flying club mailing list a month back and
here is the response I wrote to summarize my research:

Interesting accident! I got hungry for more information and found the
report from the French equivalent of the NTSB. (Located here, in French:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2007/f-cj071115/pdf/f-cj071115.pdf)

That report paints a slightly different picture in the details, although
the major points (bad test procedures, bad responses, totaled expensive
airplane) are right. Notably:

- Two out of the three people in the cockpit were Airbus employees. (The
third was present on behalf of Etihad to receive the new plane.)

- The aircraft's parking brake was used for the test. The plane started
to slowly roll forward after sitting still for three minutes at full
power. Apparently the parking brake was almost perfectly matched with
full engine thrust.

- No mention of circuit breakers or brake disablement that I saw, but
frequent mention is made of the fact that the test was performed without
chocks, despite an explicit requirement for them in the relevant manuals.

- The Airbus technician at the controls fixated on the brakes and did
not think to pull the throttles back. He did however attempt to turn
away from the wall. Unfortunately for this aircraft, the steering system
and braking system are connected and steering inhibits braking in the
center wheels.

- The other Airbus technician finally pulled power, but far too late.

- A total of nine people were on board, four of whom were seriously
injured in the accident.

Lessons to be learned that I saw:

- Don't get fixated.

- When the manual says to do things a certain way, it's usually a good
idea to do things that way.

- The ability to make unimaginably expensive boneheaded mistakes
transcends all cultural boundaries.

--
Mike Ash
Radio Free Earth
Broadcasting from our climate-controlled studios deep inside the Moon

[Steven P. McNicoll[_2_]]

Dudley Henriques wrote:
> On Apr 28, 7:41 pm, "Steven P. McNicoll" >
> wrote:
>> Private wrote:
>>
>>> RTFM
>>
>>> http://www.rense.com/general85/Airbus340.pdf
>>
>> Funny, but not quite true.
>>
>> http://www.snopes.com/photos/airplane/etihad.asp
>
> Actually it's pretty close to the truth.
>

Actually, "pretty close to the truth" and "not quite true" are pretty much
the same thing.

[Dudley Henriques[_2_]]

On Apr 28, 9:31*pm, "Steven P. McNicoll" >
wrote:
> Dudley Henriques wrote:
> > On Apr 28, 7:41 pm, "Steven P. McNicoll" >
> > wrote:
> >> Private wrote:
>
> >>> RTFM
>
> >>>http://www.rense.com/general85/Airbus340.pdf
>
> >> Funny, but not quite true.
>
> >>http://www.snopes.com/photos/airplane/etihad.asp
>
> > Actually it's pretty close to the truth.
>
> Actually, "pretty close to the truth" and "not quite true" are pretty much
> the same thing.

True.
This accident came in to our safety group via one of our airline guys
as a "note of interest"
rather than something we would be working on.
After reading the report, the only opinion I formed was that the tail
should have been tied down for any test at max thrust and that whoever
was in charge of the test (presumably the left seat) should have been
familiar with the test procedures AND checked out enough on power
lever use to know completely the emergency shutdown procedure if
something went wrong. Not bringing the power back prior to and
coincident with brake application seemed to me an inexcusable error.
Task overload shouldn't have been an issue as far as power reduction.
That was a normal procedure failure.
As to the Arab question; I didn't even consider nationality in my
rationale; simply the body in charge :-)
-DH

[Dudley Henriques[_2_]]

On Apr 28, 9:27*pm, Mike Ash > wrote:
> In article
> >,
> *Dudley Henriques > wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Apr 28, 7:41*pm, "Steven P. McNicoll" >
> > wrote:
> > > Private wrote:
>
> > > > RTFM
>
> > > >http://www.rense.com/general85/Airbus340.pdf
>
> > > Funny, but not quite true.
>
> > >http://www.snopes.com/photos/airplane/etihad.asp
>
> > Actually it's pretty close to the truth. The SOP for the engine tests
> > as far as I can determine, called for the tail to be tied down which
> > it wasn't. I'm not absolutely certain about this, but I believe the
> > brakes including the parking brake won't restrain this aircraft at
> > full thrust anyway; hence the tail tie down requirement.
> > Just as a comparison, I can't hold a T38 after a line check with
> > brakes at full max thrust, and even a P51 will jump the chocks at 40
> > inches :-)
> > At the very least, these guys were an accident waiting to happen and
> > the wait ran out.
>
> It's not all that close to the truth. The overall story is more or less
> true. The details are somewhat off. The anti-Arab sentiment is
> completely wrong.
>
> This made the rounds on my flying club mailing list a month back and
> here is the response I wrote to summarize my research:
>
> Interesting accident! I got hungry for more information and found the
> report from the French equivalent of the NTSB. (Located here, in French:http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2007/f-cj071115/pdf/f-cj071115.pdf)
>
> That report paints a slightly different picture in the details, although
> the major points (bad test procedures, bad responses, totaled expensive
> airplane) are right. Notably:
>
> - Two out of the three people in the cockpit were Airbus employees. (The
> third was present on behalf of Etihad to receive the new plane.)
>
> - The aircraft's parking brake was used for the test. The plane started
> to slowly roll forward after sitting still for three minutes at full
> power. Apparently the parking brake was almost perfectly matched with
> full engine thrust.
>
> - No mention of circuit breakers or brake disablement that I saw, but
> frequent mention is made of the fact that the test was performed without
> chocks, despite an explicit requirement for them in the relevant manuals.
>
> - The Airbus technician at the controls fixated on the brakes and did
> not think to pull the throttles back. He did however attempt to turn
> away from the wall. Unfortunately for this aircraft, the steering system
> and braking system are connected and steering inhibits braking in the
> center wheels.
>
> - The other Airbus technician finally pulled power, but far too late.
>
> - A total of nine people were on board, four of whom were seriously
> injured in the accident.
>
> Lessons to be learned that I saw:
>
> - Don't get fixated.
>
> - When the manual says to do things a certain way, it's usually a good
> idea to do things that way.
>
> - The ability to make unimaginably expensive boneheaded mistakes
> transcends all cultural boundaries.
>
> --
> Mike Ash
> Radio Free Earth
> Broadcasting from our climate-controlled studios deep inside the Moon

The ultimate failure here seems to have been the lack of experience of
the tech on the power levers. I'm sure much of the investigation
centered on this, and as well the process and people responsible for
putting him in the left seat to conduct the test.
Power reduction to idle HAD to be accomplished before braking could
be effective. This should have been a trained reaction to the
emergency rather than a checklist task item that he missed.
Shame. It was a beautiful aircraft to be lost in this way.
-DH

[Steve Foley[_4_]]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
m...
> Actually, "pretty close to the truth" and "not quite true" are pretty much
> the same thing.
But not quite the same thing <g>

[Dudley Henriques[_2_]]

On Apr 29, 7:39*am, "Steve Foley" > wrote:
> "Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in messagenews:KrudnRC5wISKM2rUnZ2dnUVZ_hKdnZ2d@earth link.com...> Actually, "pretty close to the truth" and "not quite true" are pretty much
> > the same thing.
>
> But not quite the same thing <g>

One might say it was exactly the same only just a bit different :-))
-DH

[Mike Ash]

In article
>,
Dudley Henriques > wrote:

> The ultimate failure here seems to have been the lack of experience of
> the tech on the power levers. I'm sure much of the investigation
> centered on this, and as well the process and people responsible for
> putting him in the left seat to conduct the test.
> Power reduction to idle HAD to be accomplished before braking could
> be effective. This should have been a trained reaction to the
> emergency rather than a checklist task item that he missed.
> Shame. It was a beautiful aircraft to be lost in this way.

As with most accidents it's a chain of events, but pulling power is an
obvious last step that would have saved the day.

I wonder just how much training these technicians got on the aircraft. I
have no idea if it's a lot or a little, but seeing as how they never
leave the ground I could imagine that they are being put out there
without enough. I can certainly see some penny-pinchers saying, "they
never leave the ground, how hard can it be?"

--
Mike Ash
Radio Free Earth
Broadcasting from our climate-controlled studios deep inside the Moon

[Dudley Henriques[_2_]]

On Apr 29, 8:56*am, Mike Ash > wrote:
> In article
> >,
> *Dudley Henriques > wrote:
>
> > The ultimate failure here seems to have been the lack of experience of
> > the tech on the power levers. I'm sure much of the investigation
> > centered on this, and as well the process and people responsible for
> > putting him in the left seat to conduct the test.
> > Power reduction to idle *HAD to be accomplished before braking could
> > be effective. This should have been a trained reaction to the
> > emergency rather than a checklist task item that he missed.
> > Shame. It was a beautiful aircraft to be lost in this way.
>
> As with most accidents it's a chain of events, but pulling power is an
> obvious last step that would have saved the day.
>
> I wonder just how much training these technicians got on the aircraft. I
> have no idea if it's a lot or a little, but seeing as how they never
> leave the ground I could imagine that they are being put out there
> without enough. I can certainly see some penny-pinchers saying, "they
> never leave the ground, how hard can it be?"
>
> --
> Mike Ash
> Radio Free Earth
> Broadcasting from our climate-controlled studios deep inside the Moon

Actually, in my opinion anyway, the pulling of the power should have
been the FIRST step rather than the last as the emergency developed.
The reaction chain as the aircraft started to move forward seems to
have been backwards with power reduction at the end of the reaction
chain. Power reduction prior to brake application is absolutely
necessary in this incident and should have been a trained reflex
action by anyone checked off as competent to make the test.
There is much to be learned from the incident of course, but I'd be
seriously taking a long hard look at whatever criteria was used to
classify the guy on the throttles as current.
Of course keep in mind that my area of expertise lies in warbird
accident investigation and flight safety and I'm not at all familiar
with the procedures used by the airline industry.
These opinions of mine are just random thoughts based on how we
approach these things in our community.
-DH

[John Smith]

Actually, I didn't even need to read the accident report to know that
this story was just talking bull****. An airplane where pulling one
single circuit breaker would be enough to disable all brakes would never
be certificatd. Just imagine that circuit breaker blowing while landing.

[Private]

"Mike Ash" > wrote in message
...
snip
> I wonder just how much training these technicians got on the aircraft. I
> have no idea if it's a lot or a little, but seeing as how they never
> leave the ground I could imagine that they are being put out there
> without enough. I can certainly see some penny-pinchers saying, "they
> never leave the ground, how hard can it be?"
>
> Mike Ash

I think the expression is,
'If you think that safety is too slow or expensive, then just try having an
accident'.

Safety does not happen by accident, it requires planning, commitment and
training.

Happy landings,

[Mike Ash]

In article >,
"Private" > wrote:

> "Mike Ash" > wrote in message
> ...
> snip
> > I wonder just how much training these technicians got on the aircraft. I
> > have no idea if it's a lot or a little, but seeing as how they never
> > leave the ground I could imagine that they are being put out there
> > without enough. I can certainly see some penny-pinchers saying, "they
> > never leave the ground, how hard can it be?"
> >
> I think the expression is,
> 'If you think that safety is too slow or expensive, then just try having an
> accident'.

I like that one, I don't think I've heard it before. So true, though!

--
Mike Ash
Radio Free Earth
Broadcasting from our climate-controlled studios deep inside the Moon

[Mike Ash]

In article
>,
Dudley Henriques > wrote:

> On Apr 29, 8:56*am, Mike Ash > wrote:
> > In article
> > >,
> > *Dudley Henriques > wrote:
> >
> > > The ultimate failure here seems to have been the lack of experience of
> > > the tech on the power levers. I'm sure much of the investigation
> > > centered on this, and as well the process and people responsible for
> > > putting him in the left seat to conduct the test.
> > > Power reduction to idle *HAD to be accomplished before braking could
> > > be effective. This should have been a trained reaction to the
> > > emergency rather than a checklist task item that he missed.
> > > Shame. It was a beautiful aircraft to be lost in this way.
> >
> > As with most accidents it's a chain of events, but pulling power is an
> > obvious last step that would have saved the day.
> >
> > I wonder just how much training these technicians got on the aircraft. I
> > have no idea if it's a lot or a little, but seeing as how they never
> > leave the ground I could imagine that they are being put out there
> > without enough. I can certainly see some penny-pinchers saying, "they
> > never leave the ground, how hard can it be?"
>
> Actually, in my opinion anyway, the pulling of the power should have
> been the FIRST step rather than the last as the emergency developed.
> The reaction chain as the aircraft started to move forward seems to
> have been backwards with power reduction at the end of the reaction
> chain. Power reduction prior to brake application is absolutely
> necessary in this incident and should have been a trained reflex
> action by anyone checked off as competent to make the test.
> There is much to be learned from the incident of course, but I'd be
> seriously taking a long hard look at whatever criteria was used to
> classify the guy on the throttles as current.
> Of course keep in mind that my area of expertise lies in warbird
> accident investigation and flight safety and I'm not at all familiar
> with the procedures used by the airline industry.
> These opinions of mine are just random thoughts based on how we
> approach these things in our community.

I think we are in agreement. When I say pulling power is the last step,
I mean from the perspective of preventing the entire incident in the
first place. Prior steps would include using chocks, better training for
the technician, and generally following the written test procedure.
Obviously it should have been the first thing to be done once the plane
started moving, but the chain of events started long before that.

As for the guy's currency, since he was just a technician and not a
pilot, I wonder just what sort of requirements they have at all. I could
easily see the bureaucrats deciding that the requirements should be
minimal since he's not doing anything "important" (although I bet that
if it was that way, it changed after this loss!). Anybody know how this
typically works?

--
Mike Ash
Radio Free Earth
Broadcasting from our climate-controlled studios deep inside the Moon

[bod43]

On 29 Apr, 04:28, Dudley Henriques > wrote:
> On Apr 28, 9:31*pm, "Steven P. McNicoll" >
> wrote:
>
>
>
> > Dudley Henriques wrote:
> > > On Apr 28, 7:41 pm, "Steven P. McNicoll" >
> > > wrote:
> > >> Private wrote:
>
> > >>> RTFM
>
> > >>>http://www.rense.com/general85/Airbus340.pdf
>
> > >> Funny, but not quite true.
>
> > >>http://www.snopes.com/photos/airplane/etihad.asp
>
> > > Actually it's pretty close to the truth.
>
> > Actually, "pretty close to the truth" and "not quite true" are pretty much
> > the same thing.
>
> True.
> This accident came in to our safety group via one of our airline guys
> as a "note of interest"
> rather than something we would be working on.
> After reading the report, the only opinion I formed was that the tail
> should have been tied down for any test at max thrust and that whoever
> was in charge of the test (presumably the left seat) should have been
> familiar with the test procedures AND checked out enough on power
> lever use to know completely the emergency shutdown procedure if
> something went wrong. Not bringing the power back prior to and
> coincident with brake application seemed to me an inexcusable error.
> Task overload shouldn't have been an issue as far as power reduction.
> That was a normal procedure failure.
> As to the Arab question; I didn't even consider nationality in my
> rationale; simply the body in charge :-)
> -DH

The guy in charge in one of the front seats was
apparently an Airbus employee with
another in the jump seat. Maintenance guy
from the airline in other pilot seat. All three could well
have been blond and blue eyed, and almost certainly were
not all arab - if that makes any difference to anything. It
certainly doesn't from here.

Something similar - and even scarier - but cheaper.

I happened to listen again to this audio earlier today.
Similar situation, full power run up, with non-aircrew
at the controls, gone wrong.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5iKFYaXDivs&feature=channel_page

Lightning XM135 inadvertant flight by
Wing Commander "Taffy" Holden

This time it was a taxi test, the aircraft was an
English Electric Lightening and it got airborne.
Pins in seat so no escape that way, no canopy.
Driver was senior RAF Engineering Officer who was
pilot trained but only to a low standard as part of his
Engineering training, and had never flown anything
bigger than a Harvard trainer. Was probably not
current but I don't know.

Got it down without significant damage and lived too.

Amazing.

Cause reported as getting throttles caught in re-heat
gate and not being familiar enough with it to get them
out, and steer too, before running out of runway. The only
clear path remaining was *UP*. Don't suppose that
would take too long in one of those.
Whooooosh - oh NO!!!!

Quite why you need a gate to keep throttles *in*
re-heat I have no idea.