Towpilot fatality in Oregon

[Craig[_2_]]

More bad news in a tough year. Heartfelt condolences to all involved.
http://kezi.com/news/local/138726

Craig

[Jim Logajan]

Craig > wrote:
> More bad news in a tough year. Heartfelt condolences to all involved.
> http://kezi.com/news/local/138726

I am a member of the same glider club as the tow pilot who died. I have
not yet found out who was piloting the tow on that flight, but it will
be someone I know. The story on this link provides a few extra details:

http://www.registerguard.com/csp/cms/sites/web/news/cityregion/19094265-41/story.csp

[Jim Logajan]

Craig > wrote:
> More bad news in a tough year. Heartfelt condolences to all involved.
> http://kezi.com/news/local/138726

The tow pilot was Scott Henderson. An article on him:

http://www.kval.com/news/local/54590042.html#IDCThread

He did a lot to advance the club - basically finding it a new home,
expanding the days that towing would be available, and kept everyone in the
loop on club activities.

Here's a story on his efforts last year:

http://www.thecreswellchronicle.com/news/story.cfm?story_no=6008

[JC]

I´m very sorry to hear the bad news.
Does anyone know what happened?

Regards,

Juan Carlos

[Jim Logajan]

JC > wrote:
> I'm very sorry to hear the bad news.
> Does anyone know what happened?

No word - may not get anymore public information for months.

[Larry Goddard]

"Jim Logajan" > wrote in message
:

> Craig > wrote:
> > More bad news in a tough year. Heartfelt condolences to all involved.
> > http://kezi.com/news/local/138726
>
> The tow pilot was Scott Henderson. An article on him:
>
> http://www.kval.com/news/local/54590042.html#IDCThread
>
> He did a lot to advance the club - basically finding it a new home,
> expanding the days that towing would be available, and kept everyone in the
> loop on club activities.
>
> Here's a story on his efforts last year:
>
> http://www.thecreswellchronicle.com/news/story.cfm?story_no=6008


My condolences to all!

In looking at a video shot earlier in the day of a glider launch, it
appeared to me that the pawnee was not climbing very well... Creswell
elevation is only 540 feet. And the temperature only got up to the low
70's that day. http://www.kval.com/news/local/54613062.html

Let's be careful out there! And again, my sincere condolences to all
involved.


Larry

[Jim Logajan]

"Larry Goddard" > wrote:
> "Jim Logajan" > wrote:
>> Craig > wrote:
>> > More bad news in a tough year. Heartfelt condolences to all
>> > involved. http://kezi.com/news/local/138726
>>
>> The tow pilot was Scott Henderson. An article on him:
>>
>> http://www.kval.com/news/local/54590042.html#IDCThread
>>
>> He did a lot to advance the club - basically finding it a new home,
>> expanding the days that towing would be available, and kept everyone
>> in the loop on club activities.
>>
>> Here's a story on his efforts last year:
>>
>> http://www.thecreswellchronicle.com/news/story.cfm?story_no=6008
>
>
> My condolences to all!
>
> In looking at a video shot earlier in the day of a glider launch, it
> appeared to me that the pawnee was not climbing very well... Creswell
> elevation is only 540 feet. And the temperature only got up to the
> low 70's that day. http://www.kval.com/news/local/54613062.html

Yes - the climb angle does appear low - at least compared to last year when
we launched off an 1890 foot grass airstrip (OG48) with the same tow plane
and glider (but different tow pilot.) The asphalt airfield (77S) you see in
that video is 3100 feet.

[Paul Remde]

"Jim Logajan" > wrote in message
...
> "Larry Goddard" > wrote:
>> "Jim Logajan" > wrote:
>>> Craig > wrote:
>>> > More bad news in a tough year. Heartfelt condolences to all
>>> > involved. http://kezi.com/news/local/138726
>>>
>>> The tow pilot was Scott Henderson. An article on him:
>>>
>>> http://www.kval.com/news/local/54590042.html#IDCThread
>>>
>>> He did a lot to advance the club - basically finding it a new home,
>>> expanding the days that towing would be available, and kept everyone
>>> in the loop on club activities.
>>>
>>> Here's a story on his efforts last year:
>>>
>>> http://www.thecreswellchronicle.com/news/story.cfm?story_no=6008
>>
>>
>> My condolences to all!
>>
>> In looking at a video shot earlier in the day of a glider launch, it
>> appeared to me that the pawnee was not climbing very well... Creswell
>> elevation is only 540 feet. And the temperature only got up to the
>> low 70's that day. http://www.kval.com/news/local/54613062.html
>
> Yes - the climb angle does appear low - at least compared to last year
> when
> we launched off an 1890 foot grass airstrip (OG48) with the same tow plane
> and glider (but different tow pilot.) The asphalt airfield (77S) you see
> in
> that video is 3100 feet.

I think it is very difficult to come to any conclusions about the climb rate
from looking at the video. I have towed behind many towpilots that fly low
(perhaps in ground effect) while gaining a bit of excess airspeed and then
eventually starting their climb. From the video it is tough to tell whether
that is what is happening or not. They may have started climbing nicely a
few seconds later... but we don't know.

Paul Remde

[Jim Logajan]

"Paul Remde" > wrote:
> I think it is very difficult to come to any conclusions about the
> climb rate from looking at the video. I have towed behind many
> towpilots that fly low (perhaps in ground effect) while gaining a bit
> of excess airspeed and then eventually starting their climb. From the
> video it is tough to tell whether that is what is happening or not.
> They may have started climbing nicely a few seconds later... but we
> don't know.

Agreed. My recollection is that we used much steeper climbouts from the
grass airstrip - probably because the shorter strip sort of demanded it.
But since I had not gotten around to resuming glider lessons this year at
the new field I can't offer any first-hand comparisons. :-(

[BT]

When I looked at the video, I did not get the impression of a low climb out.
It appeared normal to me.

"Jim Logajan" > wrote in message
...
> "Larry Goddard" > wrote:
>> "Jim Logajan" > wrote:
>>> Craig > wrote:
>>> > More bad news in a tough year. Heartfelt condolences to all
>>> > involved. http://kezi.com/news/local/138726
>>>
>>> The tow pilot was Scott Henderson. An article on him:
>>>
>>> http://www.kval.com/news/local/54590042.html#IDCThread
>>>
>>> He did a lot to advance the club - basically finding it a new home,
>>> expanding the days that towing would be available, and kept everyone
>>> in the loop on club activities.
>>>
>>> Here's a story on his efforts last year:
>>>
>>> http://www.thecreswellchronicle.com/news/story.cfm?story_no=6008
>>
>>
>> My condolences to all!
>>
>> In looking at a video shot earlier in the day of a glider launch, it
>> appeared to me that the pawnee was not climbing very well... Creswell
>> elevation is only 540 feet. And the temperature only got up to the
>> low 70's that day. http://www.kval.com/news/local/54613062.html
>
> Yes - the climb angle does appear low - at least compared to last year
> when
> we launched off an 1890 foot grass airstrip (OG48) with the same tow plane
> and glider (but different tow pilot.) The asphalt airfield (77S) you see
> in
> that video is 3100 feet.

[Gary Boggs]

I appears that the tow plane had mechanical problems, and, or had an
on board fire before landing in the grass field. This is preliminary
info. It appears the tug landed safely in a field but the pilot was
unable to get out in time. Scott was one of the nicest guys I've ever
met and will be greatly missed.

Gary Boggs

[NelsonFunston]

On Aug 27, 8:46*am, GARY BOGGS > wrote:
> I appears that the tow plane had mechanical problems, and, or had an
> on board fire before landing in the grass field. *This is preliminary
> info. *It appears the tug landed safely in a field but the pilot was
> unable to get out in time. *Scott was one of the nicest guys I've ever
> met and will be greatly missed.
>
> Gary Boggs


According to one of the news articles, the glider pilot saw the tow
plane in distress at the time he released. What type of distress did
he observe

Nelson Funston

[Jim Logajan]

Jim Logajan > wrote:
> "Larry Goddard" > wrote:
>> In looking at a video shot earlier in the day of a glider launch, it
>> appeared to me that the pawnee was not climbing very well...
>> Creswell elevation is only 540 feet. And the temperature only got up
>> to the low 70's that day.
>> http://www.kval.com/news/local/54613062.html
>
> Yes - the climb angle does appear low - at least compared to last year
> when we launched off an 1890 foot grass airstrip (OG48) with the same
> tow plane and glider (but different tow pilot.) The asphalt airfield
> (77S) you see in that video is 3100 feet.

I need to correct myself: the tow plane that crashed is _not_ the same one
that was used to tow the glider last year. The tow plane that I flew behind
last year was a Lycoming O-540 (235 HP) powered Pawnee. The tow plane in
the video is a Lycoming O-320 (160 HP) powered Pawnee. That is why the
takeoff looked "anemic" to me. My perception was colored by only seeing
tows behind the higher powered Pawnee. The takeoff in the video is normal
for that Pawnee.

Since I never got around to seeing any of the takeoffs at the new runway,
and because I recalled Scott telling me last fall that he was interested in
possibly buying the 235 HP Pawnee, I incorrectly assumed that he had bought
that one. Obviously I hadn't kept up to date.

[Mark Wright[_2_]]

Why can'ty you vultures just wait for the official accident report instead
of using unbased hypothesis and dragging it all out for the bereaved who
may also be reading this string ?

Shame on you

MW

At 21:37 27 August 2009, Jim Logajan wrote:
>Jim Logajan wrote:
>> "Larry Goddard" wrote:
>>> In looking at a video shot earlier in the day of a glider launch, it
>>> appeared to me that the pawnee was not climbing very well...
>>> Creswell elevation is only 540 feet. And the temperature only got up
>>> to the low 70's that day.
>>> http://www.kval.com/news/local/54613062.html
>>
>> Yes - the climb angle does appear low - at least compared to last year
>> when we launched off an 1890 foot grass airstrip (OG48) with the same
>> tow plane and glider (but different tow pilot.) The asphalt airfield
>> (77S) you see in that video is 3100 feet.
>
>I need to correct myself: the tow plane that crashed is _not_ the same
one
>
>that was used to tow the glider last year. The tow plane that I flew
>behind
>last year was a Lycoming O-540 (235 HP) powered Pawnee. The tow plane in

>the video is a Lycoming O-320 (160 HP) powered Pawnee. That is why the
>takeoff looked "anemic" to me. My perception was colored by only seeing

>tows behind the higher powered Pawnee. The takeoff in the video is normal

>for that Pawnee.
>
>Since I never got around to seeing any of the takeoffs at the new runway,

>and because I recalled Scott telling me last fall that he was interested
>in
>possibly buying the 235 HP Pawnee, I incorrectly assumed that he had
>bought
>that one. Obviously I hadn't kept up to date.
>

[[email protected][_2_]]

On Aug 28, 3:00*pm, Mark Wright > wrote:
> Why can'ty you vultures just wait for the official accident report instead
> of using unbased hypothesis and dragging it all out for the bereaved who
> may also be reading this string ?
>
> *Shame on you
>
> MW

Perhaps, Mark, because some of us vultures also fly Pawnee towplanes
and have a certain interest in what happened. Nothing in the
discussions in this thread have been in poor taste - just pilots
asking each other "what happened?"

To me, as a pilot who has lost many friends in aviation accidents, not
saying anything about an accident is much worse than open discussion.
I sure hope if something ever happens to me that people will ask why
and try to learn from it!

Your little comment, on the other hand, strikes me as somewhat mean
spirited - a bit of an overreaction, I hope.

Kirk
66

[Ramy]

I expected someone will come up sooner or later with the lame request
to wait for the "official accident report". It is comments like this
which often prevent useful discussions about accidents and how to
prevent them. I for one learned much more about accidents from RAS
then from "official accident reports". Are you referring to the
usually useless NTSB reports, or to accident reports in the soaring
magazine which may take months or years to come if at all? We had too
many fatalities this year yet I don't recall seeing any "official
accident reports". Meanwhile more could die from the same reasons.
I'm with Kirk and also hope that if something will ever happen to me
people will discuss it right away and try to learn from it.

Ramy

On Aug 28, 1:00*pm, Mark Wright > wrote:
> Why can'ty you vultures just wait for the official accident report instead
> of using unbased hypothesis and dragging it all out for the bereaved who
> may also be reading this string ?
>
> *Shame on you
>
> MW
>
> At 21:37 27 August 2009, Jim Logajan wrote:
>
>
>
> >Jim Logajan *wrote:
> >> "Larry Goddard" *wrote:
> >>> In looking at a video shot earlier in the day of a glider launch, it
> >>> appeared to me that the pawnee was not climbing very well...
> >>> Creswell elevation is only 540 feet. *And the temperature only got up
> >>> to the low 70's that day.
> >>>http://www.kval.com/news/local/54613062.html
>
> >> Yes - the climb angle does appear low - at least compared to last year
> >> when we launched off an 1890 foot grass airstrip (OG48) with the same
> >> tow plane and glider (but different tow pilot.) The asphalt airfield
> >> (77S) you see in that video is 3100 feet.
>
> >I need to correct myself: the tow plane that crashed is _not_ the same
> one
>
> >that was used to tow the glider last year. The tow plane that I flew
> >behind
> >last year was a Lycoming O-540 (235 HP) powered Pawnee. The tow plane in
> >the video is a Lycoming O-320 (160 HP) powered Pawnee. That is why the
> >takeoff looked "anemic" to me. My perception was colored by only seeing
> >tows behind the higher powered Pawnee. The takeoff in the video is normal
> >for that Pawnee.
>
> >Since I never got around to seeing any of the takeoffs at the new runway,
> >and because I recalled Scott telling me last fall that he was interested
> >in
> >possibly buying the 235 HP Pawnee, I incorrectly assumed that he had
> >bought
> >that one. Obviously I hadn't kept up to date.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

[fcnorton]

I agree.

The NTSB findings will likely be something generic. I've lost 3
friends over the last 30 years of flying. I was by no means a better
pilot than they were.

I read EVERY accident report that I see just in case there is one idea
that might save my ass someday. I don't perceive any of the comments
on here as anyone being more than curious. He sounds like a great guy
that loved flying...he would want us to question what happened.

Fly safe.

FC Norton
HpH 304CZ (FCZ)

[Scott[_7_]]

Ramy wrote:
> I expected someone will come up sooner or later with the lame request
> to wait for the "official accident report". It is comments like this
> which often prevent useful discussions about accidents and how to
> prevent them. I for one learned much more about accidents from RAS
> then from "official accident reports". Are you referring to the
> usually useless NTSB reports, or to accident reports in the soaring
> magazine which may take months or years to come if at all? We had too
> many fatalities this year yet I don't recall seeing any "official
> accident reports". Meanwhile more could die from the same reasons.
> I'm with Kirk and also hope that if something will ever happen to me
> people will discuss it right away and try to learn from it.
>
> Ramy

Just to play devil's advocate...what can be learned from "what ifs"?

If I weren't there to physically witness the accident, I might as well
say the engine quit and someone made a 180 degree turn to return to the
field and spun in. What is learned by that? Especially if the real
cause was something such as a forgotten bolt or pin, causing the wing to
fold.

I myself prefer to wait for an investigation where there are at least
some preliminary FACTS. That's just the way I work, I guess.....

Scott

>

[Eric Greenwell]

Mark Wright wrote:
> Why can'ty you vultures just wait for the official accident report instead
> of using unbased hypothesis and dragging it all out for the bereaved who
> may also be reading this string ?

If the "vultures" thought the bereaved were reading this thread and were
upset by it, I'm sure it would come to a halt. Without any evidence
that's what is happening (surely they would be smart enough to stop
reading if it upset them?), I see no harm being done here, and
potentially some good.

--
Eric Greenwell - Washington State, USA
* Change "netto" to "net" to email me directly

* "Transponders in Sailplanes" http://tinyurl.com/y739x4
* Sections on Mode S, TPAS, ADS-B, Flarm, more

* "A Guide to Self-launching Sailplane Operation" at www.motorglider.org

[Eric Greenwell]

Scott wrote:
> Ramy wrote:
>> I'm with Kirk and also hope that if something will ever happen to me
>> people will discuss it right away and try to learn from it.
>>
>> Ramy
>
> Just to play devil's advocate...what can be learned from "what ifs"?
>
> If I weren't there to physically witness the accident, I might as well
> say the engine quit and someone made a 180 degree turn to return to the
> field and spun in. What is learned by that? Especially if the real
> cause was something such as a forgotten bolt or pin, causing the wing to
> fold.
>
> I myself prefer to wait for an investigation where there are at least
> some preliminary FACTS. That's just the way I work, I guess.....

We have some preliminary facts: Pawnee, crash, fatality, glider OK,
Creswell, Oregon, etc. How long do you want to wait for more facts? How
many facts do you need? My experience is we often don't have "enough"
facts to conclusively understand an accident, even the year or so later
when NTSB report is issued.

RAS isn't a court of law trying to issue a fair judgment. We don't need
"all the facts" to have discussions that leaven the pain of losing a
fellow pilot, or goad us into rethinking about what we do when get into
our towplane or glider, and what we should be doing.

That is just the way most of us work.

--
Eric Greenwell - Washington State, USA
* Change "netto" to "net" to email me directly

* "Transponders in Sailplanes" http://tinyurl.com/y739x4
* Sections on Mode S, TPAS, ADS-B, Flarm, more

* "A Guide to Self-launching Sailplane Operation" at www.motorglider.org

[Ramy]

Agree in general, but chances are that some readers on RAS know the
facts and can share with us much faster than the NTSB will, and indeed
that seems to be the case here.
We all take it personally when one of us get killed, and want to know
why.
Thanks to all who contributed.

Ramy

On Aug 28, 5:48*pm, Scott > wrote:
> Ramy wrote:
> > I expected someone will come up sooner or later with the lame request
> > to wait for the "official accident report". It is comments like this
> > which often prevent useful discussions about accidents and how to
> > prevent them. I for one learned much more about accidents from RAS
> > then from "official accident reports". Are you referring to the
> > usually useless NTSB reports, or to accident reports in the soaring
> > magazine which may take months or years to come if at all? We had too
> > many fatalities this year yet I don't recall seeing any "official
> > accident reports". Meanwhile more could die from the same reasons.
> > I'm with Kirk and also hope that if something will ever happen to me
> > people will discuss it right away and try to learn from it.
>
> > Ramy
>
> Just to play devil's advocate...what can be learned from "what ifs"?
>
> If I weren't there to physically witness the accident, I might as well
> say the engine quit and someone made a 180 degree turn to return to the
> field and spun in. *What is learned by that? *Especially if the real
> cause was something such as a forgotten bolt or pin, causing the wing to
> fold.
>
> I myself prefer to wait for an investigation where there are at least
> some preliminary FACTS. *That's just the way I work, I guess.....
>
> Scott
>
>
>
> - Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

[Frank Whiteley]

On Aug 28, 9:07*pm, Ramy > wrote:
> Agree in general, but chances are that some readers on RAS know the
> facts and can share with us much faster than the NTSB will, and indeed
> that seems to be the case here.
> We all take it personally when one of us get killed, and want to know
> why.
> Thanks to all who contributed.
>
> Ramy
>
> On Aug 28, 5:48*pm, Scott > wrote:
>
> > Ramy wrote:
> > > I expected someone will come up sooner or later with the lame request
> > > to wait for the "official accident report". It is comments like this
> > > which often prevent useful discussions about accidents and how to
> > > prevent them. I for one learned much more about accidents from RAS
> > > then from "official accident reports". Are you referring to the
> > > usually useless NTSB reports, or to accident reports in the soaring
> > > magazine which may take months or years to come if at all? We had too
> > > many fatalities this year yet I don't recall seeing any "official
> > > accident reports". Meanwhile more could die from the same reasons.
> > > I'm with Kirk and also hope that if something will ever happen to me
> > > people will discuss it right away and try to learn from it.
>
> > > Ramy
>
> > Just to play devil's advocate...what can be learned from "what ifs"?
>
> > If I weren't there to physically witness the accident, I might as well
> > say the engine quit and someone made a 180 degree turn to return to the
> > field and spun in. *What is learned by that? *Especially if the real
> > cause was something such as a forgotten bolt or pin, causing the wing to
> > fold.
>
> > I myself prefer to wait for an investigation where there are at least
> > some preliminary FACTS. *That's just the way I work, I guess.....
>
> > Scott
>
> > - Hide quoted text -
>
> > - Show quoted text -

Details on an accident may come out early, others may come out years
later and never be part of the official record. I know of at least
two here in Colorado that are rather different than the official
findings. Can't fault the investigators as the information just
wasn't available to them at the time of the investigations.

[Scott[_7_]]

Eric Greenwell wrote:
> Scott wrote:
>> Ramy wrote:
>>> I'm with Kirk and also hope that if something will ever happen to me
>>> people will discuss it right away and try to learn from it.
>>>
>>> Ramy
>>
>> Just to play devil's advocate...what can be learned from "what ifs"?
>>
>> If I weren't there to physically witness the accident, I might as well
>> say the engine quit and someone made a 180 degree turn to return to
>> the field and spun in. What is learned by that? Especially if the
>> real cause was something such as a forgotten bolt or pin, causing the
>> wing to fold.
>>
>> I myself prefer to wait for an investigation where there are at least
>> some preliminary FACTS. That's just the way I work, I guess.....
>
> We have some preliminary facts: Pawnee, crash, fatality, glider OK,
> Creswell, Oregon, etc. How long do you want to wait for more facts? How
> many facts do you need? My experience is we often don't have "enough"
> facts to conclusively understand an accident, even the year or so later
> when NTSB report is issued.
>
> RAS isn't a court of law trying to issue a fair judgment. We don't need
> "all the facts" to have discussions that leaven the pain of losing a
> fellow pilot, or goad us into rethinking about what we do when get into
> our towplane or glider, and what we should be doing.
>
> That is just the way most of us work.
>
Yes, you have said facts. Did the Pawnee lose a wing? Stall? Carb
Ice? What is the lesson in a Pawnee that crashed in Oregon with a
fatality, other vehicle OK, etc.? What lesson do you take away from
this? Keep the wings on? Use carb heat? Fly the airplane? All good
advice, but something we ordinarily do on every (normal) flight....

[Dave Martin[_3_]]

The basic facts are that someone (or more than one) screwed up. Be it the
pilot of the tow plane the glider pilot or the engineers.

The basic cause is probably one we have seen many times before,
speculation as to cause, pointing the finger of blame only add to the
confusion.

Experience shows that rumour becomes fact it also shows that no matter
what happens we will get debate.

Expecting witnesses to speak out before the enquiry is complete would in
my opinion be wrong, what someone sees is not always the complete answer.

Our sport is dangerous even more so if you do not take care with flying or
maintainance.

Heathly discussion is always helpful, especially to the new guys, but it
is a matter of degrees and remembering that is what it is.

In the event of a technical problem one would expect a bulletin me to be
issued as soon as possible, in the event of a pilot screw up we will just
have to sit and wait.

We all know in todays climate of blame culture we have to be especially
carefull about what we say and print -- but that should not stifle safety
awareness.

Just my thoughts

Dave



At 03:19 29 August 2009, Frank Whiteley wrote:
>On Aug 28, 9:07=A0pm, Ramy wrote:
>> Agree in general, but chances are that some readers on RAS know the
>> facts and can share with us much faster than the NTSB will, and indeed
>> that seems to be the case here.
>> We all take it personally when one of us get killed, and want to know
>> why.
>> Thanks to all who contributed.
>>
>> Ramy
>>
>> On Aug 28, 5:48=A0pm, Scott wrote:
>>
>> > Ramy wrote:
>> > > I expected someone will come up sooner or later with the lame
>request
>> > > to wait for the "official accident report". It is comments like
this
>> > > which often prevent useful discussions about accidents and how to
>> > > prevent them. I for one learned much more about accidents from RAS
>> > > then from "official accident reports". Are you referring to the
>> > > usually useless NTSB reports, or to accident reports in the
soaring
>> > > magazine which may take months or years to come if at all? We had
>too
>> > > many fatalities this year yet I don't recall seeing any
"official
>> > > accident reports". Meanwhile more could die from the same
reasons.
>> > > I'm with Kirk and also hope that if something will ever happen to
me
>> > > people will discuss it right away and try to learn from it.
>>
>> > > Ramy
>>
>> > Just to play devil's advocate...what can be learned from "what
ifs"?
>>
>> > If I weren't there to physically witness the accident, I might as
well
>> > say the engine quit and someone made a 180 degree turn to return to
>the
>> > field and spun in. =A0What is learned by that? =A0Especially if the
>rea=
>l
>> > cause was something such as a forgotten bolt or pin, causing the
wing
>t=
>o
>> > fold.
>>
>> > I myself prefer to wait for an investigation where there are at
least
>> > some preliminary FACTS. =A0That's just the way I work, I guess.....
>>
>> > Scott
>>
>> > - Hide quoted text -
>>
>> > - Show quoted text -
>
>Details on an accident may come out early, others may come out years
>later and never be part of the official record. I know of at least
>two here in Colorado that are rather different than the official
>findings. Can't fault the investigators as the information just
>wasn't available to them at the time of the investigations.
>

[Bela[_2_]]

On Aug 29, 3:45*am, Dave Martin > wrote:
> The basic facts are that someone (or more than one) screwed up. *Be it the
> pilot of the tow plane the glider pilot or the engineers.
>
> The basic cause is probably one we have seen many times before,
> speculation as to cause, pointing the finger of blame only add to the
> confusion. *
>
> Experience shows that rumour becomes fact it also shows that no matter
> what happens we will get debate.
>
> Expecting witnesses to speak out before the enquiry is complete would in
> my opinion be wrong, what someone sees is not always the complete answer.
>
> Our sport is dangerous even more so if you do not take care with flying or
> maintainance.
>
> Heathly discussion is always helpful, especially to the new guys, but it
> is a matter of degrees and remembering that is what it is.
>
> In the event of a technical problem one would expect a bulletin me to be
> issued as soon as possible, in the event of a pilot screw up we will just
> have to sit and wait.
>
> We all know in todays climate of blame culture we have to be especially
> carefull about what we say and print -- but that should not stifle safety
> awareness.
>
> Just my thoughts
>
> Dave *
>
> At 03:19 29 August 2009, Frank Whiteley wrote:
>
>
>
> >On Aug 28, 9:07=A0pm, Ramy *wrote:
> >> Agree in general, but chances are that some readers on RAS know the
> >> facts and can share with us much faster than the NTSB will, and indeed
> >> that seems to be the case here.
> >> We all take it personally when one of us get killed, and want to know
> >> why.
> >> Thanks to all who contributed.
>
> >> Ramy
>
> >> On Aug 28, 5:48=A0pm, Scott *wrote:
>
> >> > Ramy wrote:
> >> > > I expected someone will come up sooner or later with the lame
> >request
> >> > > to wait for the "official accident report". It is comments like
> this
> >> > > which often prevent useful discussions about accidents and how to
> >> > > prevent them. I for one learned much more about accidents from RAS
> >> > > then from "official accident reports". Are you referring to the
> >> > > usually useless NTSB reports, or to accident reports in the
> soaring
> >> > > magazine which may take months or years to come if at all? We had
> >too
> >> > > many fatalities this year yet I don't recall seeing any
> "official
> >> > > accident reports". Meanwhile more could die from the same
> reasons.
> >> > > I'm with Kirk and also hope that if something will ever happen to
> me
> >> > > people will discuss it right away and try to learn from it.
>
> >> > > Ramy
>
> >> > Just to play devil's advocate...what can be learned from "what
> ifs"?
>
> >> > If I weren't there to physically witness the accident, I might as
> well
> >> > say the engine quit and someone made a 180 degree turn to return to
> >the
> >> > field and spun in. =A0What is learned by that? =A0Especially if the
> >rea=
> >l
> >> > cause was something such as a forgotten bolt or pin, causing the
> wing
> >t=
> >o
> >> > fold.
>
> >> > I myself prefer to wait for an investigation where there are at
> least
> >> > some preliminary FACTS. =A0That's just the way I work, I guess......
>
> >> > Scott
>
> >> > - Hide quoted text -
>
> >> > - Show quoted text -
>
> >Details on an accident may come out early, others may come out years
> >later and never be part of the official record. *I know of at least
> >two here in Colorado that are rather different than the official
> >findings. *Can't fault the investigators as the information just
> >wasn't available to them at the time of the investigations.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

There is just one more statement missing to complete the this thread
for now. That should be coming from the pilot of the glider. What
did he experienced to make him release?
Bela

[Gary Boggs]

The glider pilot is way too upset to say anything here. It was his
second solo flight and he feels very bad, but it doesnot appear to
have been caused by anything he did. The line got very slack so he
released and returned to the runway. It seems that the tug had
serious problems forcing him to land, not crash, in a field, which
then caught fire . There are accounts from the ground that the plane
sputtered and another of possible smoke or flames. In almost every
plane crash you can find some one on the ground that heard the plane
sputter though, even if it's a jet, but that's what we know at this
point. I am obviously in favor of disseminating what information we
have and I'm trying hard to keep from saying anything that would upset
anyone involved. I think it is very important to talk about
accidents. Way too many clubs and operations work to hide the
accidents that happen at their sites, and I really disagree with that
kind of attitude. We need to learn from our accidents and talk about
them openly and be very careful to not make it difficult to talk about
this by being nasty about it. If you don’t want to be involved,
don’t read it.


Gary Boggs
1309 16th St.
Hood River, Oregon.
97031
www.nwskysports.com
503-708-8869

[Ian Strachan]

On Aug 28, 11:27*pm, " >
wrote:

> some of us also fly Pawnee towplanes
> and have a certain interest in what happened. *

> not saying anything about
the possible causes of
> an accident
does not help those of us still practising the activity!

First, forgive an input on this tragic event from “the other side of
the pond”, but I am a towplane pilot, too.

I appreciate that in the long term there will be a formal report, but
in the short term it must be possible to say SOMETHING about the
circumstances. If only to (probably) rule out some causes. This
should not be difficult or embarrassing, if done sensibly.

When I was in the military I was involved in quite a few inquiries
into accidents. The RAF system is that the Board of Inquiry has to
make a "48 hour report" of what is known at that time, and whether any
immediate measures could be recommended at that early stage, to lessen
risks to others. Early recommendations might include inspections,
changes of components or to operating procedures, even "grounding" in
extreme cases. The "48 hour report" does not compromise any long-term
findings or recommendations, and the system works well.

Turning to this tragic accident, in very general terms, what happened?

That cannot be "secret", surely?

In particular, what were the approximate flight paths of the towplane
and also of the glider? That will indicate a lot, and rule out some
causes such as structural failure (my club uses a 235hp Pawnee amongst
others, so I have a definite interest!)

A possible cause could be engine failure (full or partial, the latter
often being more difficult to deal with), although landing straight
ahead should not normally have fatal consequences. Did the towplane
turn after releasing the glider? Someone must know.

Also, with any towplane fatal I always wonder whether it was one of
those "tug upsets" caused by the glider getting too high, pulling the
tug tail up to the extent that the tailplane stalls, with consequent
large loss of height to the tug. Many years ago in the UK we had some
of these, and the BGA changed its instruction for aero tow and also
for tug pilots. We have not had a "tug upset" on this side of the
pond for some time, but tug pilots now watch the rear-view mirror much
more carefully for the glider getting high, particularly near the
ground. If so, the hand moves towards the release in case the glider
pilot does not correct, and glider pilots are now taught to sit just
above the towplane slipstream rather than higher, as in the past.

There seems to be a dearth of basic information about what happened in
this tragic case. Since the issue has been raised in this forum, it
would be useful to use the same forum for other towplane pilots to
know more.

Ian Strachan
Lasham Gliding Centre, UK

[haven]

I just put together and signed off as airworthy our Pawnee and am
being towed behind it with commercial ride passengers. I want all the
info I can get to perform my tasks to the best of my ability. thank
you, Haven

[Jim Logajan]

Ian Strachan > wrote:
> On Aug 28, 11:27 pm, " >
> wrote:
>
>> some of us also fly Pawnee towplanes
>> and have a certain interest in what happened.

This may already be known to you, and it may have nothing to do with
this accident, but it appears that Pawnees have been built with three
different types of fuel tanks, with one type accounting for a
disproportionate share of post-crash fires. In 1987 the U.S. NTSB issued
the following recommendation to Piper Aircraft regarding the higher
incidence of post-crash fire fatalities of those aircraft having a
fiberglass fuel tank:

http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/1987/A87_100.pdf

The accident aircraft had a serial number of 25-468, so if the NTSB
recommendation was not followed for that aircraft and it still had the
same tank, it may have had a fiberglass fuel tank and therefore among
the group showing the highest percentage of fatalities and injuries due
to post-crash fires.

> Turning to this tragic accident, in very general terms, what happened?
>
> That cannot be "secret", surely?

Gary Boggs' posts have the most pertinent information. Also, see news
video link I include below.

> In particular, what were the approximate flight paths of the towplane
> and also of the glider? That will indicate a lot, and rule out some
> causes such as structural failure (my club uses a 235hp Pawnee amongst
> others, so I have a definite interest!)
>
> A possible cause could be engine failure (full or partial, the latter
> often being more difficult to deal with), although landing straight
> ahead should not normally have fatal consequences. Did the towplane
> turn after releasing the glider? Someone must know.

The towplane landed approximately straight ahead into a field at the
north end of the runway. There is a local TV news video at the following
URL, and in it they have a shot from a helicopter where you can see the
area of blackend burned grass where he landed at about 1:28 into the
video:

http://kezi.com/news/local/138834

Here's a Google map link of the airport:
http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ie=UTF8&ll=43.93502,-123.007479&spn=0.02766,0.066047&t=h&z=15

[Jim Logajan]

Jim Logajan > wrote:
> [...] but it appears that Pawnees have been built with three
> different types of fuel tanks, with one type accounting for a
> disproportionate share of post-crash fires.

Sorry - meant to end the sentence with "post-crash fire fatalities."

[bildan]

On Aug 31, 11:40*am, Jim Logajan > wrote:
> Ian Strachan > wrote:
> > On Aug 28, 11:27 pm, " >
> > wrote:
>
> >> some of us also fly Pawnee towplanes
> >> and have a certain interest in what happened. *
>
> This may already be known to you, and it may have nothing to do with
> this accident, but it appears that Pawnees have been built with three
> different types of fuel tanks, with one type accounting for a
> disproportionate share of post-crash fires. In 1987 the U.S. NTSB issued
> the following recommendation to Piper Aircraft regarding the higher
> incidence of post-crash fire fatalities of those aircraft having a
> fiberglass fuel tank:
>
> http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/1987/A87_100.pdf
>
> The accident aircraft had a serial number of 25-468, so if the NTSB
> recommendation was not followed for that aircraft and it still had the
> same tank, it may have had a fiberglass fuel tank and therefore among
> the group showing the highest percentage of fatalities and injuries due
> to post-crash fires.
>
> > Turning to this tragic accident, in very general terms, what happened?
>
> > That cannot be "secret", surely?
>
> Gary Boggs' posts have the most pertinent information. Also, see news
> video link I include below.
>
> > In particular, what were the approximate flight paths of the towplane
> > and also of the glider? *That will indicate a lot, and rule out some
> > causes such as structural failure (my club uses a 235hp Pawnee amongst
> > others, so I have a definite interest!)
>
> > A possible cause could be engine failure (full or partial, the latter
> > often being more difficult to deal with), although landing straight
> > ahead should not normally have fatal consequences. *Did the towplane
> > turn after releasing the glider? *Someone must know.
>
> The towplane landed approximately straight ahead into a field at the
> north end of the runway. There is a local TV news video at the following
> URL, and in it they have a shot from a helicopter where you can see the
> area of blackend burned grass where he landed at about 1:28 into the
> video:
>
> http://kezi.com/news/local/138834
>
> Here's a Google map link of the airport:http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ie=UTF8&ll=43.93502,-123.007479&spn...

The NTSB numbers would not seem to be statistically meaningful except
to say crashed Pawnees are known to burn regardless of tank type. The
number of crashes is too small to say one tank type is better than
another.

There are other airplanes with worse post crash fire records. The
Beechcraft Baron has fuel drains as the lowest part of the aircraft
with the gear retracted so in a gear-up landing they are the first
things to contact the runway. Fuel always spills and a fire almost
always follows.

[[email protected]]

On Aug 31, 2:39*pm, bildan > wrote:
> On Aug 31, 11:40*am, Jim Logajan > wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Ian Strachan > wrote:
> > > On Aug 28, 11:27 pm, " >
> > > wrote:
>
> > >> some of us also fly Pawnee towplanes
> > >> and have a certain interest in what happened. *
>
> > This may already be known to you, and it may have nothing to do with
> > this accident, but it appears that Pawnees have been built with three
> > different types of fuel tanks, with one type accounting for a
> > disproportionate share of post-crash fires. In 1987 the U.S. NTSB issued
> > the following recommendation to Piper Aircraft regarding the higher
> > incidence of post-crash fire fatalities of those aircraft having a
> > fiberglass fuel tank:
>
> >http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/1987/A87_100.pdf
>
> > The accident aircraft had a serial number of 25-468, so if the NTSB
> > recommendation was not followed for that aircraft and it still had the
> > same tank, it may have had a fiberglass fuel tank and therefore among
> > the group showing the highest percentage of fatalities and injuries due
> > to post-crash fires.
>
> > > Turning to this tragic accident, in very general terms, what happened?
>
> > > That cannot be "secret", surely?
>
> > Gary Boggs' posts have the most pertinent information. Also, see news
> > video link I include below.
>
> > > In particular, what were the approximate flight paths of the towplane
> > > and also of the glider? *That will indicate a lot, and rule out some
> > > causes such as structural failure (my club uses a 235hp Pawnee amongst
> > > others, so I have a definite interest!)
>
> > > A possible cause could be engine failure (full or partial, the latter
> > > often being more difficult to deal with), although landing straight
> > > ahead should not normally have fatal consequences. *Did the towplane
> > > turn after releasing the glider? *Someone must know.
>
> > The towplane landed approximately straight ahead into a field at the
> > north end of the runway. There is a local TV news video at the following
> > URL, and in it they have a shot from a helicopter where you can see the
> > area of blackend burned grass where he landed at about 1:28 into the
> > video:
>
> >http://kezi.com/news/local/138834
>
> > Here's a Google map link of the airport:http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ie=UTF8&ll=43.93502,-123.007479&spn...
>
> The NTSB numbers would not seem to be statistically meaningful except
> to say crashed Pawnees are known to burn regardless of tank type. *The
> number of crashes is too small to say one tank type is better than
> another.
>
> There are other airplanes with worse post crash fire records. *The
> Beechcraft Baron has fuel drains as the lowest part of the aircraft
> with the gear retracted so in a gear-up landing they are the first
> things to contact the runway. *Fuel always spills and a fire almost
> always follows.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

Bill makes a good point. Also , it is worth noting that these seem to
relate to post crash fires.
It is somewhat well known that the "early " Pawnees (I fly #54 every
week) were known to have a more than minimal risk of fire when nosed
over hard and driving the hot exhaust system back into the tank area.
That said, what little we seem to "know" about this implies the
possibility of an in flight fire with not enough time to land and
escape safely- really sad.
Also well said, it that sharing info is valuable. I admit to not
having done so during a period of 3 engine failures over a period of 8
months in our Pawnee. We didn't feel we had credible evidence to
report that it wasn't our problem.
All 3 were cylinder head failures, one of which was 8 miles from home
and 4000 ft. Cockpit full of smoke, big shake- no fire luckily. Got
home on minimal power. Cylinder(#3) replaced under warranty by
manufacturer. 6 Months later, second failure, this time #4. Replaced
under warranty. 1 month later #3 again. Second and third failed such
that intake separated and no power was available. We told
manufacturer- ECI, we were done with their product ask asked for
refund which they provided us. This paid for Lycoming cylinders. No
problems(knock on wood) for 2 years. a few months later and AD came
out.
Lesson in this long story is that there is value in sharing the
learnings of these sad events.
Respectfully
UH

[Eric Greenwell]

Scott wrote:
> Eric Greenwell wrote:

>>
>> RAS isn't a court of law trying to issue a fair judgment. We don't
>> need "all the facts" to have discussions that leaven the pain of
>> losing a fellow pilot, or goad us into rethinking about what we do
>> when get into our towplane or glider, and what we should be doing.
>>
>> That is just the way most of us work.
>>
> Yes, you have said facts. Did the Pawnee lose a wing? Stall? Carb
> Ice? What is the lesson in a Pawnee that crashed in Oregon with a
> fatality, other vehicle OK, etc.? What lesson do you take away from
> this? Keep the wings on? Use carb heat? Fly the airplane? All good
> advice, but something we ordinarily do on every (normal) flight....

Two things, I think:

1) Ti think it is the "something we ordinarily do on every (normal)
flight" that worries people: this flight seemed like a normal, every day
flight, and yet it went badly wrong. The other pilots on this thread are
likely worried they could be caught in the same circumstance, and they
want to know *now* how to avoid it, not a year from now.

2) Your goal in this situation seems to lie with knowing how and why the
accident occurred, but without the urgency to apply to your actions.
This makes you willing to wait a year for the dust to settle. Nothing
wrong with that, particularly if you aren't a towpilot or don't tow
behind Pawnees, but perhaps you can understand the urgency the other
pilots feel and how that means getting information, even it it's
incomplete and ocasionally wrong, sooner rather than later is an asset,
not a liability.

--
Eric Greenwell - Washington State, USA
* Change "netto" to "net" to email me directly

* "Transponders in Sailplanes" http://tinyurl.com/y739x4
* Sections on Mode S, TPAS, ADS-B, Flarm, more

* "A Guide to Self-launching Sailplane Operation" at www.motorglider.org

[Frank Whiteley]

On Aug 31, 2:19*pm, wrote:
> On Aug 31, 2:39*pm, bildan > wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Aug 31, 11:40*am, Jim Logajan > wrote:
>
> > > Ian Strachan > wrote:
> > > > On Aug 28, 11:27 pm, " >
> > > > wrote:
>
> > > >> some of us also fly Pawnee towplanes
> > > >> and have a certain interest in what happened. *
>
> > > This may already be known to you, and it may have nothing to do with
> > > this accident, but it appears that Pawnees have been built with three
> > > different types of fuel tanks, with one type accounting for a
> > > disproportionate share of post-crash fires. In 1987 the U.S. NTSB issued
> > > the following recommendation to Piper Aircraft regarding the higher
> > > incidence of post-crash fire fatalities of those aircraft having a
> > > fiberglass fuel tank:
>
> > >http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/1987/A87_100.pdf
>
> > > The accident aircraft had a serial number of 25-468, so if the NTSB
> > > recommendation was not followed for that aircraft and it still had the
> > > same tank, it may have had a fiberglass fuel tank and therefore among
> > > the group showing the highest percentage of fatalities and injuries due
> > > to post-crash fires.
>
> > > > Turning to this tragic accident, in very general terms, what happened?
>
> > > > That cannot be "secret", surely?
>
> > > Gary Boggs' posts have the most pertinent information. Also, see news
> > > video link I include below.
>
> > > > In particular, what were the approximate flight paths of the towplane
> > > > and also of the glider? *That will indicate a lot, and rule out some
> > > > causes such as structural failure (my club uses a 235hp Pawnee amongst
> > > > others, so I have a definite interest!)
>
> > > > A possible cause could be engine failure (full or partial, the latter
> > > > often being more difficult to deal with), although landing straight
> > > > ahead should not normally have fatal consequences. *Did the towplane
> > > > turn after releasing the glider? *Someone must know.
>
> > > The towplane landed approximately straight ahead into a field at the
> > > north end of the runway. There is a local TV news video at the following
> > > URL, and in it they have a shot from a helicopter where you can see the
> > > area of blackend burned grass where he landed at about 1:28 into the
> > > video:
>
> > >http://kezi.com/news/local/138834
>
> > > Here's a Google map link of the airport:http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ie=UTF8&ll=43.93502,-123.007479&spn...
>
> > The NTSB numbers would not seem to be statistically meaningful except
> > to say crashed Pawnees are known to burn regardless of tank type. *The
> > number of crashes is too small to say one tank type is better than
> > another.
>
> > There are other airplanes with worse post crash fire records. *The
> > Beechcraft Baron has fuel drains as the lowest part of the aircraft
> > with the gear retracted so in a gear-up landing they are the first
> > things to contact the runway. *Fuel always spills and a fire almost
> > always follows.- Hide quoted text -
>
> > - Show quoted text -
>
> Bill makes a good point. Also , it is worth noting that these seem to
> relate to post crash fires.
> It is somewhat well known that the "early " Pawnees (I fly #54 every
> week) were known to have a more than minimal risk of fire when nosed
> over hard and driving the hot exhaust system back into the tank area.
> That said, what little we seem to "know" about this implies the
> possibility of an in flight fire with not enough time to land and
> escape safely- really sad.
> Also well said, it that sharing info is valuable. I admit to not
> having done so during a period of 3 engine failures over a period of 8
> months in our Pawnee. We didn't feel we had credible evidence to
> report that it wasn't our problem.
> All 3 were cylinder head failures, one of which was 8 miles from home
> and 4000 ft. Cockpit full of smoke, big shake- no fire luckily. Got
> home on minimal power. Cylinder(#3) replaced under warranty by
> manufacturer. 6 Months later, second failure, this time #4. Replaced
> under warranty. 1 month later #3 again. Second and third failed such
> that intake separated and no power was available. We told
> manufacturer- ECI, we were done with their product ask asked for
> refund which they provided us. This paid for Lycoming cylinders. No
> problems(knock on wood) for 2 years. a few months later and AD came
> out.
> Lesson in this long story is that there is value in sharing the
> learnings of these sad events.
> Respectfully
> UH

Thanks for sharing.

The following recently happened with our Pawnee (D with wing tanks).
The pilot more commonly flies one with the fuselage tank, so he can be
excused for the urgent flight from the cockpit.

"Probably not quite exact, but executive summary: Cylinder baffle
brace wire chafed through #4 oil return line. Oil leak onto exhaust
stacks caused smoke in cockpit on takeoff roll. [pilot] shut tow down,
after XP had lifted off. Both got stopped safely before fence. [pilot]
flung the headset out one side, seatbelts off, and bailed out. Missed
the wing walk, and put a foot through the wing fabric. .... BEST news
is [pilot's] OK. We can replace equipment, but people are infinitely
valuable."

Frank Whiteley

[Scott[_7_]]

Eric Greenwell wrote:
> Scott wrote:
>> Eric Greenwell wrote:
>
>>>
>>> RAS isn't a court of law trying to issue a fair judgment. We don't
>>> need "all the facts" to have discussions that leaven the pain of
>>> losing a fellow pilot, or goad us into rethinking about what we do
>>> when get into our towplane or glider, and what we should be doing.
>>>
>>> That is just the way most of us work.
>>>
>> Yes, you have said facts. Did the Pawnee lose a wing? Stall? Carb
>> Ice? What is the lesson in a Pawnee that crashed in Oregon with a
>> fatality, other vehicle OK, etc.? What lesson do you take away from
>> this? Keep the wings on? Use carb heat? Fly the airplane? All good
>> advice, but something we ordinarily do on every (normal) flight....
>
> Two things, I think:
>
> 1) Ti think it is the "something we ordinarily do on every (normal)
> flight" that worries people: this flight seemed like a normal, every day
> flight, and yet it went badly wrong. The other pilots on this thread are
> likely worried they could be caught in the same circumstance, and they
> want to know *now* how to avoid it, not a year from now.
>
> 2) Your goal in this situation seems to lie with knowing how and why the
> accident occurred, but without the urgency to apply to your actions.
> This makes you willing to wait a year for the dust to settle. Nothing
> wrong with that, particularly if you aren't a towpilot or don't tow
> behind Pawnees, but perhaps you can understand the urgency the other
> pilots feel and how that means getting information, even it it's
> incomplete and ocasionally wrong, sooner rather than later is an asset,
> not a liability.
>

I'm not disputing that time may be of the essence, but until there are
more facts to go on, it could be a disservice, if you will, to say (for
example) Pawnees are known to have higher post crash fires, when the
fire could have occured during flight. In other words, I could put out
a hundred guesses as to what happened and most, if not all, would be
incorrect because the only facts I have to go on are it was a Pawnee,
there was a fire and there was a fatality.

[Gary Boggs]

Well, so much for preliminary reports. Most of the information that I
posted earlier, obtained from people that were there the day of the
accident, appears to be wrong. The latest info is that the Pawnee
crashed, not landed, in a significant nose down attitude. The
Schweitzer tow hook, which was mounted upside down, with the arm on
the bottom side, was bent up at a significant angle. It does not
appear to be bent from the crash. The tow release in this Pawnee was
on the floor near the flap handle, which would make it very hard to
reach in a negative G situation. The release handle in the Pawnee did
not look like it had been activated. Even if it had been pulled, it
might not have released with a strong upward pull because the
mechanism on the tail was mounted upside down.

This was the glider pilot’s second solo flight.

This is looking more like an upset caused by the glider getting too
high, and not an on board fire before the crash like we thought
earlier.

The lawyers are preparing to sue everybody involved.

[[email protected]]

On Sep 4, 10:18*am, GARY BOGGS > wrote:
> Well, so much for preliminary reports. *Most of the information that I
> posted earlier, obtained from people that were there the day of the
> accident, appears to be wrong. *The latest info is that the Pawnee
> crashed, not landed, in a significant nose down attitude. *The
> Schweitzer tow hook, which was mounted upside down, with the arm on
> the bottom side, was bent up at a significant angle. *It does not
> appear to be bent from the crash. *The tow release in this Pawnee was
> on the floor near the flap handle, which would make it very hard to
> reach in a negative G situation. *The release handle in the Pawnee did
> not look like it had been activated. *Even if it had been pulled, it
> might not have released with a strong upward pull because the
> mechanism on the tail was mounted upside down.
>
> This was the glider pilot’s second solo flight.
>
> This is looking more like an upset caused by the glider getting too
> high, and not an on board fire before the crash like we thought
> earlier.
>
> The lawyers are preparing to sue everybody involved.

Jeeez!
Inverted hook is intended to make release easier under high load than
original configuration. We tested this when we put it on our Pawnee
and found it to be true.
That said, you don't have much time and it's hard to get to release if
you are going to negative G.
Bent mount is obviously a clue to very high loads.
Thanks for keeping us informed.
UH

[OregonGliderPilot]

Well, so much for preliminary reports. Most of the information that I
posted earlier, obtained from people that were there the day of the
accident, appears to be wrong. The latest info is that the Pawnee
crashed, not landed, in a significant nose down attitude. The
Schweitzer tow hook, which was mounted upside down, with the arm on
the bottom side, was bent up at a significant angle. It does not
appear to be bent from the crash. The tow release in this Pawnee was
on the floor near the flap handle, which would make it very hard to
reach in a negative G situation. The release handle in the Pawnee did
not look like it had been activated. Even if it had been pulled, it
might not have released with a strong upward pull because the
mechanism on the tail was mounted upside down.

This was the glider pilot’s second solo flight.

This is looking more like an upset caused by the glider getting too
high, and not an on board fire before the crash like we thought
earlier.

The lawyers are preparing to sue everybody involved.

Gary,

I suspect the loads transmitted via the tow rope would never be anywhere near enough to bend the mounting plate, even if the rope had not broken at its rated stength of around 1,000 lbs.

Have you considered that the bend is more likely to be from the impact of the tailwheel?

Your comment about the lawyers is insensitive in the extreme to those involved, and I suspect based on nothing but gleeful speculation on your part?

OGP

[Gary Boggs]

The NTSB said that the bent tow hook mount was inconsistent with the
crash. It is also very hard for me to imagine that a tow rope would
be strong enough to bend the tow hook mount.

Sorry about the lawyer comment. I hope it's not true.

[Gary Boggs]

I don't know how you could have seen any glee in any of my posts. I
am very sad about this tragety. It compounds the tragety when the
lawyers get involved and try to hold everybody else liable in my
opinion.

[Papa3]

On Sep 5, 10:12*am, GARY BOGGS > wrote:
> The NTSB said that the bent tow hook mount was inconsistent with the
> crash. *It is also very hard for me to imagine that a tow rope would
> be strong enough to bend the tow hook mount.
>
> Sorry about the lawyer comment. *I hope it's not true.

FWIW, when I was a new instructor, I allowed one student to get a
little too far behind the PIO curve on tow (this well above 1,000
feet) and we swung rapidly from low and right to high and left. Ka-
thwang - there was a God awful jerk and I saw the towplane (an L-19)
diving away. We'd actually broken the tow hitch from the towplane
(it remained connected by the release cable). The mounting plate was
pretty mangled. Luckily, I wasn't mangled by the towpilot, who gave
me a well-deserved dressing down behind the hangar.

Not saying this is or isn't related to the Oregon crash, but it is
possible to do a significant amount of damage to the tow hitch if you
let enough slack develop and don't handle the recovery well...

[OregonGliderPilot]

On Sep 5, 10:12*am, GARY BOGGS wrote:
The NTSB said that the bent tow hook mount was inconsistent with the
crash. *It is also very hard for me to imagine that a tow rope would
be strong enough to bend the tow hook mount.

Sorry about the lawyer comment. *I hope it's not true.

FWIW, when I was a new instructor, I allowed one student to get a
little too far behind the PIO curve on tow (this well above 1,000
feet) and we swung rapidly from low and right to high and left. Ka-
thwang - there was a God awful jerk and I saw the towplane (an L-19)
diving away. We'd actually broken the tow hitch from the towplane
(it remained connected by the release cable). The mounting plate was
pretty mangled. Luckily, I wasn't mangled by the towpilot, who gave
me a well-deserved dressing down behind the hangar.

Not saying this is or isn't related to the Oregon crash, but it is
possible to do a significant amount of damage to the tow hitch if you
let enough slack develop and don't handle the recovery well...


I suspect that in this case they were probably using the standard 1/4" polypropylene ropes with a theoretical rated breaking load of 1,000lbs. Even after a few tows off an asphalt runway I would think that it would be hard put to transmit a load much over 1,200 lbs even with the biggest snatch imaginable. Perhaps in your case you were towing with a much stronger rope with no weak link?

Gary, You say "NTSB said that the bent tow hook mount was inconsistent with the crash" - as I can't see the report listed on the NTSB's monthly summaries, I can only hope you are taking directly to the NTSB investigator rather than adding to the speculation with third-hand information.

I accept your apology regarding the lawyer comment, but I must emphasize the effect of that type of comment would have on those affected by this accident. Perhaps we should stick to verifiable first hand facts when adding to the discussion?

OGP

[TonyV[_2_]]

> FWIW, when I was a new instructor, I allowed one student to get a
> little too far behind the PIO curve on tow (this well above 1,000
> feet) and we swung rapidly from low and right to high and left. Ka-
> thwang - ....


Oh, man, how many instructors have stories like that? When i was a new
instructor, I was flying with an "experienced" student on a 20+ knot
wind day. On short final, he was getting slow below the tree line and I
said "keep your speed up". The next thing I know, the stick goes forward
to the stop. we hit on the skid (2-33) bounce back into the air and I
recover after that. Ever since, I keep my hand MUCH closer to the stick
near the ground when a student is flying.

Tony

[Chris Rollings[_2_]]

I haven't had time to read all the posts on this thread, but none of those
I have read has given any real information on what actually happened.

I was involved in some testing of tow-plane accident scenarios many years
ago. I'm not suggesting that what happened in Oregon was this sort of
accident but nor do I know that it was not. For what it is worth,
herewith my recollections of those tests:

Whilst I was Chief Instructor at Booker Gliding Club, we conducted two
series of test on the phenomenon variously referred to as “Kiting”, “Winch
Launching behind the Tow-Plane” and “Sling-Shot Accident”, one in 1978 and
one in 1982; my memory of them is quite vivid.

Airplanes used were, for the first series, a Beagle Terrier (a side by
side, two place, high wing, tail-dragger), fitted with an Ottfur Glider
hook for towing (very similar to the Tost hook, dissimilar to the
Schweitzer hook) with a 160 hp Lycoming engine; for the second series of
tests a PA18-180 with a Schweitzer hook was used. Gliders used were a
Schleicher Ka 8b and ASK 13. Tow rope initially used was a heavy (4000 lb
breaking strain) rope with a thinner rope weak link at the glider end
(nominally 900 lb, but a well worn specimen could break at as little as
200 – 300 lbs – laboratory tests, not opinion), the second series of test
used the same heavy duty rope with “Mity” links at each end, 1100 lbs at
the Tow-Plane end and 900 lbs at the Glider end – these links use metal
shear pins, one under load and a second unloaded, which takes over if the
first one fails. This eliminates failure due to fatigue and means that
the links always fail at close to their nominal load even after some time
in service – again laboratory tested, not just subjective opinion. Rope
length was around 180 feet in all cases.

I was the Glider Pilot on all tests; Tow-Plane Pilot was Verdun Luck (then
my deputy Chief Instructor) for the first series of tests and Brian
Spreckley (then Manager of Booker GC) for the second. The object of the
tests was to try to reproduce the “Kiting” under controlled circumstances,
with a view to developing a Tow-Plane release mechanism that would
automatically release the glider if it got dangerously high above the
Tow-Plane. All tests were conducted at about 4000 feet agl.

First test: Terrier Tow-Plane and ASK 13 on nose-hook. At about 4000
feet I took the glider progressively higher above the tow-plane,
eventually reached about 100 feet above tow-plane (i.e. rope angle more
than 45 degrees above horizontal). At about this point, the tow pilot,
who had been using progressively more back stick, ran out of back stick
and the Tow-Plane began to pitch nose down but not excessively violently.
I released at that point. It took a very positive control input on my part
to achieve the displacement, we both felt it was something unlikely to
occur accidentally, even with an inexperienced glider pilot, and there was
plenty of time for either party to release if it did occur.

Second test: Terrier Tow-Plane and ASK 13 on C of G hook. I pitched the
glider about 25 – 30 degrees nose up – the weak link broke immediately!
Tow pilot reported a sharp jerk, but no significant change to flight
path.

Third test: Terrier Tow-Plane, K 8b on C of G hook. I pitched the glider
about 25 degrees nose up. The glider continued to pitch up fairly rapidly
(as at the start of a winch launch) and substantial forward movement of
the stick only slightly slowed the rate of pitch. The glider achieved
about 45 degrees nose up, speed increased rapidly from 55 knots to about
75 knots and the glider was pulled back towards level flight (again as at
the top of a winch launch). I released at that point. The entire
sequence of events occupied a VERY short period of time (subsequently
measured as 2 - 3 seconds). The Tow Pilot reported a marked deceleration
and start of pitching down which he attempted to contain by moving the
stick back; this was followed immediately by a very rapid pitch down
accompanied by significant negative “G”. The tow-plane finished up about
70 degrees nose down and took about 400 feet to recover to level flight.
We both found the experience alarming, even undertaken deliberately at
4000 feet. Our conclusion was that the combination of the initial pitch
down and the upward deflection of the elevator caused the horizontal
stabilizer/elevator combination to stall and the abrupt removal of the
down-force it provided caused the subsequent very rapid pitch-down and
negative “G”.

Our first conclusion was that, in the event of this sequence occurring
accidentally as a result of an inadvertent pitch up by the glider pilot,
there was effectively no chance that either the glider pilot or tow-pilot
would recognise the problem and pull the release in the available time.

Attempts to produce a tow-plane hook that would release automatically were
unsuccessful for reasons that became apparent later.

These tests were repeated a few years later with a PA18 – 180 as the
tow-plane, Brian Spreckley flying it. The third test described above was
repeated and photographed from a chase plane using a 35 mm motor drive
camera on automatic (this took a frame every half second – video
camcorders of small size were not readily available then). The photo
sequence started with the glider in a slightly low normal tow position and
starting to pitch up, the second frame has the glider about 30 degrees nose
up and about 20 feet higher than previously in the third frame it is about
45 degrees nose up and has gained another 30 feet or so, the tow-plane is
already starting to pitch down, in the fourth frame the glider is about
100 feet higher than its original position and the climb is starting to
shallow, the tow-plane is about 50 degrees nose down, the final frame
shows the tow-plane about 70 degrees nose down and the glider almost back
in level flight , almost directly above it (that was about the point that
I pulled the release).

Sufficiently alarmed by events, Brian Spreckley had been trying to pull
the release in the tow-plane earlier and found that it would not operate
until my releasing at the glider end removed the tension from the rope.
Subsequent tests on the ground showed that the Schweitzer hook fitted to
the tow-plane, whilst perfectly satisfactory under normal loads, was
jammed solid by the frictional loads when subject to a pull of around 700
lbs with a slight upwards component – not something that a normal
pre-flight check would reveal.

We solved that problem on our tow-planes by replacing the bolt that the
hook latches onto with a small roller bearing. So far as I know no one in
the UK has tested the Schweitzer hook as fitted to a glider, but I would
not be surprised if it exhibited the same characteristics at high loads.

The photo sequence also showed that at no time was the glider at an angle
greater than 30 degrees above the tow-plane’s centre-line. However, of
course once the glider has pitched up, the wings generate considerable
extra lift and that extra lift provides extra load on the rope. With a
large, heavy glider it is easy to exceed weak link breaking strains and
with a lightweight machine the tension can easily rise to 700 lbs or so.
With that much load on the rope, quite a small upward angle provides
enough of a vertical component to produce the results described.

That of course is the reason that attempts to produce a hook that released
if a certain angle was exceeded were unsuccessful. The, quite small, angle
between the rope and the fuselage centreline needed to trigger the “Kiting”
when the glider is pitched significantly nose-up is not much greater than
the amount of out of position commonly experienced in turbulent
conditions. We did build an experimental hook and tried it, but, set to
an angle that prevented “Kiting” it occasionally dumped an innocent glider
in turbulence, and set to an angle that prevented that, it didn’t prevent
the “Kiting”. What was needed was a hook that responded to the vertical
component of the load, not the angle at which it was applied, and that
problem we decided was beyond us (at least in a form robust and fool-proof
enough to be attached to the rear end of a tow-plane).

Our conclusions for preventing “Kiting” were:

Don’t aerotow gliders, especially lightweight, low wing-loading gliders,
on C of G hooks intended for winch launching (I think the JAR 22
requirement for nose hooks to be fitted to new gliders for aerotowing was
at least in part a result of these tests).

Don’t use short ropes. The speed at which things happen varies directly
with the length of the rope.

Don’t let inexperienced pilots fly at anywhere near aft C of G.

Don’t let inexperienced pilots fly solo in turbulent conditions.

Replace or modify all Schweitzer hooks fitted to tow planes. (So far as I
know there are none on gliders in the UK, so that question never arose).

We did also modify our PA18’s so that instead of the release cable ending
at a floor-mounted lever, it went round a pulley where that lever used to
be, and then all the way up the side of the cockpit, anchored at the roof.
This meant that grabbing any point on the wire and pulling it in any
direction could operate the release; considerably easier than finding a
floor mounted lever when being subject to about minus two “G”. We never
regarded this modification as being likely to prevent a worst-case
scenario, because, as stated earlier, it was the opinion of all involved,
that in a real “Kiting” incident, there was no realistic hope that either
pilot would respond in time.

[Gary Boggs]

Are any of the pictures still around? I would love to see them. I'm
sure others would too.

Gary Boggs

[OregonGliderPilot]

Are any of the pictures still around? I would love to see them. I'm
sure others would too.

Gary Boggs

I think they were posted on the BGA website once?

OGP

[Derek Copeland[_2_]]

At 20:10 06 September 2009, OregonGliderPilot wrote:
>
>GARY BOGGS;705095 Wrote:
>> Are any of the pictures still around? I would love to see them. I'm
>> sure others would too.
>>
>> Gary Boggs
>
>I think they were posted on the BGA website once?
>
>OGP
>
I have looked in the BGA website, but can't find these photos. If you
have access to the BGA Instructors Manual there is a graphic in Section 17
which shows the sequence of events. It shows that if the glider gets too
high and kites on a belly hook, the tug can be pulled into a stalled and
near vertically downwards attitude within 3 seconds! There is a note
saying that it takes at least 800 feet to recover from this!

At about the time I started gliding in the early 1980s, I remember there
were three or four such accidents to tugs in one year in the UK, all
unfortunately fatal. Also from memory I think most of them involved K18s
fitted only with belly hooks. This type is particularly prone to kite.

As a result of these and the Booker experiments, the standard towing
position was moved down a bit and glider pilots were briefed to release if
they started to get significantly too high or lost sight of the tug
altogether. Also tug rope releases where improved to make them more
accessible to the pilot, and there was a recommendation that all new
gliders should be fitted with nose hooks for aerotowing.

The main danger of getting too high is shortly after take off, when the
combination is still accelerating and the glider's wings are making more
and more lift due the increasing airspeed. The glider pilot needs to keep
easing the stick forward so that the glider does not get much higher than
the top of the tug's tail fin. It is probably a good idea to trim well
forward for this stage of the launch. If a tug upset does occur at this
stage of the launch there is almost no chance of the tug pilot being able
to recover before hitting the deck.

Derek Copeland

[Chris Rollings[_2_]]

The graphic in the BGA Instructors Manual was based on the photos mentioned
(as was an Australian Safety Poster from around that time). The Ka18
isn't particularly prone to the accident, it's just that the small
number imported into the UK all only had C of G Hooks, no nose hooks, but
were quite often aerotowed with low experience pilots. The problem can
arise with anything aerotowed on a C of G Hook. When we bought two used
Ka18's from Dunstable at around that time we did not allow them on site
until nose-hooks were fitted.

There were never as many as three or four such fatals in one year in the
UK, but a year with two such accidents was enought to start us on the
tests described, as Booker was the busiest aerotow operation in the UK at
that time and I wanted to try to ensure we never had one.

The standard towing position was not moved down, it remained unchanged.
To go to a lower towing position (or worse still to trasit to "low-tow")
would put the glider close to, or in, the turbulent prop wash and wake of
the tow-plane, and getting bounced around by that is one of the possible
causes of the momentary, inadvertant, pitch-up that can cause the
accident.

As in almost all phases of flight the glider should be trimmed for as
close to zero forward or back pressure on the stick as can be pre-set.
Having to hold a substantial back-pressure on the stick would be
un-helpful.

In the last sentance delete the word "almost".


At 11:00 07 September 2009, Derek Copeland wrote:
>At 20:10 06 September 2009, OregonGliderPilot wrote:
>>
>>GARY BOGGS;705095 Wrote:
>>> Are any of the pictures still around? I would love to see them.
I'm
>>> sure others would too.
>>>
>>> Gary Boggs
>>
>>I think they were posted on the BGA website once?
>>
>>OGP
>>
>I have looked in the BGA website, but can't find these photos. If you
>have access to the BGA Instructors Manual there is a graphic in Section
17
>which shows the sequence of events. It shows that if the glider gets too
>high and kites on a belly hook, the tug can be pulled into a stalled and
>near vertically downwards attitude within 3 seconds! There is a note
>saying that it takes at least 800 feet to recover from this!
>
>At about the time I started gliding in the early 1980s, I remember there
>were three or four such accidents to tugs in one year in the UK, all
>unfortunately fatal. Also from memory I think most of them involved K18s
>fitted only with belly hooks. This type is particularly prone to kite.
>
>As a result of these and the Booker experiments, the standard towing
>position was moved down a bit and glider pilots were briefed to release
if
>they started to get significantly too high or lost sight of the tug
>altogether. Also tug rope releases where improved to make them more
>accessible to the pilot, and there was a recommendation that all new
>gliders should be fitted with nose hooks for aerotowing.
>
>The main danger of getting too high is shortly after take off, when the
>combination is still accelerating and the glider's wings are making
more
>and more lift due the increasing airspeed. The glider pilot needs to
keep
>easing the stick forward so that the glider does not get much higher
than
>the top of the tug's tail fin. It is probably a good idea to trim well
>forward for this stage of the launch. If a tug upset does occur at this
>stage of the launch there is almost no chance of the tug pilot being
able
>to recover before hitting the deck.
>
>Derek Copeland
>

[Derek Copeland[_2_]]

I was a bit slimmer in those days, but I regularly flew Bill Dean's K18 at
Lasham, which only had a belly hook. It had also been fitted with a
castoring tail wheel, which made take offs and landings in a cross wind
quite 'interesting' as it was a taildragger. I remember that even with
the trim hard forward, you still had to push a bit to stop it climbing too
high on aerotow, as it basically wanted to do a winch launch. I agree that
the type became much easier to aerotow when fitted with a nose hook, and I
did fly the Booker ones and the one at Sandhill Farm as a visitor when so
fitted.

As an instructor, I would recommend setting the trimmer slightly too far
forward, rather than slightly too far back, for the early part of the
launch as this minimises the tendency to zoom too high. You can always
retrim when you get to a safe height.

After said aerotow accidents we were definitely instructed to aerotow in a
slightly lower position, just above the slip stream but definitely not in
it. If you are not sure where the correct position is, just move down a
bit until you feel a little bit of buffeting and then move back up a few
feet. You should definitely not be looking down at the tug. The
Australians generally use the low tow position below the wake.

Derek Copeland


At 14:15 07 September 2009, Chris Rollings wrote:
>The graphic in the BGA Instructors Manual was based on the photos
mentioned
>(as was an Australian Safety Poster from around that time). The Ka18
>isn't particularly prone to the accident, it's just that the small
>number imported into the UK all only had C of G Hooks, no nose hooks,
but
>were quite often aerotowed with low experience pilots. The problem can
>arise with anything aerotowed on a C of G Hook. When we bought two used
>Ka18's from Dunstable at around that time we did not allow them on site
>until nose-hooks were fitted.
>
>There were never as many as three or four such fatals in one year in the
>UK, but a year with two such accidents was enought to start us on the
>tests described, as Booker was the busiest aerotow operation in the UK
at
>that time and I wanted to try to ensure we never had one.
>
>The standard towing position was not moved down, it remained unchanged.
>To go to a lower towing position (or worse still to trasit to
"low-tow")
>would put the glider close to, or in, the turbulent prop wash and wake
of
>the tow-plane, and getting bounced around by that is one of the possible
>causes of the momentary, inadvertant, pitch-up that can cause the
>accident.
>
>As in almost all phases of flight the glider should be trimmed for as
>close to zero forward or back pressure on the stick as can be pre-set.
>Having to hold a substantial back-pressure on the stick would be
>un-helpful.
>
>In the last sentance delete the word "almost".
>
>
>At 11:00 07 September 2009, Derek Copeland wrote:
>>At 20:10 06 September 2009, OregonGliderPilot wrote:
>>>
>>>GARY BOGGS;705095 Wrote:
>>>> Are any of the pictures still around? I would love to see them.
>I'm
>>>> sure others would too.
>>>>
>>>> Gary Boggs
>>>
>>>I think they were posted on the BGA website once?
>>>
>>>OGP
>>>
>>I have looked in the BGA website, but can't find these photos. If you
>>have access to the BGA Instructors Manual there is a graphic in Section
>17
>>which shows the sequence of events. It shows that if the glider gets
too
>>high and kites on a belly hook, the tug can be pulled into a stalled
and
>>near vertically downwards attitude within 3 seconds! There is a note
>>saying that it takes at least 800 feet to recover from this!
>>
>>At about the time I started gliding in the early 1980s, I remember
there
>>were three or four such accidents to tugs in one year in the UK, all
>>unfortunately fatal. Also from memory I think most of them involved
K18s
>>fitted only with belly hooks. This type is particularly prone to kite.
>>
>>As a result of these and the Booker experiments, the standard towing
>>position was moved down a bit and glider pilots were briefed to release
>if
>>they started to get significantly too high or lost sight of the tug
>>altogether. Also tug rope releases where improved to make them more
>>accessible to the pilot, and there was a recommendation that all new
>>gliders should be fitted with nose hooks for aerotowing.
>>
>>The main danger of getting too high is shortly after take off, when the
>>combination is still accelerating and the glider's wings are making
>more
>>and more lift due the increasing airspeed. The glider pilot needs to
>keep
>>easing the stick forward so that the glider does not get much higher
>than
>>the top of the tug's tail fin. It is probably a good idea to trim well
>>forward for this stage of the launch. If a tug upset does occur at this
>>stage of the launch there is almost no chance of the tug pilot being
>able
>>to recover before hitting the deck.
>>
>>Derek Copeland
>>
>

[Colin Wray]

It was a Ka6 (also with CofG hook only) that was involved in the death
of the Dunstable tow pilot, and a Ka6 which nearly killed me around
the same time.

No kiting was involved in my case, the glider pilot gradually got too
high, which I was well aware of, and then increased speed in an
attempt to find the tow plane. With the tension removed from the rope
I assumed he had sorted it out (this is a BIG mistake), and when he
gave up and slowed down, the jerk on the rope snapped the tug 90 deg
nose down in a fraction of a second.

It took 400 ft to recover, which was below hedge height.

Chris Rollings > wrote:

>The graphic in the BGA Instructors Manual was based on the photos mentioned
>(as was an Australian Safety Poster from around that time). The Ka18
>isn't particularly prone to the accident, it's just that the small
>number imported into the UK all only had C of G Hooks, no nose hooks, but
>were quite often aerotowed with low experience pilots. The problem can
>arise with anything aerotowed on a C of G Hook. When we bought two used
>Ka18's from Dunstable at around that time we did not allow them on site
>until nose-hooks were fitted.
>
>There were never as many as three or four such fatals in one year in the
>UK, but a year with two such accidents was enought to start us on the
>tests described, as Booker was the busiest aerotow operation in the UK at
>that time and I wanted to try to ensure we never had one.
>
>The standard towing position was not moved down, it remained unchanged.
>To go to a lower towing position (or worse still to trasit to "low-tow")
>would put the glider close to, or in, the turbulent prop wash and wake of
>the tow-plane, and getting bounced around by that is one of the possible
>causes of the momentary, inadvertant, pitch-up that can cause the
>accident.
>
>As in almost all phases of flight the glider should be trimmed for as
>close to zero forward or back pressure on the stick as can be pre-set.
>Having to hold a substantial back-pressure on the stick would be
>un-helpful.
>
>In the last sentance delete the word "almost".
>
>
>At 11:00 07 September 2009, Derek Copeland wrote:
>>At 20:10 06 September 2009, OregonGliderPilot wrote:
>>>
>>>GARY BOGGS;705095 Wrote:
>>>> Are any of the pictures still around? I would love to see them.
>I'm
>>>> sure others would too.
>>>>
>>>> Gary Boggs
>>>
>>>I think they were posted on the BGA website once?
>>>
>>>OGP
>>>
>>I have looked in the BGA website, but can't find these photos. If you
>>have access to the BGA Instructors Manual there is a graphic in Section
>17
>>which shows the sequence of events. It shows that if the glider gets too
>>high and kites on a belly hook, the tug can be pulled into a stalled and
>>near vertically downwards attitude within 3 seconds! There is a note
>>saying that it takes at least 800 feet to recover from this!
>>
>>At about the time I started gliding in the early 1980s, I remember there
>>were three or four such accidents to tugs in one year in the UK, all
>>unfortunately fatal. Also from memory I think most of them involved K18s
>>fitted only with belly hooks. This type is particularly prone to kite.
>>
>>As a result of these and the Booker experiments, the standard towing
>>position was moved down a bit and glider pilots were briefed to release
>if
>>they started to get significantly too high or lost sight of the tug
>>altogether. Also tug rope releases where improved to make them more
>>accessible to the pilot, and there was a recommendation that all new
>>gliders should be fitted with nose hooks for aerotowing.
>>
>>The main danger of getting too high is shortly after take off, when the
>>combination is still accelerating and the glider's wings are making
>more
>>and more lift due the increasing airspeed. The glider pilot needs to
>keep
>>easing the stick forward so that the glider does not get much higher
>than
>>the top of the tug's tail fin. It is probably a good idea to trim well
>>forward for this stage of the launch. If a tug upset does occur at this
>>stage of the launch there is almost no chance of the tug pilot being
>able
>>to recover before hitting the deck.
>>
>>Derek Copeland
>>

[Tuno]

> Sorry about the lawyer comment. *I hope it's not true.

Gary, I too hope it's not true about the lawyers. But if it is, and I
suspect it is, you have nothing to apologize for. Your reporting on
this tragedy has been both restrained and informative. Anyone who
complains should be embarrassed to use their real name!

Oh, wait ...

-ted/2NO

[Derek Copeland[_2_]]

I once *almost* caused a tug upset flying an Olympia 463, also only fitted
with a belly hook. Aerotowing towards the ridge at Talgarth, the glider
was suddenly pushed up by either thermal or ridge lift. The glider
continued to go up relative to the tug even though by now I had the stick
hard forward against the stop. This was after the accidents mentioned
below, so I realised what was happening and released immediately. As it
happened, the piece of knotted twine that Talgarth used as a weak link at
the time also broke at the same moment, so we lost a pair of Tost rings.
If found, please return to the club!

Having checked that the Pawnee tug was still flying and in one piece, I
was able to get onto the ridge and soared for several hours. I apologised
to the tuggie afterwards, but he said that I had acted correctly and not
caused him any real problems. I did get a ticking off for losing the Tost
rings though!

Derek Copeland


At 23:46 08 September 2009, Colin Wray wrote:
>
>It was a Ka6 (also with CofG hook only) that was involved in the death
>of the Dunstable tow pilot, and a Ka6 which nearly killed me around
>the same time.
>
>No kiting was involved in my case, the glider pilot gradually got too
>high, which I was well aware of, and then increased speed in an
>attempt to find the tow plane. With the tension removed from the rope
>I assumed he had sorted it out (this is a BIG mistake), and when he
>gave up and slowed down, the jerk on the rope snapped the tug 90 deg
>nose down in a fraction of a second.
>
>It took 400 ft to recover, which was below hedge height.
>
>Chris Rollings wrote:
>
>>The graphic in the BGA Instructors Manual was based on the photos
>mentioned
>>(as was an Australian Safety Poster from around that time). The Ka18
>>isn't particularly prone to the accident, it's just that the small
>>number imported into the UK all only had C of G Hooks, no nose hooks,
but
>>were quite often aerotowed with low experience pilots. The problem can
>>arise with anything aerotowed on a C of G Hook. When we bought two
used
>>Ka18's from Dunstable at around that time we did not allow them on
site
>>until nose-hooks were fitted.
>>
>>There were never as many as three or four such fatals in one year in
the
>>UK, but a year with two such accidents was enought to start us on the
>>tests described, as Booker was the busiest aerotow operation in the UK
at
>>that time and I wanted to try to ensure we never had one.
>>
>>The standard towing position was not moved down, it remained unchanged.

>>To go to a lower towing position (or worse still to trasit to
"low-tow")
>>would put the glider close to, or in, the turbulent prop wash and wake
of
>>the tow-plane, and getting bounced around by that is one of the
possible
>>causes of the momentary, inadvertant, pitch-up that can cause the
>>accident.
>>
>>As in almost all phases of flight the glider should be trimmed for as
>>close to zero forward or back pressure on the stick as can be pre-set.
>>Having to hold a substantial back-pressure on the stick would be
>>un-helpful.
>>
>>In the last sentance delete the word "almost".
>>
>>
>>At 11:00 07 September 2009, Derek Copeland wrote:
>>>At 20:10 06 September 2009, OregonGliderPilot wrote:
>>>>
>>>>GARY BOGGS;705095 Wrote:
>>>>> Are any of the pictures still around? I would love to see them.
>>I'm
>>>>> sure others would too.
>>>>>
>>>>> Gary Boggs
>>>>
>>>>I think they were posted on the BGA website once?
>>>>
>>>>OGP
>>>>
>>>I have looked in the BGA website, but can't find these photos. If you
>>>have access to the BGA Instructors Manual there is a graphic in
Section
>>17
>>>which shows the sequence of events. It shows that if the glider gets
too
>>>high and kites on a belly hook, the tug can be pulled into a stalled
and
>>>near vertically downwards attitude within 3 seconds! There is a note
>>>saying that it takes at least 800 feet to recover from this!
>>>
>>>At about the time I started gliding in the early 1980s, I remember
there
>>>were three or four such accidents to tugs in one year in the UK, all
>>>unfortunately fatal. Also from memory I think most of them involved
K18s
>>>fitted only with belly hooks. This type is particularly prone to kite.
>>>
>>>As a result of these and the Booker experiments, the standard towing
>>>position was moved down a bit and glider pilots were briefed to
release
>>if
>>>they started to get significantly too high or lost sight of the tug
>>>altogether. Also tug rope releases where improved to make them more
>>>accessible to the pilot, and there was a recommendation that all new
>>>gliders should be fitted with nose hooks for aerotowing.
>>>
>>>The main danger of getting too high is shortly after take off, when
the
>>>combination is still accelerating and the glider's wings are making
>>more
>>>and more lift due the increasing airspeed. The glider pilot needs to
>>keep
>>>easing the stick forward so that the glider does not get much higher
>>than
>>>the top of the tug's tail fin. It is probably a good idea to trim
well
>>>forward for this stage of the launch. If a tug upset does occur at
this
>>>stage of the launch there is almost no chance of the tug pilot being
>>able
>>>to recover before hitting the deck.
>>>
>>>Derek Copeland
>>>
>

[sisu1a]

> I once *almost* caused a tug upset flying an Olympia 463, also only fitted
> with a belly hook. Aerotowing towards the ridge at Talgarth, the glider
> was suddenly pushed up by either thermal or ridge lift. The glider
> continued to go up relative to the tug even though by now I had the stick
> hard forward against the stop. This was after the accidents mentioned
> below, so I realised what was happening and released immediately. As it
> happened, the piece of knotted twine that Talgarth used as a weak link at
> the time also broke at the same moment, so we lost a pair of Tost rings.
> If found, please return to the club!

How does that work, was the towplane not in the same thermal or ridge
lift?

-Paul

[Derek Copeland[_2_]]

Well it definitely happened. Maybe the little lightweight Oly was more
affected by the lift than the Pawnee. The point is that once you get high
on a belly hook aerotow, you may get to a point of no return. I should
also mention that this was the only occasion when this has happened to me,
despite the fact that most of my gliders have been belly hook only.

Derek Copeland

At 13:44 10 September 2009, sisu1a wrote:
>> I once *almost* caused a tug upset flying an Olympia 463, also only
>fitted
>> with a belly hook. Aerotowing towards the ridge at Talgarth, the
glider
>> was suddenly pushed up by either thermal or ridge lift. The glider
>> continued to go up relative to the tug even though by now I had the
>stick
>> hard forward against the stop. This was after the accidents mentioned
>> below, so I realised what was happening and released immediately. As
it
>> happened, the piece of knotted twine that Talgarth used as a weak link
>at
>> the time also broke at the same moment, so we lost a pair of Tost
rings.
>> If found, please return to the club!
>
>How does that work, was the towplane not in the same thermal or ridge
>lift?
>
>-Paul
>

[Bruce]

Derek Copeland wrote:
> Well it definitely happened. Maybe the little lightweight Oly was more
> affected by the lift than the Pawnee. The point is that once you get high
> on a belly hook aerotow, you may get to a point of no return. I should
> also mention that this was the only occasion when this has happened to me,
> despite the fact that most of my gliders have been belly hook only.
>
> Derek Copeland
>
> At 13:44 10 September 2009, sisu1a wrote:
>>> I once *almost* caused a tug upset flying an Olympia 463, also only
>> fitted
>>> with a belly hook. Aerotowing towards the ridge at Talgarth, the
> glider
>>> was suddenly pushed up by either thermal or ridge lift. The glider
>>> continued to go up relative to the tug even though by now I had the
>> stick
>>> hard forward against the stop. This was after the accidents mentioned
>>> below, so I realised what was happening and released immediately. As
> it
>>> happened, the piece of knotted twine that Talgarth used as a weak link
>> at
>>> the time also broke at the same moment, so we lost a pair of Tost
> rings.
>>> If found, please return to the club!
>> How does that work, was the towplane not in the same thermal or ridge
>> lift?
>>
>> -Paul
>>
Glider has completely different response to vertical air mass movement.
The tug has much higher inertia compared to the glider and wing loading
is also much lower - that's why they thermal better than Pawnees.
Consequently when transiting thermals and down drafts the tug moves, but
typically less than a lightly loaded vintage - high wing loading glass
is less affected.

[Colin Wray]

Bruce > wrote:

>Derek Copeland wrote:
>> Well it definitely happened. Maybe the little lightweight Oly was more
>> affected by the lift than the Pawnee. The point is that once you get high
>> on a belly hook aerotow, you may get to a point of no return. I should
>> also mention that this was the only occasion when this has happened to me,
>> despite the fact that most of my gliders have been belly hook only.
>>
>> Derek Copeland
>>
>> At 13:44 10 September 2009, sisu1a wrote:
>>>> I once *almost* caused a tug upset flying an Olympia 463, also only
>>> fitted
>>>> with a belly hook. Aerotowing towards the ridge at Talgarth, the
>> glider
>>>> was suddenly pushed up by either thermal or ridge lift. The glider
>>>> continued to go up relative to the tug even though by now I had the
>>> stick
>>>> hard forward against the stop. This was after the accidents mentioned
>>>> below, so I realised what was happening and released immediately. As
>> it
>>>> happened, the piece of knotted twine that Talgarth used as a weak link
>>> at
>>>> the time also broke at the same moment, so we lost a pair of Tost
>> rings.
>>>> If found, please return to the club!
>>> How does that work, was the towplane not in the same thermal or ridge
>>> lift?
>>>
>>> -Paul
>>>
>Glider has completely different response to vertical air mass movement.
>The tug has much higher inertia compared to the glider and wing loading
>is also much lower - that's why they thermal better than Pawnees.
>Consequently when transiting thermals and down drafts the tug moves, but
>typically less than a lightly loaded vintage - high wing loading glass
>is less affected.

The tug also leaves the thermal before the glider.

I forgot to mention that in my upset event, the pitch down was so
rapid that the whole contents of the luggage space behind the rear
seat of the PA18 was dumped on my head. Sundry spare ropes etc.

[Chris Reed[_2_]]

sisu1a wrote:
> How does that work, was the towplane not in the same thermal or ridge
> lift?
>
> -Paul

Many UK thermals where I fly are narrow and sharp-edged. A couple of
weeks ago I was hurled up *way* above the tug (I needed to pitch the
nose down maybe 30 degrees to maintain it in sight), and was about to
release when it all started to come back together and I regained
attitude control in relation to the tug. This was only at around 200ft,
probably aggravated by the effect of some building immediately upwind.

I discussed this afterwards with the tug pilot, who is a former senior
examiner and very experienced. He said he was happy at all times, as I'd
immediately put the nose down and had enough slack in the rope not to be
pulling up the tug's tail. He told me the critical matter was whether
the glider pilot still has pitch control - if not, as described by
Derek, you have seconds or less to pull the release before the tug loses
control.

[Ramy]

On Sep 10, 1:23*pm, Chris Reed > wrote:
> sisu1a wrote:
> > How does that work, was the towplane not in the same thermal or ridge
> > lift?
>
> > -Paul
>
> Many UK thermals where I fly are narrow and sharp-edged. A couple of
> weeks ago I was hurled up *way* above the tug (I needed to pitch the
> nose down maybe 30 degrees to maintain it in sight), and was about to
> release when it all started to come back together and I regained
> attitude control in relation to the tug. This was only at around 200ft,
> probably aggravated by the effect of some building immediately upwind.
>
> I discussed this afterwards with the tug pilot, who is a former senior
> examiner and very experienced. He said he was happy at all times, as I'd
> immediately put the nose down and had enough slack in the rope not to be
> pulling up the tug's tail. He told me the critical matter was whether
> the glider pilot still has pitch control - if not, as described by
> Derek, you have seconds or less to pull the release before the tug loses
> control.

I must add that this is a great discussion, and I wish it had higher
audience then RAS readers. Whether this is the cause of the Oregon
fatality or not, it is very informative. I don't think many pilots are
aware that with a CG hook, you may not be able to correct an upset. I
flew many years with a CG hook believing that the only risk is the
reduced lateral control during the begining of the takeoff run. This
discussion will certainly make me a safer pilot.

Ramy

[Andy[_1_]]

On Sep 10, 2:21*pm, Ramy > wrote:

>I flew many years with a CG hook believing that the only risk is the
> reduced lateral control during the begining of the takeoff run. This
> discussion will certainly make me a safer pilot.

If you really believe that you MUST release immediately if you lose
sight of the tug then the reason it happened should not matter.

What is far more dangerous than flying with a CG hook is the
combination of a glider that has insufficient forward trim, an
inexperienced solo pilot, and a tug hook known not to release under
load. Yet this situation exists at many US sites that operate the 2-33
and have the non inverted (hook opens upwards) Schweizer hook
installation on the tug. The combination has killed more than one tug
pilot and will probably take a few more.

Andy

[Gary Boggs]

> *The combination has killed more than one tug
> pilot and will probably take a few more.
>
> Andy

This thought has been haunting me for quite a while now. It seems to
me that we need to change the way we train our glider pilots AND our
tow pilots. I think tow pilots need to start regularly practicing
pulling the release when the glider gets too high. If he has never
practiced this maneuver, which 99.9% of tow pilots haven't, they will
never do it in an actual tow going bad! From the accounts here, both
pilots have very little time to react, and if either pilot hesitates,
it might be another fatality. Glider pilots regularly practice rope
breaks so that our reactions are correct and rapid. I’m going to
start retraining all my tug drivers to give the glider pilot the rope
if he gets too high and our glider pilots to just pull the release
when he gets too high instead of attempting recovery.

I have emailed Oregon Glider Pilot and asked him who he is but he’s
not telling. How about it OGP, who are you?

[bildan]

On Sep 11, 7:38*am, GARY BOGGS > wrote:
> > *The combination has killed more than one tug
> > pilot and will probably take a few more.
>
> > Andy
>
> This thought has been haunting me for quite a while now. *It seems to
> me that we need to change the way we train our glider pilots AND our
> tow pilots. *I think tow pilots need to start regularly practicing
> pulling the release when the glider gets too high. *If he has never
> practiced this maneuver, which 99.9% of tow pilots haven't, they will
> never do it in an actual tow going bad! *From the accounts here, both
> pilots have very little time to react, and if either pilot hesitates,
> it might be another fatality. *Glider pilots regularly practice rope
> breaks so that our reactions are correct and rapid. *I’m going to
> start retraining all my tug drivers to give the glider pilot the rope
> if he gets too high and our glider pilots to just pull the release
> when he gets too high instead of attempting recovery.
>
> I have emailed Oregon Glider Pilot and asked him who he is but he’s
> not telling. *How about it OGP, who are you?

Additional training would be good. I also suggest some tests of the
tug release on the ground with strong upward rope tension. I can
imagine a setup with the tug secured to the ground with a pulley block
rigged to a hangar roof beam allowing controlled tension and angle.

I think you'll find even the inverted Schweizer release may not
operate easily.

[Colin Wray]

bildan > wrote:

>On Sep 11, 7:38*am, GARY BOGGS > wrote:
>> > *The combination has killed more than one tug
>> > pilot and will probably take a few more.
>>
>> > Andy
>>
>> This thought has been haunting me for quite a while now. *It seems to
>> me that we need to change the way we train our glider pilots AND our
>> tow pilots. *I think tow pilots need to start regularly practicing
>> pulling the release when the glider gets too high. *If he has never
>> practiced this maneuver, which 99.9% of tow pilots haven't, they will
>> never do it in an actual tow going bad! *From the accounts here, both
>> pilots have very little time to react, and if either pilot hesitates,
>> it might be another fatality. *Glider pilots regularly practice rope
>> breaks so that our reactions are correct and rapid. *I’m going to
>> start retraining all my tug drivers to give the glider pilot the rope
>> if he gets too high and our glider pilots to just pull the release
>> when he gets too high instead of attempting recovery.
>>
>> I have emailed Oregon Glider Pilot and asked him who he is but he’s
>> not telling. *How about it OGP, who are you?
>
>Additional training would be good. I also suggest some tests of the
>tug release on the ground with strong upward rope tension. I can
>imagine a setup with the tug secured to the ground with a pulley block
>rigged to a hangar roof beam allowing controlled tension and angle.
>
>I think you'll find even the inverted Schweizer release may not
>operate easily.

I tried exactly this test on our PA18 with US hook. I tied the rope to
a post and tried to release on full throttle - turned out it was
impossible.

On closer examination, I found the hook to have a groove where the
retaining bar rests. Once this was dressed out, the release worked
again. Well worth having a look at yours.

[Chris Rollings[_2_]]

Gary, you're right to be concerned, but bear in mind when we did some
tests in the UK we concluded that in a worst case scenario there was NO
CHANCE that either tug pilot or glider pilot would react in time, however
well trained. Prevention is better than cure in this case, DON'T AEROTOW
ON CG HOOKS. Do bear in mind that Schweizer hooks may jam under high loads
(such as those produced when a glider pitches nose up on tow) and consider
replacing/modifying them, it won't help in the very worst cases but it
may well in some of the others.

At 13:38 11 September 2009, GARY BOGGS wrote:
>> =A0The combination has killed more than one tug
>> pilot and will probably take a few more.
>>
>> Andy
>
>This thought has been haunting me for quite a while now. It seems to
>me that we need to change the way we train our glider pilots AND our
>tow pilots. I think tow pilots need to start regularly practicing
>pulling the release when the glider gets too high. If he has never
>practiced this maneuver, which 99.9% of tow pilots haven't, they will
>never do it in an actual tow going bad! From the accounts here, both
>pilots have very little time to react, and if either pilot hesitates,
>it might be another fatality. Glider pilots regularly practice rope
>breaks so that our reactions are correct and rapid. I=92m going to
>start retraining all my tug drivers to give the glider pilot the rope
>if he gets too high and our glider pilots to just pull the release
>when he gets too high instead of attempting recovery.
>
>I have emailed Oregon Glider Pilot and asked him who he is but he=92s
>not telling. How about it OGP, who are you?
>

[Ed Winchester[_2_]]

Chris Rollings wrote:
> Gary, you're right to be concerned, but bear in mind when we did some
> tests in the UK we concluded that in a worst case scenario there was NO
> CHANCE that either tug pilot or glider pilot would react in time, however
> well trained. Prevention is better than cure in this case, DON'T AEROTOW
> ON CG HOOKS. Do bear in mind that Schweizer hooks may jam under high loads
> (such as those produced when a glider pitches nose up on tow) and consider
> replacing/modifying them, it won't help in the very worst cases but it
> may well in some of the others.
>
> At 13:38 11 September 2009, GARY BOGGS wrote:
>>> =A0The combination has killed more than one tug
>>> pilot and will probably take a few more.
>>>
>>> Andy
>> This thought has been haunting me for quite a while now. It seems to
>> me that we need to change the way we train our glider pilots AND our
>> tow pilots. I think tow pilots need to start regularly practicing
>> pulling the release when the glider gets too high. If he has never
>> practiced this maneuver, which 99.9% of tow pilots haven't, they will
>> never do it in an actual tow going bad! From the accounts here, both
>> pilots have very little time to react, and if either pilot hesitates,
>> it might be another fatality. Glider pilots regularly practice rope
>> breaks so that our reactions are correct and rapid. I=92m going to
>> start retraining all my tug drivers to give the glider pilot the rope
>> if he gets too high and our glider pilots to just pull the release
>> when he gets too high instead of attempting recovery.
>>
>> I have emailed Oregon Glider Pilot and asked him who he is but he=92s
>> not telling. How about it OGP, who are you?
>>
Just out of curiosity, do the problems with releasing under high load
that are known with the Schweizer hook extend also to the Tost hook?

Ed

[sisu1a]

> Just out of curiosity, do the problems with releasing under high
load
> that are known with the Schweizer hook extend also to the Tost hook?
>
> Ed

No, Tost hooks are fine. The Polish hooks are great too. It's a real
shame the Mcfarlane replacement towhook is not able to be used on most
Schweizers & towplanes though. It has a roller bearing, hardened ways,
improved ring positioning and increased leverage. It looks much like a
Schweizer hook and mounts w/same bolt pattern, however it DOES release
under pressure. http://www.mcfarlaneaviation.com/newsletters/march2007.htm

-Paul

[Chris Rollings[_2_]]

What stops it being used, is it just the lack of STC for each type of
glider/tow-plane?

At 16:05 12 September 2009, sisu1a wrote:
> > Just out of curiosity, do the problems with releasing under high
>load
>> that are known with the Schweizer hook extend also to the Tost hook?
>>
>> Ed
>
>No, Tost hooks are fine. The Polish hooks are great too. It's a real
>shame the Mcfarlane replacement towhook is not able to be used on most
>Schweizers & towplanes though. It has a roller bearing, hardened ways,
>improved ring positioning and increased leverage. It looks much like a
>Schweizer hook and mounts w/same bolt pattern, however it DOES release
>under pressure.
http://www.mcfarlaneaviation.com/newsletters/march2007.htm
>
>-Paul
>

[sisu1a]

> What stops it being used, is it just the lack of STC for each type of
> glider/tow-plane?

Precisely, but that's a big 'just'...

-Paul

[Ian[_2_]]

On Thu, 10 Sep 2009 21:23:55 +0100, Chris Reed wrote:

> Many UK thermals where I fly are narrow and sharp-edged. A couple of
> weeks ago I was hurled up *way* above the tug (I needed to pitch the
> nose down maybe 30 degrees to maintain it in sight), and was about to
> release when it all started to come back together and I regained
> attitude control in relation to the tug. This was only at around 200ft,
> probably aggravated by the effect of some building immediately upwind.

I experienced something similar many years ago. I was flying a Std
Austria in a competition in hot summer desert conditions in Vryburg,
South Africa. When my turn came to launch, a Cessnar 180 tug pulled up in
front. Just after I gave the signal for “all out� I noticed a dusty on
the left side of the airfield. When we were rolling I noticed the dusty
moving across the airfield towards our runway. Just after the tug got
airborne it's left wing flew through the dusty. The Cessnar wing was
pushed up to a 45 deg angle. I thought the right wing would touch the
ground and that the tug would cartwheel. I was ready to release and
anticipating having to fly over a cartwheeling tug. But the tug pilot got
it under control and leveled his wings again. Then I hit the dusty - dead
centre. There was a big bump and lots of dust. Moments later, the
visibility cleared and I was way up – maybe 50 feet - above the tug. But
there was a loop in the rope and the glider was under control. The runway
sloped downhill and there was not enough length left to land ahead and
not much scope for landing downwind towards the rest of the gliders on
the grid. So I hung on, concentrating on keeping the loop in the rope,
with my hand ready to pull the release if the rope got tight. Eventually
the tug climbed to my altitude, I got back into the low tow position that
we were using, the rope went tight and we completed the launch. I landed
out that day and I never got a chance to talk to the tug pilot. I think
if he had any idea where I was he would have released me.

Ian

[Andy[_1_]]

On Sep 14, 3:18*pm, Ian > wrote:
> When we were rolling I noticed the dusty
> moving across the airfield towards our runway.

Faced with the same situation again would you chose to release?
Arizona has stong summer thermals many of which produce dust devils.
It's not uncommon to delay a launch rather than fly into the path of
one at very low altitude.

Andy

[Ian[_2_]]

On Wed, 16 Sep 2009 09:35:46 -0700, Andy wrote:

> On Sep 14, 3:18Â*pm, Ian > wrote:
>> When we were rolling I noticed the dusty moving across the airfield
>> towards our runway.
>
> Faced with the same situation again would you chose to release? Arizona
> has stong summer thermals many of which produce dust devils. It's not
> uncommon to delay a launch rather than fly into the path of one at very
> low altitude.

Hindsite is 20/20 vision.

There was a whole grid of gliders behind me anxious to get launched
during the "weather window". Aborting may have seen me launching at the
back of the grid, after the gate had opened.

I noticed the dusty after I had given the all out signal. At that stage
it was still 100's of meters away from our runway. Next time I saw it,
was in my peripheral vision and the glider was already airbone. It was
moving much faster than I would have expected and it turned out to be
much stronger.

Clearly we got that one wrong. The right time to hold the launch was
before it started. But it was a pretty freak occurence. If it happened
again I am not sure if I would call it right.

Ian