Despite the underlying "s.p.i--v--Woody" snidenesses, there's a lot of
interesting stuff going on here. (Surprisingly, I just read an
excellent fiction book about a month ago that spun a yarn about
exactly this issu--a cashiered Navy Fighter type out of Fallon
collects a group of his buddies and arranges to buy a squadron worth
of former Soviet, late-model MiGs. He also gets a Russian maintenance
guru to help run the operation and he sets up shop at Tonopah. The
plot thickens when a group of Pakistani terrorists get State Dept
approval to buy some training time, then hi-jack the MiGs and run them
into a nuclear power plant in the LA area. -- Amazing how often life
imitates art.)

Here are some of my comments:


(s.p.i.) wrote:

"Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal" wrote in message ...


The article focuses primarily on Advanced Training Systems
International (ATSI) Inc, headed by VAdm. (ret.) Larry (Hoss)
Pearson

At any rate I wouldn't think he would be the type to allow an
environment in which,"Corners will be cut because they can be--that's
human nature when you're trying to earn a buck"

You've got to expect that any out-sourcing would be subject to a lot
of contract over-sight. I wouldn't expect corner cutting would be
feasible, but there would be some economies in free enterprise
competition and the lack of all those support functions that the
military provides. Probably wouldn't need a commissary, BX, golf
course, base education office, base housing...etc.

Let's see... Former VADM + former NASA astronaut trying to make a buck and
relive the glory days... Sounds like a pretty good idea to me, and I hold
nothing against them for trying. They certainly have the credentials (and
likely the political connections) to carry it out, BUT what they offer
doesn't replace (and will never replace) the capabilities that professional
military adversary types offer now in the form of USNR VFC's and VFA's--not
to mention the surge capability that the U.S. Navy reaps when they need to
activate those VFA's during war time. Sure, they can provide FM training
and OPFOR (in fact, they have been for years).

Unfortunately we separate a lot of very capable aviators long before
they are out of utility. (And, there are, of course a lot of guys who
are simply ready to raise a family and keep flying while eliminating
the combat risk and repetitious TDYs.)

A combat ready operational type who leaves active duty at 40 years
old, can certainly still function in a high performance aircraft quite
nicely for another ten or fifteen years. And, the experienced old buck
can show a lot to the aggressive young nugget.

The article addressed your second point:
"Regardless of reasons given, someone in the armed services usually
decided the best approach was to continue performing most of the "red
air" adversary, target-towing, missile simulation and other training
activities in-house, using their own aircraft and crews. The rationale
was, "this is flying time for our crews, and we've already paid for
them and the aircraft. We might as well use them rather than pay an
outsider to provide the same services."

Thats a good rationale, but it doesn't track in the current fiscal
environment of "more combat bang per buck." Maintaining realistic
adversary operations detracts from operational crew and aircraft
numbers. Support functions like target tow and missile profiles are
certainly obvious candidates, but "red air" adversaries, dedicated
DACM opponents, etc can definitely be out-sourced (as long as
realistic standards are kept.)

But the age of outsourcing advanced tactical training and training
support services may have finally arrived--and with a vengeance.
Downsized force structures, ever-leaner budgets and a profusion of
global commitments have squeezed active-duty and reserve military air
components to exhaustion. Aircrews who were deployed to Afghanistan,
Iraq and other hot spots now return to the U.S. in need of rest and
retraining to ensure they are mission-ready for yet another
deployment. None are too enthused about going to Red Flag, Maple Flag
or some other major exercise to fly as simulated enemy adversaries or
"red air." This applies equally to both active-duty and reserve
crews...

Couldn't have said that better my self!

They STILL don't have Category IV adversary aircraft, and they are only able
to provide OPFOR and NOT adversary support.

Seems like great opportunity to exists for a venture capital
arrangement led by someone with good operational credentials (like the
guys in the article) to buy a fleet of former soviet iron and have
very realistic training at a cost-effective rate.

In the current "reserve hater" climate, their business plan/mindset: "If you
build it, they will come" is correct. The active duty Navy would love
nothing more than to cash in their Category IV USNR hardware units (and
their impending need for re-equipping) for Hoss' Category III bunch. Once
they've cornered the market, they'll be able to charge/negotiate whatever
they need to recapitalize/maintain.

I don't think this steps on the toes of Reserve ops (whether "hated"
or not). Reserves are supplements to operational forces, not training
assets.

...then our pilots can look forward to initially exploring the capabilities
of a multi-group Category IV adversary presentation when they go against
real MiG-29s.

Seems like exactly what a creative contractor could offer.

According to the Defense Science Board (in '99) real problems already
exist:
'" . . . A key element missing from even the most-demanding training
programs . . . is the notion of a dedicated opposing force that
provides realistic simulation of enemy action," the report concluded.'

This is exactly what the USAF Aggressor operation was modeled on. The
idea of a MiG-similar aircraft, flown with Soviet tactics and weapons
simulation by a cadre of folks who supplemented the flight ops with
Soviet intel analysis to really add the final dimension to dissimilar
training.

The potential is incredible for a contractor with creativity to do
this again and at considerable economy to the government.

It all boils down to how much money the Navy is willing to save versus how
much they are willing to dumb-down training.

Actually, it's a "win-win"--the cost to the operational force is
reduced and the training can get a hell of a lot better.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038