Another factor to consider was that the F6F Hellcat and Vought F4U were both
under development at the time that the Wildcat was holding the line during 1942
and the first months of '43.

It stands to reason that neither the F4F nor the F2A should have received
considerable resources to improve them in light of the fact that these better
a/c had already flown and were being readied for squadron service. The much
unheralded Hellcat wound up having a 19:1 kill ratio, which I believe was the
best among Allied fighters. The Corsair also had a kill ratio in excess of 10:1
which was even more amazing since the aircraft used during the Solomons
campaign were "birdcage" and early "-1A" models that had significant
maintenance problems that produced a relatively high "out of service rate"
until the "-1D" arrived in early 1945. This I gleaned from some of the
anectodal information published on the activities of VMF-214 and other
squadrons where missions were often flown by smaller "divisions" from multiple
squadrons and in some cases one squadron would borrow a/c from another to
complete their missions. It also would seem that there was a pretty high rate
of mission aborts due to mechanical problems. These problems probably being
caused more by the shortage of spares and mission tempo rather than any
shortfall of the mechanics who had to work with what they had. I am sure that
this was due to the lack of having enough spare aircraft as well. I would not
bet my house on it but this is the impression I am left with after reading
about the missions.

Although I could be wrong, I feel that the only reason the F4F evolved into the
FM-2 was to provide convoy coverage in the Atlantic where they operated from
Jeep carriers and there was no German fighter opposition.

Nonetheless, the F4F/FM-2 were good a/c and probably the easiest to restore and
maintain if you could find one now. (No hydraulics except the brakes).

Paul Varga