And unfortunately the Russian crew didn't study this requirement well
enough, or hadn't been trained adequately in regard to this
requirement. The Russina First Officer pointed out that the RA said
climb more than once to the Captain. The whole concept of Crew
Management Resource training was intended to teach crews to work
together better, and to keep the Captain from making the First Officer
irrelevant in an emergency.

Dima Volodin wrote in message ...
angry wrote:

I am not moved. From the above article you all can see that the media
already sets themselves to blure the facts and start inventing a story where
the controller was not guilty from any wrongdoing. The recorded
conversations between the ATC and the aicraft involved in the accident
clearly show that the controller erroneously instructed the russian pilot to
change altitude and that's exactly the cause for the accident. IT WAS HIS
FAULT, HE IS A MURDERER.

He's not, ICAO DOC. 8168 Volume 1, Part VIII:

3.2 Use of ACAS indications
...
c) in the event of an RA, pilots shall:
1) respond immediately by following the RA as indicated, unless doing so
would jeopardize the safety of the aeroplane;
2) follow the RA even if there is a conflict between the RA and an air
traffic control (ATC) instruction to manoeuvre;
3) not manoeuvre in the opposite sense to an RA.

[end quote]

Now whoever carved him up - he is.


Dima