In article ,
John Galloway wrote:

At 00:06 25 November 2005, Mark Newton wrote:
What would this thread have looked like if the BGA
had released a position paper which said that collision
warning devices were discouraged because pilots should be looking
out, and if they're not looking out the last thing
we want to do is surprise them and distract them in the high-stress
environment they get when another glider is in the
final moments of a collision course?

People die in collisions.
Nobody ever died simply by landing a glider wheel-up
on a runway but many have from approach control failures.

Oh, one more thing:

You've drawn a distinction between accidents in which people
die, and accidents in which property is damaged, in support
of a point of view which says that warning devices intended
to prevent property damage shouldn't be fitted.

Just clarify for me: Does that mean you're arguing that
accidents which result in property damage are "less unacceptable"
than accidents which result in injury or death?

Aviation safety has progressed to its present manageable levels
due to a history of participants determining that *no* accident
is acceptable, and that predictable accidents ought to be
managed before they occur. From a safety management point of
view it makes no difference whether an accident results in an
injury or not; An accident is an accident, and its risk ought
to be managed to the best of our abilities regardless.

A wheels-up landing in an aircraft which doesn't have an
undercarriage alarm is a wholly predictable accident. Why is
there this attitude that says it's ok to see it coming, yawn
about it, and do basically *nothing* to prevent it? I mean,
you can stress checklists and piloting skill as much as you
want, but we've built up a track record which says those things
DON'T WORK to prevent these accidents, while building up a
simultaneous record which says undercarriage warnings DO work.
So why resist the fitment of undercarriage warnings?

- mark