On Wed, 22 Mar 2006 22:30:00 -0800, "Peter Duniho"
wrote in
::

The onus for responsibility is on the person presenting the harm.

I agree, that's where it should be.

The FAA has granted an exception to such responsibility for the hazard
created by operations on Military Training Routes by military aircraft
in excess of 250 knots below 10,000'.

There are inherent dangers in the FAA's flawed integration of
MTRs into the National Airspace System (NAS). First is the military's
failure to appreciate that MTR operations are conducted in joint use
airspace, of which the military does not have exclusive use. From
discussions I have had with military pilots, they seem to fail to
understand that regulations require them to see-and-avoid conflicting
air traffic during MTR operations.

This leads to the second flaw in the FAA's MTR implementation: the
impossibility of spotting conflicting traffic in time to maneuver out
of the path of collision. Federal regulations restrict maximum
aircraft speed to 250 knots below 10,000 feet, but MTR operations are
conducted under a waiver at speeds nearly double that regulatory
limit. This exemption has been repeatedly demonstrated to be patently
incompatible with separating aircraft by visual means as required by
federal regulation. There is not adequate time available for a human
pilot to conduct his mission, pilot his aircraft, and comply with the
regulatory see-and-avoid mandate at such high speed.

Given this information:

http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf
An experimental scan training course conducted with military
pilots found the average time needed to conduct the operations
essential to flying the airplane was 20 seconds – 17 seconds for
the outside scan, and three seconds for the panel scan.

it is easy to see the problem; things happen too fast for humans to
reliably deconflict at such high speeds. This is evidenced in three
military/civil mid air collisions (MAC) that have occurred in
conjunction with MTR operations.

The first, a collision between a Navy A7 and a glider in 1986,
miraculously resulted in no loss of life, however the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident report
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001213X33340&key=1
erroneously failed to list as a probable cause the A7 pilot's failure
to see-and-avoid the glider that apparently had the right-of-way due
to it's being in a different Category. FAR 91.113(d)(2) mandates that
the pilot of a powered airplane shall give way to a glider and may not
pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear.

In 1993 a military A6 entering a MTR late collided with an Ag-Cat. The
NTSB report
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001211X12242&key=1 got
the probable cause right this time:

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable
cause(s) of this accident as follows:

THE INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF THE SEE-AND-AVOID CONCEPT OF
SEPARATION OF AIRCRAFT OPERATING UNDER VISUAL FLIGHT RULES THAT
PRECLUDED THE CREW OF THE A6E AND THE PILOT OF THE AGCAT FROM
RECOGNIZING A COLLISION HAZARD AND TAKING ACTIONS TO AVOID A
MIDAIR COLLISION.

The next military/civil MAC occurred in congested terminal airspace in
2000 by a flight of two F-16s without benefit of ATC clearance. The
criminal misdeeds committed by the USAF flight lead are too numerous
to mention here, but the mishap further illustrates the military's
lack of accountability for its MTR operations. The lead F-16 pilot
failed to see the Cessna 172, and lead his wingman in to a collision
with it resulting in the "disintegration" of ATP rated 172 pilot and
his aircraft; wreckage and carnage was scattered over four square
miles. It was reported that the C-172 was in steep right bank away
from the F-16 at the time of impact, but apparently the civilian pilot
did not have adequate time to successfully maneuver out of the path
the F-16 fighter. The NTSB report
http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X22313&key=1 cites
among the probably causes, the Cessna pilots failure to see-and-avoid
the high-speed military traffic.

From these military/civil MTR MACs it is evident that the hazards
caused by the FAA's integration of MTRs into the NAS are unacceptable,
and the NTSB's failure to appreciate that fact is disappointing. If
it is the military's high-speed low-level MTR operations that are
causing the hazard, it is the military upon whom sole responsibility
for deconflict ion should rest; see-and-avoid is obviously unworkable
at these closing speeds.