"Thomas Borchert" wrote in message
...
Bob,

Anyone who can't see the potential problems with this should be required
to understand the many times automation is discussed in comp.risks.


And anyone who can't see the potential benefits should be required to read
the Ueberlingen accident investigation.

So who's more right?

The first poster.

Ueberlingen is a case where the Russian crew ignored the ACAS and in
following ATC instructions did exactly the opposite of the ACAS guidance.
If it were automated, the crew would have likely disconnected the A/P to
follow the ATC instructions. You also should recognize that if the Russian
crew had done nothing, they would have been safe (assuming the DHL crew
followed their guidance.)

ACAS exists to provide a last line of defense if ATC fails to provide safe
separation. Following ATC instructions against the advice of an ACAS alert
defeats the purpose of the system. That's the reason for the wording in 14
CFR Part 91.123. If safe separation is maintained, there won't be an ACAS
alert. The current system works well.

If you were to automate it, the benefits are marginal; a bit quicker
response, a bit more accurate flying of the maneuver. But normal pilot
reactions and performance is included in the design. OTOH, the ACAS is a
complex system. When there are faults, it can result in erroneous alerts.
Responding to these alerts may be more dangerous than doing nothing. In the
real world, when these occur, they are usually fairly obvious to a crew, so
they crew ignores it and writes it up for maintenance. Add flight controls
into the system and you just added a huge level of complexity and more
opportunities for bad results.

Gerry