On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 15:25:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 14:21:30 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 04:49:37 GMT, 588 wrote in
::

Larry Dighera wrote:

An equally onerous solution would be to curtail MTR operations in the
CONUS.

No, that would be a far less satisfactory solution than converting
airspace associated with military training routes to Restricted
areas.

The more I think about such a conversion, the more appropriate I think
it would be. If Restricted airspace were created around MTRs, the
hazardous area would be fully depicted on charts. Instead of MTRs
being shown as a thin gray line, their true lateral dimensions would
be represented. Of course the chart might become so cluttered as to
be incomprehensible, but that doesn't seem to be a factor of concern
for those charged with designing airspace nor their cartographers.

OK, your homework for this week is to pick a major USAF tactical base.
You seem familiar with MacDill, but you could use Langley, Luke,
Nellis, Seymour-Johnson or similar. Now, draw up a minimum of four low
level MTRs, each a minimum of 300 miles in length. Be sure that entry
and exit points are close enough to base of origin for local
operations during a typical 90 minute flight. Have at least two of the
routes terminate on a weapons range. Consider the routes restricted
airspace. Now, how does your GA traffic go anywhere? You have
effectively created boxes that don't allow anyone else to use the
airspace.

With regard to low-level MTRs, isn't the ceiling 500' AGL to 1,500'
AGL? Why not just fly over top of the proposed MTR restricted
airspace? If that approach should happen to interfere with
navigation, then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC. I don't see the problem you apparently do.
What am I overlooking?

Isn't joint-use under VFR more practical?

Joint use of MTR airspace causes a hazard to air navigation because of
the high speeds involved. Practicality is trumped by air safety in my
mind. Is it not in yours?


Of course, military high-speed, low-level MTR operations outside the
Restricted airspace bounds would be prohibited. So if a MTR run
impaled a civil aircraft outside of R airspace, there would be no
ambiguity about who was responsible (and don't give me that
see-and-avoid weasel clause; it's absurdly unrealistic at the speeds
involved).

How much time do you have driving an airplane at 300 knots or more?
I've got about 4000 hours of tactical jet operation and never seemed
to find it too difficult to see-and-avoid other aircraft.

Would you characterize yourself as typical of the skill level attained
by the majority of military fighter pilots?

Let's also note something regarding your favorite 250 knot restriction
below 10M'. For a period of time (long ago, galaxy far, far away), I
operated an aircraft that flew final approach at typical landing
weight at 205 KIAS. That was landing configuration with gear and flaps
down. In clean configuration, 350 knots was generally the minimum
maneuverable speed. At 250 knots clean, my agile fighter suddenly
became a shuddering block of non-aerodynamic technology with little
more G available than your Cessna 172. Not practical.

Today, aircraft operate comfortably at lower speeds, but still need
operational flexibility and therefore the exemption of the 250 knot
restriction remains necessary.

I don't recall having said the exemption isn't necessary.

My objection is to the _hazard_ operating in excess of the speed limit
the National Airspace System designers chose while creating the
system. If you think the 250 knot limit below 10,000' is unwarranted,
perhaps your credentials are superior to those who designed the
system. Doubtful.

Let's do a little analysis.

VFR minimum visibility: 3 statute miles = 15,480'

250 knots: 417' per second

Time to impact at 250 knots closing: 37 seconds (3 statute miles)

These times do not take into consideration the speed of BOTH aircraft,
and more importantly, they do not allow for the time it takes to
recognize the threat, decide to maneuver out of the path, and the time
it takes for the aircraft to respond and actually finish clearing the
path.

More likely, the exemption was issued as a necessary expedient at a
time when the sky was much bigger (if you know what I mean), and there
was less oversight. Today that exemption creates a negative impact on
air safety, and the whole issue should be objectively reexamined by
qualified engineers.



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