While attending the EAA Copperstate Fly In at Casa Grande, AZ on Friday, I
had a nice chat with a gentleman from the FSDO Office at Scottsdale, AZ.

We touched on several topics related to my being a relatively new pilot
flying in Arizona in general and the Phoenix area in particular. I was
pleased to learn (in hindsight) that the FBO where I trained is well
regarded.

I then asked him what he thought of the spate of Cirrus accidents that have
been making the papers lately.

His take on it: Cirrus may indeed be headed for similar requirements as the
MU2 and the R22/R44s. I mentioned the NYC accident and he seemed pretty
confident that the chain of events leading up to that crash involved what
some here have said:
- Relatively low-time pilot
- Non local CFI unfamiliar with the area
- Tricky airspace (possibly made trickier by Wx)
- Given these three factors...a Cirrus was maybe not the best type of plane
to be in while just noodling around sight seeing.

He explained some interesting things that the FAA and the FAA Safety Team
(FAAST) are trying to accomplish:
- Get manufacturers to share information in order to quantify the types and
frequencies of common accidents/incidents.
- Get FBOs to do the same in an effort to indentify possible training gaps /
problems with rental fleets / issues pertaining to pilots who rent.
- Get more pilots actively involved with pre-emptive safety training related
to risk aversion*.
- Get the insurance industry into this mix so that they make their
premium-related decisions based on facts and not
generalizations/guesstimates. Also, the FAA would like to see insurers not
hammer specific makes or groups of pilots unless their is real proof that
higher rates are warranted and can be supported by hard numbers.

(*Apparently only about one percent of pilots regularly attend safety
seminars) I was suprised when he admitted that AOPA is "kicking our butts"
when it comes to pre-emptive safety initiatives but that "we're watching and
trying to learn and get better by observing what AOPA is doing."

I asked him if the above ideas related to data gathering would help to
quantify what pilot's are doing. His reply was yes, but while a lot of the
the data is out there and available, no one has really made a concerted
effort to collect it and break it down.

I half-jokingly said to him "You'll have to get past the prevalent pilot
mindset of: "I'm from the FAA and I'm here to help..."" He immediately came
back with "Yeah, yeah, I know..."Blah, blah, blah...We're not happy until
you're not happy..." Big Laugh

He described the number of safety issues that actually get reported as being
similar to an iceberg and that what most people hear about is only the tip.
The FAA theorizes that for every *one* incident/accident that generates
enough buzz to really "ping" the FAAs safety radar...there are roughly
**600** that do not!

He went on to add that this covers the entire gammut of safety issues from
the really low-level things like landing with a slight tailwind (no big
thing but still potentially dangerous if there were enough other
circumstances...) to the extremes like VFR into IMC, flight into known
icing, etc.

It's nice to know that the FAA may actually be somewhat forward thinking in
some areas.

Humbly submitted:

Jay Beckman
PP-ASEL
Chandler, AZ

PS...Pics from Copperstate to be posted shortly...link to follow.