A Lieberma wrote:
Dave S wrote in news:T%_uh.16106$yx6.10555
@newsread2.news.pas.earthlink.net:


Very interesting reading... and while there may be plenty of blame to
pass around, when push comes to shove, the aircraft was cleared to
depart from the proper runway, but the Pilot In Command effectively
failed to ensure that they were in fact lined up on that runway. It was
his responsibility. Regardless of any and all other contributing
factors, the FAA and the air traffic controllers weren't flying the
plane, the Pilot (and his crew) was.

Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
tragedy to advance an agenda?


While we pilots shouldn't depend on "safety nets", in my opinion, ATC is
our safety net for when we make mistakes.

The ATC folks that do catch our mistakes get very little media attention.
You can bet if that ATC controller had caught the mistake, it wouldn't
have made the comic page. Had that LEX mistake been caught at Ohare, it
may have made the third page.

Unfortunately, it does take a tragedy to get things changed.

In the LEX case, in my opinion, IF the controller was truly overworked,
that is where our safety net failed.

Allen

Before folks here reject or support the message of the original poster
you should listen to the ATC tape recording while following along on the
official transcript, then draw your own conclusions as to the sole
controller's workload during the few minutes that count.

And, consider the language in the 7110.65P (in effect on the date of the
accident). Does it mean what it says, or is it simply ATO CYA "puff."
If it means what it says, doesn't that become an impossible task for a
IFR tower/TRACON staffed with only one controller, and who is acting as
local controller, ground controller, radar controller, and data
controller?

I don't have the answer; perhaps someone here does.

Pertinant references from 7110.65P

2-1-2. DUTY PRIORITY

a. Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts
as required in this order. Good judgment shall be used in prioritizing
all other provisions of this order based on the requirements of the
situation at hand.

3-1-4. COORDINATION BETWEEN LOCAL AND GROUND CONTROLLERS

Local and ground controllers shall exchange information as necessary for
the safe and efficient use of airport runways and movement areas. This
may be accomplished via verbal means, flight progress strips, other
written information, or automation displays. As a minimum, provide
aircraft identification and applicable runway/intersection/taxiway
information as follows:

a. Ground control shall notify local control when a departing aircraft
has been taxied to a runway other than one previously designated as active.

3-1-10. OBSERVED ABNORMALITIES

When requested by a pilot or when you deem it necessary, inform an
aircraft of any observed abnormal aircraft condition.

3-1-12. VISUALLY SCANNING RUNWAYS

a. Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent
possible.

b. Ground control shall assist local control in visually scanning
runways, especially when runways are in close proximity to other
movement areas.

And, finally, do safety alerts apply only to radar operations? If so,
why is it in Chapter 2 and not Chapter 4 or 5 of the 7110.65?

2-1-6. SAFETY ALERT

Issue a safety alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is in
a position/altitude which, in your judgment, places it in unsafe
proximity to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. Once the pilot
informs you action is being taken to resolve the situation, you may
discontinue the issuance of further alerts. Do not assume that because
someone else has responsibility for the aircraft that the unsafe
situation has been observed and the safety alert issued; inform the
appropriate controller.

NOTE-
1. The issuance of a safety alert is a first priority (see para 2-1-2,
Duty Priority) once the controller observes and recognizes a situation
of unsafe aircraft proximity to terrain, obstacles, or other aircraft.
Conditions, such as workload, traffic volume, the quality/limitations of
the radar system, and the available lead time to react are factors in
determining whether it is reasonable for the controller to observe and
recognize such situations. While a controller cannot see immediately the
development of every situation where a safety alert must be issued, the
controller must remain vigilant for such situations and issue a safety
alert when the situation is recognized.

2. Recognition of situations of unsafe proximity may result from
MSAW/E-MSAW/LAAS, automatic altitude readouts, Conflict/Mode C Intruder
Alert, observations on a PAR scope, or pilot reports.

3. Once the alert is issued, it is solely the pilot’s prerogative to
determine what course of action, if any, will be taken.

a. Terrain/Obstruction Alert. Immediately issue/ initiate an alert to an
aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is at an altitude which, in your
judgment, places it in unsafe proximity to terrain/obstructions. Issue
the alert as follows:

PHRASEOLOGY-
LOW ALTITUDE ALERT (call sign),
CHECK YOUR ALTITUDE IMMEDIATELY.
THE (as appropriate) MEA/MVA/MOCA/MIA IN YOUR
AREA IS (altitude),
or if an aircraft is past the final approach fix
(nonprecision approach),
or the outer marker,
or the fix used in lieu of the outer marker (precision approach),
and, if known, issue
THE (as appropriate) MDA/DH IS (altitude).