"Chris Mark" wrote in message
...
Little item from my friend doing P-39 research:

7 P-39s escort 7 A-24s on an anti-shipping strike to Buna summer 1942.
Flying
at 9,000 feet, 3 Zeros going the opposite direction at 11,000 feet spot
them
and peel off in an attack.

In the Summer of 1942, the USAAF was still rather weak on enemy a/c
identification. The enemy a/c may or may not have been "Zeros". But in
general, IJN fighter pilots are aggressive and believe they have the
superior a/c. An attack by smaller forces on a larger one is thus
believable. There would be many unanswered questions.

Descending dogfight ensues until Zeros break off at
4,000 feet. P-39 pilots make no claims, report no losses among themselves
or
A-24s,

The report as to the integrity of the P-39's formation can be taken as true.
However, their report as to possible losses or not among the A-24s must be
cross-checked, as they probably lost sight of their charges while engaged
with the Zeros. they were unaware of the A-24s' situation whilst engaged
with the Zeros.

which they catch up to as they make their bomb runs on a convoy of one
large and four small vessels escorted by one warship which they identify
as a
destroyer.

Ship identification by USAAF pilots at this stage of the war is still weak.
Composition of enemy force should be cross-checked with A-24 pilots and if
possible a better description obtained. Often, army pilots identify smallish
enemy patrol boats as destroyers or as other types of ships, as a result.
Warship could indeed be a subchaser or a small patrol boat.


The flight home is uneventful, with no further enemy contact. They
confirm one bomb hit on the large ship, which seems to inflict no serious
damage, and six broad misses.

Damage assessment should be cross-checked with that of A-24 pilots. The A-24
pilots were probably closer to the scene, after all. Report of uneventful
rtb will be found to be in conflict with report of the sole surviving
undamaged A-24.

A-24s do not report any interception by Zeros on the way to the target and
mention no dogfight.

Not unreasonable given the account received from the P-39 pilots. They could
be expected to lose sight of the P-39s and vice-versa assuming a dogfight
enroute indeed took place.

Report attacking one 1,500 ton-class cargo ship in a
convoy of four 100-ton class coastal vessels and one subchaser escort.

At this stage of the war, USAAF pilots often overestimated and falsely
identified the the size and type of enemy combatants. Further inquiry to pin
down a description of each vessel is indicated.

AA fire
downs one A-24 during the dive. This plane releases its bomb as it spins
out
of control and crashes into the sea. No parachutes. It's bomb falls far
from
the convoy.

AA fire success suggests the presence of either an enemy combat ship of some
size (subchaser or destroyer), or AA armament aboard the "large cargo ship".
ID of all enemy ships reported should be considered tentative.

Five bombs bracket the large cargo vessel in a close pattern and
one strikes the ship amidships. This ship is left on fire, dead in the
water,
heeled over and in a sinking condition.

This report should be handled with care, as it sounds a bit overoptimistic.
P-39 report suggests a different outcome. Report of own losses by A-24s and
reasons therefor can be taken seriously.


As they recover from their dives, the
A-24s are hit by Zeros. Two are shot down immediately, crashing in flames
into
sea. Two more survive long enough to make it to the beach where they
crash
land and the crews are observed to escape into the bush. A fifth is badly
damaged but manages to make it to an emergency strip where it crash lands.
Only one returns home.

Sure contradicts the P-39 pilot reports in a big way. But the A-24 pilots'
account of own losses can be taken seriously. The fates of all seven A-24s
are accounted for in the A-24 report. Evidently the P-39 escort was not a
close escort and apparently they missed out on a lot of the action. Their
escort mission essentially failed, aas combat CAP and withdrawal support
apparently were not effected.


The next day 4 B-25s go out to bomb the convoy but find no sign of it.
Nor do
they see any debris or oil slick in the area of the A-24 attack. They
were to
have a P-39 escort but it never shows up.

Not unreasonable for an airborne rendezvous to fail in those days,
especially if the escorts and bombers did not operate from the same
airfield. Signs of sinkings often do not persist for long in areas were
there are swift currents and strong winds. Navigation is also a suspect area
for USAAF pilots while over the ocean. The B-25 pilots actually may not have
been examining the location they believed they were.


They are intercepted by 6 Zeros
which circle them, then fly parallel to them for a few minutes performing
slow
rolls before departing without making any attempt to attack. The B-25s
sweep up
the Buna coast until they spot 6 beached barges being unloaded. They bomb
and
strafe these, destroying them and the cargo offloaded onto the beach.

It would be difficult to draw any conclusions from the behavior of the enemy
a/c. Claims for damage or destruction must be cautiously evaluated,
especially in light of what is reported below. Attempt should be made to pin
down the timing of the attack.

They
report moderate AA fire, with one B-25 being holed several times and the
bombardier and co-pilot wounded. There is no fighter opposition.

Some attempt should be made to assess provenance of the AA fire. Land-based
or ship-based?


The 6 P-39s dispatched as escorts report the B-25s are not at the
rendevous
point so they proceed on a sweep of the Buna coastal area, discover
Japanese
unloading 5 barges and strafe them, leaving all burning. They also strafe
supplies stacked on the beach and tents observed under trees just inland
from
the beach, making repeated passes until expending all their ammunition.
There
is no anti-aircraft fire.

Missed rendezvous is unremarkable. Their damage claim essentially duplicates
that of the B-25s. They do not report AA opposition, however, which is a bit
surprising, given the damage reported taken by one B-25. Attempt should be
made to ascertain the timing of the attack on the barges, etc., and to
comapre that with B-25s' account. (The barges might have been "beached" as a
result of an earlier attack by the P-39s. Signs of an earlier attack might
not be visible by the time the B-25s arrived. And AA could perhaps have been
belatedly arranged, in response to an earlier P-39 attack.)

As they are departing they observe 9 Zeros
patrolling the beach at 6,000 feet but these make no aggressive moves and
maintain altitude.

Lucky for them, as they report that they had shot off all their ammo. Number
of enemy a/c reported must be treated with caution. How did the P-39 pilots
miss spotting them prior to committing to strafing runs and vice versa? Is
it possible these enemy a/c were the same spotted by the B-25s, Zeros which
closed the range but did not attack?

If you were an intelligence officer evaluating these reports, what would
you
make of them?

I'b be a bit confused, to say the least. But I'd make an attempt anyway to
compare and contrast the reports so as to come to some reasonable synthesis
of the reports.

Clearly, the pilots need more emphasis on properly effecting rendezvous as
well as on overwater navigation.

They should also be coached to take note of and possibly record any
occurrences during their mission, such as time and place of spotting or
engaging enemy a/c, time and place of bombing or strafing attacks, sources
of enemy AA, and ship identifications of all kinds.

They sould be counseled to be conservative in assessing the damage they've
inflicted on the enemy.

Doing all of this would add to their situational awareness (and of course
help the Intel officer do his job better).