TheSmokingGnu writes:

Do deny that airliners are fitted with artificial feel systems?

Some are. But feel varies significantly from one aircraft to another.
Sometimes it is simulated just because pilots expect it.

Why?

I don't know why it's true.

Also, do you feel that engine failures are such a rare occurrence that
they should be deprioritized in training and emergency procedure
(keeping in mind that vast number of reasons that an engine might fail)?

I think they should be kept in perspective. Engine failures in certain phases
of flight are serious emergencies, and since they are so easy to practice in
simulation, there's not much reason not to do so. But at the same time, they
are extremely rare in large commercial airliners, so practicing them in excess
(to the detriment of practice in other, more likely emergency scnearios) is
probably not a good idea.

In small aircraft, the engines are so unreliable that engine failures must be
practiced. Ironically, there's no really good way to practice them, since
full-motion simulators for small aircraft are rare, and it's too dangerous to
practice true engine failures in a real aircraft (setting an engine to idle
doesn't count).

Ah, but even then they would have to say that they have merely studied
the surface issues, and still yet have no direct experience.

There isn't any specific limit to the depth of study one can undertake. Both
study and experience are legitimate ways to learn; both can lead one to attain
the same goals.

Seen, noted, observed wing dihedral, question remains unanswered.

Some Airbus aircraft are designed to be unstable, under the assumption that
computers will keep them flying straight and level.

What maneuverability would be required?

That's a good question. You'd have to ask Airbus. I can't think of any high
maneuverability requirements for airliners.

Certain posters here would have
us believe that civilian jets are hardly capable of the turns they make,
let alone any kind of extreme evasion ...

They are capable of much more than is usually requested of them. This being
so, going beyond that seems illogical. But I've never seen much logic in
Airbus--after all, it's a political organization.

... why design systems that fail catastrophically?

Systems fail catastrophically when they are _not_ designed. Catastrophic
failure modes are characteristic of unanticipated exceptions in digital
systems.

Why not use a passive design that cannot fail in any kind of practical
sense, and which always returns to center?

That cannot be done with digital systems. They only fail safe in modes that
are anticipated in the design; in other modes, catastrophic failure is more
likely.

You could at least do the courtesy of leading them in the right
direction, since you consider this a service to the public.

That would not be verification.

The listing of sources is a time-honored tradition in any kind of academic or
educational capacity

Yes, and it is vastly overrated in consequence. Many incorrectly assume that
the mere presence of references somehow validates whatever uses them.

Why would anyone trust words on a page?

Exactly.

You /ARE/ familiar with the term "dichotomy", correct?

Yes. And I don't even need to look it up. Your use of the term puzzled me,
but it was part of a pattern I noticed in the entire post, so I let it slide.

See the above sources. If you have practical first-hand experience,
by all means validate your evocations with a qualifier, so that people
(again, your deserving public) may more readily distinguish between
research and anecdote.

They need to do their own research.

--
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