I found an interesting statistic the other day in researching a
presentation to a group about my book. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, one
fixed wing US aircraft was lost for 18,190 fixed wing sorties flown.
JUST ONE!! For Desert Storm, we lost 37 fixed wing aircraft on 116,000
sorties for a rate of one loss per 3135 sorties. During Rolling
Thunder, the F-105 was losing one aircraft per 65 sorties during 1966.

Good point. It also reflects several major factors effecting loss rates:
ROE, tactics and enemy capabilities. The Vietnamese capability was far
greater (largely because of ROE), and the tactics employed (essentially WW2
mentality "here we come, try and stop us") were ill-conceived. Another
factor, technological superiority, was rarely employed to maximum advantage.

In DS1 we used technology (Stealth, cruise missiles, anti-radiation,
intelligence gathering, etc.) wisely and negated much of the air defense
capability in the first missions of the war. ROE didn't prevent bombing the
airfields or attacking defensive positions as it did in Vietnam. Our
tactics better emphasized measures to insure survivability. DS2 was more
and better of the same (with virtually no air defense network to worry
about).

I suspect the venerable Thud (suitably armed with a modern weapons system
.... I bet there was room in that vast airframe for a retrofit) could have
performed admirably as a strike aircraft in the latest war. Put an F-18
system in there and ... hmmm. Similar (more?) range, similar (more?) load,
faster ingress, faster egress. Well, there'd be a down side too.
Maintainability, maneuverability (less a factor than you might think),
survivability (not sure of the relative issues there, but if we haven't
learned anything in 40 years ...).

R / John