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Old September 16th 03, 06:16 PM
Quant
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"Tom Cooper" wrote in message ...
"phil hunt" wrote in message
. ..
On 13 Sep 2003 04:51:07 -0700, Quant wrote:
(Jack White) wrote

I'm not an air force expert but it is clear from your post that
neither do you. Lets post your claims at rec.aviation.military and
watch the replies.


[I'm not an expert either, but I'll wade in nevertheless...]

The Eurofighter Typhoon will give the Saudi Armed Forces the
capability maintain air superiority over any country in the Middle
East including Israel.


Hang, on, who's saying thre Saudis are buying the Typhoon? If they
are, I haven't heard of it.


I'd like to join the opinion: even if I have heard a lots of rumors and
reports about negotiations, the deal wasn't signed yet, and there is no 100%
certainity that anything will be ordered even if something would be signed.
Norway and Greece "decided for EF-2000" too, but haven't ordered any. The
Austrians have also decided for EF-2000, but ordered some only after almost
a year of postponnement...

The Eurofighter Typhoon has the Meteor Mach4+ Ramjet Powered air to
air BVR missiles with OVER 100km range.


It will have in the future; currently Meteor is still under
development.

So? The US AIM-54 is operative for many years now and has a range of
at least 135 km.


That's a theoretical range; what's a typical engagement range, and
what's the furthest range it's been successfully fired at?


Known are following details about the combat use of the AIM-54:
- the longest shot in training ever: 212km (scored in January 1979, in Iran,
against a target drone)
- the longest shot to kill in combat: approx 140km
- average engagement ranges: between 20 and 70km
- the shorterst shot to kill in combat: 7.5km


While Israel will know the
exact characteristics of the systems Saudi Arabia and Egypt will have


Why?


Excellent question: except the Israelis would get any sensitive infos via
espionage, there is absolutely no guarantee for such statements. Quite on
the contrary: given the security regarding the EF-2000's software, the
likelyhood that anything would be revealed early is very, very low. Remember
that even if their propaganda machinery tries its best to convince us of
this, the Israelis are no "mighty supermen in everything they do"....

I don't see why SA and Egypt couldn't make modifications ot their
aircraft too, even if they don't have a large electronics industry.


Errr, one remark he doing modifications on the EF-2000 in the field will
be very problematic. As a matter of fact, the EADS did everything possible
to avoid the situation with the Tornado IDS/GR.Mks, where meanwhile even
aircraft of different units within the same air force have - in part -
completely different equipment, software etc....

The Eurofighter Typhoon has the capability to destroy F-15Is and
F-16Is before the F-15I or F-16I even knows that the Eurofighter
Typhoon is there.


This may or may not be the case. Typhoon is almost certainly a
better plane than the F-15 or F-16; it's more manouvrable, has a
better thrust-to-weight ratio, can supercruise, is partially
stealthed, and has better avionics making the pilot's job easier.
However, until it has seen combat, it's to early to say
definitievely what its capabilities are.


That's truth.

Israel is
relying upon its own early warning systems while Saudi Arabia and
Egypt will have to rely upon inferior systems, unless the US will sell
its best technology to these Arab countries


Or unless the Europeans do.


IMHO, this is the "largest" problem he the Europeans are seriously
negotiating with the Saudis for sale of advanced combat aircraft to SA - and
without a direct US involvement in the deal. This was not the case ever
since Hunters were sold to the RSAF, in the mid-1960s (even the sale of
Lightnings to RSAF and KAF was actually a US-sponsored deal, organized in
order the British to earn money so they could buy the planned F-111K - which
never materialized). For understandable reasons, the USA (and even less so
Israel) are not interested in this deal becoming a reality.

The F-22 Raptor is the only aircraft that performs better than the
Eurofighter Typhoon in an air superiority capacity.
From what I've read I don't think even the JSF is up to the
Eurofighter Typhoon's level in the air superiority role.


The JSF isn't designed to be a pure air superiority aircraft, it's,
as its name suggests, designed to be multi-role.


"Made in USA" makes nothing "automatically better" than "Made in EU" or
anywhere else. There are exceptions, of course (F-22 is one), but this
doesn't mean that one can generalize and declare the JSF a "better air
superiority fighter than the EF-2000". Nobody can know this, yet, as neither
is in active service.

The matter nobody mentioned here, however, is the fact that the Israelis are
already negotiating a purchase of 50 F-22s from 2007 or so... Consequently,
it is simply so that "both sides" are planning to continue their arms-race.
I.e. no real reasons to worry about...

Frankly, when the USA are selling 80 F-16C/D Block 60 to UAE, then there are
apparently no reasons for concern in Israel or the USA. There are such,
however, when Eurofighters could eventually be sold to SA. How comes this?

It is clear though that the Egyptian army, and maybe also the Saudi
Army pose a real threat on Israel. This is not new.


Why alway think in such a one-sided way? Isn't the Israeli military an even
larger threat to all of its neighours? From what I remember, the Arabs were
aggressors against Israel only two times: in 1948 and 1973.



Not True.
The feeling in Israel in the evening of the six days war was that "we
are doomed, the Arabs are going to win this war and our fate will be
terrible".
thoughts of a second holocaust comes to mind...

Read the facts bellow before claiming that Israel was the aggressor.

from:
http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/History/67_War.html

Israel consistently expressed a desire to negotiate with its
neighbors. In an address to the UN General Assembly on October 10,
1960, Foreign Minister Golda Meir challenged Arab leaders to meet with
Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to negotiate a peace settlement.
Nasser answered on October 15, saying that Israel was trying to
deceive world opinion, and reiterating that his country would never
recognize the Jewish State.(1)

The Arabs were equally adamant in their refusal to negotiate a
separate settlement for the refugees. As Nasser told the United Arab
Republic National Assembly March 26, 1964:

Israel and the imperialism around us, which confront us, are two
separate things. There have been attempts to separate them, in order
to break up the problems and present them in an imaginary light as if
the problem of Israel is the problem of the refugees, by the solution
of which the problem of Palestine will also be solved and no residue
of the problem will remain. The danger of Israel lies in the very
existence of Israel as it is in the present and in what she
represents.(2)

Meanwhile, Syria used the Golan Heights, which tower 3,000 feet above
the Galilee, to shell Israeli farms and villages. Syria's attacks grew
more frequent in 1965 and 1966, while Nasser's rhetoric became
increasingly bellicose: "We shall not enter Palestine with its soil
covered in sand," he said on March 8, 1965. "We shall enter it with
its soil saturated in blood."(3)

Again, a few months later, Nasser expressed the Arabs' aspiration:
"...the full restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people. In
other words, we aim at the destruction of the State of Israel. The
immediate aim: perfection of Arab military might. The national aim:
the eradication of Israel."(4)

Provocation
While Nasser continued to make speeches threatening war, Arab
terrorist attacks grew more frequent. In 1965, 35 raids were conducted
against Israel. In 1966, the number increased to 41. In just the first
four months of 1967, 37 attacks were launched.(5)

Meanwhile, Syria's attacks on Israeli kibbutzim from the Golan Heights
provoked a retaliatory strike on April 7, 1967, during which Israeli
planes shot down six Syrian MiGs. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet
Union-which had been providing military and economic aid to both Syria
and Egypt-gave Damascus information alleging a massive Israeli
military buildup in preparation for an attack. Despite Israeli
denials, Syria decided to invoke its defense treaty with Egypt.

On May 15, Israel's Independence Day, Egyptian troops began moving
into the Sinai and massing near the Israeli border. By May 18, Syrian
troops were prepared for battle along the Golan Heights.

Nasser ordered the UN Emergency Force, stationed in the Sinai since
1956, to withdraw on May 16. Without bringing the matter to the
attention of the General Assembly, as his predecessor had promised,
Secretary-General U Thant complied with the demand. After the
withdrawal of the UNEF, the Voice of the Arabs proclaimed (May 18,
1967):

As of today, there no longer exists an international emergency force
to protect Israel. We shall exercise patience no more. We shall not
complain any more to the UN about Israel. The sole method we shall
apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the
extermination of Zionist existence.(6)

An enthusiastic echo was heard May 20 from Syrian Defense Minister
Hafez Assad:

Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression,
but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the
Zionist presence in the Arab homeland. The Syrian army, with its
finger on the trigger, is united....I, as a military man, believe that
the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation.(7)

The Blockade
On May 22, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli shipping
and all ships bound for Eilat. This blockade cut off Israel's only
supply route with Asia and stopped the flow of oil from its main
supplier, Iran.

In 1956, the United States gave Israel assurances that it recognized
the Jewish State's right of access to the Straits of Tiran. In 1957,
at the UN, 17 maritime powers declared that Israel had a right to
transit the Strait. Moreover, the blockade violated the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which was adopted by the UN
Conference on the Law of the Sea on April 27, 1958.(8)

President Johnson expressed the belief that the blockade was illegal
and unsuccessfully tried to organize an international flotilla to test
it. After the war, he acknowledged the closure of the Strait of Tiran
was the casus belli (June 19, 1967):

If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than
any other it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that
the Strait of Tiran would be closed. The right of innocent maritime
passage must be preserved for all nations.(9)

Escalation
Nasser was fully aware of the pressure he was exerting to force
Israel's hand. The day after the blockade was set up, he said
defiantly: "The Jews threaten to make war. I reply: Welcome! We are
ready for war."(10)

Nasser challenged Israel to fight almost daily. "Our basic objective
will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight," he
said on May 27.(11) The following day, he added: "We will not accept
any...coexistence with Israel...Today the issue is not the
establishment of peace between the Arab states and Israel....The war
with Israel is in effect since 1948."(12)

King Hussein of Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt on May 30.
Nasser then announced:

The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the
borders of Israel...to face the challenge, while standing behind us
are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab
nation. This act will astound the world. Today they will know that the
Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived. We have
reached the stage of serious action and not declarations.(13)

President Abdur Rahman Aref of Iraq joined in the war of words: "The
existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our
opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since
1948. Our goal is clear -- to wipe Israel off the map."(14) On June 4,
Iraq joined the military alliance with Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

The Arab rhetoric was matched by the mobilization of Arab forces.
Approximately 250,000 troops (nearly half in Sinai), more than 2,000
tanks and 700 aircraft ringed Israel.(15)

By this time, Israeli forces had been on alert for three weeks. The
country could not remain fully mobilized indefinitely, nor could it
allow its sea lane through the Gulf of Aqaba to be interdicted. Israel
had no choice but preemptive action. To do this successfully, Israel
needed the element of surprise. Had it waited for an Arab invasion,
Israel would have been at a potentially catastrophic disadvantage. On
June 5, the order was given to attack Egypt.




The Israelis, on
the contrary, are more than well-known (actually "famous") for their
aggressive wars (1956, 1967, 1970, 1982 etc., etc.) and their "externals"
(1968, 1970, 1976, 1981, 1985 etc.), and are the only ones involved there
still holding areas that do not belong to them by any international
regulations (in turn giving the Arabs the reason to continue the conflict).

In total war-fighting capability the Israeli military is clearly and wastly
superior to any Arab military - even to most of them combined.

Given this alone, who is then a threat for who there?

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585