all this has shown is that there is no aircraft and its weapons that are
perfect for that job.
The F 14 / aim 54 and F 18 /aim 120 combos both have weak points.
So what is to be done? Spend more money to find one that works or change
things so that the need will no longer be there.


"Tom Cooper" wrote in message
...
Kevin, you're asking valid questions, no doubt.

Well, the fact that we are not exactly looking at a likely
confrontation with a robust Soviet long range naval aviation threat,
as we were in the bad ol' days, does seem to indicate that the threat
of a long range, massed air attack against the CV's (which is what the
AIM-54 was to counter) is greatly reduced; not *gone*, but diminished
quite significantly IMO. That you don't think so would tend to beg the
question--where, and who, do you see posing this "more dangerous"
threat that supersedes the worst of what we faced in the eighties?

As first, the Soviet naval bomber threat was neither as massive nor as
robust as assessed at the time. There were far less Blinders and Backfires
at hand assigned for anti-carrier-ops than believed. Plus, their weapons
and
avonics were really "nifty".

More modern weapons - starting already with the "Moskit" (with its pretty
"dumb" quidance system), and then especially Yakhont, are far more serious
threats than any AS-4s were ever. Foremost, the capabilities of these
weapons are such that no saturation is needed any mo they are developed
to fly over or through the envelopes of the AIM-54 and Aegis system, and
their theoretical capabilities should enable them this.

The threat is also the Moskits are already in service with the Chinese
Navy. Yakhonts not yet, but this is likely to happen in the next few
years.
Especially the situation with China is such that a confrontation around
Taiwan is highly likely (as seen already several times), and far less
predictable than in the case of the "I Cold War" (against the USSR).
Besides, the main threat from the Chinese are not dozens of bombers, but
hundreds of multi-role fighters, each of which is far more flexible and
superior to the F/A-18s in anything but avionics.

And with the advent of Aegis, the need for that ever-expanding CAP has
been reduced a bit.

The experiences with Aegis from 1988 (the IranAir incident), and again the
recent experiences with the PAC-3 show that this is not the case. You
can't
go out with the Aegis cruiser and hope to shot down the potential
attackers,
but instead blast either several own fighters returning to the carrier, or
a
few airliners. The identification systems are obviously not sophisticated
enough, and the USN - especially not in its "new", "litoral" environment -
also obviously can't hope to have a situation where the Aegis can have a
free field of fire. Consequently, there is still a need for a proper
EID/VID
of the potential target - a task the ships can't do properly in every
possible situation from ranges longer than 20 (or even less) nautical
miles.
I hope you will not tell me in turn that anybody is going to risk $1
billion
warships by moving them down the threat axis in order to try anything
similar - especially because it is pretty obvious that the "new"
interceptor
on the carrier's deck can't accomplish the taks in a manner safe for it
and
its crew?

What airborne threat out there do you see that the
F/A-18 with AIM-120, supported by AWACS and the normal aerial
refueling packages, and backstopped by Aegis-equipped CG's and DDG's,
can't handle?

Threats of Su-30s armed with R-77s, Yakhonts and other advanced weapons
that
are about to enter service within the next few years, supported recce
satellites and AEW aircraft based on Israeli/US technology.

The USN is just about to introduce the 7th Generation of Aegis into
service:
you don't believe they are doing this for nothing?

Back in the days when you were looking at a realistic possibility of a
saturation attack, that would be correct; but those days are now in
the past, thank goodness.

Yes they are. Instead, in the following years a completely new generation
of
anti-shipping weapons will enter service, which will not need to saturate
the defences. The possibility of attacks with single weapons that can
penetrate the layered defences of USN carriers due to their sheer flying
performances will considerably increase.

As next, given the lack of speed and endurance, there is also the lack
of
range: the AIM-120 can't - and will for the next ten years or so also
not be
able to - intercept enemy at such ranges like the AIM-54 can.

It doesn't have to. And neither can the AIM-54 reliably operate at the
lower altitudes that the AIM-120 has proven to be quite capable of
handling.

In combat, the AIM-120 was never used at low levels, so I must wonder a
little bit what makes you so sure about it being able to handle low-flying
threats?

On the contrary, the AIM-54A (and a "downgraded" version of it) proved
capable of tackling multiple low-level threats in combat, and was also
successful in combat against low-flying cruise missiles. Certainly, these
were of the same generation like the AIM-54, nothing of the "new breed"
that
is about to enter the service, but the point remains that without a proper
replacement for the AIM-54 the USN will stand there with its hands
shortened
by two thirds, to say at least...

The result of
this is that the slower, and shorter-ranged F/A-18s, armed only with
AIM-120s, are in a danger of literaly being overrun by faster,
longer-ranged, and fighters - such like Su-30s - that carry weapons
with
a
similar (or potentially better) range to that of the AIM-120.

Those Su-30's, if they are toting external weapons viable against a
CVN, are not going to be able to seriously outpace the F/A-18's; not
to mention the fact that they will usually find the Hornets *between*
them and their target, not in a tail chase scenario.

There are multiple factors in this game: as first, the Su-30 is much
faster
and has a better acceleration than any Hornet. As second, it is far more
maneuvreable, and has proven this too. As third, it is to carry the
weapons
that can overfly the F/A-18/AIM-120 combination. As fourth, the low speed
and endurance of the F/A-18 do not ensure at all that they will always
find
themselves "between" the carrier and the Su-30s - especially not in time.

Given the fact that the pk of the AIM-54 in combat against threats of
its
time was higher than the pk of the AIM-120 in combat against the
threats
of
its time, it is doubtfull any F/A-18 would have a serious chance of
intercepting and stopping - just for example - a formation of four
such
opponents like Su-30s (regardless how far out from the carrier),
without
either coming too late on the station, or being outranged by enemy
weapons
and shot down in return, or outrun, or outmaneuvered.... or all of
this
combined.

That sounds illogical. You have to grade the AIM-54 against the
threats of the *present* time. And your entire Su-30 scenario is less
than convincing; you keep forgetting that the CVN is the center of the
likely engagement circle, the F/A-18's are in the next ring, and then,
from outside, come your vaunted Su-30's--so how the heck are they
gonna outrun, outgun, and outmaneuver those F-18's that they have to
first get *by*?

This might sound illogical only if you think that the battles of this kind
are fought in only two dimensions, not in all four. Being on station 100,
200, or even 300km out from the carrier down the threat axis does not
ensure
that the F/A-18 will be in proper place and the needed time. Quite on the
contrary: the far superior endurance of the Su-30, just for example, maxes
it flexible enough to maneuver around the threat axis - along which the
F/A-18s can be expected - and goes for the kill "from the other side"
(i.e.
several of them go along completely different routes around or away from
the
threat axis, where the F/A-18 are most likely to expect). In turn, having
only Hornets at hand narrows down the capability of the CVBG CO to
maneuver
them, and also declines his flexibility massively.

Fighting such a battle like that of defending a carrier is basically not
much more but a game of chess, where the figures shot with radar-guided
missiles. You ought to bring your platforms into a proper position, _in
time_, so to ensure that they will be in position in time to acquire the
opponent when this will maneuver through their engagement zones - which
are
usually directly ahead of such things like F/A-18s. The volume of the
Hornet's engagement zone, however, is much narrower and shorter than that
of
the F-14's, and the plane is also slower, and has shorter endurance, which
means that moving it around - especially at high speeds - will mean
spending
lots of fuel, as well as additional problems. Trying to engage diagonally,
for example, would not only shorten the engagement envelope, but also
decrease the chance of success by a considerable margin. To illustrate it
a
little bit: while the F-14 can move three or four fields in the single
move,
the F/A-18 can - at best - move two. So, you have the F-14 in the place
where you need it within a much shorter time than the F/A-18. Plus, you'll
have still enough fuel after you have moved the F-14, than this would ever
be the case with the F/A-18, and you will still have a much longer reach
with longer-ranged weapons. With other words, you'll remain flexible, and
still have time for corrections of eventual mistakes - which are
unavoidable. Due to the longer range of such weapons like the AIM-54
you'll
also be in position to intimidate the opponent. Given the short range of
the
AIM-120 and the short endurance of the F/A-18, you have no time for
correction of mistakes: you have to move them precisely and in time, or
you'll miss the interception point, and end aside or behind the enemy: in
such case, the F/A-18 will - due to its lower speed and the shorter range
of
its main armament - also have no chance to catch up with the opponent any
more, while taking AIM-120-shots at anything but an opponent closing
towards
the launching platform is cutting the range of that weapon by at least
50%.
Cutting the range of the AIM-54 by 50% mean a max confirmed engagement
range
of 100km (against a target trying to outdistance the F-14). But, in the
case
of this being done with the AIM-120, you end with barely 15km, and can be
happy if the missile reaches that distance in a test...

The second aspect (having time for corrections), comes also from the much
wider engagement envelope offered by the F-14/AIM-54 combo. The narrow
engagement envelope means that the potential targets will have it much
easier to avoid being engaged by the F/A-18/AIM-120 combination than this
would ever be the case with the F-14/AIM-54. This eases the organization
of
the attack immensely, especially to such a flexible attack platform like
Su-30 - which can make huge detours around the area where the F/A-18s can
be
expected to operate. With other words, the Su-30 needs not to go through
the
F/A-18s in order to reach the carrier: it can easily maneuver at higher
speeds around them in order to reach attack position. In fact, due to the
shorter endurance of the F/A-18 and the shorter range of the AIM-120, the
USN's CVBGs have given up their capability to control wast areas of
airspace
around them, and so the potential opponents have much more space to
maneuver
for attack.

Not to mention that the vaunted AIM-54 has, in US
service, a combat record of what...zero victories?

That's the USN's problem, not even the one of the AIM-54 or the F-14: due
to
its own ignorance and arrogance, they attempted to engage an opponent with
weapons that were known to this opponent first-hand. The Iraqis have
suffered immensely from the AIM-54 through the 1980s, consequently they
studied it very intensively, and already by 1988 - when they finally
managed
to shot down two IRIAF F-14As - they have also shown that they started
learned how to fly around the engagement envelope of the AIM-54 in order
to
bring the Tomcats inside the envelope of their weapons. They have
confirmed
this beyond any doubt in 1991, when not a single F-14 came so far to
engage
any of their fighters - not even MiG-21s - with AIM-54s. Nobody could
expect
them (the Iraqis) to be so stupid not to learn how to avoid the threat
after
eight years of fierce engagements by it, or to forget such experiences by
1999. Yet, the huge envelope of the AWG-9/AIM-54, and the need to maneuver
at very high speeds in order to avoid it made them unable to do anything
more with aircraft at hand. If they have had such stuff like Su-30s in
1999 - when the USN F-14Ds fired several AIM-54Cs at them - they could
have
first go for causing the Tomcats to spend their Phoenix missiles, then
evade
these, and then still have enough fuel to come back and engage on their
own
terms.

Do you seriously believe and expect that nobody will ever be able to learn
to do the same against an aircraft with low top speed and shorter
endurance - like F/A-18 - and the main weapon of a much shorter range than
the AIM-54 - namely the AIM-120? And this to remain so "forever"?

No, the threat is not increasing. It is still there, but nowhere
*near* the scope of the threat that the AIM-54 was intended to defend
against (unless, of course, you think that we are still facing hordes
of Tu-22's, Tu-95's, and even Tu-16's, streaming from the Kola and
bound for the carrier groups in the North Atlantic....).

As said above: my opinion is that the threat is only decreasing in numbers
(and, no: I'm obviously not talking about "hordes" of Tu-22s; there would
be
no such thing even in the case of a WWIII in the 1980s). Numbers of
countries capable of obtaining weapons that are becoming available, and
the
numbers of such weapons that could be used in a potential conflict, as
well
as the numbers of potential platforms capable of launching are decreasing.
No doubt.

_But_, given the much increased sophistication of such weapons, as well as
their far greater endurance and speed, and their actual superiority in
capability to the future "main fighter" of the USN, the threat is actually
increasing. Given the Soviet and Iraqi experiences with the use of AS-4s
and
AS-6s against Iran, I'd say that a whole wing of AS-4-armed Tu-22Ms or
AS-6-armed Tu-16s was actually less of a threat for any USN CVBG than four
S
u-30s armed with such stuff like Yakhonts.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585